Rozprawy doktorskie na temat „Political economy”
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Mizuno, Nobuhiro. "Political Economy and Economic Development". Kyoto University, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/120727.
Pełny tekst źródłaDell, Melissa. "Essays in economic development and political economy". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72831.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 183-197).
This thesis examines three topics. The first chapter, entitled "Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita" utilizes regression discontinuity to examine the long-run impacts of the mita, an extensive forced mining labor system in effect in Peru and Bolivia between 1573 and 1812. Results indicate that a mita effect lowers household consumption by around 25% and increases the prevalence of stunted growth in children by around six percentage points in subjected districts today. Using data from the Spanish Empire and Peruvian Republic to trace channels of institutional persistence, I show that the mita's influence has persisted through its impacts on land tenure and public goods provision. Mita districts historically had fewer large landowners and lower educational attainment. Today, they are less integrated into road networks, and their residents are substantially more likely to be subsistence farmers. The second chapter, entitled "Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War" examines how drug traffickers' economic objectives influence the direct and spillover effects of Mexican policy towards the drug trade. Drug trade-related violence has escalated dramatically in Mexico during the past five years, claiming over 40,000 lives. By exploiting variation from close mayoral elections and a network model of drug trafficking, the study develops three sets of results. First, regression discontinuity estimates show that drug trade-related violence in a municipality increases substantially after the close election of a mayor from the conservative National Action Party (PAN), which has spearheaded the war on drug trafficking. This violence consists primarily of individuals involved in the drug trade killing each other. The empirical evidence suggests that the violence reflects rival traffickers' attempts to wrest control of territories after crackdowns initiated by PAN mayors have challenged the incumbent criminals. Second, the study predicts the diversion of drug traffic following close PAN victories by estimating a model of equilibrium routes for trafficking drugs across the Mexican road network to the U.S. When drug traffic is diverted to other municipalities, drug trade-related violence in these municipalities increases. Moreover, female labor force participation and informal sector wages fall, corroborating qualitative evidence that traffickers extort informal sector producers. Finally, the study uses the trafficking model and estimated spillover effects to examine the allocation of law enforcement resources. Overall, the results demonstrate how traffickers' economic objectives and constraints imposed by the routes network affect the policy outcomes of the Mexican Drug War. The third chapter, entitled "Insurgency and Long-Run Development: Lessons from the Mexican Revolution" exploits within-state variation in drought severity to identify how insurgency during the Mexican Revolution, a major early 20th century armed conflict, impacted subsequent government policies and long-run economic development. Using a novel municipal-level dataset on revolutionary insurgency, the study documents that municipalities experiencing severe drought just prior to the Revolution were substantially more likely to have insurgent activity than municipalities where drought was less severe. Many insurgents demanded land reform, and following the Revolution, Mexico redistributed over half of its surface area in the form of ejidos: farms comprised of individual and communal plots that were granted to a group of petitioners. Rights to ejido plots were non-transferable, renting plots was prohibited, and many decisions about the use of ejido lands had to be countersigned by politicians. Instrumental variables estimates show that municipalities with revolutionary insurgency had 22 percentage points more of their surface area redistributed as ejidos. Today, insurgent municipalities are 20 percentage points more agricultural and 6 percentage points less industrial. Incomes in insurgent municipalities are lower and alternations between political parties for the mayorship have been substantially less common. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that land reform, while successful at placating insurgent regions, stymied long-run economic development.
by Melissa Dell.
Ph.D.
Ivlevs, Artjoms. "Economic and political economy aspects of migration". Aix-Marseille 2, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006AIX24009.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe objective of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of migration-related economic issues in the world today. We concentrate both on immigration and emigration and at various stages of our work address all three parties involved in migration process : people hosting immigrants, people left behind and the migrants themselves. We account for several important features of today’s rapidly globalising life : the importance of the non-traded sector, asymmetry between capital and labour flows, and persisting problems between ethnic communities. The first chapter in an overview of the political economy of immigration literature and addresses the multiple ways in which immigrants may affect natives’ welfare. In particular, we discuss the role of economic and non-economic arguments in shaping immigration attitudes and summarise main labour market and welfare-state effects of immigration. Chapter two develops open economy with a non-traded sector. Our finding provide additional understanding of why native population is generally opposed to low-skilled immigrants and favouring high-skilled foreign workers. The third chapter extends the model developed in chapter two to accommodate internationally mobile capital. First, we investigate whether immigration of high-skilled and low-skilled labour leads to positive or negative FDI. Then, we find out how would immigration attitudes change if a country allows international capital movements. Chapter four investigates how ethnic diversity at home may influence emigration intentions of an individual. We explore the case of Latvia where ethnic minorities constitute 40% of the population. We find that ethnic minorities are more likely to emigrate and are positively self-selected on the basis of income, while the opposite is true for ethnic majority population
Neggers, Yusuf. "Essays in Economic Development and Political Economy". Thesis, Harvard University, 2016. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493380.
Pełny tekst źródłaPublic Policy
Vernby, Kåre. "Essays in Political Economy". Doctoral thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Government, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-6879.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis thesis consists of an introduction and three stand-alone essays. In the introduction I discuss the commonalities between the three essays. Essay I charts the the main political cleavages among 59 Swedish unions and business organizations. The main conclusion is that there appear to exist two economic sources of political cleavage: The traded versus the nontraded divide and the labor versus capital divide. Essay II suggests a political rationale for why strikes have been more common in those OECD countries where the legislature is elected in single member districts (e.g. France, Great Britain) than where it was elected by proportional representation (e.g. Sweden, Netherlands). In Essay III I present a theoretical model of political support for different types of labor market regulations. From it I recover two implications: Support for industrial relations legislation that enables unions to bid up wages should be inversely related to the economy's openness, while support for employment protection legislation should be positively related to the size of the unionized sector. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of 70 countries match my theoretical priors.
Vernby, Kåre. "Essays in political economy /". Uppsala : Uppsala universitet, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-6879.
Pełny tekst źródłaDalgiç, Hüseyin Engin. "Essays in political economy". Thesis, McGill University, 2004. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=84990.
Pełny tekst źródłaIn the second essay, we model a situation where the government tries to help a distressed industry, but it needs to know the firms' adjustment costs to set its level of support. We show that lobbying can help the firms credibly reveal their adjustment costs, when the support takes the form of a subsidy or a tariff. Furthermore, the more firms there are in the industry, the smaller is the amount of lobbying necessary to convey information, and the higher is the social welfare. When lobbying is effort intensive rather than expenditure intensive, subsidies for high adjustment cost industries go up, and subsidies for low adjustment cost industries go down with the number of firms in the industry.
The third essay considers a game between an elite with political power and the rest of the population. Foreseeing that transition to majority rule will lead to redistribution, the elite engages in activities that decrease the efficiency of the public sector to discourage redistribution. We find that initial inequality in the economy increases corruption and decreases redistribution. The model's predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence that inequality and corruption are correlated, and that corrupt governments are smaller.
Acacia, Francesca. "Essays on political economy". Thesis, University of Leicester, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/27615.
Pełny tekst źródłaVeuger, Stan. "Essays in Political Economy". Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10222.
Pełny tekst źródłaEconomics
Darbaz, Safter Burak. "Essays on political economy". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/33116.
Pełny tekst źródłaFergusson, Leopoldo. "Essays on political economy". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65486.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 177-187).
The chapters in this thesis tackle different questions, but share the attempt to open the "black box" of the relationship between institutions and economic outcomes. In the first chapter, I examine mass media's role in countering special interest group influence by studying county-level support for US Senate candidates from 1980 to 2002. I use the concentration of campaign contributions from Political Action Committees to proxy capture of politicians by special interests, and compare the reaction to increases in concentration by voters covered by two types of media markets - in-state and out-of-state media markets. Unlike in-state media markets, out-of-state markets focus on neighboring states' politics and elections. Consistent with the idea that citizens punish political capture exposed in the media, I find that an increase in concentration of special interest contributions reduces candidate's vote shares in in-state counties relative to the out-of-state counties, where the candidate receives less coverage. The second chapter (with Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson) examines the effect of population growth on violent conflict. Exploiting the international epidemiological transition starting in the 1940s, we construct an instrument for changes in population (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007) and find that countries with higher (exogenous) increases in population experimented larger increases in social conflict. Using a simple theoretical framework, we interpret these findings as evidence that a larger population generates greater competition for resources and makes violence more likely if institutions cannot handle the higher level of disputes. The third dissertation chapter asks the following question: if property rights in land are so beneficial, why are they not adopted more widely? I propose a theory based on the idea that limited property rights over peasants' plots may be supported by elite landowners to achieve two goals. First, limited property rights reduce peasants' income from their own plots, generating a cheap labour force. Second, they force peasants to remain in the rural sector to protect their property, even if job opportunities appear in the urban sector. The theory identifies conditions under which weak property rights institutions emerge, and provides a specific mechanism for the endogenous persistence of inefficient rural institutions.
by Leopoldo Fergusson.
Ph.D.
Ornaghi, Arianna, Abhijit V. Banerjee, Amy Finkelstein, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken i Sudarno 1960 Sumarto. "Essays in political economy". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/113994.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from PDF version of thesis. "Joint with Abhijit Banerjee, Amy Finkelstein, Rema Hanna, Benjamin Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto"--Page 115, Chapter 3.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 151-156).
This thesis consists of three chapters. The first two chapters explore how different organizational forms, and in particular different hiring and firing practices, affect bureaucracies. In the first chapter, I study how the introduction of merit systems reducing politicians' control over police officers' hiring and firing affected police performance in the 1970s. I exploit population-based mandates for police department merit systems in a regression discontinuity design. Merit systems improved performance: in the first ten years after the reform, the property crime rate was lower and the violent crime clearance rate was higher in departments operating under a merit system than in departments operating under a spoils system. I explore three possible channels: resources, police officers' characteristics and police officers' incentive structure. Employment and expenditures were not affected and there is limited evidence of selection changing pre-1940. Instead, I provide indirect evidence that changes in the incentive structure faced by police officers were likely important. In the second chapter, I study how the introduction of civil service boards in charge of meritocratic hiring affected the demographic composition and the performance of police officers, fire fighters and other municipal employees 1900-1940. Identification exploits the staggered timing of the reform in large municipalities using a differences-in-differences design. I find that civil service boards decreased the probability that police officers were first or second generation immigrants but mixed evidence on how the demographic characteristics of other workers were affected. Finally, I find that no effect on police performance. The third chapter, joint with with Abhijit Banerjee, Amy Finkelstein, Rema Hanna, Benjamin Olken, and Sudarno Sumarto, analyzes a large-scale experiment in Indonesia. In particular, we study how a national governmental health insurance program characterized by flexible coverage responds to subsidies and assisted registration through a website. Lowering prices and reducing hassle costs increase enrollment but households often let their coverage lapse. Subsidies attract healthier households in the short run, but over time the average value of claims equalizes because of differential claim dynamics. Overall, we find that, when dynamic adjustments to coverage are possible, subsidies do not improve the financial sustainability of health insurance programs.
by Arianna Ornaghi.
Ph. D.
Garcia-Arenas, Javier. "Essays on political economy". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104481.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 159-161).
This thesis consists of three essays on economics focusing on the determinants of regime change and economic growth. I put the focus primarily on political, institutional, and historical factors. I started working on these topics after studying the importance of regime change and institutions in the modern economics literature. The first essay analyzes how media can be a powerful tool to promote regime change in tightly controlled political systems. I analyze the impact of Radio Liberty, an American radio with an anti-communist slant, on the 1991 Russian elections, which were the first elections in the country, to study the role of Western media on the demise of the Soviet Union. I use a novel empirical strategy exploiting ionospheric variation with the aim of obtaining a measure of Radio Liberty availability in each Russian electoral district. The results show a significant effect of these broadcasts in favor of Yeltsin, documenting that media can play an important role in political processes of regime change. In the second essay, I analyze the persistent effects of the territorial division in Spain between the Christian kingdoms in the north and Islamic Iberia in the center and south of the country during the Middle Ages. I analyze this question empirically using a spatial donut discontinuity design which compares Christian and Muslim territories exploiting the dynamics of the reconquest process undertaken by the Christians which resulted in the Muslim defeat. I find important differences in current municipal economic development with substantial positive effects in Christian municipalities. The third essay analyzes the importance of protests for regime change. I provide empirical evidence that protests have a significant and non-linear impact on the likelihood that a country successfully democratizes. I show that it is for intermediate values of protests that the likelihood of democratization is higher. I present a dynamic model to explain the empirical evidence. The main implication is that protests could play an important role for regime change as long as they are not too high because in the latter case there will be a backlash which will block regime change.
by Javier Garcia-Arenas.
Ph. D.
García, Jimeno Camilo. "Essays in political economy". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/65485.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first chapter is an empirical investigation of social change, looking at the Prohibition Era in the U.S. It explores how the implementation of policies affects the evolution of beliefs about their effects, giving rise to a feedback between preferences and policy choices. Using city-level data on law enforcement and crime, it estimates a structural model where crime outcomes are the result of Prohibition enforcement, and lead to changes in public opinion about Alcohol-related policies. Enforcement depends on moral views and beliefs, but only beliefs are shaped by the outcomes of past policies. The model can account for the variation in public opinion changes, and for the heterogeneous responses of enforcement and violence across cities. Its estimates are used to perform a series of counterfactual exercises. The second chapter is a theoretical investigation of entrenchment and encroachment of rulers. It studies the strategic interaction between competition and ratchet effect incentives in a coalition-formation game of incomplete information. Rulers require the support of a subset of politically powerful groups to remain in power. These have private information about their cost of providing political support. A ruler can attempt to exploit the competitive nature of the coalition formation game to induce revelation. Its ability to do so determines the extent of entrenchment and encroachment. By restricting attention to Markov Perfect Bayesian equilibria, the model shows that limited learning is possible, and that learning dynamics are shaped by an informational commitment problem arising when rulers are "too optimistic". In joint work with James Robinson, the final chapter is a comparative empirical study of the impact of Frontier availability on long-run development across the Americas. It calls into question the notion of American exceptionalism due to its Westward Frontier, first proposed by Frederick J. Turner. Almost every country in the Americas had a substantial Frontier, but its allocation varied due to differences in the quality of political institutions around the mid-19* century, making the effect of the Frontier conditional on political institutions at the time of Frontier expansion. The empirical evidence is consistent with this "conditional Turner thesis".
by Camilo Garcia-Jimeno.
Ph.D.
Migueis, Marco (Marco A. ). "Essays on political economy". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/62401.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
Essay 1: The Effect of Political Alignment on Transfers to Portuguese Municipalities. In this paper, I use financial data of Portuguese municipalities (1992-2005) to investigate if political alignment between the central government and a local government brings financial benefit to local governments. I use a regression discontinuity design, in order to distinguish between generally partisan transfers (larger transfers to municipalities where the party in power has larger vote share), and the effect of political alignment per se, between the national government and the municipal chamber president. The benefit of pure alignment is substantial. Estimates imply that municipalities aligned with the central government receive 19% more targetable transfers than do municipalities where the party in power nearly won the local elections. I test an electoral motivation for this bias in transfers: extra transfers prove to increase the vote share of PSD incumbents, but not the vote share of PS incumbents; however, municipal incumbency does not lead to better results in national elections. Essay 2: Local Government Fiscal Policies: Left-wing vs. Right-wing Portuguese Municipalities. In this paper, I use financial data from Portuguese municipalities (from 2003 to 2007) to investigate if the ideology of the local government incumbent influences local fiscal policies. Regression discontinuity design is employed to ensure proper identification of the ideology effect on fiscal policies. Left-wing control of municipal presidency showed a significant effect on the likelihood of adopting a municipal corporate tax. Left-wing municipalities also proved more likely to invest in social infrastructure. On the other hand, right-wing municipalities were shown to be more likely to grant subsidies to families, as well as to offer more generous compensation to their municipal workers. Finally, left-wing municipalities were less likely to resort to high levels of debt than their right-wing counterparts. Essay 3: Political Alignment and Federal Transfers to the US States. In this paper, I use financial data regarding transfers from the US federal government to US States (1982-2001) to investigate if political alignment, defined as a state governor and the US President belonging to the same political party, influences the level of federal transfers received by a state. Regression discontinuity design is used to ensure proper identification of the alignment effect. Total federal transfers to aligned states are significantly larger, with the most trustworthy estimates in the neighborhood of 3%. Most of this advantage comes from significantly larger defense transfers to aligned states (the most credible estimates indicate a 13% advantage). Finally, other types of federal transfers are not significantly affected by political alignment, namely entitlements, salaries and, perhaps surprisingly, project grants.
by Marco Migueis.
Ph.D.
Reid, Otis Russell. "Essays in political economy". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/117317.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 179-184).
This thesis consists of three chapters on political economy. Each chapter explores the effects of a change to the equilibrium of a given market. In the first chapter, Jon Weigel and I study a randomized controlled trial in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on corruption at tolls. We randomly vary incentives for drivers to comply with rules instead of engaging in corruption. These incentives affect the "supply" of corruption rather than the "demand" for corruption from bureaucrats. We find that sizable financial incentives produce a 7 to 10 percentage point increase in the probability that drivers get receipts, implying an elasticity of citizen supply of bribes ranging from 0.45 to -0.95. Social incentives have no effect. Similarly, providing information about other drivers' responses to treatment (to shift social norms) does not affect behavior. Drivers' appear remarkably inelastic in their supply of bribes. We argue this reflects the fact that bribe payment may increase the efficiency of transactions in the toll setting we examine and suggest that corruption may serve to "grease the wheels" in this context. In the second chapter, Christopher Blattman, Horacio Larreguy, Benjamin Marx, and I study a large-scale randomized controlled trial designed to combat vote-buying in the 2016 election in Uganda. We find that the campaign did not reduce the extent to which voters accepted cash and gifts in exchange for their votes. In addition, we designed the study to take advantage of our large sample (covering 1.2 million voters) to examine both direct treatment and spillover effects. The spillover effects on vote-buying are also zero, but the campaign had large direct and indirect effects on vote-shares for candidates. Heavily treated areas had increases in visits from non-incumbent candidates and non-incumbent candidates improved their vote shares substantially in these parishes. Consistent with these effects, we find evidence that the campaign diminished the effectiveness of vote-buying transactions by shifting local social norms against vote-selling and by convincing some voters to vote their conscience, regardless of any gifts received. In the third chapter, I examine the effect of the 26th Amendment, which lowered the voting age in the United States from 21 to 18. This change enfranchised a large population of new voters, expanding the electorate by almost 9%. However, I find that the Amendment had little effect on overall political outcomes in the United States. Although it did increase total turnout in areas with more young voters, it did not affect the partisan composition of the electorate and correspondingly did not lead to changes in representation or policy. These results stand in contrast to other well-studied expansions of the franchise and provide an important caveat to those findings: when the preferences of new voters are insufficiently distinct from those of existing voters, politicians have little reason to change their established positions.
by Otis Russell Reid.
Citizen participation in corruption : evidence from roadway tolls in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (with Jonathan Weigel) -- A market equilibrium approach to reduce the incidence of vote -buying : evidence from Uganda (with Christopher Blattman, Horacio Larreguy, and Benjamin Marx) -- A "minor" expansion : political outcomes.
Ph. D.
Strumpf, Koleman S. (Koleman Samuel) 1968. "Essays in political economy". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/11304.
Pełny tekst źródłaRizzi, Renata. "Essays in political economy". Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/12/12138/tde-05032013-195951/.
Pełny tekst źródłaEsta tese se divide em três partes. A primeira parte avalia a instituição do voto compulsório, proporcionando novas estimativas para os efeitos da obrigação de votar sobre os indivíduos. A estratégia de identificação se baseia no sistema dual em vigor no Brasil - voluntário e compulsório - sendo a exposição determinada pela data de nascimento. Usando as metodologias de RD e VI, e dados de uma pesquisa coletada especificamente para este estudo, concluímos que esta legislação leva a um aumento significante na participação política através do voto. Este aumento é acompanhado por uma elevação considerável na probabilidade de os cidadãos expressarem preferência por um partido político, mas não no seu nível de conhecimento sobre política. Além disto, concluímos que a primeira experiência de voto afeta permanentemente as preferências dos indivíduos. A segunda parte da tese analisa empiricamente episódios de calote da dívida soberana. Alguns dos aspectos fundamentais da literatura teórica sobre o assunto, incluindo a previsão de que quase todos os calotes deveriam ocorrer em \"Períodos Ruins\", não são confirmados pelos dados: mais de 38% dos calotes ocorrem em \"Períodos Bons\", sob a definição do filtro HP. Exploramos as características de cada tipo de calote e apresentamos evidência econométrica de que calotes na dívida externa em períodos bons em geral podem ser explicados por três componentes: (i) mudanças no ambiente político, (ii) aumentos nas taxas de juros internacionais e (iii) instâncias em que o filtro HP classifica um período como bom ainda que a real situação econômica seja bastante negativa. Por fim, apresentamos alguns resultados que sugerem que a duração do episódio de calote não depende substancialmente do tipo de calote em questão, mas sim do ambiente em que o calote ocorre. Tal resultado abre caminho para novas pesquisas sobre o acesso a mercados internacionais de crédito após calotes. A terceira parte da tese trata da questão de contribuições de campanha em troca de favores políticos (esquema conhecido como \"pay-to-play\"). Eu proponho um jogo simples para modelar os incentivos de partidos políticos e firmas de setores intensos em receitas públicas, e testo as implicações deste modelo usando dados de doações de campanhas e contratos públicos do Brasil. Os dados confirmam a hipótese de pay-to-play.
Gemignani, Thomaz Mingatos Fernandes. "Essays in Political Economy". Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/12/12138/tde-22022016-115242/.
Pełny tekst źródłaEsta tese se divide em três partes. A primeira parte lida com a questão de que, em um ambiente político em que o desenvolvimento de uma carreira política possa envolver frequentes transições entre cargos, não se tem claro como a ocupação de uma dada posição eletiva pode fundamentalmente influenciar o desempenho eleitoral subsequente e a formação de uma carreira pelos políticos. São exploradas regressões descontínuas baseadas em eleições brasileiras com o intuito de se estimar o impacto eleitoral de ser o mandatário experimentado por políticos tanto ao concorrerem à reeleição ao cargo que ocupam, quanto ao disputarem outro cargo eletivo. Documenta-se, então, que a incumbência de cargos legislativos aos níveis estadual e federal encontra-se associada a um expressivo efeito positivo sobre a probabilidade de vitória da disputa seguinte pelo mesmo cargo, ao passo que mandatários de governos locais não aparentam ser eleitoralmente beneficiados por tal status, podendo ainda ser prejudicados por tal condição no caso de exibirem pouca experiência política. Além disso, verifica-se que deputados estaduais também usufruem de uma vantagem eleitoral da incumbência ao disputarem o cargo de deputado federal, e rejeita-se que tal efeito, bem como os impactos sobre a probabilidade de ser reeleito a um mesmo cargo, seja devido à seleção em novas candidaturas. À exceção da transição do cargo de deputado estadual para o de deputado federal, no entanto, mandatários de qualquer cargo tendem a ser menos propensos do que seus homólogos derrotados a se candidatar e a vencer eleições para outros cargos. Na segunda parte, investigamos se transações clientelistas podem ser sustentadas através da observação, por parte de partidos políticos e candidatos, do status de filiação partidária dos eleitores. Argumenta-se que, sendo tal filiação um exemplo de demonstração pública de apoio a um partido, tentativas de compra de voto por partidos podem se tornar mais eficazes quando direcionadas a eleitores que sejam filiados, ou no intuito de que venham a sê-lo. Por meio do emprego de dados eleitorais e demográficos acerca de municípios brasileiros, observa-se que eleitores filiados a partidos das coligações municipais do Partido dos Trabalhadores são significativamente mais propensos (relativamente a eleitores em geral) a passar a receber benefícios do Programa Bolsa Família quando da eleição de tais partidos. Investigam-se também determinantes políticos da filiação partidária, e encontra-se que o simples fato de ser o mandatário de governos locais afeta os níveis de filiação ao partido correspondente apenas em situações específicas; por outro lado, a provisão de pagamentos do Bolsa Família apresenta um efeito positivo e robusto sobre a evolução dos índices de filiação. Por fim, a terceira parte investiga o potencial exibido por professores com elevada participação política de influenciar resultados eleitorais ao induzirem os votos de seus alunos. Explora-se tal questão através da utilização de dados sobre filiação partidária e sobre professores de ensino médio de escolas estaduais no estado de São Paulo, Brasil. Combinando-se informações sobre o status de filiação partidária de tais professores com dados sobre resultados eleitorais e características do eleitorado, investiga-se especificamente a relação entre a densidade de professores filiados e o desempenho eleitoral dos partidos em uma dada região. Problemas de endogeneidade, como os possivelmente decorrentes da alocação de professores a escolas, são evitados por meio da exploração de variação na intensidade do efeito proposto de acordo com características do eleitorado em um nível ao qual eleitores (e professores) não são capazes de se selecionar. Os resultados relacionados sugerem um efeito positivo e significante da presença de professores filiados sobre o desempenho eleitoral dos partidos, particularmente em eleições majoritárias. No entanto, a evidência apresentada indica que tal efeito é aparentemente restrito a professores filiados ao Partido dos Trabalhadores, e que tais professores são capazes de alterar as preferências políticas de alunos que compareceriam à votação independentemente de sua influência. .
Mastrorocco, Nicola. "Essays in political economy". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2017. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3575/.
Pełny tekst źródłaMurgo, Daniel O. "Essays On Political Economy". FIU Digital Commons, 2010. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/149.
Pełny tekst źródłaGonnot, Jérôme. "Essays in political economy". Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020TOU10054.
Pełny tekst źródłaSánchez, Ibrahim Jesús. "Essays on Political Economy". Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/672064.
Pełny tekst źródłaEsta tesis combina datos históricos con teoría de juegos para intentar entender mejor la relación entre los partidos políticos y la opinión publica. En primer lugar, estudio las dinámicas de las cuestiones sociales. Demuestro que las cuestiones sociales (por ejemplo, aquellas relacionadas con los derechos de las mujeres y las minorías, o las cuestiones raciales) tienden a seguir patrones de comportamiento, tanto en términos de partidos como de opinión pública. Después, basándome en estos patrones, propongo una nueva forma de modelar el comportamiento de los partidos y de lo ciudadanos. A través de tres artículos teóricos, profundizo en la interacción dinámica entre partidos políticos y opinión pública alrededor de una cuestión política específica. Mis resultados arrojan luz sobre qué incentiva a los partidos a apoyar políticas opuestas. También ayudan a entender mejor diversos fenómenos que se han observado en la realidad, como por ejemplo el hecho de que los partidos políticos parecen estar más polarizados que los propios ciudadanos.
This thesis combines historical data with game theory to better understand the relationship between political parties and mass behaviour. First, I study the dynamics of social issues. I show that social issues (e.g, issues related to women's and minority rights, or racial issues) tend to follow behavioural patterns, both in terms of parties'and citizens' behaviour. Then, based on these patterns, I propose a new way of modelling parties' and citizens' behaviour. Through three theoretical papers, I deepen the dynamic interplay between political parties and the public opinion around a specific issue. My results shed light on what makes political parties be confronted with respect to an issue. They also help understanding some observed phenomena related to this interplay, like the sorting phenomenon or the question of why political parties seem to be more polarized than citizens.
Fonseca, Galvis Angela M. "Essays on Political Economy". Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17465326.
Pełny tekst źródłaPolitical Economy and Government
Kotera, Go. "Democracy and Political Economy". Kyoto University, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/157495.
Pełny tekst źródłaFriedrich, Silke 1980. "Essays in political economy". Thesis, University of Oregon, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/10899.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe following essays address the impact of special interest groups on economic decision making processes. The hypothesis of the first essay is that there exists a dynamic relationship between politicians and lobby groups. Politicians may choose to support "projects" proposed to them by lobbies because they yield clear economic benefits. However, governmental support may continue after these benefits have been exhausted, implying a cost to society and yielding rents to the lobbies. A theoretical framework is developed to model the incentives a government might have to behave in a manner consistent with the hypothesis. In this structure despite the fact that they support projects from which all economic rents have been extracted, politicians are rationally reelected. In the second chapter I examine how structural changes in the US steel industry affect the voting behavior of House Representatives on trade related bills. The hypothesis is that Representatives face opposing incentives after the PBGC bailed out the pension plans of major steel firms. Representatives have an incentive to vote less for protectionist policies, because the bailout makes the steel firms more competitive. But the Representatives also have an incentive to yield to the demands of affected steel workers, who favor more protection after the bailout. The data set underlying this study is a panel including votes on trade related bills over 9 years. The results obtained using fixed effects techniques support the hypothesis. In the third chapter, I develop a theoretical model of the dissolution of countries. I model a society with two different groups of citizens, who have different preferences over public goods, to analyze under which political regime the dissolution of these groups into separate countries is most likely. Differentiating between revolutions and civil wars allows me to look at the effects of both forms of political violence. I find that while the threat of a revolution can induce oligarchies to increase the franchise, the threat of a civil war can induce a. country to dissolve peacefully. The model predicts that peaceful dissolution is more likely in democracies, whereas oligarchies are more likely to risk civil war to stay united.
Committee in charge: Christopher Ellis, Co-Chairperson, Economics; Bruce Blonigen, Co-Chairperson, Economics; Glen Waddell, Member, Economics; Michael Dreiling, Outside Member, Sociology
Tunali, Çiğdem Börke. "Essays on political economy". Thesis, Strasbourg, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018STRAB013/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaPolitical economy is one of the sub-diciplines of economics literature. Political economists investigate the effects of political factors on economic outcomes. Institutions and the influence of different institutional structures on markets are among the main research areas of political economy. In the existing literature, the number of empirical analyses which investigate the determinants of institutions is low in comparison to the studies that focus on the effects of institutions on economic performance. Moreover, the analyses which examine the impact of culture, specifically religion, on institutions are scarce. Without doubt, religion can have dramatic effects on social and economic variables. Hence, the aim of this work is to investigate the effects of religion and religiosity on corruption, individuals’ happiness and voting behaviour. We contribute to the existing literature by providing new evidence and by focusing on the countries which are not analysed in the previous studies. [...]
Torre, Iván. "Essays in political economy". Thesis, Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016IEPP0063.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis thesis consists of three essays on the political economy of developing countries. Chapter 1 « Fiscal Federalism and Legislative Malapportionment: Causal Evidence from Independent but Related Natural Experiments » (cowritten with S. Galiani and G. Torrens) investigates the impact of distortions in districts' representation in the Argentine Congress on the distribution of federal tax resources. Exploiting exogenous variations in the provinces' legislative representation, we show that changes in the share of seats do not result in changes in the share of federal tax resources each district gets. Chapter 2, entitled « International Organizations and Structural Reforms » (co-written with S. Galiani and G. Torrens), we analyze the dynamics of structural reforms in developing countries in the presence of international organizations that fund reforms. We develop a dynamic model in which we show that these organizations alter the local political equilibrium and may incentivize countries to over-reform. This, in turns, leaves countries prone to suffer violent cycles of reform and counter-reform. In chapter 3, « Computers and Youth Political Participation », I study the impact of new information technologies on the political behavior of young people in Argentina. I analyze the effect of a laptop distribution program aimed at high school students who voted for the first time after voting age was lowered to 16. My analysis show that exposure to the program is associated with a decrease in turnout rates of teenagers, and I present evidence that suggests that this may be due to increased entertainment use of computers, which eventually leads to apathy in politics
Belmonte, Alessandro. "Essays on political economy". Thesis, IMT Alti Studi Lucca, 2014. http://e-theses.imtlucca.it/158/1/Belmonte_phdthesis.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaCOREKCIOGLU, Gozde. "Gender and political economy". Doctoral thesis, European University Institute, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/60675.
Pełny tekst źródłaExamining Board: Prof. Andrea Ichino, EUI, Supervisor; Prof. Andrea Mattozzi, EUI; Prof. Selim Güleşçi, Università Bocconi; Prof. Stefano Gagliarducci, Università di Roma Tor Vergata.
This thesis is a collection of independent empirical essays on gender and political economy. The first chapter investigates the effect of a pro-Islamist local government on female employment, using a unique dataset of civil servants in Turkish municipalities. Exploiting quasirandom variation in contested local elections and the time variation in the repeal of the headscarf ban, I establish two results. First, an Islamist mayor employs a lower share of females when religious women are denied jobs. Second, an Islamist mayor does not recruit females differently than a secular mayor, when institutions allow religious females to work. The proposed mechanism is the Islamist mayors’ preference for religious female employees, rather than intrinsic gender bias. The second chapter, co-authored with Marco Francesconi and Astrid Kunze, investigates labor demand effects of the extension of parental leave duration in Norway. We focus on whether and how firms adjust the gender composition of their workforce when the opportunity costs of certain types of workers rise. Using rich employer-employee data, we uncover that firms substitute potential mothers and fathers with older workers. Our results demonstrate potentially undesirable consequences of parental leave for women, even when some leave is provided for men. In the third chapter, co-authored with Fatih Serkant Adıg¨uzel and Aslı Cansunar, we consider the extent to which the geography of healthcare provision is effective in buying electoral votes. We construct a unique database of free primary healthcare clinics in Istanbul, Turkey. We estimate that a ten-minute decrease in walking time to the nearest clinic increases support for the incumbent party by 6 percentage points in local elections. While low-educated voters only care about visibility, highly-educated voters only value quality of healthcare. We argue that the spatial distribution of public service provision captures the information available to voters, which in turn, influences political outcomes.
--1 Headscarves and Female Employment --2 Parental Leave from the Firm’s Perspective (Chapter 2: co-authored Marco Francesconi and Astrid Kunze) --3 Out of Sight, Out of Mind? Proximity to Health Care and Electoral Outcomes (Chapter 3: co-authored Serkant Adıgüzel and Aslı Cansunar) --A Appendix
CINTOLESI, Andrea. "Essays in political economy". Doctoral thesis, European University Institute, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/65524.
Pełny tekst źródłaExamining Board: Prof. Andrea Mattozzi, European University Institute (Supervisor); Prof. Andrea Ichino, European University Institute (Co-supervisor); Prof. James M. Snyder, Jr., Harvard University; Prof. Tommaso Nannicini, Università Bocconi
In the first chapter, I study whether the introduction of primary elections induces more or less political polarization. Before 1976, only representatives from Indiana had to pass through the primaries, whereas the reform introduced primaries for Indiana’s US senators too. Using a difference-in-differences, I show that primaries deliver less-polarized politicians and account for one-fifth of the pre-reform average ideological gap between parties. I interpret the results in the light of a conceptual framework in which primaries lower the cost of participating in candidate selection procedures, giving incentives to participate to moderate voters as well. The second chapter is coauthored with D. Iorio and A. Mattozzi. We use a newly collected dataset from 63 democracies, and we construct the tenure accumulated by the ruling party while in office. We merge these data with fiscal policy indicators. We find an expenditure elasticity of 0.061 and a deficit elasticity of 0.055 over the period 1972-2014. Our findings point into the direction of a honeymoon effect: the older is the coalition of parties, the more divisive tend to be the available policy choices, which require costly transfers in the form of public expenditure to keep coalition members together later on. In the third chapter, I exploit newly collected data on ties between local politicians in Italy from 1985 onwards, to study the relation between cross-party connections and future career prospects. Exploiting a difference-in-discontinuities design, I find that ruling coalition members connected with the runner-up are twice as likely to be promoted to the council in which the runner-up leads the opposition. The effect of connections with the leader of the rivals disappears when I consider appointments to boards of state-owned enterprises. These findings suggest that connected politicians act as political brokers and smooth the relationship between government and opposition.
1. Political Polarisation and Primary Elections 2. Good Old Spendthrift. The Fiscal Effects of Political Tenure 3. 'Keep Friends Close, But Enemies Closer': Connections and Political Careers
ONORATO, MASSIMILIANO GAETANO. "Essays in political economy". Doctoral thesis, Università Bocconi, 2010. https://hdl.handle.net/11565/4054039.
Pełny tekst źródłaGENNAIOLI, CATERINA. "Essays in political economy". Doctoral thesis, Università Bocconi, 2010. https://hdl.handle.net/11565/4053953.
Pełny tekst źródłaVanden, Eynde Oliver. "Three essays on political economy and economic development". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2012. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/523/.
Pełny tekst źródłaUsman, Zainab. "The political economy of economic diversification in Nigeria". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2017. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:82813dad-ef97-46f1-a652-9c2f8403e72a.
Pełny tekst źródłaGuleryuz, Ece Handan. "Essays in Economic Growth, Political Economy and Institutions". FIU Digital Commons, 2012. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/720.
Pełny tekst źródłaZucco, Cesar. "The political economy of ordinary politics in Latin America". Diss., Restricted to subscribing institutions, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1467893851&sid=1&Fmt=2&clientId=1564&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
Pełny tekst źródłaBonilla, Claudio Andres. "Political competition and ideology in formal political economy". Access restricted to users with UT Austin EID Full text (PDF) from UMI/Dissertation Abstracts International, 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/fullcit?p3077408.
Pełny tekst źródłaShen, Fei. "An economic theory of political communication effects how the economy conditions political learning /". Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view.cgi?acc%5Fnum=osu1243880056.
Pełny tekst źródłaOzcelik, Emre. "Institutional Political Economy Of Economic Development And Global Governance". Phd thesis, METU, 2006. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12607360/index.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródławhat we call &ndash
&lsquo
Institutional International Political Economy&rsquo
(IIPE) in order to: i) assess the likelihood of developmental success on the part of the Third World countries in the twenty-first century, and ii) analyze the developmental and world-systemic implications of the so-called &lsquo
global governance model&rsquo
, which we conceptualize as an ultra-liberal capitalist project on the part of the &lsquo
commanding heights&rsquo
of the contemporary &lsquo
world-economy&rsquo
. Our IIPE-perspective relies on an &lsquo
institutionalist&rsquo
synthesis of the classic works of Karl Polanyi, Joseph Schumpeter and Fernand Braudel. In the light of this perspective, &lsquo
state-led development&rsquo
seems to be inconceivable in the face of &lsquo
governance&rsquo
, which is an attempt to disintegrate the &lsquo
institutional substance&rsquo
of the state-as-we-know-it into &lsquo
market-like processes&rsquo
. Nevertheless, &lsquo
governance&rsquo
is bound to become the victim of its own success insofar as it destroys the indispensable political institutions upon which capitalism has survived as a historical world-system in the past.
Robert-Nicoud, Frederic L. "New economic geography : multiple equilibria, welfare and political economy". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2002. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2879/.
Pełny tekst źródłaArtiles, Miriam. "Essays on long-run economic development and political economy". Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/672764.
Pełny tekst źródłaEn el primer capítulo, se estudia cómo las poblaciones se adaptan a sociedades étnicamente diversas. Usando datos nuevos de un experimento natural en Perú, se muestra que la diversidad étnica no conlleva necesariamente peores resultados-haber pertenecido a un grupo étnico con individuos de especializaciones heterogéneas puede convertir la diversidad étnica en una ventaja para el desarrollo económico. El segundo capítulo explora el proceso de selecci ón de autoridades locales cuando existen elecciones revocatorias que se usan como instrumento político en lugar de como mecanismo de control. Usando datos sobre las características de candidatos a alcalde municipal en Perú, se muestra que los candidatos de municipios en los que previamente se ha revocado al alcalde tienen menos años de educación y de experiencia en cargos públicos y son menos representativos de la población nativa.
Jarocinska, Elena. "Political economy of intergovernmental grants". Doctoral thesis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/7343.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis thesis investigates the political economy view of intergovernmental grants. It centers on the political factors that determine allocation of funds under the control of central governments to different regions. The first chapter contributes to this topic by a novel analysis of panel data and a comprehensive measure of expenditure "needs" for the case of Russia. The second chapter develops new methodological tools for analyzing multi-party political systems. These tools allow to measure swing voters on two "ideological" dimensions using individual survey data. In the third chapter the measures of swing voters are used to test theories of distributive politics for the case of Spain. This chapter shows that political variables are significant in the allocation of state subventions, and the magnitude of the effect is comparable to that of economic variables.
Cavalcanti, Francisco de Lima. "Essays on Brazilian Political Economy". Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/664500.
Pełny tekst źródłaYeoh, Melissa M. S. "Three essays in political economy". Connect to this title online, 2007. http://etd.lib.clemson.edu/documents/1181668326/.
Pełny tekst źródłaSong, Zheng. "Essays on Dynamic Political Economy". Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-636.
Pełny tekst źródłaSaporiti, Alejandro. "Three essays in political economy". Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.429597.
Pełny tekst źródłaSun, Cheng. "Reputation games and political economy". Thesis, Princeton University, 2015. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3714502.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis dissertation studies the applications of reputation games in social media and finance as well as decision games in political economy. Chapter 1 develops a reputation game in which a biased but informed expert makes a statement to attract audiences. The biased expert has an ideological incentive to distort his information as well as having a reputation concern. The expert knows that his expertise may vary in different topics, while the audiences cannot identify such differences. The biased expert is more likely to announce his favorite message when he knows less about it. Moreover, the biased expert is less willing to lie when the audiences have better outside options, and such improvements in outside options may benefit both the expert and the audiences.
Chapter 2 studies a credit rating game with a credit rating agency(CRA), an issuer and an investor. The privately informed and biased CRA provides a rating on the issuer's project, and the investor decides to purchase the project or not according to the report. As long as the CRA obtains a contract, he will inflate the rating. When the default risk is high, the CRA tells the truth. Moreover, he is more likely to tell the truth when the issuer's private benefit is larger. When the default risk is low, the CRA sends a good rating. He is more likely to inflate the rating if the issuer has a higher private benefit.
Chapter 3 presents a model in secessions and nationalism, with a special emphasis on the role of civil war. In our model, a disagreement on secession between the central government and the minority group leads to disastrous military conflicts. As a result, the tremendous potential cost of the war distorts the political choice of the minority group, and helps the central government to exploit them both economically and politically. Several key ingredients, such as population, per capita income and perceived winning chance of the civil war, play an essential role in the decision making process of the minority group. I also conduct an empirical test of this model, which supports the major findings stated above.
CoppedeÌ, Michela Redoano. "Political economy and fiscal choices". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.397587.
Pełny tekst źródłaArevalo, Bencardino Julian Javier. "Three essays on political economy". Thesis, Boston University, 2011. https://hdl.handle.net/2144/34432.
Pełny tekst źródłaPLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you.
A frequent discussion in the Political Economy literature is that of the directionality in the relationship between economic and political variables. Are our society's ideas, political orientation, concepts of morality and values conditioned by our economic development or, on the contrary, are our ideas, values and worldview what determine our political and economic attitudes, and, thereby, our economic performance and political development? This thesis comprises two parallel projects that address these two different approaches. The first project studies the effect of having land or housing property rights on the decisions of households' members of whether or not to participate in civil society organizations; I develop this idea in a paper called "Civil Society and Land Property Rights: Evidence From Nicaragua". For doing this I use household level panel data for the years 1998, 2001 and 2005. I conclude that contrary to what happens in more developed countries, in developing societies a household receiving formal property rights reduces the incentives to participate in civil society. The second project is aimed at studying the relationship between religion and welfare states: given the different possibilities available in terms of data sources and methodologies, this project is integrated by two papers. In the first one. "Religion, Political Attitudes and Welfare States" I use data from the World Values Survey in order to study the effect of individual religiosity on attitudes towards the welfare state and, thus, its aggregate impact on welfare state policies. In the second paper of this project, "Political Elites, Religion and Welfare States in Latin America" I continue studying this relationship but instead of using data from ordinary citizens I focus on the study of legislators in Latin America. I combine quantitative and qualitative data and show that more religious legislators have less progressive attitudes towards the welfare state. Similarly. I find important differences across religions in the attitudes of their members towards the relationship of religion wits state, politics, society and the economy.
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