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Gotowe bibliografie tematyczne / Political economy

Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Political economy”

Autor: Grafiati

Data publikacji: 4 czerwca 2021

Data aktualizacji: 28 września 2024

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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Political economy"

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Team, WERU. "Political Economy". Welsh Economic Review 16, nr 2 (1.10.2004): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/j.2004.10336.

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Team, WERU. "Political Economy". Welsh Economic Review 17, nr 2 (1.10.2005): 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/j.2005.10357.

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Team, WERU. "Political Economy". Welsh Economic Review 18, nr 1 (1.04.2006): 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/j.2006.10367.

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Team, WERU. "Political Economy". Welsh Economic Review 18, nr 2 (1.10.2006): 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/j.2006.10379.

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Team, WERU. "Political Economy". Welsh Economic Review 19, nr 1 (1.04.2007): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/j.2007.10389.

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Jones, Calvin. "Political Economy". Welsh Economic Review 19, nr 2 (1.11.2007): 20. http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/j.2007.10401.

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Editorial Team, WER. "Political economy". Welsh Economic Review 13, nr 1 (1.03.2001): 9. http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/wer.154.

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Editorial Team, WER. "Political economy". Welsh Economic Review 13, nr 2 (1.09.2001): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/wer.165.

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Editorial Team, WER. "Political economy". Welsh Economic Review 14, nr 1 (1.03.2002): 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/wer.176.

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Editorial Team, WER. "Political economy". Welsh Economic Review 14, nr 2 (1.10.2002): 20. http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/wer.188.

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Rozprawy doktorskie na temat "Political economy"

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Mizuno, Nobuhiro. "Political Economy and Economic Development". Kyoto University, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/120727.

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Dell, Melissa. "Essays in economic development and political economy". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/72831.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2012.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 183-197).
This thesis examines three topics. The first chapter, entitled "Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita" utilizes regression discontinuity to examine the long-run impacts of the mita, an extensive forced mining labor system in effect in Peru and Bolivia between 1573 and 1812. Results indicate that a mita effect lowers household consumption by around 25% and increases the prevalence of stunted growth in children by around six percentage points in subjected districts today. Using data from the Spanish Empire and Peruvian Republic to trace channels of institutional persistence, I show that the mita's influence has persisted through its impacts on land tenure and public goods provision. Mita districts historically had fewer large landowners and lower educational attainment. Today, they are less integrated into road networks, and their residents are substantially more likely to be subsistence farmers. The second chapter, entitled "Trafficking Networks and the Mexican Drug War" examines how drug traffickers' economic objectives influence the direct and spillover effects of Mexican policy towards the drug trade. Drug trade-related violence has escalated dramatically in Mexico during the past five years, claiming over 40,000 lives. By exploiting variation from close mayoral elections and a network model of drug trafficking, the study develops three sets of results. First, regression discontinuity estimates show that drug trade-related violence in a municipality increases substantially after the close election of a mayor from the conservative National Action Party (PAN), which has spearheaded the war on drug trafficking. This violence consists primarily of individuals involved in the drug trade killing each other. The empirical evidence suggests that the violence reflects rival traffickers' attempts to wrest control of territories after crackdowns initiated by PAN mayors have challenged the incumbent criminals. Second, the study predicts the diversion of drug traffic following close PAN victories by estimating a model of equilibrium routes for trafficking drugs across the Mexican road network to the U.S. When drug traffic is diverted to other municipalities, drug trade-related violence in these municipalities increases. Moreover, female labor force participation and informal sector wages fall, corroborating qualitative evidence that traffickers extort informal sector producers. Finally, the study uses the trafficking model and estimated spillover effects to examine the allocation of law enforcement resources. Overall, the results demonstrate how traffickers' economic objectives and constraints imposed by the routes network affect the policy outcomes of the Mexican Drug War. The third chapter, entitled "Insurgency and Long-Run Development: Lessons from the Mexican Revolution" exploits within-state variation in drought severity to identify how insurgency during the Mexican Revolution, a major early 20th century armed conflict, impacted subsequent government policies and long-run economic development. Using a novel municipal-level dataset on revolutionary insurgency, the study documents that municipalities experiencing severe drought just prior to the Revolution were substantially more likely to have insurgent activity than municipalities where drought was less severe. Many insurgents demanded land reform, and following the Revolution, Mexico redistributed over half of its surface area in the form of ejidos: farms comprised of individual and communal plots that were granted to a group of petitioners. Rights to ejido plots were non-transferable, renting plots was prohibited, and many decisions about the use of ejido lands had to be countersigned by politicians. Instrumental variables estimates show that municipalities with revolutionary insurgency had 22 percentage points more of their surface area redistributed as ejidos. Today, insurgent municipalities are 20 percentage points more agricultural and 6 percentage points less industrial. Incomes in insurgent municipalities are lower and alternations between political parties for the mayorship have been substantially less common. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that land reform, while successful at placating insurgent regions, stymied long-run economic development.
by Melissa Dell.
Ph.D.

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Ivlevs, Artjoms. "Economic and political economy aspects of migration". Aix-Marseille 2, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006AIX24009.

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L’objectif de cette thèse est d’explorer plusieurs phénomènes liés à la migration en prenant en considération différents aspects de la réalité économique contemporaine : l’importance du secteur non-échangeable, l’asymétrie entre les flux migratoires et les flux des investissements, ainsi que les problèmes persistants entre différentes communautés ethniques. Dans le premier chapitre introductif, nous explorons la littérature sur la politique économique de l’immigration et nous étudions les différentes voies par lesquelles les immigrés peuvent affecter le bien-être des résidents domestiques. Dans la deuxième partie, nous développons un cadre théorique afin d’analyser les effets de l’immigration sur le bien-être individuel dans une petite économie ouverte avec le secteur non-échangeable. Nos résultats expliquent pourquoi les résidents domestiques sont généralement opposés à l’immigration peu qualifiée et favorisent l’influx des immigrés hautement qualifiés. Dans le chapitre trois, nous faisons une extension du modèle élaboré dans le chapitre deux, en prenant en compte les flux internationaux du capital. D’abord nous cherchons à décrire le lien entre la migration peu et hautement qualifiée et les investissements directs à l’étranger. Puis, nous analysons le changement dans les attitudes envers l’immigration suite à l’introduction de la mobilité internationale du capital. Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous démontrons comment la diversité ethnique peut affecter les intentions d’émigrer. Nous traitons le cas de la Lettonie où les minorités ethniques constituent 40% de la population. Nous pouvons constater que les individus appartenant aux minorités ethniques sont plus probables d’émigrer et que cette probabilité augmente avec le revenu. Les individus appartenant à la majorité ethnique, au contraire, sont plus probables d’émigrer si leurs revenus sont plus bas
The objective of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of migration-related economic issues in the world today. We concentrate both on immigration and emigration and at various stages of our work address all three parties involved in migration process : people hosting immigrants, people left behind and the migrants themselves. We account for several important features of today’s rapidly globalising life : the importance of the non-traded sector, asymmetry between capital and labour flows, and persisting problems between ethnic communities. The first chapter in an overview of the political economy of immigration literature and addresses the multiple ways in which immigrants may affect natives’ welfare. In particular, we discuss the role of economic and non-economic arguments in shaping immigration attitudes and summarise main labour market and welfare-state effects of immigration. Chapter two develops open economy with a non-traded sector. Our finding provide additional understanding of why native population is generally opposed to low-skilled immigrants and favouring high-skilled foreign workers. The third chapter extends the model developed in chapter two to accommodate internationally mobile capital. First, we investigate whether immigration of high-skilled and low-skilled labour leads to positive or negative FDI. Then, we find out how would immigration attitudes change if a country allows international capital movements. Chapter four investigates how ethnic diversity at home may influence emigration intentions of an individual. We explore the case of Latvia where ethnic minorities constitute 40% of the population. We find that ethnic minorities are more likely to emigrate and are positively self-selected on the basis of income, while the opposite is true for ethnic majority population

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Neggers, Yusuf. "Essays in Economic Development and Political Economy". Thesis, Harvard University, 2016. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493380.

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The three chapters in this dissertation examine aspects of the relationships between transparency, government accountability, and the quality of public services. In the first chapter, I ask how ethnic diversity, or lack thereof, among polling station officials affects voting outcomes. I exploit a natural experiment occurring in the 2014 parliamentary elections in India, where the government mandated the random assignment of state employees to the teams that managed polling stations on election day. I find that the presence of officers of minority identities within teams led to significant shifts in vote share toward the political parties associated with these groups. Results suggest that the magnitude of these effects is large enough to be relevant to election outcomes. Using large-scale survey experiments, I provide evidence of own-group favoritism in polling personnel and identify the process of voter identity verification as an important channel through which voting outcomes are impacted. The second chapter examines whether electronic procurement (e-procurement), which increases access to information and reduces personal interactions with potentially corrupt officials, improves procurement outcomes in India and Indonesia. We find no evidence of reduced prices but do find that e-procurement leads to quality improvements in both countries. Regions with e-procurement are also more likely to have winners come from outside the region. On net, the results suggest that e-procurement facilitates entry from higher quality contractors. The third chapter studies the effects of the enactment across U.S. states of open meetings laws which ostensibly increase the public availability of information on legislator behavior. As recent work shows that increased remoteness of capital cities in U.S. states is strongly associated with reduced accountability and worse government performance, I also investigate how the impacts of open meetings vary with state capital isolation. I find that open meetings increase spending on public goods and heighten confidence in state government on average. Heterogeneous impacts on incumbent vote share suggest that at both low and high levels of initial accountability, open meetings provide citizens with additional information that influences voting decisions.
Public Policy

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Vernby, Kåre. "Essays in Political Economy". Doctoral thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Government, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-6879.

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This thesis consists of an introduction and three stand-alone essays. In the introduction I discuss the commonalities between the three essays. Essay I charts the the main political cleavages among 59 Swedish unions and business organizations. The main conclusion is that there appear to exist two economic sources of political cleavage: The traded versus the nontraded divide and the labor versus capital divide. Essay II suggests a political rationale for why strikes have been more common in those OECD countries where the legislature is elected in single member districts (e.g. France, Great Britain) than where it was elected by proportional representation (e.g. Sweden, Netherlands). In Essay III I present a theoretical model of political support for different types of labor market regulations. From it I recover two implications: Support for industrial relations legislation that enables unions to bid up wages should be inversely related to the economy's openness, while support for employment protection legislation should be positively related to the size of the unionized sector. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of 70 countries match my theoretical priors.

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Vernby, Kåre. "Essays in political economy /". Uppsala : Uppsala universitet, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-6879.

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Dalgiç, Hüseyin Engin. "Essays in political economy". Thesis, McGill University, 2004. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=84990.

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This dissertation consists of three essays each of which considers a political economy problem. In the first essay, we study a local government who can engage in both grabbing hand and helping hand activities with respect to the firms under its jurisdiction. We find that there are two dynamic paths for this economy. It can either stagnate or take off, i.e., grow without bound. The path actually taken depends on three variables: If the initial capital stock, tax share of the local government, or the cost of covering up corruption is sufficiently high, the economy takes off. Otherwise it stagnates.
In the second essay, we model a situation where the government tries to help a distressed industry, but it needs to know the firms' adjustment costs to set its level of support. We show that lobbying can help the firms credibly reveal their adjustment costs, when the support takes the form of a subsidy or a tariff. Furthermore, the more firms there are in the industry, the smaller is the amount of lobbying necessary to convey information, and the higher is the social welfare. When lobbying is effort intensive rather than expenditure intensive, subsidies for high adjustment cost industries go up, and subsidies for low adjustment cost industries go down with the number of firms in the industry.
The third essay considers a game between an elite with political power and the rest of the population. Foreseeing that transition to majority rule will lead to redistribution, the elite engages in activities that decrease the efficiency of the public sector to discourage redistribution. We find that initial inequality in the economy increases corruption and decreases redistribution. The model's predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence that inequality and corruption are correlated, and that corrupt governments are smaller.

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Acacia, Francesca. "Essays on political economy". Thesis, University of Leicester, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/27615.

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The first chapter shows that the ideological dimension is the key determinant of the decision to vote. We do so with a unique data base that analyses the elections in 16 OECD multi-party system countries for a period of time that spans from the 1979 to the 1995. This data set contains information on the ideological position taken by each party competing in an election and the self-declared ideological position of the citizens on the same ideological continuum. We estimate that the likelihood of voting is higher when there is a close distance between a voter’s bliss point and the preference of the nearest party. We also find that ideological location of the second nearest party matters for the decision to vote. Moreover, our results exclude that the ideology of political parties other than the first two nearest to the preferences of the voters are significant for the decision to vote. The second chapter focuses on why turnout varies across elections and across districts. A simple micro-founded measure of policy based party competition is developed and calculated for every district at every election in 15 European countries over the period 1947-1998. Our results suggest that a large proportion of the within-district inter-election variance in turnout levels can be attributed to differences in the intensity of district-level of political competition. The third chapter extends the research on happiness and spatial theory of voting by exploring whether the ideological vote affects the level of subjective well-being in the society. I rely my analysis on data on the subjective life satisfaction of a large sample of individual over 50 elections in 15 OECD countries. The results of the analysis lend firm support to the dominant role of ideological vote in the well-being of the individuals. Specifically, I demonstrate that subjective life satisfaction is negatively affected by the presence of strategic voting. The results also suggest that the level of well-being is lower when the citizen votes strategically for a political party that has not won the electoral competition. Moreover, when I account for the political affiliation, the right-wing voters are more susceptible to ideological consideration than the left wing one. My results are robust to different measures of strategic voting.

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Veuger, Stan. "Essays in Political Economy". Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10222.

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This dissertation consists of three essays on political economy. The first essay studies the various ways in which political activism affects policy making, drawing upon evidence from the Tea Party movement in the United States in 2009 and 2010. The second essay develops a policy-centered framework for understanding voting behavior in proportional-representation systems, and tests its predictions using survey data collected around the 2002 Dutch general elections. The third essay focuses on a specific aspect of the implementation of policy, the consequences regulatory supervision may have on firm performance, and assesses the net effect of this kind of supervision on firms' operating costs in the setting of the commercial-banking sector in the United States in the period 2001-2007.
Economics

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Darbaz, Safter Burak. "Essays on political economy". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/33116.

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This thesis consists of three stand-alone chapters studying theoretical models concerning a range of issues that take place within the context of political delegation: tax enforcement, political selection, electoral campaigning. First chapter studies the problem of a small electorate of workers who cannot influence tax rates but can influence their local politicians to interfere with tax enforcement. It develops a two-candidate Downsian voting model where voters are productivity-heterogenous workers who supply labour to a local firm that can engage in costly tax evasion while facing an exogenously given payroll tax collected at the firm level. Two purely office motivated local politicians compete in a winner-takes-all election by offering fine reductions to take place if the firm gets caught evading. Two results stand out. First, equilibrium tax evasion is (weakly) increasing in the productivity of the median voter as a result of the latter demanding a weaker enforcement regime through more aggressive fine reductions. Second, if politicians were able to propose and commit on tax rates as well, then the enforcement process would be interference-free and the tax level would coincide with the median voter's optimal level. These two results underline the fact that from voters' perspective, influencing enforcement policy is an imperfect substitute for influencing tax policy in achieving an optimal redistribution scheme due to tax evasion being costly. In other words, a lax enforcement pattern in a given polity can be indicative of a political demand arising as an attempt to attain a redistributive second-best when influencing tax policy is not a possibility. Second chapter turns attention to the role and incentives of media in the context of ex ante political selection, i.e. at the electoral participation level. It constructs a signalling model with pure adverse selection where a candidate whose quality is private information decides on whether to challenge an incumbent whose quality is common knowledge given an electorate composed of voters who are solely interested in electing the best politician. Electoral participation is costly and before the election, a benevolent media outlet which is assumed to be acting in the best interest of voters decides on whether to undertake a costly investigation that may or may not reveal challenger's quality and transmit this information to voters. The focus of the chapter is on studying the selection and incentive effects of changes in media's information technology. The setting creates a strategic interaction between challenger entry and media activity, which gives rise to two main results. First, an improvement in media's information technology, whether due to cost reductions or gains in investigative strength always (weakly) improves ex ante selection by increasing minimum challenger quality in equilibrium. Second, while lower information costs always (weakly) make the media more active, an higher media strength may reduce its journalistic activity, especially if it is already strong. The intuition behind this asymmetry is simple. While both types of improvements increase media's expected net benefits from journalism, a boost to its investigative strength also makes the media more threatening for inferior challengers at a given level of journalistic activity. Combining this with the first result implies that the media can afford being more passive without undermining selection if it is sufficiently strong to begin with. In short, a strong media might lead to a relatively passive media, even though the media is "working as intended". Third chapter is about electoral campaigns. More precisely, it is a theoretical investigation into one possible audience-related cause for diverging campaign structures of different candidates competing for the same office: state of political knowledge in an electorate. Electorate is assumed to consist of a continuum of voters heterogenous along two dimensions: policy preferences and political knowledge. The latter is assumed to partition the set of voters into ignorant and informed segments, with the former consisting of voters who are unable to condition their voting decisions on the policy dimension. Political competition takes place within a probabilistic voting setting with two candidates, but instead of costless policy proposals as in a standard probabilistic voting model, it revolves around campaigning. Electoral campaigning is modelled as a limited resource allocation problem between two activities: policy campaigning and valence campaigning. The former permits candidates to relocate from their initial policy positions (reputations or legacies), which are assumed to be at the opposing segments of the policy space (i.e. left and right). The latter allows them to generate universal support via a partisanship effect and can be interpreted as an investment into non-policy campaign content such as impressionistic advertising, recruitment of writers capable of producing emotionally appealing speeches, etc. The chapter has two central results. First, a candidate's resource allocation to valence campaigning increases with the fraction of ignorant voters, ideological (non-policy) heterogeneity of informed voters and proximity of candidate's initial position to the bliss point of the informed pseudo-swing voter. The last one results from decreasing relative marginal returns for politicians from converging to pseudo- swing voter's ideal position. Second, even if candidates are otherwise symmetric, a monotonic association between policy preferences and political knowledge can induce divergence into campaign structures. For instance, if ignorance and policy preferences are positively correlated (e.g. less educated preferring more public good) then the left candidate would conduct a campaign with a heavier valence focus and vice versa. Underlying this result is again the decreasing relative marginal returns argument: a candidate whose initial position is already close to that of the informed pseudo-swing voter would benefit more from a valence oriented campaign. An implication of this is that a party that is known having a relatively more ignorant voter base can end up conducting a much more policy focused campaign compared to a party that is largely associated with politically aware voters.

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Książki na temat "Political economy"

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Usher, Dan, red. Political Economy. Malden, MA, USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470752210.

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Conrad, Christian A. Political Economy. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-30884-1.

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Alex, Cukierman, i Richard Scott F, red. Political economy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

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Jean Charles Léonard Simonde de Sismondi. Political economy. Fairfield, NJ: A.M. Kelley, 1991.

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Kulikov, Aleksandr Georgievich. Political economy. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989.

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Dan, Usher. Political economy. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2003.

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May, Christian, Daniel Mertens, Andreas Nölke i Michael Schedelik. Political Economy. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49665-3.

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O’Brien, Robert, i Marc Williams. Global Political Economy. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-52313-6.

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Kravchuk, Robert S. Ukrainian Political Economy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230107243.

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Milward, Bob. Marxian Political Economy. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230287488.

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Części książek na temat "Political economy"

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Mause, Karsten. "Political Economy". W Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1599–606. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_367.

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Mause, Karsten. "Political Economy". W Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1–8. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_367-1.

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El-Anis, Imad. "Political Economy". W The Palgrave Handbook of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 117–34. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-9166-8_7.

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Edling, Max M. "Political Economy". W A Companion to Thomas Jefferson, 439–56. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444344639.ch27.

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Northcott, Michael S. "Political Economy". W The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Political Theology, 531–43. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119133759.ch38.

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Koyama, Mark. "Political Economy". W Handbook of Cliometrics, 1–33. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40458-0_54-1.

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Dalley, Lana L. "Political Economy". W The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Victorian Women's Writing, 1–4. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02721-6_54-1.

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Munck, Ronaldo. "Political Economy". W Contemporary Latin America, 61–82. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-01095-7_4.

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Peterson, Rodney D. "Political Economy". W Political Economy and American Capitalism, 13–28. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3874-1_2.

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Durac, Vincent, i Francesco Cavatorta. "Political Economy". W Politics and Governance in the Middle East, 88–112. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-52127-9_5.

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Streszczenia konferencji na temat "Political economy"

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Lipovská, Hana, Libor Žídek i Lucie Coufalová. "ECONOMIC CRIMES IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY". W Law & Political Science Conference, Vienna. International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.20472/lpc.2017.001.004.

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Maklakova, Elena, A. Timashinova i Faria Nusrat. "BANGLADESH ECONOMY". W Manager of the Year. FSBE Institution of Higher Education Voronezh State University of Forestry and Technologies named after G.F. Morozov, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.34220/my2021_147-150.

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The article is about overall history of Bangladesh Economy, how Bangladeshi Economy work, which sector playing important role in Bangladesh and what problem facing in Bangladesh Economy. Bangladesh is land of opportunities. There are lots of sectors in Bangladesh which are playing a significant role in the Economy. But there is also some factor which is the reason for not good economics especially the Political reason. There have lots of political problems in Bangladesh. If economy can growth but political leaders can’t give to growth nicely.

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Helmond, Anne, David B. Nieborg i Fernando N. van der Vlist. "The Political Economy of Social Data". W the 8th International Conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3097286.3097324.

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Haydaroğlu, Ceyhun. "Political Economy of Russia’s Voting Power on Eurasian Countries". W International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c04.00635.

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The relationship between economy and politics shows itself explicitly while governments are determining and implementing national and international economic policies. In democratic societies voting power, which means that economical and political units uses against one another in decision making mechanisms, shapes stability and/or unstability. It can be explained that a government, which is structured by the sovereignty of a single party in a parlament, has a monopoly power. Putin, has an important voting power in both The Council of The Federation and State Duma. The confidence through this voting power, while national economic and political equlibrium is provided, in international context, stable and strong policies are followed. Russia, increases the pressure and makes its economical and political power apperant on the eurasian countries, especially which were under its’ authority before. In this context Russia’s voting power calculated seperately for all election periods by Normalized Banzhaf Index. According to this, the effect of today’s Russia’s dominance on the Eurasian countries has been analyzed within the boundaries of political economics dicipline. In consequence of the analysis; it is indicated that, there is a linear relationship between the Russia’s voting power and economical stability, and Russia’s efficieny on the eurasian countries gradually increases. The most important feature of this study, which makes it differentiated form others, is making political economy of Russia’s efficiency on the eurasian countries within the context of political economics literatüre by the voting power perspective, besides cultural, historical and social factors.

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Koti, Sorina. "The Effect of Financing Political Parties in the Economy: Case of Albania". W Ninth International Scientific-Business Conference LIMEN Leadership, Innovation, Management and Economics: Integrated Politics of Research, 399–406. Association of Economists and Managers of the Balkans, Belgrade, Serbia, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.31410/limen.2023.399.

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The paper aims to analyze and determine the factors that affect the political parties’ activities and their role in the socioeconomic life of the country. Money in politics has become more and more an element of growing influence to a determining power, so the control and transparency of this component are vital to maintaining the country’s prosperity and development. The paper analyses the case of Albania, an ex-communist country, and the problems that have arisen from the use of “dirty money” for financing politics and their political campaigns. Albania needs urgently a new law on political and financing political parties, to fight corruption, and abuse of public funds and to prevent from empowerment of organized crime. Reform of political parties is needed, in order to end the power deriving from money and to consolidate the power deriving from faith and voter confidence.

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Kurtoğlu, Ramazan. "Economy and National Security". W International Conference on Eurasian Economies. Eurasian Economists Association, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.36880/c04.00644.

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After the Great Depression in 1929, “economic security” which was in litterateur after World War II developed and in Cold War period it gained a meaning with neoliberalism which was put into effect with 1978 Washington Consensus. During this period, Soviet Bloc collapsed in early 1990s and a new term emerged in New World Order which is “economic security” equals “national security” or vice versa. Now, these two terms interwined and with a religion – politics philosophy – finance / economics formatted transformation international political economy – mapping and security terms filled.

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Van Couvering, Elizabeth. "The Political Economy of New Media Revisited". W Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24251/hicss.2017.220.

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Ostasiewicz, Katarzyna, i Walenty Ostasiewicz. "Good Life: From Political to Human Economy". W 17-th AMSE. Applications of mathematics in economics. International Scientific Conference: Poland, 27-31 Agust, 2014. Conference proceedings full text papers. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.15611/amse.2014.17.23.

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Muhardi, Muhardi, i Cici Cintyawati. "Political Communication and Economy: Grassroots Community Perspectives". W International Conference on Media and Communication Studies(ICOMACS 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icomacs-18.2018.58.

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Rahmat Hidayat, Dadang, i Wahyuni Choiriyati. "Political Economy of Communication Policy in Indonesia". W International Conference on Ethics in Governance (ICONEG 2016). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/iconeg-16.2017.69.

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Raporty organizacyjne na temat "Political economy"

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Aizenman, Joshua, i Hiro Ito. The Political-Economy Trilemma. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, marzec 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w26905.

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Stephan, Paul. The Political Economy of Extraterritoriality. Librello, czerwiec 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.12924/pag2013.01010092.

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Glaeser, Edward. The Political Economy of Hatred. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, wrzesień 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9171.

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Acemoglu, Daron, Mikhail Golosov i Aleh Tsyvinski. Political Economy of Ramsey Taxation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, sierpień 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15302.

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Acemoglu, Daron, Mikhail Golosov i Aleh Tsyvinski. Power Fluctuations and Political Economy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, październik 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15400.

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Glaeser, Edward. The Political Economy of Warfare. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, grudzień 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12738.

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Hansen, Christopher Joshi, i John Bower. Political Economy of Electricity Reform. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, wrzesień 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.26889/1901795241.

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Lowes, Sara. Culture in Historical Political Economy. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, wrzesień 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30511.

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Bruno, Michael. Economic Analysis and the Political Economy of Policy Formation. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, listopad 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w3183.

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Feldstein, Martin. The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, luty 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6150.

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