Gotowe bibliografie tematyczne / SHAREHOLDER'S

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Gotowa bibliografia na temat „SHAREHOLDER'S”

Autor: Grafiati

Data publikacji: 11 września 2023

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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "SHAREHOLDER'S"

Miyake, Masatoshi, Mei Yu i Hiroshi Inoue. "Mitigating risk incentives by issuing convertible bonds: A refinement to the Black–Scholes evaluation model". Journal of Financial Engineering 01, nr 03 (wrzesień 2014): 1450024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s234576861450024x.

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This study employs option pricing theory to analyze the risk incentive conflict between shareholders and creditors. It evaluates the volatility of investment projects funded by borrowed money and compares their gains for the shareholder and creditor. Our analysis is based on the recognition that shareholders' and creditors' objectives may differ. We identify the shareholder's risk incentive as a source of agency cost originating with the shareholder and find that issuing a convertible bond avoids agency cost without diluting existing shareholders' ownership. Numerical examples are shown to examine it.

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Gratham, Ross. "The Unanimous Consent Rule in Company Law". Cambridge Law Journal 52, nr 2 (lipiec 1993): 245–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197300095155.

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In the history of the modern company the shareholder has held a privileged position, for although the company's separate identity is the fundamental tenet of company law the shareholder's place as proprietor has only recently been questioned. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that for nearly a century the unanimous assent of shareholders has held the status of an overriding authority, able to cure procedural defects, overcome statutory requirements and validate almost any act within the capacity of the company. In its most recent application in Brick and Pipe Industries Ltd. v. Occidental Life Nominees Pty. Ltd., where the consent of shareholders was held to bind the company to a guarantee, we have a striking example of the authority accorded to the wishes of shareholders.

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Young, Christopher, i James Janos. "Incongruent Court Advice: Examining Fair Value and Fair Market Value Standards in Commercial Damage Cases Pursuant to Minority Claims". Journal of Forensic Economics 28, nr 1-2 (1.09.2019): 197–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.5085/jfe-425.

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Abstract The standard of value in shareholder oppression and dissolution cases for a valuation of a minority shareholder's interest in a business in most U.S. states is fair value. The fair value standard in most U.S. states excludes discounts for control and lack of marketability. However, the three valuation approaches commonly used (income, market, and asset) all yield different levels of value. Consequently, this can unfairly negatively or positively impact minority and oppressed shareholders. In this paper we examine these inconsistencies and offer a solution to arriving at a level of value the trier of fact is seeking to obtain.

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de Jong, Abe, Philip Fliers i Henry van Beusichem. "Catering and dividend policy: evidence from the Netherlands over the twentieth century". Financial History Review 26, nr 3 (grudzień 2019): 321–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0968565019000209.

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This article investigates the determinants of Dutch firms’ dividend policies in the twentieth century. We identify three distinct episodes and document shifts in dividend policies in the 1930s and 1980s, because firm managers cater to the changing preferences of shareholders. The first episode, prior to World War II, was characterised by dividends that were fixed contracts between shareholder and management and the payouts were mechanically determined by earnings. The second epoch of Dutch dividend policy, until the 1980s, was characterised by dividend smoothing. Dividends were still strongly related to earnings, but because of shareholder's preferences for stable dividend income, earnings changes are incorporated in dividends with a lag. Finally, dividend policy in the most recent episode is inspired by shareholder wealth maximisation, based on agency and signalling motives. In this period, dividends have become largely decoupled from earnings.

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Lepetic, Jelena. "Shareholder's personal action". Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu 62, nr 1 (2014): 187–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/analipfb1401187l.

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Radulovic, Vuk. "Democracy and shareholder's participation". Skola biznisa, nr 2 (2014): 203–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/skolbiz2-7099.

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Drury, R. R. "The Relative Nature of a Shareholder's Right to Enforce the Company Contract". Cambridge Law Journal 45, nr 2 (lipiec 1986): 219–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000819730012094x.

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It has been suggested in this article that every shareholder does have a right to have all the provisions of the company contract enforced, but that this right is not an absolute one, and cannot be considered in isolation. For a more complete appreciation of the picture this right must be viewed in a context where the company contract constitutes the framework of a long-term relationship between the contracting parties. Thus we need to take into account the equally valid rights of the other shareholders to enforce conflicting provisions of this contract, to change those provisions, and to condone or regularise breaches of those provisions relating, inter alia, to the rules of internal procedure. We need also to consider the machinery provided by company law for the resolution of disputes concerning these conflicting rights, machinery which includes reference of the dispute to the decision of the majority, where it is appropriate to do so. Finally, it must be borne in mind that one of the aims of providing such machinery is the preservation of the long-term relationship between the participants in the company. It is only be considering such factors as these that the relative, rather than absolute, nature of any one shareholder's right to enforce the company contract can be truly understood.

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ATESOGLU COSKUN, Sevda, i Hakan ARACI. "THE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON CAPITAL STRUCTURE: A STUDY ON BORSA ISTANBUL". Muhasebe ve Vergi Uygulamaları Dergisi 15, nr 2 (1.07.2022): 281–319. http://dx.doi.org/10.29067/muvu.1031968.

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The study examines the effects of ownership structure on capital structure. Results of this research provide useful information for managers to align their capital structure and ownership structure decisions. The research covered the period of 2012-2017 for twenty companies selected from three sub-sectors with the largest numbers of companies in Borsa İstanbul Manufacturing Industry. (1) Metal products, equipment and machinery; (2) Chemical, rubber, petroleum and plastic products; (3) Non-metallic mineral products sectors are included in the sample. According to the results of the panel data analysis, foreign ownership reduces financial leverage. Firms with high corporate ownership or high free-float rate use have higher leverage. When the stakes of the second and third largest shareholders get closer to the largest shareholder's level, the debt ratio decreases. However, there is no evidence about a significant effect of the largest shareholder’s stake on capital structure. The findings obtained in the study support that the ownership structure has some influence on the capital structure either directly or indirectly.

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Bao, Yuyun. "Does the controlling shareholder's share pledging increases the financial risk of the company". BCP Business & Management 38 (2.03.2023): 2435–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v38i.4117.

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Equity pledging, the practice of pledge shares in exchange for liquidity from lenders, has become a popular approach to financing, especially in Chinese capital market. However, although there are many attractive benefits, share pledging also brings uncertainty and risks to the companies and the market. This study examines the effect of controlling shareholder’s equity pledging activities on corporate financial risk using a sample of public A-share listed companies in China. After processing the sample and eliminating some observations, a multiple regression model is used to examine the relationship of the share pledging, and ownership structure to the corporate financial risk. It is found that the effect of controlling shareholders' equity pledging can increase a company’s financial risk, but this effect is subject to the balanced level of the ownership structure of major shareholders, as more shares are held by other major shareholders, the negative impact that controlling shareholders’ share pledging on financial risks can be decreased.

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Wang, Rongxuan, Yankai Huang i Teng Feng. "The influence of non-controlling major shareholder's exit threat on firm's idiosyncratic risk". Highlights in Business, Economics and Management 8 (11.04.2023): 41–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/hbem.v8i.7163.

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Non-controlling major shareholders can effectively restrain controlling shareholders and management by exit threat, so as to participate in corporate governance. Traditional research holds that the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders can make the company have a more stable development prospect, but it has not paid enough attention to the hidden dangers. Based on 23,243 samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2010 to 2021, this paper analyzes the influence of non-controlling major shareholder's exit threat on idiosyncratic risk of enterprises. It is found that the exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders will significantly increase the idiosyncratic risk of enterprises. Overall, exit threat lead to increased idiosyncratic risk. This conclusion is still robust after controlling for endogenous problems. The reason why the exit threat amplifies the idiosyncratic risk is that the idiosyncratic volatility is the market's response to the increased uncertainty of the future return rate of individual stocks, while the high exit threat of non-controlling major shareholders of a company exposes the future uncertainty of the company to investors more. This paper reveals that the threat of exit is the key factor affecting the idiosyncratic risk of firms, which has important reference value for regulators and investors.

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Rozprawy doktorskie na temat "SHAREHOLDER'S"

Anyadiegwu, Okay Hyacinth. "Minority shareholder's remedies in corporate law". Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/42044.

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Investment in the corporate venture may sometimes be a risky venture for the minority shareholders. Apart from the business risk of the undertaking, there is also the risk of disagreement within the corporate organization. The interests of minority shareholders has often been made virtually worthless by the machinations of those in control of the corporation. They are often deprived of any income from the corporation either in the form of dividends or salary, they are not allowed any effective voice in the business decisions and they are denied any information about corporate affairs. Often, they are eventually eliminated from the corporation at a fraction of the real value of their interests. Conflicts of interests which exist or develop among the shareholders constitute a threat to the success of the venture. In the absence of protective mechanisms, control is in the hands of the holders of the majority of the corporation's voting shares. While remedies do exist in the law for problems which arise unexpectedly, much could be done at the inception of the business venture to reduce the possibility of conflicts of interests arising. Careful planning in the initial periods of the incorporation of the corporate organization will do-much to reduce the risk to investors and provide them with a structure for their relationships. However, even detailed planned and constructed contractual mechanisms do not always take care of the wide variety and forms which the suppression of minority interests may take. The contractual arrangements may be inadequate to take care of unforeseen future contingencies. Corporate law and the statutory provisions play active role roles here. By providing the statutory remedies, the law enables minority shareholders to either prevent the threat or rectify the abuse of corporate power. But most of these corporate law remedies are surrounded with procedural requirements and other technicalities which may diminish their utility as protective weapons available to the minority shareholders. The purpose of this work is to examine the adequacy of the statutory protections available to the minority shareholders vis-a-vis the private contractual mechanisms which also protect their interests. This study will develop its lines of enquiry by considering the leading schools of thought in corporate law. These schools are the traditional legal view and the economic approach to corporate law. While the traditional approach supports state intervention in the corporate affairs either by regulation or the facilitation of shareholder litigation, the economic approach views the corporation as founded on private contract where the role of the state is limited to enforcing contracts entered into by the participants in the intra corporate contract. Notwithstanding the adoption of contractual mechanisms by the shareholders and the development of the economic approach to corporate law with emphasis on the dynamics of the market forces which align the interests of management with that , of shareholders, this study suggests that minority shareholders still need the protection afforded by the statutes.
Law, Peter A. Allard School of
Graduate

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Wang, Kun. "From government to corporation : largest shareholder's change and firm performance /". View Abstract or Full-Text, 2003. http://library.ust.hk/cgi/db/thesis.pl?ACCT%202003%20WANG.

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John, Marie E. "An analysis of the shareholder's buy-sell agreement in the Canadian close corporation". Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/5629.

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KUTUFA', ILARIA. "Circolazione delle azioni e legittimazione all'esercizio dei diritti del socio". Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/210.

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Il lavoro ha affrontato la tematica riguardante la disciplina del trasferimento delle azioni. In particolare, l'attenzione si è concentrata sulla formalità dell'iscrizione nel libro soci. A tale riguardo, si è posto il problema di comprendere se essa costituisca ancora il mezzo necessario per il conseguimento dello status socii. Con riferimento alle s.p.a. che emettono titoli, si è ravvisato nel possesso qualificato del titolo l'unico indice di legittimazione necessario e sufficiente in caso di trasferimento a mezzo girata, riconoscendo all'iscrizione nel libro soci la funzione di elemento necessario (ma comunque insufficiente, se isolatamente considerato) all'acquisto della legittimazione in caso di trasferimento dell'azione per atto separato e di circolazione mortis causa. Si è, comunque, escluso che le novità introdotte abbiano surrettiziamente trasformato le azioni in titoli all'ordine. In assenza di titoli, si è evidenziato che l'iscrizione ha sempre funzione legittimante come accade in caso di trasferimento di quote di s.r.l. In presenza di azioni dematerializzate, si è sottolineato che l'iscrizione nel libro soci perde ogni funzione legittimante, posto che l'avente causa acquista lo status di socio tramite registrazione sul conto tenuto dall'intermediario. Si è giunti alla conclusione che, al di là della funzione cartolare, a-cartolare o scritturale, l'annotazione nel libro soci rappresenta, esaltando il suo ruolo organizzativo, l'unico strumento che l'emittente ha a disposizione per riconoscere i propri soci ed avere contezza dei suoi assetti proprietari e delle vicende relative alle partecipazioni dallo stesse emesse.
The work concerned the issue about the circulation of shares. In particular, the attention is concentrated around the registration on shareholders' book. In this respect, the difficulty lied in understanding if the registration is still the instrument for the achievement of status socii. About the corporations which issue paper securities, the only instrument (necessary and sufficient) for the ability to exercise the shareholders' rights if the share is transferred by endorsement is the security's qualified possession. The registration on shareholders' book is the necessary, but not sufficient, instrument for the ability to exercise the shareholders' rights if the share is transferred by separate contract and if the share is transferred mortis causa. Anyway, the recent reform confirmed that the shares are registered securities. About the corporations which don't issue paper securities, the registration is always the instrument for the ability to exercise the shareholders' rights, like it happens in case of circulation of unlimited liability company's stakes. About the corporations which issue dematerialized securities (in particular, listed companies), the registration isn't the instrument for the ability to exercise the shareholders' rights, because the buyer achieves status socii by the registration on intermediary's account. In short, the registration on shareholders' book is the only instrument which the legal system puts at corporation's disposal to know its shareholders and the events about its shares.

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KUTUFA', ILARIA. "Circolazione delle azioni e legittimazione all'esercizio dei diritti del socio". Doctoral thesis, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10280/210.

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Gaede, Georges. "Le pacte d'actionnaires face à la mutation du droit des sociétés". Thesis, Paris 11, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA111022.

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Tenter de saisir le pacte d’actionnaires face à la mutation du droit des sociétés incite àpoursuivre une démarche par étapes successives : une première est destinée à éprouverla viabilité d’une mise en relation des deux phénomènes, une seconde à explorer lesimplications de ce rapprochement. La démarche conduit, en un premier temps, àprendre appui sur ce qui apparaît comme un élément commun – la logique contractuelle– pour éclairer la capacité du pacte d’actionnaires à constituer une figure d’unedialectique renouvelée de la loi et du contrat.Dans le cas du pacte, le rattachement à l’ordre contractuel a à voir avec la nature mêmede cet instrument et apparaît comme un facteur crucial de son universalité. Cettedernière se manifeste aussi bien dans la capacité à transcender la distinction entre ledroit romano-germanique et le droit anglo-saxon que dans le polymorphisme dontl’étendue et les limites sont perceptibles au gré d’une approche typologique. Dans le casdu droit des sociétés, la contractualisation, si elle n’entretient pas un rapport deconsubstantialité, n’en est pas moins significative de l’évolution contemporaine en lamatière. Constitutive d’une modalité de la mutation du droit des sociétés, cette tendanceest plus particulièrement illustrée par trois mécanismes introduits au cours des vingtdernières années – la SAS, les actions de préférence et la fiducie – qui représentent unecapacité multiforme d’évidement à l’égard du pacte.En un second temps, par-delà l’absence d’incompatibilité entre le pacte et la mutation dudroit des sociétés, une quête peut être poursuivie afin d’explorer les implications de larelation qui est susceptible d’unir ces deux phénomènes et qui dessinent une doubleplasticité du pacte.La plasticité intrinsèque, qui regarde de manière prioritaire les parties au pacte, paraîttrouver dans le droit boursier un révélateur pertinent. Ce cadre particulier permet nonseulement de mettre à profit l’impératif de transparence comme palliatif à l’obstacle queconstitue la confidentialité du pacte, mais également, dans un contexte de contraintesrenforcées, d’éprouver la faculté du pacte d’incarner des orientations caractéristiquesd’une gouvernance d’entreprise efficace. La plasticité extrinsèque procède d’uneconception plus extensive. Celle-ci repose à la fois sur un phénomène spécifique aupacte, qui tient à son effectivité renouvelée par des voies réglementaire etjurisprudentielle, et sur son inscription dans un processus plus global d’altruismecontractuel, qui offre au pacte une capacité inédite de constituer un instrument derégulation paradigmatique d’une conception renouvelée du droit des sociétés
The attempt at giving account of the shareholders’ agreement in view of the contrastingevolution of law ruling commercial and financial companies supposes several steps ofresearch. First of all, it calls for assessing the viability of correlating the two phenomena;secondly it means exploring the implications of this kind of parallel investigation; yetboth should remain inconclusive without a careful scrutiny of their common ground –the logic of contractual arrangements – so as to elucidate the ability of shareholders’agreements to offer a valid scheme of a renewed dialectical process of law versuscontract.From the standpoint of shareholders’ agreements, their very nature makes for theproximity to the contractual sphere, as a crucial factor of their universality. Thisaccounts for their capacity to bridge the gap between Roman-Germanic and Anglo-Saxonlegal tradition, as well as for its polymorphism whose extent and limitations must beworked out by way of a typological approach. In the perspective of legislation pertainingto companies, the process of contractualization corresponds to an obviouscontemporary trend, even if this is not tantamount to consubstantiality.Constituting one of the modalities of mutation to which corporate law has been subject,the above tendency is illustrated by three mechanisms introduced over the last twentyyears – the “Société par actions simplifiée”, the preferred shares and the trust – all ofwhich represent multifarious ways of substituting to shareholders’ agreements differentinstruments of legal practice.In a second phase, beyond the statement of at least partial compatibility betweenshareholders’ agreements and the mutations of legislation, a quest may be pursued inorder to explore the relationship virtually linking together these two phenomena, whichcan be described as encompassing a double plasticity, appearing under two distinctaspects. The intrinsic plasticity, concerning foremost the parties to the agreement,seems to find an adequate expression in stock exchange regulations. This framework notonly allows to take advantage of the imperative requirement of transparency, in guise ofa counterpoise to the requirement of confidentiality, but also, in a context of reinforcedstatutory rules, to test the capacity of shareholders’ agreements to establish an efficientcorporate governance. The extrinsic plasticity proceeds from a more overall conception.Resting upon a specific trait of shareholders’ agreements, it results in a renewedeffectivity in terms of regulation and of jurisprudence, as well as in a more globalprocess of contractual altruism, which afford to shareholders’ agreements anunprecedented capacity of paradigmatic regulation and a renewed conception of law

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Goodman, Jennifer Coralie. "Social shareholder engagement: How shareholders bring social, environmental and ethical concerns to the heart of management". Doctoral thesis, Universitat Ramon Llull, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/295841.

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Els accionistes sempre han estat fonamentals per entendre un negoci. I ho continuen essent avui. Tanmateix, suposar que una empresa s’ha de dirigir només per satisfer les demandes dels accionistes, i que aquests accionistes estan preocupats només per maximitzar els seus beneficis econòmics, resulta problemàtic, davant de les nombroses exigències que tant aquests accionistes com d’altres stakeholders plantegen a les empreses. En una època en què temes com el canvi climàtic i la distància creixent entre els rics i els pobres s’estan convertint en preocupacions urgents per a la societat, el paper de les empreses, les seves finalitats i les seves pràctiques s’estan qüestionant tant en l’àmbit públic, com en el privat i en l’acadèmic. La inversió responsable, els diversos tipus d’inversors, les iniciatives multistakeholder, les comunitats, les campanyes d’activisme i una varietat creixent de stakeholders plantegen múltiples i diverses demandes a les empreses, que van més enllà dels interessos econòmics. Aquesta tesi adopta la perspectiva del repte que suposa per a les empreses que es qüestionin els supòsits en què es fonamenta la seva naturalesa. Hi ha accionistes que s’impliquen en la gestió corporativa de les problemàtiques socials, mediambientals i ètiques, com els drets humans o la degradació de l’entorn. En aquest estudi, s’analitza empíricament i conceptualment aquesta “implicació de l’accionista” (shareholder engagement), que és un fenomen cada vegada més rellevant en la pràctica corporativa i en l’activitat investigadora. Oferim una nova perspectiva de la implicació de l’accionista, que identifica la seva naturalesa política i ètica. D’aquesta manera, participem i contribuïm a la literatura sobre govern corporatiu, inversió responsable, activisme social i ètica empresarial, i obrim noves vies per a la recerca futura.
Los accionistas siempre han sido fundamentales para entender un negocio. Y lo siguen siendo hoy. Sin embargo, suponer que una empresa ha de ser dirigida únicamente para satisfacer las demandas de los accionistas, y que dichos accionistas están preocupados únicamente por maximizar sus beneficios económicos, resulta problemático, a la luz de las numerosas exigencias que plantean a las empresas tanto los accionistas como otros stakeholders. En un tiempo en que determinados temas, como el cambio climático y la distancia creciente entre ricos y pobres, se están convirtiendo en preocupaciones acuciantes para la sociedad, el papel de las empresas, sus fines y sus prácticas están siendo cuestionados en los ámbitos público, privado y académico. La inversión responsable, los diversos tipos de inversores, las iniciativas multistakeholder, las comunidades, las campañas de activismo y la gran variedad de stakeholders han planteado múltiples y diversas demandas a las empresas, que van más allá de los intereses económicos. Esta tesis adopta la perspectiva del reto que supone para las empresas el cuestionamiento de las asunciones en que se fundamenta su naturaleza. Hay accionistas que se implican en la gestión corporativa de las preocupaciones sociales, medioambientales y éticas, como los derechos humanos o la degradación del entorno. En este estudio, se analiza empíricamente y conceptualmente esta “implicación del accionista” (shareholder engagement), pues es un fenómeno cada vez más relevante en la práctica corporativa y en la actividad investigadora. Ofrecemos una nueva perspectiva de la implicación del accionista, que identifica su naturaleza política y ética. De este modo, participamos y contribuimos a la literatura sobre gobierno corporativo, inversión responsable, activismo social y ética empresarial, y abrimos nuevas vías para la investigación futura.
Shareholders have always been fundamental to an understanding of the corporation. The same is true today. However, the assumptions that the firm should be run to meet only the demands of shareholders, and that those shareholders are concerned only about the maximization of financial returns, are problematic in light of the multitude of demands placed on corporations by both shareholders and other stakeholders. At a time when issues such as climate change and the widening gap between rich and poor have become pressing societal concerns, the role of business, its purposes and its practices have been challenged in the public, private, and academic spheres. Responsible investment, diverse investor types, multi-stakeholder initiatives, communities, activist campaigns, and a variety of other stakeholders have resulted in multiple and diverse demands on the company which go well beyond financial interests. This thesis takes the perspective of one such challenge to the fundamental assumptions about the nature of the firm: shareholders who actively engage with corporate management on issues of social, environmental, and ethical concern such as human rights or environmental degradation. This ‘social shareholder engagement’, an increasingly relevant phenomenon in practice and research, is explored here both empirically and conceptually. I provide a new perspective on social shareholder engagement, which identifies the political and ethical nature of these actions. In this way I engage with and contribute to the corporate governance, responsible investment, social activism and business ethics literatures and open a number of future avenues for research.

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Jansson, Andreas. "Collective Action Among Shareholder Activists". Doctoral thesis, Växjö : Växjö University Press, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:vxu:diva-1665.

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Čermák, Ota. "Valná hromada a představenstvo akciové společnosti". Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2010. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-72775.

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The objective of my thesis is description of mutual relations between shareholder's meeting and board of directors of joint-stock company including their activities, rights and obligations. Then I focused on comparison of legislation of commercial code and bill of commercial corporations. In my first chapter, I dealt with characteristics of joint-stock company, its foundation by public offering or without and its formation. Second chapter concerns with legal regulations of General meeting, especially with the emphasis to its convening, composing, running, decision process and scope including rights and obligations of shareholders. Third part is focused on issues related to board of directors, its election, activity, responsibility and liability for damage and also rights and obligations of individual members. Finally in last part, I compared current legislation of commercial code and bill of commercial corporations in matters of shareholder's meeting and board of directors.

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Abdou, Majdi A. "Towards a new solution of minority shareholder protection in Libya : letting the minority shareholders have a voice". Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2015. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6423/.

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The study develops a framework for improving corporate governance mechanisms in Libya that takes into account its specific environment of weak formal enforcement and its corporate ownership structure, which is based on concentrated state ownership. The central goal of the research is to establish an adequate protection system for minority shareholders that can contribute to the development of an efficient and healthy commercial environment in Libya. To do so, the study examines the current solution for dealing with the conflict of interests between shareholders adopted by Libyan law under art 159 of Libyan Economic Activity Act (LEAA 2010): the minority shareholders’ actions. Using a social and economic analysis and a black letter approach, this study presents a novel analytical framework that formulates an appropriate solution for controlling conflict of interests between shareholders in Libya. To that end, the study addresses the following questions: how effective is the current mechanism for dealing with the conflict of interest between shareholders in Libya? What are the economic and social implications of the different proposed approaches? What elements determine which approach is preferable in Libya? And, finally, what are the challenges that the proposed law reform may face? To answer these questions, firstly, it is necessary to consider the general framework of corporate governance in Libya, examine the country’s current position as an economy in the early stages of transformation and analyse the potential impact of this transformation on corporate governance. Following this, I locate the dimensions of the conflict of interest problem between the minority and majority shareholders in Libya through analysing literature of corporate governance with regard to the minority-majority shareholder problem and applying it to the case of Libya. After that, I examine the efficacy of the current mechanism available in Libyan law (minority shareholders actions) as a solution for dealing with the conflict of interests between the minority shareholders and the majority shareholders in Libyan companies. However, the current approach is not appropriate for Libya for several reasons that relate to either the efficiency of the approach itself or its application and enforcement in Libya. After examining other possible solutions (e.g. a prohibition strategy), I propose the self-enforcing model as the most appropriate solution since it contributes to companies being able raise capital from investors, and it also lowers the number of conflict of interest transactions and makes a company’s transactions more efficient. Finally, the self-enforcing model does away with the need for external monitoring. However, this is not the end of the story; adopting such a model will inevitably lead to some potential risks (such as the risk that the minority shareholders may abuse their rights), which will require the formulation and adoption of new and specific strategies of corporate governance that are appropriate to Libya.

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Książki na temat "SHAREHOLDER'S"

Minority shareholder's remedies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

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L, Pava Moses, red. The shareholder's use of corporate annual reports. Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1993.

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Christopher, Yablonski, i Capital Research Center (Washington, D.C.), red. Patterns of corporate philanthropy: Passing the shareholder's buck. Washington, DC: Capital Research Center, 1998.

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Becchetti, Leonardo. Corporate social responsibility and shareholder's value: An event study analysis. [Atlanta, Ga.]: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 2007.

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Gu dong zi ge yan jiu: Essentials of shareholder's qualification. Beijing Shi: Bei ing da xue chu ban she, 2011.

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Gu min quan li shu: A gide [sic] to shareholder's rights and interests. Beijing Shi: Fa lü chu ban she, 2000.

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Gu dong tui chu fa leu zhi du yan jiu: On legal system of shareholder's withdrawal. Beijing Shi: Beijing da xue chu ban she, 2010.

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Min qi shang shi yu xiao gu dong quan yi bao hu: Private enterprise's listing & minority shareholder's protection. Beijing Shi: She hui ke xue wen xian chu ban she, 2006.

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author, Zhang Ting, red. Gong si chong zheng zhi du zhong de gu dong quan yi wen ti: Shareholder's interest in corporate restructuring. Beijing: Beijing da xue chu ban she, 2012.

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Fan, Chunyan. Bringing controlling shareholders to court: Standard-based strategies and controlling shareholder opportunism. The Hague, The Netherlands: Eleven International Publishing, 2013.

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Części książek na temat "SHAREHOLDER'S"

Hakelmacher, Sebastian. "Shareholder's Value oder der Wert des Aktionärs". W Topmanager sind einsame Spitze, 131–35. Wiesbaden: Gabler Verlag, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8546-0_11.

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Xie, JiaNi, i LiMei Cao. "Controlling SHAreholder's Equity Pledge and Share Repurchase Preview". W Proceedings of the 2022 2nd International Conference on Economic Development and Business Culture (ICEDBC 2022), 1330–39. Dordrecht: Atlantis Press International BV, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-036-7_196.

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Černá, Stanislava. "Vedlejší dohody akcionářů a právo drag along". W Pocta prof. Josefu Bejčkovi k 70. narozeninám, 205–19. Brno: Masaryk University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/cz.muni.p280-0094-2022-9.

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The paper deals with agreements of shareholders that oblige a minority shareholder to transfer his stocks to the person to whom the majority shareholder transfers his stocks (drag along agreements). It discusses one of the possible legal constructions of such agreements. It distinguishes its legal consequences depending on whether it is contained in the by-laws of joint stock company or whether it is entered into outside them (so-called side letters).

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Raval, Vasant. "Shareholders". W Corporate Governance, 93–104. Boca, Raton : CRC Press, 2020. |: Auerbach Publications, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9781003031796-7.

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Dathe, Tracy, René Dathe, Isabel Dathe i Marc Helmold. "Shareholders". W Management for Professionals, 159–68. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92357-0_12.

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Pisacane, Giovanni. "Shareholders and Board of Shareholders". W Corporate Governance in China, 35–53. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3911-9_4.

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Dine, Janet, i Marios Koutsias. "Shareholders’ remedies". W Company Law, 189–219. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-01562-4_10.

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Hudson, Alastair. "Shareholders’ rights". W Understanding Company Law, 148–66. Second edition. | Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315158099-10.

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Lessambo, Felix I. "Shareholders’ Equity". W Financial Statements, 141–58. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15663-2_11.

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Chang, Soonpeel Edgar. "Shareholders’ meeting". W Indonesian Company Law, 55–90. New York, NY: Routledge, 2018.: Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429503603-5.

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Streszczenia konferencji na temat "SHAREHOLDER'S"

Gao, Wei. "On the Legal System and Problems of Shareholder's Qualification". W 7th International Conference on Education, Management, Information and Mechanical Engineering (EMIM 2017). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/emim-17.2017.237.

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Shi, Houxue, i Wen Mou. "Controlling Shareholder's Equity Pledge and Corporate R&D Investment". W Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Economy, Judicature, Administration and Humanitarian Projects (JAHP 2019). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/jahp-19.2019.66.

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Li, Wanli, i Gang Jia. "An Empirical Study on Market Reaction to Large Shareholder's Assets Injection through Private Equity Offerings". W 2009 International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iciii.2009.527.

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Yin, Zhujia, i Jianhuan Huang. "Asset Injection and the Equilibrium of Shareholder's Interests: A Study Based on China's Stock Market". W 2009 International Joint Conference on Computational Sciences and Optimization, CSO. IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cso.2009.288.

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Rudenok, Olha. "Strategic tools for optimizing the ownership concentration in the corporate sector". W Conferinta stiintifica internationala "Strategii si politici de management in economia contemporana", editia VII. Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.53486/icspm2022.08.

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The article contains research on the listing requirements for shareholder ownership, established by stock exchanges of different countries. Stock exchanges of such countries as Ukraine, USA, Japan, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, France, China, and Poland were considered for comparative analysis of listing requirements. Among the requirements for shareholder ownership of issuers were considered: the minimum Free float, the number of shareholders, the share price, the market capitalization of the tradable shares, the number of tradable shares, and requirements for minority shareholders. Also, the issue of compliance with the requirements of listing as a strategic tool for optimizing the ownership concentration was investigated. The prospects of the Ukrainian corporate sector in terms of compliance with the established listing requirements (from the standpoint of requirements for the shareholder ownership structure) were assessed. Optimizing the ownership concentration of corporations involves the distribution of ownership rights among shareholders, which will help to increase the efficiency of the company and ensure the achievement of its strategic goals.

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Devyatkina, Anna Yuryevna. "SHAREHOLDER'S AUTHORITIES DURING EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF A JOINT STOCK COMPANY". W РОССИЙСКАЯ НАУКА: АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ И РАЗРАБОТКИ. Самара: Самарский государственный экономический университет, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.46554/russian.science-2021.02-2-211/215.

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WANG, JUE-MING, BAO-BAO LI i CHENG-XUAN GENG. "RESEARCH ON THE IMPACT OF EQUITY PLEDGE ON ENTERPRISE VALUE—TAKE SMES AS AN EXAMPLE". W 2021 International Conference on Management, Economics, Business and Information Technology. Destech Publications, Inc., 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.12783/dtem/mebit2021/35620.

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The pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity is one of the important ways for small and medium-sized enterprises to raise funds. However, due to the complexity of controlling shareholders’ motivations for equity pledge, equity pledge has become a double-edged sword that affects the sustainable development of enterprises. This study explores the impact of controlling shareholder equity pledge on corporate value by constructing an empirical model, so as to provide suggestions for small and medium shareholders, regulatory agencies and related financial institutions. The empirical results show that the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity is conducive to the improvement of corporate value; however, under different macro policy adjustments, the impact of equity pledges on corporate value is different. In the period of loose monetary policy, the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity has a significant positive effect on corporate value .On the contrary, during the monetary policy tightening period, equity pledge has a significant negative impact on corporate value.

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Yi-fei, Du, Li Shi-ming i Lan Yong. "Research on the Relationship between TMT Incentive and Shareholder's Wealth: Evidence from Listed Companies in Telecommunications Industry of China". W 2006 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmse.2006.314235.

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Kamenjarska, Tanja, i Igor Ivanovski. "IMPACT OF BOARD CHARACTERISTICS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: DYNAMIC PANEL EVIDENCE OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA". W Economic and Business Trends Shaping the Future. Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Faculty of Economics-Skopje, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.47063/ebtsf.2020.0027.

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Corporate governance is a crucial mechanism for the organizations’ actions to maintain market successful adequate and targeted policies and long-term strategies that ensure the maximization of shareholders’ benefits. The board of directors is appointed by organizations’ shareholders and its main role is to be responsible and accountable and to ensure enforcement of the top management acts concerning the fulfillment of the shareholder’s interests. For this to be achieved, it is important for the board to be efficient, effective, and focused on protecting the organization and shareholder’s interests. Good corporate governance and more specifically, board characteristics play a central role in companies’ management, coordination, and control mechanisms. The paper analyses various theoretical and empirical findings regarding the prominence of various board characteristics within companies and particularly evaluates the impact of board characteristics on the financial performance of listed companies in the insurance industry in the Republic of North Macedonia. The financial ratio ROA is used as a proxy and as a variable for firm performance while the board experience, CEO duality, board size, board composition, and gender diversity are set to be as independent variables. Based on the variables related to board characteristics, hypotheses are developed and their impact upon firm performance is examined with the use of Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM), a pairwise correlation matrix, as well as with multicollinearity VIF test. In that direction, this paper aims to determine the level of effectiveness of current governance mechanisms and based on the results, propose measures and actions for successfully handling agency costs while maximizing governance capability and performance in the insurance sector in the Republic of North Macedonia.

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Vutt, Andres, i Margit Vutt. "Adoption of Shareholder Resolutions in Post-COVID Era. Example of Estonian Law". W The 8th International Scientific Conference of the Faculty of Law of the University of Latvia. University of Latvia Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.22364/iscflul.8.2.31.

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In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic forced the world to find the right balance between protecting health, minimizing economic and social disruption and retaining the rights of individuals. States imposed a number of restrictions in order to prevent the spread of the pandemic, including restrictions on the movement of persons and restrictions on gathering. Traditionally, shareholders' meetings of companies have been taken place in the form of physical meetings. Company law also been based on the assumption that meetings are held physically. In the new situation, it was no longer possible to hold meetings in this way, at least for some time. This forced companies to use digital solutions. The legislator was also faced with the question of how to resolve this situation. Different countries reacted differently in order to find company law solutions. In Estonia, new rules were adopted in May 2020 that allowed legal persons to adopt decisions using digital solutions, among other things, it is allowed to make decisions in a full virtual meeting. The central question in the way companies make decisions is whether the use of virtual solutions is possible, but whether the law provides companies with sufficiently flexible options, which would enable decisions to be taken in the light of the specificities and needs of each company and whether such practices ensure the exercise of shareholders' rights. This article analyses whether and how these objectives have been achieved in Estonian law. There are three ways to adopt company’s resolutions in Estonia: a meeting, a written resolution or a vote by letter. Meetings can take place physically, virtually or in a hybrid form. It is not possible to infringe the rights of the shareholder in making a written resolution, since if such a method is used, the resolution decision is adopted only if all shareholders agree. In the case of voting by letter, the law does not take into account the fact that in a shareholder of a public limited company has the right to receive information from directors only at the general meeting. Therefore, the future case-law must lay down the principles of communication between the shareholder and the public limited company in the situation when the resolution has been adopted by using such option. The law stipulates that if digital means are used to hold a meeting, shareholders must be guaranteed all the same rights as they have in the event of a physical meeting. Since these rules have been in force only for a short period of time, there are no court cases based on them. Although the legal literature has been expressed some views on the use of digital solutions, it is not yet known how the courts will resolve these issues if disputes arise.

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Raporty organizacyjne na temat "SHAREHOLDER'S"

Bouton, Laurent, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Antonin Macé i Dimitrios Xefteris. Voting in Shareholders Meetings. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, lipiec 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w29005.

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Holderness, Clifford, i Dennis Sheehan. Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, październik 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6765.

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Yermack, David, i Yuanzhi Li. Evasive Shareholder Meetings. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, marzec 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19991.

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Morck, Randall. Shareholder Democracy in Canada. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, listopad 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w16558.

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Auerbach, Alan, i Kevin Hassett. Corporate Savings and Shareholder Consumption. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, czerwiec 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2994.

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Hirst, E., i S. Hadley. Effects of resource acquisitions on electric-utility shareholders. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), maj 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/10156385.

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Moeller, Sara, Frederik Schlingemann i Rene Stulz. Do shareholders of acquiring firms gain from acquisitions? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, marzec 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9523.

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Ammer, John, Sara Holland, David Smith i Francis Warnock. Look at Me Now: What Attracts U.S. Shareholders? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, sierpień 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12500.

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Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, i Christine Jolls. Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, kwiecień 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6919.

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Bouton, Laurent, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Antonin Macé, Adam Meirowitz, Shaoting Pi i Dimitrios Xefteris. Public Information as a Source of Disagreement Among Shareholders. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, grudzień 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30757.

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