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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Vertical integration"

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Turk, Matthew. "Vertical Integration". Computing in Science & Engineering 17, nr 1 (styczeń 2015): 64–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mcse.2015.27.

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Dunea, G. "Vertical integration". BMJ 312, nr 7037 (20.04.1996): 1044. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.312.7037.1044a.

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Joskow, Paul L. "Vertical Integration". Antitrust Bulletin 57, nr 3 (wrzesień 2012): 545–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003603x1205700303.

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Tyler, Neil. "Vertical Integration". New Electronics 52, nr 14 (23.07.2019): 14–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.12968/s0047-9624(22)61574-8.

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WATERSON, MICHAEL. "VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND VERTICAL RESTRAINTS". Oxford Review of Economic Policy 9, nr 2 (1993): 41–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/9.2.41.

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Wilding, Helen. "Integrating Care: From Horizontal to Vertical Integration". Journal of Integrated Care 18, nr 3 (czerwiec 2010): 15–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5042/jic.2010.0244.

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Quirmbach, H. C. "Sequential Vertical Integration". Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, nr 3 (1.08.1992): 1101–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118377.

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Fox, Wende L. "Vertical integration strategies". Health Care Management Review 14, nr 3 (1989): 49–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00004010-198922000-00007.

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Jackson, P. "Vertical test integration". IEEE Aerospace and Electronic Systems Magazine 15, nr 6 (czerwiec 2000): 39–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/62.847930.

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Newhouse, Robin P., i Mary Etta Mills. "Vertical Systems Integration". JONA: The Journal of Nursing Administration 29, nr 10 (październik 1999): 22–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00005110-199910000-00006.

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Rozprawy doktorskie na temat "Vertical integration"

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Williams, Ryan M. "Vertical Firm Boundaries: Supplier-Customer Contracts and Vertical Integration". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/finance_diss/20.

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I empirically examine the choice of a firm’s vertical boundaries—specifically, the decision to use supplier-customer contracts instead of either using markets or vertical integration. I examine the determinants of supplier-customer contracts using data on a customer’s contractual purchase obligations with its suppliers. Contracting propensity is positively related to supplier relationship-specific investments (RSI), the supplier’s relative bargaining power, and vertical integration costs, and negatively related to contracting costs, alternative sources of information about the customer, and the percentage of a customer’s input traded on financial markets. I also find that customer firms which have product market contracts with their suppliers have better relative performance. These performance effects are enhanced by relationship-specific investments and are robust to corrections for endogeneity. Additionally, I examine the choice between vertical integration versus supplier-customer contracts and find that the choice is predicted by the type of RSI. Consistent with theory, RSI measured using tangible (intangible) assets are positively related to integration (contracts). Further, positive (negative) shocks to industry-level intangible investment are related to increases in a firm’s contracting activity and decreases (increases) in the level of vertical integration, while positive (negative) shocks to industry-level tangible investment are related to decreases in contracting activity and increases (decreases) in the level of vertical integration. My results suggest that market frictions play an important role in shaping supplier-customer contracting activity and firm boundaries.
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Tassano, Fabian. "Upstream competition and vertical integration". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.267769.

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Dawson, Robert Donald. "Vertical Integration in Commercial Fisheries". Diss., Virginia Tech, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/28627.

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Vertical integration has received much attention in the last 25 years and there are well-known theories that explain this behavior. However, the one common thread that runs through virtually all of this research is the assumption of private property rights. Very little attention has been paid to how firms behave when the property rights structure under which they operate changes. The commercial fishing industry is a prime example of an industry where property rights have shifted. Due to problems of over-fishing and over-capitalization, economists have championed the conversion of fisheries from common property or open access resources, to private property through the use of quota programs. Research shows that quota management is effective in reducing capitalization in fisheries, yet there are questions about other effects the programs might have. Among these is a concern over increased vertical integration. Some argue that this is leading to a loss of the independent fisherman that is a part of U.S. history, much like family farms. There is also concern that increased vertical integration is in turn leading to decreased competition in these markets; by owning the quota that is required to fish, processors are increasing their power over the market for unprocessed fish. In response to these and other concerns, the United States Congress imposed a moratorium on the implementation of individual transferable quota-style (ITQ) programs in 1996. Speculation aside, however, there is no empirical evidence to confirm or refute that the use of quota management actually leads to increased vertical coordination. Three fisheries are used as case studies to analyze what affects the decision to vertically coordinate in commercial fisheries. The traditional reasons for vertical integration are to lower transaction costs or to foreclose a market. But now a new factor, shifting property rights, is also considered. Results indicate that the individual characteristics of the fishery are more important than the management or property rights regime itself. This gives some direction to designing management programs that meet our desire to reduce over-capitalization and over-fishing, yet avoid increasing vertical coordination, all the while minimizing the loss of resource rent in the fishery.
Ph. D.
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Kwon, Myung-Joong. "Partial vertical integration and competition policy". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.357525.

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Teixeria, Joao Carlos Aguiar. "Essays on outsourcing and vertical integration". Thesis, Lancaster University, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.538614.

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Halonen, Maija-Liisa Kristiina. "On the theory of vertical integration". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1994. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1248/.

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This thesis explores vertical integration in both competitive and noncompetitive settings. Chapter 2 shows that allocation of ownership matters even in a repeated relationship. The optimal control structure of the static game restricts the gain from deviation to be the lowest but also the punishment will be minimal. The worst ownership structure of the one-shot game is good in the repeated setting because it provides the highest punishment but bad because the gain from deviation is also the highest. We show that two types of equilibria exist: one where partnership and a hostage type solution are optimal and second where the results of the one-shot game apply. Chapter 3 focuses on vertical oligopolies when both integrated and unintegrated firms coexist. We analyse the integrated firm's strategy in the input market. If the integrated firm is more efficient in transforming the input into final good, it will buy some input to drive up rival's marginal cost. Only if the integrated firm is less efficient will it sell input. If there is no competition in the final good market vertical supply arises because it has no harmful effects on the downstream unit's profits. If competition is very tough overbuying will emerge; by raising rival's costs the integrated firm can achieve a dominant position in a highly competitive market. Chapter 4 examines integration decisions of successive duopolists. We show that qualitatively the same pattern of integration emerges whether there is Cournot or Bertrand competition in the input market. We find that the degree of integration in the industry is increasing in the size of the downstream market. There is a tendency for partial integration when one upstream firm is relatively efficient compared to its rival. Chapter 5 takes into account both the firm's internal and external environment. Further, we explicitly model the effect of varying the degree of market competition. We observe a non-monotonic relationship between ownership allocation and competition. We also see greater upstream ownership of assets when the upstream worker is important.
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Kimmich, Stephen. "Vertical integration, firm boundaries, & business models". Thesis, University of Manchester, 2018. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/vertical-integration-firm-boundaries--business-models(0435f63a-f472-4a61-8688-7828a88514be).html.

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The goal of this research project is to contribute to a better understanding of the theoretical frameworks that explain firm boundary choices. Although firm boundaries are a broad and heavily researched topic, there is no comprehensive understanding of why companies choose to conduct certain activities themselves while at the same time relying on external partners for other activities. Although some decisions can be understood through Transaction Cost Economics and others can be understood from the Resource-Based-View and other constructs, none of these existing frameworks are able to explain all decisions at all times. Even when combining the frameworks, gaps remain in which a specific choice of a firm cannot be fully understood. In addition to better understanding the strengths, weaknesses, and gaps in the various existing frameworks, this thesis will try to analyze the potential of the emerging business model framework in helping to supply a more complete explanation for the various paths firms take. By comparing four different direct competitors within the automotive safety industry, this research project tries to identify the background and motivations on the various vertical integration decisions made by each of the companies. When comparing the four firms, specific attention was given to identifying polar-type cases in which two firms either made opposite decisions, the same decisions at different points in time, or where a single firm chose to shift their boundaries. By identifying these polar cases and deeply analyzing the environment in which the decisions were made, a better understanding of the gaps and weaknesses in the existing frameworks could be exposed. Ultimately, the business model framework was introduced as offering a potential means of closing these gaps and offering a more holistic explanation of the firms’ choices. By recognizing that the four firms pursued individual business model designs, the potential for using this new framework to better understand firm boundaries could be explored. Overall, an explanation based on the additional business model framework was successful in helping to better understand some of the strengths and weaknesses of the existing frameworks, and offers a significant opportunity for further research into firm boundaries.
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Chikhladze, George Mandy David. "Vertical integration and sabotage evidence and regulation /". Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri--Columbia, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/6843.

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Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on Feb. 23, 2010). The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Dissertation advisor: Dr. David Mandy. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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Grove, Donald E. "The Vertical Integration of Mechatronics at Virginia Tech". Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/31554.

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The focus of this thesis is on the vertical integration of mechatronics in the mechanical engineering curriculum at Virginia Tech. It reports the details of an experimental strategy to integrate mechatronics at an early level in the education of engineers. A proposal was submitted to and accepted by the NSF/SUCCEED coalition to fund this experiment. Through this assistance, the experiment of vertically integrating mechatronics was initiated. The methodology in which it was integrated is presented -- through optional participation in a sophomore design class and a required design project in a junior system dynamics course. The material developed for the vertical integration of mechatronics is in the appendices. This material is appropriate for other institutions to use to vertically integrate mechatronics into their curriculums, which is part of the NSF/SUCCEED coalitionâ s initiative. For the sophomore class, ME 2024, Introduction to Engineering Design and Economics, selected sections were exposed to the concepts of mechatronic design, along with the normal course material. Students in the mechatronic sections were given an opportunity to incorporate the use of a custom-built VT Project Box and the PIC Visual Development (PVD) software, both of which were created specifically for the task of vertical integration of mechatronics. Throughout the semester, the students were given several demonstrations of mechatronic systems through the use of the project box and software. Many students decided to implement mechatronic concepts in their final design projects. A smaller number of students made a decision to use the project box and software to develop a prototype of their final design project. Candid remarks about the students experiences, obtained from a survey at the semesterâ s end, indicated that the vertical integration of mechatronics was a motivational feature in the second-year curriculum. For the junior class, ME 3514, System Dynamics, all sections were exposed to the concepts of mechatronics, along with the normal course material. The students were required to acquire steady-state velocity data from a DC motor and create an analytical model of the motor to predict the steady-state velocity for a given duty cycle of a pulse-width modulated controller. After the collection of the data and the creation of the analytical model, the students compared the results of simulations to the actual data collected, and report the comparison to the instructor in a memorandum. The collection of the steady-state velocity data was accomplished using the PVD software and the VT Project Box. The essentials of mechatronics was communicated to the students in two lectures, and the students gained hands-on experience with mechatronics through the use of the project box and the software. The lecture material covered the basics of mechatronics, the Mechatronics course at Virginia Tech, and detailed information about the design project. The assessment of the vertical integration of mechatronics into this junior course was accomplished by surveying all of the students in the course. The results of the survey indicated that the inclusion of mechatronics material increased the students understanding of the course material and also increased their interest in mechatronics.
Master of Science
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Dheilly, Clément. "Patent licensing and vertical integration in complementary markets". Thesis, Rennes 1, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017REN1G008/document.

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Le secteur des TIC est caractérisé par des arrangements stratégiques de transferts de technologies tels que les licences et les regroupements de brevets. Par ailleurs, les produits et services ont souvent de fortes relations de complémentarité dans ce secteur. Afin de garantir un niveau satisfaisant d'interopérabilité aux utilisateurs, les producteurs de biens complémentaires doivent échanger des informations techniques. Cette thèse cherche à prendre en compte ces deux dimensions et à produire de nouveaux éclairages sur les cas de politique de concurrence impliquant des marchés complémentaires (e.g Intel/McAfee, Google/Motorola). Nous étendons la littérature sur les licences de brevets en modélisant des marchés avals différenciés et complémentaires. En utilisant les méthodes de l'économie industrielle, nous caractérisons les stratégies de licences profitables pour un innovateur en situation de monopole concernant le nombre de licences, les instruments tarifaires ainsi que l'intégration verticale et conglomérale. Nous montrons que le nombre de licences attribuées diffère généralement de celui observé lorsque la technologie est utilisée dans un marché aval isolé. En particulier, nous obtenons que le nombre de licences distribuées est plus élevé dans les marchés de niche lorsque le nombre de firmes intéressées par la technologie est limité. Dans ce cadre d'analyse, l'intégration verticale n'est pas profitable à l'exception des cas où, une seule firme est susceptible d'acquérir une licence sur le marché homogène, ou lorsque la demande pour le produit final est incertaine. Par ailleurs, les royalties unitaires perçus sur le nombre de produits vendus en aval ne sont utilisés que dans la structure de l'industrie la plus concurrentielle et lorsque la valorisation pour le bien final est élevée. Enfin, nous montrons que lorsque la demande est incertaine et que les acquéreurs de la technologie sont réticents à la prise de risque, l'innovateur préfère utiliser des royalties ad valorem qui portent sur les revenus issus des ventes de produits finals. Nos résultats montrent que les relations de complémentarité entre les marchés finals influent sur la manière dont sont transférées les technologies et que les fusions verticales et conglomérales ne semblent pas générer de comportements de forclusion
IT industries are characterized by strategic patent agreements such as patent licensing or patent pools. Products and services frequently have strong potential complementarity relations in this industry. To guarantee a satisfactory level of interoperability to users, the exchange of technical information is required between complementary producers. This dissertation aims at taking into account these two dimensions of the IT sector in order to provide new insights on competition policy cases involving high technology complementary products (e.g Intel/McAfee, Google/Motorola). We extend the literature on patent licensing by explicitly modeling downstream differentiated complementary goods. Using industrial organization methods, we characterize the profitable strategies of a monopoly innovator with respect to the number of licenses, the pricing instruments as well as vertical and conglomerate mergers. We show that the number of licenses delivered in equilibrium can differ from the standard model with a single downstream market. In particular, we consistently find, for various forms of licensing contracts that more licenses are issued in niche markets when the number of potential licensees is capped. Overall vertical integration and conglomerate mergers are found to be unprofitable except when there is only one firm likely to acquire the technology or when there is demand uncertainty. On the other hand, per unit royalty rates are only used in the most competitive structure of the industry for high valuations of the final good. Finally, sales revenue (i.e ad valorem) is found to be a more profitable royalty base than the number of sales (i.e per unit royalties) when demand is uncertain and licensees are risk averse. Our results show that complementarity influences the way in which technologies are transferred and that vertical mergers do not generate foreclosing behaviors in this framework
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Książki na temat "Vertical integration"

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Waterman, David. Vertical integration in cable television. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997.

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Kleineberg, Christoph. Vertical Integration and Regulation. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11358-2.

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Berlin, Mitchell. Intermediation and vertical integration. Philadelphia: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Economic Research Division, 1997.

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Waterman, David. Vertical integration in cable television. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997.

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Chemla, Gilles. Competition, investent and vertical integration. London: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, 1996.

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Casson, Mark. Quality control and vertical integration. Reading: University of Reading Department of Economics, 1986.

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Hart, Oliver D. Vertical integration and market foreclosure. Cambridge, Mass: Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990.

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(Firm), FIND/SVP, red. The market for vertical integration. New York: FIND/SVP, 1995.

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Berlin, Mitchell. Financial intermediation as vertical integration. Philadelphia: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Economic Research Division, 1993.

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Jones, Ross. Vertical integration and competition policy. Uxbridge, Middx: Department of Economics, Brunel University, 1985.

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Części książek na temat "Vertical integration"

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Gianfreda, Giuseppina. "Vertical Integration". W Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2128–34. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_672.

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Gianfreda, Giuseppina. "Vertical Integration". W Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1–7. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_672-1.

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Gianfreda, Giuseppina. "Vertical Integration". W Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1–7. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_672-2.

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Joskow, Paul L. "Vertical Integration". W Handbook of New Institutional Economics, 319–48. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-69305-5_14.

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Howe, W. Stewart. "Vertical Integration". W Corporate Strategy, 133–48. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18213-8_8.

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Teece, David J. "Vertical Integration". W The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 1806–10. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-00772-8_452.

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Williamson, Oliver E. "Vertical Integration". W The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–8. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1698-1.

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Riordan, Michael H. "Vertical Integration". W The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 1–4. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1698-2.

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Teece, David J. "Vertical Integration". W The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 1–5. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_452-1.

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Riordan, Michael H. "Vertical Integration". W The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 14310–13. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_1698.

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Streszczenia konferencji na temat "Vertical integration"

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"Session - Vertical Integration Issues". W 2004 IEEE International Workshop on Factory Communication Systems. Proceedings. IEEE, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wfcs.2004.1377704.

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Artetxe,, Aranbarri. "Vertical Integration: Modeling and Evaluation". W Information Control Problems in Manufacturing, redaktor Bakhtadze, Natalia, Chair Dolgui, Alexandre i Bakhtadze, Natalia. Elsevier, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3182/20090603-3-ru-2001.00063.

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Vassiliev, M. Yu. "Vertical integration in electricity markets". W 2005 IEEE Russia Power Tech. IEEE, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ptc.2005.4524747.

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Ni, David C., Erik Shen i Sunny Hsu. "Protocol Integration for Vertical Systems". W ICISS 2019: 2019 the 2nd International Conference on Information Science and Systems. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3322645.3322651.

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Tunnell, A. J., V. W. Ballarotto, D. R. Hines i E. D. Williams. "Vertical integration using transfer printing". W 2007 International Semiconductor Device Research Symposium. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isdrs.2007.4422336.

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Marshall, Brandeis. "Determining result quality for vertical result merging". W Integration (2010 IRI). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iri.2010.5558910.

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Huang, Jianbai, i Yong Lan. "Research on vertical integration under overcapacity". W EM). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icieem.2009.5344544.

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Zorian, Y. "PANEL SESSION - Vertical integration versus disaggregation". W 2009 Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE'09). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/date.2009.5090737.

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Schulterbrandt Gragg, Richard D. "VERTICAL INTEGRATION OF UNIVERSITY AND COMMUNITY". W GSA Annual Meeting in Indianapolis, Indiana, USA - 2018. Geological Society of America, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1130/abs/2018am-321067.

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Gardner, Ann, Nancy Nugent, Edward Fitzgerald, Thomas Laford i James Babish. "Vertical Partnering Implementation for Supplier Integration". W ASME 1997 Design Engineering Technical Conferences. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/detc97/cie-4294.

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Abstract This paper will present an approach that takes the concept of vertical partnering first demonstrated under an AF ManTech pathfinder program and provides a plan for its commercial implementation. The vertical partnering concept provides small and medium-sized Enterprises (SME) secure access to Raytheon’s CAD / CAM software and engineering databases. The system is being extended from an X-based client / server technology to a World Wide Web (WWW) based system. This project establishes the first team of seven Raytheon suppliers using this system for actual product delivery. The Scranton Electronic Commerce Resource Center will provide the guidance and support necessary to make this approach available to all interested contractor / SME partnerships throughout the United States. It is anticipated that benefits will come from drastically reducing the time to move data from the procurement agencies to the subcontractors and from reducing the time it takes for the subcontractor to be able to assemble and comprehend data packages.
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Raporty organizacyjne na temat "Vertical integration"

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Bresnahan, Timothy, i Jonathan Levin. Vertical Integration and Market Structure. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, marzec 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17889.

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Alfaro, Laura, Paola Conconi, Harald Fadinger i Andrew Newman. Do Prices Determine Vertical Integration? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, czerwiec 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w16118.

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Afendulis, Christopher, i Daniel Kessler. Vertical Integration and Optimal Reimbursement Policy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, sierpień 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17316.

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Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion i Fabrizio Zilibotti. Vertical Integration and Distance to Frontier. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, wrzesień 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9191.

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Acemoglu, Daron, Philippe Aghion, Rachel Griffith i Fabrizio Zilibotti. Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, grudzień 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w10997.

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Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson i Todd Mitton. Determinants of Vertical Integration: Finance, Contracts, and Regulation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, czerwiec 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11424.

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Hortacsu, Ali, i Chad Syverson. Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, luty 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12894.

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Gray, Charles, Abby Alpert i Neeraj Sood. Disadvantaging Rivals: Vertical Integration in the Pharmaceutical Market. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, sierpień 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w31536.

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Hansman, Christopher, Jonas Hjort, Gianmarco León i Matthieu Teachout. Vertical Integration, Supplier Behavior, and Quality Upgrading among Exporters. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, październik 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w23949.

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Fan, Joseph P. H., Jun Huang, Randall Morck i Bernard Yeung. Vertical Integration, Institutional Determinants and Impact: Evidence from China. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, styczeń 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14650.

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