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1
Sidebottom, Harry. "THE ARMY IN SYRIA". Classical Review 53, nr 2 (październik 2003): 431–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cr/53.2.431.
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Markelov, Svyatoslav. "Configuration and Strategic Scenarios in the Northwest Syria". Oriental Courier, nr 1 (2023): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s268684310025315-4.
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Three years have passed since the massive military operation of Syrian Army. Nowadays territories of Syrian provinces Idlib and Aleppo which are partly under control of Syrian Army, partly under groups of islamists, and with a little presence of Kurdish forces, still are the most problematic point on the Syrian map, where interests of all main actors of Syrian conflict are crossed, where that conflict has become multi-layered, and where contradictions manifest themselves in artillery strikes and firefights despite the freezing of the hot phase of the conflict. In this article we will try to open up desires of parties of conflict and to show up scenarios, based on formed prerequisites, of the future of Northwest Syria for coming years.
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Sabrine, Isber, Ristam Abdo i Neil Brodie. "Some New Evidence Documenting the Involvement of Da’esh in Syria with the Illicit Trade in Antiquities". Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archaeology and Heritage Studies 10, nr 2 (1.05.2022): 115–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jeasmedarcherstu.10.2.0115.
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ABSTRACT We present here some new evidence documenting the involvement of Da’esh with the looting and illicit trade of antiquities in northeastern Syria. We have interviewed four people who have first-hand knowledge of its activities and acquired some images of looted objects and Da’esh administrative documents. We examine this new evidence in the context of previously reported accounts of Da’esh involvement with the antiquities trade. We also report looting at some previously unknown archaeological sites, describe extensive looting when northeastern Syria was controlled by the Free Syrian Army, and critically examine the reliability of prices reported inside Syria.
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Mazur, Przemysław. "Uyghurs of Syria: Significance for the Syrian Conflict and International Implications". Athenaeum Polskie Studia Politologiczne 79, nr 3 (2023): 194–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/athena.2023.79.10.
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The main objective of the article was to determine whether the Uyghurs were a relevant group in the Syrian conflict, i.e., whether they were numerous, well-organized and determined enough to take the fight to the Syrian army or other non-state actors or cooperate with them. Several levels of analysis were carried out in this article. Firstly, article aimed to show where the Uyghurs in Syria came from. Secondly, the following section assessed their importance to the Syrian conflict, as well as who they worked with and fought against. Thirdly, it analysed whether their military and political involvement could have an impact on the international situation. Last but not least, the fate of Uyghurs, especially those who left for Syria, was discussed. The latter issue is also a question about Syria, its fate and place in the politics of other countries.
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Tauber, Eliezer. "The Struggle for Dayr Al-Zur: The Determination of Borders Between Syria and Iraq". International Journal of Middle East Studies 23, nr 3 (sierpień 1991): 361–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800056348.
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When World War I ended and the political map of the Middle East was redrawn, the ruler-straight borders separating the Fertile Crescent countries were not determined wholly in Europe, when the mandates were divided between Britain and France, as is commonly believed. The border between Syria and Iraq was determined between 1918 and 1920, when Iraqi officers serving in the Syrian army brought about the annexation of regions originally designated for British-occupied Iraq to Faysal 's Arab government in Syria.
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Nawrotek, Jarosław. "RUSSIAN’S PROVING GROUND IN SYRIA". PROBLEMY TECHNIKI UZBROJENIA 152, nr 4 (3.04.2020): 77–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.0871.
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Mission of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Syria is their biggest foreign military operation of current times. It became a form of evaluation of combat efficiency for different forces and troops. Moreover, the Russian Army could check the newest types of used munitions in combat conditions. Leading a combat operation far beyond the borders of own territory can be used for evaluation of the overall system safeguarding the combat operations theatre, and especially the logistics. What is more, the combat experience acquired by a few dozen thousand soldiers is also a priceless value for the army.
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WÓJTOWICZ, Tomasz, Izabela BARSZNICA i Kamil DRĄG. "THE INFLUENCE OF RUSSIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR IN SYRIA". Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Sztuki Wojennej 111, nr 2 (15.01.2019): 85–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.8529.
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The Russian military intervention in Syria, conducted between September 2015 and March 2016, was one of the crucial moments in the Middle East conflict which has evolved since 2011. It not only prevented the collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad but also enabled the initiative to be taken by the Syrian Arab Army. The simultaneous conducting of two military operations by the Russian army, i.e. the Russian involvement in both Ukraine and the Middle East, requires thorough investigations into the course of these operations. Such investigations may provide answers to a number of questions which appear of key importance to Poland, e.g., regarding Russia’s logistic and technological abilities to conduct military operations outside its territory, the military outcomes of the Russian intervention, and the potential social opposition to the human losses sustained by Russia as a result of such interventions. Considering the above, the aim of this article is to outline the Russian military intervention in Syria, and its influence on the course of the war. Special attention was paid to such issues as the causes behind the Russian intervention, the situation on the Syrian war frontlines prior to this intervention, the Russian forces engaged and the resources intended for this military operation, as well as its outcome.
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Alharbi, Dakheelallah, Zarina Othman i Sity Daud. "THE IMPACT OF THE POST ARAB SPRING ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS IN SYRIA". Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 8, nr 1 (30.01.2020): 456–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2020.8157.
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Purpose: The purpose of the study is to give an analysis of the humanitarian situation and the case of human rights in Syria after the events of the Arab spring.
Methodology: This is analytical-descriptive research that has been done through literature review, content analysis, and documentary and case study research.
Result: our results suggest that the Syrian government made false concessions designed to end the revolts. The occurrence led to the formation of a rebel group, the Free Syrian Army whose main objective was to oust the authoritarian regime and stop the killing of civilians. This marked the beginning of the blatant violation of human rights as well as the civil war in Syria. The government not only ignited but also took the war to its own people killing, injuring and imprisoning thousands of people. Worse still, thousands of women and young girls still suffer sexual violence during the nightly raids conducted frequently on either opposing camps. Following the massive violations of human rights, almost all economic sectors of Syria have met rock-bottom.
Applications: This research can be used for policymakers and the international community to take a further step to aid the Syrian civilians.
Novelty/Originality: In our research, we try to target a very much debated topic in the Middle East. Although several articles written about the humanitarian and human rights situation in Syria studies on human rights after the Arab spring is still lacking.
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Karaca, Bilal Bahadir, i Berk Köksal. "The Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy in Syria: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective". Przegląd Strategiczny, nr 15 (15.02.2023): 43–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ps.2022.1.3.
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Since 2011, the Syrian Civil War has become an arena of international competition between regional and global powers. As a dominant regional actor, Turkey has important interests in this conflict. However, although great importance is given to civil war factors and power balances at the field level, Turkey’s internal conditions play a role as well as these externalities. Therefore, an analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria from a local perspective is needed to reveal some negligible dynamics. In this direction, this study aims to analyse Turkey’s foreign policy towards Syria, taking into account the interaction between Turkey’s external and internal dynamics within the framework of neoclassical realist theory. Within this scope, we ask “how do Turkish external and internal dynamics explain its foreign policy in Syria?” as the leading search question and conduct our analysis using the explanatory case study method. Based on our findings, we provide a broad perspective on the significant impacts of four main internal factors on Turkish foreign policy, from the start of the Civil War to the most recent “Operation Spring Shield” by the Turkish Army and local Syrian armed groups.
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TELLIDOU, Natalia. "SYRIA: PROXY WARS IN THE MIDDLE EAST". Conflict Studies Quarterly, nr 46 (15.01.2024): 70–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/csq.46.5.
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The conflict in Syria quickly escalated into a complex and prolonged civil war where states outside the conflict fueled rebel groups to fight. The onset of multiple proxy wars befell Syria. Proxy war happens when a ruler of a state devises and facilitates the provision of support to a rebel group that is engaged in carrying out violent activities in another state. Thus, an external state can influence the outcome of a civil war without having to bear the heavy costs of sending its army forces. States that wage proxy wars risk a potential conflict escalation, and gamble with provoking retaliation by either the offending state or its allies. Furthermore, inadvertent conse quences of backing rebel forces are also possible such as international condemnation. So, why does a state choose to form a relationship with a proxy group, instead of intervening directly? Why invest money and military power in a third party that could lead to a prolonged conflict? The analysis highlights that the political survival of regimes in the Middle East caused leaders to support rebel groups in Syria. I present a causal mechanism that is based on transnational threats to explain the phenomenon of proxy war in the Syrian civil war. Keywords: Syria, proxy war, Middle East, qualitative analysis, foreign policy.
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Cupcea, George. "TIMEKEEPING IN THE ROMAN ARMY". Classical Quarterly 67, nr 2 (9.10.2017): 597–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009838817000568.
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The structure and organization of the Roman army is a complex subject for ancient historians. Of its multiple aspects, the schedule of the daily routine is one of the most interesting but, at the same time, is scarcely known. Of course, huge progress has been made with the publication of the daily rosters of one particular auxiliary unit in the East (cohors XX Palmyrenorum, at Dura, Syria), but the detail of the chronological organization of the unit's schedule is still to be revealed.
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Minaev, Maxim. "Armed Forces in the present United States and Britain military policy. Main Trends". Russia and America in the 21st Century, nr 6 (2023): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207054760029541-2.
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The article presents the United States and United Kingdom Armed Forces evolvement main trends in the warfare below the threshold of war context. The point at issue is United States Special Operations Forces (US SOF), British Army and United Kingdom Special Forces (UKSF). The focus of the research paper on: the US Theater Special Operations Commands - Special Operations Command Africa, Special Operations Command Europe and others; British Army new units - Ranger Regiment, Army Special Operations Brigade, 11th Security Force Assistance Brigade and others. The organizational and establishment of these units, their warfighting and combat training functions, tactical battle employment the spot is on. The article consciously thinks the Future Soldier British Army reform program and its role in the battle units adapting to the new type of conflicts - hybrid warfare below the threshold of war. The special attention is given to the US Military Operation in Syria (Operation Inherent Resolve) and American-British military assistance to Ukraine Armed Forces. The article is also reviewing the CIA Special Activities Center military role in Ukraine and 22nd Special Air Service regiment (UKSF) Syria combat presence.
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Madi, Hiba P. "From Loud to Silent: The Free Patriotic Movement 2005-22 Outdoor Campaigns". Journal of Communication and Management 2, nr 01 (18.03.2023): 01–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.58966/jcm2023211.
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Lebanon’s history is characterized by events and players outside the country’s borders, which mainly include Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran and the United States. Towards the end of the Lebanese Civil War, General Michel Aoun, the caretaker Prime Minister of 1988 and head of the army, emerged as one of the most popular Christian political leaders. He strongly opposed the establishment of Syrian hegemony over its tiny neighbor Lebanon legalized by the Ta’if agreement. Yet, defeated by the Syrian army, Aoun was expelled from Lebanon and went into exile in Paris, France (Rowayheb, 2014). In 2005, twelve days after the last Syrian soldier pulled out of Lebanon following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, Aoun returned. Upon his return from exile, he resumed his political career, founded the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) in April 2006 (Ajroudi & Chughati, 2018) and reengaged with the Lebanese public and his backers. What were the political messages employed in the FPM’s resurging political advertising activity? And how did it evolve from 2005 to 2022 based on local and regional alliances?
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Karleskint, Peter, i Jonathan Matusitz. "Compliance-Gaining Theory as a Method to Analyze U.S. Support of the Free Syrian Army (FSA)". Journal of Geography, Politics and Society 11, nr 4 (20.01.2022): 29–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.26881/jpgs.2021.4.03.
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This paper examines U.S. support of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) through compliance-gaining theory. By and large, the theory describes how one party is able to get another party to comply with specific demands. The particular compliance-gaining tactics explored in this analysis are ingratiation, debt, guilt, and compromise. Thanks to these tactics, we can better understand how a rebel group like the FSA has managed to convince a superpower like the U.S. to support it, in spite of the historical implications of supporting rebel groups in the past. To make its compliance-gaining stronger, the FSA has played up ideas or concepts like oil, trust, blame, obligation, and past U.S. military interventions to collaborate with the U.S. so as to bring down the Syrian government and, by the same token, resist Russian influence in Syria.
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Mirskii, G. "Drama of the Arab East". World Economy and International Relations, nr 11 (2014): 77–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2014-11-77-87.
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New upheavals have shaken the Middle East this summer. A small but determined army of Sunni jihadists that had operated in the war-torn Syria suddenly crossed the border into Iraq and launched a large-scale military campaign. In a matter of days the invaders captured the second largest city of Iraq, Mosul, and although heavily outnumbered by the Iraqi army, put it to flight. The militants, known as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, the latter word meaning Syria and Lebanon) and led by an exceedingly tough and ruthless commander Abubaqr al-Baghdadi, are descendants of the infamous terrorist international network Al-Qaeda. Actually, the ISIS members represent the third generation of Al-Qaeda militants who waged the war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan back in 1989-s and later fought the Americans in Iraq in the wake of the U.S. invasion. Lately they joined the Syrian armed opposition that has been trying to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad for about three years. Now that the military situation in Syria appears to favor the embattled president, ISIS has probably come to the conclusion that its priority is not necessarily the ousting of Assad; rather it is the creation of an Islamic state according to the name of their organization. Exactly this seems to be the rationale for their comeback into Iraq. The Sunni jihadists whose ultimate aim is to resurrect the medieval Islamic Caliphate have to confront both the Iraqi Kurds who live in a virtually semi-independent state formation and the Shia Arabs who mostly inhabit the southern part of Iraq. Yet, both communities, although probably capable of protecting North, South and the capital city, are hardly likely to reassert the government authority in the central part of the country. What is necessary is the assistance from abroad. The Shia-dominated Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki, in deep trouble, is looking to both Iran and the U.S. for military aid. Both Washington and Tehran, however, appear reluctant to be seen as wholeheartedly backing the Shia side if only for fear of alienating the mainstream Arab States who are of course Sunni. This is a pretty delicate situation indeed.
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Kasimova, Irina Sayyarovna. "On Turkey's Policy to Solidify Its Presence in the Northern Territories of Syria". Islamovedenie 12, nr 3 (31.10.2021): 22–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.21779/2077-8155-2021-12-3-22-33.
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Turkey is one of the most active participants of the Syrian conflict that broke out in 2011. Among the priorities proclaimed by Ankara is the preservation of security and stability on the long Turkish-Syrian frontier that are under a long-term threat posed by the Syrian offshoots of the Kurdi-stan Workers' Party (PKK) recognized by Ankara as a terrorist organization. The article attempts to review and analyze the steps taken by Ankara to socially and economically restore the territories where the Turkish army, together with the armed Syrian opposition, held operations Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, and Source of Peace (2016–2019) and which, in actual fact, remain occupied. The author concludes that in the context of the ongoing Syrian conflict and uncertainty around the political process to resolve the situation in the country, Turkey is carrying out systematic, compre-hensive work to expand its influence in the Northern Syrian territories which is not always approved by the local population. Close historical and geographical ties between the peoples of the two states, a unifying factor of Islamic faith and Muslim values have become one of the prerequisite for Anka-ra's “successful” policy in the north of Syria.
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de Callataÿ, François. "Pseudo-Civic not Civic: The Abundant Double Sigloi Struck by Pamphylian and Cilician Cities (ca 460–333 B.C.E.)". Phoenix 76, nr 1 (2022): 45–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/phx.2022.a914303.
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Abstract: This paper considers all the monetary issues of large silver coins struck in the name of Greek cities between Lycia and Syria under Persian rule. It is argued that these apparently civic coinages were in fact pseudocivic, struck at a supra-civic level for the needs of the Persian army. Abstract: Cet article examine toutes les questions monétaires liées aux grandes pièces en argent frappées au nom des cités grecques situées entre la Lycie et la Syrie sous le règne perse. L'on soutient que ces monnaies en apparence civiques étaient en réalité pseudo-civiques, frappées à un niveau supra-civique pour les besoins de l'armée perse.
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Kirchner, Stefan. "Third Party Liability for Hezbollah Attacks against Israel". German Law Journal 7, nr 9 (1.09.2006): 777–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200005083.
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After an Israeli soldier was abducted in the south of the country in late June, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) began Operation “Summer Rain” in Gaza in order to secure the safe return of the soldier. On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah forces captured two Israeli soldiers in Northern Israel and killed three more, triggering Operation “Just Reward”, which ended with the fragile cease-fire agreed upon under the terms outlined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. The conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah had the potential of plunging the whole region in a wider war; as a matter of fact, it seems that Iran and Syria were fighting a proxy war against Israel. Hezbollah alone does not have the technological capabilities of hitting Haifa or Nazareth with their own Katjusha-type missiles, which essentially are not much more than slightly modified World War II weapons, yet Hezbollah struck deep inside Israel. On the last day of the war alone, with the cease-fire already in sight, 246 rockets were fired into Israel. Moreover, it appears that Israel was not hit only by Katjushot but also by other missiles with a longer range. Given their arsenal and longstanding support for Hezbollah, the assumption that Iran and Syria have actually delivered missiles or missile technology to Hezbollah is anything but farfetched. News reports during the conflict indicated that Hezbollah used Syrian 220mm-missiles against Israel and that weapons have been delivered to the Hezbollah from Iran, often via Syria. Hezbollah's arsenal includes Iranian-made Zilzal-2 missiles with a range of 210 km, Russian-designed AT-5 anti-tank weapons which were produced in Iran, as well as Russian-made Kornet-E laser-guided weapons and Metis-M anti-armor weapons, both supplied by Syria. Most notorious was the use of Iranian Fajr-3 missiles against Israeli cities. Thousands of these missiles had already been provided to Hezbollah before the fighting began. The rockets that hit the town of Afula, south of Haifa, on 28 July 2006, and which was referred to by Hezbollah as Khaibar-1, likely were the first Iranian-made Fajr-5 missiles ever used by Hezbollah. Despite the destruction of the infrastructure in Lebanon during Operation “Just Reward”, Hezbollah continued to receive weapons. But Syrian and Iranian influence goes back a long time. Today's Hezbollah is the result of an Iranian-nurtured program that lasted for two decades and transformed a local guerilla group into a full-fledged army. Today, Hezbollah's military wing is no longer a group of partisans but an army comprising between 6,000 and 8,000 regular members, not counting reserves, divided into battalions of 250 men, as well as special forces. Not only was it the late Ayatollah Khomeni who provided the initiative for the foundation of Hezbollah, Iran continues to trains Hezbollah fighters and supports Hezbollah's army with weapons, such as the C-802 land-to-sea-missile that was used against the Israeli Naval Ship “Hanit” during the recent conflict.
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Tamari, Steve, i Leila Hudson. "Historical Research and Resources in Damascus". Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 30, nr 1 (lipiec 1996): 10–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026318400032983.
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Damascus has a long and distinguished history as a center for scholars and scholarship. The Umayyad Mosque has been a hub for Muslim scholars since the first Islamic century. Under the Ayyubids and Mamluks, a flurry of madrasa-building brought professional scholars to Damascus from all corners of the Muslim world. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Damascus, many scattered manuscript collections were consolidated into the National Library, housed in the Mamluk-era Madrasa al-Zahiriyya, the pride of Syrian scholars in the age of Arab nationalism. With French rule in 1920 came an army of researchers and catalogers who established one of the region’s best library collections at the Institut Français des Études Arabes à Damas. And, in 1984, the Asad Library was established to serve as a national library and to house manuscript collections from around the country. The mid-1990s is an auspicious time for American researchers in Syria because of the establishment of the American Research Institute in Syria, Inc. (ARIS), a consortium of American universities that has been working for the past several years to establish an institute for research and residence in Damascus on par with the European facilities there. The Institute has yet to be officially approved by the Syrian government, and present efforts depend on the outcome of regional political discussions.
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Rached, Kardo, i Ahmed Omar Bali. "Post-ISIS Iraq and the Shia Armed Groups". Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 13, nr 1 (22.03.2019): 122–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.51870/cejiss.a130105.
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The political environment of Iraq in the period from 2011-2014 experienced a great degree of turbulence. Many Sunni tribes in the Anbar, Ramadi and Salahadin regions organized a daily protest against the central government, accusing it of being sectarian. Gradually, these protests become more popular, and the Baghdad government became fearful that it would spread into the other regions of Iraq. In order to control the protests, the government used force, and many were killed. Simultaneously, in Syria, and especially during 2013-2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled more land and more people, and to take advantage of the Iraqi people's dissatisfaction with their government, ISIS crossed the border between Iraq and Syria in June 2014. Mosul as the second most heavily populated city was seized by ISIS and the Iraqi army could not fight back, which meant that the Iraqi army retreated from most of the Sunni areas. Even Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, and the city where the central government operates, was threatened. While the Iraqi army was unable to fight against ISIS, the Shia religious supreme leader Al-Sistani called for self-defence and to stand against ISIS. Sistani’s call became a cornerstone for the creation of the so-called Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) with the aim of the fighting against ISIS. In this article, we assess the PMF from different perspectives, for example, using the Weberian theory that the state is the only entity that has a monopoly on violence, considering Ariel Ahram's model of state-sponsored and government-sponsored militias, and finally the devolution of violence to these armed groups.
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Zuhur, Sherifa. "The Syrian Opposition: Salafi and Nationalist Jihadism and Populist Idealism". Contemporary Review of the Middle East 2, nr 1-2 (marzec 2015): 143–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0169796x15584034.
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The debate over international responses to the Assad governments continued barrel-bombing and lethal use of chemical weapons centered on the dominance and agenda of ‘extremists’ in the Syrian opposition and their role in a post-Assad Syria. With 1,500 groups and significant inter-conflict, the future of the popular revolution that originated with non-violent, idealistic civilian demonstrators cannot be foreseen with any certainty. The Supreme Military Command of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was created in an effort to better coordinate its efforts. There were many tensions between the FSA and salafi-jihadist groups which were blocked from the FSA’s distribution system. These salafi-jihadist groups are stigmatized internationally due to their expansion, brutality and actions towards minorities and women in their areas of control. There were also secular or at least, anti-sectarian elements of the Syrian opposition. The Syrian population may well reject the harsh sectarianism and imposition of ‘Islamic rule’ by salafi-jihadists in a post-Assad era. Or conversely, Islamist elements might prevail.
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Aliquot, Julien, i Muaffaq Hazza. "The Roman army in Provincia Arabia: Old and new documents from Umm al-Jimāl (Jordan)". Syria, nr 100 (31.12.2023): 193–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/syria.15397.
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Mironova, Vera, Karam Alhamad i Sam Whitt. "Rebel Group Attrition and Reversion to Violence: Micro-Level Evidence from Syria". International Studies Quarterly 64, nr 2 (28.01.2020): 285–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa002.
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Abstract Why might former rebel combatants ever revert to fighting? The purpose of this research note is to inform the scholarly community on rebel incentives to remobilize for violence, a topic which has been underexplored in the literature, using evidence from an ongoing conflict: the case of volunteer ex-combatants in the Syrian civil war. In late 2014 to early 2015, we conducted surveys with 196 ex-fighters who served with different rebel group brigades linked to the Free Syrian Army as well as moderate Islamist and jihadist groups. Interviews were conducted in Gaziantep, Turkey, a common destination for combatants exiting the battlefield in rebel-held territory in northern Syria. We find that ex-fighters who are ideologically committed to the defeat of the Assad regime and/or the establishment of an Islamic state are most likely to want to return to combat. However, rebel group organizational deficiencies and strategies keep many highly motivated fighters away. Our results illustrate how rebel fighters might quickly remobilize when disciplined, well-organized rebel groups emerge on the scene, as evidenced by the rapid ascent of the Islamic State (ISIS).
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Anzalone, Christopher. "The Sunni Tragedy in the Middle East". American Journal of Islam and Society 34, nr 1 (1.01.2017): 123–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v34i1.867.
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Northern Lebanon, the mountainous terrain bordering Syria and the coastalplain centered on the city of Tripoli with its nearly 130,000 residents, has longbeen the heartland of the country’s Sunni Arabs, along with the old scholasticand population hub in the southern city of Sidon. The outbreak of mass popularprotests and eventually armed rebellion in neighboring Syria againstBashar al-Asad’s government in the spring of 2011, and that country’s continuingdescent into an increasingly violent and sectarian civil war, has had aprofound effect upon Lebanon, particularly in the north, for both geographicaland demographic reasons. First, northern Lebanon borders strategic areas ofcentral-western Syria (e.g., the town of al-Qusayr) and is located just south ofthe major Syrian port city of Tartus. Second, the north’s population includessignificant minority communities of Christians and Alawis, the latter of whichare largely aligned politically with Damascus. These factors have made theborder regions particularly dangerous, for while the Lebanese army attemptsto maintain control of the country’s territory, Iran-aligned Hizbullah poursfighters and military supplies into Syria and militant Sunni groups (e.g., ISISand Jabhat Fath al-Sham [JFS]) seek to establish a foothold in Lebanon fromwhich they can pursue their anti-Asad campaign.Bernard Rougier is uniquely placed to write about the contemporary historyand complex web of politics among Lebanon’s Sunni factions and particularlythe rise of jihadi militancy among some of its segments. The bookunder review, like Everyday Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam among Palestiniansin Lebanon (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), isbased upon extensive in-country fieldwork and interviews beginning in theearly 2000s and ending in 2014. It provides a fascinating and nuancedoverview of jihadism’s rise as a viable avenue of political frustration and expressionin the wider milieu of Lebanon’s intra-Sunni socio-political competitionand a fast-changing regional situation.Rougier argues that the contentious political disputes and competitionamong the country’s mainstream Sunni political figures (e.g., the al-Haririfamily), as well as the impact of Syrian control of large parts of Lebanon between1976 and 2005 and ensuing power vacuum after its withdrawal, enabledthe emergence of jihadi militancy. Northern Lebanon also became a center ofcompetition among regional actors through their local allies, which pitted ...
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Moubayed, Sami. "Royalism in Syria after Faysal I: The Struggle for the Crown of Damascus, 1920-1958". Royal Studies Journal 9, nr 2 (15.12.2022): 41–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.21039/rsj.322.
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On 24 July 1920 the first and only king in the modern history of Syria, Faysal I, was dethroned and exiled by the invading army of colonial France. Although later rewarded with the job of king of Iraq, Faysal I never lost his appetite for the crown of Damascus, and nor did any of his brothers, nephews, and other royals from the Hashemite family. Much has been written about Faysal’s era in Syria, which began in October 1918 and lasted until July 1920. Few historians, however, have paid attention to the monarchial current that emerged thereafter in Syria, as ambitious politicians and retired officers tried to restore the Hashemite Crown both during the years of the French Mandate (1920-1946) and well into the independence of Syria. They went for the ballots and, when that failed, they tried to stage a coup that would restore the royalists to power, often with material support from one of Faysal’s many relatives. This paper looks at the post-Faysal monarchial project in Syria, which triggered the emergence of two political parties, and at least two coup attempts during the years 1946-1958. None succeeded, and the monarchial dream was abandoned in July 1958 with the toppling of the monarchy in neighboring Iraq, ruled at the time by Faysal’s grandson, King Faysal II.
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Asbridge, T. S. "The ‘Crusader’ Community at Antioch: The Impact of Interaction with Byzantium and Islam". Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 9 (grudzień 1999): 305–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3679407.
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At the end of the eleventh century, in the wake of the First Crusade, a Latin principality was established at Antioch, in northern Syria. Founded by the crusade leader Bohemond (1098–,c. 1105), this Latin community experienced a period of territorial expansion under the energetic rule of his nephew, Tancred (c. 1105–12), followed by seven years of less aggressive leadership by Roger of Salerno (1113–19). The principality suffered a serious setback with the defeat of its army at the evocatively named battle of the Field of Blood in 1119, during which Prince Roger was slain. Power then passed to a regent, King Baldwin II of Jerusalem (1118–31), until Bohemond II (1126–30), the son of Antioch's first prince, arrived in northern Syria.
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Akhter, Dr Naseem. "Amin-ul-Ummah Hazrat Abu Ubaida Bin Jarrah Status and Position in Islam (A Historical Analysis)". International Research Journal of Education and Innovation 2, nr 3 (31.12.2021): 310–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.53575/irjei.v2.03(21)28.310-315.
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Hazrat Abu Ubaida (RA) was noble personality of Islam and he belonged to the famous tribe of Quraesh at Makkah. Hazrat Abu Obadiah is one of the earliest followers and followers of Islam. He was a preacher of Islam and a dutiful general. He was a close associate of the Holy Prophet. He took part in many campaigns and was honored to raise the banner of Islam. Allah's Apostle gave him the title of Amin-ul-Ummah Besides, the Prophet called him the best man. He took part in many battles and showed the essence of bravery. In the time of Hazrat Abu Bakar, he was appointed the commander of the Muslim army sent to the front of Syria against the Roman forces. Due to his bravery Muslims became victorious and the entire country of Syria was conquered under his command۔ He was also the governor of Syria for some time. The publication of Islam includes his valuable services. This dissertation highlights the personality of Hazrat Abu Obadiah and his services to Islam.
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Lev, Yaacov. "Army, Regime, And Society In Fatimid Egypt, 358–487/968–1094". International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, nr 3 (sierpień 1987): 337–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800056762.
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Tensions between the regime and the army are a crucial component for the understanding of Fatimid history and, as will be shown, they had a mostly destabilizing impact on society and the economy. A host of factors shaped the relationship between the regime, the army, and society. Among these factors, the socio-military composition of the army was especially important. The composition of the army was partly an outcome of deliberate policies of the regime, partly a consequence of local conditions, and partly a reflection of wider Islamic practices. In the case of the Fatimids, the local conditions of Ifrīqiya (Tunisia) and Egypt and the military traditions of the deposed regimes of the Aghlabids and the Ikhshidids must be taken into consideration. Fatimid reliance on the Berbers of Kutāma was not much a matter of a choice; they were the first adherents of the Fatimids and had helped bring them to power in Ifrīqiya. However, from the earliest years of Fatimid rule the Aghlabid military traditions and local conditions were reflected in the composition of the Fatimid army and had an influence on Fatimid policies. Conditions in Egypt played a smaller role in shaping the Fatimid army. Certain elements of the defeated Egyptian army (the lkhshīdiyya and the Kāfūriyya) were incorporated into the Fatimid army while others were disbanded. The Fatimid drive into Palestine and Syria, whose ultimate goal was Baghdad, confronted the Fatimids with militarily superior armies built on the model of the Buyid-'Abbasid and the Byzantines.
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Manzinger, Krisztián, i Péter Wagner. "Syrian Kurds, Rojava and Alternative Society Building in Middle East". Honvédségi Szemle 148, nr 1 (7.09.2020): 15–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.35926/hdr.2020.1.2.
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Answering to local expectations and the need for a reliant partner for the US Army in the fight against ISIS, a Kurdish-based de facto autonomous territory emerged in Northern Syria, which later turned into a multicultural entity. The characteristically leftist political, social, and economic changes implemented by the new regime differ considerably from the government models practised in the region; however, they also trigger significant criticism. Although in 2018 and 2019, the entity suffered important losses in territory due to the geopolitical interests of Russia, the US, and Turkey, the Au-tonomous Administration of North and East Syria still could be a solid pillar in Syria’s future. This is not only due to its strategic and military importance, but also because the political system could provide, nevertheless, after some changes, an alternative for the Middle East in terms of multicultural governance, women’s rights and society-building based on mutual respect.
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Daneshgar, Majid. "An Egyptian Medical Officer and Qurʾān Commentator in Ottoman Syria". Oriente Moderno 101, nr 1 (6.10.2021): 44–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22138617-12340254.
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Abstract This article pays a particular attention to an Arab army physician and scholar from the mid-19th century who placed empirical science at the center of Islamic thought and situated it within Qurʾānic exegetical debates. He is the Egyptian Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Iskandarānī, a medical officer who ended up working in Ottoman Syria, and whose works were copied and printed (in)directly by the Ottomans. Apart from the limited information contained in previous scholarly literature, which, on the basis of his first commentary alone, repeatedly presents this commentator as one of the first people to have produced a “scientific interpretation of the Qurʾān”, little is known about his personal and professional background and the production of his commentaries. This study also sheds light on exegetical and intellectual directions produced outside Egypt in the 19th century.
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Beal, Richard H. "The Location of Cilician Ura". Anatolian Studies 42 (grudzień 1992): 65–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3642951.
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Much has been written about the city of Ura in southern Anatolia, which was important in both the Bronze and the Iron Ages. Nevertheless, no fully satisfactory location for Ura has yet been proposed.The primary text for locating Ura is the Neriglissar Chronicle. This records:“Appuašu, king of Pirindu mustered his [large] army and set out to plunder and sack Syria (ebir nāri). Neriglissar mustered his army and marched to Ḫume to oppose him. In anticipation of him (i.e. Neriglissar) (lāmišu), Appuašu placed the army and cavalry which he had assembled in a mountain valley in ambush. (When) Neriglissar reached them he inflicted a defeat upon them (and) conquered the large army. He captured his army and numerous horses. He pursued Appuašu for a distance of fifteen double-hours (bēru) through difficult mountains, where men must walk in single file, as far as Ura° his royal city. When(?) he reached it, he seized Ura° and sacked it. When he had marched for a distance of six double hours through rough mountains and difficult passes from Ura° to Kirši—his forefathers' royal city—he captured Kirši, the mighty city, his royal city. He burnt its walls, its palace and its people. Pitusu, a mountain in the midst of the ocean, and six-thousand combat troops stationed therein, he captured by means of ships. He destroyed its city and captured its people. In that same year he started fires from the pass of Sallune to the border of Lydia.”
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Shibeeb, Ass Lecture Shaker Dakheel. "The Battle of Siffin: Its Causes and Consequences Ass.Lecture Shaker Dakheel Shibeeb". Thi Qar Arts Journal 3, nr 44 (31.12.2023): 180–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.32792/tqartj.v3i44.502.
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The Battle of Siffin, which took place in an area called Siffin near the city of Raqqa in Syria, between the caliph of the Muslims Imam Ali (peace be upon him) and Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan in 37 AH, is one of the important battles in Islamic history, where tens of thousands of both sides were killed and the main reason for the battle was Muawiyah’s refusal to pledge allegiance to Imam Ali for the caliphate, and his insistence on the governorship of Syria and raising the slogan of demanding the blood of Uthman, in order to confer legitimacy on all his movements against the Imam, while he was greedy for power and staying in the governorship of Syria, which the Imam dismissed him from and appointed Abdullah bin Abbas, and the battle continued but when Muawiyah saw the victory of the Imam’s ally, especially after the killing of Ammar bin Yasser, Muawiyah cried out to Omar bin al-Aas “Woe to you, where is your trick?”, Omar said to him, ask everyone to raise the Qurans on the spears, and the people of Syria shouted “Fear God, O Ali, the Book of God is between us and you” and the people of Iraq were deceived, and the sedition occurred in the Imam’s army and they said to him, answer them to the Book of God or we will kill you, the Imam said to them “They are not people of religion or Quran” it is a deception which forced the Imam to accept the arbitration and the battle ended in the month of Ramadan in 38 AH and the issue of arbitration was settled in favor of Muawiyah, and the reason for that was the disobedience of the Imam by his army in appointing Abdullah bin Abbas to be his judge, and they asked that Abu Musa al-Ash’ari be, who was deceived by Omar to depose the two and make the matter a consultation between them, and he presented it with the excuse of his old age, so Abu Musa deposed the Imam and Omar came after him and deposed the Imam and confirmed Muawiyah and a quarrel occurred between the two and the issue of arbitration ended and the Imam returned to Kufa and was busy with the war of the Kharijites who raised the slogan “No rule but the rule of God”, and their number was twelve thousand "led by Abdullah bin Wahb al-Rasibi in the Battle of Nahrawan, which is located between Baghdad and Hillah belonging to the district of al-Mada’in, and the Imam killed them except forty people, and Muawiyah returned to Syria in their view the legitimate caliph, and they began to call him “the Prince of the Believers”
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Tillo, Khoushnaw. "Perspectives of the Kurdish knot in the Middle East". Review of Nationalities 8, nr 1 (1.12.2018): 119–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pn-2018-0007.
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Abstract For centuries, Kurds have been carrying out activities aimed at obtaining their own state. Due to the cooperation of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, it was impossible in the twentieth century. As a result of Operation Desert Storm, a Kurdish enclave was created in the north of Iraq, which over the years developed and allowed for real dreams of recognized independence, at least for some of the Kurds living in the Middle East. A&er the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011, there was a political vacuum in which we observe the weakening of the Iraqi state, the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the emergence of the Islamic State, which also had direct consequences for the Kurds. The weakness of the central government in Baghdad, the need to fight the Kurdish army against IS fighters raised the importance of arguments for the proclamation of an independent Kurdish state in the Middle East, or maybe even two, including the possible division of Syria.
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Gresh, Alain. "The Free Officers And The Comrades: The Sudanese Communist Party And Nimeiri Face-To-Face, 1969–1971". International Journal of Middle East Studies 21, nr 3 (sierpień 1989): 393–409. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020743800032578.
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Africa's largest country, Sudan, is first and foremost part of the Arab world, sensitive to the political tides which sweep the Arab peoples from the Atlantic to the Gulf. Like other members of the Arab League, Sudan was taken by surprise by the defeat of 1967. It was shaken by the tidal wave that later engulfed Libya, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria; and on 25 May 1969, a military regime took over in Khartoum. Its ideology was Arab nationalism infused with socialism; its social base, the army and the urban classes; and its model, the Nasserist experiment.
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Ахмедов, Владимир. "Сирийская революция". История и современность, nr 4 (30.12.2023): 148–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.30884/iis/2023.04.06.
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The crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, which began in March 2011, quickly escalated into a bloody civil war. As a result, the country was split into warring districts and plunged into a state of religious conflict. The duration of the crisis and the difficulty of reconciliation between the conflicting parties were due to a number of factors that will be analyzed in this article. The article emphasizes that a distinctive feature of the former state-political model of governance was its institutionalized authoritarianism based on the power factor, which was embodied in the activities of the security services and the army. Over the past 40 years, the character of civil-military relations in the SAR has been determined by the prioritization of the military in the decision-making process on key issues of the country's domestic and foreign policy. It was therefore not surprising that control over the events that began in March 2011 and their subsequent development was largely in the hands of the military. The military dictated decisions to the political authorities, and in a number of critical issues they acted independently. It was they who determined at all subsequent stages the development of the crisis and the fate not only of the regime but also of the whole of Syria. Despite the radicalization of the Syrian conflict and its transformation into an interreligious struggle, the Syrian regime survived.
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Viermann, Nadine. "The Battle of Yarmouk, a Bridge of Boats, and Heraclius’s Alleged Fear of Water". Studies in Late Antiquity 5, nr 2 (2021): 241–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/sla.2021.5.2.241.
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In 636 CE, Roman and Arab contingents met at the river Yarmouk. After days of fighting, the Roman army suffered a disastrous defeat. The provinces of Palestine and Syria, which had been reconquered from Persian occupation only a few years prior, were again lost to enemy forces. The emperor Heraclius (610–641), who had coordinated the defense in person, left Syria in haste. A passage in Nicephorus’ Breviarium covers what happened in Constantinople in the aftermath of the battle: It tells a seemingly strange tale of Heraclius being so afraid of water that he would not enter the capital until a bridge of boats was built over the Bosporus. In scholarship this tale is often reproduced uncritically. Deconstructing the passage, I argue that the image of a mentally frail Heraclius is an instance of political satire that exposed the emperor’s weak position and ridiculed his attempts to cope with the destabilizing consequences of Roman defeat. When seen from a structural perspective, it becomes clear that Heraclius was not afraid of water but intended the bridge of boats to serve as a triumphalist statement at a moment when the situation in Constantinople threatened to slip out of his control.
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Nofrianti, Mami, i Dian Pertiwi. "‘Abdurrahman ad-Dakhil (Superman in Islamic History: 756 CE-788 CE)". Ishlah: Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin, Adab dan Dakwah 4, nr 2 (17.10.2022): 179–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.32939/ishlah.v4i2.197.
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This article aims at discussing the struggle of one of the Umayyads’ descendants who was able to escape from the Abbasid army from the city of Damascus (Syria) to Andalusia (Al-Andalus). He managed to re-establish the power of the Umayyads in Andalusia after the collapse of their power in Damascus, due to the Abbasid army attack. A qualitative method with library research-based was used in conducting this study, the data were analyzed by using qualitative descriptive approach, technical descriptive analysis, and content analysis. The results showed that ‘Abdurrahman Ad-Dakhil had great talent and strong influence with the result that Islamic Spain could be united under his rule. He was very instrumental in building a government in Andalusia in such a way that the Andalusian State could compete with the influence of the Abbasid Daulahh’s power in Baghdad. Thus, he is one of the most important figures in Islamic history. He became an inspirational figure because of having persistency, intelligence, thorough struggle, and upholding Islamic law.
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Mekhamadiev, Е. А. "The Danube legions of the Late Roman Empire (I Italica and V Macedonica) during the second half and middle of the fourth c. a. d.: on the ways of interaction between the frontier and expeditionary armies". Belgorod State University Scientific bulletin. Series: History. Political science 46, nr 4 (30.12.2019): 608–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.18413/2075-4458-2019-46-4-608-619.
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Since 325 A. D., when the Emperor Constantine the Great established a self-sufficient and single expeditionary army of the Roman Empire (previously, before 353, it constantly had stood in Thrace, but then it was split in some smaller military groups), military units of this army have interacted to units of frontier armies during many military campaigns. But epigraphic data from the Lower Danube regions (the provinces of Lower Moesia and Dacia Ripensis (River)) give a chance to trace one another way of interaction, which was an absolutely disregarded before. The author means a food supply of frontier units from the provinces where the expeditionary troops (or imperial bodyguards) had their service. The inscriptions covered by this paper contain evidence about two important Danube frontier legions, that are I Italica (Lower Moesia) and V Macedonica (Dacia Ripensis (River)), which received a food from the Roman Near East provinces (the author means Hellespontus at the North-West of the Asia Minor and Syria Foenice and Syria Palestina just at the Persian frontier), but not from the Danube regions. As the author supposes, the reason of such a way of supply was that some military units (vexillations) detached from the staff of the Danube frontier legions served within the Near East Roman provinces, these vexillations moved at the Near East during the time of the Tetrarchy (293–324) or the sole reign of Constantine the Great (324–337). After their relocation to the Near East, vexillations of the Danube frontier legions have never returned in their home Danube provinces, in contrast, they were parts of the Near East expeditionary armies. But, as a matter of award for diminishing of their staff, the Danube frontier («maternal») legions received a food from the provinces, where their «child» vexillations located and served.
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Sayim, Burak. "Communist Anti-Militarism in France and Anti-Colonial Wars in Morocco and Syria". Twentieth Century Communism 24, nr 24 (28.06.2023): 17–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.3898/175864323837280544.
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This article explores the intersection of Middle Eastern anti-colonialism and European anti-militarism in the interwar period through a case study focusing on French communist activities within the army during almost simultaneous anti-colonial revolts in Morocco and Syria. It argues that the interaction between revolutionary militancy in these two regions was not unilinear. Just as the impact of European revolutionary traditions was instrumental in shaping Middle Eastern communist militancy, so Middle Eastern anti-colonialism had an – underappreciated – impact on European communism. Through this case study it shows how the Communist International strove to give anti-militarism in the global north and anti-colonialism in the global south a common political language through which the two aspirations could converge. Instead of focusing on high-level decisions, this study takes a tentative step towards situating this alliance – or lack thereof – in the trenches of colonial wars.
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Battera, Federico. "Perspectives for change in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria: the military factor and implications of previous authoritarian regimes". Contemporary Arab Affairs 7, nr 4 (1.10.2014): 544–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2014.948312.
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This article argues that differences in Arab authoritarian regimes were mainly linked to the relationship between the state, the political party in power and the military. By exploring such differences in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria prior to the 2011 crisis, they are explained in the context of the political changes that ensued in the wake of the crisis. How the army played the dual role of instigating change while impeding it at crucial points in the transitional process is described. The mutual lack of autonomy between the state, the party and the military appears to have been a key factor in impeding change, whereas a clear separation of the functions of these institutions was more likely to enable political change to come about.
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Haun, Phil, i Colin Jackson. "Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War". International Security 40, nr 3 (styczeń 2016): 139–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00226.
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Most traditional accounts identify the Linebacker I and Linebacker II campaigns as the most effective and consequential uses of U.S. air power in the Vietnam War. They argue that deep interdiction in North Vietnam played a central role in the defeat of the Easter Offensive and that subsequent strategic attacks on Hanoi forced the North Vietnamese to accept the Paris accords. These conclusions are false. The Linebacker campaigns were rather ineffective in either stopping the Communist offensive or compelling concessions. The most effective and consequential use of U.S. air power came in the form of close air support and battlefield air interdiction directly attacking the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam. The success of these air strikes hinged on the presence of a U.S.-operated tactical air control system that incorporated small numbers of ground advisers, air liaison officers, and forward air controllers. This system, combined with abundant U.S. aircraft and a reasonably effective allied army, was the key to breaking the Easter Offensive and compelling Hanoi to agree to the Paris accords. The effectiveness of close air support and battlefield air interdiction and the failure of deep interdiction and strategic attack in the Vietnam War have important implications for the use of air power and advisers in contemporary conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.
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Šedivý, Miroslav. "Metternich and the Syrian Question: 1840–1841". Austrian History Yearbook 41 (kwiecień 2010): 88–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0067237809990105.
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The second Ottoman-Egyptian crisis from 1839 to 1841 was one of the most important chapters in the history of the Eastern question. At that time, the fragile structure of the Ottoman Empire trembled in its foundations under the pressure of the ambitious, powerful Egyptian governor, Mohammed Ali, who at the end of the 1830s controlled Egypt along with Sudan, Crete, a considerable part of the Arabian Peninsula, and even Syria. Although formally he was the sultan's subject administering some Ottoman provinces, in reality Mohammed Ali governed his dominions as an independent ruler, hence dividing the Ottoman Empire into two parts, one of them ruled from Constantinople and the other from Alexandria. The sultan's attempt to terminate the existence of this dual system ended in disaster; and in the midsummer of 1839, the empire found itself without its army, navy, and monarch, who died at the end of June.
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Castillo Quiñones, Juan Carlos. "Borderlands, Self-Rule Movements and State-Society Relations in Chiapas and Northern Syria from a Historical Perspective". Kurdish Studies Journal 2, nr 1 (13.06.2024): 33–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/29502292-00201008.
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Abstract This paper addresses the historical and conjunctural drivers underlying the emergence of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the pro-Mayan Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), asking how the geographical location of ethnic groups is related to the emergence of self-rule movements. To investigate this, a comparative historical review of state-society relations in Chiapas and Northern Syria was implemented in combination with frame analysis. I argue that the historical location of the Kurdish and Mayan populations in the borderlands of, first, former empires and, later, of their nation-states, has led the PYD and the EZLN to elaborate similar political projects that challenge traditional models of political autonomy. Through the prism of borderlands history, the paper prioritizes an approach from the “margins” and “peripheries” over that of the national centres of power.
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Kinney, Drew Holland. "Politicians at Arms: Civilian Recruitment of Soldiers for Middle East Coups". Armed Forces & Society 45, nr 4 (12.06.2018): 681–701. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327x18777983.
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Why would politicians recruit soldiers for military coups d’état? The civil–military relations literature assumes politicians aspire to supremacy over the military; enabling praetorianism would risk their future rule. While civil–military relations widely recognizes the empirical fact of civilian participation in military takeovers, no study specifies or theorizes the topic. This essay examines the conditions in which politicians recruit soldiers to seize power by investigating the understudied processes of military takeovers. Using British Foreign Office documents, Arabic language memoirs, and Polity data, I find that civilian statesmen in Iraq (1936) and Syria (1951) could not tolerate their civilian rivals’ incumbency but were unable to challenge them peacefully, so they recruited like-minded officers for coups. This suggests that while politicians do not necessarily want the army in the chambers, they sometimes favor praetorianism to the continued rule of their civilian opponents.
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Yelbaşı, Caner. "Ahmed Anzavur: Soldier, Governor, and Rebel". Archiv orientální 91, nr 3 (29.01.2024): 497–517. http://dx.doi.org/10.47979/aror.j.91.3.497-517.
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Following the Russian conquest of the North Caucasus, many Muslims from the region were exiled to the Ottoman Empire from the 1860s onwards. They were settled in different parts of the empire from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Syria and Iraq vilayets. By following this policy, the Ottoman state ensured that many Circassians would become part of the Ottoman army, ruling elites, harems and agricultural workforce. Anzavur Ahmed’s family was one of them. Although he did not graduate from military school, he participated in the army during the war in Libya (1911), the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), and the First World War (1914–1918). He was also appointed as the governor of Izmit (1920). Anzavur Ahmet is portrayed as a rebel by Turkish official historiography, but in reality, he was much more than that. He was an Ottoman Governor, and supported byOttoman administrators such as Damad Ferid and Ali Kemal, who were against the Kuvayi Milliye because they believed that the empire would eventually emerge from the chaotic atmosphere of the post-First World War period and make an agreement with the British. This article argues that although Ahmed Anzavur has been labeled a rebel and a traitor according to the official historiography, it is difficult to use these labels given the circumstances of his time.
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Alatas, Alwi, i Mohamad Firdaus Mansor Majdin. "Muslim Disunity and Lost in the First Crusade". UMRAN - International Journal of Islamic and Civilizational Studies 9, nr 2 (28.06.2022): 19–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.11113/umran2022.9n2.566.
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The Frankish army in the First Crusade were moved by the call of Pope Urban II in 1095. Over the next four years, they succeeded in capturing important cities in Asia Minor and al-Shām (Greater Syria), such as Nicaea, Edessa, Antioch and Jerusalem. The strength of the crusading forces was actually not greater than that of the Muslims and they were also not advanced in term of culture and science vis-a-vis the Muslims. In hindsight, this shows that there were other reasons that caused the defeat of the Muslims during the First Crusade. This study uses historical analysis as its methodology to see the correlation between the defeat of the Muslims and the political division that was prevailing among them during the First Crusade. This study suggests that there is a strong correlation between disunity and the defeat of the Muslims during the First Crusade.
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KOZERAWSKI, Dariusz, i Piotr LOTARSKI. "INFLUENCE OF MIDDLE EAST ARMED CONFLICTS INTO BATTLEFIELD CHANGES". PROBLEMY TECHNIKI UZBROJENIA 159 (16.05.2022): 87–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0015.8557.
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Wars conducted in the Middle East after the WWII significantly affected the course of military strategy, and combat tactics, and military technology. Presented paper describes circumstances of local wars and military conflicts in the Middle East and their influence on development of warfare art and technology. The wars with Israel which were lost by the Arabic countries in 20th century affected development of military strategy and tactics of using the armoured weapons and air forces. They contributed significantly to development of the intelligence, and antiaircraft combat assets, and antitank weapons. In consecutive wars the Arabic countries were not able to coordinate military operations, what gave possibility for the Israel army to successively defeat armies of particular countries. Military conflicts between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah, and suffered losses, caused the development of new revolutionary combat assets such as combat vehicles active self-defence systems (Trophy), or antimissile/antiaircraft systems (Irone Dome). Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), drones, and precise weapons were widely used. Reconnaissance and military intelligence affected significantly the results of military operations. Palestinian and Lebanese organisations counterweighed the advantages of Israelian army by systems of fortifications, tunnels, and hidden fire positions. Israelian army implemented combat vehicles in urban area fights. They proved to be efficient what denied opinions about uselessness of armoured weapons at urban fights, or even the tanks in the 21st century. The war in Syria indicated the efficient use of combined combat tactics, conventional military operations, and guerrilla and terrorist methods and actions.The high morale represented by Hezbollah and ISIS fighters proved to be an essential component of military operations. Risking own life at fighting the enemies made great impression on them, and disorganised the defence, and provided dazzling successes in the battlefield. Aviation played important role in all operations fighting the forces of Arabic countries, Hamas, Hezbollah, or Islamic State (IS).
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Strauss, Johann. "The Great War of the Postcards". Archiv orientální 88, nr 3 (15.03.2021): 525–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.47979/aror.j.88.3.525-568.
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This article examines the functions and the significance of picture postcards during World War I, with particular reference to the war in the Ottoman Lands and the Balkans, or involving the Turkish Army in Galicia. After the principal types of Kriegspostkarten – sentimental, humorous, propaganda, and artistic postcards (Künstlerpostkarten) – have been presented, the different theatres of war (Balkans, Galicia, Middle East) and their characteristic features as they are reflected on postcards are dealt with. The piece also includes aspects such as the influence of Orientalism, the problem of fake views, and the significance and the impact of photographic postcards, portraits, and photo cards. The role of postcards in book illustrations is demonstrated using a typical example (F. C. Endres, Die Türkei (1916)). The specific features of a collection of postcards left by a German soldier who served in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq during World War I will be presented at the end of this article.
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Zeichmann, Christopher B. "Military Forces in Judaea 6–130 ce: The status quaestionis and Relevance for New Testament Studies". Currents in Biblical Research 17, nr 1 (październik 2018): 86–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1476993x18791425.
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The study of the military in the Roman provinces of Judaea is not the most accessible topic. Though the data upon which scholars rely is familiar (e.g., epigraphs, papyri, ancient historians), its study requires significant methodological deviations from biblical studies. This article summarizes key points relevant for scholars of both Jewish antiquity and early Christianity. First, it provides a summary of recent developments in the social history of the Roman army in the Near East, attending especially to the question of the role and function of soldiers in that region. Second, this article provides a brief social history for all military units in Judaea before it was renamed Syria Palaestina in 130 ce (four legions, 14 infantry cohortes, and five cavalry alae), based on the latest discoveries. Finally, the article concludes with a section discussing two issues specific to New Testament studies: the presence of an Italian cohort in Judaea (Acts 10) and the issue of the Augustan cohort in Judaea and Batanaea (Acts 27).
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Abrosimov, Alexander. "The Gaza War and Irano-Israeli Fight in the Middle East". Oriental Courier, nr 2 (2024): 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s268684310031308-6.
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In the last decades, the Middle East has been one of the most turbulent regions in the world. The Gaza war activated conflicts in the region and caused changes in the system of regional international relations in the Middle East. Despite Tehran's aspirations, the attacks of Iranian backed militias on Israeli goals made Iran in the eyes of Israeli authorities an active part in Gaza war. The Israeli air forces strikes on Iran's military goals and Islamic resistance positions in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq as a response on attack on Israel's depth has widened geography of the conflict. The Israelis tactic of addressed strikes on Iran's military leaders and Hamas, Hezbollah's field commanders in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq has generated new forms of Iranian-Israeli military confrontation and posed Middle East on the brink of the new "Big War". After 100 days since the beginning of Gaza war the Israeli Army failed to achieve its final goals in fight with Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Until now Israel and Iran both has been choosing the active restraining tactics apart direct full-scale war. The Hezbollah will likely take decision to begin war with Israel without preliminary coordination with Iran. Tell Aviv will hardly push Washington to enter war with Iran. In view of the lack of "nuclear diplomacy" and growing escalation of hostilities, the resumptions of USA Iran's "liaison channels" could have a decisive role in the Gaza war's management.