Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Rugrats (fictitious characters), fiction”

Fantasy films were born from the development of fiction films that have shown existence since the beginning of its history. Fantasy films have their own charm because they can penetrate time and space compared to other genres. Fiction films develop from their creators both in terms of story and cinematography because fiction films are at the center of the poles: real and abstract. Its greatest strength lies in its ability to integrate and combine with other genres without exception and can be broadly developed unlimitedly. That is because fantasy films contain elements with different characteristics from other films where if a fantasy film has one element in the making of the film then it has been said to be a fantasy film. The elements or components that are seen are derived from the narrative and cinematic elements of filmmaking which contain ideas of stories, characters, and settings in a film. These three elements are the forming components of fantasy films that are fictitious and imaginative. The idea of the story is not based on an imaginary reality, that is a fiction that makes no sense. In the case of fantasy films, filmmakers will compete to develop and present ideas that have not been thought of before, so the audience seems to be carried away in a new world outside of real life. Character characters in fantasy films are the imagination of creators in fictitious forms, such as: animal characters, extraterrestrials, monsters, robots, and non-physical characters such as ghosts, spirits and holograms. While the background elements in fantasy films have a character setting place and time imaginative events are unique in unknown times or dimensions, can be past, present, and future with the centuries formed by the creators.

English fiction pertaining to the British rule in India marked Indian Muslims intovisibility through the portrayal of their stable stereotypical identity, and since itspublication, A Passage to India has gained the status of authentic imagining of Muslims asconservative religious ‘Other’ of the West. As such, they are analyzing this text as an instance ofcolonial fixity necessitates the identification and consideration of those discursive strategies used bythe text for the projection of abrasive Muslim images. The focus of this paper is to critically approachA Passage to India through the application of Fairclough’s threedimensional model so as to validate the claim of stereotypicalrepresentation of Muslims in India during colonial rule. Largely amatter of despotic manipulation within the text, the narrator doteson the anecdotal treatment of Muslim characters with a purpose tojustify. By adhering to colonial discursive binarism, this noveldepicts colonized Muslims as dehumanized and caricatured othersin essentialist terms by shelving their political, historical andcontextual identification.

This is a work of inquiry study as fiction inspired by the works of Huxley’s Brave New World (published in 1932) and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four or 1984 (published in 1949) on the basis of what a dystopian schooled society could resemble in the next century. The year 1945 also marked the end of the last global-scale human conflict on planet earth. Names, characters, businesses, places, events, locales, and incidents are either the products of the author's imagination or used in a fictitious manner. Any resemblance to actual persons, living or dead, or actual events is purely coincidental.

Previous studies have revealed that reading fiction is associated with dispositional empathy and theory-of-mind abilities. Earlier studies established a correlation between fiction reading habits and the two measures of social cognition: trait fantasy (i.e., the tendency to transpose oneself into fictitious characters) and performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; a test of the ability to identify others’ mental states based on their eyes). Recently, experimental studies have shown that brief exposure to fiction enhances RMET performance. Nevertheless, these studies have been conducted only in Western countries, and few published studies have investigated these relationships in Asian countries. This research aims to address this gap. Study 1, which involved 338 Japanese undergraduates, conceptually replicated the previously reported correlations between fiction reading and fantasy and RMET scores (after statistically controlling for the effect of outliers). However, Study 2, which involved 304 Japanese undergraduates, failed to replicate the causal relationship. Participants read an excerpt either from literary fiction or from nonfiction, or engaged in a calculation task, before completing the RMET. Brief exposure to literary fiction did not increase the RMET score. In sum, this study replicated the associations of fiction reading with fantasy and RMET scores in Japan, but failed to replicate the causal relationship.

The aim of this article is to examine how the biographical material that Janice Kulyk Keefer “steals” from Mansfield’s life is used to re-create a “quasi-real” life in a novel which absorbs reality, digests it, and offers an oxymoronic, semi-fictitious product: a biofiction. Keefer selected biographèmes or kernels of truth on which her fictitious details and characters could be grafted: following Mansfield’s physical, emotional and intellectual trail was an imperative part of Keefer’s research plan, as essential as close reading of the modernist author’s letters and journals. Besides seamlessly fusing reality and fiction, historical and imaginative truths, these hybrid products bring together the characteristics of literary and genre fiction. The article also focuses on the generic aspect of Thieves, which “sells” a scholarly literary background by using a commercial format that borrows features from popular genres such as love stories, thrillers, mystery and detective novels. The result is a multi-layered story endowed with great narrative virtuosity and variety, with leaps in time and space and with parallel stories that finally intersect. The article ultimately concludes with more general considerations on how such biofictions recreating the myth of iconic figures have proved to be a flourishing literary genre on the current book market. This article was submitted to the EJLW on 28 November 2013 and published on 14 October 2014.

Unanimously considered one of the greatest Latin American writers of the entire 20th century, the Cuban Guillermo Cabrera Infante is also the author who, despite his tendency to ignore the pattern of traditional fiction, also succeeds in establishing a new type of connection to the great tradition of world literature, following the steps of Miguel de Cervantes and, up to a certain point, symbolically going back to the celebrated model of Don Quixote. Cabrera Infante’s masterpiece, Three Trapped Tigers (Tres tristes tigres, 1965) thus questions the place and meanings of literature itself in the contemporary world, and the characters involved in the process organize their (fictitious) life around textual aspects, underlining the importance of a new kind of interpretative relationship, to be established between reader and writer

The relationship between fiction and history is that the two are the representation of society. The difference is their techniques of presentation. In history, events are presented as they happened in their places while in fiction, historical events are transformed by literary techniques. These literary techniques make a literary work more difficult than a history work during their understanding. Some readers, after reading a literary work, come up with a wrong conclusion that it is totally a fiction without possessing trustful information. It is the same case for Ngugi’s A Grain of Wheat that some readers judge as a work for entertainment without having true information. The characters that he used to present his message and the events told in the novel are fictitious but the events from Kenyan society that they represent are trustworthy. The intention of my work is to discuss history and fiction basing on the novel, A Grain of Wheat so as to discover whether it is a historical novel or a totally imaginary work. After analyzing the literary techniques used in the novel such as characterization, plotting and setting and comparing the narrated events with the historical events, I found that Ngugi’s A Grain of Wheat is a historical novel talking about Kenyan history. The key to better understand this literary work as a true story is to analyze it literarily first and secondly, to relate the narrated events to the depicted society in order to have full information from both sides.

Fiction as Restriction? Or as Indirect Communication? A Discussion with Dorothy Hale about an Ethical Turn in Recent Literary Theory:This article is a discussion with a recent article by Dorothy Hale: »Fiction as Restriction: Self-Binding in New Ethical Theories of the Novel«. Here, Hale claims that different new ethicists among contemporary literary scholars all end up sounding very much like the Wayne Booth of The Rhetoric of Fiction. In this connection, she points out that the reader’s willing surrender to the fictitious universe of a novel and making room for the characters he or she encounters there – the »self-binding« of her title – is a common ideal of these new ethicists, since it is an exercise in appreciating and making room for otherness as such. The argument of this article, however, is that three of the ethicists Hale discusses, Lynne Huffer, Judith Butler and J. Hillis Miller, do in fact not sound that much like Booth, since Booth does not acknowledge the problems of difference, irony and translation that they, in different ways, address. Instead, it is argued that Kierkegaard’s idea and practice of »indirect communication« seems to be a more convincing, even if somewhat subterranean, common denominator for these critics. Henry James and Walter Benjamin, too, are invited to take part in the discussion.

The postcolonial fiction of the 21st century has developed a new version of family chronicle depicting the life of several generations of migrants to demonstrate the complexity of their experience, different for each generation. This article aims at investigating this tradition from the perspective of three urgent problems: trauma, postcolonial experience, and the “female” theme. The author uses the most illustrative modern women’s postcolonial writings (Z. Smith, Ju. Chang) to show the types of trauma featured in postcolonial literature as well as the change in the character of traumatic experience, including the migrant’s automythologization from generation to generation. There are several types of trauma, or stages experienced by migrants: historical, migration and selfidentification, more or less correlated with three generations of migrants. Historical trauma is the most severe and most often insurmountable for the first generation. It generates a myth about the past, terrible or beautiful, depending on the writer’s intention realized at the level of the writer or the characters. A most expanded form of this trauma can be found in the novel Wild Swans by Jung Chang, where the “female” experience underlines the severity of the historical situation in the homeland of migrants. The trauma of migration manifests itself as a situation of deterritorialization, lack of place, when the experience of the past dominates and prevents the migrants from adapting to a new life. This situation is clearly illustrated in the novel White Teeth by Z. Smith, where the first generation of migrants cannot cope with the effects of trauma. The trauma of selfidentification promotes a fictitious identity in the younger generation of migrants. Unable to join real life communities, they create automyths, joining fictional communities based on cultural myths (Muslim organizations, rap culture, environmental organizations). Such examples can be found in Z. Smith’s White Teeth and On Beauty. Thus, the problem of trauma undergoes erosion, because, strictly speaking, with each new generation, the event experienced as traumatic is less worth designating as such. Compared to historical trauma or the trauma of migration, trauma of self-identification is rather a psychological problem that affects the emotional sphere and is quite survivable for most of the characters.

Abstract This essay examines the question of whether and under what conditions a fictitious character can be an epistemic authority for (real) readers; more precisely: it asks whether and under what conditions readers can acquire (propositional) knowledge from the character, thus learning something from it. In answering this question, the essay brings together two debates that have so far hardly been related to each other: an epistemological debate on the concept of epistemic authority and a literary-theoretical debate on aesthetic cognitivism, i. e., the discourse about what can be learned from the reception of fictional texts. In order for a person to be an epistemic authority for another person, two conditions must be met: 1) the first person must have an advantage in knowledge over the second person that the second person recognizes and acknowledges as such; and 2) the second person must have appropriate access to this knowledge. In order to clarify to what extent a fictitious character and a real reader can be related in this way, I first examine what it means to attribute knowledge to a fictitious character. To do so, I suggest the following analysis: In story S, character C knows that p if and only if C believes in S that p; p is true in S; and C is justified in S to believe that p (this suggestion, based on the classical definition of knowledge, can easily be adapted for other suggested analyses: all that is required is that all conditions in the analysis – whatever they might be – lie inside the scope of the fiction operator). Furthermore, a knowledge attribution of the form »In S, C knows whether p« is true if and only if in S, C knows that p or knows that not-p. On the question of the correctness-conditions for knowledge attributions of the form »In S, C knows that p« and »In S, C knows whether p«, I will then enter the debate about fictional truths. This is necessary for two reasons. On the one hand, the attribution of knowledge is nothing but the assertion of a particular fictional truth. And on the other hand, an attribution of knowledge involves another fictional fact, namely the fact p (which I call the »underlying fact«). The view that is largely held in the discussion about fictional truth following Lewis is that what is true in a story does not result solely from the explicit assertions in the text, but also from plausible consequences [Plausibilitätsschlüssen] that we can be further justified in drawing. More precisely, the following possibilities arise for both facts – the underlying fact as well as the attribution of knowledge: Either the text explicitly contains a reference to the fact. Or it does not contain such an explicit reference, but the question of whether the fact obtains can still be answered on the basis of plausibility conclusions. Or there are no explicit references and plausibility conclusions cannot be drawn. In this case, there is a point of indeterminacy. These distinctions result in a number of possible combinations corresponding to different types of situations, some interesting instance of which I examine in more detail. One case that is especially remarkable is when there is a point of indeterminacy in the text with regard to the underlying fact, which – as I illustrate with an example – does not exclude the possibility that knowledge can be attributed to a character with regard to the proposition in question. The claim is often made about indeterminate passages that not even God can know whether the facts in question obtain – and this is correct. Hence if we are entitled to attribute the knowledge in question to a character, this shows that fictitious characters can not only know more than the reader or the author, but even more than God. Such situations also illustrate that more knowledge does not have to go hand in hand with more epistemic authority. For readers, the indeterminate passage remains unresolvable, and readers cannot learn anything from the character in this regard. This leads me to the question of under which conditions the reader can learn something from a character to whom knowledge is attributed that the reader does not possess. A fundamental problem for the idea that there could be something like a transfer of knowledge between a fictitious character and a real reader is that both belong to different ontological spheres, so to speak: the reader is real, the character merely fictitious. If a character were to be an epistemic authority for a reader, this would be a case of a transfictional epistemic authority, which must be distinguished from »ordinary« epistemic authorities as well as from fictitious epistemic authorities and from epistemic authorities for fictitious truths. I propose to analyze transfictional epistemic authorities using the make-believe theory and the extended-pretense operator: When readers find themselves in extended pretense and pretend to be part of the fictitious world, they become at least imaginatively capable of interacting with the characters, so that the characters can become imaginary epistemic authorities for the readers. I also discuss the cognitivism debate and argue that the (fictitious) knowledge of a character can affect not only intra-fictional but also extra-fictional objects and truths. A main objection to the cognitivist view that readers can acquire propositional knowledge of reality from reading fictional texts is that fictional texts are not reliable sources and that the beliefs the reader may form through reading cannot be justified. I reject this objection and argue that readers can also acquire knowledge about reality through the attribution of knowledge to fictitious characters or even from speech acts that the characters make in the story. Finally, I will deal with a possible objection that the epistemic authority that a character can have is completely parasitic on that of the author: the objection here is that if readers learn something, it’s actually from the author. In contrast, I argue that fictitious characters can acquire an independent epistemic authority that cannot be reduced to that of the author.

This chapter examines the disciplinary power of “identity papers,” such as passports and citizenship cards, in Nabokov’s fiction. The loss of such documents does more than alienate so many of Nabokov’s characters from their homelands: it estranges them from their very selves. To be without papers in Nabokov’s fiction is not just to be stateless, but to be without any identity at all. Passports and citizenship cards both reflect their holders and supplant them, becoming papery doubles that, in mirroring the self, take its place. In “fictitious biographies” like The Real Life of Sebastian Knight, Nabokov depicts lives that rely entirely on documentation and paperwork—selves quite literally made out of paper.