Artigos de revistas sobre o tema "Balkan war, 1912-13"

The First Balkan War was by its significance and consequences a far more serious event than it was believed up until today. One of the reasons for this could be the start of the Great War which to the largest extent cast a shadow on everything that came before it. However, at conferences in London in 1912/13, decisions were made that would greatly impact the future of the Balkans and Europe as well. The liberation of the great area of European Turkey by Balkan allies came as a big surprise to European forces. The banishment of Turks from Europe further disturbed Europe, especially Austro-Hungary and Russia. The new boarders in the Balkans were supposed to reflect the power and influence of great powers in their geopolitical combinations. Austro-Hungary managed to defeat Russian influence by creating the Albanian state, which Serbia had to accept. Even such a success did not satisfy Vienna, so they embarked on diplomatic action to persuade Bulgarian representatives to attack former allies and thus break up the Balkan alliance, one of the more serious works of Russian diplomacy in the Balkans. Due to their megalomaniacal aspirations for dominance in the Balkans, Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece and thus caused the second Balkan War.

Before starting the First Balkan War, the Great Powers were not prepared for a quick victory of the young Balkan allies against an old empire, as it was until 1912 the Great Ottoman Empire. At the Ambassadors Conference in London, Austro-Hungary argued that the involvement of Shkodra City was essential to the economy of the new Albanian state. Meanwhile Russia did not open the way for solving the Shkodra problem, Russian diplomats thought how to satisfy Serbia's ambitions in Northeast Albania, respectively in Kosovo Beyond those considerations of a political character, on 8 October 1912, was the youngest member of the Balkan Alliance, the Shkodra northern neighbor, Montenegro, that rushed to launch military actions, thus opening the first campaign of the First Balkan War. The Montenegrin military assault, as its main strategic objective in this war, was precisely the occupation and annexation of the historic city of Shkodra, a city with a big economic and cultural importance for the Albanian people and territory. Received: 7 September 2020 / Accepted: 13 December 2020 / Published: 17 January 2021

Music not only affects the soul but also is a language that we express ourselves and a memory that records our experiences. As seen in the examples of Balkan history, these experiences can be migration, separation, death, and war. Balkan history can be called the history of migrations and wars. Especially the 1878 Ottoman-Russian War, the 1912-13 Balkan Wars, and the First World War caused the migrations of Turks. The recurrent waves of mass migration to mainland Turkey from the Balkans since the late 19th century continuing up to today, about 1/5 of Turkey’s population today is of Balkan origin (Kut, 1997, 42). The pain of migration, separation, suffering, and death seem to live in folk songs called ‘Rumeli Türküleri’ meaning folk songs of Rumelia that draw boundaries between Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey today. I aim to show the effects of migrations, and wars on people through the study of music. First, I will mention Balkan's historic background, and then I will analyze the lyrics of Rumelian songs together with two examples of songs from Bulgaria and Kosova and analyze the style and rhythm of selected songs. Finally, I will mention how Balkan music keeps legends alive and how it serves as a bridge of friendship between Anatolia and the Balkans today. To show this, I will analyze the folk song ‘Drama Bridge’, which is about Drama that remained within the Greek boundaries after the Balkan Wars, and which is used in the 2010 ECOC (European Capital of Culture) project in Istanbul for the immigrants in Greece and Turkey to understand each other.

Although the Balkan Wars are regarded as a defining moment in modern Greek history that led to the expansion of Greek territory, they also constitute an important chapter in the history of internal Greek politics: the Greek prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos consolidated his position as the country’s most competent politician; the Palace, at the head of the victorious Greek army, regained much of its lost prestige after the unsuccessful Greco-Turkish war of 1897; and most importantly, the old parties began to function as a united front against Venizelos. This reaction was majorly triggered by Venizelos’ handling of the country’s foreign affairs in 1912-13. The anti-Venizelists’ rhetoric against Venizelos diplomacy invested heavily in tradition and the role of the king and was a harbinger of the national schism of 1915-16.

AbstractDuring the Balkan Wars (1912–13), the mobilization of the home front became significant for the belligerent states, which initiated propaganda activities demonizing their enemies and galvanizing the emotions of their publics. This paper explores one type of such mobilization efforts from above, atrocity propaganda, through which states sought to invoke hatred and mobilize public support for war by focusing on the atrocities (mezalim) that their coreligionists had suffered at the hands of enemies. Although the term “atrocity propaganda” has been used exclusively in the context of World War I in the historiography, the practice it describes was effectively utilized during the earlier Balkan Wars. In the Ottoman Empire, both state and civil initiatives played crucial roles in the making of atrocity propaganda, which was disseminated through intense coverage in the Turkish-language press. The imagery it employed shifted with the onset of the wars, becoming increasingly shocking. Atrocity propaganda contributed to the well-known radicalization of nationalism in the late Ottoman Empire.

Abstract The author reflects on the year 1989 when she was a newly hired trainee historian at the Institute for the History of the Serbian Labor Movement in Belgrade. The topic she was assigned in the Institute was the relationship of the Serbian Social Democratic Party to the war goals of Serbia 1912–1918. As her reading and writing progressed, by 1991 what the Serbian social democrats wrote about the Balkan Wars of 1912/13 began approaching her own political views. However, their antiwar positions at the beginning of the twentieth century sounded like a real feat compared to the virtually monolithic support for the war of 1991. This is how the author’s first research left her with the bitter impression that history, the seeming magistra vitae, had really taught nobody anything given that Serbian society was falling into the same trap as some 70 years before.

The life stories of five Balkan Anglophiles emerging in the nineteenth century - two Serbs, Vladimir Jovanovic (Yovanovich) and Cedomilj Mijatovic (Chedomille Mijatovich); two Greeks, Ioannes (John) Gennadios and Eleutherios Venizelos; and one Bulgarian, Ivan Evstratiev Geshov - reflect, each in its own way, major episodes in relations between Britain and three Balkan Christian states (Serbia, the Hellenic Kingdom and Bulgaria) between the 1860s and 1920. Their education, cultural patterns, relations and models inspired by Britain are looked at, showing that they acted as intermediaries between British culture and their own and played a part in the best and worst moments in the history of mutual relations, such as the Serbian-Ottoman crisis of 1862, the Anglo-Hellenic crisis following the Dilessi murders, Bulgarian atrocities and the Eastern Crisis, unification of Bulgaria and the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885, the Balkan Wars 1912-13, the National Schism in Greece. Their biographies are therefore essential for understanding Anglo-Balkan relations in the period under study. The roles of two British Balkanophiles (a Bulgarophile, James David Bourchier, and a Hellenophile, Ronald Burrows) are looked at as well. In conclusion, a comparison of the Balkan Anglophiles is offered, and their Britain-inspired cultural and institutional legacy to their countries is shown in the form of a table.

In the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the Kingdom of Serbia wrested Old Serbia and Macedonia from Ottoman rule. The process of instituting the constitutional order and local government institutions in the liberated and annexed areas was phased: (1) the building of provisional administration on the instructions of government inspectors and the head of the Military Police Department; (2) implementation of the Decree on the Organization of the Liberated Areas of 14 December 1912; and (3) implementation of the Decree on the Organization of the Liberated Areas of 21 August 1913. Finally, under a special royal decree issued in 1913, implementation began of some sections of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbia. In late December 1913, the interior minister, Stojan M. Protic, submitted the bill on the Annexation of Old Serbia to the Kingdom of Serbia and its Administration to the Assembly along with the opinion of the State Council. The bill had, however, not been put to the vote by the time the First World War broke out, and the issue lost priority to the new wartime situation until the end of the war.

The paper, drawing primarily on archival material located in Austria, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey, examines the lifeworld of an Ottoman officer, ?erefeddin, who in the midst of the Balkan Wars (1912/13), after accepting Christianity, voluntarily joined the army of the Kingdom of Serbia. By relying on the theoretical concept of loyalty, the essay claims that loyalty towards state is not given and fixed, but rather is subject to change. It indicates in particular that ?erefeddin?s decision to join the enemy army is context-driven and thus should be imbedded in the momentary setting. It pursues to show how a person amid war is nevertheless able successfully to adjust to a new emerging context. This case should not be co understood as a typical biography, but rather as an episodic one because similar cases are noticeable in different settings worldwide as well.

Статья посвящена осмыслению взглядов русской либеральной оппозиции на балканские события 1908–1914 гг., которые, начиная с Младотурецкой революции, развивались в направлении все более острого кризиса. Проанализированы материалы политических партий и источники личного происхождения, принадлежавшие партийным лидерам. По сравнению с предшествующей историографической традицией автором впервые тесно увязаны тенденции в восприятии внешнеполитических реалий и внутриполитические интересы партий. Автор показывает, что российская либеральная оппозиция (кадеты, а позднее и перешедшие в оппозицию октябристы) в полной мере использовала те возможности, которые появились у нее в результате революции 1905–1907 гг.: парламентскую трибуну, печать, партийные форумы. В статье отмечается, что внешнеполитическая позиция ведущих либеральных партий России определялась их текущим политическим положением и партийными интересами. Младотурецкая революция 1908 г. привлекала и октябристов, и кадетов своим опытом национальной революции. Автор приходит к выводу, что Первая Балканская война 1912–1913 гг. резко усилила интерес к событиям в этом регионе, однако почва для этого интереса уже была подготовлена внешне- и внутриполитическими факторами. Война обострила внутренние противоречия в кадетской партии, приведшие к возникновению экспансионистского крыла, противостоявшего более осторожному и более информированному П.Н. Милюкову. В статье также показано, что эволюция октябристов была связана с их постепенным переходом в оппозицию. С 1912 г. А.И. Гучков начал воспринимать возможную войну с участием России как шанс на политические изменения внутри страны и возрождение октябристского влияния на правительство. Автор заключает, что к 1914 г. многие представители либеральной общественности – и октябристы, и кадеты – занимали в балканском вопросе и в вопросах внешней политики в целом более жесткую и бескомпромиссную позицию, чем российское правительство. По мнению либералов, участие Российской империи в войне лишь увеличило бы политическое влияние их партии, при этом ответственность за ее возможный неудачный исход либеральная оппозиция целиком возлагала на власть. The article is devoted to the views and opinions of the Russian liberal opposition on the Balkan events of 1908–14, which developed in the direction of an increasingly acute crisis, starting from the Young Turk Revolution. The materials of political parties and sources of personal origin belonging to party leaders are analyzed. The author closely links the trends in the perception of foreign policy realities and the domestic political interests of the parties, which is a new approach if compared to previous historiographical tradition. The author shows that the Russian liberal opposition (the Kadets, and later the Octobrists who joined the opposition) made full use of the opportunities that appeared as a result of the revolution of 1905–07: the parliamentary rostrum (the Duma), the press, and party forums. The article notes that the foreign policy position of the leading liberal parties in Russia was determined by the current political situation inside those parties and by party interests. Due to its experience of a national revolution, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 attracted both the Octobrists and the Kadets. The author concludes that the First Balkan War of 1912–13 sharply increased interest in events in the region, but that interest had already been prepared by both foreign and domestic political factors. The war intensified the internal confrontation within the Constitutional Democratic Party (the Kadets), which led to the formation of the expansionist wing that opposed more cautious and much better-informed P. Milyukov. The article shows that the evolution of the Octobrists was associated with their gradual move to the opposition. In 1912, A. Guchkov began to perceive a possible war with the participation of Russia as a chance for political changes within the country and the revival of the Octobrist influence on the government. The author concludes that by 1914 many representatives of the liberal community (both the Octobrists and the Kadets) had adopted a tougher and more uncompromising stance in the Balkan issue and in the matters of foreign policy in general than the stance of the Russian government. According to the liberals, war as such would only strengthen the position of their party, and the authorities would be made responsible for its possible unsuccessful outcome.

In the recent Greek ages the most devastating epidemics were plague, smallpox, leprosy and cholera. In 1816 plague struck the Ionian and Aegean Islands, mainland Greece, Constantinople and Smyrna. The Venetians ruling the Ionian Islands effectively combated plague in contrast to the Ottomans ruling all other regions. In 1922, plague appeared in Patras refugees who were expelled by the Turks from Smyrna and Asia Minor. Inoculation against smallpox was first performed in Thessaly by the Greek women, and the Greek doctors Emmanouel Timonis (1713, Oxford) and Jakovos Pylarinos (1715, Venice) made relevant scientific publications. The first leper colony opened in Chios Island. In Crete, Spinalonga was transformed into a leper island, which following the Independence War against Turkish occupation and the unification of Crete with Greece in 1913, was classified as an International Leper Hospital. Cholera struck Greece in 1853-1854 brought by the French troops during the Crimean War, and again during the Balkan Wars (1912-13) when the Bulgarian troops brought cholera to northern Greece. Due to successive wars, medical assistance was not always available, so desperate people turned many times to religion through processions in honor of local saints, for their salvation in epidemics.

Early twentieth-century Ottoman-Turkish architectural history discourse is subjugated by state-oriented readings, and the prescriptions of the sociopolitical ideologies of the epoch. The agency of the individual is confined within the ramifications of these programmatic concepts. In lieu of such a discourse, this article considers Rifat Osman (1874–1933) and the agency of the individual as a source for architectural historiography. Trained as a medical doctor, Rifat Osman developed an interest in the architectural heritage and everyday life of the city of Edirne, now in western Turkey. He amply recorded his observations. Exploring the motives behind this unusual interest, I argue that Rifat Osman’s experience of Edirne, in particular as he witnessed the fall of the city to Bulgarians during the Balkan Wars (1912–13), transformed his engagement with the city and its history. This rendered the traumatic imprint of war traceable in his accounts. Through concepts of antiquarian sensitivity and war-induced trauma, I question how Rifat Osman’s anxiety is transmitted to the collective memory of the city, and in return, how architectural history becomes instrumental in the recovery from trauma.

This special issue on World War I appears on the centennial of the war. The issue went to press as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was challenging the borders set nearly a hundred years ago in the Middle East by the imperial powers. Guest editor Mustafa Aksakal introduces the six research articles, part of a wave of scholarship examining the “transformative processes spawned by the war” in response to new historical questions and newly available archival sources. That half of the articles touch on sieges (in Medina) and famine (Syria/Lebanon, and in particular Beirut) produces an eerie echo at a time when civilians once again face hunger and the ravages of an armed conflict, with large numbers of refugees on the move. As we look back, so do the articles, moving backward chronologically from the “minority protection regime” established by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 to “atrocity propaganda” of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. The issues raised by these two articles resonate loudly, as does the matter of American influence in the region, which is discussed in an article on the wartime politics of Syrians in Cairo. So, too, does the photograph on the cover of this special issue: Ruins of Gaza at the Time of the Great Attack, 1917.

The article illustrates the policy of wielding the hero as a symbolic political and nationalizing instrument in the Montenegrin, Ottoman, and Serbian armies before the Balkan Wars. The heroic became an integral part of other social disciplines (such as schools). Besides standing in a clear interdependent relationship, these social disciplines represented a necessary result of various centralizing processes of the governing elites. The primary efforts for the nationalization of the population were undertaken in the pre-/post-military life, in which the role of different state agents was equally important. Hence, the grid of the social disciplines became ever denser, which led to the uniformity of the heroic. This process enabled the legitimization of the ruling elites, subsequent actions in war, and heroization among recruits. The article argues that uniformity of the heroic is lacking in the Ottoman context. Given the ideological context and intellectual background of the preachers of nationalism, the consistency of the Ottoman heroic narrative before, during, and after military service is missing. The article shows that the so-called medievalism closely linked to the heroic offered a framework for constructing continuity between the immediate and distant past, providing meaning to someone’s death. A link between the past, the present, and the future was established, which constructed the nation’s primordial character and the feeling of ancient hatred towards an imaginary enemy.

Parliamentary democracy in Serbia in the period between the May Coup of 1903 and the beginning of the First World War in 1914 was, as compellingly shown by the regular and very detailed reports of the diplomatic representatives of two exemplary democracies, Great Britain and France, functional and fully accommodated to the requirements of democratic governance. Some shortcomings, which were reflected in the influence of extra-constitutional (?irresponsible?) factors, such as the group of conspirators from 1903 or their younger wing from 1911 (the organisation Unification or Death), occasionally made Serbian democracy fragile but it nonetheless remained functional at all levels of government. A comparison with crises such as those taking place in, for example, France clearly shows that Serbia, although perceived as ?a rural democracy? and ?the poor man?s paradise?, was a constitutional and democratic state, and that it was precisely its political freedoms and liberation aspirations that made it a focal point for the rallying of South-Slavic peoples on the eve of the Great War. Had there been no firm constitutional boundaries of the parliamentary monarchy and the democratic system, Serbia would have hardly been able to cope with a series of political and economic challenges which followed one another after 1903: the Tariff War 1906-11; the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina 1908/9; the Balkan Wars 1912-13; the crisis in the summer of 1914 caused by the so-called Order of Precedence Decree, i.e. by the underlying conflict between civilian and military authorities. The Periclean age of Serbia, aired with full political freedoms and sustained cultural and scientific progress is one of the most important periods in the history of modern Serbian democracy.

As a new force on the political scene of Serbia after the 1903 Coup which brought the Karadjordjevic dynasty back to the throne and restored democratic order, the Serbian army, led by a group of conspiring officers, perceived itself as the main guardian of the country?s sovereignty and the principal executor of the sacred mission of national unification of the Serbs, a goal which had been abandoned after the 1878 Berlin Treaty. During the ?Golden Age? decade (1903-1914) in the reign of King Peter I, Serbia emerged as a point of strong attraction to the Serbs and other South Slavs in the neighbouring empires and as their potential protector. In 1912-13, Serbia demonstrated her strength by liberating the Serbs in the ?unredeemed provinces? of the Ottoman Empire. The main threat to Serbia?s very existence was multinational Austria-Hungary, which thwarted Belgrade?s aspirations at every turn. The Tariff War (1906-1911), the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908), and the coercing of Serbia to cede her territorial gains in northern Albania (1912-1913) were but episodes of this fixed policy. In 1991, the Serbian army officers, frustrated by what they considered as weak reaction from domestic political forces and the growing external challenges to Serbia?s independence, formed the secret patriotic organisation ?Unification or Death? (Black Hand). Serbian victories in the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) enhanced the prestige of the military but also boosted political ambitions of Lt.-Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijevic Apis and other founding members of the Black Hand anxious to bring about the change of government. However, the idea of a military putsch limited to Serbian Macedonia proposed in May 1914 was rejected by prominent members of the Black Hand, defunct since 1913. This was a clear indication that Apis and a few others could not find support for their meddling in politics. The government of Nikola P. Pasic, supported by the Regent, Crown Prince Alexander, called for new elections to verify its victory against those military factions that acted as an ?irresponsible factor? with ?praetorian ambitions? in Serbian politics. This trial of strength brings new and valuable insights into the controversial relationship between the Young Bosnians and the Black Hand prior to the Sarajevo assassination in June 1914.

r. Milutin Lj. Perisic, a specialist in venereal and skin diseases and a deputy medical major, was born in Kragujevac into a civilian family with a long history of contributing high-ranking officials and officers to Serbia. As the child of an officer, he frequently changed his place of residence and education, attending primary school and gymnasium in Kragujevac, Nis, and Belgrade. He then pursued his education at the Law Faculty of the Velika Skola in Belgrade, but realizing that law was not his calling, he left his position as a court clerk and embarked on medical studies in Nancy, where he studied for six years at his own expense. After obtaining a medical degree and defending his thesis on "Syphilis in Serbia," he returned to Serbia in 1901. Shortly thereafter, he was appointed as a physician for the Kosmaj district. He spent time in Paris specializing in venereal and skin diseases, and from 1905 to 1914, he served as a municipal physician in Belgrade while also running a private practice. He was the first in Serbia and this part of Europe to apply "Ehrlich's treatment" for syphilis to his patients. During the Balkan Wars of 1912/13, he served as a physician for the Danube Artillery Regiment, and at the beginning of World War I, he assumed the position of the director of the Military Hospital in Skopje. Just a few months after the death of his wife Zorka, he contracted typhus and passed away as a result of the illness. He was buried at the Serbian military cemetery in Skopje. On the occasion of the 150th anniversary of Dr. Milutin Lj. Perisic's birth, it is an opportunity to remember this distinguished yet forgotten individual from Kragujevac.

AbstractA part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, the city of Ioannina integrated into the Greek state following the Balkan wars of 1912–13. This article provides a first in-depth historical account of the city's water supply system from the early 1910s to the eve of World War II, and traces the path leading from a traditional system relying on private wells and public fountains to a modern water network entering inhabitants’ homes. In doing so, it also offers material and insights contributing to a larger research project on the technological modernization of urban Greece in the inter-war period, during which the Greek state itself was driven by a particularly strong urge to modernize the country.

The sudden explosion of interest in genocide as a topic of academic study over the past decade or so has involved academics rushing to produce “big” general theories in their efforts to have their voices heard. But more often than not, their haste has produced books that are insufficiently researched and theses that strain to be profound. In Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century, Paul Mojzes has attempted something more moderately ambitious: an overview of the Balkan genocides of the twentieth century, focusing principally on the territory of the former Yugoslavia but involving forays into other Balkan lands, including Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. This is a project that needs to be undertaken, as the mass killings of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia (the ones that, alongside the concurrent genocide in Rwanda, were responsible for the explosion in “genocide studies” in the first place) are too often analysed without a broader chronological framework. In other words, although scholars and journalists writing about the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s have frequently made reference to the prior episodes of mass killing in the region, particularly those that took place during World War II, their analytical frameworks have tended not to encompass those earlier episodes. Mojzes has attempted to break the mould, and his book analyses the mass killings of the 1940s and 1990s as well as those that occurred during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. He therefore provides an analytical overview for the English language reader that is more accessible than elsewhere. Unfortunately, the book he has produced suffers from some of the same flaws that have marred the more general studies of genocide alluded to here.

India shares excellent historical, cultural, and diplomatic contacts with the Ottomans. India’s connections with Ottoman Empire could be traced at least from the Ottoman capture of Istanbul in 1453. The Ottoman Sultans functioned as Caliph for nearly 80 million Mohammedans in India during the 19th century, revered for their control over holy places such as Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina. The Mohammedan society within India heavily sympathized with Turkiye’s cause, including support from all religious and political classes. India was the only foreign country in the world that sent a medical mission to Turkiye during the Balkan Wars (1912-13). While Indian freedom fighters significantly understood the imperial and colonial policies of the West, to which Turkiye also found itself strangled from all sides during the late and initial phases of the 19th and 20th centuries. Sharif Hussein’s family played a crucial role in igniting the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire. But he could not evoke Caliphate to attain support from Mohammedan society in the post-war era due to the fear among the Islamic community of being the puppet of the West. Moreover, the Young Turk Movement and German Kaiser (protectorate) could not supersede the supra-national identity of Islam. Still, the rise of Nationalism under the Western protectorates heavily impacted the Ottoman control of Gulf/West Asia. The First World War and subsequent agreements dismantled the Ottomans’ regional authority. The Subsequent treatment of Ottomans under the Treaty of Sevres ignited the Indian response supporting the Turkish cause. This paper seeks to outline India- Turkiye relations during the Khilafat movement 1919-1924 and possible reasons for the help of the Khilafat movement.