Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „United Nations. General Assembly 1992 : New York)”

In the decade after 1952 France faced sustained United Nations criticism of its colonial policies in north Africa. As membership of the UN General Assembly expanded, support for the non-aligned states of the Afro-Asian bloc increased. North African nationalist parties established their permanent offices in New York to press their case for independence. Tracing UN consideration of French North Africa from the first major General Assembly discussion of Tunisia in 1952 to the end of the Algerian war in 1962, this article considers the tactics employed on both sides of the colonial/anti-colonial divide to manipulate the UN Charter's ambiguities over the rights of colonial powers and the jurisdiction of the General Assembly in colonial disputes.

The election of Donald Trump caused a change in the direction of U.S. foreign policy for Latin America with the imposition of new sanctions on the Cuban government (starting a new cold war with the island) and the attempted regime changes in Venezuela and Nicaragua, whose governments are seen as a threat by Washington’s elite. In September 2018, during a speech at the opening session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Donald Trump took up the principles of the Monroe Doctrine as formal a U.S. policy and rejected the alleged interference of foreign states in the western hemisphere and in the internal affairs of the United States — a direct allusion to China and Russia. This change in U.S. policy toward Latin America has had a great impact on Sino-Latin American relations in the context of political pressures and aggressive rhetoric seeking to curb the Chinese presence there. This article explores the motivation behind the new attitude of the United States in its relations with Latin America and how it impacts Sino-Latin American relations.

From 8-10 May 2002, the United Nations General Assembly met in a Special Session on Children. Representatives from more than 180 countries agreed on 21 new goals in the areas of education, health, combating AIDS and protecting children against abuse, exploitation and violence (Reuters 2002), The Assembly set six new targets aimed at meeting the goal of ‘quality basic education for all children’. In this paper we critically examine the strategies that the UN identified to ensure that the targets are met, in the light of our experiences researching and writing a report for the UK Department for International Development (DFID) on mainstreaming environmental education.At the Special Session, held in New York, children and heads of state evaluated progress towards achieving the 27 goals set at the 1990 World Summit for Children (UNICEF 2002a). The Special Session on Children was preceded by a three-day Children's Forum ‘for those most directly affected by the decisions made at the conference’ (UNICEF 2002b). As well as 350 children from more than 150 countries (reported elsewhere as ‘376 children and young adults from 115 countries’ (MacCentral 2002) there were ‘2,000 representatives of more than 800 non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including many of UNICEF's partners in the field’ (UNICEF 2002b). The claim that the Forum was attended by ‘those most directly affected by the decisions’ is at best pious hope and at worst pure spin, but the size and scale of the event merits consideration by those working for and with children around the world.

ABSTRACT At the beginning of the industrial atomic age, launched by President Dwight Eisenhower's speech on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (“Atoms for Peace”, addressed to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 8 December 1953), and after the birth of the first atomic agencies in France (Commissariat a l'Énergie Atomique, 1945) and the United States (the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1946), the Comitato Nazionale per le Ricerche Nucleari (National Committee for Nuclear Research–CNRN) was also established in Italy (1952). The new institution, in 1960 became a self-governing organization with a modified name, Comitato Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare (National Committee for Nuclear Energy–CNEN). Its mission was to promote and develop Italian research in nuclear science and technology. Mining and mineral exploration were among the early activities that the National Committee undertook beginning in 1954, when the Divisione Geomineraria (Geology and Mining Division) was established. A regional-scale geochemical and geophysical prospecting survey for U-Th bearing ores involved different Italian regions both in northern and in southern Italy. Geological surveys, for instance, were systematically carried out in the Alps beginning in 1954. They were run by three main teams of geologists. The paper aims to analyze the key factors that contributed to fostering the emergence of a new field of research about uranium and nuclear geology in Italy during the years immediately after WWII.

AbstractThe Xlth Antarctic Treaty Special Consultative Meeting in Viña del Mar, Chile (19 November to 6 December 1990) aired the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties' views on conservation, following the collapse of support for the minerals convention. Almost simultaneously at the United Nations Assembly in New York, the eighth successive annual discussion on Antarctica included the usual critique of the Treaty System's political and legal framework. The conservationist emphasis apparent in 1989 continued in 1990, accompanied by an attack on Antarctic science. Particular emphasis was placed on adverse environmental impacts from the crowding together of scientific stations. Treaty parties countered with their long-standing opposition to UN interference in Treaty matters. Resolutions on Antarctica sought to exclude South Africa from ATS activities and to consider the establishment of a UN international research station. The 1990 discussions showed that the Treaty System at its 30th anniversary fails to enjoy universal support, and contributed to an emerging debate on the merits of Antarctic science.

The purpose of this study is to determine and analyze the legal protection of Indonesian citizens working abroad from the perspective of domestic law and international law. The research method used is descriptive research methods and qualitative analysis techniques. The results obtained from this study indicates that human trafficking is a growing human rights problem in the international community, with a focus on prostitution involving women and children. Over time, changing times and increasing demand, human trafficking is no longer only in the field of prostitution, but also used in the form of forced labor, slavery, and the sale of organs. To regulate the protection of migrant workers, the United Nations General Assembly passed Case No. 45/158 in New York on December 18, 1990 which became the legal umbrella by issuing it. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. The problem of migrant workers working abroad is currently a special concern of the Indonesian government as a guarantee that the state's goal is to protect the entire nation carried out. Protection in the form of a legal norm from Indonesia and legal entities abroad is an important factor to support the protection of migrant workers. With the direction of international and national law, Indonesian goverments puts out every effort to carry out legal protection optimally.

Rong Cave is one of the more important caves in northern Vietnam’s Dong Van Karst Plateau Geopark (part of the Global Geoparks Network), because its subterranean lake provides agricultural and domestic water for neighboring communities. Maintenance and utilization of Rong Cave’s water reservoir, as well as touristic cave use, require frequent human access to Rong Cave. Depending on the availability of seasonal drip water and the water level of the lake, the abundant clay-rich sediment in the back portion of Rong Cave and possible seepage of gas from deeper strata along geologic faults provide seasonally elevated concentrations of radon in cave air. Based on repeated measurements over 10 months in 2015 and 2016 of the concentrations of radon isotopes (222Rn and 220Rn, also called thoron) with a portable SARAD® RTM 2200 instrument (SARAD® GmbH, Germany), the human total annual inhalation dose was estimated according to the UNSCEAR (2000) algorithm. The result indicates that the radon-related radiation exposure is insignificant for short-term visitors but may reach ~1.8 mSv a-1 for tour guides and ~25 mSv a-1 for cave utility workers. The latter values exceed the IAEA-recommended safety threshold of 1 mSv a-1 (IAEA, 1996). We recommend radiation monitoring for cave utility workers and tour guides. Prolonged human presence in Rong Cave should be avoided during periods of seasonally elevated radon concentrations.References Cigna A.A., 2005. Radon in caves. Interna-tional Journal of Speleology 34(1-2), 1-18. Ha Giang Statistics Office (GSO), 2016. Statistical Yearbook of Ha Giang 2015, 404 pages, Ha Giang (in Vietnamese). Dumitru O.A., Onac B.P., Fornós J.J., Cosma C., Ginés A., Ginés J., Merino A., 2015. Radon survey in caves from Mallorca Island, Spain. Science of The Total Environment, 526, 196-203. Etiope G., Martinelli G., 2002. Migration of carrier and trace gases in the geosphere: An overview. Physics of the Earth and Planetary Interiors, 129(3-4), 185-204. Global Geoparks Network (GGN), 2010. Dong Van Karst Plateau Geopark. http://www.globalgeopark.org/aboutggn/list/vietnam/6509.htm Gregorič A., Vaupotič J., Šebela S., 2013. The role of cave ventilation in governing cave air temperature and radon levels (Postojna Cave, Slovenia). International Journal of Climatology 34, 1488-1500. Gunn J., 2003. Radon in caves. In Gunn J (Ed.): Encyclopedia of Caves and Karst Science. Fitzroy Dearborn (Taylor & Francis Books, Inc.), London, UK, 617-619. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 1996. Quality assurance for safety in nuclear power plants and other nuclear installations. Safety standards and guides, In: Safety series Q1-Q14. A publication within the Nuss programme. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), 2003. Database of Dose Coefficients: Workers and Members of the Public, Version 2.0.1 (CD- ROM), Elsevier Science, Amsterdam. International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), 2010. Lung cancer risk from radon and progeny and Statement of radon. ICPR Pub. 115. Ann. ICPR 40(1). Markkanen M., Arvela H., 1992. Radon emanation from soils. Radiation Protection Dosimetry, 45(1-4), 269-272. Meisenberg O., Mishra R., Joshi M., Gierl S., Rout R., Guo L., Agaarwwal T., Kanse S., Irlinger J., Sapra B.K., Tschiersch J., 2017. Radon and thoron inhalation doses in dwellings with earthen architecture: Comparison of measurement methods. Science of The Total Environment, 579, 1855-1862. Morawska L., Phillips C.R., 1993. Depend-ence of the radon emanation coefficient on radium distribution and internal structure of the material, Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta, 57(8), 1783-1797. Nguyen Thuy Duong, Nguyen Van Huong, Arndt Schimmelmann, Nguyen Thi Anh Nguyet, Dang Thi Phuong Thao, Ta Hoa Phuong, 2016. Radon concentrations in karst caves in Dong Van karst plat-eau. VNU Journal of Science - Earth and Environmental Sciences, 32(2S), 187-197 (in Vietnamese). Nguyen Thuy Duong, Arndt Schimmelmann, Nguyen Van Huong, Agnieszka Drobniak, Jay T. Lennon, Ta Hoa Phuong, Nguyen Thi Anh Nguyet, 2017. Subterranean microbial oxidation of atmospheric methane in cavernous tropical karst. Chemical Ge-ology, 466, 229-238. Nguyen Van Huong, Nguyen Thuy Duong, Nguyen Thi Anh Nguyet, Pham Nu Quynh Nhi, Dang Thi Phuong Thao, Tran Van Phong, Nguyen Ngoc Anh, 2016. Cenozoic tectonics in Dong Van karst plateau recorded in karst cave system. VNU Journal of Science - Earth and Environmental Sciences, 32(2S), 45-58 (in Vietnamese). Nguyen Anh Nguyet, Nguyen Thuy Dương, Arndt Schimmelmann, Nguyen Van Hu-ong, Ta Hoa Phuong, Dang Phuong Thao, Ma Ngoc Giang, 2016. Radon concentration in Rong cave in Dong Van Karst Plateau Geopark. Proceeding of International Symposium Hanoi Geoengineering 2016, 248-253. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), 1993. Report to the General Assembly, with scientific annexes. United Nations sales publication E.94.IX.2. United Nations, New York. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), 2000. UNSCEAR 2000 Report. In: Sources, vol. I. United Nations, New York. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), 2008. UNSCEAR 2000 Report. In: Sources, vol. I. United Nations, New York. Vietnamese Standards (TCVN 7889:2008), 2008. Natural Radon activity in buildings-Levels and general requirements of measuring methods, Ministry of Science and Technology and Ministry of Construction (Viet Nam) (in Vietnamese). Tong-Dzuy Thanh, Vu Khuc (Eds), 2011. Stratigraphic units of Vietnam. Vietnam National University Publisher, 553p. Walia V., Lin S.J., Fu C.C., Yang T.F., Hong W.L., Wen K.L., Chen C.H., 2010. Soil-gas monitoring: A tool for fault delineation studies along Hsinhua Fault (Tainan), Southern Taiwan. Applied Geochemistry, 25(4), 602-607. Wang J., Meisenberg O., Chen Y., Karg E., Tschiersch J., 2011. Mitigation of radon and thoron decay products by filtration. Science of The Total Environment, 409(19), 3613-3619. World Health Organization (WHO), 2000. Air Quality Guidelines for Europe, (2nd edition). WHO Regional Publications, European Series, 91, Chapter 8.3 - Radon.

Tujuan dari penelitian ini untuk mengetahui dan menganalisis perlindungan hukum bagi tenaga kerja WNI yang bekerja di luar negeri perspektif hukum nasional dan hukum internasional. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah metode penelitian hukum normatif, dengan menggunakan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan pendekatan kasus, norma-norma hukum/kaidah-kaidah yang berkaitan dengan permasalahan hukum yang dibahas, dilengkapi dengan kasus-kasus yang terjadi saat ini. Adapun hasil yang diperoleh dari penelitian ini adalah perdagangan manusia merupakan isu Hak Asasi Manusia dalam masyarakat intemasional yang berkembang dengan fokus permasalahan prostitusi yang melibatkan perempuan dan anak-anak, seiring dengan berjalannya waktu, perkembangan jaman serta meningkatnya permintaan, perdagangan manusia tidak lagi berpusat dalam bidang prostitusi, tetapi juga digunakan dalam bentuk praktek-praktek kerja paksa, perbudakan serta penjualan/pemindahan organ-organ tubuh. Dalam upaya mengatur perlindungan buruh migran, majelis umum PBB melalui Resolusi No. 45/158 di New York pada 18 Desember 1990 membuat payung hukum dengan mengeluarkan International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Dalam upaya pelaksanaan perlindungan hukum terhadap tenaga kerja migran, PBB melalui International Labour Organization (ILO) mengeluarkan konvensi-konvensi yang berkaitan dengan perlindungan buruh migran. Upaya menanggulangi maraknya kasus perdagangan manusia yang tak lepas kaitannya dalam upaya perlindungan buruh migran Indonesia berkomitmen untuk melaksanakan Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children dan menerbitkan Undang-Undang Nomor 21 Tahun 2007 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Perdagangan Orang (UU PTPPO). The purpose of this study is to find out and analyze the legal protection of Indonesian citizens working abroad from the perspective of national and international law. The research method used is a normative legal research method, using legal approaches and case approaches based on laws and regulations, norms of law / rules relating to legal issues discussed, are equipped with cases which is happening now.The results obtained from this research, human trafficking is a Human Rights issue in the evolving international community with the focus of prostitution issues involving women and children, as time goes on, the times of development and increased demand, human trafficking is no longer centered in the field prostitution, but also used in the form of forced labor, slavery and sale /removal of organs. In an effort to protect the protection of foreign workers, the UN General Assembly through Resolution No. 45/158 in New York on 18 December 1990 made a legal umbrella by issuing the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. In an effort to implement legal protection against foreign workforce, the United Nations through the International Labor Organization (ILO) issues conventions related to the protection of foreign workers. The efforts address the widespread human trafficking case in Indonesian migrant workers' protection is committed to implementing Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children and to issue Law Number 21 Year 2007 on the Eradication of Trafficking in Persons.

On May 22, 1992, the United Nations General Assembly admitted three new members—Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Croatia—all of them, in the past, constituent republics of Yugoslavia. Since June 1991, these three republics—as well as Macedonia—have seceded from the Yugoslav federation, which leaves only the two remaining republics—Serbia and Montenegro—to claim the name of Yugoslavia, as well as its rights and international status, including membership in the United Nations.

On October 26 and 27, 1992, a meeting was held of the heads of the offices responsible for international legal services of the foreign ministries of the member states of the United Nations—the Legal Advisers. The meeting—the third of its kind—was organized at the invitation of the Legal Advisers of Canada, India, Mexico, Poland and Sweden, and with the assistance of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Under-Secretary-General Carl-August Fleischhauer. Thirty Legal Advisers and sixteen of their deputies attended, together with nearly fifty other interested participants. All five colleagues representing the permanent members of the Security Council were present.

The National Model United Nations claims to be the most realistic simulation of the United Nations in the world. Every year more than 2500 students participate in the NMUN in New York, which partly takes place inside the original UNbuildings. For five days, the students simulate the different bodies of the UN-framework (e.g. Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC) by using the original UN-Rules of procedure and negotiating to formulate and pass resolutions on various topics.

This article, based on a Master's research that analyzes the speeches of Jair Bolsonaro from the perspective of the production of alterity or difference, synthesizes the results of the dissertation and seeks to present the characteristics and possible consequences of the discourse and, therefore, the bolsonarista movement, in the scope of the production of the enemy and the attack on human rights. From the Pecheutian current of language studies, methodological orientation of the work, some discursive formations that are present in the statements of Jair Bolsonaro are presented and discussed. Such formations are built, within the scope of the research, from the interdisciplinary convergence of cultural studies, notions of identity and historiographic elements of the military institution and the National Security Doctrine. The synthesis of the analysis of Jair Bolsonaro's speech in this article is based on the text given at the opening of the 74th United Nations General Assembly, in New York, on September 24, 2019.ResumoEste artigo, elaborado a partir de uma pesquisa de Mestrado que analisa os discursos de Jair Bolsonaro sob o prisma da produção da alteridade ou da diferença, sintetiza os resultados da dissertação e busca apresentar as características e as possíveis consequências do discurso e, por conseguinte, do movimento bolsonarista, no âmbito da produção do inimigo e do ataque aos direitos humanos. A partir da corrente pecheutiana de estudos da linguagem, orientação metodológica do trabalho, são apresentadas e discutidas algumas formações discursivas que estão presentes nos enunciados de Jair Bolsonaro. Tais formações são construídas, no âmbito da pesquisa, a partir da convergência interdisciplinar de estudos culturais, noções identitárias e elementos historiográficos da instituição militar e da Doutrina de Segurança Nacional. A síntese da análise do discurso de Jair Bolsonaro, neste artigo, é feita a partir do texto proferido na abertura da 74ª Assembleia Geral da Organização das Nações Unidas, ocorrido em Nova Iorque, em 24 de setembro de 2019.Resumen Este artículo, extraído de una investigación de maestría, que analiza los discursos de Jair Bolsonaro bajo el prisma de la producción de la alteridad o la diferencia, resume los resultados de la tesis y busca presentar las características y las posibles consecuencias del discurso y, por lo tanto, del movimiento bolsonarista en el contexto de la producción del enemigo y del ataque a los derechos humanos. Desde la corriente peuchetiana de estudios del lenguaje, orientación metodológica del artículo, se presentan y discuten algunas formaciones discursivas que están presentes en los enunciados de Jair Bolsonaro. Estas formaciones se construyen, en el ámbito de la investigación, desde la convergencia interdisciplinaria de estudios culturales, nociones de identidad y elementos historiográficos de la institución militar y de la Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional. La síntesis del análisis del discurso de Jair Bolsonaro, en este artículo, se hace a partir del texto dado en la apertura de la 74ª Asamblea General de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas, que ocurrió en Nueva York el 24 de septiembre de 2019.Palavras-chave: Jair Bolsonaro, Alteridade, Doutrina de Segurança Nacional, Identidade.Keywords: Jair Bolsonaro, Alterity, National Security Doctrine, Identity.Palabras claves: Jair Bolsonaro, Alteridad, Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional, Identidad.ReferencesALVES, Maria Helena Moreira. Estado e Oposição no Brasil. Petrópolis, RJ: Editora Vozes, 1984. ANDERSON, Benedict. Comunidades Imaginadas. São Paulo. Companhia das Letras, 2008.BAUMAN, Zygmunt. Modernidade Líquida. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2005.BRASIL. Presidente (2019-2023: Jair Messias Bolsonaro) Discurso na abertura da 74ª Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas. Nova York, 24 set. 2019. Disponível em: <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/discursos-artigos-e-entrevistas-categoria/presidente-da-republica-federativa-do-brasil-discursos/20890-discurso-do-presidente-jair-bolsonaro-na-abertura-da-74-assembleia-geral-das-nacoes-unidas-nova-york-24-de-setembro-de-2019>. Acesso em: 29 mai. 2020.CALVEIRO, Pilar. Poder e desaparecimento: os campos de concentração na Argentina. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2013.CASTRO, Celso. O espírito militar: um estudo de antropologia social na Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Ed, 1990.CHIRIO, Maud. A política nos quartéis: revoltas e protestos de oficiais na ditadura militar brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2012.HALL, Stuart. A identidade cultural na pós-modernidade. Rio de Janeiro: Lamparina, 2019. 12ª edição. 2ª reimpressão.HALL, Stuart. Cultura e representação. Rio de Janeiro: Editora PUC RIO: Apicuri, 2016, 260 p.MOTTA, Rodrigo Patto Sá. Em guarda contra o perigo vermelho: o anticomunismo no Brasil (1917 – 1964). Tese (Doutorado em História) – Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2000.SILVA, Tomaz Tadeu. A produção social da identidade e da diferença. In: SILVA, Tomaz Tadeu. Identidade e diferença: a perspectiva dos Estudos Culturais. 15ª ed. Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro: Vozes, 2014.VALDÉS, Jorge A. Tapia. El terrorismo de estado: la doutrina de Seguridade Nacional enelcono sul. México: Editorial Nueva Imagem, 1980.WOODWART, Kathryn. Identidade e diferença: uma introdução teórica e conceitual. In: SILVA, Tomaz Tadeu. Identidade e diferença: a perspectiva dos Estudos Culturais. 15ª ed. Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro: Vozes, 2014.e4544139

On September 19, 2016, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a set of commitments to enhance the protection of refugees and migrants, known as the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. In the Declaration, all 193 member states of the United Nations reaffirmed the importance of the international protection regime and committed to strengthening and enhancing mechanisms to protect people on the move. They also agreed to work toward the adoption of a global compact on refugees and a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration. These two compacts were drafted through separate processes over eighteen months in 2017–18 and formally adopted by the General Assembly in December 2018. One hundred and fifty-two states voted in favor of the adoption of the Migration Compact, while twelve countries abstained from the vote (Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Chile, Italy, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Romania, Singapore, and Switzerland), and five countries voted against (Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, and the United States).

The Working Group on Indigenous Populations, an organ of the United Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ended its fourth annual session last August by distributing seven “draft principles” to governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for comment as the first step in preparing “a draft declaration on indigenous rights, which may be proclaimed by the General Assembly.” For the first time since indigenous organizations took their concerns to the international level in 1977, a formal commitment has been made to the development of new law, probably in time for the “cinquecentennial” in 1992 of the “discovery” of the Americas and a proposed international indigenous year.

In March 2023, thousands of people from various disciplines came together in New York for the United Nations 2023 Water Conference. The attendees included policymakers, activists, professionals and academics, all with an interest in the water sector. The conference provided a platform to share knowledge and exchange ideas about water-related challenges. Through a combination of in-house and side events, participants were provided with the opportunity to voice their concerns, engage in crucial discussions and exchange novel insights, despite the predominantly scripted nature of the event as a forum tailored for politicians and policymakers. The Water Conference identified risks ensuing from the number of short-term commitments, unclear funding and the lack of quantifiable measurements (President of the General Assembly 2023). The Water Conference also saw the adoption of the Water Action Agenda (United Nations 2023), consisting of voluntary commitments in line with UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and focusing on water. Crafting these commitments posed a challenge, highlighting the complex nature of the United Nations’efforts in fostering collaboration among people representing diverse backgrounds, interests, cultures and histories.

AbstractThe United Nations (UN) General Assembly High-Level Meeting (HLM) on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response (PPPR) was a missed opportunity to bring high-level commitment and momentum to the global governance of health emergencies. Intended to bring much-needed attention to a policy issue that is rapidly slipping down the international agenda, the fraught diplomacy among member states, lack of consensus on key issues, and weak UN Political Declaration in New York foreshadow a difficult road ahead for upcoming negotiations under the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva. This column chronicles the evolving engagement of the UN in global health governance, examines the diplomatic process leading to the UN HLM on PPPR, and assesses the contributions and missed opportunities of its resulting Political Declaration.

The article by Fairbrother et al1 is an indictment of the quality of care provided to disadvantaged children in "Medicaid Mills" in New York City. The missed opportunities to immunize and to test for lead poisoning and tuberculosis represent misused opportunities that are avoidable and tragic. The International Covenant on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on November 19, 1989.2 This covenant stated the principle that children require safeguards and care, including the highest attainable standard of health and access to facilities to ensure that no child is deprived of her or his right to such health services.

On September 19th, 2016, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted Resolution 71/1, the text of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (the “New York Declaration”). Resolution 71/1 is the outcome document of the high-level plenary meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, held at the UN headquarters. The New York Declaration reflects how UN member states have decided to address the challenge of large movements of people in two main legal categories: asylum seekers/refugees and migrants. Resolution 71/1 includes an annex titled “Towards a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration” (the “global compact for migration” or “global compact”). This document is comprised of several thematic issues related to international migration that will be the basis of a globally negotiated agreement on how member states should respond to international migration at the national, regional, and international levels, as well as to issues related to international migration and development. The global compact for migration is intended to be adopted at a conference on international migration and development before the inauguration of the 73rd annual session of the UN General Assembly in September 2018. This paper addresses how UN member states should plan to address international migration in the future. It does not refer to refugees and asylum seekers: a global compact on refugees will be drafted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2018, and to be presented to the UN General Assembly for states' consideration during its 73rd annual session, which starts in September 2018.1 For those who have been involved in migration issues within the United Nations, the fact that member states have finally agreed to convene an international conference on international migration represents a major achievement. It is the result of an extended process that started decades ago and was made possible by a long chain of efforts by many state delegations and other stakeholders. The global compact for migration will not be the first outcome document dealing exclusively with international migration. A declaration2 adopted at a high-level meeting at the United Nations in October 2013, for example, paved the way for the 2018 conference. Nonetheless, the global compact represents a unique opportunity to address international migration comprehensively and humanely. This paper contributes to the discussion on the elements that should be included in the global compact for migration. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes the main elements of Annex II, “Towards a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” and the criteria that needs to be adopted in order to achieve a substantive outcome. In particular, participants in the negotiation process should aim to balance the concerns of states and the members of host societies, on one hand, with the needs and rights of migrants, on the other. The second section includes proposals to enrich the final global compact for migration and takes into account two documents written by two different actors within the UN system, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration, and the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants. In particular, the paper proposes that the global compact for migration: • sets forth principles that can inform the actions of governments in relation to international migration at all levels; • enunciates a clearer definition of state protection responsibilities in relation to migrants in crisis situations and so-called “mixed flows”3; affords a substantive role to civil society organizations, the private sector, and academic institutions in the global compact's follow-up and review process; • defines the institutional framework for the implementation and follow-up of the global compact within the United Nations, including through the work of the UN High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF); • establishes a mechanism to fund migration policies for states that lack enough resources to invest sufficiently in this task; and • builds a cooperation-oriented, peer-review mechanism to review migration policies. The paper has been conceived as an input for those who will take part in the negotiation of the global compact for migration, as well as those who will closely follow those negotiations. Thus, the paper assumes a level of knowledge on how international migration has been addressed within the United Nations during the last several years and of the complexities of these negotiation processes. The author took part in different UN negotiation processes on international migration from 2004 to 2013. The paper is primarily based on this experience.4

The Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Preparatory Committee or committee) held its sixth and final session from March 16 to April 3, 1998, at the United Nations headquarters in New York. At this session it completed its work of preparing a consolidated text of a statute for a permanent international criminal court (ICC) for adoption at a diplomatic conference in Rome held from June 15 to July 17, 1998. The consolidated text is considerably longer than the draft statute submitted by the International Law Commission to the UN General Assembly in July 1994 (ILC draft statute) and contains many different options submitted by states, but it is still largely consistent with the basic structure of the ILC draft statute.

This paper looks briefly at the pattern of hard copy publication of a number of ! international organisations and considers the extent of library holdings of items from these bodies, both in this country and, to a much more limited extent, in the United States. It then lookstat their websites and considers the extent to which the same information is available in both formats. Finally, questions are asked about the value of these websites both for users in Africa and elsewhere and there is also some discussion about the problems which they raise for librarians.Any mention of the term ‘international organisation’ leads most people to think immediately of the United Nations. But this paper is not about the output of the central bodies of the UN, although there is plenty of material of interest to Africanists coming out of bodies such as the General Assembly, the Security Council and UNESCO, based as they are in New York, Geneva or Paris.

Climate change is affecting the environment and humanity globally by increasing the average surface temperature, extreme weather events, changing rainfall patterns, rising sea levels and acidification of the oceans. Climate change is now having an impact on all countries on every continent, disrupting national economies and people's livelihoods as resources, food and water become scarcer. To address these risks and threats to security and even the existence of life, in 2015, the United Nations General Assembly (UN) in New York adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This document aims, through its 17 objectives, a better future for humanity, in response to the identified threats, being structured on three pillars of sustainable development – economic, social and environmental. The 2030 Agenda was adopted and subsequently implemented by the European Union, through the Communication "Next Steps for a Sustainable European Future" of November 22, 2016 and by Romania, through the "National Strategy for the Sustainable Development of Romania 2030" of November 9, 2018.

ABSTRACT1991 saw the ninth successive United Nations (UN) discussion on the ‘Question of Antarctica.’ The adoption of two more resolutions critical of the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), including South African participation therein, reaffirmed the unchanging nature of the UN episode and the lack of consensus on the management of Antarctica. Key developments affecting Antarctica continue to occur away from New York: during 1990—91 the negotiations conducted at Vifia del Mar and Madrid for the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (PREP) and the measures agreed at the Bonn Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting proved the point. The critics of the ATS were appeased by neither PREP and its mining prohibition nor the recent dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa.Two UN reports were published on the state of the Antarctic environment as well as the proposed establishment of a UNsponsored research station in Antarctica. One resolution adopted in December 1991 called for annual UN reports on the Antarctic environment, although fiscal and other considerations meant that the research station proposal was effectively shelved. Another resolution urged South African exclusion from ATS meetings. The tenth annual UN discussion on Antarctica is scheduled for the close of 1992. There exists growing evidence that the critical campaign is losing momentum, although it seems premature to anticipate Antarctica's imminent demise as an UN agenda topic.

The threat of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in bacteria has been escalated to a rightful seat on the global health agenda. In September 2016, for only the fourth time in United Nations (UN) history, the UN General Assembly in New York will meet to focus on a health threat – antimicrobial resistance. Other diseases afforded this level of consultation at the UN were human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), non-communicable diseases and Ebola virus. There are grim predictions for the future in terms of AMR and health security that span income settings. These predictions challenge the premise that minor bacterial infections of childhood are innocuous, and threaten to halt the medical advancements dependant on antibiotic therapy. Those with compromised immune systems, whether endogenous or induced, will be at highest risk. The development and spread of AMR has been, and will continue to be, fanned by the relentless selection pressure of exposure to antibiotics whether used appropriately, unnecessarily or suboptimally, in human health, animal health and agriculture. The distribution of antibiotic resistant bacteria is facilitated by travel and transport. Antimicrobial resistance will affect those in the community and the hospital.

During the past twelve months, the issue of sexual violence in conflict and emergencies has received an unprecedented amount of attention at the highest political and institutional levels. In 2013, the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) launched a Call to Action to mobilize donors, UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other stakeholders on protecting women and girls in humanitarian emergencies, culminating in the high-level event “Protecting Girls and Women in Emergencies” in November 2013. As of August 2014, over forty partners (including governments, United Nations (UN) agencies and NGOs) had made commitments to the Call to Action. Furthermore, in June 2014 the “Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict”, co-chaired by the UK Foreign Secretary and Angelina Jolie, Special Envoy for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), gathered 1,700 delegates and 129 country delegations. In his summary, the chair of the Global Summit states: “We must apply the lessons we have learned and move from condemnation to concrete action. We must all live up to the commitments we have made.”1In September 2014, the United States organized a Call to Action event in New York during the UN General Assembly with the purpose of sharing progress on commitments made in November 2013. It thus seems that efforts to raise awareness about sexual violence in conflict and emergencies and advocate for a much stronger commitment to action are well under way. But is this enough? Is there enough evidence from lessons learned to allow us to increase and improve our response?

In October 1992, the united nations security council requested the secretary-general to appoint an impartial commission to examine and record the atrocities committed in the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Two years later, this commission produced its final report. Some of the goriest pages in this catalogue of infamy are dedicated to the explosion on the Markale open-air market in central Sarajevo that took place around noon on Saturday, 5 February 1994. The report describes it as “the worst attack on civilians during the siege” of Sarajevo, citing that it killed at least 66 persons and wounded 197 (781). This explosion can be said to represent the turning point in the Bosnian war, which by that point had lasted some twenty-two months without any reasonable resolution in sight. David Binder, a New York Times reporter and the author of the most detailed account of this atrocity to date, writes that itprovoked the first engagement of NATO in European hostilities since it was founded four decades earlier and the first involvement of U.S. forces in combat in Europe since the beginning of the Cold War. Within days it also drew Russia into the hapless circle of Balkan problem-solvers, along with a unit of Russian peacekeeping troops—the first entry of Russia into the former Yugoslavia since Joseph Stalin's break-up with Josip Broz Tito in 1948. (70)

With the continuous increase in world air travel which has been observed since 1995 being maintained, although at a somewhat lower rate after the terrorism enacted at the World Trade Centre in New York last year, it has been estimated that the number of aircraft hull loss accidents will double by 2012. Such serious accidents often involve fatalities. To ensure that there is in place an acceptable level of support for victims and their families, wherever the accident may have occurred, a Resolution A32–7 was adopted at the 32nd General Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), a body of the United Nations. (Every nation which is a member of the UN is entitled to be a member of ICAO: once a member, the state and its airlines must provide air services to the standard required by the ICAO.) The Resolution is based implicitly on the rules which have been put in place by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the USA. This short paper briefly explains what the rules entail, the likely impact that such rules will have on an airline affected by an air accident, and what are some of the other implications of implementing the Resolution.

Sustainable Development Goals are the global action plans constituted by world leaders including Indonesia at the 70th general assembly of the United Nations in New York. The next global action known as SDGs has formed 17 objectives with 169 targeted action plans up until 2030 with the theme “Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for Sustainable Development Goals”. As a form of participation in this action, Indonesian Government has officially issued a Presidential Regulation of Republic Indonesia Number 59 of 2017 concerning the Implementation in Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. This research has the aim to determine the quality of education as one of the purposes in SDGs, namely SDG 4 in the Communication and Informatics Business Management (MBTI) study program based on the perceptions of the students taking entrepreneurship course. By gauging the level of understanding (cognitive), the ability to advocate (socio-emotional), the participation (behavioral) of the students related to SDG 4, also to measure the conformity of MBTI study program’s vision and mission with 3 Pillars of the Tridharma where it is linked directly to SDG 4 targets. As well as to disclose the readiness of MBTI study program in actualizing SDG 4 targets based on the perspective of students taking entrepreneurship courses. In order to identify each category for every variable, the writer is using descriptive analysis. The result shows that the cognitive, socio-emotional, and behavioral aspects of MBTI students are well mannered. The same thing applies to the conformity of its vision and mission linked with 3 Pillars of the Tridharma also the readiness of the study program.

The global socio-economic and environmental crises are worsening daily. The scale is up and daunting. Poverty is glaring and evident in all spheres of life. The effect is much more on the developing nations, Africa and Nigeria being at the core. At the turn of the 21st century, the world woke up to the startling reality of a world so rich yet the majority of its populations live in poverty. Half of the three billion go to bed without a means of livelihood especially food in their bellies. By the year 2020 developing nations were already expending $1.3 on debt repayment for $1 they received in grants. In addition to this statistical reality, approximately one billion people entered into the 21st century not able to read and write. The environment is polluted with various outbreak of pandemics and deadly diseases which have claimed and still claiming millions of lives. These horrendous statistics moved the United Nations to adopt the Millennium Declaration on 8th September, 2000 in New York. From the Declaration came the millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a set of eight goals, 18 targets and 48 indicators which are committed to fight poverty, gender inequality and environmental degradation and to foster a global partnership for development (Oke and Oluwasuji, 2008:61; Oke; Oluwasuji and Simon-Oke 2011:61; Oluwasuji; 2013). As a follow-up to the achievement and attainment of the MDGs, World leaders on September 2015 during the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (a transmutation for MDGs to SDGs). The 2030 Agenda for sustainable development focuses on ‘a present and a future that is economically sustainable, socially inclusive and environmentally resilient’. This is expressed through the framing of the 17 SDGs, 169 targets and 230 Key Performance Indicators. It is also aimed at ending poverty, safeguarding the planet and ensuring that all people live in peace and prosperity by the year 2030. This paper hence, focuses on the prospects and the challenges that are posed as inhibitors to the attainment of these goals in Nigeria. The paper used secondary sources of data and content analysis. It is observed that as laudable as the dream of SDGs is, there are some inherent inhibiting factors such as insecurity, global economic recession, corruption, embezzlement and nepotism, secessionist agitations, youth restiveness, global pandemics, a monolithic economy, culture and tradition, insurgency and terrorism among other factors that will impede the attainment of the SDGs in Nigeria. The paper submits that for the goals to be achieved these factors have to be addressed head on. In addition to the fight, the paper suggested diversification of the monolithic economy from oil dependency to other non-oil sectors; involvement of non-state actors and non-governmental agencies, institutions and agencies vis-à-vis the critical stakeholders and civil societies to encourage socialization, awareness and public understanding of the goals. The paper also encourages the government to establish a special monitoring agency to monitor the activities earmarked under SDGs for effectiveness and efficiency to avoid the same old stories with other similar intervening agencies in Nigeria.

On September 19, 2016, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants. This document launched a two-year process to develop a Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing on Refugees (“Global Compact on Refugees”) and a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration. With a record 65 million displaced persons in the world, the global community must come together to fashion a stronger protection regime for persons on the move. This paper outlines broad themes and specific recommendations that the Global Compact on Refugees should adopt on how to strengthen the global refugee protection system. The recommendations fall into several categories: (1) responsibility sharing for the protection of refugees; (2) filling in protection gaps; (3) balancing and replacing deterrence strategies with protection solutions; (4) refugee resettlement; and (5) building refugee self-sufficiency. Some of the key recommendations include: • the development of a responsibility-sharing formula to respond to large movements of refugees; • the development of an early warning system to identify and respond to nations in crisis; • the adoption of principles included in the Nansen and Migrants in Countries of Crisis initiatives; • the use of temporary protection measures to protect populations that flee natural disaster; • the adoption of model processes that ensure safe and voluntary return; • cooperation between destination and transit countries to expand refugee protections; • the provision of asylum and due process protections at borders; • the use of development assistance to ensure the self-sufficiency of refugees; • the adoption of a goal to resettle 10 percent of the global refugee population each year; • the establishment of a refugee matching system between refugees and resettlement countries; and • the adoption of coherent strategies, involving all sectors, to address large movements of refugees. This paper draws heavily, albeit not exclusively, from a series of papers published as a special collection in the Journal on Migration and Human Security1 on strengthening the global system of refugee protection.

The World BOSAI Forum 2023 (WBF2023), held in March 2023 in Sendai, Japan, was successfully convened as a global platform for practical discussion of disaster risk reduction issues in a free and dynamic manner, in contrast to the United Nations, where national interests collide, or academic conferences where experts gather. In particular, we aimed to disseminate the knowledge and lessons learned from the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) to the world and share the knowledge and lessons with Japan. We would like to take this opportunity again to express our heartfelt gratitude to all those who participated in the sessions, exhibitions, posters, and flash talk presentations, as well as to the many locals who attended the event. According to the World BOSAI Forum [1], the WBF2023 was attended by 5,412 people over 3 days, including 1,335 pre-registrants from 40 countries and regions, on-site registrants, and EXPO participants. It included 30 oral sessions, 7 conferences, 50 poster sessions, 33 flash talk presentations, and 33 exhibition booths, where tangible solutions for disaster risk reduction were discussed through dialogue among international organizations, governments, academia, the private sector, NGOs, and citizens. At the forum, Tohoku University hosted 4 sessions and co-hosted 10 sessions, which introduced the role of Tohoku University and the International Research Institute of Disaster Science as well as their contributions to the processes of recovery and reconstruction from the 2011 GEJET. Finally, the forum came up with recommendations for a Midterm Review of the Implementation of the Sendai Framework 2015–2030 (MTR SF). In May 2023, the High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on the MTR SF was held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York [2]. The guest editors are pleased to publish this special issue in the Journal of Disaster Research, which comprises six articles sharing the research advancements presented at the WBF2023. We hope that this special issue on the WBF2023 will contribute to the literature on disaster science and further advance disaster risk reduction. References: [1] World BOSAI Forum, “WBF2023 Report,” 2023. https://worldBOSAIforum.com/2023/en/report/ [Accessed May 18, 2024] [2] UNDRR, “High-Level Meeting on the Midterm Review of the Sendai Framework,” 2023. https://sendaiframework-mtr.undrr.org/high-level-meeting-midterm-review-sendai-framework-disaster-risk-reduction-2015-2030 [Accessed May 18, 2024]

In the new history of present states, one of the main risks to the socio-economic development of society is corruption. The fight against it is based on the development of normative and legal acts, prevention and prevention, information and investigative activities, and is expressed in the form of deterrence and counteraction.The fundamental regulatory framework is the “United Nations Convention against Corruption” (adopted in New York on October 31, 2003 by Resolution 58/4 at the 51st plenary session of the 58th UN General Assembly), the Federal Law “On Countering Corruption” of 12/25/2008 N 273-FL. At the same time, to date, combating corruption in local government is regulated superficially and is formal in character. Due to the actual closed nature of the activities and peculiarities of the functioning of local government, the issues of corruption are not fully studied in order to provide effective prevention and counteraction.The possibility of a detailed study of corruptionogenic factors of local government and the development of methods of counteraction became possible after the elections of 2019, after which non-systemic municipal deputies were elected to the representative bodies of local government. Exercising the powers in the representative body of local government, municipal deputies independent from the territorial executive bodies of state power were able to study the specifics of the functioning of local government, make public the issues of the problem field, identify vulnerable places in the activities, take response measures and make appropriate practical conclusions.The purpose of this article is to establish the causes of the emergence of corruption in local government on the example of a separate municipality of the MO Svetlanovskoye of St. Petersburg. Study of the causes of the emergence of corruptionogenic factors, search and proposal of possible ways to address the issue of effective counteraction to corruption in local government in the new conditions of life of modern society.On the basis of the study the authors declare the need to take specific measures of response of the public authorities of the subject of the Russian Federation and the representative body of local government, aimed at creating certain conditions for effective counteraction and prevention of corruption, minimizing the consequences of corruptogenic factors in the modern conditions of democratic functioning of local government.

he 2020 is rich in anniversaries: the world community celebrates the 75th anniversary of the United Nations (UN) and the 25th anniversary of the Fourth World Conference on Women, a mass meeting of more than five thousand participants in Beijing in 1995. A three-day special event is planned during the September Session of the UN General Assembly in New York (2020), dedicated to the celebration of “Beijing Plus 25”. At these meetings governments from around the world are expected to commit to speeding up and scaling up the promises made in the historic Beijing Platform for Action. And the last 2019 was marked by the fortieth anniversary of the most important document in the field of gender equality – the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women – CEDAW, which is rightfully widely known in the world as “The Bill on the Rights of Women” (1979). Anniversary dates increase motivation to comprehend the role and place of events and phenomena associated with them. Moreover, the UN theme and gender equality is a hot topic, which is due to two main circumstances. 47НАДЕАЖ АШВОИнст иД суА ВД ОНАДЕО ОДЕ суА СКсу ОДДнаАЖдОЖт иы суА ВДнаАЖдОИ иЖНОДнРОсниДInternational Trends. Volume 18. No. 2 (61). April–June / 2020On the one hand, the UN is a unique global organization that has a significant impact on international processes. On the other hand, the problem of gender equality is the basis of social stability, a condition for development and an instrument for creating the quality of life. Bridging the gender gap in all areas of life is vital to achieving sustainable development and fulfilling the promise of the 2030 Agenda. To achieve the sustainable development goals, it is necessary to ensure full and equal access for and participation in women and girls. Despite progress, women and girls are still systematically underrepresented as users and leaders in critical areas of human life. The fight against stereotypes and myths occupies a key place. There is a wide range of options available to address both the causes and symptoms underlying gender stereotypes and social norms. The emphasis on a sound strategy with a gender perspective is something that can contribute to achieving gender equality for the sustainable development of the civilized world, this is what the UN insists on.

Hong Kong has seen an upheaval in recent years. From the protests over the extradition law to the protests over the National Security Law, these protests are a response to the ever-encroaching hand of Beijing on political rights in Hong Kong. After the National Security Law was implemented, Hong Kong’s freedom was almost gone. One by one, pro-democracy protesters, opposition parliament members, and opposition media are being targeted and repressed. Despite the numerous protests and riots, the Hong Kong SAR government perseveres with little concession to the protesters. Why does the government of Hong Kong decided not to respect Hong Kong’s unique democratic system in China, arguably the system that has brought Hong Kong to one of the most prominent cities in the world for global interactions, and instead wish to turn it into another normal Chinese city? Why does the Hong Kong SAR government almost completely ignore the voice of the Hong Kong people? Using the framework developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith in The Dictator’s Handbook, I argue that the small size of Hong Kong’s governing coalition (i.e., the minimum amount of support required for the leader to stay in power) and the ease in which the Chief Executive of Hong Kong rewards her allies play a significant role in this democratic backsliding. Furthermore, while the Western World reacted in outrage over this undemocratic encroachment of Beijing on Hong Kong, I argue that their sanctions on Hong Kong leaders will not play a significant role as the Chief Executive of Hong Kong does not need their support. Keywords: Hong Kong; democracy; protests; governing coalition;sanctions REFERENCES Allison, Graham. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides’s Trap? New York: Houghton Miflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2017. 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Introduction: The use of abundant feedstocks, such as water and air, in manufacturing of value-added products is important in achieving the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.1 In this context, electrified direct synthesis of chemicals from oxygen in the air is of special interest since it avoids greenhouse gas emissions if the electricity used to drive the synthesis comes from sustainable sources such as solar- and wind-power. The controlling of oxygen reduction path over catalysts incorporation with oxygen evolution reaction as auxiliary reaction enables the electrosynthesis of value-added chemicals, oxygen and hydroxyl radical. The development of cheap materials e.g., mesoporous transition metal oxides, is urged to replace the expensive and scarce of platinum group metal (PGM)-based catalysts, with the ability to provide competitive reaction rate in alkaline media.2 Experimental: A template-free hydrothermal method is developed for the synthesis of mesoporous NiO and NiCo2O4. The materials’ physicochemical properties are characterized by X-ray diffraction, physisorption, electron microscopy, selected electron area diffraction, and X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy. The electrochemical properties and electrocatalytic oxygen activity are evaluated via cyclic voltammetry and electrochemical impedance spectra in alkaline electrolyte using a standard three electrodes electrochemical working station equipped with (ring) rotating disk electrode (RDE/RRDE) techniques. The catalysts coated on carbon fiber paper (CFP) are used as electrode assembled with anion exchange membrane in two-electrodes-electrochemical cell for device test. NiO- and NiCo2O4-modified CFP are used as cathode and anode, respectively, for constructing electrochemical generator of hydroxyl radical. 50 mL min-1 O2 flow was maintained in catholyte to enable oxygen saturation. 20 mg L-1 rhodamine B (RhB)was fed into cathode. Off-line UV-vis measurements were used for RhB quantification. In Electrochemical oxygen purifier, NiCo2O4-modified CFP are used as electrodes. 0.1 - 3 M KOH aqueous solutions were used as anolyte and air-saturated catholyte. The volume of produced oxygen on the anode after 2 h was collected and measured by a water displacement method. Results and Discussion: A facile template-free hydrothermal synthesis is developed for bifunctional oxygen electrocatalysts (OER and ORR) of NiO and NiCo2O4. Physicochemical characterization shows that both NiO and NiCo2O4 are mesoporous with the pore size within a range of 2 - 8 nm and specific surface areas of 60 and 120 m2 g-1, respectively. In addition, NiO and NiCo2O4 possess cubic crystal structures with the corresponding crystal sizes of ~6.0 and 9.3 nm. Electrochemical analysis shows that mesoporous NiCo2O4 has about two times larger capacitance and eight times smaller charge transfer resistance compared to NiO. NiCo2O4 shows higher electrocatalytic activity in OER and selectivity to water as the terminal product of ORR. On the contrary, ORR over NiO yielded hydroxyl radicals, as a product of a Fenton-like reaction of H2O2. The product selectivity in ORR is used to construct two electrolyzers of electrified purification of oxygen and generation of hydroxyl radicals. The optimization of configuration of hydroxyl radical generator enables the degradation of RhB up to 90% after 1 hour, and the electrochemical oxygen purifier shows high efficiency of about 100%. Significance: It is demonstrated that the synthesized mesoporous transition metal oxides via a simple template-free hydrothermal route, and the materials can be used as alternatives to PGM-based electrocatalysts for driving electrochemical cell towards to various products. The work also clearly shows how the composition and structure of catalysts affect the oxygen reactions, and the selectivity of ORR used for producing value-added chemicals coupling with OER. It is shown that the established electrochemical oxygen purifier and hydroxyl radical generator have a high conversion efficiency. Schematic 1. (a) Scheme of operation of the hydroxyl radical generator, (b) the degradation efficiency and rate constants as function of current densities; (c) Scheme of the oxygen purifier, and (d) the generated oxygen volume as a function of working power of the electrochemical cell with different anolyte concentrations. Acknowledgements: This work was supported by the competence center FunMat-II funded by the Swedish Agency for Innovation Systems (Vinnova, grant no 2016-05156), the Swedish Energy Agency (project no 42022-1), and Swedish Research Council (VR 2019-05577, Flexible metal-air primary batteries). Reference: 1 United Nations. Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable developement. (UN General Assembly, New York, 2015). 2 Yang, Y. et al. Electrocatalysis in Alkaline Media and Alkaline Membrane-Based Energy Technologies. Chem. Rev. 6, 6117–6321 (2022). Figure 1

_ A database for tracking the world’s fossil fuel production, reserves, and emissions launched on 19 September, coinciding with climate discussions taking place at the 77th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Developed jointly by Carbon Tracker, an independent financial think tank, and the Global Energy Monitor, which tracks global energy projects, the Global Registry of Fossil Fuels is the first open-source database that translates fossil fuel reserves and production data into greenhouse-gas emissions expressed in CO2 equivalents. It was built using data for more than 50,000 fields in 89 countries, which covers about 75% of global reserves, production, and emissions. It is available for public use, a first for a collection of this size, according to Carbon Tracker, and provides an interactive database and dashboard to help governments make decisions to align their fossil fuel production with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5°C temperature goal. It will also allow investors, civil society, and other stakeholders to evaluate production decisions in the context of climate policies. Private data have been available previously for purchase to analyze global fossil fuel usage and reserves, and the International Energy Agency (IEA) maintains public data on oil, gas, and coal, but it focuses on the demand for the fuels. By demonstrating the scale of CO2 emissions associated with each country’s national reserves and production, the registry tracks what is yet to be combusted and may help investors understand which assets may be at risk of being stranded as the energy transition evolves. Stranded assets are now generally accepted to be those assets that at some point before the end of their economic life (based on the time of the investment decision) no longer deliver economic returns because of changes such as lower-than-anticipated demand or prices. Carbon Tracker said for potential new investments, its research aims to prevent stranded assets “by identifying where capital expenditure may be allocated to investments which may not yield the expected returns as the world decarbonizes. Our focus is, therefore, on advancing the energy transition through the stewardship of capital, with the intention of preventing it from being wasted.” Is the Methodology Solid and Is it the Best Approach? Carbon Tracker, a not-for-profit, was launched in 2011 and has gained traction since then as a recognized name in emissions quantification, including citations in some OnePetro papers. It has been involved in other endeavors such as Trafigura and Palantir Technologies’ development of a platform to calculate carbon intensity in the supply chain through its involvement with the Science-Based Targets initiative. The emissions methodology is based on the range of constants provided by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change process for combustion of fossil fuels; IEA and OPGEE data for crude oil and gas for supply chain emissions; and the database of coal mines built by Global Energy Monitor, according to the registry’s website. OPGEE is the Oil Production Greenhouse Gas Estimator, an engineering-based life-cycle assessment tool which applies to initial exploration to refinery entrance. But is it the best approach when hydrocarbons are forecast to be needed through at least 2050 for the world’s energy requirements? The potential retreat from providing financing for continued production may have corollary effects. The Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ), the umbrella organization for many climate finance initiatives, de-emphasized financed emissions in its recent guidance on financial institution net-zero transition plans: “A narrow focus on financed emissions in target setting and measurement might incentivize selecting low-emission assets and clients, as this would reduce a financial institution’s footprint quickly and in a manner for which established accounting methodologies exist. However, such an approach does not guarantee that portfolio assets and clients are aligned to a 1.5°C pathway or that emissions in the real economy are reduced. At a global level, this approach redirects capital away from high-emitting portfolio companies and clients that require capital and other services to enable their net-zero transition.” GFANZ highlighted the importance of financing emissions reductions, as well as supporting firms that may be carbon-intensive today but have a plan to transition to net zero. The energy transition is rife with opinions, demands from various stakeholders, and targets that vary widely. No measurement or metric will be the definitive answer for everyone—one size does not fit all. The Global Registry may be useful as another tool to help with the understanding of the complexity of a global transition for which there are no hard and fast rules.

Resumen:En este trabajo se realiza el estudio, en la perspectiva histórica de los cuarenta años de democracia en España, de las normas que han disciplinado la participación electoral de las personas con discapacidad, en tanto máximo exponente de la integración en la comunidad de este colectivo tan numeroso, variado y vulnerable. Ello permite no solo conocer la regulación existente en los diversos estadios de nuestra joven democracia, sino también, al propio tiempo, poder valorar de manera más completa, junto con otros factores contextuales, la normativa actualmente vigente. La exposición se divide en las tres etapas que parecen más significativas desde el punto de vista de la regulación estudiada: el arranque de la democracia, con la normativa electoral de la época, el Real Decreto Ley 20/1977, de 18 de marzo (periodo de indiferencia); el establecimiento de la Ley Orgánica 5/1985, de 19 de junio, del Régimen Electoral General, y los ajustes y complementos de los años inmediatamente posteriores (periodo de visualización); y los avances normativosproducidos con el arranque del siglo xxi, con la muy relevante Convención de Nueva York de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de las personas con discapacidad y el Real Decreto 422/2011, de 25 de marzo, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento sobre las condiciones básicas para la participación de las personas con discapacidad en la vida política y en los procesos electorales (periodo de sensibilización). A ello le siguen unas breves consideraciones finales entre recapitulatorias y prospectivas, la principal de las cuales es la de poner de manifiesto la constante y sólida progresión que poco a poco se ha ido produciendo en este terreno con un resultado final que merece ser reconocido y estimado. Se apunta también que la mayoría de las acciones normativas establecidas operan en el campo del derecho de sufragio activo, dejando bastante de lado el derecho de sufragio pasivo y otras formas de participación; que la atención legislativa a los diversos colectivos de personas con discapacidad no ha sido equilibrada ni a lo largo del tiempo ni en el resultado final, observándose, en general, una mayor atención a la problemática de las personas con discapacidad física y sensorial (visual o auditiva) que a las de aquellas con discapacidad intelectual y psíquica; y que son muchos los retos todavía pendientes, como la limitación de la restricción del voto de las personas con discapacidad intelectual y psíquica y la adopción de medidas de apoyo en el terreno del sufragio pasivo.Summary:I. Introduction. II. The start of the democracy (period of indiference). II.1 The Law Royal Decree 20/1977, of March 18, on electoral norms. II.1.1 Provisions on the field of active suffrage. II.1.2 Provisions on the field of passive suffrage. II.1.3 Provisions on others fields. II.2 Other norms. III. The establishment of the loreg and its adjusts and complements during the XXI century (period of visualization). III.1 The LOREG. III.1.1. New elements. III.1.2 Continuity elements. III.2 The posterior adjusts and complements. III.2.1 The accessibility of electoral sites. III.2.2 The vote by mail in case of illness or inability which prevents the displacement. III.2.2.1 Develop of 72.c) article of LOREG in its first version. III.2.2.2 The reform of LOREG in 1992 and the posterior develop. IV. The normative advances produced at the start of the xxi century (period of sensitization). IV.1 The anti-discriminatory movement along the centuries. IV.2 The sectoral norms of disability. IV.2.1 Law 51/2003, of 2 December. IV.2.2 2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. IV.2.3 Law 27/2007, of 23 October. IV.2.4. Royal Legislative Decree 1/2013, of 29 November. IV.3 The electoral norms. IV.3.1 The reforms of LOREG in 2007 and 2011 and the develop normative. IV.3.2 The Royal Decree 422/2011, of 25 March. IV.3.3 Other dispositions. V. Final considerations.Abstract:This work deals with the study, in the historical perspective of the forty years of democracy in Spain, of the norms that have disciplined the electoral participation of people with disabilities, as a maximum exponent of the integration in the community of this so huge, varied and vulnerable collective. This allows not only to know the existing regulation in the various stages of our young democracy, but also, at the same time, to be able to value in a more complete way, with other contextual factors, the current legislation. The work is divided into the three stages that seem to us to be most significant from the point of view of the studied regulation: the start of democracy, with the electoral regulations of the time, the Royal Law Decree 20/1977, of March 18 (indifference period); the period of Organic Law 5/1985, of June 19, of the General Electoral Regime, and the adjustments and complements of the immediately following years (period of visualization); and the normative advances made at the start of the twenty-first century, with the very relevant United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and Royal Decree 422/2011, of March 25, approving the Regulation on the basic conditions for the participation of persons with disabilities in political life and in electoral processes (awareness period). Thisis followed by a brief final considerations, recapitulatory and prospective, the main of which is to highlight the constant and solid progression that has gradually been produced in this field with a final result that deserves to be recognized and estimated. It is also pointed out that most of the established normative actions operate in the area of active suffrage, leaving aside the right to passive suffrage and other forms of participation; That legislative attention to the various groups of people with disabilities has not been balanced either over time or in the final result, with greater attention being paid to the problem of people with physical and sensory disabilities (visual or auditory) than those with intellectual and psychic disabilities; And that many challenges remain, such as the limitation of the restriction of the vote of persons with intellectual and mental disabilities and the adoption of support measures in the field of passive suffrage.

We explored the sustainable business practices of selected Philippine corporations that promote the quest for peace. We used three key indicators of sustainable business practices, namely, fostering economic development, espousing corporate citizenship, and respecting the rule of law, as our variables to measure our sustainable business practices construct. On the other hand, we adopted sustainable development and sound business environmental our variables to measure the quest for peace construct. We assumed that sustainable business practices and quest for peace are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. We anchored our study on the Theories of Positive Peace, Sustainable Development, and Humanistic Management. We used the qualitative exploratory research design and the holistic multiple case study research strategy. We used the qualitative exploratory research design and the holistic multiple case study research strategy. We selected through the non-probability purposive sampling technique, the 20 Publicly - Listed Companies in the Philippines. We then, utilized the monomethod as the data collection technique for selecting the Sustainability Reports published in 2018 and uploaded in the websites of the respective corporations. With this deductive approach, we specifically adopted the pattern matching analytical procedure in the process of our content analysis of information from the Sustainability Reports. Results on fostering economic development revealed numerous jobs created, training and development, as well as trade and business development programs and activities executed. Analysis on espousing corporate citizenship disclosed many programs and activities related to encourage the use of voice from the firm, community engagement, and governance implemented. Findings on respecting the rule of law showed also various programs and activities that cover compliance with Philippine laws, international laws, and environmental standards. Findings also indicated that the nexus of sustainable business practices and the quest for peace aims to build companies of enduring greatness by doing good and working toward a sustainable future. In conducting responsible business, they were able to help in attaining positive peace in our coun try, which, in return, is essential for sustainable development, as manifested by their significant contribution in achieving sustainable development/growth, working closely with regulators to achieve shared goals; and protecting the environment and preserving natural resources. We recommend that there should be a coordinated effort of all the stakeholders to ensure that there is an integrated and holistic approach in the sustainability of the business sector to promote positive peace.We also propose to undertake further research on employing quantitative approach by using business, financial, and socio-economic indicators to address the limitations of this study. ReferencesBoulding, E. (2000). Cultures of peace: The hidden side of history. Syracuse University Press. Brauch, H. G., Oswald Spring, U., Grin, J., Scheffran, J. (Ed.). (2016). Handbook on sustainability transition and sustainable peace. Springer.Cortright, D. (2009). Peace: A history of movements and ideas. Cambridge University Press.Creswell, J. (2014). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches (4th ed.). Sage Publications.Edralin, D. & Pastrana, R. (2019). Sustainability initiatives and practices of selected top universities in Asia, Europe, and USA. 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The high point of 1990 came when the ICRC was granted observer status with the United Nations General Assembly (resolution 45/6 adopted by consensus on 16 October). Until then, the ICRC had had consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council; this did not reflect the institution's specific character nor its growing cooperation with UN bodies in New York.

The end of the cold war raised hopes for a more peaceful world. While in the new climate of international relations tension has indeed eased in several areas of conflict, violence has flared up in other parts of the world and is today claiming not thousands but millions of victims on every continent.

When we think of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, the first image that is conjured in our mind is of an individual sporting a blue helmet or a blue beret (fig. 1). While simple and uncomplicated, these blue accessories represent an expression and an embodiment resembling that of a warrior, sent to bring peace to conflict-torn communities. UN peacekeeping first conceptually emerged in 1948 in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war that ensued following the United Kingdom’s relinquishing of its mandate over Palestine, and the proclamation of the State of Israel. “Forged in the crucible of practical diplomacy” (Rubinstein 16), unarmed military observers were deployed to Palestine to monitor the hostilities and mediate armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), significantly exemplified the diplomatic and observational capabilities of military men, in line with the UN Charter’s objectives of international peace and security, setting henceforth a basic archetype for international peacekeeping. It was only in 1956, however, that peacekeeping formally emerged when armed UN forces deployed to Egypt to supervise the withdrawal of forces occupying the Suez Canal (informally known as the ‘Second Arab-Israeli’ war). Here, the formation of UN peacekeeping represented an international pacifying mechanism comprised of multiple third-party intermediaries whereby peaceful resolution would be achieved by transcending realist instincts of violence for political attainment in favour of applying a less-destructive liberal model of persuasion, compromise, and perseverance (Howard). ‘Blue helmet’ peacekeeping operations continue to be regarded by the UN as an integral subsidiary instrument of its organisation. At present, there are 12 active peacekeeping operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping across the world (United Nations Peacekeeping). Fig. 1: United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) sporting blue berets (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-awarded-un-medals-for-south-sudan-peacekeeping-mission) But where did the blue helmets and berets originate from? Rubinstein details a surprisingly mundane account of the origins of the political accessory that is now a widely recognised symbol for UN peacekeepers’ uniforms. Peacekeepers’ uniforms initially emerged from the ad hoc need to distinguish UN troops from those of the armed forces in a distinctive dress during the 1947 UNTSO mission by any means and material readily available, such as armbands and helmets (Henry). The era of early peacekeeping operations also saw ‘observers’ carry UN flags and paint their vehicle white with ‘UN’ written in large black letters in order to distinguish themselves. The blue helmets specifically came to be adorned during the first peacekeeping operation in 1956 during the Suez crisis. At this time, Canada supplied a large number of non-combatant troops whose uniform was the same as the belligerent British forces, party to the conflict. An effort to thus distinguish the peacekeepers was made by spray-painting surplus World War II American plastic helmet-liners, which were available in quantity in Europe, blue (Urquhart; Rubenstein). The two official colours of the UN are ‘light blue’ and ‘white’. The unique light “UN” blue colour, in particular, was approved as the background for the UN flag in the 1947 General Assembly Resolution 167(II), alongside a white emblem depicting a map of the world surrounded by two olive branches. While the UN’s use of the colour was chosen as a “practical effect of identifying the Organization in areas of trouble and conflict, to any and all parties concerned”, the colour blue was also specifically chosen at this time as “an integral part of the visual identity of the organisation” representing “peace in opposition to red, for war” (United Nations). Blue is seen to be placed in antithesis to the colour red across several fields including popular culture, and even within politics, as a way to typically indicate conflict between two warring groups. Within popular culture, for example, many films in the science fiction, fantasy, or horror genres, use a clearly demarcated, dichotomous ‘red vs. blue’ colour scheme in their posters (fig. 2). This is also commonly seen in political campaign posters, for example during the 2021 US presidential election (fig. 3). Fig. 2: Blue and red colour schemes in film posters (left to right: Star Wars: The Force Awakens (2015), Captain Marvel (2019), and The Dead Don’t Die (2019)) Fig. 3: Biden (Democratic party) vs. Trump (Republican party) US presidential election (https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-15/us-election-political-parties-explained-democrats-vs-republicans/12708296) This dichotomy can be traced back to the high Middle Ages between the fourteenth and seventeenth century where the colour blue became a colour associated with “moral implications”, rivalling both the colours black and red which were extremely popular in clothing during the eras of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance (Pastoureau 85). This ‘moral metamorphosis’ in European society was largely influenced by the views of Christian Protestant reformers concerning the social, religious, and artistic use of the colour blue (Pastoureau). A shift in the use of blue and its symbolic connotations may also be seen, for example, in early Christian art and iconography, specifically those deriving from depictions of the Virgin Mary; according to Pastoureau (50), this provides the “clearest illustration of the social, religious, and artistic consequences of blue's new status”. Up until the eighteenth century, the colour blue, specifically ‘sky blue’ or light blue tones resemblant of the “UN” shade of blue, had minimal symbolic or aesthetic value, particularly in European culture and certainly amongst nobility and the upper levels of society. Historically, light blue was typically associated with peasants’ clothing. This was due to the fact that peasants would often dye their clothes using the pigment of the woad herb; however, the woad would poorly penetrate cloth fibres and inevitably fade under the effects of sunlight and soap, thereby resulting in a ‘bland’ colour (Pastoureau). Although the blue hues worn by the nobility and wealthy were typically denser and more solid, a “new fashion” for light blue tones gradually took hold at the courts of the wealthy and the bourgeoisie, inevitably becoming deeply anchored in Western European counties (Pastoureau). Here, the reorganisation of the colour hierarchy and reformulation of blue certainly resembles Pastoureau’s (10) assertion that “any history of colour is, above all, a social history”. Within the humanities, colour represents a social phenomenon and construction. Colour thus provides insights into the ways society assigns meaning to it, “constructs its codes and values, establishes its uses, and determines whether it is acceptable or not” (Pastoureau, 10). In this way, although colour is a naturally occurring phenomenon, it is also a complex cultural construct. That the UN and its subsidiary bodies, including the Department of Peacekeeping, deliberately assigned light blue as its official organisational colour therefore usefully illustrates a significant social process of meaning-making and cultural sociology. The historical transition of light blue’s association from one of poverty in and around the eighteenth century to one of wealth in the nineteenth century may perhaps also be indicative of the next transitional era for light blue in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, representative of the amalgamation or unity between the two classes. Representing the ambitions not only of the organisation, but rather of the 193 member-states, of attaining worldwide peace, light blue may be seen as a colour of peace, as well as one of the people, for the people. This may be traced back, according to Pastoureau, as early as the Middle Ages where the colour blue was seen a colour of ‘peace’. Colours, however, do not solely determine social and cultural relevance in a given historical event. Rather, fabrics and clothing too offer “the richest and most diverse source of artifacts” in understanding history and culture. Artifacts such as UN peacekeepers’ blue berets and helmets necessarily incorporate economic, social, ideological, aesthetic, and symbolic aspects of both colour and material into the one complete uniform (Pastoureau). While the ‘UN blue’ is associated with peace, the beret, on the other hand, has been described as “an ally in the battlefield” (Kliest). The history of the beret is largely rooted in the armed forces – institutions typically associated with conflict and violence – and it continues to be a vital aspect of military uniforms worn by personnel from countries all around the globe. Given that the large majority of UN peacekeeping forces are made up of military personnel, peacekeeping, as both an action and an institution, thus adds a layer of complexity when discussing artifact symbolism. Here, a peacekeeper’s uniform uniquely represents the embodiment of an amalgamation of two traditionally juxtaposing concepts: peace, nurture, and diplomacy (often associated with ‘feminine’ qualities) versus conflict, strength, and discipline (often associated with ‘masculine’ qualities). A peacekeeper’s uniform thus represents the UN’s institutionalisation of “soldiers for peace” (Howard) who are, as former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold proclaimed, “the front line of a moral force” (BBC cited in Howard). Aside from its association with the armed forces, the beret has also been used as a fashion symbol by political revolutionaries, such as members of the ‘Black Panther Party’ (BPP) founded in the 1960s during the US Civil Rights Movement, as well as Che Guevara, prominent Leftist figure in the Cuban Revolution (see fig. 4). For, Rosabelle Forzy, CEO of beret and headwear fashion manufacturing company ‘Laulhère’, the beret is “emblematic of non-conformism … worn by people who create, commit, militate, and resist” (Kliest). Fig. 4: Berets worn by political revolutionaries (Left to right: Black Panthers Party (BPP) protesting outside of a New York courthouse (https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2988897/Black-Panther-double-cop-killer-sues-freedom-plays-FLUTE-Murderer-demands-parole-changed-fury-victim-s-widow.html), and portrait of Che Guevara) In a way, the UN’s ‘blue beret’ too bears a ‘non-conformist’ visage as its peacekeepers neither fit categorisations as ‘revolutionaries’ nor as traditional ‘soldiers’. Peacekeepers personify a cultural phenomenon that operates in a complex environment (Rubinstein). While peacekeepers retain their national military (usually camouflage) uniforms during missions, the UN headwear is a symbol of non-conformity in response to sociological preconceptions regarding military culture. In the case of peacekeeping, the implementation and longevity of peacekeepers’ uniforms has occurred through a process of what Rubinstein (50) refers to as ‘cultural’ or ‘symbolic inversion’ wherein traditional notions of military rituals and symbolism have been appropriated or ‘inverted’ and given a new meaning by the UN. In other words, the UN promotes the image of soldiers acting without the use of force in service of peace in order to encode an image of a “world transformed” through the contribution of peacekeeping toward the “elaboration of an image of an international community acting in a neutral, consensual manner” (Rubinstein, 50). Cultural inversion therefore creates a socio-political space wherein normative representations are reconfigured and conditioned as acceptable. Rubinstein argues, however, that the UN’s need to integrate individuals with such diverse backgrounds and perceptions into a collective peacekeeper identity can be problematic. Rubinstein (72) adds that the blue beret is the “most obvious evidence” of an ordinary symbol investing ‘legitimacy’ in peacekeeping through ritual repetition which still holds its cultural relevance to the present day. Arguably, institutional uniforms are symbols which profoundly shape human experience, validating contextual action according to the symbol’s meanings relevant to those wearing it. In this way, uniform symbolism not only allows us to make sense of our daily experiences, but allows us to construct and understand our identities and our interactions with others who are also part of the symbolic culture we are situated in. Consider, for example, a police officer. A police officer’s uniform not only grants them membership to the policing institution but also necessarily grants them certain powers, privileges, and jurisdictions within society which thereby impact on the way they see the world and interact with it. Necessarily, the social and cultural identity one acquires from wearing a specific uniform only effectively functions by “investing differences”, however large or small, into these symbols that “distinguish us from others” (Rubinstein, 74). For example, a policeman’s badge is a signifier that they are, in fact, part of an exclusive group that the majority of the citizenry are not. To this extent, the use of uniforms is not without its controversies or without the capacity to be misused as a tool of discrimination in a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ scenario. Referring to case regarding the beret, for example, in 2000 then US Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shineski, announced that the black beret – traditionally worn exclusively by specialised US Army units such as ‘Rangers’ – would become a standardised part of the US Army uniform for all soldiers and would denote a “symbol of unity”. General Shineski’s decision for the new headgear symbolised “the half-million-strong army’s transition to a lighter, more agile force that can respond more rapidly to distant trouble spots” (Borger). This was, however, met with angry backlash particularly from the Rangers who stated that they “were being robbed of a badge of pride” as “the beret is a symbol of excellence … that is not to be worn by everybody” (Borger). Responses to the proposition pointed to the problem of ‘low morale’ that the military faced, which could not be fixed just by “changing hats” (Borger). In this case, the beret was identified and isolated as a tool for coordinating perceptions (Rubinstein, 78). Here, the use of uniforms is as much about being external identifiers and designating a group from another as it is about sustaining a group by means of perpetuating what Rubinstein conceptualises as ‘self-legitimation’. This occurs in order to ensure the survival of a group and is similarly seen as occurring within UN peacekeeping (Joseph & Alex). Within peacekeeping the blue beret is an effective symbol used to perpetuate self-legitimacy across various levels of the UN which construct systems, or a ‘community’, of reinforcement largely rooted on organisational models of virtue and diplomacy. In the broadest sense, the UN promotes “a unique responsibility to set a global standard” in service to creating a unified and pacific world order (Guterres). As an integral instrument of international action, peacekeeping is, by extension, necessarily conditioned and supported by this cultural model whereby the actions of individual peacekeepers are strategically linked to the symbolic capital at the broadest levels of the organisation to manage the organisation’s power and legitimacy. The image of the peacekeeper, however, is fraught with problems and, as such, UN peacekeepers’ uniforms represent discrepancies and contradictions in the UN’s mission and organisational culture, particularly with relation to the UN’s symbolic construction of community and cooperation amongst peacekeepers. Given that peacekeeping troops are made up of individuals from different ethnic, cultural, and professional backgrounds, conditions for cultural interaction become challenging, if not problematic, and may necessarily lead to cross-cultural misunderstandings, miscommunication, and conflict. This applies to the context of peacekeeper deployment to host nations amongst local communities with whom they are also culturally unfamiliar (Rubinstein, "Intervention"). According to Rubinstein ("Intervention", 528), such operations may “create the conditions under which criminal activities or the institution of neo-colonial relationships can emerge”. Moncrief adds to this by also suggesting that a breakdown in conduct and discipline during missions may also contribute to peacekeepers engaging in violence during missions. Consequently, multiple cases of misdemeanour by UN peacekeepers have been reported across the years including peacekeeper involvement in bribery, weapons trading, and gold smuggling (Escobales). One of the most notorious acts of misconduct and violence that continues to be reported in the present day, however, is of peacekeepers perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse against host women and children. Between 2004 and 2016, for example, “the UN received almost 2,000 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse” (Essa). According to former chief of operations at the UN’s Emergency Co-ordination Centre, Andrew Macleod, this figure may be, however, much more disturbing, estimating in general that approximately “60,000 rapes had been carried out by UN staff in the past decade” (Zeffman). An article in the Guardian reported that a 12-year-old girl had been hiding in a bathroom during a house search in a Muslim enclave of the capital, Bangui [in the Central African Republic] … . A man allegedly wearing the blue helmet and vest of the UN peacekeeping forces took her outside and raped her behind a truck. (Smith & Lewis) In the article, the assailant’s uniform (“the blue helmet and vest”) is not only described as literal imagery to contextualise the grave crime that was committed against the child. In evoking the image of the blue helmet and vest, the author highlights the uniform as a symbolic tool of power which was misused to perpetuate harm against the vulnerable civilian ‘other’. In this scenario, like many others, rather than representing peace and hope, the blue helmet (or beret) instead illustrates the contradictions of the UN peacekeeper’s uniform. Here, the uniform has consequently come to be associated as a symbol of violence, fear, and most significantly, betrayal, for the victim(s) of the abuse, as well as for much of the victim’s community. This discrepancy was also highlighted in a speech presented by former Ambassador of the UK Mission to the UN, Matthew Rycroft, who stated that “when a girl looks up to a blue helmet, she should do so not in fear, but in hope”. For many peacekeepers perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse, particularly transactional sex, however, they “do not see themselves as abusing women”. This is largely to do with the power and privileges peacekeepers are afforded, such as ‘immunity’ – that is, a peacekeeper is granted immunity from trial or prosecution for criminal misconduct by the host nation’s judicial system. Over the years, scholarly research regarding peacekeepers’ immunity has highlighted a plethora of organisational problems within the UN, including lack of perpetrator accountability, and internal investigation or follow-up. More so, it has undoubtedly “contributed to a culture of individuals committing sexual violence knowing that they will get away with it” (Freedman). When a peacekeeper wears their uniform, they are thus imbued with the power and charged with the responsibility to properly embody and represent the values of the UN; “if [peacekeepers] don’t understand how powerful a position they are in, they will never understand what they do is actually wrong” (Elks). As such, unlike other traditional institutional uniforms, such as that of a soldier or a police officer, a peacekeeper’s uniform stands out as an enigma. One the one hand, peacekeepers channel the peaceful and passive organisational values of the UN by wearing the blue beret or helmet, whilst at the same time, they continue to sport the national military body uniform of their home country. Questions pertaining to the peacekeeper’s uniform arise and require further exploration: how can peacekeepers disassociate from their disciplined military personas and learnt combat skills if they continue to wear military camouflage during peacekeeping missions? Is the addition of the blue beret or helmet enough to reconfigure the body of the peacekeeper from one of violence, masculinity, and offence to that of peace, nurture, and diplomacy? Certainly, a range of factors are pertinent to an understanding of peacekeepers’ behaviour and group culture. But whether these two opposing identities can cohesively create or reconstitute a third identity using the positive skills and attributes of both juxtaposing institutions remains elusive. Nonetheless, the blue beret is a symbol of international hope, not only for vulnerable populations, but also for the world population collectively, as it represents neutral third-party member states working together to rebuild the world through non-combative means. References Borger, Julian. “Elite Forces Fear the Coming of the Egalitarian Beret.” The Guardian 19 Oct. 2000. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/oct/19/julianborger>. Elks, Sonia. “Haitians Say Underaged Girls Were Abused by U.N. Peacekeepers.” Reuters 19 Dec. 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-women-peacekeepers-idUSKBN1YM27W>. Escobales, Roxanne. “UN Peacekeepers 'Traded Gold and Guns with Congolese rebels'.” The Guardian 28 Apr. 2008. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/28/congo.unitednations>. Essa, Azad. “Why Do Some Peacekeepers Rape? The Full Report.” Al Jazeera 10 Aug. 2017. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/8/10/why-do-some-peacekeepers-rape-the-full-report>. Freedman, Rosa. “Why Do peacekeepers Have Immunity in Sex Abuse Cases?” CNN 25 May 2015. <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/22/opinions/freedman-un-peacekeepers-immunity/index.html>. Guterres, António. Address to High-Level Meeting on the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. United Nations. 18 Sep. 2017. <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-09-18/secretary-generals-sea-address-high-level-meeting>. Henry, Charles P. Ralph Bunche: Model Negro or American Other? New York: New York UP, 1999. Howard, Lise Morjé. Power in Peacekeeping. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2019. Joseph, Nathan, and Nicholas Alex. "The Uniform: A Sociological Perspective." American Journal of Sociology 77.4 (1972): 719-730. Kliest, Nicole. “Why the Beret Never Goes Out of Style.” TZR 6 April 2021. <https://www.thezoereport.com/fashion/history-berets-hat-trend>. Rubinstein, Robert A. "Intervention and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Peace Operations." Security Dialogue 36.4 (2005): 527-544. DOI: 10.1177/0967010605060454. ———. Peacekeeping under Fire: Culture and Intervention. Routledge, 2015. Rycroft, Matthew. "When a Girl Looks Up to a Blue Helmet, She Should Do So Not in Fear, But in Hope." 10 Mar. 2016. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/when-a-girl-looks-up-to-a-blue-helmet-she-should-do-so-not-in-fear-but-in-hope>. Smith, David, and Paul Lewis. "UN Peacekeepers Accused of Killing and Rape in Central African Republic." The Guardian 12 Aug. 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/11/un-peacekeepers-accused-killing-rape-central-african-republic>. United Nations. :United Nations Emblem and Flag." N.d. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-emblem-and-flag>. United Nations Peacekeeping. “Where We Operate.” N.d. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate>. Urquhart, Brian. Ralph Bunche: An American Life. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1993. Zeffman, Henry. “Charity Sex Scandal: UN Staff ‘Responsible for 60,000 rapes in a Decade’.” The Times 14 Feb. 2018. <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/un-staff-responsible-for-60-000-rapes-in-a-decade-c627rx239>.

We Break Up, I Publish: Theorising and Emotional Processing like Taylor Swift In 2007 after the rather painful end of my first long-term same-sex relationship I asked myself two questions (and like a good graduate student wrote a paper about it that was subsequently published): (1) what is love; (2) and if love exists, are queer and straight love somehow different. I asked myself the second question because, unlike my previous “straight” breakups (back when I honestly thought I was straight), this one was different, was far more messy, and seemed to have a lot to do with the fact that my then fresh ex-boyfriend and I had dramatically different ideas about how the relationship should look, work, be codified, or if it should or could be codified. It was an eye-opening experience since the truth that these different ideas existed—basically his point of view—really only “came out” in my mind through the act and learning involved in that breakup. Until then, from a Queer Theory perspective, you could have described me as a “man who had sex with men,” called himself homosexual, but was so homonormative that if you’d approached me with even a light version of Michel Foucault’s thoughts on “Friendship as a Way of Life” I’d have looked at you as queerly, and cluelessly, as possible. Mainstream Queer Theory would have put the end of the relationship down to the difference and conflict between what is pejoratively called the “marriage-chasing-Gay-normaliser,” represented by me, and the “radical-Queer(ness)-of-difference” represented by my ex-boyfriend, although like a lot of theory, that misses the personal (which I recall being political...), and a whole host of non-theoretical problems that plagued that relationship. Basically I thought Queer/Homosexual/Lesbian/Transgendered and the rest of the alphabet soup was exactly the same as Straight folks both with respect to a subjective understanding of the self, social relations and formations, and how you acted or enacted yourself in public and private except in the bedroom.. I thought, since Canada had legalised same-sex marriage, all was well and equal (other than the occasional hate-crime which would then be justly punished). Of course I understood that at that point Canada was the exception and not the rule with respect to same-sex rights and same-sex marriage, so it followed in my mind that most of our time collectively should be spent supporting those south of the border or overseas who still faced restrictions on these basic rights, or out-and-out violence, persecution and even state-sanctioned death for just being who they are and/or trying to express it. And now, five years on, stating that Canada is the exception as opposed to the rule with respect to the legalisation of same-sex marriage and the codification of same-sex rights in law has the potential to be outdated as the recent successes of social movements, court rulings and the tenor of political debate and voting has shifted internationally with rapid speed. But it was only because of that breakup that these theoretical and practical issues had come out of my queer closet and for the first time I started to question some necessary link between love and codification (marriage), and how the queer in Queer relationships does or potentially can disrupt this link. And not just for Queers, but for Straight folk too, which is the primary point that should be underlined now and is addressed at the end of this paper. Because, embittered as I was at the time, I still basically agree with the theoretical position that I came to in that paper on love—based on a queering of the terms of Alain Badiou—where I affirmed that love resisted codification, especially in its queer form, because it is fidelity to an act and truth between two or more partners which resists the rigid walls of State-based codification (Potts, Love Hurts; Badiou, Ethics and Saint Paul). But as one of the peer reviewers for this paper rightly pointed out, the above distinctions between my ex and myself implicitly rely upon a State-centric model of rights and freedoms, which I attacked in the first paper, but which I freely admit I am guilty of utilising and arguing in favour of here. But that is because I am interested, here, not in talking about love as an abstract concept towards which we should work in our personal relationships, but as the state of things, and specifically the state of same-sex marriage and the discourse and images which surrounds it, which means that the State does matter. This is specifically so given the lack of meaningful challenges to the State System in Canada and the US. I maintain, following Butler, that it is through power, and our response to the representatives of power “hailing us,” that we become bodies that matter and subjects (Bodies That Matter; The Psychic Life of Power; and Giving An Account of Oneself). While her re-reading of Althusser in these texts argues that we should come to a philosophical and political position which challenges this State-based form of subject creation and power, she also notes that politically and philosophically we have yet to articulate such a position clearly, and I’d say that this is especially the case for what is covered and argued in the mainstream (media) debate on same-sex marriage. So apropos what is arguably Foucault’s most mature analysis of “power,” and while agreeing that my State-based argument for inclusion and rights does indeed strengthen the “biopolitical” (The History of Sexuality 140 and 145) control over, in this case, Queer populations, I argue that this is nonetheless the political reality with which we are working in and analyzing, and that is my concern here. Despite a personal desire that this not be the case, the State or state sanctioned institutions do continue to hold a monopoly of power in conferring subjecthood and rights. To take a page from Jeremy Bentham, I would say that arguing from a position which does not start from or seriously consider the State as the current basis for rights and subjecthood, though potentially less ethically problematic and more in line with my personal politics, is tantamount to talking and arguing about “nonsense on stilts.” “Caught in a Bad Romance?” Comparing Homonationalist Trajectories and the Appeal of Militarist Discourse to LGBT Grassroots Organisations In comparing the discourses and enframings of the debate over same-sex marriage between Canada in the mid 1990s and early 2000s and in the US today, one might presume that how it came to say “I do” in Canada and how it might or might not get “left at the altar” in the US, is the result of very different national cultures. But this would just subscribe to one of a number of “cultural explanations” for perceived differences between Canada and the US that are usually built upon straw-man comparisons which then pillorise the US for something or other. And in doing so it would continue an obscuration that Canada, unlike the US, is unproblematically open and accepting when it comes to multicultural, multiracial and multisexual diversity and inclusion. Which Canada isn’t nor has it ever been. When you look at the current discourse in both countries—by their key political representatives on the international stage—you find the opposite. In the US, you have President Barack Obama, the first sitting President to come out in favour of same-sex marriage, and the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, setting same-sex rights at home and abroad as key policy planks (Gay Rights are Human Rights). Meanwhile, in Canada, you have Prime Minister Stephen Harper, in office since 2006, openly support his Conservative Party’s “traditional marriage” policy which is thankfully made difficult to implement because of the courts, and John Baird, the badly closeted Minister of Foreign Affairs, who doesn’t mention same-sex rights at home or with respect to foreign relations—unless it is used as supplementary evidence to further other foreign policy goals (c.f. Seguin)—only showing off his sexuality outside of the press-gallery to drum up gay-conservative votes or gay-conservative fundraising at LGBTQ community events which his government is then apt to pull funding for (c.f. Bradshaw). Of course my point is not to just reverse the stereotypes, painting an idyllic picture of the US and a grim one of Canada. What I want to problematise is the supposed national cultural distinctions which are naturalised when arguments are made through them as to why same-sex marriage was legalised in Canada, while the Defense of Marriage Act still stands in the US. To follow and extend Jasbir Puar’s argument from Terrorist Assemblages, what we see in both same-sex marriage debates and discourses is really the same phenomenon, but, so far, with different outcomes and having different manifestations. Puar contends that same-sex rights, like most equalising rights for minority groups, are only granted when all three of the following conditions prevail: (1) in a state or narrative of exception, where the nation grants a minority group equal rights because “the nation” feels threatened from without; (2) only on the condition that normalisation (or homonormalisation in the case of the Queer community) occurs, with those who don’t conform pushed further from a place in the national-subject; (3) and that the price of admission into being the “allowed Queer” is an ultra-patriotic identification with the Nation. In Canada, the state or narrative of exception was an “attack” from within which resulted in the third criterion being downplayed (although it is still present). Court challenges in a number of provinces led in each case to a successful ruling in favour of legalising same-sex marriage. Appeals to these rulings made their way to the Supreme Court, who likewise ruled in favour of the legalisation of same-sex marriage. This ruling came with an order to the Canadian Parliament that it had to change the existing marriage laws and definition of marriage to make it inclusive of same-sex marriage. This “attack” was performed by the judiciary who have traditionally (c.f. Makin) been much less partisan in appointment or ruling than their counterparts in the US. When new marriage laws were proposed to take account of the direction made by the courts, the governing Liberal Party and then Prime Minister Paul Martin made it a “free vote” so members of his own party could vote against it if they chose. Although granted with only lacklustre support by the governing party, the Canadian LGBTQ community rejoiced and became less politically active, because we’d won, right? International Queers flocked to Canada—one in four same-sex weddings since legalisation in Canada have been to out of country residents (Postmedia News)—as long as they had the proper socioeconomic profile (which is also a racialised profile) to afford the trip and wedding. This caused a budding same-sex marriage tourism and queer love normalisation industry to be built around the Canada Queer experience because especially at the time of legalisation Canada was still one of the few countries to allow for same-sex marriages. What this all means is that homonationalism in Canada is much less charged. It manifests itself as fitting in and not just keeping up with the Joneses when it comes to things like community engagement and Parent Teacher Association (PTA) meetings, but trying to do them one better (although only by a bit so as not to offend). In essence, the comparatively bland process in the 1990s by which Canada slowly underwent a state of exception by a non-politically charged and non-radical professional judiciary simply interpreting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms at the provincial and then the federal level is mirrored in the rather bland and non-radical homonationalism which resulted. So unlike the US, the rhetoric of the LGBT community stays subdued unless there’s a hint that the right to same-sex divorce might get hit by Conservative Party guns, in which case all hell breaks loose (c.f. Ha). While the US is subject to the same set of logics for the currently in-progress enactment of legalising same-sex marriage, the state of exception is dramatically different. Puar argues it is the never-ending War on Terror. This also means that the enframings and debate in the US are exceptionally charged and political, leading to a very different type of homonationalism and homonationalist subject than is found in Canada. American homonationalism has not radically changed from Puar’s description, but due to leadership from the top (Obama, Clinton and Lady Gaga) the intensity and thereby structured confinement of what is an acceptable Queer-American subject has become increasingly rigid. What is included and given rights is the hyper-patriotic queer-soldier, the defender of the nation. And what reinforces the rigidity of what amounts to a new “glass closet” for queers is that grassroots organisations have bought into the same rhetoric, logic, and direction as to how to achieve equality as the Homecoming advertisement from the Equal Love Campaign in Britain shows. For the other long-leading nation engaged in the War on Terror narrative, Homecoming provides the imagery of a gay member of the armed services draped in the flag proposing to his partner at the end of duty overseas that ends with the following text: “All men can be heroes. All men can be husbands. End discrimination.” Can’t get more patriotic—and heteronormative with the use of the term “husbands”—than that. Well, unless you’re Lady Gaga. Now Lady Gaga stands out as a public figure whom has taken an explicitly pro-queer and pro-LGBT stance from the outset of her career. And I do not want to diminish the fact that she has been admirably effective in her campaigning and consistent pro-queer and pro-LGBT stance. While above I characterised her input above as leadership from the top, she also, in effect, by standing outside of State Power unlike Obama and Clinton, and being able to be critical of it, is able to push the State in a more progressive direction. This was most obviously evidenced in her very public criticism of the Democratic Party and President Obama for not moving quickly enough to adopt a more pro-queer and pro-LGBT stance after the 2008 election where such promises were made. So Lady Gaga plays a doubled role whereby she also acts as a spokesperson for the grassroots—some would call this co-opting, but that is not the charge made here as she has more accurately given her pre-existing spotlight and Twitter and Facebook presence over to progressive campaigns—and, given her large mainstream media appeal and willingness to use this space to argue for queer and LGBT rights, performs the function of a grassroots organisation by herself as far as the general public is concerned. And in her recent queer activism we see the same sort of discourse and images utilised as in Homecoming. Her work over the first term of Obama’s Presidency—what I’m going to call “The Lady Gaga Offensive”—is indicative: she literally and metaphorically wrapped herself in the American flag, screaming “Obama, ARE YOU LISTENING!!! Repeal ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ and [have the homophobic soldiers] go home, go home, go home!” (Lady Gaga Rallies for Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell). And presumably to the same home of otherness that is occupied by the terrorist or anything that falls under the blanket of “anti-American” in Puar’s critique of this approach to political activism. This speech was modelled on her highly successful one at the National Equality March in 2009, which she ended with “Bless God and Bless the Gays.” When the highly watched speeches are taken together you literally can’t top them for Americanness, unless it is by a piece of old-fashioned American apple-pie bought at a National Rifle Association (NRA) bake-sale. And is likely why, after Obama’s same-sex “evolution,” the pre-election ads put out by the Democratic Party this year focused so heavily on the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the queer patriotic soldier or veteran’s obligation to or previous service in bearing arms for the country. Now if the goal is to get formal and legal equality quickly, then as a political strategy, to get people onside with same-sex marriage, and from that place to same-sex rights and equal social recognition and respect, this might be a good idea. Before, that is, moving on to a strategy that actually gets to the roots of social inequality and doesn’t rely on “hate of ‘the other’” which Puar’s analysis points out is both a byproduct of and rooted in the base of any nationalist based appeal for minoritarian rights. And I want to underline that I am here talking about what strategy seems to be appealing to people, as opposed to arguing an ethically unproblematic and PC position on equality that is completely inclusive of all forms of love. Because Lady Gaga’s flag-covered and pro-military scream was answered by Obama with the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the extension of some benefits to same-sex couples, and has Obama referring to Gaga as “your leader” in the pre-election ads and elsewhere. So it isn’t really surprising to find mainstream LGBT organisations adopting the same discourse and images to get same-sex rights including marriage. One can also take recent poll numbers from Canada as indicative as well. While only 10 percent of Canadians have trust in political parties, and 17 and 16 percent have trust in Parliament and Prime Minister Harper respectively, a whopping 53 percent have trust in the Canadian Forces (Leblanc). One aspect that undergirds Puar’s argument is that especially at a "time of war," more than average levels of affection or trust is shown for those institutions that defend “us,” so that if the face of that institution is reinscribed to the look of the hyper-patriotic queer-soldier (by advertising of the Homecoming sort which is produced not by the State but by grassroots LGBT organisations), then it looks like these groups seem to be banking that support for Gays and Lesbians in general, and same-sex marriage in specific, will further rise if LGBT and Queer become substantively linked in the imagination of the general public with the armed forces. But as 1980s Rockers Heart Asked: “But There’s Something That You Forgot. What about Love?” What these two homonationalist trajectories and rhetorics on same-sex marriage entirely skip over is how exactly you can codify “love.” Because isn’t that the purpose of marriage? Saying you can codify it is like grasping at a perfectly measured and exact cubic foot of air and telling it to stay put in the middle of a hurricane. So to return to how I ended my earlier exploration of love and if it could or should be codified: it means that as I affirm love, and as I remain in fidelity to it, I subject myself in my fundamental weakness constantly to the "not-known;" to constant heartbreak; to affirmations which I cannot betray as it would be a betrayal of the truth process itself. It's as if at the very moment the Beatles say the words 'All you need is love' they were subjected to wrenching heartbreak and still went on: 'All you need is love...' (Love Hurts) Which is really depressing when I look back at it now. But it was a bad breakup, and I can tend to the morose in word choice and cultural references when depressed. But it also remains essentially my position. If you impose “till death or divorce do us part” on to love you’re really only just participating in the chimera of static love and giving second wind to a patriarchal institution which has had a crappy record when it comes to equality. It also has the potential to preserve asymmetrical roles “traditional marriage” contains from when the institution was only extended to straight couples. And isn’t equality the underlying philosophical principle and political position that we’re supposedly fighting for if we’re arguing for an equal right to get married? Again, it’s important to try and codify the same rights for everyone through the State at the present time because I honestly don’t see major changes confronting the nation state system in Canada or the US in the near future. We remain the play-children of a digitally entrenched form of Foucaultian biopower that is State and Capital directed. Because while the Occupy Wall Street movements got a lot of hay in the press, I’ve yet to see any substantive or mainstreamed political change come out of them—if someone can direct me to their substantive contribution to the recent US election I’d be happy to revise my position—which is likely to our long term detriment. So this is a pragmatic analysis, one of locating one node in the matrices of power relations, of seeing how mainstream LGBT political organisations and Lady Gaga are applying the “theoretical tool kits” given to us by Foucault and Puar, and seeing how these organisations and Gaga are applying them, but in this case in a way that is likely counter to authorial intention(s) and personal politics (Power/Knowledge 145, 193; Terrorist Assemblages). So what this means is that we’re likely to continue to see, in mainstream images of same-sex couples put out by grassroots LGBT organisations, a homonationalism and ideological construction that grows more and more out of touch with Queer realities—the “upper-class house-holding PTA Gay”; although on a positive note I should point out that the Democratic Party in the US seems to be at least including both white and non-white faces in their pre-election same-sex marriage ads—and one that most Queers don’t or can’t fit themselves into especially when it comes down to the economic aspect of that picture, which is contradictory and problematic (c.f. Christopher). It also means that in the US the homonationalism on the horizon looks the same as in Canada except with a healthy dose of paranoia of outsiders and “the other” and a flag draped membership in the NRA, that is, for when the queer super-soldier is not in uniform. It’s a straightjacket for a closet that is becoming smaller because it seeks, through the images projected, inclusion for only a smaller and smaller social sub-set of the Lesbian and Gay community and leaves out more and more of the Queer community than it was five years ago when Puar described it. So instead of trying to dunk the queer into the institution of patriarchy, why not, by showing how so many Queers, their relationships, and their loving styles don’t fit into these archetypes help give everyone, including my “marriage-chasing-Gay-normaliser” former self a little “queer eye, for all eyes.” To look at and see modern straight marriage through the lenses and reasons LGBT and Queer communities (by-and-large) fought for years for access to it: as the codification and breakdown of some rights and responsibilities (i.e. taking care of children); as an act which gives you straightforward access to health benefits and hospital visitation rights; as an easy social signifier for others of a commitment to another person that doesn’t use diluted language like “special friend;” and because when it comes down to it that “in sickness and in health” part of the vow—in the language of a queered Badiou, a vow can be read as the affirmation of a universal and disinterested truth (love) and a moment which can’t be erased retrospectively, say, by divorce—seems like a sincere way to value at least one of those you really care for in the world. And hopefully it, as a side-benefit, it acts as a reminder but is not the actuality of that first fuzzy feeling which (hopefully) doesn’t go away. But I learned my lesson the first time and know that the fuzzy feeling might disappear as it often does. It doesn’t matter how far we try and cram it into any variety of homonationalist closets, since it’ll always find a way to not be there, no matter how tight you thought you’d locked the door to keep it in for good if it wants out. Because you can’t keep emotions by contract: so at the end of the day the logical, ethical and theoretically sound position is to argue for the abolition of marriage as an institution. However, Plato and others have been making that argument for thousands of years, and it still doesn’t seem to have gained popular traction. And we also need to realise, contrary to the opinion of my former self and The Beatles, that you really do need more than love as fidelity to an event of you and your partner’s making when you are being denied your partners health benefits just because you are a same-sex couple, especially when those health benefits could be saving your life. And if same-sex marriage codification is a quick fix for that and similar issues for those who can fit into the State sanctioned same-sex marriage walls, which admittedly leaves some members of the Queer community who don’t overlap out, as part of an overall and more inclusive strategy that does include them then I’m in favour of it. That is, till the time comes that Straight and Queer can, over time and with a lot of mutual social learning, explore how to recognise and give equal rights with or without State based codification to the multiple queer and sometimes polyamorous relationship models that already populate the Gay and Straight worlds right now. So in the meantime continue to count me down as a “marriage-chasing-Gay.” But just pragmatically, not to normalise, as one of a diversity of political strategies for equality and just for now. References Badiou, Alain. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. New York: Verso, 2001. ———. Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003. Bradshaw, James. “Pride Toronto Denied Federal Funding.” The Globe and Mail. 7 May. 2012 ‹http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/pride-toronto-denied-federal-funding/article1211065/›. Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge,1990. ———. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. New York: Routledge, 1993. ———. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge, 1997. ———. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997. ———. Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham UP, 2005. Christopher, Nathaniel. “Openly Gay Men Make Less money, Survey Shows.” Xtra! .5 Nov. 2012 ‹http://www.xtra.ca/public/Vancouver/Openly_gay_men_make_less_money_survey_shows-12756.aspx›. Clinton, Hillary. “Gay Rights Are Human Rights, And Human Rights Are Gay Rights.” United Nations General Assembly. 26 Dec. 2011 ‹http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2011/12/06/383003/sec-clinton-to-un-gay-rights-are-human-rights-and-human-rights-are-gay-rights/?mobile=nc›. Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. Trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper. New York: Random House,1980. —. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. Toronto: Random House, 1977. —. The History of Sexuality Volume One: An Introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Random House, 1978. Heart. “What About Love.” Heart. Capitol Records, 1985. CD. Ha, Tu Thanh. “Dan Savage: ‘I Had Been Divorced Overnight’.” The Globe and Mail. 12 Jan. 2012 ‹http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/dan-savage-i-had-been-divorced-overnight/article1358211/›. “Homecoming.” Equal Love Campaign. ‹http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a54UBWFXsF4›. Leblanc, Daniel. “Harper Among Least Trusted Leaders, Poll Shows.” The Globe and Mail. 12 Nov. 2012 ‹http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-among-least-trusted-leaders-poll-shows/article5187774/#›. Makin, Kirk. “The Coming Conservative Court: Harper to Reshape Judiciary.” The Globe and Mail. 24 Aug. 2012 ‹http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/the-coming-conservative-court-harper-to-reshape-judiciary/article595398/›. “Lady Gaga Rallies for Repeal of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ in Portland, Maine.” 9 Sep. 2010 ‹http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g4rGla6OzGc›. “Lady Gaga Speaks at Gay Rights Rally in Washington DC as Part of the National Equality March.” 11 Oct. 2009 ‹http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jepWXu-Z38›. “Obama’s Stirring New Gay Rights Ad.” Newzar.com. 24 May. 2012 ‹http://newzar.com/obamas-stirring-new-gay-rights-ad/›. Postmedia News. “Same-sex Marriage in Canada will not be Revisited, Harper Says.” 12 Jan. 2012 ‹http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/01/12/same-sex-marriage-in-canada-will-not-be-revisited-harper-says/›. Potts, Graham. “‘Love Hurts’: Hunter S. Thompson, the Marquis de Sade and St. Paul Queer Alain Badiou’s Truth and Fidelity.” CTheory. rt002: 2009 ‹http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=606›. Puar, Jasbir. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. London: Duke UP, 2007. Seguin, Rheal. “Baird Calls Out Iran on Human Rights Violations.” The Globe and Mail. 22 Oct. 2012 ‹http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/baird-calls-out-iran-on-human-rights-violations/article4628968/›.

Introduction Daffodil Day, usually held in spring, raises funds for cancer awareness and research using this symbol of hope. On that day, people who donate money to this good cause are usually given a yellow daffodil pin to wear. When I lived in Auckland, New Zealand, on the last Friday in August most people walking around the city centre proudly wore a cheerful yellow flower. So many people generously participated in this initiative that one almost felt obliged to join the cause in order to wear the ‘uniform’ – the daffodil pin – as everyone else did on that day. To donate and to wear a daffodil is the social expectation, and operating in social environment people often endeavour to meet the expectation by doing the ‘appropriate things’ defined by societies or communities. After all, who does not like to receive a beam of acceptance and appreciation from a fellow daffodil bearer in Auckland’s Queen Street? States in international society are no different. In some ways, states wear ‘uniforms’ while executing domestic and foreign affairs just as human beings do within their social groups. States develop the understandings of desirable behaviour from the international community with which they interact and identify. They are ‘socialised’ to act in line with the expectations of international community. These expectations are expressed in the form of international norms, a prescriptive set of ideas about the ‘appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 891). Motivated by this logic of appropriateness, states that comply with certain international norms in world politics justify and undertake actions that are considered appropriate for their identities. This essay starts with examining how international norms can be spread to different countries through the process of ‘state socialisation’ (how the countries are ‘talked into’ wearing the ‘uniform’). Second, the essay investigates the idea of ‘cultural match’: how domestic actors comply with an international norm by interpreting and manipulating it according to their local political and legal practices (how the countries wear the ‘uniform’ differently). Lastly, the essay probes the current international normative community and the liberal values embedded in major international norms (whether states would continue wearing the ‘uniform’). International Norms and State Socialisation: Why Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’? Norm diffusion is related to the efforts of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ using various platforms to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 895-896). Early studies of norm diffusion tend to emphasise nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as norm entrepreneurs and advocates, such as Oxfam and its goal of reducing poverty and hunger worldwide (Capie 638). In other empirical research, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) were shown to serve as ‘norm teachers,’ such as UNESCO educating developing countries the value of science policy organisations (Finnemore 581-586). Additionally, states and other international actors can also play important roles in norm diffusion. Powerful states with more communication resources sometimes enjoy advantages in creating and promoting new norms (Florini 375). For example, the United States and Western European countries have often been considered as the major proponents of free trade. Norm emergence and state socialisation in a normative community often occurs during critical historical periods, such as wars and major economic downturns, when international changes and domestic crises often coincide with each other (Ikenberry and Kupchan 292). For instance, the norm entrepreneurs of ‘responsible power/state’ can be traced back to the great powers (mainly the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) and their management of international order at the end of WWII (see Bull). With their negotiations and series of international agreements at the Cairo, Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conference in the 1940s, these great powers established a post-World War international society based on the key liberal values of international peace and security, free trade, human rights, and democracy. Human beings are not born to know what appropriate behaviour is; we learn social norms from parents, schools, peers, and other community members. International norms are collective expectations and understanding of how state governments should approach their domestic and foreign affairs. States ‘learn’ international norms while socialising with a normative community. From a sociological perspective, socialisation summarises ‘how and to what extent diverse individuals are meshed with the requirement of collective life’ at the societal level (Long and Hadden 39). It mainly consists of the process of training and shaping newcomers by the group members and the social adjustment of novices to the normative framework and the logic of appropriateness (Long and Hadden 39). Similarly, social psychology defines socialisation as the process in which ‘social organisations influence the action and experience of individuals’ (Gold and Douvan 145). Inspired by sociology and psychology, political scientists consider socialisation to be the mechanism through which norm entrepreneurs persuade other actors (usually a norm novice) to adhere to a particular prescriptive standard (Johnston, “Social State” 16). Norm entrepreneurs can change novices’ behaviour by the methods of persuasion and social influence (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 496-506). Socialisation sometimes demands that individual actors should comply with organisational norms by changing their interests or preferences (persuasion). Norm entrepreneurs often attempt to construct an appealing cognitive frame in order to persuade the novices (either individuals or states) to change their normative preferences or adopt new norms. They tend to use language that can ‘name, interpret and dramatise’ the issues related to the emerging norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 987). As a main persuasive device, ‘framing’ can provide a singular interpretation and appropriate behavioural response for a particular situation (Payne 39). Cognitive consistency theory found in psychology has suggested the mechanism of ‘analogy’, which indicates that actors are more likely to accept new ideas that share some similarities to the extant belief or ideas that they have already accepted (see Hybel, ch. 2). Based on this understanding, norm entrepreneurs usually frame issues in a way that can associate and resonate with the shared value of the targeted novices (Payne 43). For example, Finnemore’s research shows that when it promoted the creation of state science bureaucracies in the 1960s, UNESCO associated professional science policy-making with the appropriate role of a modern state, which was well received by the post-war developing countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (Finnemore 565-597). Socialisation can also emanate actors’ pro-norm behaviour through a cost-benefit calculation made with social rewards and punishments (social influence). A normative community can use the mechanism of back-patting and opprobrium to distribute social reward and punishment. Back-patting – ‘recognition, praise and normative support’ – is offered for a novice’s or member’s cooperative and pro-norm behaviour (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503). In contrast, opprobrium associated with status denial and identity rejection can create social and psychological costs (Johnston 504). Both the reward and punishment grow in intensity with the number of co-operators (Johnston 504). A larger community can often create more criticism towards rule-breakers, and thus greatly increase the cost of disobedience. For instance, the lack of full commitment from major powers, such as China, the United States, and some other OECD countries, has arguably made global collective action towards mitigating climate change more difficult, as the cost of non-compliance is relatively low. While being in a normative environment, novice or emerging states that have not yet been socialised into the international community can respond to persuasion and social influence through the processes of identification and mimicking. Social psychology indicates that when one actor accepts persuasion or social influence based on its desire to build or maintain a ‘satisfying self-defining relationship’ to another actor, the mechanism of identification starts to work (Kelman 53). Identification among a social group can generate ‘obligatory’ behaviour, where individual states make decisions by attempting to match their perceptions of ‘who they are’ (national identity) with the expectation of the normative community (Glodgeier and Tetlock 82). After identifying with the normative community, a novice state would then mimic peer states’ pro-norm behaviour in order to be considered as a qualified member of the social group. For example, when the Chinese government was deliberating over its ratification of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2003, a Ministry of Environmental Protection brief noted that China should ratify the Protocol as soon as possible because China had always been a country ‘keeping its word’ in international society, and non-ratification would largely ‘undermine China’s international image and reputation’ (Ministry of Environmental Protection of PRC). Despite the domestic industry’s disagreement with entering into the Protocol, the Chinese government’s self-identification as a ‘responsible state’ that performs its international promises and duties played an important role in China’s adoption of the international norm of biosafety. Domestic Salience of International Norms: How Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’ Differently? Individual states do not accept international norms passively; instead, state governments often negotiate and interact with domestic actors, such as major industries and interest groups, whose actions and understandings in turn impact on how the norm is understood and implemented. This in turn feeds back to the larger normative community and creates variations of those norms. There are three main factors that can contribute to the domestic salience of an international norm. First, as the norm-takers, domestic actors can decide whether and to what extent an international norm can enter the domestic agenda and how it will be implemented in policy-making. These actors tend to favour an international norm that can justify their political and social programs and promote their interests in domestic policy debates (Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter?” 453). By advocating the existence and adoption of an international norm, domestic actors attempt to enhance the legitimacy and authority of their current policy or institution (Acharya, “How Ideas Spread” 248). Political elites can strengthen state legitimacy by complying with an international norm in their policy-making, and consequently obtain international approval with reputation, trust, and credibility as social benefits in the international community (Finnemore and Sikkink 903). For example, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), only four states – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States – voted against the Declaration. They argued that their constitutional and national policies were sufficiently responsive to the type of Indigenous self-determination envisioned by UNDRIP. Nevertheless, given the opprobrium directed against these states by the international community, and their well-organised Indigenous populations, the four state leaders recognised the value of supporting UNDRIP. Subsequently all four states adopted the Declaration, but in each instance state leaders observed UNDRIP’s ‘aspirational’ rather than legal status; UNDRIP was a statement of values that these states’ policies should seek to incorporate into their domestic Indigenous law. Second, the various cultural, political, and institutional strategies of domestic actors can influence the effectiveness of norm empowerment. Political rhetoric and political institutions are usually created and used to promote a norm domestically. Both state and societal leaders can make the performative speech act of an international norm work and raise its importance in a national context by repeated declarations on the legitimacy and obligations brought by the norm (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 76). Moreover, domestic actors can also develop or modify political institutions to incorporate an international norm into the domestic bureaucratic or legal system (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 76). These institutions provide rules for domestic actors and articulate their rights and obligations, which transforms the international norm’s legitimacy and authority into local practices. For example, the New Zealand Government adopted a non-nuclear policy in the 1980s. This policy arose from the non-nuclear movement that was leading the development of the Raratonga Treaty (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone) and peace and Green party movements across Europe who sought to de-nuclearise the European continent. The Lange Labour Government’s 1984 adoption of an NZ anti-nuclear policy gained impetus because of these larger norm movements, and these movements in turn recognised the normative importance of a smaller power in international relations. Third, the characteristics of the international norm can also impact on the likelihood that the norm will be accepted by domestic actors. A ‘cultural match’ between international norm and local values can facilitate norm diffusion to domestic level. Sociologists suggest that norm diffusion is more likely to be successful if the norm is congruent with the prior values and practices of the norm-taker (Acharya, “Asian Regional Institutions” 14). Norm diffusion tends to be more efficient when there is a high degree of cultural match such that the global norm resonates with the target country’s domestic values, beliefs or understandings, which in turn can be reflected in national discourse, as well as the legal and bureaucratic system (Checkel 87; Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 73). With such cultural consistency, domestic actors are more likely to accept an international norm and treat it as a given or as ‘matter-of-fact’ (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 74). Cultural match in norm localisation explains why identical or similar international socialisation processes can lead to quite different local developments and variations of international norms. The debate between universal human rights and the ‘Asian values’ of human rights is an example where some Asian states, such as Singapore and China, prioritise citizen’s economic rights over social and political rights and embrace collective rights instead of individual rights. Cultural match can also explain why one country may easily accept a certain international norm, or some aspect of one particular norm, while rejecting others. For example, when Taiwanese and Japanese governments adapted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into their local political and legal practice, various cultural aspects of Indigenous rights have been more thoroughly implemented compared to indigenous economic and political rights (Gao et al. 60-65). In some extreme cases, the norm entrepreneurs even attempt to change the local culture of norm recipients to create a better cultural match for norm localisation. For example, when it tried to socialise India into its colonial system in the early nineteenth century, Britain successfully shaped the evolution of Indian political culture by adding British values and practices into India’s social, political, and judicial system (Ikenberry and Kupchan 307-309). The International Normative Community: Would States Continue Wearing ‘Uniforms’? International norms evolve. Not every international norm can survive and sustain. For example, while imperialism and colonial expansion, where various European states explored, conquered, settled, and exploited other parts of the world, was a widely accepted idea and practice in the nineteenth century, state sovereignty, equality, and individual rights have replaced imperialism and become the prevailing norms in international society today. The meanings of the same international norm can evolve as well. The Great Powers first established the post-war international norms of ‘state responsibility’ based on the idea of sovereign equality and non-intervention of domestic affairs. However, the 1980s saw the emergence of many international organisations, which built new standards and offered new meanings for a responsible state in international society: a responsible state must actively participate in international organisations and comply with international regimes. In the post-Cold War era, international society has paid more attention to states’ responsibility to offer global common goods and to promote the values of human rights and democracy. This shift of focus has changed the international expectation of state responsibility again to embrace collective goods and global values (Foot, “Chinese Power” 3-11). In addition to the nature and evolution of international norms, the unity and strength of the normative community can also affect states’ compliance with the norms. The growing size of the community group or the number of other cooperatives can amplify the effect of socialisation (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503-506). In other words, individual states are often more concerned about their national image, reputation and identity regarding norm compliance when a critical mass of states have already subscribed into the international norm. How much could this critical mass be? Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that international norms reach the threshold global acceptance when the norm entrepreneurs have persuaded at least one third of all states to adopt the new norm (901). The veto record of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) shows this impact. China, for example, has cast a UNSC veto vote 17 times as of 2022, but it has rarely excised its veto power alone (Security Council Report). For instance, though being sceptical of the notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which prioritises human right over state sovereignty, China did not veto Resolution 1973 (2011) regarding the Libyan civil war. The Resolution allowed the international society to take ‘all necessary measure to protect civilians’ from a failed state government, and it received wide support among UNSC members (no negative votes from the other 14 members). Moreover, states are not entirely equal in terms of their ‘normative weight’. When Great Powers act as norm entrepreneurs, they can usually utilise their wealth and influence to better socialise other norm novice states. In the history of promoting biological diversity norms which are embedded in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the OECD countries, especially France, UK, Germany, and Japan, have been regarded as normative leaders. French and Japanese political leaders employed normative language (such as ‘need’ and ‘must’) in various international forums to promote the norms and to highlight their normative commitment (see e.g. Chirac; Kan). Additionally, both governments provided financial assistance for developing countries to adopt the biodiversity norms. In the 2011 annual review of CBD, Japan reaffirmed its US$12 million contribution to assisting developing countries (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 9). France joined Japan’s commitment by announcing a financial contribution of €1 million along, with some additional funding from Norway and Switzerland (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 9). Today, biological diversity has been one of the most widely accepted international environmental norms, which 196 states/nations have ratified (United Nations). While Great Powers can make more substantial contributions to norm diffusion compared to many smaller powers with limited state capacity, Great Powers’ non-compliance with the normative ‘uniform’ can also significantly undermine the international norms’ validity and the normative community’s unity and reputation. The current normative community of climate change is hardly a unified one, as it is characterised by a low degree of consensus. Major industrial countries, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, have not yet reached an agreement concerning their individual responsibilities for reducing greenhouse emissions. This lack of agreement, which includes the amount of cuts, the feasibility and usefulness of such cuts, and the relative sharing of cuts across various states, is complicated by the fact that large developing countries, such as China, Brazil, and India, also hold different opinions towards climate change regimes (see Vidal et al.). Experts heavily criticised the major global powers, such as the European Union and the United States, for their lack of ambition in phasing out fossil fuels during the 2022 climate summit in Egypt (COP27; Ehsan et al.). In international trade, both China and the United States are among the leading powers because of their large trade volume, capacity, and transnational network; however, both countries have recently undermined the world trade system and norms. China took punitive measures against Australian export products after Australia’s Covid-19 inquiry request at the World Health Organisation. The United States, particularly under the Trump Administration, invoked the WTO national security exception in Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to justify its tariffs on steel and aluminium. Lastly, norm diffusion and socialisation can be a ‘two-way path,’ especially when the norm novice state is a powerful and influential state in the international system. In this case, the novices are not merely assimilated into the group, but can also successfully exert some influence on other group members and affect intra-group relations (Moreland 1174). As such, the novices can be both targets of socialisation and active agents who can shape the content and outcome of socialisation processes (Pu 344). The influence from the novices can create normative contestation and thus influence the norm evolution (Thies 547). In other words, novice states can influence international society and shape the international norm during the socialisation process. For example, the ‘ASEAN Way’ is a set of norms that regulate member states’ relationships within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It establishes a diplomatic and security culture characterised by informality, consultation, and dialogue, and consensus-building in decision-making processes (Caballero-Anthony). From its interaction with ASEAN, China has been socialised into the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Ba 157-159). Nevertheless, China’s relations with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also suggest that there exists a ‘feedback’ process between China and ARF which resulted in institutional changes in ARF to accommodate China’s response (Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way?” 291). For another example, while the Western powers generally promote the norm of ‘shared responsibility’ in global environment regimes, the emerging economies, such as the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), have responded to the normative engagement and proposed a ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ regime where the developing countries shoulder less international obligations. Similarly, the Western-led norm of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which justifies international humanitarian intervention, has received much resistance from the countries that only adhere to the conventional international rules regarding state sovereignty rights and non-intervention to domestic affairs. Conclusion International norms are shared expectations about what constitutes appropriate state behaviour. They are the ‘uniforms’ for individual states to wear when operating at the international level. States comply with international norms in order to affirm their preferred national identities as well as to gain social acceptance and reputation in the normative community. When the normative community is united and sizable, states tend to receive more social pressure to consistently wear these normative uniforms – be they the Geneva Conventions or nuclear non-proliferation. Nevertheless, in the post-pandemic world where liberal values, such as individual rights and rule of law, face significant challenges and democracies are in decline, the future success of the global normative community may be at risk. Great Powers are especially responsible for the survival and sustainability of international norms. The United States under President Trump adopted a nationalist ‘America First’ security agenda: alienating traditional allies, befriending authoritarian regimes previously shunned, and rejecting multilateralism as the foundation of the post-war global order. While the West has been criticised of failing to live up to its declared values, and has suffered its own loss of confidence in the liberal model, the rising powers have offered their alternative version of the world system. Instead of merely adapting to the Western-led global norms, China has created new institutions, such as the Belt and Road Initiatives, to promote its own preferred values, and has reshaped the global order where it deems the norms undesirable (Foot, “Chinese Power in a Changing World Order” 7). Great Power participation has reshaped the landscape of global normative community, and sadly not always in positive ways. Umberto Eco lamented the disappearance of the beauty of the past in his novel The Name of the Rose: ‘stat rosa pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus’ ('yesterday’s rose endures in its name, we hold empty names'; Eco 538). If the international community does not want to witness an era where global norms and universal values are reduced to nominalist symbols, it must renew and reinvigorate its commitment to global values, such as human rights and democracy. It must consider wearing these uniforms again, properly. 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On 7 August 2019 the Singapore Convention on recognition and enforcement of international mediated settlement agreements (hereinafter, the Singapore Convention)1 became open for signature. This multilateral treaty was drafted by UNCITRAL after a labourious discussion that spanned several years and was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 20 December 2018. In order to mirror the provisions of the Singapore Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation of 2002 was amended and renamed as UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation.2 The purpose of this essay is to present an overview of the major contents of the Singapore Convention, a treaty aimed at providing uniform enforcement mechanisms for the mediated settlement agreements by which international commercial disputes are resolved. The hope is that the Convention will promote a wider use of cross-border mediation. Just as the New York Convention of 19583 has been a successful instrument of international arbitration, the Singapore Convention is expected to make mediation more appealing thanks to specific and harmonized rules that are intended to make enforcement of settlement agreements easier and quicker to obtain.