Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „Virtue”
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Barber, Michael. "Docility, Virtue of Virtues". International Philosophical Quarterly 38, nr 2 (1998): 119–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq199838219.
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Weisband, Edward. "The Virtues of Virtue". American Behavioral Scientist 52, nr 6 (luty 2009): 905–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764208327665.
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Santos, Breno Ricardo Guimarães, i Pedro Merlussi. "Virtue epistemology - Epistemologia da virtude". Intuitio 8, nr 1 (31.07.2015): 325. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2015.1.19738.
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Brady, Michael, i Duncan Pritchard. "Epistemic Virtues and Virtue Epistemology". Philosophical Studies 130, nr 1 (lipiec 2006): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3230-4.
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BRADLEY, BEN. "Virtue Consequentialism". Utilitas 17, nr 3 (28.10.2005): 282–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820805001652.
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Virtue consequentialism has been held by many prominent philosophers, but has never been properly formulated. I criticize Julia Driver's formulation of virtue consequentialism and offer an alternative. I maintain that according to the best version of virtue consequentialism, attributions of virtue are really disguised comparisons between two character traits, and the consequences of a trait in non-actual circumstances may affect its actual status as a virtue or vice. Such a view best enables the consequentialist to account for moral luck, unexemplified virtues, and virtues and vices involving the prevention of goodness and badness.
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SLOTE, MICHAEL. "Driver's Virtues". Utilitas 16, nr 1 (11.02.2004): 22–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820803001031.
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Julia Driver's Uneasy Virtue offers a theory of virtue and the virtues without being an instance of virtue ethics. It presents a consequentialist challenge to recent virtue ethics, but its positive views – and especially its interesting examples – have great significance in their own right. Driver's defence of ‘virtues of ignorance’ has force despite all the challenges to it that have been mounted over the years. But there are also examples differing from those Driver has mentioned that favour the idea of such virtues. Perhaps certain virtues of religious faith and the virtue necessary for dealing as best one can with moral dilemmas both require ignorance. However, some of the examples Driver does discuss raise the question whether virtue status is based solely on consequences, rather than perhaps having (in addition) a motivational component.
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Greco, John. "Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23, nr 3 (wrzesień 1993): 413–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1993.10717329.
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In recent years, virtue epistemology has won the attention of a wide range of philosophers. A developed form of the position has been expounded forcefully by Ernest Sosa and represents the most plausible version of reliabilism to date. Through the person of Alvin Plantinga, virtue epistemology has taken philosophy of religion by storm, evoking objections and defenses in a wide variety of journals and volumes. Historically, virtue epistemology has its roots in the work of Thomas Reid, and the explosion of Reid scholarship in the last few years is perhaps both a cause and an effect of recent interest in the position.In this paper I want to examine the virtues and vices of virtue epistemology. My conclusion will be that the position is correct, when qualified appropriately. The central claim of virtue epistemology is that, Gettier problems aside, knowledge is true belief which results from a cognitive virtue. In section one I will clarify this claim with some brief remarks about the nature of virtues in general, and cognitive virtues in particular. In section two I will consider two objections to the theory of knowledge which results. In section three of the paper I will argue that virtue epistemology can be qualified so as to avoid the objections raised in section two. Finally, I will argue that the amendments which solve the objections of section two also allow us to solve a version of the dreaded generality problem.
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Levy, Neil. "Intellectual Virtue Signaling". American Philosophical Quarterly 60, nr 3 (1.07.2023): 311–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521123.60.3.07.
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Abstract Discussions of virtue signaling to date have focused exclusively on the signaling of the moral virtues. This article focuses on intellectual virtue signaling: the status-seeking advertising of supposed intellectual virtues. Intellectual virtue signaling takes distinctive forms. It is also far more likely to be harmful than moral virtue signaling, because it distracts attention from genuine expertise and gives contrarian opinions an undue prominence in public debate. The article provides a heuristic by which to identify possible instances of intellectual virtue signaling. When people with no relevant expertise rapidly move to offer their opinions on a wide range of topics as soon as these topics become fashionable or newsworthy, and especially when these opinions are contrarian, we should suspect them of intellectual virtue signaling.
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Piazza, Jared, Geoffrey P. Goodwin, Paul Rozin i Edward B. Royzman. "When a Virtue is Not a Virtue: Conditional Virtues in Moral Evaluation". Social Cognition 32, nr 6 (grudzień 2014): 528–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.2014.32.6.528.
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Stichter, Matt. "Virtues as Skills in Virtue Epistemology". Journal of Philosophical Research 38 (2013): 333–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr20133817.
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Stafford, Sue P. "Intellectual Virtues in Environmental Virtue Ethics". Environmental Ethics 32, nr 4 (2010): 339–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics201032439.
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Galston, William A. "Liberal Virtues". American Political Science Review 82, nr 4 (grudzień 1988): 1277–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1961760.
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I explore possible links between liberalism and conceptions of individual virtue. I first distinguish between virtue seen as instrumental to the preservation of societies and institutions and virtue seen as intrinsically valuable, that is, as an end in itself. I argue that certain distinctive instrumental virtues are required for well-functioning liberal societies, economies, and political institutions. I then sketch different versions of liberal intrinsic virtue and explore the tensions among them and between them and liberal instrumental virtue. I conclude with some competing conjectures as to what extent necessary liberal virtues are being fostered through current institutions.
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Dahm, Brandon, i Matthew Breuninger. "Virtue and the Psychology of Habit". American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 96, nr 2 (2022): 291–315. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq2022119245.
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An exciting trend in virtue ethics is its engagement with empirical psychology. Virtue theorists have connected virtue to various constructs in empirical psychology. The strategy of grounding virtue in the psychological theory of habit, however, has yet to be fully explored. Recent decades of psychological research have shown that habits are an indispensable feature of human life, and virtues and habits have a number of similarities. In this paper, we consider whether virtues are psychological habits (i.e., habits as understood by the field of psychology). After some background to frame the interaction between the two disciplines, we explain the predominant account of habit in psychology, which we call “standard psychological habit,” in the next section. We then consider Servais Pinckaers’s objections that virtue cannot be a habit and conclude that standard psychological habits cannot be virtues. Finally, we argue that another psychological account of habits, goal-directed habits, withstand Pinckaers’s objections and provide a promising construct for understanding virtue.
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Froeyman, Anton. "Virtues of Historiography". Journal of the Philosophy of History 6, nr 3 (2012): 415–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341239.
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Abstract In this paper, I take up Herman Paul’s suggestion to analyze the process of writing history in terms of virtues. In contrast to Paul, however, I argue that the concept of virtue used here should not be based on virtue epistemology, but rather on virtue ethics. The reason is that virtue epistemology is discriminative towards non-cognitive virtues and incompatible with the Ankersmitian/Whitean view of historiography as a multivocal path from historical reality to historical representation. Virtue ethics on the other hand, more specifically those forms of virtue ethics which emphasize the uncodifiability thesis, is very capable of providing such an account. In order to make this somewhat more concrete, I distinguish four important traits of virtue ethics, and I try to make clear how these can be interpreted with respect to the writing of history.
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Sandler, Ronald. "A Response to Martin Calkins’s “How Casuistry and Virtue Ethics Might Break the Ideological Stalemate Troubling Agricultural Biotechnology”". Business Ethics Quarterly 15, nr 2 (kwiecień 2005): 319–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq200515217.
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Abstract:Martin Calkins proposes the “combined use of casuistry and virtue ethics as a way for both sides to move ahead on [the] pressing issue [of agricultural biotechnology].” However, his defense of this methodology relies on a set of mistaken, albeit familiar, claims regarding the normative resources of virtue ethics: (1) virtue ethics is egoistic; (2) virtue ethics cannot defend any particular account of the virtues as the objectively correct ones and is therefore inextricably relativistic; (3) virtue ethics cannot supply a procedure for providing practical or policy guidance in concrete situations; and (4) virtue ethics cannot adequately account for the possibility of conflicting or partial virtues. After a brief overview of the basic structure of virtue ethics, I take up each of these misconceptions in turn. I conclude with some comments on the implications of these considerations for Calkins’s proposed methodology for addressing the issue of agricultural biotechnology.
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Lara, Amy. "Some Apparent Obstacles to Developing a Kantian Virtue Theory". Análisis Filosófico 30, nr 2 (1.11.2010): 187–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.36446/af.2010.129.
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Several neo-Kantians have questioned the standard deontological interpretation of Kant's ethical theory. They have also responded to charges of rationalism and rigorism by emphasizing the role of virtues and emotions in Kant's view. However, none have defended a fully virtue theoretic interpretation of Kant's theory. I claim that virtue theory has much to offer Kantians, but that resistance to developing a Kantian virtue theory rests on faulty assumptions about virtue theory. In this paper I clear away three apparent obstacles to developing a Kantian virtue theory. The first regards his account of the virtues, which I argue is tangential to the issue of whether he can be interpreted as a virtue theorist. The second is Kant's codification of moral principles, which I argue is compatible with virtue theory. The third is the apparent explanatory primacy of the Categorical Imperative, which I argue is not fully supported by the textual evidence.
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Aberdein, Andrew. "Virtues Suffice for Argument Evaluation". Informal Logic 43, nr 4 (21.01.2024): 543–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.22329/il.v43i4.8483.
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The virtues and vices of argument are now an established part of argumentation theory. They have helped direct attention to hitherto neglected aspects of how we argue. However, it remains controversial whether a virtue theory can contribute to some of the central questions of argumentation theory. Notably, Harvey Siegel disputes whether what he calls ‘arguments in the abstract propositional sense’ can be evaluated meaningfully within a virtue theory. This paper explores the prospects for grounding an account of argument evaluation in arguers’ virtues and vices by examination of a corresponding debate in virtue ethics: Can an ethics of virtue guide our actions? It is thereby argued that an affirmative answer is possible: virtues suffice for argument evaluation.
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De Raad, Boele, i Jan Pieter Van Oudenhoven. "A psycholexical Study of Virtues in the Dutch Language, and Relations between Virtues and Personality". European Journal of Personality 25, nr 1 (styczeń 2011): 43–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/per.777.
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Following the psycholexical approach, a list of 153 virtue descriptors was selected from a previously constructed list of trait–terms, under the assumption that virtues form a subset of traits. The virtue list was administered to 400 participants (self– and other–raters), who had to indicate the extent to which each term applied to them or to the others. Principal Component Analyses were performed yielding six factors of virtues. In addition, Big Five factors and markers of an external set of virtues were constructed. Correlation and regression analyses were performed to describe the relations between virtues, the Dutch Big Five system and other virtue systems. Compared to the other virtue systems, the present study revealed some additional domains. The overlap found with personality measures corresponds to earlier findings supporting the assumption that virtues are important traits. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Uusimäki, Elisa. "Mapping ideal ways of living: Virtue and vice lists in 1QS and 4Q286". Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha 30, nr 1 (wrzesień 2020): 35–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951820720948616.
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This article analyses virtue and vice lists in ancient Hebrew literature, specifically focusing on those found in 1QS and 4Q286. It is argued that these texts from Qumran offer distinctive evidence for extended lists of virtues and vices. Apart from illustrating ideals of the yaḥad movement, the sources invite us to consider what counted as ethical to ancient Jews and whether the texts indicate any attempt to organize ethical concerns. The authors lacked a meta-category denoting “virtue” (cf. ἀρετή in Greek or virtus in Latin), but they discussed a myriad of specific virtues and vices by way of listing and grouping (un)desirable qualities that can be characterized as moral, intellectual, and ritual. It is also likely that the authors regarded the qualities of wisdom and truth as elevated “master virtues” of some kind. The article ends with reflections on the types of ethics attested in 1QS and 4Q286. Drawing on anthropological research, the texts are argued to primarily promote what could be called “ethics of divinity.”
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Ross, Lewis. "THE VIRTUE OF CURIOSITY". Episteme 17, nr 1 (2.08.2018): 105–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.31.
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ABSTRACTA thriving project in contemporary epistemology concerns identifying and explicating the epistemic virtues. Although there is little sustained argument for this claim, a number of prominent sources suggest that curiosity is an epistemic virtue. In this paper, I provide an account of the virtue of curiosity. After arguing that virtuous curiosity must be appropriately discerning, timely and exacting, I then situate my account in relation to two broader questions for virtue responsibilists: What sort of motivations are required for epistemic virtue? And do epistemic virtues need to be reliable? I will sketch an account on which curiosity is only virtuous when rooted in a non-instrumental appreciation of epistemic goods, before arguing that curiosity can exhibit intellectual virtue irrespective of whether one is reliable in satisfying it.
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Alzola, Miguel. "The Possibility of Virtue". Business Ethics Quarterly 22, nr 2 (kwiecień 2012): 377–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq201222224.
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ABSTRACT:To have a virtue is to possess a certain kind of trait of character that is appropriate in pursuing the moral good at which the virtue aims. Human beings are assumed to be capable of attaining those traits. Yet, a number of scholars are skeptical about the very existence of such character traits. They claim a sizable amount of empirical evidence in their support. This article is concerned with the existence and explanatory power of character as a way to assess the possibility of achieving moral virtue, with particular attention paid to business context. I aim to unsettle the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics. In the course of this article, I shall defend four claims, namely, that virtues are more than just behavioral dispositions, that at least some virtues may not be unitary traits, that psychologists cannot infer virtues from overt behavior, and that the situationist data do not account for the observational equivalence of traits. Since it rests on a misconception of what virtue is, the situationist objection remains unconvincing.
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Cooper, John M. "The Unity of Virtue". Social Philosophy and Policy 15, nr 1 (1998): 233–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003149.
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Philosophers have recently revived the study of the ancient Greek topics of virtue and the virtues—justice, honesty, temperance, friendship, courage, and so on as qualities of mind and character belonging to individual people. But one issue at the center of Greek moral theory seems to have dropped out of consideration. This is the question of the unity of virtue, the unity of the virtues. Must anyone who has one of these qualities have others of them as well, indeed all of them—all the ones that really do deserve to be counted as virtues? Even further, is there really no set of distinct and separate virtuous qualities at all, but at bottom only a single one—so that the person who has this single condition of “virtue” (and only he) is entitled also to the further descriptions “honest” and “well-controlled” and “just” and “friendly” and “courageous” and “fostering” and “supportive,” and so on, as distinguishable aspects or immediate effects of his unitary “virtue”?
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Roberts, Robert C. "Is Kierkegaard a “Virtue Ethicist”?" Faith and Philosophy 36, nr 3 (2019): 325–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/faithphil201981125.
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Several readers of Kierkegaard have proposed that his works are a good source for contemporary investigations of virtues, especially theistic and Christian ones. Sylvia Walsh has recently offered several arguments to cast doubt on the thesis that Kierkegaard can be profitably read as a “virtue ethicist.” Examination of her arguments helps to clarify what virtues, as excellent traits of human character, can be in a moral outlook that ascribes deep sin and moral helplessness to human beings and their existence and salvation entirely to God’s grace. The examination also clarifies the relationship between virtues and character and between the practices of virtue ethics and character ethics. Such clarification also may provide a bridge of communication between Kierkegaard scholarship and scholars of virtue ethics beyond the theistic communities. In particular, I’ll argue that a character ethics that is not a virtue ethics would be suboptimal as an aid to the formation of Christian wisdom and sanctification. Kierkegaard’s character ethics is a virtue ethics.
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Goldstein, Rena Beatrice. "You Are Only as Good as You Are Behind Closed Doors". Precollege Philosophy and Public Practice 2 (2020): 88–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/p42020348.
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Virtues are standardly characterized as stable dispositions. A stable disposition implies that the virtuous actor must be disposed to act well in any domain required of them. For example, a politician is not virtuous if s/he is friendly in debate with an opponent, but hostile at home with a partner or children. Some recent virtue theoretic accounts focus on specific domains in which virtues can be exercised. I call these domain-variant accounts of virtue. This paper examines two such accounts: Randall Curren and Charles Dorn’s (2018) discussion of virtue in the civic sphere, and Michael Brady’s (2018) account of virtues of vulnerability. I argue that being consistent with the standard characterization of virtue requires generalizing beyond a domain. I suggest four actions the authors could take to preserve their accounts while remaining consistent with the standard characterization. I also discuss how virtue education could be enhanced by domain-variant accounts.
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Beier, Kathi. "The Soul, the Virtues, and the Human Good: Comments on Aristotle's Moral Psychology". Labyrinth 18, nr 2 (30.12.2016): 137. http://dx.doi.org/10.25180/lj.v18i2.51.
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In modern moral philosophy, virtue ethics has developed into one of the major approaches to ethical inquiry. As it seems, however, it is faced with a kind of perplexity similar to the one that Elisabeth Anscombe has described in Modern moral philosophy with regard to ethics in general. For if we assume that Anscombe is right in claiming that virtue ethics ought to be grounded in a sound philosophy of psychology, modern virtue ethics seems to be baseless since it lacks or even avoids reflections on the human soul. To overcome this difficulty, the paper explores the conceptual connections between virtue and soul in Aristotle's ethics. It claims that the human soul is the principle of virtue since reflections on the soul help us to define the nature of virtue, to understand the different kinds of virtues, and to answer the question why human beings need the virtues at all.
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Gentry, Lonnie, i James W. Fleshman. "Leadership and Ethics: Virtue Ethics as a Model for Leadership Development". Clinics in Colon and Rectal Surgery 33, nr 04 (3.06.2020): 217–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1055/s-0040-1709437.
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AbstractLeaders are held to the highest of standards in both performance and ethics. The same is true for leaders in medicine. Thus, medical leaders must give attention to ethical development as well as performance development. Virtue ethics provide a way for the leader to develop ethically. Virtue ethics is the oldest form of ethics. Although other ethical approaches focus on external considerations, virtue ethics focuses on the inward development of character. Following the examples of virtuous people and developing habits of virtue are critical with this approach. The cardinal virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and justice are considered the most important. Specific virtue lists have also been developed for medical practitioners. All of these virtues can contribute to the enhancement of leadership skills. The virtue approach is especially helpful for leaders because it motivates one to excel in whatever endeavor pursued, whether medicine, leadership, relationships, or life.
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West, Ryan. "Anger and the virtues: a critical study in virtue individuation". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46, nr 6 (grudzień 2016): 877–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1199232.
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AbstractAristotle and others suggest that a single virtue – ‘good temper’ – pertains specifically to anger. I argue that if good temper is a single virtue, it is constituted by aspects of a combination of other virtues. I present three categories of anger-relevant virtues – those that (potentially) dispose one to anger; those that delay, mitigate, and qualify anger; and those required for effortful anger control – and show how virtues in each category make distinct contributions to good temper. In addition to clarifying the relationship between anger and the virtues, my analysis has theoretical implications for virtue individuation more generally, and practical implications for character cultivation.
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Audi, Robert. "Virtue Ethics as a Resource in Business". Business Ethics Quarterly 22, nr 2 (kwiecień 2012): 273–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq201222220.
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ABSTRACT:This article provides an account of virtues as praiseworthy traits of character with a far-reaching capacity to influence conduct. Virtues supply their possessors both with good reasons that indicate, for diverse contexts, what sort of thing should be done and with motivation to do them. This motivational power of virtue is crucial for the question of what kind of person, or businessperson, one wants to be. The article shows how the contrast between virtue ethics and rule ethics is often drawn too sharply and indicates how virtue theories can incorporate both theoretical and practical uses of rules. More generally, it shows how a virtue orientation affects attitudes in management practices and how an understanding of certain virtues can help in making better decisions, both ethically and in relation to success in business.
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CALDER, TODD. "Against Consequentialist Theories of Virtue and Vice". Utilitas 19, nr 2 (czerwiec 2007): 201–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0953820807002476.
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Consequentialist theories of virtue and vice, such as the theories of Jeremy Bentham and Julia Driver, characterize virtue and vice in terms of the consequential, or instrumental, properties of these character traits. There are two problems with theories of this sort. First they imply that, under the right circumstances, paradigmatic virtues, such as benevolence, are vices and paradigmatic vices, such as maliciousness, are virtues. This is conceptually problematic. Second, they say nothing about the intrinsic nature of the virtues and vices, which is less than we could hope for from a theory of virtue and vice. Thus, we have reason to reject consequentialist theories in favour of theories that characterize virtue and vice in terms of the intrinsic properties of these character traits. Aristotle and Thomas Hurka have theories this sort.
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Dahm, Brandon. "The Virtue of Somnience". American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 94, nr 4 (2020): 611–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq202098206.
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It’s strange that sleep doesn’t come up more when we think of virtue. In this paper, I argue that there is a virtue concerned with sleep, which I call “somnience,” and I develop an account of this virtue. My account of somnience builds on the virtue tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas and recent research about the nature of sleep. In the first section I argue that there is a need for such a virtue. Next, I argue that somnience is a form of temperance. Third, I show how somnience connects to a number of other virtues, which helps us fill out the nature of the virtue. Finally, I argue that sleep also relates to virtue by aiding virtue formation.
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Huang, Yong. "Why Confucian Ethics is a Virtue Ethics, Virtue Ethics is not a Bad Thing, and Neville Should Endorse it". Journal of Chinese Philosophy 47, nr 3-4 (3.03.2020): 283–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-0470304011.
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This paper addresses one of the three main themes of Neville’s The Goodness Is One, Its Manifestations Many: Whether Confucian ethics can be appropriately characterized as a virtue ethics. It first examines some unique features of virtues ethics, concluding that Confucian ethics may be plausibly regarded as a virtue ethics. Then it shows that virtue ethics is immune to the two diseases that Neville worries about: subjectivism and individualism. Finally, it argues that what Neville regards as salient features of Confucian ethics, (1) situationism, (2) attention to knowledge and skills beyond virtues, and (3) consequentialism of principle, can all be kept intact when it is characterized as a virtue ethics.
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Newstead, Toby, Sarah Dawkins, Rob Macklin i Angela Martin. "Evaluating The Virtues Project as a leadership development programme". Leadership 16, nr 6 (21.01.2020): 633–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1742715019899845.
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This article contributes to an emerging field of virtue-based leadership development scholarship by reporting on the first known empirical evaluation of The Virtues Project as a leadership development programme. This exploratory study seeks to understand if or how The Virtues Project might facilitate the development of good leaders. Our understanding of ‘good’ is informed by the notion of virtue and the philosophy of virtue ethics, and we adopt a critical realist evaluation framework to distil what about The Virtues Project works for whom in which contexts and why. Our study employs a longitudinal comparative case design composed of multiple in-depth interviews with nine leader participants and their colleagues over the duration of five months. Findings indicate that (a) The Virtues Project training was experienced as a trigger event that fostered leaders’ new understandings of what virtue is and how virtues inform behaviour, and (b) The Virtues Project training equipped leaders with language-based strategies to incorporate virtues into their leadership practices. In sum, participating leaders felt that The Virtues Project facilitated the development of their leadership by enabling them to understand and recognize the best in themselves and others (virtues) and to incorporate virtues into their leadership practices. Limitations and future research are discussed.
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Berber, Andrea. "A brief introduction to virtue epistemology". Theoria, Beograd 65, nr 1 (2022): 103–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2201103b.
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This paper presents a concise and stimulating introduction to virtue epistemology, a field of epistemology that has gained increasing importance in recent decades. At the beginning of the paper, we explain the methodological turn towards the epistemic agent as the subject of research, which is the beginning and the defining characteristic of this approach to epistemology. We introduce two main approaches to the understanding of epistemic virtues: reliabilism and responsibilism. The first approach considers epistemic virtues as stable traits that reliably lead to the truth, while the second understands them as desirable and praiseworthy dispositions of our character. After demonstrating that these two approaches are best viewed as complementary, we move on to consider the main themes of virtue epistemology. As the most relevant topics, we singled out: the question of the nature of epistemic virtues; the relationship between moral and epistemic virtues; exploring the importance of individual virtues; shifting focus on epistemological vices and expanding the framework of virtue epistemology to groups and extended cognition. Finally, we address the practical potentials of virtue epistemology in the fields of education and human resources.
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Gaut, Berys. "Mixed Motivations: Creativity as a Virtue". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 75 (październik 2014): 183–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246114000198.
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The thought that creativity is a kind of virtue is an attractive one. Virtues are valuable traits that are praised and admired, and creativity is a widely celebrated trait in our society. In philosophical ethics, epistemology, and increasingly aesthetics, virtue-theoretical approaches are influential, so an account of creativity as a virtue can draw on well-established theories. Several philosophers, including Linda Zagzebski, Christine Swanton and Matthew Kieran, have argued for the claim that creativity is a virtue, locating this claim within a broader picture of intellectual, ethical and aesthetic virtues respectively. Moreover, a prominent research programme in psychology, led by Teresa Amabile, holds that people have an intrinsic motivation when they are creative, and this seems seamlessly to fit with the view that creativity is a virtue, for it is often held that a requirement for a trait to be a virtue is that the virtuous agent acts from an intrinsic motivation.
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Dentsoras, Dimitrios. "Carving Up Virtue: The Stoics on Wisdom’s Scope and the Multiplicity of Virtues". International Philosophical Quarterly 60, nr 1 (2020): 5–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq202013143.
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This essay examines the early Stoic debates concerning the number of virtues and the differentiation among them. It begins with the defense of virtue’s unity offered by the heterodox Stoic Aristo of Chios and with a comparison between the definitions that Aristo and Zeno offered for the four primary virtues. Aristo maintained that virtue consists exclusively in the knowledge of good and bad. Zeno and his successors presented the virtues as epistemic dispositions whose scopes differ. I conclude that by adding the knowledge of indifferents to the definition of virtue, Zeno and his successors were able to avoid the circularity to which Aristo’s definition of virtue fell victim while providing a way to differentiate among the virtues.
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Walker, A. D. M. "Virtue and Character". Philosophy 64, nr 249 (lipiec 1989): 349–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100044703.
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Moral theories which, like those of Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas, give a central place to the virtues, tend to assume that as traits of character the virtues are mutually compatible so that it is possible for one and the same person to possess them all. This assumption—let us call it the compatibility thesis—does not deny the existence of painful moral dilemmas: it allows that the virtues may conflict in particular situations when considerations associated with different virtues favour incompatible courses of action, but holds that these conflicts occur only at the level of individual actions. Thus while it may not always be possible to do both what would be just and what would be kind or to act both loyally and honestly, it is possible to be both a kind and a just person and to have both the virtue of loyalty and the virtue of honesty.
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Toner, Christopher. "The Virtues (and a Few Vices) of Daniel Russell's Practical Intelligence and the Virtues". Journal of Moral Philosophy 8, nr 3 (2011): 453–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/174552411x591366.
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AbstractDaniel Russell's Practical Intelligence and the Virtues is principally a defense of the Aristotelian claim that phronesis is part of every unqualified virtue—a defense of what Russell calls "hard virtue theory" and "hard virtue ethics." The main support for this is the further claim that we would be unable to act well reliably, or form our character reliably, without phronesis performing its "twin roles": correctly identifying the mean of each virtue, and integrating the mean of each virtue with those of others so as to enable us to act in an overall virtuous manner. In following Russell's argument for these claims, we find much else of interest, including a persuasive account of right action and a resurrection of the old doctrine of cardinal virtues. Here I seek first to give readers a sense of the range and depth of this important book by summarizing the main lines of its argument. But I also raise some critical points, the most substantive of which concern his treatments of the unity of the virtues and of responsibility for character.
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Moros, Enrique R., i Richard J. Umbers. "Distinguishing Virtues from Faculties in Virtue Epistemology". Southern Journal of Philosophy 42, nr 1 (marzec 2004): 61–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb00990.x.
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S, Marithangam. "Virtue in Philosophical Songs of Kannadasan". International Research Journal of Tamil 4, S-19 (10.12.2022): 132–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.34256/irjt224s1920.
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Virtue promotes human beings intellectual and moral capabilities and shows how one should behave in society. Virtue can be defined as a set of behaviors accepted by a society. Virtues are not the same in all societies and it varies with time, belief and culture. So long virtue has long been explored from a religious perspective. Thiruvalluvar said that the books of virtue arose to talk about virtue. If we use the virtues in an orderly manner, we can become a better person in the society. Many books, articles, stories and theories have been written and published based on morality. In today's era, there is no human being who hates music. Various messages are conveyed to people through music and virtue is one among them. In society we can find many scholars like film lyricists and poets. Kannadasan is a very famous writer and he has written more than four thousand poems, more than five thousand film songs and many articles. He explained many philosophical ideas to the people through film songs. It seems that the philosophical thoughts of Karaimuthu poet have got a stable place among the people. Thus, the article explores the virtues in philosophical songs of Kannadasan.
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T. J, Asha Dalin. "The Internal life of Virtue in Natrinai". International Research Journal of Tamil 4, S-19 (10.12.2022): 199–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.34256/irjt224s1930.
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Natrinai is the first book in the collection of Ettuthogai. Natrinai is an introspective text. Internal ideas are more prominent in the text. The text also covers the characteristics of social virtues and about husband-wife love. The internal life is filled with love, chastity, cohabitation, marriage, domesticity, wealth. There are some immoral behaviors too that is, the boy refuses to see his love after love making, refuses to marry the girl, seeking for a prostitute without maintaining a household, all these are acts against morality. Virtue in internal life is the boy must marry the girl after love making, he should love his wife and maintain the family. Internal virtue is a restrictive system. Virtue is the only reason for internal discipline. The friend of a girl insists the boy to marry the girl and she tells since I have been a supporter of both of you, I am now a friend of both of you, so the virtue of a friend is manifested here as emphasizing family life by marrying her friend. In this society where many people live together, each has its own virtue. External life has its own virtues. Likewise, internal life is subjected to the concept of virtue. In this article, we can know the virtues for life in Natrinai.
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Paul, Herman. "Virtue Ethics and/or Virtue Epistemology: A Response to Anton Froeyman". Journal of the Philosophy of History 6, nr 3 (2012): 432–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18722636-12341240.
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Abstract In response to Anton Froeyman’s paper, “Virtues of Historiography,” this article argues that philosophers of history interested in why historians cherish such virtues as carefulness, impartiality, and intellectual courage would do wise not to classify these virtues unequivocally as either epistemic or moral virtues. Likewise, in trying to grasp the roles that virtues play in the historian’s professional practice, philosophers of history would be best advised to avoid adopting either an epistemological or an ethical perspective. Assuming that the historian’s virtuous behavior has epistemic and moral dimensions (as well as aesthetic, political, and other dimensions), this article advocates a non-reductionist account of historical scholarship, which acknowledges that the virtues cherished by historians usually play a variety of roles, depending on the goals they are supposed to serve. Given that not the least important of these goals are epistemic ones, the articles concludes that virtue ethical approaches, to the extent that they are focused on the acquisition of moral instead of epistemic goods, insufficiently recognize the role of virtue in the pursuit of such epistemic aims as knowledge and understanding.
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Mixon, Katy. "The Role of Virtue Ethics in Modern Moral Dilemmas". International Journal of Philosophy 3, nr 4 (13.07.2024): 14–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.47941/ijp.2094.
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Purpose: The study sought to investigate how virtue ethics can be applied to contemporary ethical issues and comparing its implementation across different cultural contexts. Methodology: The study adopted a desktop research methodology. Desk research refers to secondary data or that which can be collected without fieldwork. Desk research is basically involved in collecting data from existing resources hence it is often considered a low cost technique as compared to field research, as the main cost is involved in executive’s time, telephone charges and directories. Thus, the study relied on already published studies, reports and statistics. This secondary data was easily accessed through the online journals and library. Findings: The findings reveal that there exists a contextual and methodological gap relating to the role of virtue ethics in modern moral dilemmas. Preliminary empirical review revealed that virtue ethics provided a robust framework for addressing modern moral dilemmas by focusing on the development of moral character and the habitual practice of virtues like honesty, courage, and compassion. It emphasized that virtues guide not only actions but also motivations, enabling consistent ethical behavior. The study highlighted the importance of community and social context in nurturing virtues, suggesting that supportive environments are crucial for ethical decision-making in various settings, such as healthcare and corporate governance. Ultimately, virtue ethics was found to promote ethical resilience and adaptability, making it a valuable approach for resolving contemporary ethical challenges and fostering a more just and sustainable world. Unique Contribution to Theory, Practice and Policy: Aristotle's Virtue Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre's Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and Philippa Foot's Natural Goodness may be used to anchor future studies on virtue ethics and modern moral dilemmas. The study recommended expanding the theoretical foundations of virtue ethics to include contemporary issues, integrating virtue ethics into professional and personal domains, and incorporating it into public policy frameworks. It emphasized the need for educational institutions to promote character development and suggested community programs to nurture virtues. Additionally, the study highlighted the importance of continuous research and interdisciplinary dialogue to keep virtue ethics relevant in addressing modern moral dilemmas. These recommendations aimed to enhance theoretical insights, improve practical applications, and create policies that foster an ethically conscious society.
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Dennis, Matthew J. "Virtue as Empowerment". Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 24, nr 2 (2020): 411–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/epoche202034162.
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Virtue ethical interpretations of Nietzsche are increasingly viewed as a promising way to explain his moral philosophy, although current interpretations disagree on which character traits he regards as virtues. Of the first-, second-, and third-wave attempts addressing this question, only the latter can explain why Nietzsche denies that the same character traits are virtues for all individuals. Instead of positing the same set of character traits as Nietzschean virtues, third-wave theorists propose that Nietzsche only endorses criteria determining whether a specific character trait is a virtue or vice for a specific individual. The article examines the criteria-based approaches of third-wave theorists Lester Hunt and Christine Swanton, showing how they urgently need revising to explain Nietzsche’s endorsement of non-acquisitive character traits (such as those involving sensitivity and receptivity). To do this I explore Nietzsche’s unpublished remarks on Spinoza, which I contend better explains why he understands non-acquisitive character traits as virtues.
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Jarczewski, Dominik. "What Intellectual Ethics for Contemporary Science? Perspectives of Virtue Epistemology". Ruch Filozoficzny 77, nr 4 (15.07.2022): 23–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/rf.2021.034.
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In face of unethical incidents that threaten the world of science, a question of the necessity and a possible shape of intellectual ethics has been raised. The article argues that advantages of virtue epistemology make it more attractive than other models of intellectual ethics (deontology, in particular). To that purpose, it reviews alternative models for intellectual ethics, analyses and criticises deontological approach and demonstrates the virtues of the virtue approach. As problems with implementation of virtue ethics have been put against that approach, the article addresses the question of how to promote virtue intellectual ethics. It discusses four possible methods of formation in virtues: theoretical, success-oriented, social and based on emulating exemplars. It argues for the role of excellent exemplars (both direct and narrative) whose emulation forms virtues in agent. The conclusions of the article should transform the way we think about intellectual ethics and promote it.
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Paddock, Caroline. "Is Art a Virtue?" Southwest Philosophy Review 36, nr 1 (2020): 169–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202036119.
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In several articles, Peter Goldie argues that artistic production and appreciation should enjoy the status of full-fledged virtues. In this paper, I draw on the Summa Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas to provide a more nuanced account of artistic or aesthetic virtue. First, I raise some objections to Goldie’s account. Next, I show that, unlike Goldie, Aquinas distinguishes between virtue “properly so called” and virtue in a more restricted sense, and he calls art a virtue only in the restricted sense. In other words, art is a true human excellence, but is not (as Goldie claims) intimately connected to human flourishing in the way that the moral virtues are. Next, I show that there is room in Aquinas’s account for Goldie’s claims that art is done not as a means to another end but rather “under the guise of the good.” Finally, I consider some other ways to understand Goldie’s intuition and affirm that there might be an intimate connection between artistic practice and some kinds of moral virtue.
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Sandler, Ronald. "Towards an Adequate Environmental Virtue Ethic". Environmental Values 13, nr 4 (listopad 2004): 477–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/096327190401300405.
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In this article I consider four concerns regarding the possibility of an environmental virtue ethic functioning as an alternative – rather than a supplement – to more conventional approaches to environmental ethics. The concerns are: (1) it is not possible to provide an objective specification of environmental virtue, (2) an environmental virtue ethic will lack the resources to provide critique of obtaining cultural practices and policies, (3) an environmental virtue ethic will not provide sufficient action-guidance, (4) an environmental virtue ethic cannot ground constraints on human activities regarding the natural environment. Each of these concerns makes a claim about the poverty of normative resources at the disposal of environmental virtue ethics. I defend a conception of environmental virtue – as a character virtue with the same normative standing as the conventional personal and interpersonal virtues – that enables an environmental virtue ethic with the wherewithal to address each of the concerns.
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Rony, Joseph, i S. Nair Tara. "Learning virtue ethics for developing psychological sustainability". i-manager’s Journal on Educational Psychology 16, nr 1 (2022): 38. http://dx.doi.org/10.26634/jpsy.16.1.18842.
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Virtue ethics has been considered to be of utmost relevance in every aspect of education in terms of cultivating virtuous character in individuals. Moral education aims at the development of worthy moral character through the cultivation of virtues, values, attitudes, ethical conduct and habits. Eudemonic well-being suggests engaging in behaviours that people perceive to be morally right and derive a sense of personal meaning from righteous actions. Modern education has neglected concern for human virtues, which has led to the erosion of moral virtues in society at large. With this backdrop, a study which could investigate what virtues could be inculcated that are most essential to students and those that would improve their psychological sustainability seems relevant. This study aimed to practice virtue ethics as a means to learn virtues based on an Aristotelian perspective. Virtue-based lessons were prepared and taught to students based on set objectives. A Situational Judgment Test was administered as pre and post tests to analyze the effectiveness of these lessons in the treatment group. The results reveal that virtue-ethics based lessons are effective for developing the psychological sustainability of students.
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Schneider, Henrique. "Confucianism, Commerce, Capitalism". Culture and Dialogue 8, nr 2 (29.10.2020): 295–322. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24683949-12340088.
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Abstract This paper discusses commerce in Early Confucianism. It argues that the virtuous Confucian agent engages with the world in different ways, including in commerce – it is another way of acting with virtue. This conception is compared with two roughly contemporary approaches in economics, the thought of Wilhelm Röpke and the Humanomics project by Vernon Smith. In both, virtue is constitutive to commerce. However, they differ substantially in the exact relationship between virtue and commerce. While in Early Confucianism commerce is a way for the agent to unfold and cultivate virtues, in Röpke, virtues are a corrective to the utilitarianism in commerce. In Humanomics, agents engaging in commercial relations find shared virtues.
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A, Ramya. "Virtues in Sangam Literature". International Research Journal of Tamil 4, S-19 (10.12.2022): 416–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.34256/irjt224s1963.
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Virtue is derived conceptually and is changeable according to the change of time. Moral values are different for man who lived as an ethnic group and for an individualistic society. This article shows up how the virtues mentioned in Sangam literary songs new shape for the sake of necessity. A materialistic society constructs virtue according to the occupation, materials, eligibility etc. A man accepts and reject a thing based on his knowledge of virtue. In the struggle for life, the commonality has been distorted based on the ideas of labor and surplus. This article describes the virtues of war, which are intended to destroy the generality and about the government virtues that emphasize power.
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Cheng, Chung-ying. "On Virtue and Reason: Integrative Theory of De 德 and Aretê". Journal of Chinese Philosophy 48, nr 2 (17.05.2021): 170–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-12340015.
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Abstract This article is to argue that virtue is experienced and understood in Confucian ethics as power to act and as performance of a moral action, and that virtue (de 德) as such has to be onto-cosmologically explicated, not just teleologically explained. In other words, it is intended to construct an integrative theory of virtues based on both dao (the Way 道) and de. To do so, we will examine the two features of de, as the power that is derived from self-reflection and self-restraining, and as the motivated action for attaining its practical end in a community. Only by a self-integrated moral consciousness can one’s experience, action and ideal remain in consistency and coherence, which leads us to the Aristotelian notion of virtue as excellence (aretê) and enables us to see how virtue as aretê could be introduced as a second feature of de, namely as the power for effective action in the whole system of virtues, apart from the first feature of de as self-restraining power. We will conclude that reason and virtue are practically united and remain inseparable, and that taking into account the onto-cosmological foundation of virtues, reason and virtue are inevitably the moving and advancing forces for the formation and transformation of human morality just as they are motivating and prompting incentives for individual moral action.