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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"
FÜLLBRUNN, SASCHA. "COLLUSION OR SNIPING IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS — A PRISONER'S DILEMMA". International Game Theory Review 13, nr 01 (marzec 2011): 75–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021919891100285x.
Pełny tekst źródłaRosa, Benjamin V. "Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions". Games and Economic Behavior 132 (marzec 2022): 189–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.009.
Pełny tekst źródłaKagel, John H., Yuanchuan Lien i Paul Milgrom. "Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis". American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, nr 3 (1.08.2010): 160–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.3.160.
Pełny tekst źródłaEngelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, i Charles M. Kahn. "Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions". Management Science 51, nr 3 (marzec 2005): 508–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0339.
Pełny tekst źródłaFox, Jeremy T., i Patrick Bajari. "Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction". American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, nr 1 (1.02.2013): 100–146. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.1.100.
Pełny tekst źródłaBrusco, Sandro, i Giuseppe Lopomo. "Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints". Economic Theory 38, nr 1 (13.02.2007): 105–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0217-8.
Pełny tekst źródłaZheng, Charles Z. "Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions". Games and Economic Behavior 76, nr 2 (listopad 2012): 648–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.002.
Pełny tekst źródłaBRUSCO, SANDRO, i GIUSEPPE LOPOMO. "BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING-BID AUCTIONS". Journal of Industrial Economics 56, nr 1 (marzec 2008): 113–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00335.x.
Pełny tekst źródłaRiedel, Frank, i Elmar Wolfstetter. "Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result". Economic Theory 29, nr 3 (13.11.2005): 721–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0039-5.
Pełny tekst źródłaSherstyuk, Katerina, i Jeremy Dulatre. "Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment". International Journal of Industrial Organization 26, nr 2 (marzec 2008): 557–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.04.005.
Pełny tekst źródłaRozprawy doktorskie na temat "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"
Pacaud, Alexandre. "Bidding efficiently in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions using Monte Carlo Tree Search". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024IPPAT003.
Pełny tekst źródłaSince its introduction in 1994 in the United States, the Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) has become the privileged mechanism for spectrum auctions. As sometimes billions of euros are at stake in an SAA, and a mobile operator’s business plan highly depends on the auction outcome, establishing an efficient bidding strategy is crucial. Despite the importance of this problem, there is a lack of research dedicated to developing an efficient bidding strategy for the SAA. The intrinsic complexity of the SAA makes its analysis very challenging for auction theory and exact game resolution methods. Additionally, the mechanism introduces strategical issues such as the exposure problem, adding an extra layer of complexity to its study.This thesis proposes the use of Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to compute an efficient bidding strategy for the SAA. The six chapters of the thesis are structured as follows. The first chapter introduces spectrum auction mechanisms, highlighting their pros and cons. The second chapter details the bidding problem in the SAA, along with relevant related research.The third chapter provides a summary of adversarial search methods, with a specific focus on MCTS. Chapters four to six are dedicated to developing an efficient MCTS bidding strategy for the SAA. The fourth chapter considers a turn-based deterministic model of the SAA with perfect and complete information. Numerical experiments are only undertaken on small instances.The fifth chapter considers a n-player simultaneous move model of SAA with incomplete information. Extensive numerical experiments are undertaken on instances of realistic size. The sixth chapter extends the preceding game to incomplete information to introduce uncertainties. For each model, an algorithm that significantly outperforms state-of-the-art bidding strategies is proposed, notably by better tackling the exposure problem. Moreover, a final price prediction method is developed throughout the chapters, upon which each MCTS algorithm relies
Książki na temat "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"
Milgrom, Paul R. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaMilgrom, Paul. Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction. The World Bank, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-1986.
Pełny tekst źródłaCzęści książek na temat "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"
Bousquet, Nicolas, Yang Cai i Adrian Vetta. "Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction". W Web and Internet Economics, 216–29. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_16.
Pełny tekst źródłaCramton, Peter. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions". W Combinatorial Auctions, 99–114. The MIT Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0005.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenia konferencji na temat "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"
Pacaud, Alexandre, Marceau Coupechoux i Aurelien Bechler. "Monte Carlo Tree Search Bidding Strategy for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions". W 2022 20th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOpt). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/wiopt56218.2022.9930539.
Pełny tekst źródłaDu, Li, Qian Chen i Na Bian. "An Empirical Analysis of Bidding Behavior in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions". W 2010 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icee.2010.70.
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