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Artigos de revistas sobre o assunto "1711-1776 Philosophy"
1
King, Peter, e Nathan Ballantyne. "Augustine on Testimony". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39, n.º 2 (junho de 2009): 195–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/cjp.0.0045.
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Philosophical work on testimony has flourished in recent years. Testimony roughly involves a source affirming or stating something in an attempt to transfer information to one or more persons. It is often said that the topic of testimony has been neglected throughout most of the history of philosophy, aside from contributions by David Hume (1711-1776) and Thomas Reid (1710-1796). True as this may be, Hume and Reid aren't the only ones who deserve a tip of the hat for recognizing the importance of testimony: Augustine of Hippo (354-430) affirms the place of testimony in human cognition, at least in his later writings.In what follows, we consider three questions raised by Augustine's thinking about testimony: the analytical question of what sources count as testimony (Section I); the epistemological question about the status of testimony-based belief (Section II); and the doxastic question about the circumstances in which it is appropriate to believe on the basis of testimony (Section III).
2
Craig, Edward. "David Hume". Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (março de 1986): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957042x00004041.
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David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.
3
Orsi, Cosma. "THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INCLUSION: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WORKHOUSE SYSTEM". Journal of the History of Economic Thought 39, n.º 4 (2 de outubro de 2017): 453–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1053837216000249.
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The aim of this article is to describe the rise and fall of the workhouse system in connection with the developments that took place in economic thought in the transition from mercantilism to the Classical tradition. By examining the economic debate about wages, efficiency, labor market, workers’ mobility, and unemployment, we discuss whether the social policy shift epitomized by institutional reforms like the Gilbert Act (1782), the Rose Act (1793), and the Speenhamland system (1795) was accompanied and eventually inspired by a change in the perception of major political economy issues. In doing so, we review the writings of Jacob Vanderlint (d. 1740), George Berkeley (1685–1753), Malachy Postlethwayt (1707?–1767), Josiah Tucker (1713–1799), David Hume (1711–1776), and Adam Smith (1723-1790), among others. Although a direct influence by these writers cannot be proven, the originality of the present work rests on the effort to put into perspective the arguments elaborated by economic thinkers and the proposals made by social reformers so as to identify possible connections between economic theorizing and social legislation.
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Schabas, Margaret, e Carl Wennerlind. "Retrospectives: Hume on Money, Commerce, and the Science of Economics". Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, n.º 3 (1 de agosto de 2011): 217–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.3.217.
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David Hume (1711–1776) is arguably the most esteemed philosopher to have written in the English language. During his lifetime, however, Hume was as well if not better known for his contributions to political economy, particularly for the essays published as the Political Discourses (1752). Hume left his mark on the economic thought of the physiocrats, the classical economists, and the American Federalists. Adam Smith, who met Hume circa 1750, was his closest friend and interlocutor for some 25 years. Among modern economists, Hume's essays on money and trade have informed theorists of both Keynesian and Monetarist persuasions. In this essay, we begin by discussing Hume's monetary economics, and then spell out his theory of economic development, noting his qualified enthusiasm for the modern commercial system. We end with an assessment of his views on the scientific standing of economics, specifically his counterintuitive argument that economics could be epistemologically superior to physics.
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Waldmann, Felix. "David Hume in Chicago: A Twentieth-Century Hoax". Journal of British Studies 59, n.º 4 (outubro de 2020): 793–820. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jbr.2020.127.
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AbstractThis article alleges that two letters attributed to the philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) were forged in the twentieth century. The letters were first published in 1972 and 1973 by Michael Morrisroe, an assistant professor of English in the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle, after which they became monuments of conventional scholarship on Hume's life and writings. Both letters are cited without qualification by scholars of Hume's thought in dozens of publications, including Ernest Campbell Mossner's celebrated Life of David Hume (1980), and John Robertson's entry for Hume in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (2004). This article reconstructs the history and transmission of Hume's extant letters and attempts to account for why the forgeries published by Morrisroe were accepted as genuine. It makes a systematic case against the authenticity of the letters, and focuses in particular on the question of whether Hume met the Jansenist homme de lettres Noël-Antoine Pluche (1688–1761) and had access to his library, in Reims, in 1734. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the exposé for modern editorial scholarship and intellectual history.
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Koch, Carl Henrik. "Den mangfoldige Hume". Fund og Forskning i Det Kongelige Biblioteks Samlinger 51 (18 de dezembro de 2015). http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/fof.v51i0.41277.
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The Scot David Hume (1711–1776) and Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) in Holland were two of the greatest philosophers of the European Enlightenment. Whereas Spinoza’s Bible criticism was the inspiration behind the often clandestine tradition known as radical Enlightenment, Hume tried with all his might to wrest the science of mankind from the grip of theology and religion. Since the mid 19th century Hume’s philosophy has been interpreted as either scepticism, naturalism or first and foremost criticism of religion. In my article I describe these three very different interpretations and argue that, although Hume was in a certain sense a sceptic and strongly concerned to criticize the clergy and Christianity, yet both these traits of his thought are connected with his naturalistic and secularist philosophy. The title of the article is explained in its introduction, which describes his manifold interests.
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"David Hume". Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series 20 (março de 1986): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100004045.
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David Hume (1711–1776) was born in Scotland and attended Edinburgh University. In 1734, after a brief spell in a merchant's office in Bristol, he went to France to write A Treatise of Human Nature, published anonymously in 1739 (Books I and II) and 1740 (Book III). An Abstract, also anonymous and written as if by someone other than the author of the Treatise, appeared about the same time, and provides an invaluable account, in a brief compass, of what Hume thought most important about the Treatise. The Treatise was not well received, and Hume was unsuccessful in his candidature for the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. He rewrote Book I of the Treatise, adding a controversial discussion of miracles and providence; and a revision of this was published as An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding in 1748. His Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, which was a rewriting of Book III of the Treatise, was published in 1751, and his Dissertation on the Passions, corresponding to Book II of the Treatise, but with significant omissions, such as the account of the psychological mechanism of sympathy, in 1757. In 1752 he had been made keeper of the Advocates' Library at Edinburgh, and wrote his History of England which, at the time, brought him more approbation than his philosophy. During this time, he wrote the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, published posthumously in 1779. In 1763 he became secretary to the British Embassy in Paris. He returned to London in 1766, and a year later was Undersecretary of State. In 1769 he returned to Edinburgh and worked on final editions of his writings, and on an autobiography, dated 18 April 1776, a few months before his death.
Teses / dissertações sobre o assunto "1711-1776 Philosophy"
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Cruz, Fernão de Oliveira Salles dos Santos. "As condições de possibilidade da ciência da natureza humana: crítica da metafísica e ciência do homem". Universidade de São Paulo, 2007. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-26112007-141351/.
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Desde sua primeira obra, David Hume anuncia ao leitor o projeto de constituição de uma ciência da natureza humana. O principal objetivo deste trabalho consiste em examinar os argumentos utilizados por Hume para construir as condições de possibilidade desse saber.Since his first work David Hume announces his intentions to constitute a science of human nature. The main target of this thesis is to examine the arguments used by Hume to build the conditions of possibility of this field of knowledge.
2
Rowan, Michael. "Hume, probability and induction". Title page, contents and abstract only, 1985. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phr877.pdf.
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Silva, Laila T. Correa e. 1987. "A crença na existência do mundo exterior e o ceticismo mitigado em Hume". [s.n.], 2012. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/278710.
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Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida MarquesDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: David Hume, no Tratado da Natureza Humana, livro 1, parte 4, seção 2, "Do ceticismo quanto aos sentidos", pretende explicar a causa de nossa crença na existência do mundo exterior, isto é, a crença em existências contínuas e distintas da mente e da percepção. Ele inicia a seção com a seguinte afirmação: devemos dar nosso assentimento ao princípio referente à existência dos corpos, embora não possamos ter a pretensão de sustentar a sua veracidade por meio de argumentos filosóficos (T 1.4.2.1). Mas, ao final da seção, sua postura diante da crença na existência do mundo exterior muda totalmente, como Hume mesmo diz, em T 1.4.2.56, penúltimo parágrafo: "iniciei este tema com a premissa de que deveria ter uma fé implícita em nossos sentidos, e que essa é a conclusão que extrairia da totalidade de meu raciocínio", contudo, argumenta ele, "sinto-me neste momento possuído pelo sentimento contrário", ou seja, Hume não deposita mais nenhuma confiança nos sentidos, ou antes, imaginação. Por que Hume chega a tal conclusão? Hume argumenta que essas existências contínuas e distintas são ficções da imaginação e, como tais, não merecem nosso assentimento e confiança. Essa situação embaraçosa conduz Hume a um ceticismo radical que, segundo o próprio filósofo, somente pode ser curado por meio do "descuido e desatenção". Mas, como poderíamos interpretar essa declaração de Hume? Minha proposta de interpretação defende que através do conceito humeano de ceticismo mitigado presente no Tratado, livro 1, parte 4, seção 7, "Conclusão deste livro", e na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano, seção 12, "Da filosofia acadêmica ou cética", somos capazes de compreendê-la. Nas duas obras mencionadas Hume apresenta o modo de investigação filosófica que é, para ele, o mais adequado, a saber: o método cético. Contudo, o ceticismo de Hume não é o ceticismo radical que impede toda a ação, mas sim um ceticismo mais mitigado que combina consigo uma parcela da "mistura bruta e terrena" (T 1.4.7.14), constituinte da vida comum e afazeres cotidianos
Abstract: David Hume, in the Treatise of Human Nature, book 1, part 4, section 2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses", wants to explain the cause of our belief in the existence of external world, i.e., the belief in existence continued and distinct of the mind and perception. He begins the section with the following affirmation: we might give our assentiment to the principle regarding the existence of external world, even though we cannot pretend to sustain its veracity through philosophical arguments (T 1.4.2.1). But, at the end of section, Hume's position as regards of the belief of external world changes completely, as Hume says, in T 1.4.2.56: "I begun this subject with premising, that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses, and that this wou'd be the conclusion, I shou'd draw from the whole of my reasoning", however, he says, "I feel myself at present of quite contrary sentiment", i.e., Hume didn't deposit any more trust in the senses, or first, imagination. Why Hume concluded that? Hume says that these continued and distinct existences are fictions of imagination, and in this way, don't diserve our trust and assentiment. This complicated situation brings Hume to the radical scepticism that, according to himself, can only be cured by "carelessness and in-attention". But how can we interpret Hume's declaration? My proposal is that by means of the humean concept of mitigate scepticism present in the Treatise, book 1, part 4, section 7, and in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 12, we can comprehended Hume's situation. In both books, he presented for us a way of philosophical investigation that is, for him, more adequate: the sceptical method. However, humean scepticism is not the radical one that obstructed all action, instead, more mitigated humean scepticism brings with itself one part of the "gross earthy mixture, as an ingredient" (T 1.4.7.14), that constitutes common life
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia
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Leme, Antonio Cesar da Silva 1972. "O tema da identidade pessoal no livro 1 do Tratadode Hume". [s.n.], 2013. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/279805.
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Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida MarquesDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: Esta dissertação examina o tema da identidade pessoal no Livro 1 do Tratado da natureza humana de David Hume, e a sua retomada nos textos da Sinopse e do "Apêndice". Trata-se de explicar o sentido de algumas afirmações feitas por Hume sobre esse tema. Na seção "Da Identidade Pessoal", Hume, por um lado, nega a existência da ideia do eu e, por outro, propõe uma tese sobre o eu, segundo a qual o eu é um sistema de diferentes percepções, encadeadas pelos princípios de associação de ideias. Ao retomar o tema da identidade pessoal no "Apêndice", Hume mostra-se decepcionado com sua própria explicação oferecida previamente para esse assunto no Tratado e na Sinopse. Diante dessas afirmações, o objetivo do nosso trabalho é cotejar suas afirmações iniciais sobre o tema do eu com sua reconsideração posterior a fim de tentar entender o motivo da sua insatisfação. Seguindo a hipótese proposta por Piston, defendo que Hume apresenta uma concepção do eu alternativa para as explicações de Descartes e Locke. Além disso, sugiro que Hume mantém no "Apêndice" a mesma concepção de identidade pessoal apresentada inicialmente no texto do Tratado. Para sustentar essas hipóteses, é imprescindível distinguir o objeto da crítica de Hume, o eu inventado pelos filósofos, da proposição humeana acerca sobre o eu como um sistema de percepções em fluxo constante
Abstract: This dissertation examines the theme of personal identity in Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, and its resumption in the texts of the Synopsis and the "Appendix." It intends to explain the meaning of some statements made by Hume on this topic. In the section "Personal Identity" Hume, on the one hand, denies the existence of the idea of the self and, on the other, proposes a thesis about the self, according to which the self is a system of different perceptions, linked by the principles of association of ideas. When he revisited the issue of personal identity in the "Appendix", Hume appears disappointed with his own explanation previously offered for that subject in the Treatise and in the Synopsis. Given these statements, the aim of this work is to collate Hume's initial statements on the subject of the self with his subsequent reconsideration, in order to try to understand the reason for his dissatisfaction. Following a hypothesis proposed by Piston, I argue that Hume presents a conception of the self alternative to explanations of Descartes and Locke. Furthermore, I suggest that Hume holds in the "Appendix" the same conception of personal identity presented initially in the text of the Treatise. To support these hypotheses, it is essential to distinguish the object of Hume's criticism, the self invented by philosophers, from Hume's proposition about the self as a system of perceptions in constant flux
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia
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Perinetti, Dario. "Hume, history and the science of human nature". Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=38509.
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This thesis sets out to show that a philosophical reflection on history is, in the strongest possible way, an essential feature of Hume's project of a science of human nature: a philosophical investigation of human nature, for Hume, cannot be successful independently of an understanding of the relation of human beings to their history. Hume intended to criticize traditional metaphysics by referring all knowledge to experience. But it is almost always assumed that Hume means by "experience" the result of an individual's past sense perception or personal observation. Accordingly, Hume's criticism of traditional metaphysics is taken to lead to an individualistic conception of knowledge and human nature. In this thesis I claim that this picture of Hume's "empiricism" is simply wrong. He is not a philosopher who reduces "experience" to the merely private happenings within a personal psychology. On the contrary, Hume has a wider notion of experience, one that includes not only personal observation and memory, but, fundamentally, one that includes implicit knowledge of human history. Experience, so understood, brings about what I term a historical point of view, namely, the point of view of someone who seeks to extend his experience as far as it is possible in order to acquire the capacity to produce more nuanced and impartial judgments in any given practice. It is precisely this historical point of view that enables us to depart from the individualistic perspective that we would otherwise be bound to adopt not only in epistemology but, most significantly, in politics, in social life, in religion, etc.Chapter 1 presents the historical background against which Hume elaborates his views of history's role in philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes the individualist reading of Hume by showing that he had a satisfactory account of beliefs formed via human testimony. Chapter 3 presents a view of Hume on explanation that underscores his interest in practical and informal explanations as those of history. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of Hume's notion of historical experience in relation both to his theory of perception and to his project of a "science of man."
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Oliveira, Roberto Carlos de. "Sociedade e artÃficio na teoria politica de Hume". [s.n.], 2007. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/278704.
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Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida MarquesDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: A análise de David Hume (1711-1776) vincula a epistemologia, a moral e a política de forma tal que a sociedade é apresentada como resultado da interação entre as faculdades naturais dos homens e os recursos artificiais decorrentes da reflexão. O artifício denota as invenções refletidas e voluntárias que ampliam as perspectivas da natureza humana, ou seja, os mecanismos de sociabilização do homem que promovem seu desenvolvimento social, situando-o no universo da moral e da política e adaptando seus interesses particulares ao interesse público. A essência do artifício reside na capacidade humana de dominar seus impulsos mediante a sublimação, que direciona os desejos para uma perspectiva estável de satisfação. Nesse sentido, ele amplia as possibilidades de realização do homem, além de cooperar na manutenção da sociedade. Este estudo pretende mostrar como Hume compõe uma filosofia que analisa a sociedade a partir das implicações e desdobramentos de princípios naturais e mostrar como o artifício estabelece um vínculo entre a moral e a política, entre os interesses particulares dos indivíduos e os interesses gerais da sociedade, contribuindo para o estabelecimento das instituições sociais e da autoridade
Abstract: The analysis of David Hume (1711-1776) entail the epistemology, the morals and the politics so that the society is presented like the result of interaction between the natural faculties of men and the artificial recourses current from reflexion. The artifice connotes the reflected and voluntary inventions that ampliflies the perspectives of human nature, that is, the mechanisms of sociabilization of man which promote their social development, placing them in the universe of morals and politics and adapting their particular interests to the public interest. The essence of the artifice resides in the human capability to dominate their impulses through sublimation, which directionates the desires to an estable perspective of satisfaction. In this sense, it amplifies the possibilities of man's realization, yonder to collaborate with the maintenance of society. This study intends to display how Hume composes a philosophy which analyses the society from the implications and unfoldments of natural principles and to indicate how the artifice establishes an entailment between moral and politics, between the particular interests of individuals and the general interests of society, contributing to the establishment of social instituitions and the authority
Mestrado
Ética e Política
Mestre em Filosofia
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Silva, Gilberto Cabral da. "Para além de Deus e da natureza: Elementos de filosofia trágica nos diálogos sobre a religião de David Hume". Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2005. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/2150.
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Previous issue date: 2005-08-26Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
This Work intends an epistemological approach of David Hume s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion by French philosopher Clément Rosset s category of tragic philosophy . We propose a new interpretative possibility of Hume s thought in the Dialogues, different form the naturalism and beyond the simple skepticism . The concept of tragic philosophy allows one to think the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as a work of tragic philosophy, in which the concept of nature is completely dissolved by the skeptic arguments.
Esta dissertação pretende uma abordagem epistemológica dos Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural de David Hume por meio da categoria de filosofia trágica , trabalhada pelo filósofo francês Clément Rosset. Propomos uma nova possibilidade interpretativa do pensamento de David Hume, diferente do naturalismo e além do simples ceticismo. O conceito de filosofia trágica permite pensar os Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural como uma obra de filosofia trágica, na qual é efetuada, através dos argumentos céticos, a completa dissolução do conceito de natureza .
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Lunardi, Giovani Mendonça. "Sensibilidade moral e normatividade em Hume". reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/17668.
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A filosofia moral de David Hume é interpretada, predominantemente, como representante de um ceticismo normativo ou de uma moralidade psicologizada. Tais interpretações privilegiam um determinado hábito de leitura dos textos humeanos, influenciadas pelas denominadas "teorias da razão prática", afirmando que seu sistema filosófico não contempla a estrutura de racionalidade necessária para a fundamentação da normatividade da moralidade. De forma contrária, a presente investigação sustenta que a filosofia moral humeana permite uma interpretação normativa através do exame da "dinâmica dos sentimentos" presentes na natureza humana. A normatividade da moral é estabelecida, de acordo com o filósofo escocês, a partir do conteúdo valorativo dos sentimentos naturais de "dor" e "prazer" que "sentimos" de forma imediata. No entanto, isso não implica que sua filosofia moral possa ser reduzida a um puro hedonismo, subjetivismo ou relativismo moral. Defendemos que a sensibilidade moral, segundo Hume, providencia a discriminação das ações humanas com conteúdo valorativo através da comunicação dos sentimentos (simpatia) avaliados de um ponto de vista imparcial (espectador judicioso). Essa "dinâmica dos sentimentos" é o que denominamos de normatividade como reflexividade, ou seja, a sucessiva reflexividade produz um resultado normativo. Nossa tese conclui que, na visão do filósofo escocês, o problema da normatividade da moralidade pode ser respondido a partir das seguintes perspectivas: do conteúdo valorativo de sentimentos naturais, não de valores impostos por uma razão prática; da comunicação de sentimentos entre os agentes, não da deliberação solipsista do agente moral; do ponto de vista imparcial de um espectador judicioso, não dos interesses dos agentes envolvidos; da dinâmica de sentimentos com uma sucessiva reflexividade, não da reflexão de uma "pura razão".David Hume's moral philosophy is mainly understood as a representative of a normative scepticism and also as a psychologised morality. Such conceptions privilege a reading habit of humeans texts influenced by the so called "theories of the practical reason'" stating that his philosophical system does not contemplate the rationality structure necessary for the grounds of normativity of morality. As opposed to this, the present investigation supports the idea that humean moral philosophy allows a normative interpretation by examining "dynamic of feelings" present in human nature. The normativity of moral is established, according to the Scottish philosopher, from the evaluative contents of natural feelings of "pain" and "pleasure" in which, we immediately "feel". However, that does not mean that his moral philosophy can be reduced to pure hedonism, subjectivism or moral relativism. We support the idea that moral sensibility, according to Hume, provides discrimination of worthy human actions through communication of the feelings (sympathy) evaluative from an impartial point of view (judicious spectator). Such "dynamic of feelings" is what we call normativity as reflexivity, in other words, successful reflexivity producing normative outcome. Our thesis concludes that according to the Scottish philosopher's view, the normativity of morality question can be answered from the following perspectives: from natural feelings' worth rather than from the worth imposed by practical reason; from communication of feelings between agents, rather than from the solipsist deliberation of moral agent; from the impartial point of view of a judicious spectator, rather than from the interests of the involved agents; from the dynamic of feelings with successive reflexivity, rather than from the reflexion of a "pure reason".
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Ferraz, Marilia Cortes de. "Liberdade e imputabilidade moral em Hume". [s.n.], 2006. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281518.
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Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida MarquesDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: A dissertação examina a análise de Hume dos conceitos de liberdade e imputabilidade moral. O texto de referência para a pesquisa é a seção VIII da Investigação sobre o entendimento humano. Mostro, a partir do estudo dessa seção, em que sentido os conceitos de liberdade e necessidade são compatíveis para Hume. Para tanto, analiso o compatibilismo humeano enfatizando a unidade explicativa que o autor esposa claramente na obra citada. De fato, Hume, em seu exame das noções de liberdade e necessidade anuncia introduzir novidades que prometem ao menos algum resultado na decisão da controvérsia entre a doutrina da necessidade e a doutrina da liberdade (da vontade). Ele propõe um 'projeto de reconciliação¿ (reconciling project) que consiste em mostrar que liberdade e necessidade são perfeitamente compatíveis entre si, e que afirmar que as ações humanas são livres não é afirmar que estejam fora do âmbito da necessidade, mas apenas que se realizaram sem constrangimento. Em seguida, esclareço as razões que conduzem à crença na vontade livre, crença esta infundada, segundo Hume. Por fim, procuro estabelecer as conseqüências que o compatibilismo humeano traz para a noção de responsabilidade moral. Hume entende que não só é perfeitamente possível explicar os juízos morais pelo seu compatibilismo, como também que o seu compatibilismo é a única alternativa de fato consistente para dar conta dos ajuizamentos que fazemos acerca da moralidade. Entendo que a explicação dos juízos morais de imputabilidade oferecida por Hume representa uma hipótese altamente persuasiva e com vigor suficiente para responder a objeções geralmente apresentadas pelos incompatibilistas
Abstract: The dissertation examines the analysis of Hume of the concepts of freedom and moral imputability. The text of reference for the research is section VIII of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I show, from the study of this section, how freedom and necessity are compatible for Hume. To this effect, I analyze the humean compatibilism emphasizing the unit of the explanation that the author maintains in the cited work. Hume, in his examination of freedom and necessity, announces a new approach that promises at least some results for the decision of the controversy between the doctrine of the necessity and the doctrine of the freedom (of the will). He proposes a conciliatory project that consists in showing that freedom and necessity are perfectly compatible, and that to say that the human actions are free is not to say that they are out of the scope of the necessity, but only that they are without constraint. After that, I clarify the reasons that lead to the belief in free will, which is baseless according to Hume. Finally, I establish the consequences that humean compatibilism brings for the notion of moral responsibility. Hume understands not only that it is perfectly possible to explain moral judgments by means of his compatibilism, but also that his compatibilism is the only consistent alternative to account for moral judgement. I understand that the explanation of moral judgments of imputability offered by Hume represents a highly persuasive hypothesis, and strong enough to answer the objections generally raised by incompatibilists
Mestrado
Filosofia Moral
Mestre em Filosofia
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Cabezas, Barra Domingo. "El laberinto de la identidad personal en la filosofía de David Hume". Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/398034.
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En esta tesis analizaremos la filosofía de la identidad personal elaborada por Hume. Para ello, partiremos del análisis de los principios expuestos en el Tratado de la Naturaleza Humana. Distinguiremos detalladamente lo que los estudiosos de Hume han llamado los primeros y los segundos pensamientos sobre la identidad personal, profundizando en el crucial momento en el que en los segundos pensamientos, Hume confiesa que "todas mis esperanzas se desvanecen" al intentar explicar los principios que enlazan nuestras sucesivas percepciones. Ello nos sugiere que se siente frustrado al intentar explicitar, desde sus principios epistemológicos, las conexiones reales que enlazarían las percepciones y que son necesarias para el funcionamiento de la memoria.
Encontraremos a Hume ante un dilema imposible, pues o bien ha de renunciar a la identidad personal y a la memoria o bien tiene que renunciar a los principios de su filosofía. Por ello, Hume se encontrará perdido dentro del laberinto de la identidad personal, de tal manera que la única salida posible es sentarse en el banco de escepticismo.In this thesis we will discuss the philosophy of personal identity developed by Hume. Starting from the analysis of the principles outlined in the Treatise of Human Nature, we will thoroughly describe what the experts in the work of Hume have called the first and second thoughts about personal identity. Then we will delve in the crucial moment when, while discussing second thoughts, Hume confesses that "all my hopes vanish" when trying to explain the principles that link our successive perceptions. This implies that he feels frustrated when trying to explain, from its epistemological principles, the real connections that would link perceptions and that are necessary for the functioning of memory. Here we find Hume facing an impossible dilemma, since he has to give up either his personal identity and memory or the principles of his philosophy. Therefore, Hume will be lost in the maze of personal identity, until the only way out is to sit on the bench of skepticism.
Livros sobre o assunto "1711-1776 Philosophy"
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Fideism and Hume's philosophy: Knowledge, religion, and metaphysics. New York: P. Lang, 1993.
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Historical dictionary of Hume's philosophy. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2008.
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Theory and practice in the philosophy of David Hume. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
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Kail, P. J. E. Projection and realism in Hume's philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
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Philosophical melancholy and delirium: Hume's pathology of philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
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Baier, Annette. The pursuits of philosophy: An introduction to the life and thought of David Hume. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011.
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Hume's philosophy of the self. London: Routledge, 2002.
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P, Wright John. Hume's "Treatise of human nature": An introduction. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
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Inc, ebrary, ed. Deleuze's Hume: Philosophy, culture and the Scottish Enlightenment. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
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Baier, Annette. The cautious jealous virtue: Hume on justice. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2010.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteCapítulos de livros sobre o assunto "1711-1776 Philosophy"
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Salter, John. "Hume (1711–1776)". In Interpreting Modern Political Philosophy, 81–98. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-0725-7_5.
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Howard, Alex. "David Hume (1711–1776)". In Philosophy for Counselling and Psychotherapy, 172–81. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-04644-4_18.
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Demeter, Tamás. "Hume, David (1711–1776)". In Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences, 1–7. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20791-9_440-1.
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Beckwith, Christopher I. "Greek Enlightenment". In Greek Buddha. Princeton University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691176321.003.0005.
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The argument known in Antiquity as the Problem of the Criterion was introduced to Western thought by Pyrrho of Elis, who learned it in Central Asia and India from Early Buddhism. The problem revolutionized ancient European thought, such that from Pyrrho's time onward ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy was focused on the epistemological question, “Can we really know anything?” With the ascendancy of Christianity and its Aristotelian and Neoplatonic apologetics, the problem was sidelined and practically forgotten during the Middle Ages. When Pyrrhonism was reintroduced to Western Europe in the late Renaissance, the problem once again revolutionized Western thought and shifted the central focus of philosophy to epistemology. Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) is responsible for what may be called the problem's modern incarnation, known today as the “Problem of Induction.” This chapter analyzes the issues fundamental to understanding not only Hume but also Pyrrho, and in turn the Buddha.
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Earley,, Joseph E. sr. "How Properties Hold Together in Substances". In Essays in the Philosophy of Chemistry. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190494599.003.0017.
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A main aim of chemical research is to understand how the characteristic properties of specific chemical substances relate to the composition and to the structure of those materials. Such investigations assume a broad consensus regarding basic aspects of chemistry. Philosophers generally regard widespread agreement on basic principles as a remote goal, not something already achieved. They do not agree on how properties stay together in ordinary objects. Some follow John Locke [1632–1704] and maintain that properties of entities inhere in substrates. The item that this approach considers to underlie characteristics is often called “a bare particular” (Sider 2006). However, others reject this understanding and hold that substances are bundles of properties—an approach advocated by David Hume [1711–1776]. Some supporters of Hume’s theory hold that entities are collections of “tropes” (property-instances) held together in a “compresence relationship” (Simons 1994). Recently several authors have pointed out the importance of “structures” for the coherence of substances, but serious questions have been raised about those proposals. Philosophers generally use a time-independent (synchronic) approach and do not consider how chemists understand properties of chemical substances and of dynamic networks of chemical reactions. This chapter aims to clarify how current chemical understanding relates to aspects of contemporary philosophy. The first section introduces philosophical debates, the second considers properties of chemical systems, the third part deals with theories of wholes and parts, the fourth segment argues that closure grounds properties of coherences, the fifth section introduces structural realism (SR), the sixth part considers contextual emergence and concludes that dynamic structures of processes may qualify as determinants (“causes”) of specific outcomes, and the final section suggests that ordinary items are based on closure of relationships among constituents additionally determined by selection for integration into more-extensive coherences. Ruth Garrett Millikan discussed the concept of substance in philosophy: . . . Substances . . . are whatever one can learn from given only one or a few encounters, various skills or information that will apply to other encounters. . . . Further, this possibility must be grounded in some kind of natural necessity. . . . The function of a substance concept is to make possible this sort of learning and use of knowledge for a specific substance. . . . (Millikan 2000, 33)
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Cléro, Jean-Pierre. "Hume (1711-1776) : la science de la nature humaine". In Histoire raisonnée de la philosophie morale et politique, 455–62. La Découverte, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/dec.caill.2001.01.0455.
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