Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Speeches (Hyperides)”

A tanulmány Hypereidés Démosthenés ellen című beszédének szöveghagyományát tekinti át a Har- ris-Arden papirusztekercs töredékcsoportjainak bemutatásával. Gianfranco Bartolini fél évszázaddal korábban publikált átfogó elemzését egészíti ki az 1972 óta megismert adatokkal. Az előkészületben lévő Hypereidés-szövegkiadás (Bibliotheca Teubneriana) előszavának egyik, bővített fejezetét jelenti.This paper reviews the textual tradition of Hyperides’ speech Against Demosthenes by presenting fragment groups of the Harris-Arden papyrus scroll. It complements Gianfranco Bartolini’s comprehensive analysis published half a century ago with data acquired since 1972. It constitutes an extended chapter of the preface to the forthcoming Hyperides edition (Bibliotheca Teubneriana).

AbstractThis paper re-examines Hyperides’ speech In Defence of Euxenippus as evidence for the role of divination in fourth-century BCE Athens. The oration recounts an occasion of oracular divination through incubation at Amphiaraos’ sanctuary in Oropos, whereby the Athenian Assembly ordered individuals to undergo incubation to resolve an issue concerning land ownership. This paper argues that Hyperides’ speech not only furnishes crucial evidence which broadens our understanding of divination beyond the famous oracle at Delphi, it also provides us with a valuable case study for the process of oracular consultation. The paper analyses the different stages of this process, including the selection of incubants, the nature of the dream received and the aftermath of incubation, demonstrating how the dream could be contested. It thereby sheds new light on the complexities of oracular transmission and interpretation, both of which are open to contestation as a result of the multiplicity of religious authority.

I begin with a warm welcome for Evangelos Alexiou's Greek Rhetoric of the 4th Century bc, a ‘revised and slightly abbreviated’ version of the modern Greek edition published in 2016 (ix). Though the volume's title points to a primary focus on the fourth century, sufficient attention is given to the late fifth and early third centuries to provide context. As ‘rhetoric’ in the title indicates, the book's scope is not limited to oratory: Chapter 1 outlines the development of a rhetorical culture; Chapter 2 introduces theoretical debates about rhetoric (Plato, Isocrates, Alcidamas); and Chapter 3 deals with rhetorical handbooks (Anaximenes, Aristotle, and the theoretical precepts embedded in Isocrates). Oratory comes to the fore in Chapter 4, which introduces the ‘canon’ of ten Attic orators: in keeping with the fourth-century focus, Antiphon, Andocides, and Lysias receive no more than sporadic attention; conversely, extra-canonical fourth-century orators (Apollodorus, the author of Against Neaera, Hegesippus, and Demades) receive limited coverage. The remaining chapters deal with the seven major canonical orators: Isocrates, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Isaeus, Lycurgus, Hyperides, and Dinarchus. Each chapter follows the same basic pattern: life, work, speeches, style, transmission of text and reception. Isocrates and Demosthenes have additional sections on research trends and on, respectively, Isocratean ideology and issues of authenticity in the Demosthenic corpus. In the case of Isaeus, there is a brief discussion of contract oratory; Lycurgus is introduced as ‘the relentless prosecutor’. Generous extracts from primary sources are provided, in Greek and in English translation; small-type sections signal a level of detail that some readers may wish to pass over. The footnotes provide extensive references to older as well as more recent scholarship. The thirty-page bibliography is organized by chapter (a helpful arrangement in a book of this kind, despite the resulting repetition); the footnotes supply some additional references. Bibliographical supplements to the original edition have been supplied ‘only in isolated cases’ (ix). In short, this volume is a thorough, well-conceived, and organized synthesis that will be recognized, without doubt, as a landmark contribution. There are, inevitably, potential points of contention. The volume's subtitle, ‘the elixir of democracy and individuality’, ties rhetoric more closely to democracy and to Athens than is warranted: the precarious balancing act which acknowledges that rhetoric ‘has never been divorced from human activity’ while insisting that ‘its vital political space was the democracy of city-states’ (ix–x) seems to me untenable. Alexiou acknowledges that ‘the gift of speaking well, natural eloquence, was considered a virtue already by Homer's era’ (ix), and that ‘the natural gift of speaking well was considered a virtue’ (1). But the repeated insistence on natural eloquence is perplexing. Phoenix, in the embassy scene in Iliad 9, makes it clear that his remit included the teaching of eloquence (Il. 9.442, διδασκέμεναι): Alexiou only quotes the following line, which he mistakenly assigns to Book 10. (The only other typo that I noticed was ‘Aritsotle’ [97]. I, too, have a tendency to mistype the Stagirite's name, though my own automatic transposition is, alas, embarrassingly scatological.) Alexiou provides examples of later Greek assessments of fourth-century orators, including (for example) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Hermogenes, and the author of On Sublimity (the reluctance to commit to the ‘pseudo’ prefix is my, not Alexiou's, reservation). He observes cryptically that ‘we are aware of Didymus’ commentary’ (245); but the extensive late ancient scholia, which contain material from Menander's Demosthenic commentaries, disappointingly evoke no sign of awareness.

Arguments from fairness as described in Aristotle’s Rhetoric are usually taken to aim at mitigating the strictness of the law or, in terms of procedure, to favour the defendant. This paper considers a more inclusive interpretation, that is, that arguments from fairness can work both ways. In the example given in the Rhetoric, arguments from fairness are directed at a restrictive interpretation of the text. That may not be necessary however. Likewise, fairness may speak for the claimant. Two examples may support this conclusion: a judicial speech by Hyperides, and the doctrine of issues appearing in Hellenistic school rhetoric.

Abstract A recently published fragment of the fourth-century speechwriter Hyperides contains a speech for the prosecution of Timandrus, accused of mistreating four orphans in his care. This article draws out from the fragment three important contributions to our understanding of Athenian conceptions of family relationships, particularly the relationships of marginalized groups: girls and enslaved people. First, the fragment constitutes a rare portrayal of a relationship between two sisters. Second, the fragment clearly articulates the idea that affective family relationships are not a biological inevitability but arise from socialization, a departure from other fourth-century thinking. Third, the speaker applies this statement to enslaved people, claiming that the separation of children from close family members is so cruel that even slave-traders avoid it in their sale of human beings. Though this claim seems to have been untrue except in a very limited sense, its place in the argumentation of the speech assumes broad recognition of the existence and value of family relationships between enslaved people, vivid evidence of the paradox that slave societies recognized the humanity of people they simultaneously insisted were subhuman.

AbstractThis paper analyses and interprets three passages in Hyperides' speech against Demosthenes and suggests a textual correction. The statements in columns XXIX–XXX become more comprehensible based on the relevant passages in the speech against Diondas. In line 21 of columna XXVIII, αὐτῷ (pronomen personale – Jensen and all the editors) should be replaced by αὑτῷ (pronomen reflexivum), which reconstructs the proper meaning of the text. After Chaeronea it was not the people who were grateful to Demosthenes, but quite the opposite: the people expected that Demosthenes and his companions would be grateful to them. Thus, the name lost in the lacuna is not Lycurgus, but Demosthenes.

Abstract As we have just seen, the speeches of the 330s focus on the defeat at Chaeronea, which they present as the most recent event in a long tradition of Athenian accomplishments. These orations pay little attention to subsequent developments, as Philip and Alexander consolidated their control of Greece. But in the 320s Athenian prospects improved dramatically, and the death of Alexander in 323 provided an ideal opportunity to renew the fight for the freedom lost at Chaeronea. Hyperides’ speech reflects the changed situation. With its focus on recent events, it stands apart from Athenian speeches of the 330s and from earlier funeral orations. The Athenians had finally put Chaeronea be- hind them, and Hyperides shows them that the current campaign was more important than any of their ancestors’ achievements.

Abstract Hyperides’ Funeral Oration was addressed to a large audience of Athenians and foreigners at the public ceremony for the burial of the war dead in early 322. We will now consider the institutional setting of the speech and the characteristic elements found in Athenian state funeral orations. We will then focus on the Demosthenic Funeral Oration and examine the coexistence of traditional motifs and current attitudes to- ward Macedon in that speech. We will see that Demosthenes defends the decision to fight the Macedonians at Chaeronea by invoking patriotic models from Athenian history, and at the same time his speech reflects its historical context in 338. From there we will turn to other speeches of the 330s and find a similar attitude of nostalgic patriotism alongside acknowledgment of the Macedonian hegemony. This discussion of the rhetorical background to Hyperides’ speech will help illuminate the innovative techniques and newfound optimism of Hyperides’ Funeral Oration, on which we will concentrate in the following section.

Abstract It is the year 345 b.c., or thereabouts. A woman is on trial, the courtesan (hetaira) Phryne. She is accused of impiety, of introducing a new god, Isodaites, and if proven guilty, she will be condemned to death. The good news is that she is defended by Hyperides. Hyperides is one of the best advocates around and he has produced one of his best speeches for the occasion. Bits of it survive. The bad news is that the judges seem unconvinced nevertheless. Hyperides tries a desperate measure: “He led Phryne herself into view, tore off her underclothes, exposed her breasts and finished his speech with a pitiful finale. He filled the jurors with religious awe and stopped them from condemning to death Aphrodite’s representative and attendant, as they indulged their feelings of compassion.”

Chapter 6 discusses the ‘Crown trial’ of 330 BC, the other major court clash between Aeschines (prosecutor) and Demosthenes (defending his associate Ctesiphon) for which we have extant speech texts from each side. The chapter shows that part of the success of On the Crown lies in Demosthenes’ ability to find ways to capitalize on the strategic error Aeschines had made in assuming that reviving the modes of accusation used in the Embassy trial could work in a context where the direction Demosthenes helped take Athens in nearly a decade earlier still apparently commanded broad popular approval, despite the fact that it had led to Macedonian hegemony. Demosthenes builds on this in On the Crown with an optimistic strategy—in which historical material plays a crucial role—which gives his audience much better versions of their past, present, and future to believe in than those assumed by Aeschines. After an introduction and overview in Chapter 6.1, which includes an assessment of the nature of our speech texts and some contextualization of Demosthenes’ strategies within those of his political group (especially Hyperides), Chapters 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 show Demosthenes confronting Aeschines’ historically related set pieces with a series of set pieces of his own which cover the same thematic ground and act as persuasive usurpations of the originals, seeking to upstage them. Chapter 6.5 offers a succinct conclusion.