Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „Personal Injury Lawyer”

Personal injury claim can be found if any accident occurs such as road accident. After the accident occur the victim which is humankind can claim the compensation to himself regarding to injury in that accident. This claim involve law to determine the compensation amount to the victim. Unfortunately, in Malaysia multiplier-multiplicand approach still used by the court. This approach is outdated and unfair to victim as it’s not seen through the victim personal condition. So, the personal injury claim application which is it using Ogden table were implemented to calculate the compensation amount to victim. This Ogden table is special since it’s seen through in all aspect of victim personal condition. This application is build using Android Studio and Atom. This application has information about claimant, court and lawyer. It also can calculate the compensation amount more accurately to claimant. The target users of this application are claimant which is the victim, lawyer and court.

The work of defence lawyers in civil litigation has been neglected by law and society studies. Research on personal injury cases, in particular, has usually focused on the alleged failure of legal systems to compensate plaintiffs as fully and as quickly as they believe proper. The defence lawyer is conventionally portrayed as a pettifogger in the classic sense, one who seeks points of detail on which to argue, delay and confuse issues until the plaintiff reduces their demands, dies, loses heart or otherwise goes away. Recent work has been widely taken as proposing that the most effective plaintiff response is to harry defendants in an aggressive and uncompromising fashion–so-called ‘hard bargaining’. This paper combines data from two studies of personal injury litigation carried out in the late 1980s and the mid 1990s to question this conclusion. Although the procedural environment has changed in England since the implementation of the Civil Justice Reforms in April 1999, it is argued that the general points on methodology and on the starting assumptions of socio-legal research remain valid.

Road accident often leads to claims for personal injury by aggrieved parties. In Malaysia, courts have been using multiplier-multiplicand approach. This approach seems to be outdated and unfair to the claimant. Presently, the approach excludes the claimant's personal condition in the calculation of quantum of damages. Hence, this study uses the Ogden Table as introduced in the United Kingdom as benchmarking guidelines, by taking into account of all aspect of claimant's personal condition for the purpose of such calculation. This study aim is to build upon a proposed data modeling system known as Entity Relationship Diagram (ERD) and the created process modeling known as data flow diagram (DFD). In so doing, the claimants will insert his input data, run it through the first process, and store the information in the claim injury part database. They can also edit and store to claim injury part database on their own. This will generate a report with the information in claim injury part database and can be viewed by claimant, court and lawyer as target users. It is hoped that it will facilitate the calculation of injury claim which would serve justice and accuracy of personal injury in road accidents.

Peter Caswell had always viewed the families bottling business as his birthright. He was stunned when his father sold the business while he was still in college. After becoming a successful personal injury lawyer with a bright future, he learns of the Brustlin Bottling Company that was for sale. In the case Peter reviews with Alan Dawes, his long time friend, information he has developed on five successful companies in the boutique soft drink bottling business. He is trying to decide his next steps a strategy to employ in the business.

Everyone involved in the practice of medicine is acutely aware that the nature of their work has changed dramatically over the past one to two decades. For one thing, given the requisites of dealing with managed care, Medicare, Medicaid, HMOs, and PPOs, there is a new language to be learned. The new systems often demand spending paperwork time in excess of that allowed for clinical work, filling out a myriad of constantly changing forms, and doing battle, not with one’s medical peers but with unseen gatekeepers trained in business not in medicine, in defense of treatment plans. To add insult to injury, and perhaps even more in conflict with the practice of good medicine, are those cases involving (1) workman’s compensation (WC) and (2) personal injury (PI) litigation. Most physicians presumably elected medicine over other professions, including business or law, and thus have reason to resent the proportion of their time taken from what they do best, taking care of patients, by the many administrative and legal aspects of practicing medicine.

The article deals with the urgent issue of translation of special vocabulary. It has been proved, that effective study of English legal terminology by Russian native speakers is possible when there is profound knowledge of the corresponding piece of worldview shared by the English native speakers and understanding how the cognition of one nation is translated into the worldview of another nation. This understanding is achieved by means of studying concepts named by legal terms. The authors have systematized the difficulties, which appear in the process of English-Russian translation of the terms within the field of legal profession. Etymological, universal, national and professional conceptual layers named by the legal terms: barrister, solicitor, attorney, lawyer, адвокат, coroner, Personal Injury Law have been characterized, the peculiarities, which motivate representative variants of translation – found out. The appearance of new signs in the structure of concepts, represented by the terms legal research, discovery, legal writing has been detected; the choice of translation techniques applied for these terminological units is explained. The research has revealed the changes in the piece of worldview of the English native speakers connected with the appearance of new concepts named by the terms ediscovery and predictive coding. The choice of translation techniques has been justified.

Buscar información en Google se ha convertido en una actividad común en la vida cotidiana de los usuarios o consumidores. El propósito de esta investigación es estudiar los factores que inciden en el posicionamiento web de Google en Toronto. Para entender la importancia de los factores que inciden en el posicionamiento de un negocio en la web se analizó los tres resultados que aparecen en Google cuando se tiene un criterio de búsqueda a nivel local. En esta investigación se analiza la localidad de Toronto y con la palabra clave “personal injury lawyer Toronto”, (abogado para accidentes y lesiones personales en Toronto). Se utilizó una metodología cualitativa para analizar elementos específicos de los tres perfiles de negocio de Google posicionados por la palabra clave que aparecen en la primera página de búsqueda de Google. Se utilizó la escala de Likert con una valoración del 1 al 5 para analizar la relevancia, la distancia y la prominencia de las firmas, factores que Google recomienda para tener un mejor posicionamiento web local. En conclusión, la interpretación estadística de los resultados señaló que los estudios jurídicos posicionados son: Neinstein, Diamond & Diamond y Preszler. Segundo, se identificó exhaustivamente los factores prominencia, distancia y relevancia para cada firma. Finalmente, la distancia, relevancia y prominencia son factores que no trabajan aisladamente sino en conjunto influyen positivamente en el posicionamiento web.

The article analyses problems of determining ways to improve the procedural procedure to protect the rights and freedoms of victim in the legal field of competitive criminal justice. The issue of improving the status of the victim, extending his rights, determining the procedure for its implementation stipulated by law, harmonization of legislation, elimination of legal conflicts, ensuring the rule of law, strengthening guarantees The rights and freedoms of the victim. Aligning the CPC of Ukraine with the Constitution of Ukraine, and coordinating it with the Civil Code of Ukraine and applicable international legal acts, we propose in the norm of the CPC of Ukraine, which determines the status of the victim, in addition to the rights established there by the law, to set out the following rights of the victim: a) to demand compensation for the moral harm caused and physical and pecuniary damages at the expense of the person guilty of the crime or persons who are financially responsible for their actions, and in cases where the person who committed the crime is not identified, for ahunok State budget; b) to respect his honor and dignity, to demand that facts of the collection, use, storage and disclosure of the degrading honor, dignity or business reputation of false information be prevented, and, if necessary, make a request for the removal of such information, raise the issue of closed court proceedings ; c) require arrest of the defendant's deposits and property and take other measures provided by law to recover the damage caused to him by the crime; d) require personal immediate examination by a forensic expert in case of personal injury or harm to his / her health; e) to use the legal assistance of a legal representative from a lawyer or other specialist in the field of law from the moment of recognition as a victim; g) have a confidential date with the legal attorney before the first interrogation, as well as the presence of a lawyer or legal representative at his first interrogation; g) to be acquainted with the decision on the appointment of forensic examination and the expert's opinion; h) to get acquainted with the case file in the suspended criminal proceedings on the grounds of not identifying the perpetrator; i) to participate directly in the examination of all evidence at the trial and to speak in court, regardless of the participation of the prosecutor. The investigator, the inquirer, the prosecutor, the court are obliged to immediately explain to the victim his procedural rights, to hand him a written document describing his rights - a declaration of the victim's rights, to immediately take the measures provided by law for ensuring the victim's rights. Prospects for further study of this problem are seen in the development of models of realization of the victims of their procedural rights at different stages of the process.

The escalating cost of civil litigation is leaving many defendants and plaintiffs unable to meet legal expenses such as attorney fees, court charges and others. This significantly impacts their ability to sue or defend themselves effectively. Related to this phenomenon is the ethics discussion around access to justice and crowdfunding. This article explores the dimensions that explain the phenomenon of litigation crowdfunding. Using data from CrowdJustice, a popular Internet fundraising platform used to assist in turning legal cases into publicly funded social cases, we study litigation crowdfunding through the lenses of the number of pledges, goal achievement, target amount, length of description, country, case category, and others. Overall, we see a higher number of cases seeking funding in the categories of human rights, environment, and judicial review. Meanwhile, the platform offers access to funding for other less prominent categories, such as voting rights, personal injury, intellectual property, and data & privacy. At the same time, donors are willing to donate more to cases related to health, politics, and public services. Also noteworthy is that while donors are willing to donate to education, animal welfare, data & privacy, and inquest-related cases, they are not willing to donate large sums to these causes. In terms of lawyer/law firm status, donors are more willing to donate to cases assisted by experienced lawyers. Furthermore, we also note that the higher the number of successful cases an attorney presents, the greater the amount raised. We analyzed valence, arousal, and dominance in case description and found they have a positive relationship with funds raised. Also, when a case description is updated on a crowdsourcing site, it ends up being more successful in funding—at least in the categories of health, immigration, and judicial review. This is not the case, however, for categories such as public service, human rights, and environment. Our research addresses whether litigation crowdfunding, in particular, levels the playing field in terms of opening up financing opportunities for those individuals who cannot afford the costs of litigation. While it may support social justice, ethical concerns with regards to the kinds of campaigns must also be addressed. Most of the ethical concerns center around issues relating to both the fundraisers and donors. Our findings have ethical and social justice implications for crowdfunding platform design.

At the wheels of railroads and streetcars, the law of accidental personal injury, known as negligence, became a discrete body of law between 1870 and 1920. The defining component of negligence was “fault”–the notion that the individuals (injured and injurer) must have failed to act according to some minimal standard of caution. Theorists of the history of negligence have explained that the conduct of all was measured against what a “reasonable man” would have done under the circumstances. The author here challenges this fundamental assertion. Through trial records, lawyer's written arguments, and appellate opinions, she reconstructs the critical role of gender in shaping the law of accidental injury. As she argues, in 19th- and 20th-century America, injury was a gendered event. The fact that courts in these years held men and women to different standards of care undermines theorists' arguments that economic considerations drove the law of accidental injury. Moreover, the reification of gender nm in private law, in turn, vitally affected the experience of gender in turn-of-the-century America.

ABSTRACTThe lecture discusses the issue of actuarial evidence in personal injury cases, and how the courts have been diffident towards actuarial evidence and the utility and importance of actuarial expertise. Until recently lawyers have not understood the ways in which actuaries work with probabilities. The lecture then shows that now the law has adopted actuarial thinking in several significant ways, and in particular in damages and personal injury cases. The discount rate for calculating the multiplier for future loss is discussed, as is the new area of risk assessment and conditional fees. Lawyers need actuarial help where appropriate, and both face the daily problem of applying the laws of probability to human activity.

Road accidents are a major contribution in personal injury claims. The accident victims are allowed to claim a certain amount of damages from negligible parties. In Malaysia, courts adopt the traditional method of Multiplier-Multiplicand Approach to calculate the compensation amount. However, there is still no available tool to estimate personal injury claim with respect to loss of earning. This study aims to develop a flowchart for Personal Injury Claims (PIC) to calculate the compensation amount for loss of earning in Malaysia regarding the Ogden Table introduced by the United Kingdom. A flowchart is proposed and built using Microsoft Visio. The users will fill up the details displayed to get the estimated compensation amount. It is expected that claimants, courts and lawyers would be among the target users. To get started, nine elements as inputs will fill up by users. Then, there is three important processes involved in order to calculate the damages for loss of earning. In a conclusion, at the end of the session, the users will know their entitled amount of claim in loss of earning.

This paper reveals some of the tactics that lawyers may use when conducting personal injury litigation. The research is empirically based by being drawn from structured interviews with a cross-section of practitioners. This qualitative evidence helps to place the rules of tort in a wider context and suggests that tactical considerations may affect the outcome of individual cases irrespective of their legal merits. A range of strategies are considered here to illustrate how they may be used at different points during the litigation. In addition, the paper updates our understanding of the compensation system by considering the practitioners' responses in the light of the major changes made to this area of practice in recent years. It reveals how negotiation tactics have developed since research in this area was last carried out. Overall, the paper adds to a very limited literature dealing with negotiation and settlement of personal injury claims in the UK.

This article analvzes referral practices among lawyers. The hypothesis is that the market for legal services is “efficient,” that is, market forces enable plaintiffs in personal injury cases to maximize their recoveries, given the quality of lawyers representing defendants. If this market is indeed efficient, one would expect that legal claims which would benefit most from high-quality legal services would be assigned to high-quality lawyers. The evidence shows that referrals enable claims to be matched with lawyers in just that way. That is, through the mechanism of referrals, claims of greater intrinsic value are assigned to lawyers of higher quality. The paper also provides a model of the decision a generalist must make: to litigate a case himself or refer it to a trial specialist. The implications of the model support the hypothesis that this market is efficient in the sense defined above.

In Singapore personal injury litigations, successful claimants usually receive their compensations as a lump sum. The main advantage of a lump sum payment is that the proceedings can be concluded with a 'clean break' between the parties. The lump sum is a result of discounting the future pecuniary values into a single present-day amount, considering the time value of money and the claimant's mortality. Conventionally, lump sum awards are determined by making reference to a spread of amounts in comparable cases. However, a fairer method would be one that involves input from not only lawyers but also other experts including economists and actuaries. This study, which is carried out by an inter-professional working group, provides a set of actuarially computed tables for use in personal injury settlements in Singapore. The calculations involve a consideration of recent advancements in stochastic mortality modeling and an empirical study on the econometrics of real returns on risk-free assets in Singapore. We then present two recent personal injury cases in Singapore, aiming at helping the Singapore legal profession understand and use the economic principles with actuarial tables, and educating economists and actuaries the legal concerns and concepts in personal injury cases.

The system for assessing appropriate damages for individuals who have suffered a personal injury, caused by another person or persons is well established in the UK. A claimant, for example, who has been in a road accident, work accident, medical accident or negligent action can make a claim for his/her physical and psychological injuries, time off work and future disability, provided it is proven that another person(s) is responsible. The system involves obtaining, medical-legal evidence on the diagnosis, causation, treatment and prognosis of any injuries, physical or psychological. One key aspect of this covers the crucial issue of evidential reliability. This paper explains the key questions facing lawyers and experts alike in the UK; fundamental postulates or beliefs about evidence; ways to improve reliability; the relevance of pre-event history and improving evidential reliability via Part 35 questioning. The UK, along with the USA, has the most advanced and developed system of personal injury litigation process.

One of the more vexed questions for tort lawyers in recent times has been whether recovery in negligence lies for the what has been described as the ‘loss of a chance’. The exact definition of ‘loss of chance’ is unclear, but it is generally accepted that it refers to the loss of an opportunity to obtain or receive a desired outcome; for example, recovery from a personal injury. Accordingly, where a patient receives negligent medical treatment in circumstances where, even if the treatment was properly carried out, that patient might not have been cured it is said that the patient has lost the chance of being cured as a result of the treatment.

The history of medical malpractice in Canada has received little attention from legal or medical historians. Through a contextualized study of a Nova Scotia case from the 1930s, Davis v. Colchester County Hospital, this article demonstrates how changes in technology and surgical procedures both created situations that spurred malpractice claims, and made it difficult for injured patients to prove medical negligence. In addition, developments in tort law concerning the liability of hospitals, and the doctors and nurses working within them, provided medical defendants ample opportunity to avoid legal liability, even in cases in which the existence of negligent treatment was obvious. The testimony at trial, the legal strategies utilized by the lawyers, and the judicial rulings also shed light on attitudes of the medical profession toward personal responsibility and ethics, and demonstrates how the interests of patients were weighed against those of medical institutions and professionals by lawyers and judges.

The article examines the introduction of digitalization into justice processes and the processing of judicial decisions in administrative and civil personal injury compensation disputes. The purpose of the implementation of the algorithms was an attempt to develop indicative criteria and ways to determine the amount of compensation for bodily injury. It is noted that the new rules were met ambiguously by the professional community. For example, delegations of lawyers from G7 countries expressed concerns about the future of justice. The reason for their discontent was the possibility of excluding adversarial discussion from judicial proceedings if artificial intelligence was used. In this context, the regulation of algorithms used in the justice sector, designated by the term “algorithmic models of judicial decision analysis” (MAAD) seems to be a priority for the preservation of democracy and the rule of law. The author believes that MAAD will promote greater openness of the judge, both to the plaintiffs and to the judicial institution, as well as – “coherence” of the case law, making it available for judges to examine. It is emphasized that the introduction of such algorithms is a form of digital judicial collegiality, not the standardization of judicial thinking.

The paper examines the controversial issue of referral fees for personal injury claims. It looks at the function of referral fees in the civil justice system, their relationship to the guarantees of access to court and the right to seek legal assistance in ECHR Art 6, and the debate about promoting access to justice or a litigious society. It examines the experience of the referral fees market in England and Wales, where the costs of referrals have risen dramatically and there is concern that referrers are auctioning their customers to the highest bidder rather than helping them find competent lawyers. Sir Rupert Jackson recommended banning referral fees in his report on the costs of civil litigation, and the Government has announced it will implement this recommendation. The paper considers the potential effects of a ban on competition in the legal services market and its compatibility with UK and EU competition law. The paper argues that a combination of better regulation of the industry and proper regulation of costs rules is a better and more proportionate way of controlling legal costs and the quality of legal services than an outright ban. While referral fees have not delivered all the benefits one would expect from a for-profit independent referrals service, they can help people obtain information about their legal rights, and competent lawyers to enforce them. This service is particularly valuable given that the state has substantially cut public funding of the civil justice system in recent years.

This article examines the ability of the claimant to recover damages for mental distress in the English law of torts. This is an area of law which has received little attention and indeed, the general impression is frequently that such damages are not recoverable. This article seeks to establish that this is far from the case and that damages are frequently awarded for mental distress even if they are not always openly recognised. Most lawyers are familiar with the award of damages for ‘suffering’ within the action for personal injury, but damages for distress are awarded generally, particularly as aggravated damages, as recognised by the Law Commission in 1997. It will be argued that much will be gained by appreciating the true nature of these damages and the policy factors which determine when the claimant will be granted such an award. Whilst there is no evidence to support a right to claim such damages in their own right, there is sufficient authority for a separate head of damages us part of the claimant's general compensatory claim. It is therefore submitted that open recognition of this head will be to the benefit of individual claimants and the system as a whole in clarifying this area of damages.

Asbestos was once referred to as a ‘miracle mineral’ for its ability to withstand heat and it was used in thousands of products. But exposure to asbestos causes cancer and other diseases. As of the beginning of 2001, 600,000 individuals had filed lawsuits for asbestos-related diseases against more than 6,000 defendants. 85 firms have filed for bankruptcy due to asbestos liabilities and several insurers have failed or are in financial distress. More than $54 billion has been spent on the litigation -higher than any other mass tort. Estimates of the eventual cost of asbestos litigation range from $200 to $265 billion. The paper examines the history of asbestos regulation and asbestos liability and argues that it was liability rather than regulation that eventually caused producers to eliminate asbestos from most products by the late 1970s. But despite the disappearance of asbestos products from the marketplace, asbestos litigation continued to grow. Plaintiffs' lawyers used forum-shopping to select the most favorable state courts techniques for mass processing of claims, and substituted new defendants when old ones went bankrupt. Because representing asbestos victims was extremely profitable, lawyers had an incentive to seek out large numbers of additional plaintiffs, including many claimants who were not harmed by asbestos exposure. The paper contrasts asbestos litigation to other mass torts involving personal injury and concludes that asbestos was unique in a number of ways, so that future mass torts are unlikely to be as big. However new legal innovations developed for asbestos are likely to make future mass torts larger and more expensive. I explore two mechanisms - bankruptcies and class action settlements - that the legal system has developed to resolve mass torts and show that neither has worked for asbestos litigation. The first, bankruptcy by individual asbestos defendants, exacerbates the litigation by spreading it to non-bankrupt defendants. The second, a class action settlement, is impractical for asbestos litigation because of the large number of defendants. As a result, Congressional legislation is needed and the paper discusses the compensation fund approach that Congress is currently considering.

As issues such as the nature of the sexual, marital, and other relationships and claims—both personal and economic—continue to face Americans and America’s lawyers, the question of how we as a people distinguish fundamental from non-fundamental rights is one of first importance. In constitutional law, the Supreme Court has addressed this question through the doctrine of “Substantive Due Process.” In his lengthy dissent in McDonald v. Chicago—his final opinion as a Supreme Court Justice—Justice John Paul Stevens claimed that substantive due process is fundamentally a matter of how we interpret the meaning of the word “liberty.” The issue as to whether the right is specifically enumerated in the Amendments is irrelevant, Stevens argues, if the interest is naturally within the definition of “liberty.” Moreover, Justice Stevens’s argument in McDonald was approved by his liberal colleagues on the Court, which indicates that his theory of liberty may well become the baseline for determining what are, and what are not, fundamental rights. However, in the recent case of United States v. Windsor, the Court refused to employ the substantive due process doctrine, as traditionally understood, as the basis for striking down the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). Instead, the Court employed rational basis review, finding that the legislative purpose and effect behind DOMA was “to disparage and to injure” those wishing to enter into same-sex marriages, and thus served “no legitimate purpose.” Still, Justice Kennedy clearly signals in his Windsor opinion that some formulation of the substantive due process doctrine remains alive and well as a constitutional basis for deciding Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process “liberty” interests such as same-sex marriage. Indeed, both Justices share a conceptual core in their understandings of what constitutes a constitutionally protected liberty interest.

Abstract: After a few futile attempts at reforming German law relating to compensation for tortious acts and breach of contract, a bill enacted on April 18, 2000 brought about some major changes. Amongst the key areas of reform are: the introduction of a general claim for non-pecuniary loss in cases of personal injury; the partial exclusion of value-added tax (VAT) in the calculation of material damages; an improvement of the position of children participating in public traffic; a “levelling” of the defences available to train operators as well as keepers of motorised vehicles under strict liability statutes; new rules relating to liabilty for pharmaceutical products; the raise of existing compensation caps (Haftungshöchstgrenzen) in the field of strict liability; and the introduction of liability of court-appointed experts who submit erroneous reports. Not only has the German legislator, by implementing this reform in August 2002, stayed abreast of changes in case law relating to compensation for tortious acts and breach of contract, but it has also fallen into line with general developments of the law in Europe, such as the improved protection of small children and the establishment of an express claim for non-pecuniary loss. However, the legal basis for a general right of personality has remained unchanged; in this context, a proposal by the Bundesrat to include such a right expressis verbis in the new § 847 BGB has not been adopted. The same holds true for the possibility of the principal to escape liability for his assistants, which is even more important against the background of other European jurisdictions. To lawyers with a common law background, who are accustomed to the gradual development of their case law, this history of German tort law offers an interesting perspective: it demonstrates the frictions involved in the interplay between legislative “maintainance” of an entire Code on the one hand, and development of the law by Courts on the other.

AbstractThough judges and lawyers encourage claimants to settle disputes out of courts, lawyers may struggle managing out-of-court dispute resolution processes. Some of the dispute management struggles are related to emotions of clients. One of the reasons why it may be difficult to manage a client’s emotions is because out-of-court disputes require a different communication skillset from lawyers. The following note features some advice for law students on how to incorporate compassionate communication methods in personal injury disputes. Personal injury disputes may be emotionally challenging for clients. Such challenges may manifest in communication issues and prolonged suffering of clients. Yet, both students and academics may dismiss the importance of soft-skill development in due course of legal education. As lawyer-socialization institutions, law schools have a duty to foster skills that are necessary to successfully assist clients in emotionally challenging disputes. This contribution discusses the notion of human suffering and compassion-based counselling scholarship in relation to personal injury disputes. The paper advocates for normalizing emotions in personal injury disputes, and through testimonials of Michigan lawyers, presents real life examples of how lawyers can communicate compassionately with their clients. Law students can benefit from learning about real-life examples of communication patterns between lawyers and clients to have better conversations with their clients.

Abstract Do people turn on those who turn to the courts? Using a survey experiment, we find people have significantly more negative attitudes toward personal injury litigants than other types of claimants, even when they believe the claimant is injured and mostly not at fault. Moreover, our subjects were not anti-claim, anti-hiring a lawyer, or even anti-government program. Instead, they were distinctively anti-litigant.

This article explores current trends in personal injury litigation in Russia compared with the common law countries (the UK and US). In contrast to the British and American situation, there is no concern about the problem of “compensation culture” or “litigious behaviour” in Russian public discourse. The number of personal injury cases considered by Russian courts is not particularly high despite the growing number of accidents. This state of affairs can be explained by the influence of the Soviet culture of tort law. The most visible areas of the Soviet impact addressed in the article are liability insurance, non-pecuniary damages, and the legal profession. The article demonstrates the specificity of the Russian approach to these issues. The research is based on the analysis of judicial decisions on personal injury cases, court statistics, and expert interviews with personal injury lawyers. The findings are discussed from a historical and comparative perspective.

A staple in assessing and valuing injury and related monetary damages claims, life care plans have traditionally encapsulated damages computations associated with present and anticipated future rehabilitation interventions related to contested events, the most common involving personal injury, medical malpractice, and product liability. The needs and sophistication of the injury claims assessment process have continued to evolve since the inception of life care plans, and accordingly affect the services life care planners contribute to resolve disputes over the need for and value of litigated future rehabilitation interventions. After a brief history and overview of life care planning, this article describes how the discipline evolved to its current state. The authors then discuss how lawyers’ discernments in prosecuting cases have led to the need for three variations/derivatives of the traditional life care plan: the life care plan cost comparison, the interpolated life care plan, and the international life care plan. Standards of practice considerations follow. According to the Commission on Rehabilitation Counselor Certification, life care planning is a career pathway for certified rehabilitation counselors (CRCs). Rehabilitation counselors encounter a myriad of physical and psychosocial factors that affect the rehabilitation process. CRC certification and training prepares counselors to holistically address complex areas of rehabilitation following a catastrophic illness or injury. According to the Commission on Rehabilitation Counselor Certification (CRCC) Code of Ethics, CRCs have a responsibility to the public to engage in practices that are based on accepted research methodologies and evidence-based practices. They need to remain current with developments in evidence-based practice. Notably, the three variations/derivatives of the traditional life care plan presented in this article address pertinent standards of practice considerations.

Purpose The purpose of this study is to build on previous literature in this area thus, the views of professionals working with those who report institutional abuse was sought using a Delphi method. Design/methodology/approach Professionals working with those who report institutional abuse, such as psychologists, social workers and personal injury lawyers, were invited to engage in the Delphi study. Sixteen professionals completed the final round (with four rounds in total). This method was used to gain professional consensus on the considered impacts of institutional child abuse and what factors influence impacts. Findings Eight superordinate themes were developed, as follows: institutional abuse has lasting negative effects on well-being, functioning and behaviour; loss of trust in others and the system is a potential outcome of institutional abuse; negative impacts on future life chances; negative impacts of institutional abuse are exacerbated by numerous factors; protective factors reduced negative impacts; psychological intervention is useful for survivors; positive and negative impacts of disclosure – the response of others as important; and keep impacts individualised. Practical implications The need for an individualised approach when working with those reporting institutional abuse was a salient finding. Originality/value Institutional abuse is known to result in several negative impacts, although research into this area is limited with a need to better understand what may protect or exacerbate impacts.

IntroductionThe existential question today is not whether to be or not to be, but how one can become what one truly is. (Golomb 200)In contemporary Western culture the ideal of living authentically, of being “true to yourself,” is ubiquitous. Authenticity is “taken for granted” as an absolute value in a multitude of areas, from music, to travel to identity (Lindholm 1). A core component of authentic selfhood is to find an occupation that is a “passion:” work that is “really you.” This article draws on recent qualitative interviews with Australians from a range of occupations about work, identity and meaning (James). It will demonstrate that for these contemporary individuals, occupation is often closely linked to perceptions of authentic selfhood. I begin by overviewing the significance and presence of authenticity as a value in contemporary culture through discussions of reality television and self-help literature focussed on careers. This is followed by a discussion of sociological theories of authenticity, drawing out the connections between the authentic self, modernity and work. The final section uses examples from the interviews to argue that the ideal of work being an extension of the authentic self is compelling because in providing direction and purpose, it helps the individual avoid anomie, disenchantment and other modern malaises (Taylor).The Authentic Self and Career Guidance in Contemporary Popular CultureThe prevalence of authenticity in contemporary Western popular culture can be seen in reality television programs like Master Chef (a cooking competition) and The Voice (a singing competition). Generally, contestants take part in the show in order to “follow their dreams” and pursue the career they feel they were “destined” for. When elimination is immanent, those at risk of departure are given one last chance to tell the judges what being in the competition means to them. This usually takes the form of a tearful monologue in which the contestant explains that the past few weeks have been the best of their life, that they finally feel “alive” and that they have found their “passion.” In these shows, finding work that is “really you”—that is an extension of your authentic-self—is portrayed as being a fundamental component of fulfillment and self-actualization.The same message is delivered in self-help media and texts. Since the 1970s, “finding your passion” and “finding yourself” have been popular subjects for the genre. The best known of these books is perhaps Richard Bolles’s What Color is Your Parachute?: a job-hunting manual aimed primarily at people looking for a career change. First published in 1970, a new edition has been released every year and there are over 10 million copies in print. In 1995 it was included in the Library of Congress’s Center for the Book’s 25 Books That Have Shaped Readers’ Lives, placing Bolles in the company of Cervantes and Tolstoy (Bolles).Bolles’s book and similar career guidance titles generally follow a pattern of providing exercises for the reader to help them discover the “real you,” which then becomes the basis for choosing the “right” occupation, or as Bolles puts it, “first deciding who you are before deciding the kind of work you want to pursue.” Another best-selling self-help writer is Phil McGraw or “Dr. Phil,” better known for his television program than his books. In his Self Matters—Creating Your Life from the Inside Out, McGraw begins bytelling the story of his own search for his authentic “passion.” Before moving into television, McGraw spent ten years working as a practicing psychiatrist. He recalls:So much of what I did—while totally okay if it had been what I had a passion for—was as unnatural for me as it would be for a dog. It didn’t come from the heart. It wasn’t something that sprang from who I really was ... I wasn’t doing what was meaningful for me. I wasn’t doing what I was good at and therefore was not pursuing my mission in life, my purpose for being here … You and everyone else has a mission, a purpose in life that cannot be denied if you are to live fully. If you have no purpose, you have no passion. If you have no passion, you have sold yourself out (7–12).McGraw connects living authentically with living meaningfully. Working in an occupation that is in accordance with the authentic self gives one’s life purpose. This is the same message Oprah Winfrey chose to deliver in the final episode of the The Oprah Winfrey Show, which was watched by more than 16 million viewers in the U.S. alone. Rather than following the usual pattern of the show and interview celebrity guests, Winfrey chose to talk directly to her viewers about what matters in life:Everybody has a calling, and your real job in life is to figure out what that is and get about the business of doing it. Every time we have seen a person on this stage who is a success in their life, they spoke of the job, and they spoke of the juice that they receive from doing what they knew they were meant to be doing [...] Because that is what a calling is. It lights you up and it lets you know that you are exactly where you're supposed to be, doing exactly what you're supposed to be doing. And that is what I want for all of you and hope that you will take from this show. To live from the heart of yourself.Like McGraw, Winfrey draws a link between living authentically—living “from the heart”—and finding a “calling.” The message here is that the person whose career is in accordance with their authentic self can live with certainty, direction and purpose. Authenticity may act as a buffer against the anomie and disenchantment that arguably plague individuals in late modernity (Elliott & du Gay).Disenchantment, Modernity and Authenticity For many sociologists, most famously Max Weber, finding something that gives life purpose is the great challenge for individuals in the modern West. In a disenchanted society, without religion or other “mysterious incalculable forces” to provide direction, individuals may struggle to work out what they should do with their lives (149). For Weber the answer is to find your calling. Each individual must discover the “demon who holds the fibers of his very life” and obey its demands (156).Following Weber, John Carroll has argued that in modern secular societies, individuals must draw on their inner resources to find answers to life’s “fundamental questions” (Ego 3–4). As Carroll stresses, it is not that the religious impulse has disappeared from contemporary society, but it is expressed in new ways. Individuals still yearn for a sense of purpose but they are “more likely to pursue their quests for meaning on their own, in experimental ways and with their main resource being their ontological qualities” (Carroll, Beauty 221).Other Australian academics, like Gary Bouma and David Tacey, argue that rather than a decline in religiosity in Australia, what we are seeing is a change in the way people pursue the spiritual. Tacey suggests that while many Australians may “slink away” from the idea of God as something external to our lives, they may find more resonance with a conception of God as a “core dimension” of the person (167). Contemporary Australians continue to yearn for guidance, but they are more likely to look within to find it.There is a clear link between this process of turning inward to pursue the spiritual, the prevalence of authenticity in contemporary Western culture, and modernity. With the breakdown of traditional structures, individuals become more “free to self-create” (Bauman, Identity 3). As Charles Lindholm describes it: “The inclination toward a spontaneous mode of expressive self-revelation correlates with the collapse of reliable and sacralised institutional frameworks that once offered meaning and succour” (65–66).For Charles Taylor, the origins of this “massive subjective turn of modern culture” (26) lie in the 18th-century romantic period with the idea that each individual has an intuitive moral sense. To determine what is right, the individual must be in touch with their “inner voice” and act in accordance with it. It is in this notion that Taylor identifies the background to the belief, which is so prominent today, that “There is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s” (28–29). Lindholm points to Rousseau as the “inventor” of this ideal, with his revelatory Confessions becoming “the harbinger of a new ideal in which exploring and revealing one’s essential nature was taken as an absolute good” (8). According to Rousseau, social norms suppress the individual’s true nature, and so it is only possible for one to be authentic if they break these chains and act in accordance with their inner depths. For employees in today’s service-oriented knowledge economy, there are significant risks involved in following Rousseau’s advice and expressing one’s “true feelings.” As many researchers have noted, in the new capitalism, workers are increasingly required to regulate their emotions and present themselves as calm, agreeable and above all positive (Hochschild; Sennett; Ehrenreich). To offer criticism or express frustration, to drop the “mask of cooperativeness” (Sennett 112), may mean risking one’s employment.Nevertheless, while it is arguably becoming more difficult to express authentic feeling at work, for contemporary workers, choice of occupation is still often closely linked to perceptions of authentic selfhood. In fact, in a time of increasingly fragmented careers and short-term, episodic work, it becomes more necessary to create a meaningful narrative to link numerous and varied jobs to a core sense of self. As Richard Sennett argues, today’s flexible employees—frequently moving from one workplace to the next—are at risk of “drift:” a sensation of aimless movement (30). To counter this, individuals must create a convincing story that provides a rationale for career changes and can thereby “form their characters into sustained narratives” (31).In the next section, drawing on recent empirical research, I argue that linking authentic selfhood to work provides individuals with a way to make sense of the trajectory of their work lives and to accept change. Today’s employees are able to interpret even the most unexpected career changes as a beneficial occurrence—something that was “meant to be”—by rationalising that such changes are part of a process of finding work that is an expression of the authentic self.The Authentic Self at Work: Being True to Your EssenceThe following discussion focuses on how authenticity as an ideal influences individuals’s work identity and career aspirations. It draws examples from recent qualitative interviews with Australian workers from a range of occupations (James 2012). A number of interviewees described a search for an occupation that was authentically “them,” a task that was well-suited to their capabilities and came “naturally:”I have a feeling that I was sort of a natural teacher. (Teacher, 60)Medical is what I like, that’s me. (Paramedic, 49)I found my thing, I stick to it. (Farrier, 27) These beliefs are quite clearly influenced by the idea of vocation, in that there is a particular task the individual is most suited to, but they do not invoke the sense of duty that a religious “calling” entails. Often, the interviewees had discovered the occupation that was “really them” by working in other jobs that were not their “true passion.” Realising that performing a particular role felt inauthentic helped them to define their authentic self and encouraged them to pursue more fulfilling work. This process often required experimentation, since “one knows what one is only after realising what one is not” (Golomb 201).For instance, Olivia, a 33-year old lawyer had begun her career in a corporate law firm. She had never felt comfortable in the corporate environment: “I always thought, ‘They know I don’t belong here’.” Her performance at work felt inauthentic: “I was never good at smiling and saying yes.” This experience led her to move into human rights, which she found more fulfilling. Similarly Hazel, a 50 year-old social worker, had started her career in what she described as “boring administration jobs.” Although she had “always wanted” to work in the “caring sector” her family’s expectations and her low self-confidence had stopped her from applying for university. When she finally quit the administration work and began to study it was liberating: “a weight had come out off my shoulders.” In her occupation as a social worker she felt that her work fitted with her authentic self: “the kind of person I am,” and for the first time in her life she looked forward to going to work. Both of these women, and many of the other interviewees, rationalised their decision to work in a particular field by appealing to narratives of authentic selfhood.Similarly, in explaining why they enjoyed their work, a number of interviewees looked back to their childhood for signs of what was “meant to be.” For instance, Tim, a 27 year-old farrier, justified his work with horses: “Mum came from a farming background, every school holidays I was up there…I followed my grandpa around like a little dog, annoyed and pestered him and asked him ‘Why’ and How?’ I’ve always been like that … So I think from an early age I was destined to do something like this.” Ken, a 50 year-old electrician, had a similar explanation for his choice of occupation: “Even as a little kid I was always mucking around with batteries and getting lights to work and things like that, so I think it was just a natural progression.”This tendency to associate childhood interests with authentic selfhood is perhaps due to the belief that childhood is a time of innocence and freedom, where the individual had not yet been moulded by society. As Duschinsky argues, childhood is often connected with an “originary natural essence.” We are close here to Rousseau’s “sentiment of being,” or its contemporary manifestation the “real you.” Of course, the idea that the child is free from external influence is problematised by ideas of socialisation. From birth the infant learns by copying “significant others” and self-conception is formed through interaction (Cooley; Mead). Therefore, from the very beginning, an individual’s interests, dispositions and tastes are influenced by family and culture.Shane, a 29 year-old real estate agent, had resisted working in property because it was the family business and he “didn’t want to be as boring as to follow in Dad’s footsteps.” He saw himself as “academic” and “creative” and for a number of years worked as a writer. Eventually though he decided that writing was not his calling: it was “not actually me … I categorise myself as someone who has the ability to write but not naturally.” When Shane began working in real-estate however, it felt almost automatic. Like the other members of his family he had the right skills and traits to thrive in the business and was immediately successful. Interestingly, Shane’s conception of his authenticity includes both a belief in an essential, pre-social “true” self and at the same time an understanding of the importance of the influence of family in the formation of the self.Regardless of whether the idea of a natural, inner-essence discernable in childhood pastimes can be disproven, it is clear that the understanding of authentic selfhood as an “immediate expression of our essence” continues to influence how individuals conceive of their work identities. However, at the same time, the interviewees’ accounts of authenticity also acknowledged the role of parents in influencing traits and dispositions. In these narratives of the self, authenticity encompasses opposing understandings of childhood as being both free from social influences and highly influenced by primary agents of socialisation. That individuals are willing to do the necessary mental and emotional work to maintain these contradictory beliefs suggests that there is a strong incentive to frame work identity as an expression of authentic selfhood.Authenticity Provides PurposeThe great benefit of being able to convincingly rationalise one’s work as a manifestation of the true self is that it gives the individual direction and purpose. Work then provides answers to Carroll’s fundamental questions: “who am I?” and “What should I do with my life?” A number of the interviewees recalled their attempts to secure a sense of purpose by linking their current occupation to their inner essence. As Greg, a 36-year-old fitness consultant described it:You just gotta think ‘What do you really wanna do, what makes you happy, what are you about?’ … I guess the strengthening and conditioning work, the fitness, has been the constant right the way through. It’s probably the core of what I’ve done over the years, seeing individuals and teams get fit. It’s what I do. That’s my role, if you put it in a nutshell. That’s what I’m about … I was sort of floating around a little bit … I need to go ‘This is what I am.’ By identifying his authentic self and linking it to his work, Greg was able to make sense of his past. He had once been a professional runner and after an injury was forced to redefine himself. He now rationalised that his ability to run had led him into the fitness field: You look at what is your life mission and basically what are you out here for … with athletics it’s allowed me to deal with any sport, made me flexible in my career … if I was, therefore born to run? Yeah, quite possibly, there had to be a reason. Like many of the interviewees, Greg had been forced to change his plans, but he was able to rationalise that this change was positive by forming a narrative that connected both his current and previous occupations to his perception of his authentic self. As Sennett describes it, he is able to from his character into a “sustained narrative” (31). Similarly, Trish, a 42 year-old retail coordinator, connected both her work as a chef and her job in a hardware store back to her sense of authentic self. Both occupations, she thought, were “down and dirty” and she linked this to her family “roots” and her identity as a “country girl.” In interpreting these two substantially different occupations as an expression of her true self, Trish is able to create a narrative in which unexpected career changes are as seen as something beneficial that was “meant to be.” These accounts of career trajectories suggest that linking authenticity to work identity is a strategy individuals employ to cope with the disorienting effects of fragmented work lives. Even jobs that are unfulfilling and feel inauthentic can be made meaningful by interpreting them as necessary steps leading towards the discovery of one’s “ true passion”. This is quite different to the ideal of a life-long calling in one occupation, which as Bauman has noted, has become a “privilege of the few” in late-modernity (Work 34). In an era of insecure and fragmented work, the narrative of an authentic self becomes particularly appealing as it allows the individual to create a meaningful work-narrative that can accommodate the numerous twists and turns of contemporary “liquid” existence (Bauman, Identity 5) and avoid “drift” (Sennett). Conclusion Drawing on qualitative research, this paper has analysed the connections between authenticity, work and modern selfhood. I have shown that in an era of flexible and fragmented working lives, work-identities are often closely tied to understandings of authentic selfhood. Interpreting particular kinds of work as being expressions of the authentic self provides individuals with a sense of purpose and in some cases assists them in coming to terms with unexpected career changes. A meaningful career narrative acts as a buffer against disorientation, disenchantment and anomie. It is therefore no wonder that authentic selfhood is such a prominent theme in reality television, self-help and other forms of popular culture, since it is taps into an existential need for a sense of purpose that becomes increasingly elusive in late-modernity. It is clear from the accounts presented in this paper that the pursuit of authenticity is not merely a narcissistic endeavor, and is employed by individuals to work through fundamental existential questions. Future work in this area should continue to make use of empirical research to add depth and complexity to theoretical accounts of authentic selfhood. References Bauman, Zygmunt. “Identity in the Globalizing World.” Identity in Question. Ed. Anthony Elliott and Paul du Gay. London: Sage, 2009. 1–12. Bauman, Zygmunt. Work, Consumerism and the New Poor. Buckingham: Open UP, 1998. Bolles, Richard. What Colour Is Your Parachute 2015. 23 Jan. 2015 ‹http://www.jobhuntersbible.com/books/view/what-color-is-your-parachute-2015›. Bolles, Richard. What Colour Is Your Parachute. Berkley: Ten Speed, 1970. Bouma, Gary. Australian Soul: Religion and Spirituality in the 21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Carroll, John. “Beauty contra God: Has Aesthetics Replaced Religion in Modernity?” Journal of Sociology 48.2 (2012): 206–23. Carroll, John. Ego and Soul: The Modern West in Search of Meaning. Melbourne: Scribe, 2008. Cooley, Charles Horton. Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Scribner’s, 1902. Duschinsky, Robbie. “Childhood Innocence: Essence, Education, and Performativity.” Textual Practice 27.5 (2013): 763–81. Elliott, Anthony, and Paul du Gay. “Editors’ Introduction.” Identity in Question. Eds. Anthony Elliott and Paul du Gay. London: Sage, 2009. xi–xxi. Ehrenreich, Barbara. Bright-Sided : How the Relentless Promotion of Positive Thinking Has Undermined America. New York: Henry Holt, 2009. Golomb, Jacob. In Search of Authenticity: From Kierkegaard to Camus. London: Routledge, 1995. Hochschild, Arlie Russell. The Managed Heart: Commercialization Human Feeling. Berkeley: U of California P, 1983. James, Sara. “Making a Living, Making a Life: Contemporary Narratives of Work, Vocation and Meaning.” PhD Thesis. La Trobe U, 2012. Lindholm, Charles. Culture and Authenticity. Malden: Blackwell, 2008. McGraw, Phil. Self Matters—Creating Your Life from the Inside Out. London: Simon and Schuster, 2001. Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1934. Sennett, Richard. The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism, New York: WW Norton, 1998. Tacey, David. Edge of the Sacred: Jung, Psyche, Earth. Sydney: Daimon, 2008. Taylor, Charles. Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991. Weber, Max. “Science as a Vocation.” From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Ed. Hans Heinrich Gerth and Charles Wright Mills. London: Routledge, 1991. 129–56. Winfrey, Oprah. The Oprah Winfrey Show Finale. 23 Jan. 2015 ‹http://www.oprah.com/oprahshow/The-Oprah-Winfrey-Show-Finale_1#ixzz3PbhBrdBs›.

On 26 April 2002, in the German city of Erfurt, 19-year-old Robert Steinhäuser entered his former high school with two semi-automatic weapons. He killed the secretary, twelve teachers, two students, and a policeman before a staff member locked him in an empty classroom and he turned his gun on himself (Lemonick). Ten years later, I visited the city with the intention of writing a play about it. This was to be my fifth play based on primary research of an actual event. In previous projects, I had written about personal catastrophes of failed relationships, and reversals of fortune within private community groups. As my experience progressed, I was drawn to events of increasing complexity and seriousness. Now I was dealing with the social catastrophe of violent, deliberate loss of life that had affected the community on a national scale. I had developed a practice of making contact with potential participants, gaining their trust, and conducting interviews. I was interested in truth and authenticity and the ethics of writing about real experiences. My process was informed by the work of theorists Donna Haraway, Zygmunt Bauman and Roy Bhaskar. While embracing postmodern reflexivity, these thinkers nevertheless maintain the existence of a reality that operates independently of social construction (Davies 19). This involves a rejection of a postmodern relativism, in which “unadulterated individualism” (Bauman 2) leaves us free to construct our own worlds with impunity. Instead, we are invited to acknowledge that “we are not in charge of the world” (Haraway 39), and that we are answerable for our relationships within it. I intended to challenge postmodern notions of truth with work that was real rather than relative, authentic rather than constructed. I believed that a personal relationship between me and those who inspired my work was crucial. This relationship would be the ethical foundation from which I could monitor the value of my work and the risk of harm to those involved in the stories I chose to tell. I launched into the Erfurt project intending to follow my established process. But that didn’t happen. I went to Erfurt on the tenth anniversary of the event. I attended an official memorial ceremony at the school, and another service at the church which had been heavily involved in counselling the bereaved. In the evening I saw a theatre production at the Erfurt Theatre entitled Die Würde der deutschen Waffenschränke ist unantastbar (The Dignity of German Weapons Cupboards is Inviolable). The piece, by writer and journalist Roman Grafe, is based on interviews and contemporary reports about this and similar incidents around Germany. My intention had been to make initial contact with people and lay the ground-work for subsequent communication and interviews for my project. However, the whole time I was in Erfurt, I spoke to no one, apart from waiters, shopkeepers and a lonely sight-seeing chimneysweep who cornered me for a conversation in the cathedral. It’s highly likely I couldn’t have done the interviews the way I had planned them anyway. But the point is that, in Erfurt, I decided I wasn’t going to try. The work I had done in the past was always about uncovering an untold story. My drive to investigate and illuminate a story was directly related to how hidden, surprising, and unreachable it was. This was a big part of how I judged the value of what I was doing, despite the inherent inequitable power of the colonizing voice (hooks 343). My previous experience had been that the people I found wanted to speak to me because no one had ever asked them for their story before. I also believed in the value of unearthing a story for an audience who either didn't know about it, or wanted to know more. Neither of these applied in Erfurt. This event attracted enormous media attention. There are dedicated books, documentaries, YouTube shorts, essays, Masters theses, parliamentary reports, inquiries, debates, magazine articles, and newspaper reports. Many people, including survivors, the bereaved, professionals, and Robert Steinhäuser’s parents and friends, had already spoken. Inquiries for more information keep coming. The principal of the school has ring binders full of them and, even after ten years, they continue to stream onto her desk every week (Müller 165). When I was at the official memorial service at the school, I saw reporters and photographers hovering in the crowd, sneaking around to catch moments of grief. I was ashamed to feel that I was one of them. For all my noble aspirations, academic justification and approval by an ethics committee, the sheer volume of interest in this event combined with the ongoing pain of those involved made what I was doing seem grubby. The closest I came to a personal interaction was a pencilled note in the margins of a copy of Für heute reichts (Geipel), a hybrid narrative-style investigation of the event which I borrowed from the library. The copy had been underlined throughout. On page 230, the investigator of the story is warned away by a bereaved lawyer: Ich kann Ihnen im Moment niemanden von den Angehörigen sagen, der bereit wäre, mit Ihnen zu sprechen. (I can’t tell you any of the next of kin at the moment who would be prepared to speak with you.) Written underneath in pencil: Ich hab’s nie ausgesprochen und doch denke ich, ich redete ununterbrochen davon. (I’ve never said it aloud and yet I think I’ve talked about it continuously.) I took this as a warning: those who wanted to speak already had; those who didn’t, wouldn’t. And more importantly, it was painful either way. To comb over this well-mined ground yet again, causing even more pain in the process, seemed unethical to me. The risk of further harm was obvious. The stories that people had told were horrifying. At the centre of each of them: raw, hopeless pain. The testimonials all spiralled into a tunnel of loss, silence, death, and blame. They bristled with the need for community, to have been there, the indignity and pain of not being with their loved ones when they needed them. The painful, horrible, awful truth: there is nothing they could have done. As I sat in the memorial church service in Erfurt, I felt the depth of my own losses yawning inside me and I was almost engulfed with sadness. The vulnerability of my loved ones and my own mortality loomed so large that I had to consciously control myself and pull myself back from the brink. It’s that silent place of grief that Cixous identifies as both aesthetically compelling and ethically fraught (McEvoy 214). It’s the silence where death exists. This is where the people around me had been for ten years. I’ve been taken to that place so many times in the course of researching this event, and it was in the theatre that it was most intense. I sat in the theatre and experienced a verbatim monologue from a bereaved mother, performed by an actress sitting on the edge of the stage, reading aloud from printed sheets of paper. A fifteen minute monologue of how she found out about the shooting, the wait for more news, how her daughter's mobile phone didn't answer, how she found out her daughter had been killed when someone called her to offer condolences, what the days, weeks and months afterwards were like, the celebration of her birthday beside her grave. It was authentic, in that it came directly from the person who had experienced it. The ethical values of the theatre maker were evident in the unedited rawness of the piece and the respect it was given within the production. This theatre piece did exactly what I had thought I wanted do: it opened a real window into what happened. But it wasn’t satisfying to experience. It was just plain awful. What I have come to believe, as an artist wanting to interpret this event with integrity, is that opening this window into grief is not enough. The tunnelling spiral of pain, loss and blame goes nowhere but down. It’s harder to bear because the victims were young, and they were killed in an explosion of violence, at the imposition of a stranger’s will, in a place that was supposed to be safe. But when you strip away the circumstances, the essence of loss is the same, whether your loved one dies of cancer, in a car accident, or a natural disaster. It’s terrible, and it’s real, but it’s not unique to this event. If I was going to be part of a crowd picking over the corpses, then I felt I had to be very clear within myself why I had chosen these ones. I was staying in a monastery where two hundred and sixty-seven people were killed by a bomb while sheltering in the library during World War II. Stories of violent death and loss are everywhere. Feeling the intensity of that loss as though it’s your own isn’t necessarily productive. A few weeks before, I had passed the scene of an accident on the way to school with my daughter. A girl had been hit by a car and seriously injured. The ambulance officers were already there and they had put a cushion under the girl's head, and they were at the ambulance preparing the stretcher. The girl was lying in the middle of the road, alone and crying. As we passed and walked towards the school, girls were running from the front gates to join the expanding fan of onlookers standing there, looking, shaking their heads, agreeing with each other how terrible it was. I wanted to tell them to go away. It highlighted for me the deeply held response to trauma that my parents instilled in me: if there’s nothing you can do to help, then you have no business being there. Standing around watching turned the girl’s pain turned her into a spectacle. It created a bright line between the spectators and the girl, while simultaneously making the spectators feel as though they were part of her story and that they were special for witnessing it. They could go back to class and say: I was there, it was terrible. The comfort seems to be in processing sympathy into a feeling of self-importance at having felt pain that isn’t yours. I have felt the pain of the bereaved. I have cried for those who were killed. But my tears have not brought me closer to understanding what happened here. I had the same feeling of wrongness when I left the theatre as when I was escaping the crowd staring at the girl from the side of the road. Sharing the feeling of loss gave an illusion of understanding, solidarity, community and helpfulness that the spectators could then just walk away from and take superficial comfort from, without ever dealing with what I think is the actual reality of the event. In my opinion, the essence of this event does not lie in the nature of the violence and its attendant loss. What happened in Erfurt wasn’t an accident. These were targeted murders. The heart of this event is not the loss: it’s the desire to kill. This is what distinguishes this particular kind of event from any other catastrophe in which lives are lost. At its centre: someone did this on purpose. Robert Steinhäuser was expelled from school without any qualifications, so he was unemployable and ineligible for further education. He didn’t tell his family or his friends about the expulsion, so for months afterwards he lived a charade of attending school. When he attacked, he specifically targeted teachers and actively tried to avoid hurting students. (The two students who died that day were killed as he shot through a locked door.) According to the state government commission into the incident, Robert Steinhäuser’s transgression was an attempt to achieve recognition and public importance (Müller 193). It appears that he was at a point where he decided that the best thing or the only thing he could do was enact a theatrical mass murder of the people he thought were responsible for his misery. For me, focusing on the repercussions and the victims and the loss actually reinforces the structures that led Robert to make this decision: Robert is isolated, singular, and everyone else is against him. For many, this is seen as the appropriate way to deal with him. Angela Merkel, the conservative party leader at the time, said: Wer das Unverständliche verstehbar und das Unerklärbare erklärbar machen möchte, der muss aufpassen, das er sich nicht – zumindest unterschwellig – auf die Seite des Täters stellt und versucht, das Unentschuldbar mit irgendwelchen Umständen zu erklären. (Slotosch 1) (Whoever wants to make something that’s beyond understanding understandable and the inexplicable explicable has to be careful that he doesn’t—even unconsciously—stand on the side of the perpetrator and try to explain the inexcusable with circumstances of some kind.) According to Merkel, even to attempt to understand Robert is to betray his victims, and places you on the wrong side of the line that defines our humanity. Many of those who were directly affected by the event believe this as well. A recurring issue for many of the survivors and bereaved is the need to suppress the memory of Robert Steinhäuser. The school principal, Christiane Alt, said: Ich kann es nicht ertragen, dass er so postmortalen Ruhm auf sich zieht – das passiert immer wieder, nicht nur im Internet – und dass die Namen der Opfer ins Vergessen sinken. (Müller 160) (I can’t bear that he attracts such posthumous celebrity—it keeps happening, not just on the internet—and that the names of the victims sink into obscurity.) There is ongoing debate about the appropriateness of a seventeenth tribute: seventeen people died that day, only sixteen are officially mourned. There were sixteen names on the plaque at the school, sixteen candles on the memorial on the steps, and sixteen people were honoured and remembered in speeches. The voices of the perpetrators were unheard in the theatre piece. They were given no words and no story. It was only in the church that there was a seventeenth candle, on its own, to the side, in the dark. I have circled around this story for over a year and I keep coming back to Robert, however unwillingly. I am a dramatic writer. I write characters who take action. The German word for “perpetrator” is Täter. From the verb tun, to do. It means “do-er.” Someone who does something. It’s closer to our word “actor”, which for me reinforces the theatricality of the event as a whole. Robert staged this event. He wanted witnesses, as the impact of what he did depends on it. He even performed in costume. I am concerned that looking at Robert may actively reinforce the dramaturgical structure that he orchestrated, and thereby empower him and those like him. He wanted people to see him and know his story, and this is the only way he felt he could take control over it and face its indignity. I don’t want him to be right. All of this has left me in a very strange position. My own ethical process has actually collapsed beneath my feet. I had relied on giving a voice to those who wanted to speak—those people have already spoken. I saw value in uncovering a story that was previously unknown. This one has been examined many times over. I relied on personal, situated relationships between myself and those involved in the event. I have no such relationship. And if I did, what I see as an ethical response to this event—that is to try to understand Robert’s story—would actually be contrary to what many of those involved in the event want. I would run the risk of hurting those I most want to champion. It’s a risk I’ve had to run before. My last play was about a fifteen-year-old girl who had a sexual relationship with a teacher. I interviewed her and her friends, family, court officials, and also spoke to the teacher himself. The girl is highly intelligent and she had suffered terribly, but she could also be conceited and manipulative, and for me that truth was a crucial part of her story. I believed I got it right, but I also knew I ran the risk of hurting her, which of course I didn’t want to do. The girl came to see the play on opening night and I was absolutely terrified. We couldn’t speak, because she has to remain anonymous, but she thanked me via e-mail afterwards and told me that she felt privileged. She said that the play gave her experience a level of dignity that she would never have found otherwise. I was relieved, humbled, honoured, and vindicated. This is what I hoped for: a creative work about real events that was truthful and authentic, without being exploitative or hurtful. I had thought that the process relied on this ethical and responsible relationship. But the girl told me what she appreciated most was the energy and integrity with which I had dedicated myself to her story. This response has helped me to continue with my project. I am no longer sure of how to achieve an ethical, authentic artistic outcome, or even what that may be. But I still believe in my own capacity to ask questions with energy and integrity, and I hope that this will be enough. Because it’s all I have left. References Bauman, Zygmunt. Postmodern Ethics. Blackwell: Oxford, 1993. Davies, Charlotte Aull. Reflexive Ethnography: A Guide to Researching Selves and Others. Routledge: London, 2008. Die Würde der deutschen Waffenschränke ist unantastbar (The Dignity of German Weapons Cupboards Is Inviolable). Dir. Roman Grafe. Erfurt Theatre, 2012. Geipel, Ines. Für heute reichts (Amok in Erfurt). Berlin: Rohwohlt, 2004. Haraway, Donna. “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” Turning Points in Qualitative Research: Tying Knots in a Handkerchief. Eds. Norman K. Denzin, and Yvonna S. Lincoln. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira P, 2003. 21–46. hooks, b. “Marginality as a Site of Resistance.” Out There: Marginalization and Contemporary Cultures. Eds. Russell Ferguson et al. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1990. 341–343. Lemonick, Michael. D. “Germany’s Columbine.” Time 159.18 (6 May 2002): 36. Mcevoy, W. “Finding the Balance: Writing and Performing Ethics in Théâtre du Soleil’s Le Dernier Caravansérail.” New Theatre Quarterly 22.3 (2003): 211–26. Müller, Hanno, and Paul-Josef Raue. Der Amoklauf: 10 Jahre danach—Erinnern und Gedenken. Essen: Klartext-Verlag, 2012. Slotosch, Sven. “Das alte Lied, das alte Leid.” Telepolis 30 Nov. 2006. 7 Jun. 2012 < http://www.heise.de/tp/artikel/24/24101/1.html >.

Nine Inch Nails have just released a new single; In addition to the usual formats, “The Hand That Feeds” was available for free download in Garageband format. Trent Reznor explained, “For quite some time I’ve been interested in the idea of allowing you the ability to tinker around with my tracks – to create remixes, experiment, embellish or destroy what’s there” (MacMinute 15 April 2005). Reznor invites creativity facilitated by copying and transformation. “Copy” carries connotations of unsavoury notions such as piracy, stealing, fake, and plagiarism. Conversely, in some circumstances copying is acceptable, some situations demand copying. This article examines the treatment of “copy” at the intersection of musical creativity and copyright law with regard to cover versions and sampling. Waldron reminds us that copyright was devised first and foremost with a public benefit in mind (851). This fundamental has been persistently reiterated (H. R Rep. (1909); Sen. Rep. (1909); H. R. Rep. (1988); Patterson & Lindberg 70). The law grants creators a bundle of rights in copyrighted works. Two rights implicated in recorded music are located in the composition and the recording. Many potential uses of copyrighted songs require a license. The Copyright Act 1976, s. 115 provides a compulsory licence for cover versions. In other words, any song can be covered for a statutory royalty fee. The law curtails the extent of the copyright monopoly. Compulsory licensing serves both creative and business sides of the recording industry. First, it ensures creative diversity. Musicians are free to reinterpret cultural soundtracks. Second, it safeguards the composer’s right to generate an income from his work by securing royalties for subsequent usage. Although s. 115 permits a certain degree of artistic licence, it requires “the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work”. Notwithstanding this proviso, songs can still be transformed and their meaning reshaped. Johnny Cash was able to provide an insight into the mind of a dying man through covering such songs as Nine Inch Nails’ “Hurt”, Depeche Mode’s “Personal Jesus” and Parker & Charles’ “We’ll Meet Again”. Compulsory licensing was introduced in response to a Supreme Court decision that deprived composers of royalties. Congress recognised: The main object to be desired in expanding copyright protection accorded to music has been to give to the composer an adequate return for the value of his composition, and it has been a serious and difficult task to combine the protection of the composer with the protection of the public, and to so frame an act that it would accomplish the double purpose of securing to the composer and at the same time prevent the formation of oppressive monopolies, which might be founded upon the very rights granted to the composer for the purpose of protecting his interests (H. R. Rep. (1909)). Composers exercise rights over the initial exploitation of a song. Once a recording is released, the right is curtailed to serve the public dimension of copyright. A sampler is a device that allows recorded (sampled) sounds to be triggered from a MIDI keyboard or sequencer. Samplers provide potent tools for transforming sounds – filters, pitch-shifting, time-stretching and effects can warp samples beyond recognition. Sampling is a practice that formed the backbone of rap and hip-hop, features heavily in many forms of electronic music, and has proved invaluable in many studio productions (Rose 73-80; Prendergast 383-84, 415-16, 433-34). Samples implicate both of the musical copyrights mentioned earlier. To legally use a sample, the rights in the recording and the underlying composition must be licensed. Ostensibly, acquiring permission to use the composition poses few obstacles due to the compulsory licence. The sound recording, however, is a different matter entirely. There is no compulsory licence for sound recordings. Copyright owners (usually record labels) are free to demand whatever fees they see fit. For example, SST charged Fatboy Slim $1000 for sampling a Negativland record (Negativland). (Ironically, the sample was itself an unlicensed sample appropriated from a 1966 religious recording.) The price paid by The Verve for sampling an obscure orchestral version of a Rolling Stones song was more substantial. Allan Klein owns the copyright in “The Last Time” released by The Andrew Oldham Orchestra in 1965 (American Hit Network, undated). Licence negotiations for the sample left Klein with 100% of the royalties from the song and The Verve with a bitter taste. To add insult to injury, “Bittersweet Symphony” was attributed to Mick Jagger and Keith Richards when the song was nominated for a Grammy (Superswell, undated). License fees can prove prohibitive to many musicians and may outweigh the artistic merit in using the sample: “Sony wanted five thousand dollars for the Clash sample, which … is one thousand dollars a word. In retrospect, this was a bargain, given the skyrocketing costs of sampling throughout the 1990s” (McLeod 86). Adam Dorn, alias Mocean Worker, tried for nine months to licence a sample of gospel singer Mahalia Jackson. Eventually his persistent requests were met with a demand for $10,000 in advance with royalties of six cents per record. Dorn was working with an album budget of a mere $40 and was expecting to sell 2500 copies (Beaujon 25). Unregulated licensing fees stifle creativity and create a de facto monopoly over recorded music. Although copyright was designed to be an engine of free expression1 it still carries characteristics of its monopolistic, totalitarian heritage. The decision in Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films supported this monopoly. Judge Guy ruled, “Get a license or do not sample. We do not see this stifling creativity in any significant way” (397). The lack of compulsory licensing and the Bridgeport decision creates an untenable situation for sampling musicians and adversely impacts upon the public benefit derived from creative diversity and transformative works (Netanel 288, 331). The sobering potential for lawsuits, ruinous legal costs, injunctions, damages (to copyright owners as well as master recordings), suppresses the creativity of musicians unwilling or unable to pay licence fees (Negativland 251.). I’m a big fan of David Bowie. If I wanted to release a cover version of “Survive”, Bowie and Gabrels (composers) and BMI (publishers) could not prevent it. According the Harry Fox Agency’s online licensing system, it would cost $222.50 (US) for a licence to produce 2500 copies. The compulsory licence demands fidelity to the character of the original. Although my own individual style would be embedded in the cover version, the potential for transformation is limited. Whilst trawling through results from a search for “acapella” on the Soulseek network I found an MP3 of the vocal acapella for “Survive”. Thirty minutes later Bowie was loaded into Sonar 4 and accompanied by a drum loop and bass line whilst I jammed along on guitar and tinkered with synths. Free access to music encourages creative diversity and active cultural participation. Licensing fees, however, may prohibit such creative explorations. Sampling technology offers some truly innovative possibilities for transforming recorded sound. The Roland VariOS can pitch-eliminate; a vocal sample can be reproduced to a melody played by the sampling musician. Although the original singer’s voice is preserved the melody and characteristic nuances can be significantly altered: V-Producer’s Phrase Scope [a system software component] separates the melody from the rest of the phrase, allowing users to re-construct a new melody or add harmonies graphically, or by playing in notes from a MIDI keyboard. Using Phrase Scope, you can take an existing vocal phrase or melodic instrument phrase and change the actual notes, phrasing and vocal gender without unwanted artefacts. Bowie’s original vocal could be aligned with an original melody and set to an original composition. The original would be completely transformed into a new creative work. Unfortunately, EMI is the parent company for Virgin Records, the copyright owner of “Survive”. It is doubtful licence fees could be accommodated by many inspired bedroom producers. EMI’s reaction to DJ Dangermouse’s “Grey Album“ suggests that it would not look upon unlicensed sampling with any favour. Threatening letters from lawyers representing one of the “Big Four” are enough to subjugate most small time producers. Fair use? If a musician is unable to afford a licence, it is unlikely he can afford a fair use defence. Musicians planning only a limited run, underground release may be forgiven for assuming that the “Big Four” have better things to do than trawl through bins of White Labels for unlicensed samples. Professional bootlegger Richard X found otherwise when his history of unlicensed sampling caught up to him: “A certain major label won’t let me use any samples I ask them to. We just got a report back from them saying, ‘Due to Richard’s earlier work of which we are well aware, we will not be assisting him with any future projects’” (Petridis). For record labels “copy” equals “money”. Allan Klein did very well out of licensing his newly acquired “Bittersweet Symphony” to Nike (Superswell). Inability to afford either licences or legal costs means that some innovative and novel creations will never leave the bedroom. Sampling masterpieces such as “It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us Back” are no longer cost effective (McLeod). The absence of a compulsory licence for sampling permits a de facto monopoly over recorded music. Tricia Rose notes the recording industry knows the value of “copy” (90). “Copy” is permissible as long as musicians pay for the privilege – if the resultant market for the sampling song is not highly profitable labels may decline to negotiate a licence. Some parties have recognised the value of the desire to creatively engage with music. UK (dis)band(ed) Curve posted component samples of their song “Unreadable Communication” on their website and invited fans to create their own versions of the song. All submissions were listed on the website. Although the band reserved copyright, they permitted me to upload my version to my online distribution website for free download. It has been downloaded 113 times and streamed a further 112 times over the last couple of months. The remix project has a reciprocal dimension: Creative engagement strengthens the fan base. Guitarist/programmer, Dean Garcia, states “the main reason for posting the samples is for others to experiment with something they love . . . an opportunity as you say to mess around with something you otherwise would never have access to2”. Umixit is testing the market for remixable songs. Although the company has only five bands on its roster (the most notable being Aerosmith), it will be interesting to observe the development of a market for “neutered sampling” and how long it will be before the majors claim a stake. The would-be descendants of Grand Master Flash and Afrika Bambaataa may find themselves bound by end-user licences and contracts. The notion of “copy” at the nexus of creativity and copyright law is simultaneously a vehicle for free expression and a vulgar infringement on a valuable economic interest. The compulsory licence for cover versions encourages musicians to rework existing music, uncover hidden meaning, challenge the boundaries of genre, and actively participate in culture creation. Lack of affirmative congressional or judicial interference in the current sampling regime places the beneficial aspects of “copy” under an oppressive monopoly founded on copyright, an engine of free expression. References American Hit Network. “Bittersweet Symphony – The Verve.” Undated. 17 April 2005 http://www.americanhitnetwork.com/1990/fsongs.cfm?id=8&view=detail&rank=1>. Beaujon, A. “It’s Not The Beat, It’s the Mocean.’ CMJ New Music Monthly, April 1999. EMI. “EMI and Orange Announce New Music Deal.” Immediate Future: PR & Communications, 6 January 2005. 17 April 2005 http://www.immediatefuture.co.uk/359>. H. R. Rep. No. 2222. 60th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7. 1909. H. R. Rep. No. 609. 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 23. 1988. MacMinute. “NIN Offers New Single in GarageBand Format.” 15 April 2005. 16 April 2005 http://www.macminute.com/2005/04/15/nin/>. McLeod, K. “How Copyright Law Changed Hip Hop: An Interview with Public Enemy’s Chuck D and Hank Shocklee.” Stay Free 2002, 23 June 2004 http://www.stayfreemagazine.org/archives/20/public_enemy.html>. McLeod, K. Freedom of Expression: Overzealous Copyright Bozos and Other Enemies of Creativity. United States: Doubleday Books, 2005. Negativland. “Discography.” Undated. 18 April 2005 http://www.negativland.com/negdisco.html>. Negativland (ed.). Fair Use: The Story of the Letter U and the Numeral 2. Concord: Seeland, 2005. Netanel, N. W. “Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society.” 106 Yale L. J. 283. 1996. Patterson, L.R., and S. Lindberg. The Nature of Copyright: A Law of Users’ Rights. Georgia: U of Georgia P, 1991. Petridis, A. “Pop Will Eat Itself.” The Guardian (UK) 2003. 22 June 2004 http://www.guardian.co.uk/arts/critic/feature/0,1169,922797,00.html>. Prendergast, M. The Ambient Century: From Mahler to Moby – The Evolution of Sound in the Electronic Age. London: Bloomsbury, 2003. Rose, T. Black Noise: Rap Music and Black Culture in Contemporary America. Middletown: Wesleyan UP, 2004. Sen. Rep. No. 1108, 60th Cong., 2nd Sess. 7. 1909. Superswell. “Horror Stories.” 17 April 2005 http://www.superswell.com/samplelaw/horror.html>. Waldron, J. “From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property.” 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 842, 1998. Endnotes 1 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 2 From personal correspondence with Curve dated 16 September 2004. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Collins, Steve. "Good Copy, Bad Copy: Covers, Sampling and Copyright." M/C Journal 8.3 (2005). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0507/02-collins.php>. APA Style Collins, S. (Jul. 2005) "Good Copy, Bad Copy: Covers, Sampling and Copyright," M/C Journal, 8(3). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0507/02-collins.php>.

Photo by Towfiqu barbhuiya on Unsplash INTRODUCTION Bioethics does not have an explicitly stated and agreed upon means of resolving conflicts between normative theories. As such, bioethics lacks an essential feature – action guidance ― an effective translation from theory to practice. While the normative approaches and historical precedents of bioethics may discourage overtly egregious acts, the bioethical discipline does not offer decisive guidance in situations with multiple competing normative approaches. For example, Utilitarians and Kantians offer diametrically opposed guidance in emblematic cases like the trolley problem in which saving a greater number of people conflicts with the imperative to treat persons as ends-in-themselves rather than a means to an end. The predominant framework in bioethics, principlism, also suffers from a lack of action guidance.[1] The consequences of a ‘toothless’ bioethics impeded by misaligned principles and conflicting normative theories are disastrous – not only in death count but also in moral injury and societal fracture. This paper argues that while there is no ‘one theory to rule them all,’ a virtue-based approach to bioethics can ameliorate the adjudication problem. Bioethics ought to embody moral strength but has often provided indecisive guidance due to its awkward theoretical architecture. In defence of bioethics, many actors control societal level decision making. Thus, the onus does not rest entirely on bioethicists but also leaders in government and healthcare. This paper critiques principlism as internally incongruous, as it is composed of elements from multiple ethical theories. Understanding this, it is seen that the entirety of theoretical bioethics, as composed of conflicting normative approaches, also suffers from this action-guidance problem.[2] l. The Birth of Bioethics Amid Tragedy Bioethics was born out of tragedy. During the Nuremberg Trials of 1946-47, a cohort of French, American, British, and Soviet judges forced the Nazi doctors and architects of the Holocaust to stand trial for their egregious actions and feel the firm hand of justice. In an example of ex post facto law, the global community identified unethical action and indicted Germans for breaking natural law.[3] As a result, the Nuremberg Code arose to prevent crimes against human research subjects. It outlines the parameters of ethical research and is a foundational document of modern bioethics.[4] Early bioethics pronounced immorality and offered decisive guidance, laying the groundwork for an internationally unified theory of negative morality – that which is never permissible. Tuskegee was another foundational tragedy in the history of bioethical discipline. In 1932, the US Public Health Service recruited six hundred African American men from Macon County, Alabama for a study on the effects of untreated syphilis.[5] The researchers failed to obtain informed consent and intentionally withheld information regarding the disease or the nature of the study. The researchers did not offer any men the cure, penicillin, which was discovered midway through the experiment. Many men died during the study. The perpetrators evaded justice until 1972. Tuskegee sparked a new paradigm of bioethics, including the US federal policies, the establishment of ethics review boards, and informed consent as a core tenet of biomedical practice.[6] The National Research Act of 1974 and the Belmont Report of 1978 laid new ground for research ethics and set the tone for the contemporary practice of bioethics. ll. The Rise of Principlism These two cases demonstrate the nature of the early days of bioethics. It largely lacked high-level theory and appealed more to generally agreed upon moral facts and common-sense morality. However, as medicine advanced, increasingly complex biomedical issues created problems that required greater appeals to theory.[7] The “heroic” phase of bioethics saw “theorists aspire to construct symmetrical cathedrals of normative thought.”[8] In the wake of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress helped draft the Belmont Report, a bulwark intended to prevent future atrocities in human research trials. The document aimed to curtail the utilitarianism implicit in medical research and add essential considerations of the subjects themselves, including respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.[9] It also served as the bedrock of the theoretical architecture of principlism. In 1979, Beauchamp and Childress’ published Principles of Biomedical Ethics, which is arguably the most influential text in bioethics scholarship. It attempts to incorporate some main theoretical approaches to ethics in a unified moral theory: autonomy reflects the work of Kant; beneficence aligns with utilitarianism; non-maleficence is reminiscent of Hippocrates; and justice borrows heavily from Rawls.[10] These four principles have become canonical in academic bioethics. However, doubts remain as to their effectiveness in guiding action toward ethical aims given how scholars contend that “ethical expertise cannot be codified in principles.”[11] lll. A Critique of Principlism Clouser & Gert say: At best, ‘principles’ operate primarily as checklists naming issues worth remembering when considering a biomedical moral issue. At worst ‘principles’ obscure and confuse moral reasoning by their failure to be guidelines and by their eclectic and unsystematic use of moral theory.[12] To this point, principlism is no more than a flashlight – a tool to illuminate the ethical landscape. Viewing cases through the lens of moral principles can reveal the salient moral features, but it ultimately provides no guidance for adjudication, hereby referred to as the adjudication problem. Consequently, the doctor’s moral intuition has de facto weight, and the principles are merely a post hoc justification for any given action they choose. Using the four principles to decide the right course of moral action is “tantamount to using two, three, or four conflicting moral theories to decide a case.”[13] Principlism attempts to reap the benefit of multiple ethical theories, each with unambiguous goals. When blended, the result is discordant directives. These conflicting principles “provide no systematic guidance” for real world dilemmas.[14] Other ethical theories have faults too. Kantians leave no room for exceptions for exigency, and utilitarianism ‘crosses the line’ far too often. At least these theories decisively guide action and provide unambiguous justification for doing so. Utilitarianism is quite measurable: “Provide the greatest good for the greatest number” – sure! Done. Kant’s ethical imperative has a clear rule: “Never treat humans as a mere means to an end” – certainly, will do. Principlism merely provides “a check list of considerations” that doctors can cross off one by one before going about their originally intended course of action.[15] Worse, the internally disharmonious nature of principlism allows doctors to justify ethically dubious decisions. An important goal of bioethics is avoiding the following scenario: a doctor faces with a moral dilemma. He can choose Option A or Option B. Let’s say B is morally preferrable on a consensus view. However, his moral intuition guides him toward Option A. Having completed his required course on biomedical ethics in medical school, he recalls a few theories which are relevant to his case. He considers the four principles but autonomy conflicts with beneficence, which does not yield a straightforward, practical directive, so he disregards principlism for the case at hand. Kantian ethics disagrees with his intuition, but utilitarianism may support it. He goes ahead with Option A, claiming utilitarianism supported his actions. He, therefore, provides post hoc justification for Option A, using whichever theory agrees with his judgment. Reliance on intuition when the principles conflict is an intractable problem “unless one is willing to grant privileged epistemological status to the moral judgments (calling them "intuitions") or to the moral principles (calling them "self-evident" or otherwise a priori”).[16] Neither deserves a privileged epistemological status. Moral intuitions can possess prejudice or ignorance, and moral principles can demonstrably conflict, offering no guidance. Realistically, most people “pay little attention to theories when they make moral decisions,” and when they do, post hoc rationalization often follows. When discipline is used as an afterthought, it provides justifications for potentially unethical actions. lV. Virtue Ethics: A Provisional Solution Virtue ethics may provide a workaround. It emphasizes the disposition and character of the moral agent instead of abstract theories, making it a practical choice. As Jacobson writes, “ethical dictates cannot be codified in general rules applicable to particular situations by someone who lacks virtue.”[17] Ethical theories can still highlight moral lapses and dilemmas, but since they do not decisively guide action, bioethics must focus on moral agents’ decision-making abilities. Aristotelian virtue as a provisional solution to the adjudication problem also accounts for the “multiple and heterogeneous” particularities which other theories often neglect.[18] Aristotle said that "phronesis [practical wisdom] deals with the ultimate particular and this is done by perception (aisthesis) rather than science (episteme).”[19] Scientific knowledge in the case of bioethics may appropriately refer to medical facts. Perception refers to the moral intuition of an individual agent as applied to a given scenario. Jonsen goes further, however, interpreting this perception as “the appreciative sight of a constellation of ideas, arguments, and facts about the case, seen as a whole.”[20] Phronesis, or practical wisdom, is the cardinal virtue of Aristotelian virtue ethics. It enables the agent to consider the relevant facts and act in the most prudent, courageous, or tempered manner. This paper proposes that in the face of intractable theoretical disagreements, the only way forward for bioethics is to educate bioethics practitioners and students in this tradition. V. Counterargument So far, this paper has argued that bioethics is relatively toothless and needs to give clear guidance due to theoretical disagreements and the intractable differences between normative approaches. And yet, some may object to the notion that bioethics ought to have these proverbial teeth. In this view, bioethics merely acts as a sounding board for those in executive roles (doctors, lawyers, politicians) to better understand the moral landscape of the problem. To them, bioethics’ failure to decisively guide action is acceptable because it should not. If this is the case, then bioethics need not speak with one voice and should cherish the long-standing, obstinate disagreements between different theoretical camps. But this paper contends the opposite. If bioethics continues to offer conflicting imperatives and fails to demonstrably guide individuals, hospitals, and society toward clear ethical aims and outcomes, it has failed as a discipline. One might argue that virtue theory is not an ideal framework to replace principlism because individuals approach ethical problems in many ways based on features of their character and background. Injecting one’s character into moral decisions can lead to bias. As Carl Elliot writes, “how a moral problem is described will turn on an array of variables: the role and degree of involvement in the case of the person who is describing it, the person’s particular profession or discipline, her religious and cultural inheritance-indeed, with all of the intangibles that have contributed to her character.”[21] Self-awareness may counteract personal biases in moral decision making. Vl. Limitation Virtue ethics is only a provisional solution to the adjudication problem for two reasons. One, not everyone is inherently virtuous, and two, theoretical differences may be resolved. If deontology and consequentialism can be incorporated into a unified theory for bioethics, then virtue ethics may not be necessary. On a certain view, it would be ideal for ethics to be computational – plug in the relevant variables and receive the morally correct answer. Arguably, principlism was an attempt at such a matrix, but it ultimately failed as a unified theory. Rather than waiting for a perfect unified theory, we must count on the genuine virtue of the moral agents who make ethically important decisions from policy to bedside. If practical wisdom is not a characteristic of these agents, then their decisions will not be as ethical as they ought to be, and no theory is the panacea to such a problem. CONCLUSION Bioethics emerged out of unified responses to clear cases of moral depravity, like the Holocaust and Tuskegee, and perhaps bioethics is most appropriate for such cases which are conducive to moral certitude. At minimum, bioethics offers meaningful guidance in cases where the relevant duties align with beneficent consequences. For example, in both the Nuremberg and Tuskegee cases, abrogating fundamental duties to humanity led to grievous consequences. The principles developed in the wake of such problems led to a conflict between autonomy and beneficence, which perhaps mirror the conflict between Kantian deontology and utilitarianism. Bioethics excels when deontology and utilitarianism are aligned, but most of the time, they are not. In such instances, virtue is needed to adjudicate conflicting normative approaches and resolve theoretical tensions with practical wisdom and courage. - [1] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). A Critique of Principlism, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Volume 15, Issue 2, April 1990, Pages 219–236, https://doi.org/10.1093/jmp/15.2.219 [2] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). [3] Annas, G. J. (2010). The legacy of the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial to American bioethics and human rights. In Medicine After the Holocaust (pp. 93-105). Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol10/iss1/4 [4] Annas, G. J. (2010). The legacy of the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial to American bioethics and human rights. In Medicine After the Holocaust (pp. 93-105). Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol10/iss1/4 [5] Barrett, L. A. (2019). Tuskegee Syphilis Study of 1932-1973 and the Rise of Bioethics as Shown through Government Documents and Actions. DttP, 47, 11. https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/dttp47&div=36&id=&page= [6] Barrett, L. A. (2019). [7] Annas, G. J. (2010). [8] Annas, G. J. (2010). [9] Adashi, E. Y., Walters, L. B., & Menikoff, J. A. (2018). The Belmont Report at 40: reckoning with time. American Journal of Public Health, 108(10), 1345-1348. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304580 [10] Beauchamp, T. L., & Childress, J. F. (2001). Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Oxford University Press, USA. [11] Jacobson, D. (2005). Seeing by feeling: virtues, skills, and moral perception. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 8(4), 387-409. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-005-8837-1 [12] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). [13] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). [14] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). [15] Clouser, K. D., & Gert, B. (1990). [16] Daniels, N. (1979). Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics. The Journal of Philosophy, 76(5), 256-282. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025881 [17] Jacobson, D. (2005). [18] Jonsen, A. R. (1991). Of balloons and bicycles—or—the relationship between ethical theory and practical judgment. Hastings Center Report, 21(5), 14-16. https://doi.org/10.2307/3562885 [19] Jonsen, A. R. (1991), p. 15. [20] Jonsen, A. R. (1991), p. 15. [21] Elliott, C. (1992). Where ethics comes from and what to do about it. Hastings Center Report, 22(4), 28-35. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.2307/3563021

By most accounts, “resilience” is a pretty resilient concept. Or policy instrument. Or heuristic tool. It’s this last that really concerns us here: resilience not as a politics, but rather as a descriptive device for attempts in the humanities—particularly in rhetoric and cultural studies—to adequately describe a discursive event. Or rather, to adequately describe a class of discursive events: those that involve rhetorical resistance by victimised subjects. I’ve argued elsewhere (Munro, Descriptive; Reading) that Peircean semiosis, inflected by a rhetorical postulate of genre, equips us well to closely describe a discursive event. Here, I want briefly to suggest that resilience—“discursive” resilience, to coin a term—might usefully supplement these hypotheses, at least from time to time. To support this suggestion, I’ll signal some uses of resilience before turning briefly to a case study: a sensational Argentine homicide case, which occurred in October 2002, and came to be known as the caso Belsunce. At the time, Argentina was wracked by economic crises and political instability. The imposition of severe restrictions on cash withdrawals from bank deposits had provoked major civil unrest. Between 21 December 2001 and 2 January 2002, Argentines witnessed a succession of five presidents. “Resilient” is a term that readily comes to mind to describe many of those who endured this catastrophic period. To describe the caso Belsunce, however—to describe its constitution and import as a discursive event—we might appeal to some more disciplinary-specific understandings of resilience. Glossing Peircean semiosis as a teleological process, Short notes that “one and the same thing […] may be many different signs at once” (106). Any given sign, in other words, admits of multiple interpretants or uptakes. And so it is with resilience, which is both a keyword in academic disciplines ranging from psychology to ecology and political science, and a buzzword in several corporate domains and spheres of governmental activity. It’s particularly prevalent in the discourses of highly networked post-9/11 Anglophone societies. So what, pray tell, is resilience? To the American Psychological Association, resilience comprises “the process of adapting well in the face of adversity.” To the Resilience Solutions Group at Arizona State University, resilience is “the capacity to recover fully from acute stressors, to carry on in the face of chronic difficulties: to regain one’s balance after losing it.” To the Stockholm Resilience Centre, resilience amounts to the “capacity of a system to continually change and adapt yet remain within critical thresholds,” while to the Resilience Alliance, resilience is similarly “the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and still retain its basic function and structure” (Walker and Salt xiii). The adjective “resilient” is thus predicated of those entities, individuals or collectivities, which exhibit “resilience”. A “resilient Australia,” for example, is one “where all Australians are better able to adapt to change, where we have reduced exposure to risks, and where we are all better able to bounce back from disaster” (Australian Government). It’s tempting here to synthesise these statements with a sense of “ordinary language” usage to derive a definitional distillate: “resilience” is a capacity attributed to an entity which recovers intact from major injury. This capacity is evidenced in a reaction or uptake: a “resilient” entity is one which suffers some insult or disturbance, but whose integrity is held to have been maintained, or even enhanced, by its resistive or adaptive response. A conjecturally “resilient” entity is thus one which would presumably evince resilience if faced with an unrealised aversive event. However, such abstractions ignore how definitional claims do rhetorical work. On any given occasion, how “resilience” and its cognates are construed and what they connote are a function, at least in part, of the purposes of rhetorical agents and the protocols and objects of the disciplines or genres in which these agents put these terms to work. In disciplines operating within the same form of life or sphere of activity—disciplines sharing general conventions and broad objects of inquiry, such as the capacious ecological sciences or the contiguous fields of study within the ambit of applied psychology—resilience acts, at least at times, as a something of a “boundary object” (Star and Griesemer). Correlatively, across more diverse and distant fields of inquiry, resilience can work in more seemingly exclusive or contradictory ways (see Handmer and Dovers). Rhetorical aims and disciplinary objects similarly determine the originary tales we are inclined to tell. In the social sciences, the advent of resilience is often attributed to applied psychology, indebted, in turn, to epidemiology (see Seery, Holman and Cohen Silver). In environmental science, by contrast, resilience is typically taken to be a theory born in ecology (indebted to engineering and to the physical sciences, in particular to complex systems theory [see Janssen, Schoon, Ke and Börner]). Having no foundational claim to stake and, moreover, having different purposes and taking different objects, some more recent uptakes of resilience, in, for instance, securitisation studies, allow for its multidisciplinary roots (see Bourbeau; Kaufmann). But if resilience is many things to many people, a couple of commonalities in its range of translations should be drawn out. First, irrespective of its discipline or sphere of activity, talk of resilience typically entails construing an object of inquiry qua system, be that system an individual, a community of circumstance, a state, a socio-ecological unit or some differently delimited entity. This bounded system suffers some insult with no resulting loss of structural, relational, functional or other integrity. Second, resilience is usually marshalled to promote a politics. Resilience talk often consorts with discourses of meliorative action and of readily quantifiable practical effects. When the environmental sciences take the “Earth system” and the dynamics of global change as their objects of inquiry, a postulate of resilience is key to the elaboration and implementation of natural resource management policy. Proponents of socio-ecological resilience see the resilience hypothesis as enabling a demonstrably more enlightened stewardship of the biosphere (see Folke et al.; Holling; Walker and Salt). When applied psychology takes the anomalous situation of disadvantaged, at-risk individuals triumphing over trauma as its declared object of inquiry, a postulate of resilience is key to the positing and identification of personal and environmental resources or protective factors which would enable the overcoming of adversity. Proponents of psychosocial resilience see this concept as enabling the elaboration and implementation of interventions to foster individual and collective wellbeing (see Goldstein and Brooks; Ungar). Similarly, when policy think-tanks and government departments and agencies take the apprehension of particular threats to the social fabric as their object of inquiry, a postulate of resilience—or of a lack thereof—is critical to the elaboration and implementation of urban infrastructure, emergency planning and disaster management policies (see Drury et al.; Handmer and Dovers). However, despite its often positive connotations, resilience is well understood as a “normatively open” (Bourbeau 11) concept. This openness is apparent in some theories and practices of resilience. In limnological modelling, for example, eutrophication can result in a lake’s being in an undesirable, albeit resilient, turbid-water state (see Carpenter et al.; Walker and Meyers). But perhaps the negative connotations or indeed perverse effects of resilience are most apparent in some of its political uptakes. Certainly, governmental operationalisations of resilience are coming under increased scrutiny. Chief among the criticisms levelled at the “muddled politics” (Grove 147) of and around resilience is that its mobilisation works to constitute a particular neoliberal subjectivity (see Joseph; Neocleous). By enabling a conservative focus on individual responsibility, preparedness and adaptability, the topos of resilience contributes critically to the development of neoliberal governmentality (Joseph). In a practical sense, this deployment of resilience silences resistance: “building resilient subjects,” observe Evans and Reid (85), “involves the deliberate disabling of political habits. […] Resilient subjects are subjects that have accepted the imperative not to resist or secure themselves from the difficulties they are faced with but instead adapt to their enabling conditions.” It’s this prospect of practical acquiescence that sees resistance at times opposed to resilience (Neocleous). “Good intentions not withstanding,” notes Grove (146), “the effect of resilience initiatives is often to defend and strengthen the political economic status quo.” There’s much to commend in these analyses of how neoliberal uses of resilience constitute citizens as highly accommodating of capital and the state. But such critiques pertain to the governmental mobilisation of resilience in the contemporary “advanced liberal” settings of “various Anglo-Saxon countries” (Joseph 47). There are, of course, other instances—other events in other times and places—in which resilience indisputably sorts with resistance. Such an event is the caso Belsunce, in which a rhetorically resilient journalistic community pushed back, resisting some of the excesses of a corrupt neoliberal Argentine regime. I’ll turn briefly to this infamous case to suggest that a notion of “discursive resilience” might afford us some purchase when it comes to describing discursive events. To be clear: we’re considering resilience here not as an anticipatory politics, but rather as an analytic device to supplement the descriptive tools of Peircean semiosis and a rhetorical postulate of genre. As such, it’s more an instrument than an answer: a program, perhaps, for ongoing work. Although drawing on different disciplinary construals of the term, this use of resilience would be particularly indebted to the resilience thinking developed in ecology (see Carpenter el al.; Folke et al.; Holling; Walker et al.; Walker and Salt). Things would, of course, be lost in translation (see Adger; Gallopín): in taking a discursive event, rather than the dynamics of a socio-ecological system, as our object of inquiry, we’d retain some topological analogies while dispensing with, for example, Holling’s four-phase adaptive cycle (see Carpenter et al.; Folke; Gunderson; Gunderson and Holling; Walker et al.). For our purposes, it’s unlikely that descriptions of ecosystem succession need to be carried across. However, the general postulates of ecological resilience thinking—that a system is a complex series of dynamic relations and functions located at any given time within a basin of attraction (or stability domain or system regime) delimited by thresholds; that it is subject to multiple attractors and follows trajectories describable over varying scales of time and space; that these trajectories are inflected by exogenous and endogenous perturbations to which the system is subject; that the system either proves itself resilient to these perturbations in its adaptive or resistive response, or transforms, flipping from one domain (or basin) to another may well prove useful to some descriptive projects in the humanities. Resilience is fundamentally a question of uptake or response. Hence, when examining resilience in socio-ecological systems, Gallopín notes that it’s useful to consider “not only the resilience of the system (maintenance within a basin) but also coping with impacts produced and taking advantage of opportunities” (300). Argentine society in the early-to-mid 2000s was one such socio-political system, and the caso Belsunce was both one such impact and one such opportunity. Well-connected in the world of finance, 57-year-old former stockbroker Carlos Alberto Carrascosa lived with his 50-year-old sociologist turned charity worker wife, María Marta García Belsunce, close to their relatives in the exclusive gated community of Carmel Country Club, Pilar, Provincia de Buenos Aires, Argentina. At 7:07 pm on Sunday 27 October 2002, Carrascosa called ambulance emergencies, claiming that his wife had slipped and knocked her head while drawing a bath alone that rainy Sunday afternoon. At the time of his call, it transpired, Carrascosa was at home in the presence of intimates. Blood was pooled on the bathroom floor and smeared and spattered on its walls and adjoining areas. María Marta lay lifeless, brain matter oozing from several holes in her left parietal and temporal lobes. This was the moment when Carrascosa, calm and coherent, called emergency services, but didn’t advert the police. Someone, he told the operator, had slipped in the bath and bumped her head. Carrascosa described María Marta as breathing, with a faint pulse, but somehow failed to mention the holes in her head. “A knock with a tap,” a police source told journalist Horacio Cecchi, “really doesn’t compare with the five shots to the head, the spillage of brain matter and the loss of about half a litre of blood suffered by the victim” (Cecchi and Kollmann). Rather than a bathroom tap, María Marta’s head had met with five bullets discharged from a .32-calibre revolver. In effect, reported Cecchi, María Marta had died twice. “While perhaps a common conceit in fiction,” notes Cecchi, “in reality, dying twice is, by definition, impossible. María Marta’s two obscure endings seem to unsettle this certainty.” Her cadaver was eventually subjected to an autopsy, and what had been a tale of clumsiness and happenstance was rewritten, reinscribed under the Argentine Penal Code. The autopsy was conducted 36 days after the burial of María Marta; nine days later, she was mentioned for the second time in the mainstream Argentine press. Her reappearance, however, was marked by a shift in rubrics: from a short death notice in La Nación, María Marta was translated to the crime section of Argentina’s dailies. Until his wife’s mediatic reapparition, Carroscosa and other relatives had persisted with their “accident” hypothesis. Indeed, they’d taken a range of measures to preclude the sorts of uptakes that might ordinarily be expected to flow, under functioning liberal democratic regimes, from the discovery of a corpse with five projectiles lodged in its head. Subsequently recited as part of Carrascosa’s indictment, these measures were extensively reiterated in media coverage of the case. One of the more notorious actions involved the disposal of the sixth bullet, which was found lying under María Marta. In the course of moving the body of his half-sister, John Hurtig retrieved a small metallic object. This discovery was discussed by a number of family members, including Carrascosa, who had received ballistics training during his four years of naval instruction at the Escuela Nacional de Náutica de la Armada. They determined that the object was a lug or connector rod (“pituto”) used in library shelving: nothing, in any case, to indicate a homicide. With this determination made, the “pituto” was duly wrapped in lavatory paper and flushed down the toilet. This episode occasioned a range of outraged articles in Argentine dailies examining the topoi of privilege, power, corruption and impunity. “Distinguished persons,” notes Viau pointedly, “are so disposed […] that in the midst of all that chaos, they can locate a small, hard, steely object, wrap it in lavatory paper and flush it down the toilet, for that must be how they usually dispose of […] all that rubbish that no longer fits under the carpet.” Most often, though, critical comment was conducted by translating the reporting of the case to the genres of crime fiction. In an article entitled Someone Call Agatha Christie, Quick!, H.A.T. writes that “[s]omething smells rotten in the Carmel Country; a whole pile of rubbish seems to have been swept under its plush carpets.” An exemplary intervention in this vein was the work of journalist and novelist Vicente Battista, for whom the case (María Marta) “synthesizes the best of both traditions of crime fiction: the murder mystery and the hard-boiled novels.” “The crime,” Battista (¿Hubo Otra Mujer?) has Rodolfo observe in the first of his speculative dialogues on the case, “seems to be lifted from an Agatha Christie novel, but the criminal turns out to be a copy of the savage killers that Jim Thompson usually depicts.” Later, in an interview in which he correctly predicted the verdict, Battista expanded on these remarks: This familiar plot brings together the English murder mystery and the American hard-boiled novels. The murder mystery because it has all the elements: the crime takes place in a sealed room. In this instance, sealed not only because it occurred in a house, but also in a country, a sealed place of privilege. The victim was a society lady. Burglary is not the motive. In classic murder mystery novels, it was a bit unseemly that one should kill in order to rob. One killed either for a juicy sum of money, or for revenge, or out of passion. In those novels there were neither corrupt judges nor fugitive lawyers. Once Sherlock Holmes […] or Hercule Poirot […] said ‘this is the murderer’, that was that. That’s to say, once fingered in the climactic living room scene, with everyone gathered around the hearth, the perpetrator wouldn’t resist at all. And everyone would be happy because the judges were thought to be upright persons, at least in fiction. […] The violence of the crime of María Marta is part of the hard-boiled novel, and the sealed location in which it takes place, part of the murder mystery (Alarcón). I’ve argued elsewhere (Munro, Belsunce) that the translation of the case to the genres of crime fiction and their metaanalysis was a means by which a victimised Argentine public, represented by a disempowered and marginalised fourth estate, sought some rhetorical recompense. The postulate of resilience, however, might help further to describe and contextualise this notorious discursive event. A disaffected Argentine press finds itself in a stability domain with multiple attractors: on the one hand, an acquiescence to ever-increasing politico-juridical corruption, malfeasance and elitist impunity; on the other, an attractor of increasing contestation, democratisation, accountability and transparency. A discursive event like the caso Belsunce further perturbs Argentine society, threatening to displace it from its democratising trajectory. Unable to enforce due process, Argentina’s fourth estate adapts, doing what, in the circumstances, amounts to the next best thing: it denounces the proceedings by translating the case to the genres of crime fiction. In so doing, it engages a venerable reception history in which the co-constitution of true crime fiction and investigative journalism is exemplified by the figure of Rodolfo Walsh, whose denunciatory works mark a “politicisation of crime” (see Amar Sánchez Juegos; El sueño). Put otherwise, a section of Argentina’s fourth estate bounced back: by making poetics do rhetorical work, it resisted the pull towards what ecology calls an undesirable basin of attraction. Through a show of discursive resilience, these journalists worked to keep Argentine society on a democratising track. 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