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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Tolérance aux attaquess"
Ravit, Magali, i Claudine Vacheret. "La méthode Photolangage et un groupe de toxicomanes en prison". Revue de psychothérapie psychanalytique de groupe 29, nr 1 (1997): 117–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/rppg.1997.1381.
Pełny tekst źródłaBéchacq, Dimitri, i Hadrien Munier. "Vodou". Anthropen, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.17184/eac.anthropen.040.
Pełny tekst źródłaRozprawy doktorskie na temat "Tolérance aux attaquess"
Segovia-Ferreira, Mariana. "Cyber-resilience and attack tolerance for cyber-physical systems". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2021. http://www.theses.fr/2021IPPAS005.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis thesis investigates the resilience of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). CPS integrate computation and networking resources to control a physical process often related to critical infrastructures, such as energy distribution, health care, industrial process control, among others. The adoption of new communication capabilities comes at the cost of introducing new security threats that need to be properly handled. An attack may have dangerous consequences in the physical world putting in danger the safety of the people, the environment and the controlled physical processes. For this reason, cyber-resilience is a fundamental property to ensure attack tolerance, i.e., the system must maintain the correct operation of a set of crucial functionalities despite ongoing adversarial misbehavior. For that, threats must be addressed at cyber and physical domains at the same time. We aboard the system reaction creating a synergy between control-theoretic information and cybersecurity methods to absorb and recover from the threat. We propose two approaches using different paradigms. The first one is based on a detection and reaction strategy to attenuate cyber-physical attacks driven by reflective programmable networking to take control of adversarial actions. The mechanism builds upon the concept of software reflection and programmable networking. The second approach proposes a resilient-by-design strategy. The approach is based on a Moving Target Defense paradigm, driven by a linear switching of state-space matrices, and applied at both the physical and network layers of a CPS. We provide a step-by-step procedure that takes a transfer function, representing the dynamics of the physical process and we show that the final system maintains stability. As a result, we obtain a resilient CPS design structured using a topology of decentralized controllers. Also, we present metrics to quantify the cyber-resilience level of a system based on the design, structure, stability, and performance under the attack. The metrics provide reference points to evaluate whether the system is better prepared to face adversaries. This way, it is possible to quantify the ability to recover from an adversary using its mathematical model. We evaluated the proposed approaches using numerical simulations and obtained promising results. Finally, we identified several possibilities for future research perspectives to improve existing knowledge in the field
Giraud, Christophe. "Attaques de cryptosystèmes embarqués et contre-mesures associées". Versailles-St Quentin en Yvelines, 2007. http://www.theses.fr/2007VERS0020.
Pełny tekst źródłaSide channel attacks are a very powerful tool used to recover secrets stored in embedded devices such as smart cards. By analysing the power consumption, the electromagnetic radiations or by disturbing the device, an attacker can easily obtain secret keys used by non protected embedded cryptosystems. The subject of this thesis is to extend the impact of side channel analysis by presenting new attacks and new countermeasures. The latter must have a very small impact on the performance of the algorithm since the embedded environment is limited in terms of both memory space and computation power. Firstly, we focus on Power Analysis countermeasures. We describe a method to protect the elliptic curve scalar multiplication from Simple Analysis. Then, we propose a countermeasure against Differential Analysis on DES and AES and a generic method to protect S-Box access. Secondly, we deal with Fault Attacks. After presenting a general overview of this field, we propose new fault attacks on cryptosystems such as AES and XTR which haven't yet been successfully impacted. Then, we improve some existing attacks on several signature schemes in order to be able to put these attacks into practice. Finally, we present new countermeasures on XTR and on the RSA cryptosystem
Masgana, Delphine. "Injection de fautes et de logiciels sur les implémentations cryptographiques". Paris 7, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012PA077215.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe cryptography is very widespread inside smartcards or secure devices. These embedded cryptoSystems are proved theoretically secure. Nevertheless, they infère in far or near environment. So active perturbations, named fault analysis, or passive eavesdropping, called side-channel analysis, constitute real threats against hardware and software implementations. This thesis dealts with fault and software injections on cryptographie protocols. The fault analysis and side-channnel analysis give some more information on hardware and software implementations. The internai state of cryptographic computations, secret or private keys or private algorithms are all potential targets of this kind of analysis. In this thesis, a statistical analysis based on fault attack on the carry of Schnorr scheme operations gives access to private key in asymmetric signature or ciphering. Then, code injection in order to monitor memory cache of computer allows one to retrieve secret permutation table for stream cipher RC4, due to timing analysis on cache lines. Then, two differential analysis on internai rounds of AES enable to obtain secret key for the three different AES variants. Finally, a new consequence of fault model, which bypasses one instruction, allows one to take over a host. It is proved that it is important to protect cryptographic implémentations with proper countermeasures against fault analysis and side-channel analysis
Yaseen, Amer Atta. "Toward self-detection of cyber-physical attacks in control systems". Thesis, Lille 1, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019LIL1I040/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaA networked control system (NCS) is a control system in which the control loop is closed over a real-time network. NCSs are used in many industrial applications, and also in applications such as remote control, unmanned aerial vehicles or surgical teleoperation, ... The major advantages of NCS are a flexible architecture and a reduction of installation and maintenance costs, the main disadvantage of NCS is the network effects, such as time-delays, that influence the performance and stability of the control loop. These systems are also vulnerable to cyber attacks.This thesis makes some contributions regarding the detection of cyber-physical attacks as well as the development of a controller which capable of dealing with the other the bad effects of the network like time-delays.To achieve this goal, the proposed approach is to adapt model-free controller and to improve its use in NCS. The main idea is based on mutual benefit between Smith predictor and the basic model-free controller. Then, the intelligent structure of model-free control is applied along with Generalized Predictive Controller (GPC) to achieve the Intelligent Generalized Predictive Controller (IGPC) as an enhancement for the standard GPC. The IGPC is designed along with two different methods for cyber-attack detection.Moreover, a new security mechanism based on the deception for the cyber-physical attacks in NCS is proposed, this mechanism can allow to stop the cyber-attacks by providing the last line of defense when the attacker has an access to the remote plant.Finally, two detectors for controller hijacking attack are introduced. The objective is to be able to detect an attack such as the Stuxnet case where the controller has been reprogrammed and hijacked. The advantage of these proposed detectors is that there is not necessary to have a priori mathematical model of the controller
Ouffoué, Georges. "Attack tolerance for services-based applications in the Cloud". Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018SACLS562/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaWeb services allow the communication of heterogeneous systems on the Web. These facilities make them particularly suitable for deploying in the cloud. Although research on formalization and verification has improved trust in Web services, issues such as high availability and security are not fully addressed. In addition, Web services deployed in cloud infrastructures inherit their vulnerabilities. Because of this limitation, they may be unable to perform their tasks perfectly. In this thesis, we claim that a good tolerance requires attack detection and continuous monitoring on the one hand; and reliable reaction mechanisms on the other hand. We therefore proposed a new formal monitoring methodology that takes into account the risks that our services may face. To implement this methodology, we first developed an approach of attack tolerance that leverages model-level diversity. We define a model of the system and derive more robust functionally equivalent variants that can replace the first one in case of attack. To avoid manually deriving the variants and to increase the level of diversity, we proposed a second complementary approach. The latter always consists in having different variants of our services; but unlike the first, we have a single model and the implementations differ at the language, source code and binaries levels. Moreover, to ensure detection of insider attacks, we investigated a new detection and reaction mechanism based on software reflection. While the program is running, we analyze the methods to detect malicious executions. When these malicious activities are detected, using reflection again, new efficient implementations are generated as countermeasure. Finally, we extended a formal Web service testing framework by incorporating all these complementary mechanisms in order to take advantage of the benefits of each of them. We validated our approach with realistic experiments