Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „Rites et cérémonies du marriage”

Le Hezbollah a su utiliser les cérémonies d’Achoura au Liban et notamment les rites traditionnellement observés par les fidèles durant cette période, pour servir sa communication et ses objectifs politiques. En étudiant le contenu des discours et des latmiya ainsi que la mise en scène du Hezbollah, durant cet événement annuel important dans le calendrier religieux chiite, on tentera de saisir à l’aune de cet exemple la politique de communication du parti-milice libanais.

Une enquête menée dans la région de Saint-Jean-Iberville, auprès de personnes mariées au cours des périodes 1920-1940 et 1980-1995, a permis de montrer la transformation de la cérémonie religieuse du mariage au XXe siècle. Ce changement est le résultat de multiples tensions. D’abord, l’Église édicte les règles de la célébration des mariages et établit une classification des cérémonies en fonction de l’aisance des familles. Ensuite, les prêtres tentent de répondre aux demandes des fidèles qui réclament des rites renforçant la distinction sociale. Enfin, un groupe au sein du clergé s’oppose au déploiement cérémoniel lors des mariages. À la fin du siècle, les cérémonies de mariage sont fastueuses et les couples tiennent une place très importante dans leur organisation. Si l’Église favorise la participation des époux et de leurs familles, elle n’a pas totalement perdu son privilège de définir le rituel religieux. Elle est parvenue à transmettre aux jeunes mariés sa vision sacrée du mariage et de la famille.

Résumé Peu après la fin de la Grande Guerre, divers États vainqueurs ont inhumé à une place d’honneur un soldat inidentifiable, qu’on a appelé Inconnu. Celui-ci devenait « le Fils de toutes les mères qui n’ont pas retrouvé leur Fils », le métonyme de tous les soldats tombés pour la Patrie, dont leurs mères était la métaphore. Les rites qui sont liés à la présence de ce corps méconnaissable présentent les divers aspects des rites funéraires en général, mais portés au niveau de cérémonies commémoratives, dont la signification se perd, qui sont à la fois d’expiation (de toutes ces morts glorieuses) et d’exaltation de la communauté nationale.

Cet exposé utilise les testaments de gentilshommes d'Essex pour étudier les cérémonies funéraires en vogue en Angleterre pendant la seconde moitié du 16e siècle. Plusieurs rites traditionnels ont survécu la Réforme et aussi dans certains cas, les trente jours ou le mois du ‘souvenir’. Les pratiques réformatrices étaient lentes à se propager. Alors que certains membres de la noblesse proclamaient leur aversions de toute ‘pompe’, d'autres spécifiaient la panoplie complète des cérémonies: vêtements de deuil, cortèges funèbres, distributions charitables, fêtes communautaires et le verre à vider solennellement en souvenir du défunt. Les testateurs se souciaient souvent autant de l'endroit où reposerait leur dépouille, soit á proximité de leurs ancêtres ou parents et alliés, soit dans un lieu consacré ou socialement important, que du sort de leur âme. On peut mieux comprendre ces coutumes á partir des observations anthropologiques modernes. Les funérailles des gentilshommes élisabéthains non seulement disposaient d'un cadavre, mais elles servaient encore á souligner certaines valeurs, telles que la décence, la réputation, la continuité de la famille, l'hospitalité ainsi que d'autres piliers de l'ordre moral et social.

Résumé Si l’encens trouve sa place dans la plupart des rites publics des religions de l’Antiquité, qu’en est-il sur le plan du culte privé chez les Romains ? Les auteurs anciens, notamment les poètes, évoquent fréquemment la libation du vin et l’offrande de l’encens qui interviennent avant le sacrifice proprement dit. Ceci se retrouve dans les témoignages iconographiques qui sont tout aussi indispensables que les témoignages littéraires pour l’analyse des rites. C’est pourquoi cette étude sera menée à partir des peintures de laraires et objets de culte découverts dans les maisons pompéiennes afin de déterminer quelle est la place accordée à l’encens dans les cérémonies du culte domestique mais aussi lors des rites funéraires. Nous devrions être à même de trouver des témoignages archéologiques de sa présence et d’en tirer des conclusions. Nous les enrichirons par une approche du domaine funéraire à Pompéi afin de compléter nos témoignages sur l’utilisation de l’encens lors des rites organisés par la famille. Abstract Title: Rites and offerings in the domestic religion of the Romans: what testimonies on the use of incense? If frankincense finds its place in most of the public rites of religions of Antiquity, what about the Romans’private worship ? Ancient authors, especially poets, frequently mention the libation of wine and the incense’s offering that occur before the sacrifice itself. Nevertheless, the sacrifices’ scenes don’t give them much importance whereas they are as indispensable as the literary testimonies for the rites’ analysis. Therefore, this study will be carried out from lararia paintings and cult objects discovered in Pompeian houses to determine the place given to incense in the ceremonies of domestic cult but also in funeral rites. We should be able to find archaeological evidence of its presence and draw conclusions. We will complete with an approach to the funerary field to look for evidence of incense use in the funeral in Pompeii.

Aujourd'hui, l'homme actuel qu'on appelle homo sapiens sapiens, avec l'évolution de la vie, de la capacité crânienne et intellectuelle, nous assistons par contre à des cérémonies funéraires différemment dans divers milieux et provinces qui laissent à désirer. C'est ainsi que nous nous sommes posés la question de savoir comment se les rites mortuaires à Kinshasa, Ville Province de la République démocratique du Congo et quelles en sont les conséquences ?Dans le but d'évaluer la qualité des rites mortuaires et ses conséquences dans la ville province de Kinshasa, RD Congo, nous avons utilisé la méthode d'enquête avec les techniques d'interview constituées et d'observation non participante et un questionnaire guide interview nous un service comme instrument de collecte des données sur un échantillon de 100 sujets.Après analyse des données nécessaires, nous avons trouvé que 70 % des sujets pensent que le lieu mortuaire est un lieu de compassion ; les sportifs et chabanistes sont les auteurs des désordres au lieu de deuil ; la tranche d'âge la plus impliquée dans le désordre au lieu de deuil est celle de 15 à 18 ans, soit (55%). L'influence des masses et la mauvaise compagnie sont des facteurs explicatifs du désordre le plus cité, soit (44%) ; la majorité des enquêtés participe la nuit et le jour au deuil, soit (50%) ; les insanités sont les paroles les plus attendues au deuil, soit (68%) ; la bagarre est l'acte majoritairement vécue au deuil, soit (50%). Pour mettre fin au désordre au lieu de deuil, les enquêtés responsables que les pouvoirs pourraient permettre un programme de la campagne de la sensibilisation par les médias ou défendre l'exposition et le passage de la morgue, du corps du défunt à son domicile voir même dans les lieux de recueillement, soit (45%).Mots-clés : rites, rites mortuaires, conséquences, Kinshasa

Le but de cet article est de comparer le rituel andin qui entoure le marquage du bétail (herranza) avec d’autres rites essentiels du cycle annuel de la région. L’auteur compare tout d’abord la herranza avec les rituels liés au nettoyage des canaux d’irrigation, puis il la confronte avec les cérémonies relatives au recouvrement des chaumières. La première comparaison est géographiquement limitée à une seule région – celle de la sierra de Lima –, tandis que la seconde considère les ethnographies d’autres régions de langue quechua afin de pallier le manque de données existantes sur le sujet. Lorsqu’elle est intégrée de cette façon au cycle rituel annuel, la herranza se révèle être une forme de rite de passage dont les multiples dimensions symboliques sont ici explorées.

Les sanctuaires de Déméter dans le Péloponnèse sont le théâtre de rites dont la nature nécessite souvent d’être dissimulés. Ainsi, il est possible de déterminer l’existence de plusieurs niveaux de frontières protégeant ces cérémonies secrètes. L’installation de sanctuaires éloignés des centres urbains constitue une première façon de s’isoler et permet, de surcroît, d’exploiter les caractéristiques naturelles du terrain ; la pente d’une montagne, les bois ou encore les grottes offrent une couverture supplémentaire. Les délimitations peuvent tout autant être architecturées : de hauts murs d’enceinte interviennent parfois pour protéger les lieux de culte en contexte urbain, ces derniers peuvent aussi être agrémentés d’un bois pour encore plus de discrétion. Il existe également des bâtiments conçus pour abriter les rites qui ne doivent pas être vus ou entendus de certaines catégories de personnes (hommes ou non-initiés). Enfin, plusieurs éléments doivent même être cachés des fidèles : il est parfois interdit à quiconque de voir la statue de culte, d’assister au sacrifice ou d’accéder à une certaine partie du lieu de culte. Par conséquent, la frontière revêt divers rôles au sein des cultes de Déméter et divise la population des fidèles en différentes catégories.

La discussion, au sujet de la formation des ménages et du mariage en Angleterre au début des temps modernes, reposait sur les analyses des ménages et sur les notions de parenté d'après des modéles prédéterminés d'une société paysanne. L'importance de la parenté était minimisée et les coutumes du mariage ainsi que les relations sociales étaient tout au plus décrites comme diverses et flexibles quoique essentiellement invariables. L'article veut faire la critique de l'imprécision théorique de cette discussion et veut réévaluer le rôle joué par la parenté. A l'aide de témoignages détaillés devant le consistoire l'article propose une définition plus complexe de la parenté et plaide son importance idéologique pour la structuration de relations sociales. Par l'examen des procès et des cérémonies séculaires du mariage il prouve toute la portée des influences et des pressions exercées par la famille, les amis, les parentés ‘fictives’ et la communauté lorsqu'on décide de se marier.

AbstractHow can one be Christian whilst remaining Kikuyu and reproduce in a socially legitimate manner? Focusing on akurinu Prophetic Churches in Kenya, this article analyses the diff erent stages of akurinu marriage in order to understand its individual, moral and social meanings. Akurinu marriage is seen as a new set of rules, organised and managed by the religious community. One of its most striking features is that the wedding is not paid for by the families of the husband and wife. is is an important change in the social structure of the Kikuyu and it shows that Prophetic Churches can be seen as groups which adapt to social change within Kenyan urban society. Moreover, the hope of finding a spouse is one of the reasons for changing to this type of religious community. Comment être chrétien, demeurer Kikuyu et se reproduire légitimement ? En se penchant sur le cas des Eglises prophétiques akurinu au Kenya, cet article retrace les étapes du mariage akurinu afi n d'en comprendre les enjeux individuels, moraux et sociaux. Le mariage akurinu est analysé comme un nouvel ensemble de règles, organisé et géré par la communauté religieuse. Un des points les plus remarquables est que les frais des cérémonies de mariage n'incombent plus aux familles des époux, ce qui introduit un bouleversement fondamental dans la structure sociale kikuyu, et permet de considérer les Eglises prophétiques comme des groupes qui répondent aux changements sociaux de la société urbaine en cours au Kenya. De plus, l'espoir de trouver un conjoint demeure une des raisons de la conversion à ce type de communauté.

La spiritualité de l'Orient chrétien: IV La spiritualité liturgique Dans ce quatrième article l’auteur essaie d’esquisser la relation entre la liturgie et la vie spirituelle. Puisque Ie sujet est très vaste, il en relève un point central: Ie symbolisme dans la liturgie. Le symbolisme se manifeste dans l’espace et Ie temps. Il est clair dans l’architecture de l’église, dans l’art des icönes, comme aussi dans Ie temps, ou Ie passé et l’avenir sont rendus présents en célébrant les mystères. Les personnes et les choses ont également un sens symbolique. Les célébrants habillés de leurs vêtements liturgiques forment un ordre sacré, une hiérarchie. Nombreux sont les détails qui viennent rehausser la splendeur des cérémonies et qui aident à représenter Dieu et Ie Christ parmi les hommes et Ie ciel surterre. Ce symbolisme est emaciné dans une société sacrale. Pourtant, on constate un paradoxe: d’un côté la création et les créatures, sortant de la main de Dieu, sont regardées commes bonnes, mais d’autre part elles doivent être bénies et consacrées sans cesse. Une valeur spéciale est attribuée à la bénédiction et à la consécration. Les mystères ou sacrements, comme beaucoup de rites et de prières du rituel, sont des instruments pour rendre Ie sacré présent. Mais ce monde sacramentel s’affaiblit lentement. Le changement de culture a une répercussion sur Ie culte. Reconnaître que Dieu est à l’oeuvre par des instruments humains et matériels, c’est essentiel pour la structure sacramentelle du christianisme. Mais on peut interpréter ce fait d’une façon moins cultuelle. En accentuant moins l’union dans Ie mystère au profit de l’imitation du Christ, on pourrait présenter un christianisme plus convaincant et contagieux.

Résumé: Cette contribution analyse les dépenses funéraires des femmes Gouro dans le Centre Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire. Les ressources économiques provenant de la commercialisation de produits vivriers ont permis au leadership féminin associatif d'établir une relation de concurrence entre sexes aboutissant à la transgression de normes sociales et culturelles par des femmes désignées « femmes battantes » dans les espaces masculins. Leur prise de pouvoir se fonde sur les contributions financières aux funérailles qui étaient auparavant uniquement à la charge du groupe agnatique du défunt ou de la défunte. Cette étude examine les différentes formes de légitimation du repositionnement statutaire des femmes lors des cérémonies funéraires en pays Gouro. Pour ce faire, nous avons mobilisé l'ethnographie comme méthode d'observation et comme production de sens de la transformation des rapports de sexes à l'occasion des rites funéraires. ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the funeral expenditures of Gouro women in west central Côte d'Ivoire. The economic resources derived from the commercialization of food products have created a competitive relationship between the sexes, leading to the transgression of social and cultural norms by women called "fighting women" in male spaces. Their empowerment is based on financial contributions to funerals that were previously the sole responsibility of the agnatic group. This study examines the different forms of legitimization of Gouro women's changing status in funeral ceremonies. To do so, we have relied on ethnography as a method of observation, and as a means of producing meaning about the transformation of gender relations.

Résumé: Cette contribution analyse les dépenses funéraires des femmes Gouro dans le Centre Ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire. Les ressources économiques provenant de la commercialisation de produits vivriers ont permis au leadership féminin associatif d'établir une relation de concurrence entre sexes aboutissant à la transgression de normes sociales et culturelles par des femmes désignées « femmes battantes » dans les espaces masculins. Leur prise de pouvoir se fonde sur les contributions financières aux funérailles qui étaient auparavant uniquement à la charge du groupe agnatique du défunt ou de la défunte. Cette étude examine les différentes formes de légitimation du repositionnement statutaire des femmes lors des cérémonies funéraires en pays Gouro. Pour ce faire, nous avons mobilisé l'ethnographie comme méthode d'observation et comme production de sens de la transformation des rapports de sexes à l'occasion des rites funéraires. ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the funeral expenditures of Gouro women in west central Côte d'Ivoire. The economic resources derived from the commercialization of food products have created a competitive relationship between the sexes, leading to the transgression of social and cultural norms by women called "fighting women" in male spaces. Their empowerment is based on financial contributions to funerals that were previously the sole responsibility of the agnatic group. This study examines the different forms of legitimization of Gouro women's changing status in funeral ceremonies. To do so, we have relied on ethnography as a method of observation, and as a means of producing meaning about the transformation of gender relations.

Résumé Des traces de diverses cérémonies plutôt rituelles datant de l'Antiquité prouvent la fertilité de l'histoire du théâtre persan. Il y a eu même à cette époque des échanges culturels entre l'Orient et l'Occident. Au cours des siècles, les rites traditionnels ont cédé la place à des genres de théâtre populaire tels les farces, les comédies, les marionnettes, les imitations mimétiques, …etc. Puis, des conteurs se sont mis à réaliser les récits à épisodes basés sur des histoires épiques, de divers romans picaresques, des lamentations pour les Imams martyrisés, sur des places publiques ou dans des maisons de thé. Ce n'est qu'au XIXe siècle que le théâtre moderne d'inspiration occidentale a été créé par les témoignages des étudiants envoyés en Europe pour se spécialiser en diverses technologies occidentales. En 1886, une première salle de théâtre a été construite à l'École Polytechnique de Téhéran (Dâr Ol- Fonûn), où la traduction du Misanthrope de Molière, y a été mise en scène en 1889. Sous le règne des Pahlavis, fut créé un théâtre nationaliste, se référant au passé préislamique de l'Iran. Puis, vu que les iraniens diplômés en études théâtrales et cinématographiques des universités, des grandes écoles et des conservatoires européennes se sont mis à traduire les pièces de théâtre étrangères, les pièces ont pris un air socio-politique. Sous la Révolution islamique, le théâtre a vécu plusieurs périodes de détente et de tension. Et enfin, depuis 1997, une autorisation de la mise en scène des pièces de théâtre a été émise de nouveau. Ali Raffi, iranien contemporain, dont la dernière réalisation théâtrale à Téhéran date du mois de Janvier 2019, a su exposer l'essentiel de sa conception esthétique par le mépris total des conventions scéniques mises en pratique en Iran. L'esthétique de ses pièces a suscité des discussions sans nombre. Il a toujours privilégié la couleur, le mouvement et l'intuition. Il a eu une influence considérable sur la mentalité du peuple iranien par la mise en scène des pièces de théâtre françaises ou européennes traduites vers le français. Notre problématique consiste à mettre en évidence les échanges interculturels qui se sont effectués entre l'Iran et la France grâce à la mise en scène des pièces de théâtre européennes en Iran et de voir l'innovation créative et le rôle d'Ali Raffi dans l'enrichissement de ces transferts culturels et artistiques. Notre but est de mettre en relief la circulation des savoirs, issue de la mise en scène des pièces de théâtre françaises par les réalisateurs iraniens, en particulier par Ali Raffi en Iran, de démontrer l'omniprésence des grands auteurs dramatiques, tragiques et comiques français dans ce pays, et de dévoiler que les élites intellectuelles iraniennes vivent en symbiose permanente avec ces éminents auteurs français. Mots clés: Circulation des savoirs France-Iran, Échanges culturels, Mise en scène, Ali Raffi, Pièces de théâtre européennes, Francophonie, Conception esthétique

On se représente trop souvent l'Acadie comme une société «monolithique», «unidimensionnelle», «non pluraliste», un peu comme la survivance d'un antique modèle de société hiérarchique où la transmission des traditions est rigoureusement contrôlée par des grands-prêtres ou des dignitaires initiés par la « patente », et méthodiquement rythmée par les rites et cérémonies du calendrier occulte. Une telle image constituée par analogie ressemble trop au type-idéal pour rendre compte de cette formation historique originale qu'est la société acadienne. Elle est aussi trop conforme, par certains côtés, aux canons d'une idéologie unitariste pour ne pas être soumise à la critique. Cette première représentation à laquelle se rattachent de nombreuses variations est très optimiste dans le sens où elle constitue un objet fini, non contradictoire, non problématique : la société existe en soi, tel est son modèle. Une deuxième représentation, moins « savante » que l'autre, consiste à définir l'Acadie comme un souvenir et à ne voir en l'Acadie actuelle qu'un terrain vague parsemé des débris d'une histoire malheureuse. Il resterait quelques ilôts acadiens au Nouveau-Brunswick et en Nouvelle-Ecosse où on parle encore un français archaïque et où l'on continue à filer et à chanter, comme dans la chanson. Ce sont eux qui justifiaient que la province du Nouveau-Brunswick se déclare bilingue alors qu'elle était renommée pour son loyalisme à la couronne britannique... Cette image, trop pessimiste, à laquelle se rattachent aussi de nombreuses variations, a des relents de l'idéologie anglo-canadienne intégratrice qui nie à l'autre toute existence autonome pour, au mieux, en faire une originalité « culturelle » à préserver. Acadie traditionnelle, Acadie folklorique : deux stéréotypes — on pourrait en trouver d'autres — dont on découvre vite l'étroite filiation avec des formations idéologiques connues et qui ont tous deux pour conséquence de surdéterminer au départ le terrain sémantique ou de brouiller momentanément le champ d'investigation au « regard prolongé » (celui du sociologue, journaliste, homme politique, etc.). La société acadienne est en soi une certaine configuration de rapports sociaux dont il ne sera pas question dans cet article. Elle existe aussi pour soi dans les diverses théories qu'en ont les acteurs et groupements d'acteurs sociaux. Contrairement à la théorie ou idéologie dominante, j'emploie théories au pluriel et c'est précisément de l'aventure de l'idéologie contestataire de l'idéologie officielle qu'il sera question. L'existence même du discours discordant d'intellectuels et leaders étudiants détruit la théorie simplificatrice selon laquelle la société serait un consensus et ses leaders nationaux les « chefs naturels » incontestés. Il existe deux discours visant à définir les finalités et objectifs de la société globale qui ont en commun une grande cohérence et la même prétention à faire l'unanimité des consciences. La différence est que l'un vise à protéger et perpétuer une certaine lecture de la tradition et une certaine pratique de la culture, et comme tel il a la légitimité, alors que l'autre vise à changer lecture et pratique de la culture pour donner à la société un nouveau destin. Celui-ci n'a pas comme dans d'autres formations sociales la légitimité que pourrait lui conférer l'affiliation à un club, un parti, un syndicat ou tout autre groupement organisé et reconnu : il est tenu pour sauvage, quand il n'est pas tout simplement nié comme tel. Mon propos est le suivant : observer et comprendre le rapport des jeunes idéologues au signe Acadie ou Acadien, en suivre l'itinéraire pour retracer la genèse du projet collectif tout neuf de l'annexion de « L'Acadie » au futur Québec indépendant. Le contenu proprement dit de ce projet m'importe peu ; m'intéresse sa genèse en rapport avec le signe d'identité collective. Mon hypothèse était la suivante : il fallait que les étudiants conservent le signe, qu'ils lui donnent un sens explicite et positif pour faire entrer leur discours dans l'histoire ou pour lui donner des chances objectives de devenir collectif. Mieux : afin que le discours gagne la cohérence nécessaire pour entrer en concurrence avec le discours traditionnel, il devait faire du signe Acadie son centre. Le symbole primordial devait assurer la liaison entre l'ancien et le nouveau : il devait continuer d'être le lieu de l'échange entre le caché et le manifeste, entre la langue et la parole, entre la culture et les traditions. J'ai distingué, dans l'évolution du rapport des nouveaux idéologues au signe Acadie, trois moments qui reproduisent à peu de choses près trois étapes successives de la praxis collective des étudiants de l'Université de Moncton : le Ralliement de 1966, les «événements» de '67-'69, la «répression» de '70-'71. Je n'ai retenu pour ce travail que les exemples les plus significatifs, sélectionnés à partir d'un fichier systématique de la production idéologique acadienne de ces dernières années. Beaucoup de documents annexes ou connexes ne seront pas reproduits ici.

L’intrusion des nouvelles visions, des manières de voir le monde à Travers des canons du christianisme et autres avatars tels la mondialisation et le multiculturalisme en pays bamiléké ont notoirement altéré la réalité culturelle de ces derniers. Le deuil, les funérailles et bien d’autres rites locaux ont évolués prenant tantôt des allures de discrédit, tantôt de rayonnement, relatif pour la majorité aux grandes mutations sociales d’après les indépendances surtout d’un point de vu d’actualité. Ces nouvelles manières de faire on engendrer un important flux économiques autour des pratiques funèbres et funéraires bamiléké. La question centrale ici mise en exergue est celle de savoir: comment les pratiques funèbres et funéraires constituent-elles de nouvelles opportunités économiques chez les Bamiléké de l’Ouest Cameroun? Dès lors, La méthodologie de cette analyse est sou tendu par l’exploitation documentaire ayant permis de saisir la littérature sur la question. Les enquêtes ethnologiques et anthropologiques de terrain auprès de personnes ressources ont permis la collecte des données empiriques sur les sites même de ces pratiques qui se présente comme fleuron d’une économie en plein essor chez les Bamiléké.à terme, Il s’est avéré que les cérémonies funèbres et funéraires bamiléké sont aujourd’hui des émulateurs à n’en plus douter d’une économie sans cesse croissante. Outre, cette neo-economie mortuaire s’adosse sur des échanges commerciales de natures variées tel que les petits commerces, les trafics routiers, les prestations de services (logistiques) et autres tractations financières non moins ressente qui participent au renforcement de ce point de l’industrie mortuaire en pays bamiléké aujourd’hui plus qu’hier. D’ailleurs, il faut dire que cette économie, non sans empiéter la forme de ces cérémonies d’antan participe de leurs revitalisations dans ces territoires pour la majorité rurales

Comparaison entre la herranza, la « fête de l’eau » et la zafa-casa dans les AndesJuan Javier Rivera Andía Le but de cet article est de comparer le rituel andin qui entoure le marquage du bétail (herranza) avec d’autres rites essentiels du cycle annuel de la région. L’auteur compare tout d’abord la herranza avec les rituels liés au nettoyage des canaux d’irrigation, puis il la confronte avec les cérémonies relatives au recouvrement des chaumières. La première comparaison est géographiquement limitée à une seule région – celle de la sierra de Lima –, tandis que la seconde considère les ethnographies d’autres régions de langue quechua afin de pallier le manque de données existantes sur le sujet. Lorsqu’elle est intégrée de cette façon au cycle rituel annuel, la herranza se révèle être une forme de rite de passage dont les multiples dimensions symboliques sont ici explorées.Mots clés : Andes, Pérou, rituel, religion, cosmologie Some Comparisons Between the Cattle Branding Ritual, the “Fiesta del Agua” and the “Zafa-casa” in the AndesJuan Javier Rivera Andía This article intends to compare the Andean cattle branding ritual (“herranza”) with other rites that are a key component of the annual cycle in this region. First, the compares the “herranza” with the rituals around the cleaning of irrigation cannals, then he contrasts it with the celebrations around the house rethatching. Geographically, the first comparison will be restricted to the same area (Lima highlands), while the second one will consider ethnographies from other Quechua-speaking regions, because of data availability. Finally, framed in this way on its annual ritual cycle, the “herranza” will emerge as a rite of passage whose various symbolic dimension this article will intend to explore.Keywords: Andes, Peru, Rite, Religion, Cosmology Comparaciones entre la herranza, la “fiesta del agua” y la “zafa-casa” en los AndesJuan Javier Rivera Andía Este artículo intenta comparar un ritual ampliamente difundido en los Andes, la herranza, con otros ritos que constituyen momentos claves en el ciclo anual de esta región. En primer lugar, establezco un contraste entre la herranza y los rituales ligados a la limpieza de los canales de riego (conocidos como “champería” o “limpia acequia”, entre otras denominaciones). A continuación, confronto los datos de la herranza con aquellos relacionados al techado ritual de las casas (usualmente llamado “zafa casa” o “wasichakuy”). Geográficamente, la primera comparación está limitada a la misma región de la cual provienen nuestros datos etnográficos de la herranza (la sierra de Lima, Perú). En cambio, la segunda comparación considerará etnografías provenientes de otras regiones de lengua quechua en el Perú, debido a la actual escasez de datos al respecto. Integrándola, pues, en este marco comparativo con ritos cruciales para las actividades económicas y para la formación de las familias, intentaremos delinear la herranza como un rito de paso cuyas múltiples dimensiones simbólicas serán exploradas en este artículo.Palabras clave : Andes, Perú, Ritual, Religión, Cosmologías

Le vodou haïtien compte parmi les religions issues des cultures afro-américaines telles que les différentes formes de candomblé au Brésil, la santería et le palo monte à Cuba ou encore le culte shango à Trinidad. Le vodou partage certains aspects avec ces autres religions nées de la traite et de l'esclavage des Africains, façonné par l'histoire singulière de la société dans laquelle il est s'est formé. Tout au long de l’histoire haïtienne, le vodou a été marqué par des rapports étroits avec le champ politique et religieux. Entre mythe et histoire, à la fois réunion politique et religieuse, la cérémonie vodou du Bois-Caïman est passée à la postérité comme l’événement initiateur de l’indépendance d’Haïti proclamée le 1er janvier 1804. Nées dans le contexte esclavagiste de la colonie française de Saint-Domingue, les pratiques alors assimilées au vodou (fabrication de poisons, danses, assemblées nocturnes, etc.) étaient interdites. Au XIXe siècle, différentes constitutions privilégièrent le catholicisme au détriment du vodou jusqu’au Concordat de 1860 entre Haïti et le Vatican. Si certains dirigeants haïtiens comptaient dans leurs réseaux des serviteurs du culte, d’autres soutenaient les campagnes antisuperstitieuses menées par le clergé. L’Occupation américaine d’Haïti (1915-1934) provoqua un sursaut nationaliste : l’indigénisme et le mouvement ethnologique et folklorique placèrent alors les classes populaires et le vodou au centre d’une refondation culturelle, ce qui fut ensuite récupéré par François Duvalier avec le noirisme (Béchacq 2014a). En 1986, des officiants et des temples vodou furent attaqués à la suite de l’exil de Jean-Claude Duvalier du fait de leur relation étroite, avérée ou supposée, avec la dictature. Deux premières associations de défense et de promotion du culte, Zantray et Bodè Nasyonal furent crées. Un mouvement d’institutionnalisation du vodou se développa dans les années 1990 par des militants souhaitant représenter les pratiquants dans les instances publiques nationales. En 2003, le culte fut reconnu par décret comme « religion à part entière » et en 2008, une fédération d’associations vodou désigna son représentant, Max Beauvoir, comme « Guide Suprême du Vodou » et défenseur du culte contre ses détracteurs (Béchacq 2014b). Le catholicisme, les églises protestantes et plus récemment l’islam entretiennent des relations complexes avec le vodou. Son influence est combattue par les autorités religieuses, notamment protestantes, qui appellent à la lutte contre le vodou, poursuivant ainsi l’œuvre des campagnes antisuperstitieuses catholiques (fin XIXe-milieu XXe siècles). Parallèlement, plusieurs religions peuvent être représentées dans une même famille ; l’adhésion au vodou, comme aux autres cultes, peut constituer une étape dans un parcours religieux, d’autant qu’il existe des similitudes entre vodou et pentecôtisme (glossolalie, transe, etc.). Le vodou est réputé pour être fréquenté majoritairement par des femmes, comme espace de tolérance pour les homosexuels et il existe plusieurs niveaux de rapport au vodou, du client non initié au pratiquant assidu. Si ce culte a pendant longtemps symbolisé la bipolarité socioculturelle haïtienne (pauvres/riches, noirs/mulâtres, campagne/ville, créole/français, etc.), toutes les couches sociales sont aujourd’hui représentées dans le vodou. Les serviteurs sont organisés en familles spirituelles sous l'autorité charismatique d'un oungan ou d'une manbo et liés par une filiation initiatique. De ce fait, et par son mode de transmission principalement oral, le vodou haïtien connaît une grande variabilité d'un groupe à l'autre. Une diversité régionale du vodou se manifeste dans les identités des esprits, les rites, les chants, les rythmes musicaux, la liturgie, l’initiation et dans le rapport à la possession, certains rituels régionaux valorisant des transes plus expressives. Enfin, selon qu'il soit pratiqué en ville, et surtout à Port-au-Prince, ou en milieu rural, lieu de nombreux pèlerinages, le vodou affiche des différences importantes affectant le rapport aux entités, la sophistication des cérémonies ou le rapport à l'environnement. Cette diversité amène certains auteurs à considérer qu'il existe plusieurs vodou (Kerboull 1973). L’essentiel de la liturgie est issu de rites de possessions africains, origine que l’on retrouve dans les noms des lwa (Legba, Danbala, Ogou…), dans ceux de leurs familles ou nanchon (nation), ou encore dans ceux des rituels (Rada, Nago, Kongo...) (Métraux 1958). Pendant la période coloniale, les pratiquants – principalement des esclaves mais également, à différents degrés d’implication, des colons ou des « libres de couleur » – se sont aussi appropriés le catholicisme populaire européen par l'usage des chromolithographies et des prières. Les deux autres influences sont la magie – européenne, diffusée par la circulation de livres, et plusieurs variantes africaines – et la franc-maçonnerie. Par ailleurs, le contact des esclaves avec les premiers habitants de l’île et l’usage d’artefacts taïno (haches polies, céramiques) dans le vodou étant avérés, certains intellectuels y voient la preuve d’une influence sur le culte. L'ensemble de ces influences, sans cesse retravaillées par les dynamiques sociales, a fait du vodou une « religion vivante » (Bastide 1996) parmi les religions afro-américaines. Le vodou fait partie intégrante du pluralisme médical haïtien, aux côtés de la phytothérapie populaire, des doktè fey (docteurs feuilles), de la biomédecine et de certaines églises évangéliques (Brodwin 1996 ; Vonarx 2011 ; Benoît 2015). Pour effectuer leurs trètman (traitements), les praticiens vodou recourent systématiquement à leurs entités, dépositaires du savoir thérapeutique. Les rituels de guérison et les séances de consultation prennent en charge les maux physiques, relationnels et spirituels et comprennent des bains, des prières, des boissons et/ou la confection d'objets magiques (Munier 2013). Ils sollicitent parfois des lieux spécifiques (église, carrefour, cimetière) et des éléments de l’espace naturel (rivière, mer, arbre, grotte). Ces pratiques visent à intégrer le patient dans des collectifs composés d'entités et de pratiquants, reliés entre eux par des échanges mutuels témoignant de la dimension holistique du vodou qui associe étroitement médecine et religion, environnement social et naturel. La diaspora haïtienne – en Amérique du Nord, dans la Caraïbe et en Europe francophone – s’est formée dans les années 1960 et est actuellement estimée à 2 millions de personnes. Ces communautés d’Haïtiens, leurs descendants et leur pays d’origine sont reliés par des réseaux familiaux, économiques, politiques et religieux, dont ceux du vodou (Richman 2005). Ce dernier s’est adapté à de nouveaux environnements urbains et participe de cette dynamique transnationale (Brown Mac Carthey 2001) ; Béchacq 2012). Du fait de son fort ancrage dans la culture haïtienne et de son absence de prosélytisme, le vodou est surtout pratiqué dans ces nouveaux espaces par des Haïtiens et leurs descendants, ainsi que par des Caribéens et des Africains-Américains mais assez peu par d'autres populations.

IntroductionContemporary theorisations of family often present change in marriage as an icon of deinstitutionalisation (Cherlin). This idea, widely discussed in sociology, has been deepened and extended by Giddens, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, Beck-Gernsheim and Bauman, considered to be the main architects of the individualisation, detraditionalisation and risk theses (Brannen and Nielsen). According to these authors, contemporary family is an ephemeral, fluid, and fragilereality, and weakening as a traditional institution. At the same time, and partly as a result of the changes to this institution, there has been a rise in the individual’s capacity to reflect on and choose their own life, to the point that living a life of their own becomes the individual’s defining injunction. Based on an in-depth and detailed analysis of a number of young Portuguese people’s accounts of their entry into conjugality, this paper seeks to unveil some of the hidden constraints which persist despite this claim to individualisation. Whilst individuals incorporate a personalised narrative in their construction of that “special day” – stressing the performance of the wedding they wanted, in the way they chose – these data show the continuing influence of the family on individual decisions (e.g. to marry or not to marry, and how to marry). These empirical findings thus contribute to the recent body of literature complexifying the individualisation and detraditionalisation theses (Smart and Shipman, Gross, Smart, Eldén).Using Sociology to Unveil Individualisation’s Hidden ConstraintsThis discussion of contemporary marriages is driven by empirical data from a sociological qualitative study based on episodic interviews (Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research and The Episodic Interview). This research (Costa) was developed in 2009 and aimed at an in-depth understanding of family practices (Morgan, Risk and Family Practices, Family Connections and Rethinking Family Practices), specifically family rituals (Bossard and Boll, Imber-Black and Roberts, Wolin and Bennett). Using a theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss), accounts were collected from 30 middle-class individuals, both men and women, living in an urban medium-sized city (Évora) in the south of Portugal (southern Europe), and with at least one small child between the age of 3 and 14 years old. Confidentiality and anonymity were maintained, and all names used in this paper are pseudonyms. For the purposes of this paper, I focus only on the women’s accounts. On the one hand, particularly for them, socialisation and media culture helped to consolidate a social representation around the wedding (Gillis, Marriages of the Mind); on the other hand, their more exhaustive descriptions of the wedding day allow better for examining the hidden constraints to individualisation. Data were coded and analysed through a thematic and structural content analysis (Bardin). The analysis of emerging themes and issues regarding the diverse ways of entering into conjugality was primarily assisted by qualitative software (NVivo, QSR International) and then presented in the form of contextualised narratives. Using a sociological perspective, the themes presented below illustrate the major conclusions of this study. Big Decisions: To Marry or Not to Marry? How to Marry?At the core of the decision of whether “to marry or not to marry?” and “how to marry?,” one can find multiple and complex arguments, which go beyond simplistic justifications based exclusively on the couple’s decision (Chesser; Maillochnon and Castrén). Women in particular display an awareness of the ways in which their decisions regarding marriage are crossed by the will, desires or preferences of the parents or in-laws. This was the case of Maria dos Anjos, married at the age of 26:It was a choice of the two of us [to marry]. Not an imposition. I didn’t care whether we were married by church or not… and there were times when I even put forward the possibility of a simple civil marriage. However, my parents really liked that I got married by the church. I'm not sure if this is due to tradition, if… and... they talked about it… and I also thought it was beautiful... it was a beautiful party... the dress, all that fantasy... and I really loved marrying in the church... so it became a strong possibility when we began to think about it [to get marry]… The argument that two people might marry because of or also to please the parents or in-laws explains, at least partially, a certain pressure that the fiancées feel before marriage to marry “in a certain way.” Filipa, who dated for ten years, lived the wedding day like “the realisation of a childhood’s dream.” The satisfaction she obtained was shared with her parents and in-laws:To marry in the church, with the wedding dress, and everything else... My mother in-law is a religious person too, right? So we felt that we both like it, the two of us, my mother, my mother-in-law, they would also like it, so we decided to marry in the church. To do the parents’ will is to meet the expectations around a “beautiful” wedding, but sometimes also to fulfil the marriage that the parents did not have. Lurdes is an only daughter, married at the age of 29. She argues that “marriage should be primarily significant for those who actually marry, not the parents or in-laws”. Yet, that was not her case: For us, maybe it was not so important; the paper signed, the ceremony in the church… maybe the two of us made it for our parents. It doesn’t mean that we didn’t have fun [...] and I don’t mean by this that it was a sacrifice, or a hardship […] My mother had no more daughters, and had a great will to marry her only daughter in the church. My mother was not married by the church, but was only married by civil registry. She never managed to convince my dad to get married by the church. And perhaps it was a bit... to project on me what she had not done! Despite her having the will to do but did not achieve it. And maybe I made her wish come true; I realise that she had that desire, a great desire that her daughter would marry in the church. For me, it was not a problem. So, we finally did agree and married in the church. The family of origin thus clearly has a great influence over some of the big decisions associated with marriage, such as whether to get married at all, and whether to involve the church in the process.Small decisions: It Is All about Details! The intrusion of the family of origin is also felt on the apparently more individual decisions as the choice of the dress or several other details concerning the organisation of the ceremony and the party (Chesser, Leeds-Hurwitz). The wedding dress is a good example of how women in particular perceive a certain pressure for conformity and subjection to buy it or choose it “in a certain way.” Silvia, who married at age 23, remembers: I married with a traditional wedding dress, even though I did not want to. I took a long veil, yet I did not want it... because at the time... I wanted to take a short dress... my mum thought I should not... because my mother did not marry in a wedding dress, did not marry in the church, she was already pregnant at the time and so on [downgrade of the tone] so she made pressure so that I was dressed properly.Precisely in order to run away from these impositions, some women admit having bought the dress alone, almost secretly. Maria dos Anjos, for example, chose and bought the wedding dress alone so that she did not have to give in to pressure from anyone: I really enjoyed it! I took a wedding dress... I was the one who chose it; I went to buy it myself, with my own money. I said to myself ‘the wedding dress, I will choose it; I will not be constrained by... I will not take my godmother and then think’... oh... I knew that if I did it, I would have to submit a little to her likes and dislikes… no! So I went to choose the dress alone. The girl who was in the shop was an acquaintance of mine, I tried a lot of them, and when I tried that one, I said to myself ‘this is it!’ and so it was the one!The position of the spouses in the sibling group also has an effect on numerous decisions that fiancées must make in the lead-up to the wedding. Raquel, who felt this pressure before marriage, attributed it to a large extent to the fact that her husband is an only child: Pressure in the sense that João [her husband]... he is an only child, right? So… his parents were always very concerned with certain things. And... everybody... even little things that had no importance, they wanted to decide on that! […] There are a lot of things that have to be decided, a lot of detail and… what I really think is that it is a really unique day, and it's all very important and all that but... but... then each one gives his/her opinion... And ‘I want this,’ ‘I want that,’ ‘I want the other’… it's too much; it's a lot of pressure... to manage... on one side, on the other side… because to try not to hurt vulnerabilities ends up being... crazy. Completely! Those fifteen days before... I think they are... they are a little crazy!Seemingly unimportant details (such as the fact that the mother did not marry in a wedding dress) end up becoming major arguments behind the suggestions or impositions made by both parents and in-laws in relation to decisions surrounding their children’s weddings.(Un)important Decisions: The Guest List The parents of the couple are often heavily involved in the planning of the wedding partly because, although the day is officially about the bride and groom, it is also the way that the parents share this important milestone with their family and friends (Pleck, Kalmijn, Maillochnon and Castrén). Interviewees say it is “easy” to decide on the guest list, since, at first glance arguments behind the most significant family relatives and friends to be present on the wedding day have to do with proximity, relationality and pleasure or happiness in sharing the moment. Nevertheless, it can be a hard task for couples to implement the criteria of proximity in the selection of guests as initially planned. In cases where the family is larger and there are economic constraints, it is common for fiancées to feel some unpleasantness from those relatives who would like to have been invited and were not. In other cases, parents, closer to the extended family, are the ones who produce this tension. On the one hand, they feel the need to justify to some relatives the choices of their adult children who did not include them in the guest list; on the other hand, they are forced to accept the fact that that decision lies with the couple. When planning the marriage of Dora, her mother at one point said something like “[…] ‘but my aunt invited us to her wedding and now...’” Dora understood the suspension of the sentence as a subtle pressure from her mother, although, for her, the question was indeed a very simple one: I give a lot of importance to the people who are with me on a day-to-day basis and that really are with me in good and bad times. [...] It happened. It was easy. For me, it was [laughs]. To my way of thinking it was. It cost my parents. However, not to me [laughs]. It cost me nothing! When the family is larger – but when there are no economic constraints which limit the number of guests – it is more common that weddings are bigger. In these circumstances, it is also more common to have a certain meddling from the families of origin encouraging couples to include the guests of the parents. Teresa admits this is precisely what happened with her: It was not so difficult because we were not also so limited. […] We left everything to the satisfaction of all. […] there were many people who were distant relatives, whom I was not close to. It didn’t really matter to me whether those people were present or not. It had more to do with the will of my parents. And usually we were also invited to those people’s weddings, so maybe it was also because of that… In some other cases there is a kind of agreement between parents and adult children, which allows both to invite “whoever they want”. This is the case of Marina, who had 194 guests “on her side,” against around 70 invited by her husband: I invited more people than him. Why? Well... I could count on my parents, right? And what my parents told me was: ‘you invite whoever you want!’. So, I invited my friends, and some other people I was not as close to, but who my parents wanted me to invite, right? […] but ok, they made a point of inviting them, and since they did not impose any financial limits, instead, they said to me ‘invite whoever you want to’, and we invited... For me, it was a ‘deal.’ I was indifferent about it [laughs]. Marina admits that she made a “deal” with her parents. By letting them pay the costs, she gave tacit consent that they could invite those who they wanted, even if it was the case those guests “didn’t relate to [her] at all.” At the wedding of Raquel, the fact that “there is family that [only her] parents were keen on inviting” was one of the main points of contention between her parents and the couple. The indignation was greater since it was “your [their own, not the parent’s] wedding” and they were being pressed to include people who they “hardly knew,” and with whom they “had no connection”: There were people who came who I did not know even who they were! Never seen them anywhere... but ok, my parents were keen on inviting some people, because they know them and all that... and then... it went into widening, extending and then... it ended up with more than one hundred guests […] we wanted it to be more intimate, more... with closer people… but it was not! The engaged couple thus recognises the importance of the parents’ guests. As one of the interviewees points out, the question is not so much the imposition of the will of the parents, rather the recognition of the importance of certain guests because “they are important to the parents.” Thus, the importance of these guests is not directly measured by the couple, but indirectly by being part of the importance that parents give them.Counter-Decisions: Narratives from the Inside Out Joana, a first daughter, “felt in her skin” the “punishment” for not having succumbed to the pressure she felt over her decision to marry. She told us she had her teenage dreams; however, as she grew older she identified herself less and less with the wedding ceremony. Moreover, with the death of her grandmother, who was especially meaningful to her, “it no longer made sense” to arrange that kind of ceremony since it would always be “incomplete” without her presence. Her boyfriend also did not urge that they marry, instead preferring to live in a de facto union. Joana felt strongly the pressure to take on a role that her parents and in-laws wanted: on the one hand, because she was “a girl, and the oldest daughter;” on the other hand, because her mother-in-law insisted since she had not saw her other daughter to get marry in church, as she was only civilly married. In fact, Joana could marry in church because she had been educated in the Catholic religion and met all the formal requirements to perform a religious marriage: I was the person who was prepared to move forward with this. And I did not! I'm not sorry. I don’t regret it at all! Although not regretted, Joana felt “very deeply” the gap between the expectations of her parents and the direction that she decided to give to her life when she told her parents she did not wanted to marry. She had the same boyfriend since adolescence, whom she moved in with on a New Year's Day at the age of 27. On that evening she organised a small party in the house they had rented and furnished, and stayed there for good. The mother “never forgave her.” The following year, when her sister got married, Joana “had the punishment” of, in the eyes of the mother, “not having done the right thing”: one thing I would have loved to have was a nightshirt [old piece of clothing, handmade] of my grandmother [...] But my mother kept the nightshirt and gave it to my sister on the day she married! My sister also loved my grandmother..., but she didn’t have the same emotional bond that I had with her! So, I got hurt. Honestly, I got! And the day of my sister's wedding for me it was full of surprises... This episode is particularly revealing of how Joana experienced the disappointment that caused to her parents for not having married: I did not have the faintest idea that she [her mother] was going to do that... Yet she kept it [the nightshirt]! [...] She kept it, and then she gave it to my sister! [...] It was my grandmother’s! And then I said, ‘but I was the first to get married!’ And it was I who had a closer relationship with my grandmother. I found it very unfair! [...] Joana sees this wedding gift as “a prize”: It was... she [her sister] was awarded because ‘you did the right thing,’ ‘you got married,’ ‘you had done it with all the pomp ... so take this [the nightshirt], that was of your grandmother!’ The day of her sister's wedding would still hold another surprise for Joana, that one coming from her father. She remembers always seeing at home a bottle of aged whiskey that her father “kept for the first daughter who gets to marry.” I did not get married, right? And... and it was sad to see that day and get the bottle open, the bottle that was proudly kept untouched for many years until the first daughter to marry... Whilst most women admit to have given in to pressure from parents and in-laws, Joana’s example demonstrates another side – emotionally painful – of those who did not conform to marry or to marry in a certain way.Conclusion Based on empirical research on marriages as a family ritual, I have argued that behind representations and discourses of a wedding “of our own,” quite often individuals grant the importance, of, and sometimes they are even pressured by, their families of origin (e.g. parents and in-laws). At the crossroad of tradition and modernity, this pressure is pervasive from the most important to the most apparently trivial decisions or details concerning the mise en scène of the ritual elements chosen to give a symbolic meaning to the ceremony and party (Chesser, Leeds-Hurwitz).Empirical findings and data discussion thus confirm and reinforce the high symbolic value that, despite all the changes weddings, still assume in contemporary society (Berger and Kellner, Segalen and Gillis, A World of their Own Making, Our Virtual Families and Marriages of the Mind). The power and influence of the size and density of the families of origin is not a part of history left behind by the processes of individualization and detraditionalization; rather, families continue to play a central role in structuring the actual options behind the anticipation, planning, and organisation of the wedding. This demonstrates that the reality of contemporary relationality is vastly more textured (Smart) than the normative generalisations of the individualisation and detraditionalisation theses imply, and suggests that in contemplating contemporary marriage conventions, the overt claims to individual choice and autonomy should be be contextualised by the variety of relationships the bride and groom participate in. References Bardin, Laurence. L’Analyse de Contenu. Paris: PUF, 1977. Bauman, Zygmunt. Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds. Cambridge: Polity, 2003. Beck, Ulrich, and Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth. The Normal Chaos of Love. Cambridge: Polity, 1995. Beck-Gernsheim, Elisabeth. Reinventing the Family: In search of New Lifestyles. Cambridge: Polity, 2002. Berger, Peter, and Kellner, Hansfried. “Marriage and the constitution of reality.” Diogenes 46 (1964): 1–24. Bossard, James, and Boll, Eleanor. Ritual in Family Living – A Contemporary Study. Philadelphia: U Pennsylvania P, 1950. Brannen, Julia, and Nielsen, Ann. “Individualisation, Choice and Structure: a Discussion of Current Trends in Sociological Analysis.” The Sociological Review 53.3 (2005): 412–28. Cherlin, Andrew. “The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage.” Journal of Marriage and Family 66 (2004): 848–861. Chesser, Barbara Jo. “Analysis of Wedding Rituals: An Attempt to Make Weddings More Meaningful.” Family Relations 29.2 1980): 204—09. Costa, Rosalina. Pequenos e Grandes Dias: os Rituais na Construção da Família Contemporânea [Small and Big Days. The Rituals Constructing Contemporay Families]. PhD Thesis in Social Sciences – specialization ‘General Sociology’. University of Lisbon: Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (ICS-UL), 2011 ‹http://hdl.handle.net/10451/4770›. Eldén, Sara. “Scripts for the ‘Good Couple’: Individualization and the Reproduction of Gender Inequality.” Acta Sociologica 55.1 (2012): 3–18. Flick, Uwe. An Introduction to Qualitative Research. Sage Publications: London, 1998. —. The Episodic Interview: Small-scale Narratives as Approach to Relevant Experiences (Series Paper) (1997). 29 Oct. 2010 ‹http://www2.lse.ac.uk/methodologyInstitute/pdf/QualPapers/Flick-episodic.pdf›. Giddens, Anthony. The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies. Cambridge: Polity, 1992. Gillis, John. “Marriages of the Mind.” Journal of Marriage and Family 66.4 (2004): 988–91. —. A World of their Own Making. Myth, Ritual, and the Quest for family Values. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1996. —. Our Virtual Families: Toward a Cultural Understanding of Modern Family Life, The Emory Center for Myth and Ritual in American Life – Working Paper, 2. Rutgers U/Department of History (2000). 03 Nov. 2005 ‹http://www.marial.emory.edu/pdfs/Gillispaper.PDF›. Glaser, Barney, and Strauss, Anselm. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1967. Gross, Neil. “The Detraditionalization of Intimacy Reconsidered.” Sociological Theory 23.3 (2005): 286–311. Imber-Black, Evan, and Roberts, Janine. Rituals for Our Times: Celebrating, Healing, and Changing our Lives and our Relationships. New York: Harper Perennial, 1993. Kalmijn, Matthijs. “Marriage Rituals as Reinforcers of Role Transitions: an Analysis of Wedding in the Netherlands.” Journal of Marriage and Family 66 (2004): 582–94. Leeds-Hurwitz, Wendy. “Making Marriage Visible: Wedding Anniversaries as the Public Component of Private Relationships.” Text 25.5 (2005): 595–631. Maillochnon, Florence, and Castrén, Anna-Maija. “Making Family at a Wedding: Bilateral Kinship and Equality.” Families and Kinship in Contemporary Europe. Ed. Ritta Jallinoja, and Eric D. Widmer. Hampshire: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2011. 31–44. Morgan, David. “Risk and Family Practices: Accounting for Change and Fluidity in Family Life.” The New Family?. Ed. Elisabeth B. Silva, and Carol Smart. London: Sage Publications, 1999. 13–30.—. Family Connections—an Introduction to Family Studies. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996. —. Rethinking Family Practices. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillam, 2011. Pleck, Elizabeth. Celebrating the Family. Ethnicity, Consumer Culture, and Family Rituals. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2000. Segalen, Martine. Rites et Rituels Contemporains. Paris: Nathan, 1998. Smart, Carol. Personal Life – New Directions in Sociological Thinking. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007. Smart, Carol, and Shipman, Beccy. “Visions in Monochrome: Families, Marriage and the Individualization Thesis.” The British Journal of Sociology 55.4 (2004): 491–509. Wolin, Steven, and Bennett, Linda. “Family Rituals.” Family Process 23 (1984): 401–20.

In its preamble, The Western Australian Charter of Multiculturalism (WA) commits the state to becoming: “A society in which respect for mutual difference is accompanied by equality of opportunity within a framework of democratic citizenship”. One of the principles of multiculturalism, as enunciated in the Charter, is “equality of opportunity for all members of society to achieve their full potential in a free and democratic society where every individual is equal before and under the law”. An important element of this principle is the “equality of opportunity … to achieve … full potential”. The implication here is that those who start from a position of disadvantage when it comes to achieving that potential deserve more than ‘equal’ treatment. Implicitly, equality can be achieved only through the recognition of and response to differential needs and according to the likelihood of achieving full potential. This is encapsulated in Kymlicka’s argument that neutrality is “hopelessly inadequate once we look at the diversity of cultural membership which exists in contemporary liberal democracies” (903). Yet such a potential commitment to differential support might seem unequal to some, where equality is constructed as the same or equal treatment regardless of differing circumstances. Until the past half-century or more, this problematic has been a hotly-contested element of the struggle for Civil Rights for African-Americans in the United States, especially as these rights related to educational opportunity during the years of racial segregation. For some, providing resources to achieve equal outcomes (rather than be committed to equal inputs) may appear to undermine the very ethos of liberal democracy. In Australia, this perspective has been the central argument of Pauline Hanson and her supporters who denounce programs designed as measures to achieve equality for specific disadvantaged groups; including Indigenous Australians and humanitarian refugees. Nevertheless, equality for all on all grounds of legally-accepted difference: gender, race, age, family status, sexual orientation, political conviction, to name a few; is often held as the hallmark of progressive liberal societies such as Australia. In the matter of religious freedoms the situation seems much less complex. All that is required for religious equality, it seems, is to define religion as a private matter – carried out, as it were, between consenting parties away from the public sphere. This necessitates, effectively, the separation of state and religion. This separation of religious belief from the apparatus of the state is referred to as ‘secularism’ and it tends to be regarded as a cornerstone of a liberal democracy, given the general assumption that secularism is a necessary precursor to equal treatment of and respect for different religious beliefs, and the association of secularism with the Western project of the Enlightenment when liberty, equality and science replaced religion and superstition. By this token, western nations committed to equality are also committed to being liberal, democratic and secular in nature; and it is a matter of state indifference as to which religious faith a citizen embraces – Wiccan, Christian, Judaism, etc – if any. Historically, and arguably more so in the past decade, the terms ‘democratic’, ‘secular’, ‘liberal’ and ‘equal’ have all been used to inscribe characteristics of the collective ‘West’. Individuals and states whom the West ascribe as ‘other’ are therefore either or all of: not democratic; not liberal; or not secular – and failing any one of these characteristics (for any country other than Britain, with its parliamentary-established Church of England, headed by the Queen as Supreme Governor) means that that country certainly does not espouse equality. The West and the ‘Other’ in Popular Discourse The constructed polarisation between the free, secular and democratic West that values equality; and the oppressive ‘other’ that perpetuates theocracies, religious discrimination and – at the ultimate – human rights abuses, is a common theme in much of the West’s media and popular discourse on Islam. The same themes are also applied in some measure to Muslims in Australia, in particular to constructions of the rights of Muslim women in Australia. Typically, Muslim women’s dress is deemed by some secular Australians to be a symbol of religious subjugation, rather than of free choice. Arguably, this polemic has come to the fore since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. However, as Aly and Walker note, the comparisons between the West and the ‘other’ are historically constructed and inherited (Said) and have tended latterly to focus western attention on the role and status of Muslim women as evidence of the West’s progression comparative to its antithesis, Eastern oppression. An examination of studies of the United States media coverage of the September 11 attacks, and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, reveals some common media constructions around good versus evil. There is no equal status between these. Good must necessarily triumph. In the media coverage, the evil ‘other’ is Islamic terrorism, personified by Osama bin Laden. Part of the justification for the war on terror is a perception that the West, as a force for good in this world, must battle evil and protect freedom and democracy (Erjavec and Volcic): to do otherwise is to allow the terror of the ‘other’ to seep into western lives. The war on terror becomes the defence of the west, and hence the defence of equality and freedom. A commitment to equality entails a defeat of all things constructed as denying the rights of people to be equal. Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeaux and Garland analysed the range of discourses evident in Time and Newsweek magazines in the five weeks following September 11 and found that journalists replicated themes of national identity present in the communication strategies of US leaders and elites. The political and media response to the threat of the evil ‘other’ is to create a monolithic appeal to liberal values which are constructed as being a monopoly of the ‘free’ West. A brief look at just a few instances of public communication by US political leaders confirms Hutcheson et al.’s contention that the official construction of the 2001 attacks invoked discourses of good and evil reminiscent of the Cold War. In reference to the actions of the four teams of plane hijackers, US president George W Bush opened his Address to the Nation on the evening of September 11: “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts” (“Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”). After enjoining Americans to recite Psalm 23 in prayer for the victims and their families, President Bush ended his address with a clear message of national unity and a further reference to the battle between good and evil: “This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world” (“Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”). In his address to the joint houses of Congress shortly after September 11, President Bush implicated not just the United States in this fight against evil, but the entire international community stating: “This is the world’s fight. This is civilisation’s fight” (cited by Brown 295). Addressing the California Business Association a month later, in October 2001, Bush reiterated the notion of the United States as the leading nation in the moral fight against evil, and identified this as a possible reason for the attack: “This great state is known for its diversity – people of all races, all religions, and all nationalities. They’ve come here to live a better life, to find freedom, to live in peace and security, with tolerance and with justice. When the terrorists attacked America, this is what they attacked”. While the US media framed the events of September 11 as an attack on the values of democracy and liberalism as these are embodied in US democratic traditions, work by scholars analysing the Australian media’s representation of the attacks suggested that this perspective was echoed and internationalised for an Australian audience. Green asserts that global media coverage of the attacks positioned the global audience, including Australians, as ‘American’. The localisation of the discourses of patriotism and national identity for Australian audiences has mainly been attributed to the media’s use of the good versus evil frame that constructed the West as good, virtuous and moral and invited Australian audiences to subscribe to this argument as members of a shared Western democratic identity (Osuri and Banerjee). Further, where the ‘we’ are defenders of justice, equality and the rule of law; the opposing ‘others’ are necessarily barbaric. Secularism and the Muslim Diaspora Secularism is a historically laden term that has been harnessed to symbolise the emancipation of social life from the forced imposition of religious doctrine. The struggle between the essentially voluntary and private demands of religion, and the enjoyment of a public social life distinct from religious obligations, is historically entrenched in the cultural identities of many modern Western societies (Dallmayr). The concept of religious freedom in the West has evolved into a principle based on the bifurcation of life into the objective public sphere and the subjective private sphere within which individuals are free to practice their religion of choice (Yousif), or no religion at all. Secularism, then, is contingent on the maintenance of a separation between the public (religion-free) and the private or non- public (which may include religion). The debate regarding the feasibility or lack thereof of maintaining this separation has been a matter of concern for democratic theorists for some time, and has been made somewhat more complicated with the growing presence of religious diasporas in liberal democratic states (Charney). In fact, secularism is often cited as a precondition for the existence of religious pluralism. By removing religion from the public domain of the state, religious freedom, in so far as it constitutes the ability of an individual to freely choose which religion, if any, to practice, is deemed to be ensured. However, as Yousif notes, the Western conception of religious freedom is based on a narrow notion of religion as a personal matter, possibly a private emotional response to the idea of God, separate from the rational aspects of life which reside in the public domain. Arguably, religion is conceived of as recognising (or creating) a supernatural dimension to life that involves faith and belief, and the suspension of rational thought. This Western notion of religion as separate from the state, dividing the private from the public sphere, is constructed as a necessary basis for the liberal democratic commitment to secularism, and the notional equality of all religions, or none. Rawls questioned how people with conflicting political views and ideologies can freely endorse a common political regime in secular nations. The answer, he posits, lies in the conception of justice as a mechanism to regulate society independently of plural (and often opposing) religious or political conceptions. Thus, secularism can be constructed as an indicator of pluralism and justice; and political reason becomes the “common currency of debate in a pluralist society” (Charney 7). A corollary of this is that religious minorities must learn to use the language of political reason to represent and articulate their views and opinions in the public context, especially when talking with non-religious others. This imposes a need for religious minorities to support their views and opinions with political reason that appeals to the community at large as citizens, and not just to members of the minority religion concerned. The common ground becomes one of secularism, in which all speakers are deemed to be indifferent as to the (private) claims of religion upon believers. Minority religious groups, such as fundamentalist Mormons, invoke secular language of moral tolerance and civil rights to be acknowledged by the state, and to carry out their door-to-door ‘information’ evangelisation/campaigns. Right wing fundamentalist Christian groups and Catholics opposed to abortion couch their views in terms of an extension of the secular right to life, and in terms of the human rights and civil liberties of the yet-to-be-born. In doing this, these religious groups express an acceptance of the plurality of the liberal state and engage in debates in the public sphere through the language of political values and political principles of the liberal democratic state. The same principles do not apply within their own associations and communities where the language of the private religious realm prevails, and indeed is expected. This embracing of a political rhetoric for discussions of religion in the public sphere presents a dilemma for the Muslim diaspora in liberal democratic states. For many Muslims, religion is a complete way of life, incapable of compartmentalisation. The narrow Western concept of religious expression as a private matter is somewhat alien to Muslims who are either unable or unwilling to separate their religious needs from their needs as citizens of the nation state. Problems become apparent when religious needs challenge what seems to be publicly acceptable, and conflicts occur between what the state perceives to be matters of rational state interest and what Muslims perceive to be matters of religious identity. Muslim women’s groups in Western Australia for example have for some years discussed the desirability of a Sharia divorce court which would enable Muslims to obtain divorces according to Islamic law. It should be noted here that not all Muslims agree with the need for such a court and many – probably a majority – are satisfied with the existing processes that allow Muslim men and women to obtain a divorce through the Australian family court. For some Muslims however, this secular process does not satisfy their religious needs and it is perceived as having an adverse impact on their ability to adhere to their faith. A similar situation pertains to divorced Catholics who, according to a strict interpretation of their doctrine, are unable to take the Eucharist if they form a subsequent relationship (even if married according to the state), unless their prior marriage has been annulled by the Catholic Church or their previous partner has died. Whereas divorce is considered by the state as a public and legal concern, for some Muslims and others it is undeniably a religious matter. The suggestion by the Anglican Communion’s Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, that the adoption of certain aspects of Sharia law regarding marital disputes or financial matters is ultimately unavoidable, sparked controversy in Britain and in Australia. Attempts by some Australian Muslim scholars to elaborate on Dr Williams’s suggestions, such as an article by Anisa Buckley in The Herald Sun (Buckley), drew responses that, typically, called for Muslims to ‘go home’. A common theme in these responses is that proponents of Sharia law (and Islam in general) do not share a commitment to the Australian values of freedom and equality. The following excerpts from the online pages of Herald Sun Readers’ Comments (Herald Sun) demonstrate this perception: “These people come to Australia for freedoms they have never experienced before and to escape repression which is generally brought about by such ‘laws’ as Sharia! How very dare they even think that this would be an option. Go home if you want such a regime. Such an insult to want to come over to this country on our very goodwill and our humanity and want to change our systems and ways. Simply, No!” Posted 1:58am February 12, 2008 “Under our English derived common law statutes, the law is supposed to protect an individual’s rights to life, liberty and property. That is the basis of democracy in Australia and most other western nations. Sharia law does not adequately share these philosophies and principles, thus it is incompatible with our system of law.” Posted 12:55am February 11, 2008 “Incorporating religious laws in the secular legal system is just plain wrong. No fundamentalist religion (Islam in particular) is compatible with a liberal-democracy.” Posted 2:23pm February 10, 2008 “It should not be allowed in Australia the Muslims come her for a better life and we give them that opportunity but they still believe in covering them selfs why do they even come to Australia for when they don’t follow owe [our] rules but if we went to there [their] country we have to cover owe selfs [sic]” Posted 11:28am February 10, 2008 Conflicts similar to this one – over any overt or non-private religious practice in Australia – may also be observed in public debates concerning the wearing of traditional Islamic dress; the slaughter of animals for consumption; Islamic burial rites, and other religious practices which cannot be confined to the private realm. Such conflicts highlight the inability of the rational liberal approach to solve all controversies arising from religious traditions that enjoin a broader world view than merely private spirituality. In order to adhere to the liberal reduction of religion to the private sphere, Muslims in the West must negotiate some religious practices that are constructed as being at odds with the rational state and practice a form of Islam that is consistent with secularism. At the extreme, this Western-acceptable form is what the Australian government has termed ‘moderate Islam’. The implication here is that, for the state, ‘non-moderate Islam’ – Islam that pervades the public realm – is just a descriptor away from ‘extreme’. The divide between Christianity and Islam has been historically played out in European Christendom as a refusal to recognise Islam as a world religion, preferring instead to classify it according to race or ethnicity: a Moorish tendency, perhaps. The secular state prefers to engage with Muslims as an ethnic, linguistic or cultural group or groups (Yousif). Thus, in order to engage with the state as political citizens, Muslims must find ways to present their needs that meet the expectations of the state – ways that do not use their religious identity as a frame of reference. They can do this by utilizing the language of political reason in the public domain or by framing their needs, views and opinions exclusively in terms of their ethnic or cultural identity with no reference to their shared faith. Neither option is ideal, or indeed even viable. This is partly because many Muslims find it difficult if not impossible to separate their religious needs from their needs as political citizens; and also because the prevailing perception of Muslims in the media and public arena is constructed on the basis of an understanding of Islam as a religion that conflicts with the values of liberal democracy. In the media and public arena, little consideration is given to the vast differences that exist among Muslims in Australia, not only in terms of ethnicity and culture, but also in terms of practice and doctrine (Shia or Sunni). The dominant construction of Muslims in the Australian popular media is of religious purists committed to annihilating liberal, secular governments and replacing them with anti-modernist theocratic regimes (Brasted). It becomes a talking point for some, for example, to realise that there are international campaigns to recognise Gay Muslims’ rights within their faith (ABC) (in the same way that there are campaigns to recognise Gay Christians as full members of their churches and denominations and equally able to hold high office, as followers of the Anglican Communion will appreciate). Secularism, Preference and Equality Modood asserts that the extent to which a minority religious community can fully participate in the public and political life of the secular nation state is contingent on the extent to which religion is the primary marker of identity. “It may well be the case therefore that if a faith is the primary identity of any community then that community cannot fully identify with and participate in a polity to the extent that it privileges a rival faith. Or privileges secularism” (60). Modood is not saying here that Islam has to be privileged in order for Muslims to participate fully in the polity; but that no other religion, nor secularism, should be so privileged. None should be first, or last, among equals. For such a situation to occur, Islam would have to be equally acceptable both with other religions and with secularism. Following a 2006 address by the former treasurer (and self-avowed Christian) Peter Costello to the Sydney Institute, in which Costello suggested that people who feel a dual claim from both Islamic law and Australian law should be stripped of their citizenship (Costello), the former Prime Minister, John Howard, affirmed what he considers to be Australia’s primary identity when he stated that ‘Australia’s core set of values flowed from its Anglo Saxon identity’ and that any one who did not embrace those values should not be allowed into the country (Humphries). The (then) Prime Minister’s statement is an unequivocal assertion of the privileged position of the Anglo Saxon tradition in Australia, a tradition with which many Muslims and others in Australia find it difficult to identify. Conclusion Religious identity is increasingly becoming the identity of choice for Muslims in Australia, partly because it is perceived that their faith is under attack and that it needs defending (Aly). They construct the defence of their faith as a choice and an obligation; but also as a right that they have under Australian law as equal citizens in a secular state (Aly and Green). Australian Muslims who have no difficulty in reconciling their core Australianness with their deep faith take it as a responsibility to live their lives in ways that model the reconciliation of each identity – civil and religious – with the other. In this respect, the political call to Australian Muslims to embrace a ‘moderate Islam’, where this is seen as an Islam without a public or political dimension, is constructed as treating their faith as less than equal. Religious identity is generally deemed to have no place in the liberal democratic model, particularly where that religion is constructed to be at odds with the principles and values of liberal democracy, namely tolerance and adherence to the rule of law. Indeed, it is as if the national commitment to secularism rules as out-of-bounds any identity that is grounded in religion, giving precedence instead to accepting and negotiating cultural and ethnic differences. Religion becomes a taboo topic in these terms, an affront against secularism and the values of the Enlightenment that include liberty and equality. In these circumstances, it is not the case that all religions are equally ignored in a secular framework. What is the case is that the secular framework has been constructed as a way of ‘privatising’ one religion, Christianity; leaving others – including Islam – as having nowhere to go. Islam thus becomes constructed as less than equal since it appears that, unlike Christians, Muslims are not willing to play the secular game. In fact, Muslims are puzzling over how they can play the secular game, and why they should play the secular game, given that – as is the case with Christians – they see no contradiction in performing ‘good Muslim’ and ‘good Australian’, if given an equal chance to embrace both. Acknowledgements This paper is based on the findings of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project, 2005-7, involving 10 focus groups and 60 in-depth interviews. The authors wish to acknowledge the participation and contributions of WA community members. 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