Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Relations (general) with Korea (Democratic People's Republic)”

The aim of this paper is to analyze the most important aspects of the ideological relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the face of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Policy Brief is divided into four parts: Reactions of the Workers' Party of Korea to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party CPC; Mention of Korea during the 20th CPC Congress; The role of CPC in People's Republic of China according to WKP and the Significance of Sino-North Korean ideological relations after 20th Congress of the CPC. The methodology included media and literature review, which were collected through Korean Central News Agency, Rodong Sinmun and documents of the 20th Congress of the CPC. This study makes evident the importance of ideological relations between China and North Korea.

The U.S. relations to Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are since the end of the Cold War revolving around achieving a state of nuclear free Korean peninsula. As non-proliferation is a long term of American foreign policy, relations to North Korea could be categorized primarily under this umbrella. However, the issue of North Korean political system also plays role as it belongs to the other important, more normative category of U.S. foreign policy which is the protection of human rights and spreading of democracy and liberal values. In addition, the North Korean issue influences U.S. relations and interests in broader region of Northeast Asia, its bilateral alliances with South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) and Japan as well as sensitive and complex relations to People’s Republic of China. As the current administration of president Donald J. Trump published its National security strategy and was fully occupied with the situation on Korean peninsula in its first year, the aim of the paper is to analyse the changes in evolution of U.S. North Korean policy under last three administrations, look at the different strategies adopted in order to achieve the same aim, the denuclearization. The paper does not provide a thorough analysis, neither looks at all documents adopted and presented in the U.S. or within the U.N. It more focuses on the general principles of particular strategies, most significant events in mutual relations as recorded by involved gov­ernmental officials and also weaknesses of these strategies as none has achieved desirable result. In conclusion, several options for current administration are drawn, however all of them require significant compromises and could be accompanied with series of setbacks dangerous for regional stability and U.S. position in the region.

The paper analyzes South Korea’s strategy in the global oil market. South Korean oil cooperation is characterized by the creation or termination of joint projects in the oil sector, as well as the Republic of Korea’s national project for the diversification of state-energy suppliers. Oil cooperation currently has great potential, and the conditions that have developed at the highest level allow open discussions about positive dynamics for short-term and medium-term prospects in the field of oil cooperation. The analysis presented here includes export and import connections in the oil market. The authorities of the current administration of the Republic of Korea have adopted a new political stance towards the north, in accordance with which the state is actively developing and establishing relations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Russian Federation. In the coming years, South Korea aims to renew and revise potential projects in the field of oil cooperation. The main result of this is that the political climate of the Republic of Korea is currently concentrated on the development of an oil cooperation strategy.

This article analyzes the possibility of normalizing diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Republic of Cuba (Cuba). It poses two main questions: Why does the ROK desire to normalize diplomatic relations with Cuba? Can diplomatic normalization be achieved, and if so, what policy measures are necessary to make it happen? To answer these questions, the article explores the ROK’s previous efforts and assesses the current state of bilateral relations between the ROK and Cuba. The strong relationship between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Cuba is pointed out as an essential obstacle, and the article examines what policy actions could be taken to overcome it. Finally, the article draws on previous experiences and cases of Nordpolitik (Northern Policy) to suggest a direction for the ROK’s foreign policy toward normalizing diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The Western Capital (Sŏgyŏng) project was of ideological, cultural, and strategic significance for the Empire of Korea (1897–1910) struggling for survival in the age of imperialism. This study argues that Imperial Korea's understanding of its place in the civilized world of the past, present, and future inspired redeveloping P'yŏngyang as the secondary capital. The advocates cited the history of the city in particular and of the nation in general to legitimize the project. Also, status-conscious specialistchungin(“middle people”), a newly prominent social group with loyalist members, played active roles. Moreover, responding to the deteriorating Russo-Japanese relations, Korea began preparing the nation's secondary capital, located within a neutral zone that Russia proposed to Japan. From the outset, the critics of the project highlighted funding constraints, a heavy tax burden on the local population, and rapacious officials exploiting the situation. The Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 effectively ended the project, but the memory of P'yŏngyang's status as the secondary capital outlived the Empire of Korea and the subsequent Japanese colonial rule before the city became the national capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, established in 1948.

The article studies the history of the US foreign policy adaptation to détente that started in the late 1960s. By this time the Americans had strong military and political positions on the Korean peninsula. Washington managed to thwart DPRK attempts in 1966–1969 to destabilize the situation in the South. Americans saw growing inter-Korean contacts as a new challenge. With détente gaining momentum, this led to the obsolescence of some American foreign policy instruments in the region, including the US-controlled UN Commission on the Unification and Rebuilding of Korea. Another challenge for the Americans was the North Koreans' «diplomatic offensive,» which strengthened North Korea's position in the world. It tried to use the accumulated political weight to turn the annual debate on the Korean issue in the UN General Assembly from a formality to something real. At the same time, the military threat posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, for example, in the 1973–1975 conflict along the Northern Boundary Line, remained relevant.Nevertheless, in 1968–1973 the Americans succeeded in reshaping their policy toward Korea under conditions of a dramatic improvement in the international situation of the DPRK and settlement of US-Chinese relations. The Americans managed to eliminate the obsolete UN Commission on the Unification and Restoration of Korea with minimal losses. They ensured that the discussion of the Korean question in the United Nations would not have a destructive influence on the internal political life of the South. Under these conditions, the inter-Korean dialogue remained merely a political game of the regimes on the peninsula. Preserving the status quo in the region was the main result of US diplomacy’s manipulative techniques. Such approaches are still relevant for the modern US foreign policy – getting rid of international instruments, which have exhausted their purpose.

The Amur River basin covers the territory of four countries – Russia, China, North Korea and Mongolia. But, since North Korea and Mongolia account for a small part, the pressure from the activities of these countries on the water arteries of the Amur basin is insignificant. At the same time, Russia and China cover 98% (54% and 44%, respectively) of the basin area, and the activities of these two states have the greatest impact on the Amur and its tributaries. The article deals with the problems of the different approach of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China in relation to the use of joint reservoirs, which are the border for the two countries – one of the longest in the world. The purpose of the material is to consider the evolution of the use of the Amur River basin by Russia and China, the emerging dangers for one of the largest rivers in the world (9th place), and the interaction of the two countries to reduce the detrimental impact of human activity in this territory. With the beginning of the process of development and industrialization of the Russian Far East (USSR) and the Northeast of China, pressure began on the ecological and hydrological spheres of these regions. This is especially true of the Chinese territory, where from the middle of the 20th century. the population of the population has grown significantly, exceeding 100 million people, and, accordingly, the process of industrialization of the region and the development of agriculture, including the cultivation of rice, which requires significant irrigation work, has significantly increased. The material touches upon the issues of the use of waterways for the extraction of biological resources, navigation, agriculture, bank protection works and the needs of industry, as well as the threat from emergencies at enterprises located in the basin of border rivers. In addition, the issue of preventing economic damage and protecting the ports of the Russian Primorye in the event of a change in the rules for using the Tumannaya (Tumangan) border river, which for the last 17 km before flowing into the Sea of Japan, separates the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, thus excluding access to sea to Chinese ships from the port of Hunchun.

In recent years, much attention has been given to the current situation and trend regarding economic development in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), of which urbanization is an important indicator. In the present study, (i) the urbanized area is estimated using DMSP/OLS and NPP/VIIRS, (ii) the current spatial pattern and the change characteristics of typical cities are revealed, and (iii) the scale and developmental stage of major cities in the DPRK are judged through comparison. Although the DPRK is relatively closed, the financial crisis in 2008 indirectly affected its economic development, and a large gap remains between the urbanization level of the DPRK and that of China and the Republic of Korea. The large cities in the DPRK are located mainly in its eastern coastal areas and western plains, and there has been no significant expansion in Pyongyang, Chungjin, and Hamhung in the past 28 years. Although economic construction has begun again recently in the DPRK, further reform and opening are required. As the DPRK’s relations with its neighbors and countries around the world improve, its economic development and urban construction will present a new pattern.

This article develops a novel assessment of the nuclear program of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Using a theory-driven approach rooted in comparative foreign policy analysis, the article undermines two common assumptions about the DPRK nuclear threat: first, that the North Korean leadership's nuclear intentions are a measured response to the external environment and, second, that the DPRK has developed enough technical capacity to go nuclear whenever it pleases. In place of these assumptions, the article puts forth the general theoretical hypotheses that (1) the decision to go nuclear is rarely if ever based on typical cost-benefit analysis, and instead reflects deep-seated national identity conceptions, and (2) the capacity to go nuclear depends not only on raw levels of industrialization and nuclear technology, but also on the state's organizational acumen. Applied to the case of the DPRK, these hypotheses suggest that it has long been strongly committed to the goal of acquiring an operational nuclear deterrent, but also that it has been finding it very difficult to successfully implement that wish. The article also demonstrates that these hypotheses are supported by the meager evidence available on this case.

Freedom of thought and conscience are fundamental human rights and are guaranteed in a democratic society. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea states that “the state has the duty to affirm and guarantee the inviolable and fundamental human rights of individuals”(Article 10). However, in South Korean society, this common sense goes out the window the moment someone is labeled a “bbalgaengyi” (reds) or a “jongbukjueuija” (followers of North Korea). This is because the National Security Act legally supports a divided country with anti-communism at the forefront. When it was first enacted in 1948, it was seen as a temporary device to maintain authoritarianism under the divided system, but the reality was different. Even as political democratization has progressed and inter-Korean relations have improved, it has remained powerful as a device for restricting popular movements and unification movements and controlling ideas. It has not only restricted social movements but also controlled academic and artistic activities and regulated people’s inner worlds. The National Security Act has been controversial since the 1987 democratization, but it is still alive and well in 2023. For a long time, research on the National Security Act was a taboo subject that was not easily accessible because it could be considered a violation of the law. Adding to the difficulty of research was the lack of access to documentation of cases where the law was applied. With the democratization of 1987 and the development of the Northern Policy and inter-Korean relations in the early 1990s, the environment was ripe for rethinking the meaning of the National Security Act. Pioneering studies before and after 1990 and the Constitutional Court’s unconstitutionality review process, which began in 1990, led to a serious examination of its legal issues. Theological commentary on the National Security Act is scarce. Not only from the point of view of the church, which was responsible for integrating the public into the anti-communist ideology during the formation and development of the pro- American anti-communist state, but also from the point of view of Minjung theology. For theologians, too, it was not a simple matter to overcome the taboo of anti-communism. They were always conscious of the limits of that taboo, and when they crossed them, they were bound to face the swift blade of state power. In the absence of a theological response to the National Security Act, this article begins that discussion. Approaching it from a theological position is based on an awareness of universal human rights that can no longer be avoided as a theological task today. After articulating that position, this article briefly reaffirms the problems with the National Security Act and addresses the issues of the rule of law and human dignity.

Avec l’échec des négociations entre les États-Unis et la Corée du Nord, menées depuis le début des années 1990, sur la question du nucléaire, le problème est devenu graduellement l’affaire des pays voisins, tous soucieux de l’avenir de la région du sud-est asiatique. Présentée comme le seul allié de la Corée du Nord, la China a été invitée à participer à des négociations à trois, à quatre (1997-1998), et à six (2003-2007), dans l’espoir de faire entendre raison au régime isolé, mais jusqu’à maintenant, aucune des tentatives n’est parvenue à satisfaire chacun des membres à la table. Alors que la tension monte et que la politique américaine se fait de moins en moins flexible, la Chine quant à elle, continue d’encourager le retour des négociations à six (Six-Party Talks) dans l’optique de dénucléariser la péninsule coréenne, tout en travaillant à maintenir ses liens avec la Corée du Nord. Le fil conducteur de cette présente recherche est d’abord d’essayer de comprendre pourquoi la Chine continue de soutenir la Corée du Nord, fournissant dons alimentaires et financiers. L’idée est donc d’analyser, selon les principes du réalisme néoclassique, la politique étrangère de la Chine. L’hypothèse principale de cette théorie renvoie à l’idée que la distribution du pouvoir dans le système international influence la politique étrangère des États, mais que des variables au niveau de l’état et/ou de l’individu interviennent dans la formulation et l’application de celle-ci. Il est proposé ici que le lien entre l’unipolarité du système international et la politique nord-coréenne de la Chine, est façonné par des variables intermédiaires telles que : a) la perception des leaders de la distribution du pouvoir et de leur place dans le système international; b) l’idéologie du régime politique, et; c) le type d’unité responsable de la prise de décision en politique étrangère. L’analyse de chacune des variables permettra de faire la lumière sur les intérêts politiques et économiques de la Chine dans l’entretien de cette relation avec la Corée du Nord.
Since the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula failed to produce any effective outcome in the 1990s, China was brought to the table and agreed to play its part as a mediator in the Four Party Talks (1997-1998) between both Koreas and the United States, as well as in the Six-Party Talks (2003-2007), with the addition of Russia and Japan as negotiators. While the American policies toward the DPRK have taken a tough and inflexible turn with former President George W. Bush declaring, at the end of January 2002, that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq “constitute an axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world”, China’s DPRK policy, however, reflects long-lasting terms of friendship and collaboration between the two countries. With concerns mounting over the aggressive policies of the North Korean regime and its determination to keep its nuclear arsenal, the question is: why does China insist on preserving its good ties with its neighbour, even when those policies are said to hinder its political and economical interests? To address this question, the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism will be tested within a three-level – systemic, state, and individual level – analysis, with consideration of the propositions that the relative distribution of power shapes China’s North Korea policy, and intervening variables at the state and individual levels are filtering the systemic pressures and thus, shaping decisions related to North Korea. These variables include: a) leadership’s perception of power; b) regime type and ideology, and; c) type of foreign policy decision-making unit. This in-depth analysis will then provide grounds in defining China’s core interests in backing up the secluded regime.