Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Self-enforcing agreements”

In a highly interconnected world, immunizing infections are a transboundary problem, and their control and elimination require international cooperation and coordination. In the absence of a global or regional body that can impose a universal vaccination strategy, each individual country sets its own strategy. Mobility of populations across borders can promote free-riding, because a country can benefit from the vaccination efforts of its neighbours, which can result in vaccination coverage lower than the global optimum. Here we explore whether voluntary coalitions that reward countries that join by cooperatively increasing vaccination coverage can solve this problem. We use dynamic epidemiological models embedded in a game-theoretic framework in order to identify conditions in which coalitions are self-enforcing and therefore stable, and thus successful at promoting a cooperative vaccination strategy. We find that countries can achieve significantly greater vaccination coverage at a lower cost by forming coalitions than when acting independently, provided a coalition has the tools to deter free-riding. Furthermore, when economically or epidemiologically asymmetric countries form coalitions, realized coverage is regionally more consistent than in the absence of coalitions.

In this paper, we discuss the endogenous formation of self-enforcing climate coalitions linked to the issue of a free trade agreement. As a framework, a strategic trade model is used in which countries may discourage greenhouse gas emissions by means of an import tariff on dirty goods. In addition, countries can set an emissions cap being effective on a permit market. Our main focus, however, is on the utilization of terms of trade privileges provided to members of a preferential free trade area. We propose evidence for that the welfare gains of trade liberalization are strongly promoting the formation of climate coalitions. In the parametrical simulation of the model, global emissions as well as climate change damages are found significantly reduced compared to the BAU scenario while global welfare is found significantly higher.

In this paper, we discuss the endogenous formation of self-enforcing climate coalitions linked to the issue of a free trade agreement. As a framework, a strategic trade model is used in which countries may discourage greenhouse gas emissions by means of an import tariff on dirty goods. In addition, countries can set an emissions cap being effective on a permit market. Our main focus, however, is on the utilization of terms of trade privileges provided to members of a preferential free trade area. We propose evidence for that the welfare gains of trade liberalization are strongly promoting the formation of climate coalitions. In the parametrical simulation of the model, global emissions as well as climate change damages are found significantly reduced compared to the BAU scenario while global welfare is found significantly higher.

Population increase and economic growth have caused competing demands to occur over transboundary water resources. The property rights on such water resources are not well defined, and therefore competing demands give rise to conflict among riparian states. In this thesis, we focus on successive transboundary rivers (transboundary rivers where riparian states are ordered one after another along the river). By virtue of this geographic structure, the states along the river have asymmetric access to the river water. In a setting like this, it is necessary to allocate water in an equitable and self-enforcing fashion. The literature advocates the usage of the Pareto optimal (efficient) allocation of water as a water allocation scheme. This formal problem in economic literature which deals with efficient water allocation and self-enforcement is termed as the River sharing problem. However, the river sharing model in literature does not address several externality issues which occur along a transboundary river. In this thesis, we extend the traditional river sharing model so as to accommodate the negative externality aspects of pollution, storage, and flooding. These aspects may be seen to have a profound influence on the propensity for conflict on a transboundary river basin. In Part-I of this thesis, the issue of pollution and its implication on water allocation on a transboundary river is addressed using a two-agent static model. We examine the allocation under non-cooperative behaviour and propose two methods for cooperation. The first method is a bilateral trading mechanism in which the agents interact as buyer and seller and thus arrive at an efficient allocation of the water resource. This bilateral trading approach would ensure that the resulting payoff allocation is self-enforcing. The cooperative equilibrium which arises from the trade process facilitates in understanding the interplay between water quality and the amount of water traded. We find that the presence of pollutants restricts the extent of water trade. This means that proper pricing policy on traded water could lead to pollution abatement since the payoff of both the agents would increase when water becomes cleaner. This idea is pursued further in an investigation of different pricing policies for cooperation. It is argued that the market equilibrium price may be unattractive due to its asymmetry as well as its inability to guarantee abatement. This leads us to believe that cooperation facilitated by an impartial arbitrator would be more appealing in real life negotiations, and it should involve considerations of symmetry and abatement. In order to accomplish this, we make use of the Nash Bargaining Solution. The Nash Bargaining Solution proposes a price which has an egalitarian nature and is thus interesting because of its symmetrical treatment. However, we notice that even this Bilateral Egalitarian Solution may fail to induce abatement efforts from the upstream agent. In order to address this limitation, a Nash Abatement Price, which provides incentives for the upstream agent to abate pollution, is proposed. We show that if Nash Abatement Price does not exist, then there is no pricing policy which can motivate abatement. In Part-II of this thesis, we take up the problem of dam ownership and its welfare implications. We consider a two-agent river which faces two seasons in a hydrological year. The upstream agent has an option to build a dam to store water for its usage in the dry season. We investigate the economic behaviour of upstream agent in anticipation of bilateral trade, and discuss the consequences of this behaviour. We find that the upstream agent can store water exclusively for engaging in trade, and thus increase the downstream agent's willingness to pay. This extra storage is termed as Strategic Storage in our analysis. This would reduce the downstream agent's welfare and also reduce the social welfare. It may be argued that this strategic storage behaviour is a negative externality on transboundary rivers. Part-III of this thesis tackles the issue of flooding on transboundary rivers. Flooding is an externality on transboundary rivers. The cumulative effective of water releases from the upstream agents causes flood damages in downstream agents. Flood damages have a large magnitude. Therefore, flood damages should be allocated across administrative boundaries. Further, the flood damages should be allocated amongst the agents in a manner which reflects their respective water releases. With this motivation, we propose a Sequential Upstream Proportional Allocation (SUPA) scheme. We discuss an algorithmic means of achieving this allocation, and axiomatically characterize this scheme. We show that the SUPA rule is the only flood damage allocation rule that satisfies the axioms of Downstream Independence, Efficiency, and Proportionality simultaneously. The SUPA scheme is found to coincide with the Shapley value of the Flood Cost Sharing Game which is constructed on the basis of the Extended Producer's Responsibility principle. We also show that the SUPA rule belongs to the Core of the flood cost sharing game. Using a repeated game formalism, we try to construct self-enforcing fixed payment agreements on two-agent rivers with flood risk. These agreements should sustain the efficient allocation of water and allocation of damages as per SUPA rule as a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We determine the condition on the discount factor which makes this possible. This condition reveals that agreements on flood prone rivers are at least as unstable as agreements on a similar river without flood risk. Through our study of the externalities of pollution, storage, and flooding on transboundary rivers, we were able to come to the conclusion that cooperative mechanisms with side-payment can lead to self-enforcing agreements on transboundary rivers. These cooperative agreements may be market based mechanisms or agreements facilitated by an impartial arbitrator.

This chapter discusses the law of set-off in Ireland. Under Irish laws, a set-off agreement serves as a mechanism for a lender to take effective security over a customer's account with it. Set-off may be considered a self-help remedy that prevents uncertainty when enforcing security against persons. The chapter first provides an overview of set-off between solvent parties, focusing on statutory set-off, contractual set-off, cash management (pooling) arrangements, and security interests. It then examines the effect of a mareva injunction on the validity of the right to set-off or security before proceeding with an analysis of set-off against insolvent parties. The rule against double proof is explored, along with set-off on winding-up, set-off in financial contracts, and financial collateral arrangements. The chapter concludes with an assessment of cross-border issues arising from the right of set-off.

This chapter examines contracts in electronic commerce and their implications for the traditional contract law and the law relating to payment and payment methods. It first looks at the rules for the formation of informal electronic contracts and the regulation of offer and acceptance, focusing on Articles 9–11 of the European Union’s Electronic Commerce Directive. The chapter then considers the question of when acceptance is effectively communicated to the offeror, the terms of the contract, and their enforcement as well as evaluating formal contracts and discussing their formation and terms. A focus for this chapter is the evolving laws on electronic signatures, the role of qualified trust service providers and how electronic signatures are formalized. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the evolving area of smart contracts: their design, formation, and what the role of the law is in relation to these self-enforcing agreements.

Abstract This chapter invites wealthy elites to act strategically to reinforce the trust the Grand Bargain once secured, even without government enforcement. The private sector has, after all, fueled the innovation on display in the rise of philanthropy limited liability companies (LLCs), commercially affiliated donor-advised funds, and strategic corporate philanthropy. Perhaps it can also tame those creations to build a more accountable for-profit philanthropy to forestall the risk that public skepticism will smother it. Much of charity law can be described as tools to demonstrate trustworthiness. Rather than relying on policymakers to supply the trust for-profit philanthropy needs, careful private ordering could reveal corporate philanthropists, commercially affiliated donor-advised funds, and philanthropy LLCs to be uniquely capable of saving themselves. A precisely tailored corporate governance scheme for strategic corporate philanthropy, a contractual dead man’s switch for donor-advised funds, and self-enforcing transparency agreements for philanthropy LLCs could mitigate the risks they impose while unleashing their potential value.

This chapter examines contracts in electronic commerce and their implications for the traditional contract law and the law relating to payment and payment methods. It first looks at the rules for the formation of informal electronic contracts and the regulation of offer and acceptance, focusing on Articles 9–11 of the European Union’s Electronic Commerce Directive. The chapter then considers the question of when acceptance is effectively communicated to the offeror, the terms of the contract, and their enforcement as well as evaluating formal contracts and discussing their formation and terms. A focus for this chapter is the evolving laws on electronic signatures, the role of qualified trust service providers and how electronic signatures are formalized. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the evolving area of smart contracts: their design, formation and what the role of the law is in relation to these self-enforcing agreements through an analysis of the Law Commission Report Smart Legal Contracts.

The novel characteristics of distributed ledger technology (‘DLT’) and ‘smart legal contracts’ (‘SLCs’) make it essential for parties to think carefully about how disputes arising in this context will be resolved. Put simply, codification and self-execution of parties’ agreements will not do away with disputes, and conflict of law questions can be very complicated in the absence of express dispute resolution mechanics within the SLC itself or the governance framework of the relevant DLT ecosystem. Many users of DLT are keen to resolve disputes ‘on chain’, avoiding recourse to traditional courts or tribunals. This trend is diving a new wave of Online Dispute Resolution (‘ODR’) tools. However, notwithstanding the potential benefits of efficiently enforcing ODR decisions ‘on-chain’ as a matter of practice, it is crucial to consider how those decisions can be anchored (and enforced or protected) within a valid domestic or international legal framework. It is no good to have a self-executing ODR process ‘on-chain’ which can be wholly unwound if a dissatisfied party takes the matter to a domestic court. This chapter summarizes the basic concepts related to ODR, DLT, smart contracts, and SLCs, reviews the possibility of resolving DLT disputes through new and established ODR processes, and explores the promise and challenges of DLT-based ODR solutions currently available. It comments on the need for greater multi-disciplinary collaboration at the interface of law and technology to build legally robust ODR processes that are fit for the digital economy and will enable and promote more mainstream adoption of DLT.

This chapter discusses the correlation between state-capitalist subsidies and the World Trade Organization (WTO). It elaborates on the substance and politics of the trade regime. While the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was a limited-scope trading regime of pluralist liberalism, the GATT harnessed incentives from the wider self-enforcing international order. The chapter considers the WTO as an international organization, citing that its lack of resilience was a problem of design. The WTO's Appellate Body operates fine where the parties are a big and a small state, or two big states sharing some semblance of thick Society but it falters when the parties are rival powers, the law is unclear, and the dispute's stakes are high.

Abstract Free lateral vibration of stepped shafts is investigated in this paper using the Timoshenko beam theory and the finite element method. Beam finite elements having two nodes and 16 degrees of freedom were employed to model flexural vibration of a stepped shaft for a total four field variables — two lateral displacements and two bending angles. Within each uniform segment, the stepped shaft is modeled as a substructure for which a system of equations of motion may be easily formulated using the Galerkin method. The global equations of motion for the entire stepped shaft are subsequently formulated by enforcing the displacement continuity and force equilibrium conditions across the interfaces between two adjacent substructures. The second order governing differential equations for a non self-adjoint dynamic system are then reduced to the equivalent first order differential equations for which eigenvalue problem is formulated and solved using the Matlab® program. Values of natural frequencies are in excellent agreement with those available in the literature. Effects of rotational springs attached to the end of a stepped shaft, used to simulate the non-classical boundary constraints of chuck on a work piece in a typical turning process, are also investigated. The bi-orthogonal conditions for modal vectors, which are useful in chatter analysis during turning processes, are given in this paper.