Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Rent, Germany: Berlin”

Criticism has been raised over the legislative process to the extent that the revised legislation on the so-called Three Rent Acts in 2020 is called legislative dictatorship. The rent law is the subject of civil law, but from public law perspective, it can be regarded as one of regulatory legislations as part of a kind of housing policy. It can be said that it is a very important element of evaluation of the regulatory legislation whether it has undergone an appropriate process of deliberation based on our economic reality. This study deals with the regulation on the rent control in Berlin, which has recently become a problem in Germany, and the decision on unconstitutionality of the German Federal Constitutional Court. The Berlin’s rent cap is a very radical legislative attempt comparable to our Three Rent Acts. But, it is difficult to compare them in that German civil law as a whole, because of regulations that are not in Korean civil law. The above decision has a simple logical structure that the Act that introduced the Berlin’s rent cap is unconstitutional because the federation used competitive legislative authority completely. However, by devoting very long pages to explaining the German legislative history on social rent law, it warns that the rationality and prudence of legislation are important. Through the discussion on German rent regulations, the level of avoiding ideological discussions shown by German law, the systematic and balanced German civil law system, and the importance of a step-by-step and unified response to housing rent regulation can be seen. The level of Korean law has already well developed for a long time, and it is exceeding the level of simply translating foreign law. Therefore, it is silly to imitate German legislation without analyzing or deliberating on our economic situation.

In Germany, the population of large cities such as Berlin has increased rapidly due to industrialization and urbanization since modern times. The rental apartments for workers in large cities built during this period were called “rental barracks”(Mietskaserne), and the living conditions were very poor. As such, the demand for residential space in large cities continued to increase, and this resulted in an increase in demand for land, leading to a rapid rise in land prices. In the midst of this, American economist Henry George argued that the land value should be shared by society through the land value taxation, which collects land rent as a tax, and through this, the land problem could be solved. Influenced by Henry George's argument, Adolf Damashke appeared in Germany and the German Land Reformers Association (Bund Deutscher Bodenreformer) was formed. Due to their efforts, the Hereditary Land Rights Act was enacted in 1919, and Article 155 of the Weimar Constitution contained the content of the return of development profits. However, even if the constitution stipulates the return of development profits, the subsequent legislation was not implemented. This experience of Germany's past legislation can be used as a reference in Korea's current legislation related to land-rental housing for sale and the issue of stipulating the concept of land public in the Constitution.

Theoretical basis This case applies a stakeholder analysis to examine the trade-offs between the firm’s strategy and the interests of different stakeholder groups. A PESTEL analysis supports an evaluation of the firm’s situation. Consumer behavior theories on psychological ownership and territoriality offer a framework for analyzing the conflicts that arise from the inhabitants’ protests. Research methodology This case relies on secondary sources, including news reports, social media sites and company websites. This case has been classroom tested with undergraduate students in a strategic management course in January 2019 at the University of Cologne, Germany. Case overview/synopsis In November 2016, Google announced its intentions to rent a building in the Kreuzberg district of Berlin to open a Google Campus, a business incubator for tech start-ups that would offer entrepreneurs support, workshops and access to networks. Following the announcement, dissatisfied local communities organized protests, in which leaders complained that “It is extremely violent and arrogant of this mega-corporation, whose business model is based on mass surveillance and which speculates like crazy, to set up shop here” (Business Times, 2018). Berlin’s Government supported the Google Campus plan; inhabitants rejected it with fierce and persistent protests. In face of this challenge, was it still possible for Google to continue its plans in Berlin? Complexity academic level This case qualifies for use in strategic management classes at undergraduate and MBA levels. Its focus aligns well with stakeholder analyses, PESTEL analyses and business strategy. In addition, for courses on organizational communications or public relations, this case provides a way to explore the relationship between Google and its stakeholders, especially protesters, in detail. Moreover, this case is well suited for consumer research and public policy courses (e.g., transformative consumer research) centered on discussions of territoriality.

Berlin is facing large increases in rent levels over the last decades. To overcome pressure on the market, the Senate of the city has repeatedly introduced rent controls. While the German Constitutional Court has found the latest rent-controlling legislation, the Price Ceiling Act of 2020 to be violating German constitutional law and hence invalid and void, there is strong economic evidence for why rent controls do more harm than good and after all even lead to a decrease in housing provided. To provide for affordable housing, the City of Berlin needs to pursue other measures that stipulate the construction of new housing: the increase and acceleration of the granting of building permits, release of shallow land and actively engage in municipal construction.

Abstract New rental contracts have risen dramatically in many German places in recent years due to strong influxes and sluggish construction activity. The rent brake should put a stop to this development so that housing in prospering cities remains affordable for people on normal and low incomes. Although initial successes were attested to the rent brake, empirical findings are increasing, according to which the rent brake is not having the desired effect. This also applies to the findings determined here: the results of a difference-in-difference estimation show that the rent brake has reduced rents on offer in Hamburg, Berlin and Munich by up to 5%, while no effects are observed in Cologne and Düsseldorf. Nevertheless, the effects are lagging behind the expected effects almost everywhere. The results illustrate once again an implementation deficit and show that no general statements on the effectiveness of the rent brake are currently permissible. However, the rent brake is certainly having a price effect in some regions, even if not to the intended extent.

Abstract We analyze the behavior of investors in the Berlin rental apartment house market over the years 1980-2004. Using constant-quality multipliers ( price- rent ratios), we reject the hypothesis that multipliers in the market were set in a rational manner. Supported by narrative evidence, we conjecture that investors misjudged the economic effects of the German reunification. To examine this, we employ a stylized structural economic model and analyze the effects of shocks on rational multipliers. It seems that investors confused the reunification with a permanent supply side shock to the economy. By basing their investment decisions on this misjudgement, investors behaved irrationally, but in a very uncertain and unprecedented environment.

AbstractThis text is a synopsis of the “Seminar on Organizational Aspects of POCT Management” which was part of the 4th Munich POCT symposium 2019. The session was chaired in part 1 by Christiane Maschek (Berlin) and Anke Urban (Ludwigshafen), and in part 2 by Barbara Oschwald-Häg (Offenburg) and Marco Kachler (Klagenfurt/AT). The seminar was held in German in order to allow non-English-speaking medical technicians the full understanding of the presented contents. Part 1: Nice to Know – Challenges for networking POCT systems (Michaela Markhoff, Hamburg). Best Practice – Implementation of POCT in a hospital without central lab services (Jennifer Planz, Essen). Best Practice – Benefits of the POCT commission demonstrated using the example of implementing glucose POCT devices (Barbara Oschwald-Häg, Offenburg). Part 2: Best Practice – Challenges of a group-wide implementation of a POCT competence management (Sandra Mütze, Berlin). Nice to Know – Learning from mistakes in preanalytics (Reno Konzack, Berlin). New IFCC recommendation for checking reference intervals (Harald Maier, Altötting).

Introduction. The article examines the German experience of the investment policy of rehabilitation of industrial panel residential buildings. Based on scientific research, the Senate of Berlin decided on the need for rehabilitation of panel housing of the city. German scientists developed an investment policy for supporting the programme of panel housing rehabilitation. Special attention was paid to investment planning and analysis of investments in the programme. Materials and methods. Investment planning of measures for rehabilitation of industrial residential buildings in Berlin carried out from 1990 to 2000 was analysed in the course of the study. The classification of investment payback procedure was investigated. The profitability of investment projects is determined by well-known methods of investment accounting: static and dynamic ones. The German concept of integrated investment analysis system through SIB simulation model programmes is studied. Results. The SIB simulation model is a part of the general investment analysis system. The selection criteria identified in the model should promote investment analysis and facilitate the search for solutions. The OSIM programme performs the actual simulation of solvency and investment accounts. The SOSIM programme specifies the data to control the OSIM simulation programme. Control data are entered and stored in the SAUS programme. The programmes aim at their systematic application to make the considered investments transparent and explainable. Conclusions. The profitability of the rehabilitation programme was determined using well-known methods of investment simulation. When rehabilitating the panel houses, the following parameters were obtained: restoration of physical and moral deterioration of the housing stock, reduction of operating costs, providing people living quality, criteria of demand for housing services and acceptable rent cost, satisfaction of tenants in terms of price-to-quality relation, location and social facilities, employment opportunities, identifying demand for affordable housing. The positive results of the applying investment modeling methods can be used to calculate the profitability of budget investments in the state programme of renovation in Moscow.

This paper concerns the spatial structure of Tesla’s four ‘gigafactories’ (‘giga’ is gigawatt hour, GWh) which are located in Tesla’s first Gigafacility (1) at Sparks, near Reno, Nevada; the Solar City Gigafactory (2) at Buffalo, New York state; the 2019 Tesla plant at Shanghai, China Gigafactory (3); and the new Tesla gigafactory Europe Gigafactory (4), which is a manufacturing plant to be constructed in Grünheide, near Berlin, Germany. The newest campus is 20 miles southeast of central Berlin on the main railway line to Wrocław, Poland. Three main features of the ‘gigafactory’ phenomenon, apart from their scale, are in the industry organisation of production, which thus far reverses much current conventional wisdom regarding production geography. Thus, Tesla’s automotive facility in Fremont California reconcentrates manufacturing on site as in-house own brand componentry, especially heavy parts, or by requiring hitherto distant global suppliers to locate in proximity to the main manufacturing plant. Second, as an electric vehicle (EV) producer, the contributions of Tesla’s production infrastructure and logistics infrastructure are important in meeting greenhouse gas mitigation and the reduction of global warming. Finally, the deployment of Big Data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI) and ‘predictive management’ are important. This lies in gigafactory logistics contributing to production and distribution efficiency and effectiveness as a primer for all future industry and services in seeking to minimise time-management issues. This too potentially contributes significantly to the reduction of wasteful energy usage.

This book provides a comprehensive review of the transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe, from the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall to the Trump administration. It highlights the primary factors that test the U.S-Europe relationship. America and Europe Adrift highlights the background of the German unification and the reaffirmation of NATO as the framework of U.S. presence in Europe after the end of the Cold War; the NATO enlargement; the Transatlantic Rift in the context of the Iraq War; the economic aspects of transatlantic relations, specifically the rise of Germany's weight in international affairs as a result of the European Monetary Union; and the gradual retrenchment of U.S. power. It focuses on the enduring factors that threaten the transatlantic relationship during the 21st century while also suggesting how that relationship will likely survive: through the United States' continued provision of indispensable security to the rest of the Western world. This book is an essential resource for students of transatlantic relations; graduates in international politics and international history, security studies, and strategic studies; and foreign policy practitioners.

Barbarossawas the biggest German invasion of World War II. Comprehensively illustrated, this study explores the air campaign that spearheaded it, and how it evolved during the rest of 1941. The German invasion of the USSR, OperationBarbarossa, was the apex of Hitler’s aggression. The strength of the Luftwaffe was gathered from across Europe for its opening strikes, where it faced a huge but badly equipped and ill-prepared Soviet Air Force (VVS) of 20,000 aircraft, which it quickly destroyed. In this book, Eastern Front expert William E. Hiestand examines this shattering first campaign, as well as how theBarbarossaair war developed over the following months. He describes how between June and December 1941, Luftwaffe losses rose and aircraft readiness steadily decreased under the pressure of combat. He also analyses the evacuation of Soviet industry – including aircraft production – to the Urals, and the rebuilding of the VVS; by the time German columns stalled 25km from Moscow, the VVS had more operational aircraft at the front than the Luftwaffe. He also covers aspects such as the abortive VVS strikes on Berlin and other strategic targets, and the Luftwaffe’s strategic bombing raids on Moscow. With striking original artwork, 3D diagrams, maps and rare photos, this book reveals the full story of the aerial campaign inBarbarossa, as the devastation began in the most brutal theatre of World War II.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.

AbstractOne of the stylized facts in the literature is that the level and quality of entrepreneurship is determined by institutional framework conditions—the so-called rules of the game. In this conceptual contribution, we show that this insight is also key to understand the massive surge in start-up activity after the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. Our contribution draws on recent work analyzing who decided to start a venture in East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In this previous work, it was found that many individuals who demonstrated commitment to the anti-entrepreneurial communist regime in the socialist German Democratic Republic (GDR) launched their own new ventures soon after German re-unification. We argue that the previous commitment to communism of post-socialist entrepreneurs reflects a tendency toward rent-seeking, which is a form of unproductive entrepreneurship. Once institutions changed radically, their entrepreneurial efforts were directed toward start-up activity. In the current contribution, we reflect on this evidence and discuss to which extent it can be generalized beyond the East German context.

AbstractThis chapter will focus on the two decades after 1945, the period of the “post-war society” (1945–1967), which in the historical sciences is also characterized as a period of boom (keywords: “Wirtschaftswunder” (“economic miracle”), expansion of the welfare state, expansion of the educational sector, certainty about the future) and which comes to an end in the 1970s. Germany was undergoing a profound process of change: socio-structural changes in an advanced industrial society, structural changes in the family and a retreat into the private sphere, new opportunities in the areas of consumption and leisure due to the “Wirtschaftswunder,” urbanization and changes in communities, “Western Integration” (“Westbindung”), the ban on the KPD (Communist Party of Germany) in 1956, remilitarization, the development of the mass media and mass motorization, and the repression of the Nazi past were central social and sociological issues. At the same time, fascist tendencies were still virulent during the 1950s and 1960s. After 1945, sociology had to be rebuilt. Journals were refounded or newly founded, the German Sociological Association was restored and sociology was re-established as a teaching subject. Different “schools” and regional centers of sociology emerged. The so-called Cologne School centered around René König, the Frankfurt School around Adorno and Horkheimer, and the circle around Helmut Schelsky should be mentioned in particular; but also, Wolfgang Abendroth, Werner Hofmann, and Heinz Maus (Marburg School), Otto Stammer (Berlin), Arnold Bergstraesser (Freiburg i.Br.), and Helmuth Plessner (Göttingen). Despite their theoretical and political differences, up until the 1950s, they all had in common the decisive will for political and social enlightenment regarding the post-war situation. Furthermore, the particular importance that empirical social research and non-university research institutions had for the further development of sociology after 1945 is worth mentioning.At the end of the 1950s, field-specific dynamics gained momentum. The different “schools” and groups tried to secure and expand their position in the sociological field and their divergent research profiles became increasingly visible. The so-called civil war in sociology drove the actors further apart. Additionally, disciplinary struggles and camp-building processes during the first 20 years of West German sociology revolved around the debate on role theory and the dispute over positivism. By the end of the 1950s, an institutional and generational change can be observed. The so-called post-war generation, which included Ralf Dahrendorf, Jürgen Habermas, Niklas Luhmann, Erwin K. Scheuch, Heinrich Popitz, Hans Paul Bahrdt, M. Rainer Lepsius, and Renate Mayntz, assumed central positions in organizations, editorial boards of journals, and universities. While the early “schools” and circles (König, Schelsky, Adorno, and Horkheimer) initially focused on the sociology of the family and empirical research, the following generation concentrated foremost on industrial sociology, but also on topics of social structure and social stratification as well as on social mobility.

Abstract This chapter shows that even an American passport did not guarantee safety from SA attacks. Its first section catalogues attacks against American Jews in Berlin, frequently caused by rent and property disputes, and shows that even when the German State had a vital interest in identifying the culprits, as in the case of the attack on Philip Zuckerman, which had attracted international attention, SA leaders succeeded in shielding their own. Here, as in all other instances, attackers got off scot-free. Yet, as a result of attacks on U.S. nationals, the American public was forewarned at an early date, so that not only daily papers such as The New York Times and Chicago Tribune but also magazines such as The Nation, Contemporary Review, Current History, and others ran long reports on Nazi antisemitic violence in the spring of 1933. West European Jews and Jews from Czechoslovakia and Rumania were not spared either, however long their stay in Germany and however deep their roots in the country may have been. Even though attacks against them were frequently based on private quarrels (attackers were often debtors who wanted to eliminate their debt), assailants often used stereotypical Nazi propaganda accusations as a pretext, making their Jewish victims out to be communists, child molesters, or seducers of German women. There was no factual basis for these accusations; they served merely as an alibi function and “moral” justification for the attackers, who thereby sought to protect themselves from criminal prosecution in case charges would be brought against them.

Abstract Der Freischiitz had its first performance on 18 June 1821 at the newly erected Royal Playhouse in Berlin. Musical politics attended the birth of Weber’s most famous opera. Spontini’s Olympia, reworked specifically for Berlin and translated into German by E. T. A. Hoffmann, had had its premiere at the Berlin Opera shortly before, on 14 May, with much scenic splendor. Spontini was the favorite composer of King Frederick William Ill and had just been appointed General musikdirektor over the opposition of much of the German public; indeed the Court Theater Intendant, Count Bruhl, had hoped to install Weber in that position. Weber’s triumph obliterated Olympia, and in the end both composers were the losers: Berlin remained closed to Weber for the rest of his short life, and Spontini, though he remained there until 1842, never won over the public. Heine, a witness to both operatic premieres, reported gleefully on the party politics surrounding them; and Weber’s son, born the following year, pictured the political situation vividly in the extract given below, from the biography of his father (published in 1864).

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the euro's birth and failure. The euro was supposed to strengthen the union between European nation states by allowing the poorer ‘peripheral’ countries to catch up with the richer core, increasing prosperity for all, as well as permanently channelling the growing strength of a reunified Germany into a common European destiny. Instead, the periphery found itself abandoned by financial markets and fell into an economic black hole. The call for more German money put Berlin firmly in the driver's seat of European policymaking. In the rest of Europe, voters, creditors and debtors alike felt angry and disempowered. Rather than being the crowning glory of Europe's successful reconciliation, the common currency came to look more like a millstone around the continent's neck.

This chapter discusses the challenges faced by Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg and the rest of the German Jewry during the Nazi regime. Aside from the political challenges in Nazi Germany, there were many pressing religious issues brought on by the policies of the regime. It was in this area that Weinberg assumed a prominent role. The chapter thus embarks on a few of the halakhic issues with which he had to deal, to illustrate the difficult circumstances in which Orthodox Jews found themselves. Despite these challenges, however, the chapter also shows that Weinberg and the Berlin Rabbinical Seminary experienced a rather productive period, as the seminary became the focus of German Jews' social, cultural, and intellectual engagement — and all this was accomplished without government interference. The chapter also describes the decline of the Torah im Derekh Eretz ideal among the younger generations, despite Weinberg's attempts to defend it. To conclude, the chapter closes with the events of the Kristallnacht and the closure of the seminary despite Weinberg's persistently optimistic views regarding the Nazis' treatment of the Jews.

“Peace Street.” As we drive up to the home of Wolfgang Harich, 72, one of the leading intellectual controversialists in postwar Germany—indeed a one-man battlefield where DDR history and identity have fought themselves out—I remark to my friend Ulrike on the ironies of his address. It seemed to evoke what Harich wished for himself, after decades of struggle to regain his good name: to rest in peace. And that he not, as he once said, “go dishonored to the grave.” Ulrike, 35, a western Berlin linguist, is interested in hearing more about Harich’s history. The DDR itself is like a dream to her, she says—let alone such distant events such as Harich’s arrest and trial for sedition in 1956/57. She doesn’t remember ever paying much attention to the DDR; East Berlin was just a few streets yet a world away. She does not know much about DDR history, but as a Berliner, she says, she has always felt some special bond to “the east.” She too is eager to meet Wolfgang Harich, the man whose comprehensive reform proposals constituted the only Party attempt at internal restructuring of the DDR before its collapse in 1989/90. I talk about Harich’s reputation as a young man—what I’ve heard of it from acquaintances, such as Monika Hüchel, wife of the poet Peter Hüchel and a former colleague of Harich at the Tägliche Rundschau. Harich was “quite a ladies’ man,” she noted, very much a bon vivant, glittering in his wit and repartee amid the rubble in postwar Berlin. Brilliant, gossipy, impulsive, principled, rational, visionary, high-minded, refractory, moralizing, self-righteous: Harich, son of the distinguished literary critic Walther Harich—who died when Harich was a small boy—came from a well-to-do German bourgeois family and seemed in the late 1940s a throwback to an earlier era of broadly cultivated European intellectuals. I had long hoped to meet Wolfgang Harich—ever since I had read the 1956 Spiegel cover story about him—in which the editor of the Deutsche Rundschau had called him “an intellectual phenomenon,” “a pure intellect on two feet,” and “a genius, an intellectual Wunderkind.”

The epilogue, which opens by tracing the legacy of Frieda Kliem’s Berlin throughout the rest of the twentieth century, insists that we cannot understand this famous twilight of “old” Germany and its transition into “new” Germany unless we take seriously the tensions surrounding love, intimacy, and dating that play out in Love at Last Sight. It further contends that the modern world—epitomized by the modern metropolis—not only exacerbated some of the long-standing and inherent risks of love, but also created a whole new set of dilemmas with which men and women throughout Germany, Europe, and the United States continue to grapple as they pursue love using similarly radical methods and technologies (most notably, online dating). The story of the Berliners who negotiated these same tensions at the turn of the century, the epilogue concludes, is thus eminently relevant to and instructive for our own contemporary world.

Abstract FEW ISSUES GAVE ROOSEVELT more concern in the summer of 1940 than the threat to Latin America. As Hitler’s armies swept across Western Europe in May and June, Roosevelt received repeated warnings of Nazi subversion in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, and Mexico. Edwin C. Wilson, the United States Minister in Montevideo, described alleged Nazi plans for an uprising there which the Uruguayan Parliament made public in June. “It is commonly thought here,” Claude Bowers, now Ambassador to Chile, wrote from Santiago, “that the Germans, who are numerous, are thoroughly organized with the view of a coup d’etat.” By late May, Roosevelt had concluded that continued Nazi victories would lead Berlin to attempt the overthrow of existing Latin American governments and the transfer of Dutch and French possessions in the Western Hemisphere to its control. He also saw Germany’s likely acquisition of France’s Fleet and West African bases as a prelude to an attack on Brazil and the rest of South America. Though Roosevelt had been alive to these dangers for more than two years, he now saw an urgent need for a strong response. On May 23 he had approved a request to all the American Republics for secret military talks between United States and Latin American officers. Shortly there after, in response to State Department recommendations for a show of naval force off Brazil and Uruguay, he sent a heavy cruiser to visit Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo.

Germany has decided to fundamentally transform its whole energy system. The transformation requires numerous infrastructure projects that are conflict-prone [1]. To handle conflicts, involved companies are expected to use legally prescribed public participation procedures (formal) as well as non-legally binding participation processes (informal). Public participation can occur on three intensity levels: information, consultation, and cooperation [2]. Little research has been done on how conflict communication can be used at different participation levels. This paper aims on a deeper understanding of how conflict communication formats are perceived by people living in so-called energy regions, i.e., regions undergoing an intensive energy transformation. It focuses on how they retrospectively evaluate their potential for conflict management, and what recommendations they derive from this knowledge.This paper presents selected outcomes of a study conducted in the large-scale project ENSURE, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. The project aims on solutions for the German energy transition. The study combines in-depth interview and pre-questionnaire. The literature-based interview guideline covers two question complexes: (1) background, remit, and experience, (2) conflict communication (occurrence of conflict; conflict triggers and resolutions; potential of communication formats; quality criteria; challenges of distance conditions). In the pre-questionnaire, respondents were asked to rate the potential of formats of participation levels for conflict management (1 = very suitable; 6 = not suitable at all). For each level, formats frequently named in the literature were given [3]. In the in-depth interviews, participants were asked to comment on their ratings. In addition, they were asked to recall two infrastructure projects they had experience with and indicate which formats had been used particularly well or poorly? The participants were contacted using a stakeholder list provided by the project consortium. The participants (n=12; nine male, three female) live in the federate state Schleswig-Holstein and have experience with infrastructure projects in the energy and/or mobility sector. All are well-informed about the region. Most of them (n=8) are involved in environmental protection organizations or in local politics, e.g., in regional development committees. Interviews were conducted digitally in 2021. The data were anonymized, transcribed, analyzed qualitatively (two coders; overall categories: 247) as well as quantitatively.Conflict communication formats were mostly used on the information level. The best ratings are given to consultation level formats (Ø = 2.2). At the information level, information events are rated as most suitable (Ø = 1.3). At consultation level, resource-intensive personal talks with those affected are recommended (Ø = 1.3). Respondents favor integrating levels of participation and formats, e.g., consultation processes as part of information events. At cooperation level, mediation is best rated (Ø = 1.9). The respondents address factors influencing the suitability of formats for conflict management. Some formats are strongly topic-dependent, e.g., an expert hearing is particularly suitable if a topic generates fears. Other factors are the target group, the local context (city/rural) or the setting (private/public). The format choice should consider the project size and phase.Further research should examine the impact of the factors named above and how conflict communication can function under distance conditions (COVID-19 pandemic).Literature[1] Renn (2015): Aspekte der Energiewende aus sozialwissenschaftlicher Perspektive. Analyse aus der Schriftenreihe Energiesysteme der Zukunft. München: acatech.[2] Verein Deutscher Ingenieure e.V. (VDI) (2015): VDI-Standard 7001 – Communication and public participation in planning and building of infrastructure projects. Training for work stages of engineers. Berlin: Beuth.[3] Ziekow/ Barth/ Schütte/ Ewen (2014): Konfliktdialog bei der Zulassung von Vorhaben der Energiewende. Leitfaden für Behörden. Konfliktdialog bei Höchstspannungsanlagen.