Rozprawy doktorskie na temat „Philosophie <Motiv>”

La notion d'eschatologie est originellement théologique : elle est pourtant réinvestie par la philosophie contemporaine chez Heidegger, puis par la philosophie française chez Levinas et Derrida. Quelles sont ainsi les conditions de possibilité, la spécificité philosophique et l'opérativité spéculative de ce réinvestissement ? L'étude généalogique de l'eschatologie, chez Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche et Heidegger, révèle que l'eschatologie ne peut être mobilisée en philosophie qu’à condition d’être préalablement dissociée de la téléologie, de la théologie et de l'ontologie. Elle est alors convoquée chez Levinas et Derrida en dialogue avec le messianisme et la phénoménologie pour former un motif original, aussi bien élément constituant que moteur philosophique. L’eschatologie lévinasso-derridienne devient un schème éthique, sans contenu ontique et radicalement anti-ontologique, qui consiste à interrompre le présent et la présence : une eschatologie du présent. L’eschatologie du présent constitue ainsi une triple problématisation de la limite : elle éclate les limites entre les circonscriptions disciplinaires (théologie et philosophie) ; marque la limite (c'est-à-dire la défaillance) du logos ; et brise la limite (l'horizon) de l'histoire pour proposer une pensée éthique de l'événement
The concept of eschatology originally comes from theology: it is however summoned by contemporary philosophers, first by Heidegger then by Levinas and Derrida. What are the conditions of possibility of this philosophical gesture? How is it specifically philosophical? And what are its operativity and consequences? The genealogical study of eschatology in Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger’s philosophy reveals that eschatology can only be used in philosophy if it is first dissociated from teleology, theology and ontology. It then becomes an original motive (both a pattern and a philosophical driving force) in Levinas and Derrida’s philosophy, in dialog with Jewish messianism and phenomenology. As an ethical and contentless principle, radically anti-ontological, it consists in interrupting presence (both time and essence): an eschatology of the present. It thus constitutes a triple problematization of limit: it bursts limits between disciplines (theology and philosophy); its sets logos’ limitation (its failure); and shatters the historical limit (horizon) to create and ethical conception of the event

Les motifs du tissu et du tissage proliferent dans le discours philosophique du vingtieme siecle. Ces motifs donnent lieu a une polysemie conceptuelle, une torsion de la referentialite et une polyvalence d'usage recoupant certains themes majeurs de la philosophie : l'intentionnalite, le rapport du langage formel a la langue usuelle, la mise en corps des idees, le textualisme. Ils participent a certifier la puissance semantico-conceptuelle superieure d'une logique discursive sur une logique formelle, en localisant la metaphorique comme lieu de la singularite dynamique de l'acces de la langue descriptive a l'ontologie. Ainsi proposons-nous un groupe conceptuel, le << groupe-tisser >>, dont les elements expliquent le role privilegie accorde au tissu dans la philosophie contemporaine-et la tradition francaise. Lecteurs de la poesie de l'antiquite et de la fabrication poetique des univers romantique et symboliste reconnaitront la singularite du motif. Les faits historiques nous orientent vers un rapport privilegie, dans des cultures tres differentes, du tisserand et du tissage au suprasensible. Le tisserand est le travailleur de l'attraction sensorielle et sensuelle, rejoignant par une force mysterieuse, pres de la sagesse, les regles facultatives du desir. Dans son extension philosophique, c'est une theorie de la signification qui se creuse dans le groupe, soulignant le role de la sensation et de l'emotion dans la traduction du sensoriel au linguistique. En eloignement de son objet, et en projection microscopique de sa structure dynamique, cette theorie se fera sous forme d'un holisme inverse. Le caractere inhabituel de ce holisme a pour consequence que le modele du tisser se situe aux confins des theories du nom, de la proposition et du texte. Les implications epistemologiques du concept << figural >> du tissu et la philosophie descriptive issue du groupe-tisser, nous offrent les ressources pour avancer une theorie de la relation suggeree par les rythmes et les trames.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the motif of wonder in the gospel of Mark. The first chapter defines wonder, and compares its use in Mark to that of Matthew and Luke. Reasons for the study are then given, followed by a survey of previous suggestions on the topic, and the plan of the study. The second chapter surveys over 100 Greco-Roman sources to see how wonder functioned in that literature. Wonder functions here most commonly as a response to divine interventions. The third chapter follows with a survey of the use of wonder in early Jewish literature from the second temple period. Wonder here is seen to be an eschatological expectation, and is also connected with messianic and propagandistic texts. The fourth chapter then examines wonder in early Christian literature from canonical, gnostic, and apocryphal sources. It is shown in these texts to be depicted as both positive and negative. Presuppositions for exegesis in Mark are presented in chapter five, involving Peter as a source for Mark, a setting in Rome prior to A.D. 70, and a discussion of methodology involving redaction-criticism and literary-criticism in Mark. The concept of a motif is defined and clarified. The sixth and seventh chapters are exegesis of the thirty-two occasions in Mark where wonder occurs, in light of the material in the previous chapters. The kingdom of God is consistently in view in pericopae using wonder. The eighth chapter is the conclusion. The thesis proper that the evidence has produced is that Mark uses wonder to signify the human response to the breaking-in of the kingdom of God. Wonder is nuanced throughout Mark in such a way to defy schematization as a negative reaction, and is a necessary response to the numinous.

The Gift 2.0 - A Museological Study of donations of Objects and its Underlying Motives, is a study in order to explain why people choose to donate items for museums, rather than any other alternative.The empirical study consists of qualitative, semi-structured research-interviews conducted with seven selected curators from various museums, with extensive experience of the subject acquisition. I have chosen to only examine Swedish cultural-historical museums. The hypothesis that I assumed was first and foremost that the heritage sphere is what Pierre Bourdieu calls a field. The reason that people would donate objects to museums, is that the donation itself brings cultural capital to the donor, from people with the same habitus. Since I felt that Bourdieus theory of field, capital and habitus could not explain all the reason why people donate items to museum, my second hypotheses was that certain objects are what Annette Weiner called inalienable possessions, objects that at any cost may not be sold or bartered away. It is precisely the ability to keep the object outside of the commercial sphere that is the essential for an inalienable possession. Linked to this hypothesis I argued that museums act like a bastion of inalienable possessions, in which the donor can continue to keep the object while it has been given. My source material consists of the research interviews and secondary material that I have acquired during the study, consisting of literature, deed of gift and e-mail correspondence. I have analyzed both primary and secondary source material using my hypotheses. The results of this study verify that my hypothesis is valid to use as a musicological theory of gifts. The study is a two year master´s thesis in Museum and Heritage Studies.

In this dissertation, I argue for a set of interpretations regarding the relationship between moral obligation and reasons for acting in the theories of Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Hume. Several commentators have noted affinities between these naturalist moral theories and contemporary ethical internalism. I argue that attempts to locate internalist theses in these figures are not entirely successful in any clear way. I follow Stephen Darwall's suggestion that addressing the question “why be moral?” is one of the fundamental problems of modern moral philosophy. Since, as some have argued, there is a tension between accepting internalism and providing an adequate response to the “why be moral” question, I argue that each figure maintains a distinctive response to this question given the sort of internalism, if any, he would accept. In the introduction, I provide the key distinctions that arise from contemporary discussions of ethical internalism, and I motivate my project of looking for insight into the relationship between internalism and amoralism in the British Moralists. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the moral theory Hobbes who, I argue, would accept a version of constitutive existence internalism because he holds that there is a necessary connection between one's being contractually obligated and one's being in certain rationally motivating states. I then present the fool's objection as an objection to the assumption of a relevant similarity between divine obligation and contractual obligation. I argue that, irrespective of this dissimilarity, the fool has some rational motive to keep his covenants in virtue of the fact that making covenants changes one's decision situation in such a way that it becomes reasonable to treat covenants as if they imposed categorical constraints on behavior. I claim that Hobbes's response to the fool is, at least in part, that the fool fails to understand what moral obligation consists in. In the remainder of the dissertation I turn my attention to two classical sentimentalist moral theories. I examine the theories of Hutcheson and Hume because it is not clear what resources moral sentimentalism has available to it in order to address questions about the reasonableness of moral action. In chapters 3 and 4, I develop an interpretation of Hutcheson who, because he distinguishes between exciting and justifying reasons, is able to say there is some non-derivative sense in which moral actions are reasonable. I argue that he develops a theory whereby moral obligation is to be understood in terms of the non-motivating states of approval of moral spectators, and I do not think, contrary to Darwall, that there is anything puzzling about his doing so. I argue that Hutcheson does not accept a version of motive internalism, but that he shares much in common with internalist views: he claims that there is a very strong, if contingent, connection between our states of approval and our motivational states. I offer an explanation of how Hutcheson could respond to the amoalist, which holds that we ought to be moral because, in part, we all already have the motives for and the interests in doing the sorts of things of which moral spectators approve. In chapters 5 and 6, I turn my attention to Hume who, because he makes no distinction between motivating and justifying reasons, does not seem to have anything to say about the non-derivative reasonableness of moral action. I argue that a textually grounded interpretation of Hume's theory of the passions provides us with more reason to favor an (appraiser motive) internalist reading over an externalist reading of his moral theory. Much of my argument depends on an interpretation of Hume's claim that it is possible for agents to be moved to act from a sense of duty alone. When we ask what Hume can say to the question “why be moral,” some of the options that Hutcheson pursues are initially open to him. However, I argue that Hume thinks philosophical theorizing must give way to the operations of psychological mechanisms that are causally responsible for inspiring agents to act morally by giving rise in them to particular kinds of affections. I conclude with some general remarks about the problems surrounding Darwall's interpretation of Hume's theory of justice, and use this discussion to lend further support to the claim that the actual theories of Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Hume do not neatly fit into the taxonomies that Darwall seems to think they do.

In An Image of Africa, Chinua Achebe indicts Conrad’s Heart of Darkness for exemplifying the kind of purist rhetoric that has long benefited Western ontology while propagating reductive renderings of African experience. Edward Said refers to this dynamic as the way in which societies define themselves contextually against an imagined Other. Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s fiction exposes how, by occupying cultural dominance, Western, white male values are normalized as universal. Nevertheless, these values are de-naturalized by their inconsistencies in the lived experiences of Adichie’s black, African women. Women who are at once aware of and participant in, the pretentions that underlie social interaction—pointing to the inevitability of performativity and disrupting the illusion of pure identity. These realizations interrupt Conrad’s essentialist conception of identity and reclaim diverse ontological possibilities for the Other.

L’histoire de la maison et celle du roman se croisent tout particulièrement au XIXe siècle alors que littérature et architecture engagent des chantiers dont Philippe Hamon souligne le parallélisme. La maison comme la maisonnée sont par ailleurs affectées par les évolutions sociétales. Objet privilégié de la description réaliste, la maison a depuis été ébranlée dans ses fondations d’autant que l’intérêt même de son exposition s’est trouvé remis en cause. La question de la représentation est au cœur des crises que traverse le roman. Le retour à la fiction initié au tournant des années 1980, en réactivant le romanesque, favorise-t-il la délivrance de nouveaux permis de construire et le réinvestissement d’un lieu redevenu fréquentable? Cette thèse se propose d’explorer le motif de la maison dans l’œuvre romanesque de quatre romanciers contemporains, J.M.G. Le Clézio, Pascal Quignard, Sylvie Germain et Marie NDiaye, à l’aune des changements sociologiques comme des problématiques du roman, afin de montrer que la maison offre des perspectives nouvelles pour la fiction. Nous envisagerons un «roman de maison» lequel, comme le roman d’aventure, aurait son espace, ses intrigues, ses personnages. En parcourant des espaces domestiques distincts, nous ferons ressortir un certain nombre d’enjeux esthétiques et poétiques liés au thème et nous nous demanderons si le roman ne serait pas, à notre époque, devenu le refuge le plus sûr et le lieu le plus hospitalier
The history of home and that of the novel have crossed paths more than once, but hardly ever more so than in the nineteenth century, when literature and architecture began exploring new forms, the similarities of which were aptly pointed out by Philippe Hamon. At the time, both house and home were subjected to deep societal changes, and their worth as literary object was called into question: thus, home, which had long been a favourite topic of the realists, was shaken to its foundations. The very notion of representation lay at the crux of the crises the novel was going through. Around the 1980s, however, the novel began pivoting back towards fiction, thus reviving its core characteristic. Did this return to home promote new building permits, so to speak? Did it make home, as a literary trope, inhabitable once again ? This dissertation shall explore the motif of home in the complete works of four contemporary authors, namely J.M.G. Le Clézio, Pascal Quignard, Sylvie Germain and Marie NDiaye, as analyzed through the prism of sociological changes, as well as of novel-related problematics. By so doing, I hope to demonstrate that home still bears a slew of new perspectives for the fiction genre. I will put forward the notion of a ‘home novel’, which, just like the ‘adventure novel’, is endowed with its very own set of spaces, plots and characters. By delving into various domestic spaces, I shall bring out some of its key aspects, be they aesthetic or poetic, and wonder whether the novel might have become, in the times we live in, the safest and most hospitable haven at our disposal

L'œuvre principalement photographique de Kimiko Yoshida (née le 23 juin 1963 au Japon et installée en France depuis 1995) se fonde sur la création de « mythes» à travers ses autoportraits. Les « mythes du Photographe» à l'origine des « fonctions» de son œuvre - visant entre autres à « informer, représenter, surprendre, faire signifier, donner envie» selon Roland Barthes dans La chambre claire - trouvent leurs sources dans la société, la culture, l'époque auxquelles l'artiste appartient et par conséquent également dans ce qui touche à la singularité de la personnalité, du vécu, de l'histoire à l'échelle intime de celui-ci. De fait, le titre général de cette étude énonce une quête des « mythes personnels et pluriels dans l'œuvre de Kimiko Yoshida », dont le thème de « rentre-deux» constitue la posture esthétique majeure, l'artiste et son œuvre se trouvant entre Japon et Occident, entre figuration et abstraction, entre réalité et fiction, entre citation et transgression. Ce discours fictionnel par l'image et dans l'image subit différentes métamorphoses qui forment les quatre axes fondateurs de la thèse, à savoir l'entre-deux particulier du « personnage conceptuel» défini par Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari dans Qu'est-ce que la philosophie / appliqué à la « signature» Kimiko Yoshida : l'étude d'un entre-deux géographique et culturel définissant un « syncrétisme» artistique singulier: les illustrations des différentes dimensions spatio-temporelles perceptibles dans l ' œuvre de Kimiko Yoshida, notamment à travers les (enjeux des couleurs des images : et l'interrogation concernant la place du sujet à l'image, entre trace et absence
The work of Kimiko Yoshida (born on June 23rd, 1963, in Japan and living in France since 1995), mainly based on photography, is founded on the creation of « myths ». This study is about searching, defining and analysing the « functions » of Kimiko Yoshida's self-portraits. The « myths of the Photographer », at the origins of her work's functions - aiming. amongst others, to « inform, represent, surprise, signify, create desire» according to Roland Barthes' Camera Lucida - are rooted in the society, the culture and the time the artist belongs to, and as a consequence also in the singularity of his/her personality, experience, and intimate story. Thus, the general title of this study brings forwards a research of « personal and plural myths in Kimiko Yoshida's work of art», whose topic of the « in-between » is the main aesthetic position, the artist and her work situated between Japan and the West between representation and abstraction, between reality and fiction, between quotation and transgression. The fictional speech through and in the image undergoes several transformations which make up the four founding lines of this thesis, that is to say the distinctive in-between of the « conceptual character » defined by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in Whut is Philosophy ) applied to Kirniko Yoshida's name : the study of a geographical and cultural in-between defining a singular artistic « syncretism » : the illustrations of the several perceptible space-time dimensions in Kimiko Yoshida's work, notably through the games/aims of the images' colours : and the questioning about the subject in the image, between trace and absence

This thesis considers Kant's departure from moral naturalism. In doing so, it explores the relationship between ethics, naturalism, normativity and freedom. Throughout this exploration, I build the case that Kant's ethics of autonomy allows us to make better sense of ethics than Hume's moral naturalism. Hume believes that morality is ultimately grounded in human nature. Kant finds this understanding of ethics limiting. He insists that we are free - we can critically reflect upon our nature and (to an extent) alter it accordingly. This freedom, I contend, renders the moral naturalist's appeal to nature lacking. Of course, a Kantian conception of freedom - some form of independence from the causal order - is fairly unpopular in contemporary circles. In particular, a commitment to naturalism casts doubt on such a notion of freedom. I argue with Kant that such a conception of freedom is essential to the conception of ourselves as rational agents. The critical turn, unlike naturalism, warrants this conception of freedom, accommodating the point of view of our rational agency. It thus allows Kant's ethics of autonomy to better grasp certain key elements of morality - normativity and our agency - than Hume's moral naturalism.

碩士
國立師範大學
英語學系
86
Through an examination of parallel motifs, this thesis examines therelationship between Plato and Vergil, suggesting that the Roman poet was profoundly influenced by the Athenian philosopher. It studies as well Sidney's "Arcadia," partly as a way of verifying the connection between Plato and Vergil.Supported by the directly parallel motifs in Plato and Vergil and by the implications of Sidney's work, the author argues that Plato may have had as much influence on the "Aeneid" as the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey" had. The main focus of this thesis (in Chapters Two through Four) is on theinvestigation of the "Aeneid" for elements that derive directly from Plato's dialogues, such as the motif of the cave, the themes of soul and love, and the principles of erotikos and daimonion, which guide the education of Plato's ideal philosopher-king. Chapter One offers an introduction to the historical relationship of the principal figures: Plato and Vergil. In Chapter Two, which examines the caveepisodes in the "Aeneid" and "The Republic," clear correspondences emerge--through a study of Plato's and Vergil's imagery of light and darkness, through the themes of the ascent and descent of their heroes, and through the theme ofeducation. Chapter Three studies Aeneas' pre-cave experience (the love affairwith Dido before his descent to the second cave, the underworld), showing its dependence upon Plato's concepts of soul and love as expressed in the"Phaedrus," "The Symposium" and "The Republic." Here the author focuses on Plato's concept of the erotikos, or a passion-governed person. Chapter Four analyzes Aeneas' post-cave experience, i.e. his practical management of the polis in Books VII to XII of the "Aeneid." Here, like the philosopher-king inhis political career, he acts as a daimonion, a spirit-governed person who passes the divine will to mortals. Chapter Five explores the two cave episodesin Sidney's "Arcadia," demonstrating that their characters and plots echo the amalgam found in Verigl of Platonic ideas and motifs. Chapter Six provides final arguments in support of the author's discovery of the extensive Platonic influence upon the "Aeneid."

This thesis describes the motif connecting two sides of a few selected aspects are essential to the concept of integral theme. The theoretical part is devoted to symbolic and philosophical significance of the theme of the bridge, which is linked to a gradual work. It focuses on the genesis of the architecture of the bridge together with social and cultural background. Subsequently imaging theme deals with the bridge in the history of visual culture. Practical implemented using spatial concepts of subjective motive in terms of symbolism encoded in a simplified bridge construction, located in the illusionary space of emptiness, allowing mutual connection.

The thesis deals with the Czechoslovakian philosophy in the nineteen-sixties. It focuses not only to its historical description but intends to enter its philosophical thinking from inside and analyse its principal categories. Especially it focuses on the category of work and examines its various formulations, developed in different theoretical perspectives of Czechoslovakian philosophers. This allows distinguish these perspectives in their similarities on one hand and differences on the other. The thesis notably focuses on so called "Hegelian movement" and its evaluation of category of work. This movement, which is in fact the Czechoslovakian variation to the philosophy of praxis, formulates the category of work in its philosophical meaning, i. e. as an ontological category decisive for an origin of the reality and human being. It was originally Hegel, who developed this meaning of category, and Czechoslovakian Hegelian movement continued in developing his ontology adopted through Marx. The Czech philosophers enriched it with aspects of socialistic humanism. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part explains historical conditions of philosophical scientific performance in Czechoslovakia. The second interprets the texts of Czechoslovakian Hegelian philosophers and their expositions of category...