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Novikova, Anastassia. "Virtue by virtue of virtuosity". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.271267.
Pełny tekst źródłaWaidler, Katharyn. "The justification of virtue". Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2000. http://www.tren.com.
Pełny tekst źródłaCortés, Andreu Laura. "La recuperación contemporánea del concepto de “virtud”. Posibilidades y límites de la “virtue ethics”". Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/383522.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe aim of this PhD thesis is to find the limits and the possibilities of virtue ethics. From its beginning until now, virtue ethics has developed evolved into one of the three main normative ethical theories —together with deontology and utilitarianism. It's time to take a look back to this great development in order to see what are the worst problems the theory has to face and what are its most promising possibilities. The first chapter is devoted to present the various ideas and thesis contained within the vast landscape represented by virtue ethics. After finding an adequate definition of virtue ethics, a general framework of a normative ethical theory will be presented. Finally, the main thesis of virtue ethics concerning each question previously identified will be classified within the framework. The second chapter deals with the objections and limits of virtue ethics. It is argued that the theory can face the objection of egoism and the objection of elitism. However, if virtue ethics does not want to find itself limited by an insubstantial concept of 'virtue', it should address fundamental aspects of the ancient theory of virtue which can now be problematic. The purpose of the third chapter is to explore the most promising possibilities of virtue ethics. The main contention is that these possibilities can be found precisely where the theory has received the hardest criticisms: normativity. Virtue ethics can face the action-guiding objection, but it can also develop a genuinely innovative normative approach. Along several sections some fundamental ideas of virtue ethics are presented and explored. All these ideas add to a new perspective on normativity which focuses on the formation of a global virtuous character. After reviewing the recent debate between virtue ethics and social psychology, it is argued that the new normative project will benefit from the empirical findings of psychology. In the fourth chapter the various theses classified in the first chapter are re-examined, in order to select the best ones on the basis of the results yielded by the central chapters of this work. The result is the most promising version of virtue ethics so far.
Hampson, Margaret Róisín. "Enacting virtue". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2017. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/10040101/.
Pełny tekst źródłaRogers, Tristan John, i Tristan John Rogers. "Virtue Politics". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/625650.
Pełny tekst źródłaKaplan, Christopher Francis. "Environmental Virtue Ethics and the Virtue of Ecological Sensitivity". Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/579285.
Pełny tekst źródłaBogiaris-Thibault, Guillaume. "Machiavelli's political virtue". Thesis, McGill University, 2011. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=104843.
Pełny tekst źródłaCette thèse vise à clarifier le concept de vertu politique chez Machiavel en se basant principalement sur l'opinion que celui-ci avance quant à la valeur empirique de l'information fournie par l'histoire. Ce travail se base donc sur l'idée que les Histoires Florentines est un ouvrage dont le contenu peut être utilisé comme un outil ayant la capacité de vérifier toute conclusion ayant trait à la vertu politique de Machiavel en tant que concept éthique. L'idée principale de cette thèse est que la vertu politique de Machiavel correspond précisément à un système éthique de 'déontologie modérée,' dans lequel le concept de nécessité sers à identifier le 'moment seuil' où la valeur morale d'une action peut changer dans l'absolu. Ensuite, le chapitre deux examine les qualités communes des princes et des républiques les plus illustres et propose l'idée que la vertu politique doit donc être la vertu du dirigeant, qu'il soit un seul homme ou un gouvernement. Finalement, le chapitre trois explore comment cette interprétation de la vertu politique de Machiavel offre une nouvelle perspective sur le « problèmes des mains sales » en politique.
Redmond, Walter. "Logic, Duty, Virtue". Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112991.
Pełny tekst źródłaLa lógica deóntica. la lógica de la ética, es aplicable a varias teorías morales, por ejemplo a las fundamentadas en la concepción de la virtud o en la del deber. Un cuadrado de oposición al estilo escolástico puede servir para exhibir las relaciones lógicas entre tales nociones morales u operadores como debe y puede. El sistema puede construirse sobre la base de un solo operador y luego otros pueden agregarse para indicar una correspondencia con otras expresiones del lenguaje ordinario. Se ofrecen dos principios para aclarar la super erogación.el caso del acto o hábito bueno no obligatorio. y para proponer una lógica básica de la virtud.
Brown, Steven G. "Realistic Virtue Ethics". The Ohio State University, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1339517161.
Pełny tekst źródłaHynes, Julia Maria. "Thomistic virtue theory". Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.501281.
Pełny tekst źródłaHorner, David Alan. "The seeds of virtue : law and virtue ethical conceptions in Aquinas's ethics". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:91aff45b-df61-4435-937d-b8331ec20b86.
Pełny tekst źródłaWeatherup, Michael Norman. "Neo-Schopenhauerian virtue ethics". Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 2017. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.728826.
Pełny tekst źródłaHardwicke, Tery Vance. "Virtue and self-interest". The University of Waikato, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10289/2670.
Pełny tekst źródłaHarley, D. "Just shy of virtue". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2014. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1402574/.
Pełny tekst źródłaHamalainen, Hasse Joel. "Aristotle's steps to virtue". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/19515.
Pełny tekst źródłaStichter, Matthew K. "The Skill of Virtue". Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1181851300.
Pełny tekst źródłaAustin, Nicholas Owen. "Thomas Aquinas on the Four Causes of Temperance". Thesis, Boston College, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3742.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis dissertation aims to give a theoretical account of the cardinal virtue of temperance that portrays it as an attractive (albeit demanding) virtue, and provides the justification and method for applying it to multiple spheres of life today. To this end, it offers a critical interpretation and retrieval of Saint Thomas Aquinas' account of the four causes of temperantia in the Summa Theologiae. I claim that, for Thomas, the four causes of a moral virtue are its mode (formal cause), matter and subject (material cause), proper end (final cause) and agent (efficient cause). Less technically, they can be expressed in terms of five guiding questions to be used in understanding any given virtue: What is the practical wisdom actualized by that virtue? What is the sphere of life with which the virtue is concerned? What aspect of the human heart and mind does the virtue modify? What is the virtue for? What causes the virtue to exist and increase? To answer to these five questions is to give an account of a moral virtue. This dissertation develops and applies this causal method for analyzing a moral virtue, both as a means of interpreting Thomas' account of temperance, and as a tool for constructing a theory of temperance for today. Temperance, I claim, can be defined as the modulation of attraction for the sake of right relationship. It is developed through both discipline and grace. Temperance does not repress desire, but forms and channels its positively, placing it at the service of right relationship to oneself, others, the earth and God. It does limit and restrain desire, but always for the sake of deeper and more meaningful goods. Temperance therefore modulates harmoniously between the restraint and the redirection of desire, the fast and the feast. Temperance is often misunderstood as proposing a purely negative ideal of repression and constraint. The dissertation claims that, on the contrary, temperance is a positive and attractive virtue, and one that is urgently needed in consumer society
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Theology
O'Connor, John Daniel. "Groundwork for a theoretically ambitious and distinctively virtue ethical theory : constitutivist virtue ethics". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/25708.
Pełny tekst źródłaThompson, Allen Andrew. "Virtue and reason in nature /". Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/5718.
Pełny tekst źródłaMoula, Payam. "Virtue Ethics and right action". Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Culture and Communication, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-54309.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis paper evaluates some arguments made against the conceptions of right action within virtue ethics. I argue that the different accounts of right action can meet the objections raised against them. Michael Slote‘s agent-based and Rosalind Hursthouses agent-focused account of right action give different judgments of right action but there seems to be a lack of real disagreement between the two accounts. I also argue that the concept of right action often has two important parts, relating to action guidance and moral appraisal, respectively, and that virtue ethics can deal with both without a concept of right action.
Kakalis, Nicolaos. "Plato's ethics & virtue ethics". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/24749.
Pełny tekst źródłaLanza, Jean-François. "The search for public virtue". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0009/NQ36291.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaCrockett, Carter. "Grounding the theory of virtue". Thesis, Robert Gordon University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10059/1248.
Pełny tekst źródłaPurcell, Elizabeth Bowie-Sexton. "Flourishing Bodies: Disability, Virtue, Happiness". Thesis, Boston College, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3040.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe pursuit of living a good and moral life has been a longstanding ideal of philosophy, an ideal that dates back to the writings of Plato, and more specifically, Aristotle. This ideal establishes that a good life as a happy and flourishing life is pursued by developing the right motives and the right character. And in order to live this life, one must, then, develop a virtuous character, i.e., be a virtuous person, who desires the good. Finally, in the pursuit of the good, one must not do so alone; rather, one should pursue the virtuous life with others, i.e., friends, because they enhance our ability to think and to act. This specific position which is taken up by Aristotelian virtue ethics, however, has recently come under scrutiny by certain studies in social psychology. Particularly, the concept of character has been discredited by empirical studies. Furthermore, the classic model of the virtuous person has assumed only persons with able-bodies. As a result of these two criticisms, Aristotelian virtue ethics has been discredited as a fantasy ethics available for only a few to achieve. The principle aim of this dissertation is to develop and defend an account of Aristotelian virtue ethics which is grounded in empirical psychology and enables people with disabilities to flourish as moral exemplars within a society. The value of virtue and character for ethical debate is imperative for human happiness within moral life. Instead of happiness being something an individual strives to acquire or feel, Aristotelian virtue ethicists have argued that true happiness is human flourishing. In other words, in order to be happy, humans should focus not just on what it is good to do, but also, and more importantly, focus on who it is good to be. To live a good life, then, it is necessary that one is a good person, or has a good character. Thus, to acquire virtues such as charity, benevolence, honesty, and generosity and to shun vices such as dishonesty, cruelty, or stinginess, is the task, Aristotelian virtue ethicists have argued, that leads to eudaimonia, i.e., human flourishing. The person who has acquired virtuous character traits, then, is the person who is most happy in life. However, the attempt to understand human happiness as a result of a virtuous character has become vulnerable to criticism from philosophical positions grounded in empirical psychology and disability theory. In light of the charge that virtue ethics is a fantasy ethics, many philosophers argue that Aristotelian virtue ethics should be abandoned because it is an ethics with little or no scientific basis. In my defense of Aristotelian virtue ethics, I first address the objection that Aristotelian virtue ethics is a "fantasy ethics" which has no grounding in empirical psychology, and thus, as a result, should not be used for moral theory. This objection has been put forth by certain "Situationist" philosophers, who cite psychological studies which demonstrate that the idea of a virtue as a "global character trait" is something that humans do not actually, or very rarely, possess. This objection to Aristotelian virtue ethics has dealt a devastating blow. In response to this objection, philosopher Nancy Snow has mounted a defense of Aristotelian virtue ethics which is grounded in empirical psychology. Snow's defense, though superficially appealing, has two intractable problems. I address the failure of her proposal in Chapter One: The Problem of Virtue as Social Intelligence. The first problem Snow faces concerns her use of CAPS as a method for virtue ethics to be used throughout life. I call this problem the longitudinality problem, which argues that Snow's proposal for the constancy of virtue for longer than a period of six weeks is overreaching. The second problem Snow faces concerns her reliance on virtue as social intelligence for the actual achievement of being virtuous in daily living. This problem turns on the empirical criteria for what makes a person capable of virtuous action and I call this problem the exclusivity problem, which excludes people with "Autism" form being virtuous. As an alternative to Snow's account, I begin my defense of Aristotelian virtue ethics by developing the following account of empirical virtue based on a narrative identity which desires and actively pursues the good in life-long striving. This moral desire is encouraged through the shared dialogue of virtuous caregiving, which enables a moral novice to flourish and grow into a moral expert. This pursuit of the good enables everyone to flourish and incorporates insights from disability, embodied cognition and social psychology. To accomplish this task, I begin with an examination of the first of two foundational components of character, i.e., the four processing levels of CAPS theory in Chapter Two: Moral Perception. Although CAPS theory provides a solid beginning for an account of virtue, it is not a sustainable theory throughout life. This theory of social-cognitive moral psychology needs to be supplemented by developmental moral psychology. CAPS theory also assumes the individual's perspective in the dynamic interaction between situation and character. It assumes a person's intentions, and this assumption of intentionality - desires, intentions, and beliefs - assumes a person's embodiment in that situation. In other words, CAPS theory assumes lived embodiment. In this chapter, I turn to the method of phenomenology used by both psychologists and philosophers of embodied cognition to account for the moral "interpretation of the situation" experienced by people with illness or impairment. As a complimentary to CAPS and the second foundational component for character, certain moral psychologists have argued for the narrative development of Event Representations for virtuous character. This development begins with the shared dialogue of the caregiver and dependent asking the dependent to recall events which have just occurred. In this practice, the caregiver's aim is to help the dependent form memories and incorporate those memories into the creation of a narrative identity. In Chapter Three: Representations of Moral Events, I extend the caring relation to this practice of shared dialogue to incorporate certain forms of intellectual disability, such as "Autism" and Alzheimer's disease. To accomplish this, I incorporate the roles of narrative and trust in order to construct the relation of dependency and interdependency as trusting co-authorship rather than reciprocal capability. After establishing the importance of the caregiver in the development of one's narrative identity, I employ the life narrative longitudinal psychological approach to moral development as a structure for the moral event representations and schemas guided by the caregiver. Finally, I argue that the co-authorship of one's life story animates one's moral desire for the good and as a result, leads to the development of interdependent virtues. In Chapter Four: Moral Self-Coherence through Personal Strivings, I examine the importance of personal strivings for a sense of lived self-coherence for character over time. My argument is that our personal strivings are unified by the life story which animates and directs those strivings throughout our lives. Although our personal strivings may be altered or deterred due to life transitions including accident, illness, and "disabling injury," they still retain a sense of unity through our overarching life story. It is this narrative which gives unity to both our psychological intentions and bodily intentions, even when they are experienced as a phenomenally lived dualism due to illness, stroke, or impairment. In order to make my argument, I examine ten case studies from medical patients. I argue that our personal strivings toward the good guide our growth of character from a moral novice to become a moral expert. In Chapter Five: Flourishing Bodies, I develop an empirically grounded model of a virtuous character which begins with interdependent virtues and eventually grows into independent virtues. To do this, I draw on the two foundational components of character: CAPS theory and event representations. From the caring relation and shared dialogue of the caregiver, an individual begins to develop basic moral schemas, tasks, and scripts. This is when the individual is a moral novice. As the novice pursues excellences in these practices, the novice grows into a moral expert according to those virtues and becomes virtuously independent. The moral expert, unlike the moral novice, executes virtuous action with ease. Having acquired skills of virtue and knowledge, the moral expert knows the right thing to do at the right time and does so with the right reasons. MacIntyre, however, acknowledged the limit of ethics and turned to politics to address specific needs for people with disabilities such as care, financial support, educational support, and political proxy. The purpose of the final chapter, The Virtue-Oriented Politics of Interdependence, is to follow MacIntyre's endeavor and to propose a virtue-oriented politics of interdependence as an initial solution. First, I examine the various forms of oppression facing people with disabilities in society. In order to address these forms of oppression for people with disabilities, I argue that a shift in the central component of a political framework is needed. Instead of focusing on distribution or recognition, one should focus on education in the broad sense. In conclusion of my dissertation, The Fragility of Virtue, I provide a perspective of our human condition that is a vulnerable one. In this final section, I discuss the role of our collective vulnerability and the fragility of human goodness with regard to illness and impairment. And that our interdependence is strengthened through the virtue of friendship. I finish with a proposal of the role of sacrifice as a way to reconcile the pursuit of a flourishing life in the face of our own fragility
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Philosophy
Nussbaum, Martha C. "Virtue Ethics: The Misleading Category". Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113259.
Pełny tekst źródłaLa ética de la virtud es frecuentemente considerada una categoría singular de la teoría ética, y una rival del kantismo y del utilitarismo. Considero que es un error, puesto que tanto kantianos como utilitaristas pueden tener, y tienen, un interés en las virtudes y en la formación del carácter. Mas, aun si focalizamos el grupo de teóricos de la ética, comúnmente llamados teóricos de la virtud, porque rechazan la dirección tanto del kantismo como del utilitarismo y se inspiran en la ética griega antigua, hay poca unidad en este grupo. Aun cuando hay un delgado territorio común que vincula a todos los miembros del grupo -una preocupación por la formación del carácter, la naturaleza de las pasiones y por la elección sobre el transcurso entero de la vida- también hay diferencias cruciales entre ellos.
Ho, Tsung-Hsing. "Epistemic value and virtue epistemology". Thesis, University of Southampton, 2015. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/383455/.
Pełny tekst źródłaSher, Gavin. "The artistic path to virtue". Thesis, Rhodes University, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10962/d1004370.
Pełny tekst źródłaBovair, Simone. "Handling virtue : Chaucer's narrative art". Thesis, University of Bristol, 2016. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.702157.
Pełny tekst źródłaFreelin, Jeffrey M. "Toward a naturalized virtue ethic /". free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p3036826.
Pełny tekst źródłaSvatos, Michele Lynn. "The structure of virtue ethics". Diss., The University of Arizona, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/186878.
Pełny tekst źródłaBaehr, Jason S. "The epistemological role of the intellectual virtues /". Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/5701.
Pełny tekst źródłaSaad-Delgado, Mariela. "Une Analyse de la Vertu dans Trois Tragédies Historiques de Pierre Corneille". Scholar Commons, 2018. https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/7566.
Pełny tekst źródłaPillay, Yershen. "Essential virtues for responsible leader behaviour : a virtue-based approach to responsible leader behaviour". Diss., University of Pretoria, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/79637.
Pełny tekst źródłaMini Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2020.
pt2021
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
MBA
Unrestricted
Moberly, Jennifer Lynne. "The virtue of Bonhoeffer's ethics : a study of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's ethics in relation to virtue ethics". Thesis, Durham University, 2009. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/89/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStockden, Eric W. A. "Democracy, civic virtue and liberal education". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape7/PQDD_0032/NQ38509.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaBeam, Craig. "Virtue beyond morality, Nietzsche's ethical naturalism". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0002/NQ44751.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaHooten, James R. "St. Thomas Aquinas and virtue epistemology". Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2006. http://www.tren.com/search.cfm?p050-0136.
Pełny tekst źródłaDuff, Tim. "Plutarch's "lives" : exploring virtue and vice /". Oxford [u.a.] : Clarendon Press, 1999. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy0606/98040794-d.html.
Pełny tekst źródłaevers, madeleine. "Emotion,Imagination and Virtue in Education". Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för utbildningsvetenskap (UV), 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-26655.
Pełny tekst źródłaDevine, John William. "Challenges to Virtue in Political Office". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.522880.
Pełny tekst źródłaSussman, Matthew Benjamin. "Stylistic Virtue in Nineteenth-Century Fiction". Thesis, Harvard University, 2013. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11097.
Pełny tekst źródłaShelton, Paul J. "An Ignatian approach to virtue education". Thesis, Boston College, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:105022.
Pełny tekst źródłaLee, K. H. "Political legitimacy, representation, and confucian Virtue". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2014. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1429891/.
Pełny tekst źródłaWillows, Adam Matthew. "A defence of theological virtue ethics". Thesis, Durham University, 2015. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/10957/.
Pełny tekst źródłaLindemann, Monica A. "Environmental Virtue Education: Ancient Wisdom Applied". Thesis, University of North Texas, 2005. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4859/.
Pełny tekst źródłaMalone, Christopher David. "The foundations of international political virtue". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:0f14f2a6-0d49-4c8d-8ebb-cb5af2cc444d.
Pełny tekst źródłaBrown, Christopher Anthony. "A Kantian Account of Human Virtue". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/195324.
Pełny tekst źródłaSilver, David Brian 1969. "A virtue theory of practical reason". Diss., The University of Arizona, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/288726.
Pełny tekst źródłaWoodford, Nicole Frances. "Moral luck : control, choice, and virtue". Thesis, University of Hull, 2016. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:15196.
Pełny tekst źródłaKjellsson, Love. "Can the Act of Destroying Nature be Evil in Itself? : A Virtue Ethical Approach to the Last Man Thought Experiment". Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-123172.
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