Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Vietnamese Communist Movement”

This article argues that the diplomacy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam came closer to failure than we have thought. Between 1945 and 1950, Vietnamese communists had a remarkably hard time joining the internationalist communist movement. Stalin, above all, was wary of Hôô Chíí Minh, whom he considered untrustworthy for having "dissolved" the Indochinese Communist Party in 1945. This article concludes that, thanks to Chinese communist pressure, Stalin agreed to recognize the DRV. Had he not done so, Vietnamese communists would have found themselves almost completely isolated at a crucial point in their struggle for national independence.

The Denounce the Communists Campaign (1955–c.1960) was a key moment in the conflict between the Republic of Vietnam (RVN, South Vietnam) and the Vietnamese communist movement and would eventually escalate to become the Vietnam War. The RVN launched the campaign to turn public opinion against communism and destroy the underground communist network. Building on previous scholarship, this article examines the propaganda associated with the initiative. During the campaign, state propagandists and allied intellectuals developed a historical narrative about the Anti-French Resistance (1945–54) that vilified the communists. Although highly partisan, the narrative illuminates the longer history of violence between communists and anti-communists in Vietnam.

AbstractThis article studies the collaboration between the Chinese and Vietnamese communists in the socialist transformation of their shared borderlands after the First Indochina War. It both complicates and clarifies the volatile bilateral relationship between the two emerging communist states as they solidified their power in the 1950s. Departing from traditional narratives of Sino-Vietnamese relations which focus on wars and conflicts, this article examines how the timely convergence of Cold War and state expansion transformed the Sino-Vietnamese borderlands from 1954 to 1957. Using both Chinese and Vietnamese archival sources, it contends that the Chinese and Vietnamese communists pursued two interrelated goals in carrying out the political projects at the territorial limits of their countries. First, they wanted to build an inward-looking economy and society at the respective borders by consolidating the national administration of territory. Second, they wanted to impose a contrived Cold War comradeship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in place of the organic interdependence of people within the borderlands that had existed in the area for centuries. The Sino-Vietnamese border, therefore, was the focus of joint state-building by the two communist governments, which made the cross-border movement of people and goods more visible, manipulable, and, more importantly, taxable.

This article reexamines Nhân Văn–Giai Phẩm (NVGP), a political protest movement led by intellectuals that coalesced in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1956. The article reassesses the development of the movement and the internal composition of its leadership. Through a close reading of the major publications produced by NVGP, the article takes issue with the conventional view, which characterizes the movement as a robust grouping of political dissidents against the party-state. The article shows that NVGP should in fact be seen as a relatively timid strain of the “revisionist” or “reform Communist” movements that emerged throughout the Communist world in the wake of Iosif Stalin's death.

The South China Sea conflict is spurring a popular nationalist movement in Vietnam that challenges the ruling communist Party by demanding Hà Nội to sever relations with its patron in Beijing. This paper examines this movement by connecting it to the often misunderstood historical relationship between the ruling Party and modern Vietnamese nationalism. This historical relationship explains why the Party has tried to suppress the movement and why movement discourse strives to debunk national myths and reconstruct national history. Linking national interests to democracy and human rights, the currently fragile movement is creating dissent within the Party and damaging its legitimacy.

Cold War historians have neglected the significance of the year 1948 for Indochina. Based on new sources, this paper shows critical shifts in politics within the Vietnamese nationalist movement in 1948. These were the result of converging developments during late 1947 and early 1948, including changes in international politics, in French–Vietnamese relations, and in the relationship between non-communist and communist leaders within the Việt Minh state. By late 1948, Party ideologues were already looking beyond national independence towards building a new socialist regime. The nationalist coalition that had led the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was seriously damaged in 1948, even though civil war would only break out several years later. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, 1948 thus marked a new period: the beginning of the end of the ‘united front’ period and cooperation with bourgeois nationalists.

AbstractCivil society actors collectively organized online and offline to nominate themselves and oppose the Vietnamese Communist Party in the 2016 legislative election. The level of opposition coordination among these independent self-nominees exceeded and qualitatively differed from previous atomized attempts in the 2011 election. External shifts in the political opportunity structure offer only a partial explanation for the increased coordination among independent candidates in Vietnam's 2016 self-nomination movement. In this article, I theorize that it is the combination of both opportunity structure and overlapping linkages across spheres of social contention and civil society, all accumulated from a prior history of protests and activism, that provide the conditions for the emergence of independent self-nominees and opposition coordination in single-party-elections. In Vietnam, a cumulative process of participation in social contention and civil society organizations during 2011 to 2016 allowed actors to develop linkages that strengthened their repertoires of contention and resonant frames of collective action. These linkages, combined with favorable political opportunities, effectively facilitated greater mobilization and coordination among independent self-nominees in the 2016 election.

AbstractThis paper examines recent constitutional mobilisation in China, embodied in the weiquan (right defence) movement, Charter 08 and the 2013 constitutionalism debate. It contrasts Chinese and Vietnamese experience of constitutional mobilisation. This paper argues that constitutional mobilisation in China presents both convergence and divergence with those in Vietnam. The convergence stems from domestic dynamics, the impact of globalisation and the shared features of socialist/communist institutional settings. The divergence is due to Chinese constitutional exceptionalism and Vietnam's instrumentalist approach to global constitutionalism. Particularly, without necessary constitutional opportunity created by the constitution-making process, constitutional mobilisation in China has not created a national constitutional dialogue as has happened in Vietnam. This paper draws attention to the new function of socialist constitutions as a frame for social mobilisation and has general implications for the comparative inquiry into the social dynamics of constitutional law.

During May 1936 and March 1937 there were attempts by different political factions in Cochin China to form an Indochinese Congress. The congress was planned as a people's assembly in which the Vietnamese could negotiate colonial reforms with French authorities. Such attempts revealed competition among different political factions and also reflected a genuine French effort to introduce reforms and liberalize the Indochinese colony. The congress movement was eventually suppressed by French authorities, but it provided the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) with access to the masses and helped the Party expand its political activities into the Mekong Delta during the latter half of the 1930s.

The Vietnamese people have always harboured an extraordinarily strong patriotic drive. But the government formed by Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969) after the Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on the 2nd September 1945, the group that was to represent majority Vietnamese opinion until and after 1975, was spearheaded by the Vietminh (League for Vietnam's Independence) - a movement that did not define itself as Nationalist, but rather as an expressly Communist group. When the people of Vietnam looked for leadership, this was the obvious group to choose - the only movement prepared and willing to step in (other, more nationalist resistance groups had prematurely flourished and failed, as shall be discussed). In the Vietnam that found itself suddenly free at the close of the Second World War, no other lobby was ready, no group presented itself nationally as the Communists were and did. The Liberation Army that seized control of town after town was the military arm of the Viet Minh, formed in 1944 under Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1912), an element of a movement that published its manifesto in February 1930, that had begun preparation and ideological training in the late 1920's in Guangzhou under Ho Chi Minh. Given the long preparation carried out by the Vietminh, the progression to the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a Communist nation with Ho at its head was a natural one. Whilst that development seems logical given the conditions of the day, the manner in which those conditions were reached (or manipulated) has been the subject of intense debate. Was that natural progression one in which the ideologists of Communist revolution 'captured' the Nationalist movement, exploited a nationalistic fervour to produce the desired revolt, using the front of the Viet Minh to blend their esoteric dogmas with the more easily understood nationalist cause of resistance? This is a perception held by many modern historians - that, in effect, Communists are the parasites of the modernization process. This attitude was and is encouraged by examination of advice given to Asian revolutionaries by their Soviet counterparts; Grigori Zinoviev (1833-1936) - later to die by Stalin's order - argued in 1922 that Communists should co-operate with the rising nationalists in Asia, gain the leadership of their movement, and then cast aside the genuine national leaders. For by itself, the tiny Indochina Communist Party could never have hoped to attract the support of politically engaged Vietnamese, let alone the hearts and minds of the nation at large. This is the essence of the currently accepted analysis of the revolutionary Vietnamese setting - that the Communist lobby exploited a majority furious with the abuses of French rule, sliding Communism into a dominant role in Vietnamese life. The majority of people had not fought for a communist government, but to be rid of the colonial occupying power. Such a perception, as shall be discussed, is representative of the Western reading of the whole Southeast Asian region of the day. The Vietnamese people were accustomed to the use of violence to protect their independence; perennial opposition to expansionist China meant that few peoples in Asia had been compelled to fight longer and harder to retain their identity as a separate and independent state than the Vietnamese. Whilst the ability and commitment of the Vietcong in resistance to outside power has been recognised, the strong sense of Vietnamese identity in and of itself has never really been acknowledged beyond the most simplistic of terms by external observers, perhaps because of the difficulty of comprehending how such an emotion can form when looking at the odd shape of the nation on a map. Such a lack of awareness allows supposed Vietnam specialists to assert that the dominant Vietnamese self-assessment is the extent to which the country is not Chinese (and, to a lesser extent, not French) rather than entering into a more significant analysis of how a national identity formed: how, whilst certainly influenced by feelings of encirclement and domination, Vietnam also developed a separate, distinct sense of self. This, whilst a sense that has only relatively recently manifested itself in territorial demands, is a longstanding emotion and sense, in and of itself. Given an understanding of that sense or merely an awareness of its existence, the willingness of the Vietnamese to combat the most powerful nation on Earth, though certainly impressive, needs little explanation; this work has attempted to explore a more difficult question - why they chose the dogma that served them. The idea that the majority of the Vietnamese people had not fought for a communist government, but to be rid of the colonial occupying power is in truth the presentation of a false dichotomy. The fact that a group within a broad movement participates for different reasons from another group does not necessarily imply exploitation or pretense. Neither does the fact that one has a strong political ideology such as socialism forbid the possession of any other political inclination, such as patriotism. The concept of a socialist exploitation of Vietnamese nationalism will be opposed here: a discussion of the disputed importance of nationalism to the Vietnamese Communist movement in resistance, and of Communism to the nationalist movement, will form the subject of this essay. The unity of Vietnam under Communist government in 1975 seems a fitting end to the period to be considered. Much of interest - the politics behind partition, or the Communist-led conduct of war with America, for example - can be considered only briefly; fortunately, these are issues considered in great depth elsewhere. The central issue to this work shall be the development of the Communist movement in French Indochina, and the thesis herein shall be that nationalism and Marxist-Leninism occupied a symbiotic relationship in the motivation of the Communist movement and its chief practitioners in the nation once again known as Vietnam.

The Vietnamese people have always harboured an extraordinarily strong patriotic drive. But the government formed by Ho Chi Minh (1890-1969) after the Declaration of Independence of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on the 2nd September 1945, the group that was to represent majority Vietnamese opinion until and after 1975, was spearheaded by the Vietminh (League for Vietnam's Independence) - a movement that did not define itself as Nationalist, but rather as an expressly Communist group. When the people of Vietnam looked for leadership, this was the obvious group to choose - the only movement prepared and willing to step in (other, more nationalist resistance groups had prematurely flourished and failed, as shall be discussed). In the Vietnam that found itself suddenly free at the close of the Second World War, no other lobby was ready, no group presented itself nationally as the Communists were and did. The Liberation Army that seized control of town after town was the military arm of the Viet Minh, formed in 1944 under Vo Nguyen Giap (b. 1912), an element of a movement that published its manifesto in February 1930, that had begun preparation and ideological training in the late 1920's in Guangzhou under Ho Chi Minh. Given the long preparation carried out by the Vietminh, the progression to the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a Communist nation with Ho at its head was a natural one. Whilst that development seems logical given the conditions of the day, the manner in which those conditions were reached (or manipulated) has been the subject of intense debate. Was that natural progression one in which the ideologists of Communist revolution 'captured' the Nationalist movement, exploited a nationalistic fervour to produce the desired revolt, using the front of the Viet Minh to blend their esoteric dogmas with the more easily understood nationalist cause of resistance? This is a perception held by many modern historians - that, in effect, Communists are the parasites of the modernization process. This attitude was and is encouraged by examination of advice given to Asian revolutionaries by their Soviet counterparts; Grigori Zinoviev (1833-1936) - later to die by Stalin's order - argued in 1922 that Communists should co-operate with the rising nationalists in Asia, gain the leadership of their movement, and then cast aside the genuine national leaders. For by itself, the tiny Indochina Communist Party could never have hoped to attract the support of politically engaged Vietnamese, let alone the hearts and minds of the nation at large. This is the essence of the currently accepted analysis of the revolutionary Vietnamese setting - that the Communist lobby exploited a majority furious with the abuses of French rule, sliding Communism into a dominant role in Vietnamese life. The majority of people had not fought for a communist government, but to be rid of the colonial occupying power. Such a perception, as shall be discussed, is representative of the Western reading of the whole Southeast Asian region of the day. The Vietnamese people were accustomed to the use of violence to protect their independence; perennial opposition to expansionist China meant that few peoples in Asia had been compelled to fight longer and harder to retain their identity as a separate and independent state than the Vietnamese. Whilst the ability and commitment of the Vietcong in resistance to outside power has been recognised, the strong sense of Vietnamese identity in and of itself has never really been acknowledged beyond the most simplistic of terms by external observers, perhaps because of the difficulty of comprehending how such an emotion can form when looking at the odd shape of the nation on a map. Such a lack of awareness allows supposed Vietnam specialists to assert that the dominant Vietnamese self-assessment is the extent to which the country is not Chinese (and, to a lesser extent, not French) rather than entering into a more significant analysis of how a national identity formed: how, whilst certainly influenced by feelings of encirclement and domination, Vietnam also developed a separate, distinct sense of self. This, whilst a sense that has only relatively recently manifested itself in territorial demands, is a longstanding emotion and sense, in and of itself. Given an understanding of that sense or merely an awareness of its existence, the willingness of the Vietnamese to combat the most powerful nation on Earth, though certainly impressive, needs little explanation; this work has attempted to explore a more difficult question - why they chose the dogma that served them. The idea that the majority of the Vietnamese people had not fought for a communist government, but to be rid of the colonial occupying power is in truth the presentation of a false dichotomy. The fact that a group within a broad movement participates for different reasons from another group does not necessarily imply exploitation or pretense. Neither does the fact that one has a strong political ideology such as socialism forbid the possession of any other political inclination, such as patriotism. The concept of a socialist exploitation of Vietnamese nationalism will be opposed here: a discussion of the disputed importance of nationalism to the Vietnamese Communist movement in resistance, and of Communism to the nationalist movement, will form the subject of this essay. The unity of Vietnam under Communist government in 1975 seems a fitting end to the period to be considered. Much of interest - the politics behind partition, or the Communist-led conduct of war with America, for example - can be considered only briefly; fortunately, these are issues considered in great depth elsewhere. The central issue to this work shall be the development of the Communist movement in French Indochina, and the thesis herein shall be that nationalism and Marxist-Leninism occupied a symbiotic relationship in the motivation of the Communist movement and its chief practitioners in the nation once again known as Vietnam.
Thesis (Masters)
Master of Arts
Griffith Business School
Faculty of International Business and Politics
Full Text

This thesis is an examination of Nguyen Ai Quoc's (Ho Chi Minh's) role in transmitting communism to Vietnam in the period between the First and Second World Wars. As the Third International (Comintern) provided the theory and much of the organizational support for this task, it is also a study of the Comintern's changing policies towards revolution in colonial countries. It has grown out of research in the Moscow archives of the Comintern, which first became available to researchers in late 1991-1992. It also makes extensive use of the French colonial archives at the Centre d'Archives d'Outre-Mer in Aix-en-Provence. This study begins with Nguyen Ai Quoc's appearance in Paris in 1919, when he lobbied the Paris Peace Conference for greater Vietnamese freedom and was then drawn into the political world of the French left. It follows his first contacts with the Comintern in Moscow (1923- 1924), through his two-year sojourn in Canton during the Communist-Guomindang United Front, when he established the first training courses for Vietnamese revolutionaries. Chapters IV and V cover his return to Asia in mid-1928, his founding of the Vietnamese Communist Party in 1930, and the 1930-31 insurrectionary movement in Vietnam. Chapter Six deals with his Jime 1931 arrest and his long period of political inactivity in Moscow, from mid-1934 until the autumn of 1938. The final chapter covers his return to southern China and his efforts to regain his influence in the Vietnamese communist movement from 1939 to 1941. The thesis concludes that, with the benefit of the documentary evidence now available, it is necessary to readjust the perception of Nguyen Ai Quoc as an influential communist during his early political career. Initially he received little financial support from Moscow and he never became a member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nor did he exist entirely within the world of the Comintern. Although the latter was an essential force in the creation of Vietnamese communism, there were other factors which shaped its growth, including family and regional ties, as well as Chinese and French left-wing politics.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2008.
Title from first page of PDF file (viewed July 14, 2008). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 221-235).

The essay falls into two sections. The first examines the history of the Third International (Comintern) from its creation in 1919 to its dissolution in 1943, looking at the imposition of the Twenty-One Conditions on parties wishing to join the new International in 1920, the move from a perspective of splitting the labour movement to one of a united front in the early 1920s, the shift to the sectarian ‘third period’ strategy in 1928, and the gradual emergence of the popular front strategy in the mid-1930s. It examines the institutions of the Comintern and the Stalinization of national communist parties. The second section looks at some issues in the historiography of the Comintern, including the extent to which it was a tool of Soviet foreign policy, conflict over policy within the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI), and the relationship of ECCI to ‘national sections’, with a particular focus on the Vietnamese Communist Party. Finally, it discusses problems of cultural and linguistic communication within the Comintern.

This chapter traces the history of music censorship in Vietnam since 1954 with reference to a broad range of music genres. It discusses music censorship from 1954 to 1975, when Vietnam was divided into North and South. The tight ideological control established by the Vietnamese Communist Party in the North is compared with music movements linked to antiwar protests in the South. The chapter then examines the period of severe censorship following the end of the Vietnamese-American war in 1975 and considers how the cultural climate changed in the reform era after 1986. It highlights the limits of cultural freedom in the reform era and discusses how music censorship has become intertwined with concerns about the effects of globalization on morality and national identity. Finally, the chapter addresses the impact of technology since the late 1990s, paying particular attention to Vietnamese rap and the potential for musicians to use the Internet to bypass conventional systems of state censorship.

Chapter 6 reveals that Beijing increased its military aid and advisory assistance to the Vietnamese Communists in their war efforts against the French in 1953–1954 to meet the new goal. Beijing sent political advisors to Vietnam in early 1953 to supervise the land reform. The large rural movement spread in the north and many provinces in the south. As a result of the land reform, more poor peasants supported the Vietnamese Communist Party, officially the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP), and joined the PAVN. The peasants’ enthusiasm would bring about the PAVN’s final victory at Dien Bien Phu. The PLA sent Korean veterans to Vietnam after the Korean War ended in July 1953, including engineering, artillery, and AAA officers and troops, who played an important role in the siege of Dien Bien Phu in January-March 1954.

This chapter resurrects the infamous history of shadowy US-based anti-communist insurgent forces modelled on Ronald Reagan’s “freedom fighters.” Often disparaged as the quintessential “bad refugee” that brought the Vietnam War to America, as evidenced by the unsolved murders of several Vietnamese journalists suspected of communist ties, the members of the “resistance movement” were actually being “good refugees” as defined by the secret Cold War policies of the Reagan Administration.

The chapter explores the political backgrounds, strategic interests, and diplomatic consequences of Senator J. William Fulbright’s visit to socialist Yugoslavia in November 1964 to chair the signing of the Yugoslav Fulbright agreement. The mission tackled two issues: as a US senator, Fulbright repaired misunderstandings and low points of previous US-Yugoslav bilateral relations; as a politician who was intellectually committed to liberal internationalism, he confirmed his support for Yugoslav independence from the Soviet Union and, by observing the Yugoslav Communist regime, convinced himself of a different solution for Vietnam’s emerging tangle. By examining Fulbright and Yugoslav papers, the chapter argues that Yugoslav experimentation with national communism and its possible bridge function between East and West framed the senator’s politics of dissent over Vietnam on the assumption that Communist movements were not as monolithic as most US policy makers viewed them. America’s soft approach to Yugoslav communism corroborated Fulbright’s convictions and persuaded him that Yugoslavia could serve as a case study for the impasse in Vietnam.

Chapter 1 details how Ho made China his revolutionary base from World War II to the French Indochina War. The Vietnamese and Chinese shared a common heritage and anticolonial experiences for more than a hundred years. The background narrative extends beyond the diplomatic activities and historical events between China and Vietnam and views their nationalist independence movements and Communist revolutions as an intertwined history, not as isolated or parallel phenomena. East Asia’s countries and peoples participated in the global Cold War of 1946–1991 for their own historical reasons in some specific ways that served their own political agenda, met their economic programs and security needs, and created their own development models. This chapter places Vietnam and China at center stage for exploring the anticolonial movements and transnationalism in East and Southeast Asia from 1800 to 1949 rather than treating them primarily as subordinate or dependent actors in a larger historical drama. As a result, by the early twentieth century, all of these areas saw the rise of new kinds of nationalism and Communism, which were adjusting to military confrontations with the West.

The end of the Illinois student movement came wrapped in the intertwined issues of the day, race and war, when first, a young black man named Edgar Hoults was fatally shot in the back by Champaign police, and then next day, President Richard Nixon announced an invasion of the sovereign state of Cambodia. Hoults was guilty of having an expired driver’s license, Cambodia of harboring North Vietnamese. Champaign community leaders demanded an explanation from police, U.S. congressmen demanded one from the president, and neither received satisfaction. Four days later Ohio National Guardsmen shot and killed four protesters at Kent State.

In summer of 1969, the NY Young Lords launched an ambitious course of community-based protests, involving thousands of residents in East Harlem. They addressed many of the social problems underscored, but unsolved, by the War on Poverty. Their legendary “Garbage Offensive,” name in deference to the Tet Offensive of the Vietnamese, the group barricaded major throughways with East Harlem’s uncollected garbage. It exposed environmental racism and impugned city government for treating Puerto Ricans and Black Americans like garbage. It’s combination of urban guerrilla protest with sharp political messaging pressured politicians to respond, and poor sanitation services became a major issue in the run-up to the heated mayoral elections in November 1969. Although histories of the civil rights and black power movements are popularly understood within the framework of citizenship rights, the work of organizations like the Black Panthers and the Young Lords paint a portrait of struggle that is more composite. They show that the black movement set in motion an awakening of social consciousness wherein virtually no social issue escaped public scrutiny. The Young Lords’ campaigns established standards of decency in city services that expanded the definition of the common good and stretched our nation’s definition of democracy.

Chapter 7 explores how translocal livelihoods have contributed to a rise in nationalistic discourse, national communitarian ideology and the ethnically mediated ‘othering’ of certain groups. The chapter begins by exploring the linkages between the domestic garment industry, the union movement and political opposition to the incumbent Cambodia People’s Party, before extending the analysis to explore these themes in relation to Cambodia’s two major international migration systems: those with Thailand and Vietnam. The first of these examines issues of national identity amongst translocal migrants to Thailand in order to interpret the impact of international household and community economies on political conceptions of the state. The second examines the perspectives of translocal migrants between Cambodia and Vietnam, in the context of Cambodia’s recent upsurge in anti-Vietnamese popular sentiment and political discourse. Chapter 7 concludes by drawing together the lessons of these case studies to consider both how mass translocal livelihoods have shaped national discourse and how national narratives of nationhood have contributed to structuring Cambodia’s international diaspora.