Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „United States. Navy. Fleets”

This article is the third in a series of six texts devoted to classification problems in the group of artillery ships, such as heavy cruisers. In the first text, we dealt with the genesis of the heavy cruiser and formulated its definition, necessary for making reliable scientific analyses. In the second text, we confronted this definition with ships with a disputed classification. This section presents the heavy cruiser fleets of the three largest owners. The following will discuss the fleets of these types of ships under the other flags and their global characteristics. The three most numerous owners of heavy cruisers: the United States, Japan, and Great Britain, had 70% of their total number. These values clearly reflect for whom they were the most desirable weapons. This is confirmed by the hostilities of 1937-1945, especially the Pacific War. The U.S.A. had the largest fleet of 38 ships, followed by Japan with 18 ships, and the third with Great Britain with 13 ships of this type. As a result of World War II, the Japanese Navy’s heavy cruiser fleet was completely wiped out, the Americans lost 7, the British 4, and they also handed over 1 to Australia. The Anglo-Saxon powers’ remaining heavy cruisers were gradually decommissioned during the Cold War. At the same time, the Royal Navy completed this process by the end of the 1940s, for reasons of economy. U.S. Navy also used them, among others in the Korean Wars 1950-1953 and Vietnam Wars 1964-1973. The last American heavy cruiser, Newport News, was decommissioned in 1975. On the other hand, the last deletion from the records of the U.S. Navy was made in 1991 when it happened to reserve Salem.

Since the 1970's, the world's merchant fleets have been pursuing crew reductions as a way to cut costs: however, the United States military has been slow to adopt this trend. In the current age of tight budgets and defense cutbacks, the Coast Guard and Navy can no longer afford to continue in this manner. Both services have now initiated research and acquisition projects which address minimal manning. These projects must be carried out and minimal manning practices implemented if our sea going services are expected to maintain their edge as world leaders. This paper presents a study designed to research the quest for minimally manned crews and its applicability to military vessels. It is meant to provide guidance to the United States Coast Guard and other interested parties on future surface combatant acquisition projects including but not limited to the Coast Guard Deepwater Program. Emphasis is placed on the theory behind automation and the organizational impacts associated with minimal manning.

Over the past decade, the Chinese economy has grown at a faster pace (up to 8 % per year), which is a consequence of the unprecedented expansion of China in world markets. Such a competitive position presupposes the same significant (up to 15 %) growth in energy consumption, which is ensured by both an increase in domestic production (to a lesser extent) and imports of energy resources — oil, pipeline and liquefied natural gas and coal. In the context of aggravated competition between the leading economies of the world (China and the United States), the security of transporting energy resources from the Persian Gulf and other regions through the narrows of the Strait of Hormuz and Malacca, as well as through the regions of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait controlled by the United States, acquires a new sound for China. To solve this problem, China is building up its naval presence in the direction of the Southern Silk Road, but mainly in the waters of the Pacific Ocean seas — the Yellow, East China and South China, that is, in the operational zones of the three fleets of the Chinese Navy — the North, East and South, from the exits to the operational zone of the Russian Pacific Fleet in the waters of the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. Demonstration of strength and flag during joint sailing of the two fleets is carried out within the framework of the exercises of the “Maritime Interaction” format from 2012 to 2021 inclusive, except for 2020 due to the aggravation of the epidemiological situation in connection with COVID-19. The latent goal of these exercises is to practice coastal defense missions in the zone where China's strategic oil reserve is located.

Helicobacter pylori prevalence is elevated in German submarine crews and in United States Navy (USN) surface fleet personnel, but H. pylori prevalence in USN submariners was unknown. The goal of the study was to determine the prevalence of H. pylori in the crews of USN nuclear submarines compared to other military personnel and to the general US population. The presence of H. pylori IgG antibodies was determined in serum samples using a commercial ELISA. Only 47 out of 451 submariners (9·4%) were H. pylori positive, which is similar to that of the US general population with a similar level of education. In contrast, H. pylori prevalence is significantly higher in US Army recruits (26%), USN surface fleet personnel (25%), and German diesel submariners (38%). These data demonstrate that submarine service (and by inference activity requiring isolation and close contact, per se) is not a risk factor for H. pylori infection.

From the beginnings of the Cold War until the present the Canadian Navy has been a one ocean fleet, postured primarily to supply anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Atlantic. Various plans, including the 1987 White Paper on defence, to give the Navy more balance in terms of its areas of operation, mix of forces and missions, have been largely unsuccessful. The main reason for this is that the NATO maritime role has been directly related to the long-standing Canadian foreign policy objective of participating in this multilateral Alliance. In addition, forces earmarked for NATO's Atlantic Command (ACLANT) could also be used for North American maritime roles in cooperation with the United States Navy (USN) and for non-military sovereignty protection tasks. Recent dramatic changes in the international security environment combined with domestic budgetary pressures are likely to result in a continuation of this Atlantic orientation in Canadian naval policy.

The U.S Navy has developed and implemented a comprehensive Solid Waste Management Program to comply with "Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships" (Title 33 United States Code Chapter 33), as amended, which ratified "International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships" (MARPOL 73/78). Through this program, the U.S. Navy is backfitting its surface fleet with plastic waste processors, pulpers, and shredders to manage nonhazardous solid waste by 31 December 2000. Future Navy ship designs are building upon the lessons learned from the fleet modernization process and are pushing technology to achieve the Chief of Naval Operations, Director Environmental Protection, Safety and Occupational Health (CNO N45) vision for the environmentally sound ship of the 21st century. Evolutionary development of waste transport systems and thermal destruction technologies are essential for realizing this vision. This paper provides an overview of the program and a glimpse of future expectations for management of solid waste through the Navy Integrated Waste Management System. The cornerstone of this system is a compact Plasma Arc Waste Destruction System capable of destroying solid waste, liquid waste, oily waste, and medical waste.

By the 1840’s the era of the wooden ship of the line was coming to a close. As early as the 1820’s and 1830’s, ships of war were outfitted with increasingly heavy guns. Naval guns such as the increasingly popular 68 pounder could quickly damage the best wooden hulled ships of the line. Yet, by the 1840’s, explosive shells were in use by the British, French, and Imperial Russian navies. It was the explosive shell that could with great ease, cripple a standard wooden hulled warship, this truth was exposed at the Battle of Sinope in 1853. For this reason, warships had to be armored. By 1856, Great Britain drafted a design for an armored corvette. In 1857, France began construction on the first ocean going ironclad, La Gloire, which was launched in 1859. This development quickly caused Great Britain to begin construction on HMS Warrior and HMS Black Prince. By the time HMS Warrior was commissioned in 1861, the Royal Navy had decided that its entire battle fleet needed to be armored. While the British and the French naval arms race was intensifying, the United States was entering into its greatest crisis, the United States Civil War. After the outbreak of the Civil War, the majority of the United States Navy remained loyal to the Union. The Confederacy, therefore, gained inspiration from the ironclads across the Atlantic, quickly obtaining its own ironclads. CSS Manassas was the first to enter service, but was eventually brought down by a hail of Union broadside fire. The CSS Virginia, however, made an impact. Meanwhile, the Union began stockpiling City Class ironclads and in 1862, the USS Monitor was completed. After the veritable stalemate between the CSS Virginia and USS Monitor, the Union utilized its superior production capabilities to mass produce ironclads and enter them into service in the Union Navy. As the Union began armoring its increasingly large navy, the world’s foremost naval power certainly took notice. Therefore, this paper will utilize British newspapers, government documents, Royal Naval Reviews, and various personal documents from the 1860’s in order to examine the British public and naval reaction to the Union buildup of ironclad warships.

Wartime naval builders in the United States constructed the world's largest fleet that defeated the Japanese Imperial Navy, aided the Allied victory during the Battle of the Atlantic, and projected American naval power into all corners of the globe. Many naval combatants were built by highly experienced shipbuilders who possessed advanced design skills and production capabilities that had been years in the making. The present study examines the structures and dynamics of American naval shipbuilding and compares them to their foreign counterparts; it argues that extant capabilities were vital to the success of the U.S. war economy.

As the United States Navy moves towards a reduction in manning aboard future ships, the number and complexity of tasks the warfighter must perform remains high. One responsibility of the warfighter that is very taxing on his/her audio channel is the handling of voice communications. To determine the “breaking point” in handling these voice communications, researchers used a fully developed scenario to test the capabilities and limitations of typical Navy watchstanders when subjected to a varying number of active communications circuits. Metrics such as accuracy and latency of response were used to measure human performance. In addition, a between-subject experiment was used to determine whether or not a simulated speech-to-text tool would help to improve warfighter performance on a communications task, while not degrading performance on a primary, tactical task. The experiment was performed in the Integrated Command Environment (ICE) lab at NAVSEA Dahlgren, a testbed for future command and control concepts and a vehicle to solicit valuable feedback from members of the fleet.

The National Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP), Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA), Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC), National Weather Association, and American Meteorological Society (AMS) cosponsored a “Symposium on the 50th Anniversary of Operational Numerical Weather Prediction,” on 14–17 June 2004 at the University of Maryland, College Park in College Park, Maryland. Operational numerical weather prediction (NWP) in the United States started with the Joint Numerical Weather Prediction Unit (JNWPU) on 1 July 1954, staffed by members of the U.S. Weather Bureau, the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. The origins of NCEP, AFWA, and FNMOC can all be traced to the JNWPU. The symposium celebrated the pioneering developments in NWP and the remarkable improvements in forecast skill and support of the nation's economy, well being, and national defense achieved over the last 50 years. This essay was inspired by the presentations from that symposium.

The dolphin SAY is considered a jack-of-all-trades in marine mammal science. This comes as no surprise as her mother was one of the five dolphins deployed to Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam as part of the Navy’s first deployable marine mammal system. SAY was born in 1979 and began participating in research from birth; she was the first dolphin to have her caloric intake and weight tracked as a calf into adulthood, and while carrying her own calf in 1991. In her early years, she participated in cutting-edge studies using high-speed video endoscopy to better understand dolphin click production. She later participated in echolocation vigilance tasks that spearheaded our understanding of dolphin cognitive abilities focusing on duration and the effects of anthropogenic noise. During this same time, she diligently contributed to projects that revolutionized our understanding of dolphin biosonar and its relation to perception and auditory system neurophysiology. SAY will be remembered by her charismatic personality and her 38 years of service to science and the United States Navy. Her daughter continues to carry out her legacy working for the Navy’s fleet mine-hunting system.

Constant demand for new naval and commercial vessels has created special conditions for the Government-owned Soviet shipbuilding industry, which practically has not been affected by the world shipbuilding crisis. On the other hand, such chronic diseases of the centralized economy as lack of incentive, material shortage and poor workmanship cause specific problems for ship construction. Being technically and financially unable to rapidly improve the overall technology level and performance of the entire industry, the Soviets concentrate their efforts on certain important areas and have achieved significant results, especially in welding and cutting titanium and aluminum alloys, modular production methods, standardization, etc. All productivity improvement efforts are supported by an army of highly educated engineers and scientists at shipyards, in multiple scientific, research and design institutions. Discussion Edwin J. Petersen, Todd Pacific Shipyards Three years ago I addressed the Ship Production Symposium as chairman of the Ship Production Committee and outlined some major factors which had contributed to the U.S. shipbuilding industry's remarkable achievements in building and maintaining the world's largest naval and merchant fleets during the five-year period starting just before World War II. The factors were as follows:There was a national commitment to get the job done. The shipbuilding industry was recognized as a needed national resource. There was a dependable workload. Standardization was extensively and effectively utilized. Shipbuilding work was effectively organized. Although these lessons appear to have been lost by our Government since World War II, the paper indicates that the Soviet Union has picked up these principles and has applied them very well to its current shipbuilding program. The paper also gives testimony to the observation that the Soviet Government recognizes the strategic and economic importance of a strong merchant fleet as well as a powerful naval fleet. In reviewing the paper, I found great similarity between the Soviet shipbuilding productivity improvement efforts and our own efforts or goals under the National Shipbuilding Research Program in the following areas:welding technology, flexible automation (robotics), application of group technology, standardization, facilities development, and education and training. In some areas, the Soviet Union appears to be well ahead of the United States in improving the shipbuilding process. Most noteworthy among these is the stable long-and medium-range planning that is possible by virtue of the use and adherence to the "Table of Vessel Classes." It will be obvious to most who hear and read these comments what a vast and significant improvement in shipbuilding costs and schedules could be achieved with a relatively dependable 15year master ship procurement plan for the U.S. naval and merchant fleets. Another area where the Soviet Union appears to lead the United States is in the integration of ship component suppliers into the shipbuilding process. This has been recognized as a vital step by the National Shipbuilding Research Program, but so far we have not made significant progress. A necessary prerequisite for this "supplier integration" is extensive standardization of ship components, yet another area in which the Soviets have achieved significantly greater progress than we have. Additional areas of Soviet advantage are the presence of a multilevel research and development infrastructure well supported by highly educated scientists, engineering and technical personnel; and better integration of formally educated engineering and technical personnel into the ship production process. In his conclusion, the author lists a number of problems facing the Soviet economy that adversely affect shipbuilding productivity. Perhaps behind this listing we can delve out some potential U.S. shipbuilding advantages. First, production systems in U.S. shipyards (with the possible exception of naval shipyards) are probably more flexible and adjustable to meet new circumstances as a consequence of not being constrained by a burdensome centralized bureaucracy, as is the case with Soviet shipyards. Next, such initiatives as the Ship Production Committee's "Human Resources Innovation" projects stand a better chance of achieving product-oriented "production team" relationship among labor, management, and technical personnel than the more rigid Soviet system, especially in view of the ability of U.S. shipyard management to offer meaningful financial incentives without the kind of bureaucratic constraints imposed in the Soviet system. Finally, the current U.S. Navy/shipbuilding industry cooperative effort to develop a common engineering database should lead to a highly integrated and disciplined ship design, construction, operation, and maintenance system for naval ships (and subsequently for commercial ships) that will ultimately restore the U.S. shipbuilding process to a leadership position in the world marketplace (additional references [16] and [17]).On that tentatively positive note, it seems fitting to close this discussion with a question: Is the author aware of any similar Soviet effort to develop an integrated computer-aided design, production and logistics support system? The author is to be congratulated on an excellent, comprehensive insight into the Soviet shipbuilding process and productivity improvement efforts that should give us all adequate cause not to be complacent in our own efforts. Peter M. Palermo, Naval Sea Systems Command The author presents an interesting paper that unfortunately leaves this reader with a number of unanswered questions. The paper is a paradox. It depicts a system consisting of a highly educated work force, advanced fabrication processes including the use of standardized hull modules, sophisticated materials and welding processes, and yet in the author's words they suffer from "low productivity, poor product quality, . . . and the rigid production systems which resists the introduction of new ideas." Is it possible that incentive, motivation, and morale play an equally significant role in achieving quality and producibility advances? Can the author discuss underlying reasons for quality problems in particular—or can we assume that the learning curves of Figs. 5 and Fig. 6 are representative of quality improvement curves? It has been my general impression that quality will improve with application of high-tech fabrication procedures, enclosed fabrication ways, availability of highly educated welding engineers on the building ways, and that productivity would improve with the implementation of modular or zone outfitting techniques coupled with the quality improvements. Can the author give his impressions of the impact of these innovations in the U.S. shipbuilding industry vis-a-vis the Soviet industry? Many of the welding processes cited in the paper are also familiar to the free world, with certain notable exceptions concerning application in Navy shipbuilding. For example, (1) electroslag welding is generally confined to single-pass welding of heavy plates; application to thinner plates—l1/4 in. and less when certified—would permit its use in more applications than heretofore. (2) Electron beam welding is generally restricted to high-technology machinery parts; vacuum chamber size restricts its use for larger components (thus it must be assumed that the Soviets have solved the vacuum chamber problem or have much larger chambers). (3) Likewise, laser welding has had limited use in U.S. shipbuilding. An interesting theme that runs throughout the paper, but is not explicitly addressed, is the quality of Soviet ship fitting. The use of high-tech welding processes and the mention of "remote controlled tooling for welding and X-ray testing the butt, and for following painting" imply significant ship fitting capabilities for fitting and positioning. This is particularly true if modules are built in one facility, outfitted and assembled elsewhere depending on the type of ship required. Any comments concerning Soviet ship fitting capabilities would be appreciated. The discussion on modular construction seems to indicate that the Soviets have a "standard hull module" that is used for different types of vessels, and if the use of these hull modules permit increasing hull length without changes to the fore and aft ends, it can be assumed that they are based on a standard structural design. That being the case, the midship structure will be overdesigned for many applications and optimally designed for very few. Recognizing that the initial additional cost for such a piece of hull structure is relatively minimal, it cannot be forgotten that the lifecycle costs for transporting unnecessary hull weight around can have significant fuel cost impacts. If I perceived the modular construction approach correctly, then I am truly intrigued concerning the methods for handling the distributive systems. In particular, during conversion when the ship is lengthened, how are the electrical, fluid, communications, and other distributive systems broken down, reassembled and tested? "Quick connect couplings" for these type systems at the module breaks is one particular area where economies can be achieved when zone construction methods become the order of the day in U.S. Navy ships. The author's comments in this regard would be most welcome. The design process as presented is somewhat different than U.S. Navy practice. In U.S. practice, Preliminary and Contract design are developed by the Navy. Detail design, the development of the working drawings, is conducted by the lead shipbuilder. While the detail design drawings can be used by follow shipbuilders, flexibility is permitted to facilitate unique shipbuilding or outfitting procedures. Even the contract drawings supplied by the Navy can be modified— upon Navy approval—to permit application of unique shipbuilder capabilities. The large number of college-trained personnel entering the Soviet shipbuilding and allied fields annually is mind-boggling. According to the author's estimation, a minimum of about 6500 college graduates—5000 of which have M.S. degrees—enter these fields each year. It would be most interesting to see a breakdown of these figures—in particular, how many naval architects and welding engineers are included in these figures? These are disciplines with relatively few personnel entering the Navy design and shipbuilding field today. For example, in 1985 in all U.S. colleges and universities, there were only 928 graduates (B.S., M.S. and Ph.D.) in marine, naval architecture and ocean engineering and only 1872 graduates in materials and metallurgy. The number of these graduates that entered the U.S. shipbuilding field is unknown. Again, the author is to be congratulated for providing a very thought-provoking paper. Frank J. Long, Win/Win Strategies This paper serves not only as a chronicle of some of the productivity improvement efforts in Soviet shipbuilding but also as an important reminder of the fruits of those efforts. While most Americans have an appreciation of the strengths of the Russian Navy, this paper serves to bring into clearer focus the Russians' entire maritime might in its naval, commercial, and fishing fleets. Indeed, no other nation on earth has a greater maritime capability. It is generally acknowledged that the Soviet Navy is the largest in the world. When considering the fact that the commercial and fishing fleets are, in many military respects, arms of the naval fleet, we can more fully appreciate how awesome Soviet maritime power truly is. The expansion of its maritime capabilities is simply another but highly significant aspect of Soviet worldwide ambitions. The development and updating of "Setka Typov Su dov" (Table of Vessel Classes), which the author describes is a classic example of the Soviet planning process. As the author states, "A mighty fishing and commercial fleet was built in accordance with a 'Setka' which was originally developed in the 1960's. And an even more impressive example is the rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy." In my opinion it is not mere coincidence that the Russians embarked on this course in the 1960's. That was the beginning of the coldest of cold war periods—Francis Gary Power's U-2 plane was downed by the Russians on May 1, 1960; the mid-May 1960 Four Power Geneva Summit was a bust; the Berlin Wall was erected in 1961 and, in 1962, we had the Cuban Missile Crisis. The United States maritime embargo capability in that crisis undoubtedly influenced the Soviet's planning process. It is a natural and normal function of a state-controlled economy with its state-controlled industries to act to bring about the controlled productivity improvement developments in exactly the key areas discussed in the author's paper. As the author states, "All innovations at Soviet shipyards have originated at two main sources:domestic development andadaptation of new ideas introduced by leading foreign yards, or most likely a combination of both. Soviet shipbuilders are very fast learners; moreover, their own experience is quite substantial." The Ship Production Committee of SNAME has organized its panels to conduct research in many of these same areas for productivity improvement purposes. For example, addressing the areas of technology and equipment are Panels SP-1 and 3, Shipbuilding Facilities and Environmental Effects, and Panel SP-7, Shipbuilding Welding. Shipbuilding methods are the province of SP-2; outfitting and production aids and engineering and scientific support are the province of SP-4, Design Production Integration. As I read through the descriptions of the processes that led to the productivity improvements, I was hoping to learn more about the organizational structure of Soviet shipyards, the managerial hierarchy and how work is organized by function or by craft in the shipyard. (I would assume that for all intents and purposes, all Russian yards are organized in the same way.) American shipyard management is wedded to the notion that American shipbuilding suffers immeasurably from a productivity standpoint because of limitations on management's ability to assign workers across craft lines. It is unlikely that this limitation exists in Soviet shipyards. If it does not, how is the unfettered right of assignment optimized? What are the tangible, measurable results? I believe it would have been helpful, also, for the author to have dedicated some of the paper to one of the most important factors in improvement in the labor-intensive shipbuilding industry—the shipyard worker. There are several references to worker problems—absenteeism, labor shortage, poor workmanship, and labor discipline. The reader is left with the impression that the Russians believe that either those are unsolvable problems or have a priority ranking significantly inferior to the organizational, technical, and design efforts discussed. As a case in point, the author devotes a complete section to engineering education and professional training but makes no mention of education or training programs for blue-collar workers. It would seem that a paper on productivity improvement efforts in Soviet shipbuilding would address this most important element. My guess is that the Russians have considerable such efforts underway and it would be beneficial for us to learn of them.

Abstract The military implications of Chinese control of Taiwan are understudied. Chinese control of Taiwan would likely improve the military balance in China's favor because of reunification's positive impact on Chinese submarine warfare and ocean surveillance capabilities. Basing Chinese submarine warfare assets on Taiwan would increase the vulnerability of U.S. surface forces to attack during a crisis, reduce the attrition rate of Chinese submarines during a war, and likely increase the number of submarine attack opportunities against U.S. surface combatants. Furthermore, placing hydrophone arrays off Taiwan's coasts for ocean surveillance would forge a critical missing link in China's kill chain for long-range attacks. This outcome could push the United States toward anti-satellite warfare that it might otherwise avoid, or it could force the U.S. Navy into narrower parts of the Philippine Sea. Finally, over the long term, if China were to develop a large fleet of truly quiet nuclear attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines, basing them on Taiwan would provide it with additional advantages. Specifically, such basing would enable China to both threaten Northeast Asian sea lanes of communication and strengthen its sea-based nuclear deterrent in ways that it is otherwise unlikely to be able to do. These findings have important implications for U.S. operational planning, policy, and grand strategy.

In the summer of 1898 the entire Spanish fleet was destroyed in two successive engagements with the navy of the United States: the most comprehensive, catastrophic and humiliating naval defeats of modern history. Not only did these reverses shear Spain of the last shreds of transatlantic empire: they also inflicted a severe psychological blow to the Spanish nation at large. Already a stranger to most of the invigorating developments in economic, cultural and political life which had transformed western Europe in the course of the nineteenth century, Spain found that her backwardness and feebleness had now been devastatingly exposed to the gaze of the world. Spain had become a laughing-stock among the nations. What had gone wrong? The ‘Generation of ‘98’ was the name given to the group of intellectuals and public men who set themselves to ponder this question. They conceived of their task in large terms. It was not just a matter of diagnosing and treating present and local sickness—to employ the medical imagery of which they were so fond—but of taking account of the whole organism which was so visibly ailing; and this involved examining its early growth. An historical dimension was built into their deliberations from the outset. It is for this reason that 1898 is a significant date for the historian of medieval Spain.

The article dedicated the life and scientific way of George de Bothezat, the first Doctor of Sciences in the field of aviation. Together with Nikolay Zhukovsky, Igor Sikorsky, Stephen Timoshenko, Alexander Fan-der-Flit, and Alexey Lebedev, he was one of the organizers of the Air Fleet of the Russian Empire. He is the author of various inventions: gyroscopic sight and other types of aviation equipment. We analyze works by G. Bothezat on the impulse theory of propellers. In particular, the scientist derived formulas for ensuring the flight stability of airplanes and helicopters. He developed training ballistic tables, which allowed making corrections for the speed of the flight and the direction of the wind. We briefly describe a biography of G. Bothezat, focusing on the student period of his life in Kharkiv, Ukraine, and the reasons for G. Bothezat’s departure to the United States in 1918. It is stated that it was there that his talent as a designer and creator of helicopters of the original system was disclosed in the best way. In 1922, George Bothezat obtained the financial support of the American government to build a workable helicopter model without prototypes and experiments, only based on the results of calculations. The reasons why G.Bothezat did not manage to achieve the launch of the serial production of helicopters are analyzed. We also mention the activities of the company founded by G.Bothezat, which was engaged in the production of fans of a new type for the US Navy. The Bothezat system fans were installed at the Rockefeller Center in New York as well as in American tanks. It is emphasized that I. Sikorsky also used the works by G.Bothezat in his research. It is stated that the flight trajectory calculated by G.Bothezat in air and airless space was used in the development of the American program of a manned landing on the Moon using the “Apollo” system.

Large scale ocean currents, such as the Gulf Stream, Kuroshlo, Peru Current, Agulhaus Current, etc., strongly modify the surrounding wave characteristics. As the Gulf Stream moves along the Continental Shelf of the southeast coast of the United States, the local ocean environment is divided into three wave climatic regimes. They are the offshore, the Gulf Stream, and the nearshore regimes. The nearshore zone is bounded by the land to the west and the Gulf Stream to the east. The distance between land and the Gulf Stream varies from 10 to 60 miles. Most of the waves in this regime are generated offshore and cross the Gulf Stream. The correlation of local wind and waves in the nearshore regime is poor except in the presence of a persistent onshore storm. A semi-empirical approach has been developed to compute the nearshore wave climate. The hindcast/forecast directional waves from the Spectral Ocean Wave Model (SOWM) of the Navy Fleet Numerical Oceanography Center have been used as the source of the initial offshore wave conditions. After crossing the Gulf Stream, which is assumed to be a uniform current with a velocity of 2 m/s, the waves are either refracted to the nearshore regime or reflected to the offshore regime following ray theory. The onshore waves in the nearshore zone are confined to the sector from 30 to 150 degrees. The computed results are then compared with measured data with good agreement. In summary, the Gulf Stream acts as a barrier to damp long waves and to regroup short waves. The refraction of long waves can be predicted by using ray theory. Further field experiments are needed to quantify the variation of the Gulf Stream and to investigate the interaction with approaching long waves and local wind generated short waves.

The AP-3C Orion aircraft is the oldest aircraft in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) inventory. The planned fleet withdrawal has been extended far beyond the original design service objective. Continued safe and effective operation has required the development of a robust ageing aircraft management approach. A fundamental aspect was supplementing the structural certification basis with appropriate standards in the form of fatigue management requirements from Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 25.571 and Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular (FAA AC) 120-93. To develop and underpin the ageing aircraft management plan and transition to the supplementary fatigue management standards, the RAAF collaborated with the Original Equipment Manufacturer, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company, the United States Navy (USN) and other operators to form the P-3C Service Life Assessment Program (SLAP). This program provided Full Scale Fatigue Test (FSFT) data, associated analyses and analysis tools to support management in accordance with FAR 25.571. An important element of the ageing aircraft management plan included the introduction of a rigorous Safety By Inspection (SBI) maintenance regime to assure structural airworthiness. FAA AC 120-93 requires assessment of structural repairs to determine revised fatigue management and inspection requirements. Often, this information is derived using tailored analysis tools and detailed models on a case-by-case basis. This approach is specialized, expensive and usually occurs after the repair has been designed and installed. To avoid these limitations, the AP-3C Repair Assessment Manual (RAM) was developed to provide the repair designer with a design handbook approach to fatigue analysis. In conjunction with some simple Finite Element (FE) models, the RAM supports complete repair analysis prior to an aircraft leaving the maintenance venue. This paper will present the history of the SBI program, the genesis of the RAM and actual examples of assessing structural repairs on the P-3 platform using the RAM.

AbstractThe mission of the United States Navy expanded significantly because of the presence of the institution of racial slavery on American soil. Most important, both proslavery and antislavery forces favored, for very different reasons, a substantial naval buildup in the late 1850s. The navy had, however, long been engaged in securing the nation’s borders against slave smuggling, an activity that also seemed to have broad support at the time. Finally, somewhat more controversially, the navy had been associated with the American Colonization Society’s Liberian enterprise from its very inception, deciding to deploy vessels to Africa in an otherwise unimaginable time frame. The relationship between the presence of slavery and the pre–Civil War activities of the navy is a largely untold—or, at best, half-told—story of American state development.

While the market for medium- and heavy-duty battery-electric vehicles (MHD EVs) is still nascent, a growing number of these vehicles are being deployed across the U.S. This study used over 2.3 million miles of operational data from multiple types of MHD EVs across various regions and operating conditions to address knowledge gaps in total cost of ownership and operational range. First, real-world energy cost savings were determined: MHD fleets should experience energy cost savings each year from 2021 to 2035, regardless of vehicle platform, with the greatest savings seen in transit buses (up to USD 4459 annually) and HD trucks (up to USD 3284 annually). Second, to help fleets across various geographies throughout the U.S. assess the suitability of EVs for their year-round operating needs, operational range was modeled using the XGBoost algorithm (R2: 70%) given 22 input features relevant to vehicle efficiency. Finally, this paper recommends (1) that MHD fleets apply energy-saving practices to minimize the impacts of cold temperatures and high congestion levels on vehicle efficiency and range, and (2) that local hauling fleets select trucks with a nominal range nearly double the expected maximum daily range to account for range losses under local, urban driving conditions.

ABSTRACTEdwin Jesse De Haven (1816–1865) led the first Grinnell expedition in search of the lost British explorer Sir John Franklin in 1850–1851. Since it was the ship's charismatic surgeon, Elisha Kent Kane, who wrote the popular account of the voyage, De Haven's achievements have generally been overlooked. De Haven joined the United States Navy when he was 13 and was master on the ill-fated Peacock during the United States Exploring Expedition (1838–1842) to the Antarctic under Charles Wilkes. He saw action in the Mexican War in 1848, and was serving under Matthew Fontaine Maury at the Naval Observatory when he was chosen to take command of the first United States Franklin search expedition. He retired from the navy at the age of 46 and died three years later.

Abstract There are many explanations for the victory of the United States against the Japanese at the Battle of Midway on June 4, 1942. Mistakes made by the Japanese certainly factored in the outcome and the United States also had certain advantages. However, an important if not sufficient explanation for the US victory is the pre-war preparation of the US Navy during peacetime. Designed by Ed Heinemann at Douglas Aircraft in El Segundo, California, from 1934 until 1938, the first Dauntless planes were delivered to the navy in 1940, well in advance of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the moment which is conventionally regarded as the US entry into the war. The pilots of the Dauntless, as I will show in this essay, were much the same; they too were the product of a peacetime Navy.

The analysis of the existing methods of determining the effectiveness of the maintenance and repair system of new and newest types of weapons and military equipment entering service in the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine showed that each of the existing approaches has its advantages and disadvantages. The article considers the application of adequate models for determining changes in the technical condition indicator in the form of a normalized residual resource of samples of weapons and military equipment. The proposed method of extrapolation makes it possible to determine the trend of changes in the technical condition of samples of military equipment of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or its development by the time of operation. This approach to modeling the processes of changes in the technical state of samples of weapons and military equipment contributes to the quantitative analysis and forecast of the dynamics of changes over time in their important parameters, namely, the characteristics of quality, condition and prospects for updating their fleet. The use of the proposed methods of assessing changes in the technical condition of a sample of weapons and military equipment during its operation will allow timely forecasting of the process of development of changes in the technical condition of a sample of weapons and military equipment and will allow to increase the readiness of samples of weapons and military equipment to perform tasks as intended. at a given level of reliability of these samples. The presented proposed method makes it possible to determine the moment in time at which the indicator of the technical condition of a sample of weapons and military equipment reaches a given or critical level and is a real step in the research of issues of quantitative determination of the level of the indicator of the residual normalized resource of new and newest samples of weapons and military equipment and in solving the task high-quality (sustainable) between-repair functioning of such samples. Keywords: sample of military equipment, technical condition, indicator of technical condition, residual normalized resource, model. extrapolation method, trend assessment.

The article examines the rationale and practical content of measures to increase the US Navy in 1913-1917. The main attention is focused on the ideological and organizational foundations of the strategy of the American leadership regarding the role of naval power as a factor in ensuring national interests. The design and implementation of the strategy are considered in the context of the reaction of the administration of President W. Wilson to the course and nature of the block confrontation in Europe, to the development of the international situation during the period of US neutrality in the First World War. The research is based on the application of the principles of historicism and scientific objectivity. The theoretical and methodological basis of the study was a systematic approach. On the basis of a comprehensive study of legislative acts, statistical data, official accounting documents and sources of personal origin, along with the materials of well-known historical research, the totality of factors that caused the deployment of naval construction in 1913-1917 was identified, the content and scale of measures to increase the US Navy were determined and evaluated. As a result, it is concluded that by the time the United States entered the war against Germany, the role of the Navy in ensuring the implementation of foreign policy tasks was determined, but the goals of the quantitative and qualitative state of the US Navy for real participation in the resolution of the conflict were not achieved.

Performance evaluation is an important tool for effective management. Much of the recent literature has focused on the efficacy of civilian performance appraisal systems. As a result, there is a knowledge gap with respect to military appraisal systems in general, and those of the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps in particular. The 1978 Civil Service Reform Act spawned several performance appraisal systems within each of these agencies; the USMC utilizes five separate systems in the evaluation of civilian and military personnel; the Navy has adopted three separate appraisal mechanisms. This article specifically examines the device used to evaluate senior military staff in the Navy and Marine Corps—the fitness report. Because this particular appraisal methodology differs radically from its federal civilian counterparts, a rather detailed descriptive section serves as an orientation for the reader. The approach is intended to supplement John Pelissero's article on performance evaluation in the Department of the Army (Pelissero, 1984).