Rozprawy doktorskie na temat „Nominalism”

Orientador: Yara Adario Frateschi
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: No presente trabalho procuro apresentar como o método resolutivo-compositivo ou geométrico estabelece uma relação fundamental entre filosofia natural e política nas bases do pensamento hobbesiano mais sistemático. Nesse registro, busco mostrar como Hobbes entende que as definições geométricas não seriam apenas descritivas ou especulativas, mas também prescritivas e práticas. Por isso, as definições da geometria euclidiana não apenas descreveriam a forma de uma figura estática, mas também prescreveriam um possível modo de geração ou de construção desses objetos. Da perspectiva hobbesiana os axiomas fundamentais da geometria euclidiana podem ser demonstrados, por isso estes postulados devem ser entendidos como princípios de construção ou de autoridade, mais do que de conhecimento. Desse prisma, a geometria euclidiana poderia ser entendida como uma ciência capaz de orientar tanto o entendimento quanto as ações humanas. Com base nisso, procuro mostrar como a filosofia natural e política de Hobbes se funda sobre uma aplicação desse método a uma mesma matéria: os homens e suas paixões. É nesse registro que, no decorrer de todo o presente trabalho, procuro elucidar como as paixões humanas (matéria tanto da filosofia natural quanto da política) são vistas por Hobbes sob a ótica do mesmo método geométrico, mas ora como efeito (do movimento externo que afeta os sentidos humanos) e ora como causa (do movimento voluntário dos homens no mundo). Sob esta perspectiva, procuro evidenciar de que modo o caráter convencional do método hobbesiano se aplica aos termos do contrato social constitutivo de um Estado civil soberano, presente nas bases de uma filosofia que entende as ciências e o próprio conhecimento como sinônimos de poder
Abstract: In this thesis I try to present as the resolutive-compositive or geometric method establishes a fundamental relationship between natural philosophy and policy on the fundamental principle of hobbesian thought. In this sense, I try to show how Hobbes believes that the geometric definitions would not only descriptive or speculative, but also prescriptive and practices. Therefore, the geometry definitions describe not only the form of a static picture but also prescribe a possible way of generation or building these objects. For the Hobbesian perspective the fundamental axioms of Euclidean geometry can be demonstrated, so these postulates must be understood as principles of construction or authority rather than knowledge. From this angle, Euclidean geometry could be understood as a science capable of guiding both the understanding and human actions. These actions regarded both as a knowledge and authority. Based on this, I seek to show how natural philosophy and policy is based on an application of this method to the same matter: men and their passions. In this way, throughout this work I try to elucidate how human passions (matter of natural philosophy and politics) are seen by Hobbes from the perspective of the same geometric method, but sometimes as the effect (of the external movement affects the human senses) and sometimes as cause (the voluntary human movement in the world). From this perspective, I try to show how the conventional character of the Hobbesian method applies to the terms of the constitutive social contract of a sovereign civil State that are present on the basis of a philosophy that understands the science and knowledge itself as power synonymous
Doutorado
Filosofia
Doutor em Filosofia

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This study aims to investigate how is the critique of nominalist system ockhamiano front of realistic theories developed in the Middle Ages. For this research takes place we choose to trace an investigative path that begins with the elucidation of what the 'Quarrel of the Universal' in the Middle Ages and the establishment of typologies that bring together the theories of the period. Later we work with the contextualization of the logical system developed by William of Ockham setting the bases of your system and pointing out some of the realistic writers who are criticized by the author. So that the logic of the author system became clear we seek to elucidate the logic of the terms of their time, which means the author's nominalism and what are the logical tools that he used to implement his critique of realism, namely: the supposition, the connotation and the signification. Finally we seek to discuss and demonstrate what the nominalist response of the author face the realistic theoretical models, placing the universal only with mental existence, exerting a semantic function, and devoid of ontology and a reality that is outside the human mind, shifting the axis the discussion of the problem to the field of logic to the detriment of the ontological field.
O presente trabalho tem como objetivo investigar de que forma ocorre a crítica do sistema nominalista ockhamiano frente às teorias realistas desenvolvidas no medievo. Para que a presente pesquisa se realize optamos por traçar um caminho investigativo que se inicia com a elucidação do que seja a ‘Querela dos Universais’ no medievo e o estabelecimento das tipologias que congregam as teorias do período. Posteriormente trabalhamos com a contextualização do sistema lógico desenvolvido por Guilherme de Ockham fixando as bases de seu sistema e apontando alguns dos autores realistas que são criticados pelo autor. Para que o sistema lógico do autor se tornasse claro buscamos elucidar a Lógica dos Termos de seu tempo, o que significa o nominalismo do autor e quais são as ferramentas lógicas por ele usadas para implementar sua crítica ao realismo, a saber: a suposição, a conotação e a significação. Por fim buscamos discorrer e demonstrar qual é a resposta nominalista do autor frente aos modelos teóricos realistas, colocando os universais somente com existência mental, exercendo uma função semântica, e desprovidos de ontologia e de uma realidade que esteja fora da mente humana, deslocando o eixo da discussão do problema para o campo da lógica em detrimento do campo ontológico.

Notre hypothèse est la suivante : pour des raisons différentes et avec des méthodes différentes, Derrida et Goodman ont, chacun, ébranlé l’un des deux piliers qui sous-tendent l’essentiel de la tradition philosophique. Derrida, par le jeu subtil de la différance, a fait vaciller la vaste entreprise de mise en ordre. Goodman, par la profusion de mondes construits et irréductibles les uns aux autres, remet en cause l’aspiration à l’unité. Nous avons tenté d’établir que la métaphysique s’est développée dans une dialectique de l’un et de l’ordre, se rétablissant sur l’un de ses pilastres quand l’autre faiblissait. Si donc les soubassements de l’histoire philosophique devaient être revisités – peut-être révisés – il serait fructueux d’user simultanément des propositions derridiennes et goodmaniennes. C’est l’originalité de ce projet. Il s’agit, pour neutraliser la récupération dialectique par l’autre pilier (par l’unité quand l’ordre faillit ou par la mise en ordre dans la multitude s’immisce) d’interroger la tradition suivant le double impératif de la déconstruction et du nominalisme, suivant le double prisme du dés-ordre de Derrida et du multiple de Goodman. Nous avons tenté d’établir que l’efficace d’une remise en cause du « mythe de l’un » ne peut se faire sans ébranler le « mythe de l’ordre ». Considérer conjointement les systèmes (ou des dé-systématisations) de Derrida et Goodman serait donc, suivant ce dessein, non seulement utile mais presque indispensable. Chacun d’eux permet d’éviter la récupération dialectique du schème de l’autre. L’étude est menée à partir d’un inconfort partagé face au concept de vérité
Our hypothesis is the following : for different reasons and with different methods, Derrida and Goodman have both deconstructed one of the pillars of the Western philosophical tradition. Derrida, using the subtleties of the differance concept, has shaken the general entreprise of « organisation ». On the other hand, Goodman, by considering numerous constructed worlds that cannot be reduced one to the other, questions the desire of unity. We have tried to establish that metaphysics has developed in a dialectic articulation of order and unity, using one when the other fails. If the groundings of the history of philosophy were then to be revisited, it would be useful — if not necessary — to use simultaneously the derridean and goodmanian views. This the originality of this project. To break the dialectic mechanics using order to cure multiplicity, or the other way round, we have reconsidered the tradition using both deconstruction and nominalism, Derrida’s disorder and Goodman’s diversity. We have tried to show that the efficiency of the questioning of the « unity myth » depends on how far the « order myth » has been revised. Considering simultaneously both Derrida’s and Goodman’s systems allows to avoid the dialectic neutralisation of the proposal. The study is performed through the question of truth

In the last 30 years there has been growing interest in and a greater appreciation of the unique contributions that medieval authors have made to the history of logic. In this thesis, we compare and contrast the modal logics of Robert Kilwardby and John Buridan and explore how their two conceptions of modality relate to and differ from modern notions of modal logic. We develop formal reconstructions of both authors' logics, making use of a number of different formal techniques. In the case of Robert Kilwardby we show that using his distinction between per se and per accidens modalities, he is able to provide a consistent interpretation of the apodictic fragment of Aristotle's modal syllogism and that, by generalising this distinction to hypothetical construction, he can develop an account of connexive logic. In the case of John Buridan we show that his modal logic is a natural extension of the usual Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, and that this modal logic can be shown to be sound and complete relative to a proof-theoretic formalisation of Buridan's treatment of the expository syllogism.

Orientador: Fátima Regina Rodrigues Évora
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: Essa dissertação tem por objetivo geral investigar as noções de ciência e conhecimento científico de Nicole Oresme (1323?-1382). Mais precisamente, procura-se situar o projeto filosófico de Oresme no contexto do século XIV e de seu progressivo afastamento da concepção aristotélica de ciência enquanto um saber demonstrativo, necessário e evidente. Desse modo, procura-se investigar de que maneira e por quais razões Oresme fala em causas prováveis, bem como qual o papel que a matemática ocupa em sua epistemologia probabilista. Para tanto, empreende-se a análise de algumas passagens do comentário de Oresme ao De anima de Aristóteles, e procura-se sobretudo apresentar e explicar a ciência de figurar qualidades e movimentos que Oresme formula, em seu Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum e motuum, com o intuito de assinalar as causas prováveis de diversos fenômenos naturais
Abstract: The objective of this thesis is to investigate Nicole Oresme's notions of science and scientific knowledge. More specifically, we attempt to place Oresme's philosophical project in the context of fourteenth-century natural philosophy, with its progressive departure from an Aristotelic conception of science as an evident, necessary and demonstrative knowledge. Hence, we investigate how and for which reasons Oresme speaks of \probable causes" and \probable explanations", and try to determine the role that mathematics plays in his probabilistic epistemology. For this effect, we analyse some passages of Oresme's commentary on Aristotle's De anima and seek, above all, to present and explain the science of figuring qualities and movements formulated by Oresme in his Tractatus de configurationibus qualitatum e motuum for the pourpose of assigning probable causes to various natural phenomena
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia

This thesis adds a new contribution to the field of empirical theology pertaining to nominalism. The thesis explores the belonging, beliefs and practice of nominal Irish Anglicans. It seeks to unearth the reasons they give for their identification with the Church of Ireland. The method used in the exploration is primarily quantitative with a brief qualitative element. The instrument employed is a questionnaire, based on the template employed by Richter and Francis and Francis and Richter on church-leaving. The thesis opens by introducing the Church of Ireland in the religious context of Ireland. The frame is widened to Europe, before examining the literature surrounding the debate on nominalism. A method is outlined to locate nominal Irish Anglicans in order to obtain and analyse their views as to their belonging, belief and practice. There follows an empirical analysis to explore the beliefs of nominal Irish Anglicans and the reasons they give for reducing their church attendance. The analysis is thematic, following the pattern used by and the earlier work of Richter and Francis (1998), Francis, Robbins and Astley (2005) and Francis and Richter (2007). This thesis concludes by offering a summary of the findings before providing an explanation as to why nominal Irish Anglicans continue their identification with the Church of Ireland. It suggests how some of the discoveries may shape future research. The thesis ends by considering the implication of the results for the Church of Ireland.

Foucault analisa o liberalismo a fim de tornar inteligíveis as relações concretas de poder. Isso porque o liberalismo moderno põe em jogo um determinado regime de verdade, o que significa que seria possível, a partir dele, destacar o sentido que unifica esse período como época moderna. O procedimento adotado por Foucault consiste em delimitar condições de existência, fazendo a metodologia arqueológica prolongar-se na dimensão macrofísica do poder. Todavia, esse procedimento crítico de busca por condições impede a realização de uma história nominalista, única concepção de história que poderia atender aos pressupostos do projeto genealógico. Afinal, o nominalismo em história está em jogo desde que Foucault procura acentuar a contingência e singularidade de todo acontecimento, incluindo aí o nascimento do sujeito moderno. Mas não há conciliação possível entre o acento no método crítico e o acento no pressuposto da diferença, próprio ao nominalismo, o que leva Foucault a uma leitura incomum da modernidade e do sujeito. Essa leitura traz à tona duas consequências incômodas, pois nela toma corpo certo primado do discurso e a criação, como signo da atividade (política) do sujeito, parece não ter lugar. A fim de iluminar essa duplicidade inconciliável e suas consequências, procuro analisar como se define, em Foucault, o sujeito do liberalismo, o sujeito na história e, por fim, o sujeito moral, considerando especialmente seu trabalho posterior a 1976.
Foucault examines liberalism in order to make intelligible the concrete relations of power. That is because the modern liberalism puts into play a certain regime of truth, which means that it would be possible to deprehend, out of it, the meaning which unifies this period as a modern era. The procedure adopted by Foucault consists in delimiting conditions of existence, causing the archeological methodology to extend into the macrophysical dimension of power. Nevertheless, this critical procedure of searching conditions prevents the accomplishment of a nominalistic history, the only conception of history which might comply with the assumptions of the genealogical project. After all, nominalism in history is at play since Foucault endeavours to emphasize the contingency and singularity of every occurrence, including the birth of the modern subject. But there is not a possible conciliation between the emphasis on the critical method and the emphasis on the assumption of difference, proper to nominalism, which leads Foucault to an uncommon reading of modernity and the subject. This reading reveals two disquieting consequences, because a certain primacy of the discourse arises from it, and creation, as a sign of the (political) activity of the subject, seems not to have room. In order to clarify this incompatible duplicity and its consequences, I try to analyse how it is defined, in Foucault, the subject of liberalism, the subject in history and, lastly, the moral subject, considering particularly his writings done after 1976.

Boèce prétend avoir apporté une solution définitive aux deux grandes apories du corpus logique aristotélicien, l'aporie de l'universel et l'aporie des futurs contingents. Nous montrons qu'Abélard, à travers sa critique des reales, met en question ces deux solutions et leur substitue deux distinctions voulues comme aporétiques - entre res et status d'un côté et entre res et dictum propositionis de l'autre - qui naissent de la reconnaissance par Abélard du caractère fictif des solutions boéciennes aux grandes apories du corpus logique aristotélicien. Ces deux distinctions organisent une réflexion philosophique profondément novatrice que nous nous efforçons de décrire
Boethius claims to have definitively solved the two great aporias of the corpus of Aristotelian Iogic, the universal aporia and the aporia of contingent futures. l demonstrate that Abelard,Through his critique of reales calls into question these two solutions and substitutes two distinctions that he wanted to he aporetique - between res and status on the one band andand dictum propositionis on the other hand - born of Abelard's recognition of the fictional character of the two Boetian solutions to the great aporias of the Aristotelician logical corpus. The two. distinctions pave the way for a profoundly new kind of philosophical reasoning,which this text mtends to describe

Introduction: I lay out the broad contours of my thesis: a defence of mathematical nominalism, and nominalism more generally. I discuss the possibility of metaphysics, and the relationship of nominalism to naturalism and pragmatism. Chapter 2: I delineate an account of abstractness. I then provide counter-arguments to claims that mathematical objects make a di erence to the concrete world, and claim that mathematical objects are abstract in the sense delineated. Chapter 3: I argue that the epistemological problem with abstract objects is not best understood as an incompatibility with a causal theory of knowledge, or as an inability to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, but resides in the epistemic luck that would infect any belief about abstract objects. To this end, I develop an account of epistemic luck that can account for cases of belief in necessary truths and apply it to the mathematical case. Chapter 4: I consider objections, based on (meta)metaphysical considerations and linguistic data, to the view that the existential quantifier expresses existence. I argue that these considerations can be accommodated by an existentially committing quantifier when the pragmatics of quantified sentences are properly understood. I develop a semi-formal framework within which we can define a notion of nominalistic adequacy. I show how our notion of nominalistic adequacy can show why it is legitimate for the nominalist to make use of platonistic “assumptions” in inference-making. Chapter 5: I turn to the application of mathematics in science, including explanatory applications, and its relation to a number of indispensability arguments. I consider also issues of realism and anti-realism, and their relation to these arguments. I argue that abstraction away from pragmatic considerations has acted to skew the debate, and has obscured possibilities for a nominalistic understanding of mathematical practices. I end by explaining the notion of a pragmatic meta-vocabulary, and argue that this notion can be used to carve out a new way of locating our ontological commitments. Chapter 6: I show how the apparatus developed in earlier chapters can be utilised to roll out the nominalist project to other domains of discourse. In particular, I consider propositions and types. I claim that a unified account of nominalism across these domains is available. Conclusion: I recapitulate the claims of my thesis. I suggest that the goal of mathematical enquiry is not descriptive knowledge, but understanding.

While Richard Baxter (1615-91) is well known and rightly held in high esteem for his practical divinity and his evangelistic zeal, he has hitherto been conspicuously neglected as a theologian. In particular there have been no major studies of him with respect to the renewed paradigm of Protestant Scholasticism and none at all of his Methodus Theologiae (1681), which represents the fruit of a lifetime of theological reflection and study and which is arguably, in both scope and vision, one of the last great Summas of English scholastic divinity. This thesis focuses on the Methodus and on Baxter‟s theological method, which he took, though imperfect, to be the closest to the true Scripture method of theology that anyone had yet come. Baxter believed that every level of (active) created reality reflected the impress of God‟s Triune being in metaphysical composition, structure and activity. This he described, following the Italian metaphysicist Tommaso Campanella, in terms of the divine primalities or principles of Power, Wisdom and Love. In the Methodus these insights are systematised into a kind of Trinitarian logic. Baxter held that human reason should be sanctified in order to conform to the Trinitarian structure of created reality, and therefore espoused a method of trichotomising organised according to these same divine principles, derivative of both Ramist and Lullist method. This thesis argues that the whole of Baxter‟s mature thought is structured in a Trinitarian fashion according to his own „hallowed logic‟ and that two themes, often interlinked, are the key to interpreting his thought: the metaphysics of the divine principles and the Christian‟s baptismal covenant with the Triune God. Furthermore it examines Baxter‟s analogical ascent from the general vestigia Trinitatis present in the whole created order through the special vestigium of man‟s soul fashioned in the image of God and finally to the Trinity itself. This detailed exposition provides the basis, in the concluding chapter, for an examination of the whole of the Methodus and a demonstration that this represents a methodological unfolding of the covenant between the believer and God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in the threefold Kingdom of Nature, Grace and Glory. In this way the Methodus may be seen as having taken its inspiration from the Theo-Politica (1659) of Baxter‟s friend George Lawson. Finally this thesis concludes that Baxter‟s thought has pronounced Scotist and Nominalist accents. His Scotism in particular runs deep and has strong ties with his Trinitarian thought, which is especially significant in light of the recent increasingly vocal discussions of the Scotist character of Protestant Scholasticism. Overall therefore it is suggested that Baxter is a neglected figure who deserves to be rediscovered and whose mature theology represents a fascinating reconstrual of biblical ideas according to a Trinitarian and scholastic paradigm.

Cette thèse de doctorat est consacrée à la pensée du philosophe américain Nelson Goodman (1906-1998). Nous y défendons, à l’encontre de la plus grande partie de la critique, une lecture métaphysicienne de son œuvre. Il est démontré que Goodman, dans tous ses travaux, développe une métaphysique technique et méconnue, dont les piliers sont le nominalisme, le pluralisme, le perdurantisme, l’actualisme, et l’universalisme méréologique. Cette lecture permet de réévaluer l’ensemble de la pensée goodmanienne. Elle établit aussi ses liens insoupçonnés avec la métaphysique analytique contemporaine
This PhD dissertation is dedicated to the philosophy of Nelson Goodman (1906-1998). We defend, against most critics, a metaphysical interpretation of Goodman’s works. It will be shown that the latter developed a technical and often overlooked metaphysics, whose pillars are nominalism, pluralism, perdurantism, actualism, and mereological universalism. This reading allows for a critical reevaluation of Goodman’s views. It also brings to light his unexpected links with contemporary analytic metaphysics

This study aims at investigating the problem of universals, which is one of the most venerable issues in the history of philosophy. The problem of universals emerges from the ontological status of properties and relations
i.e., the existence and nature of properties and relations. It can be defined as the problem of how two or more different objects can have the same property or how a property can be a part of different things. The problem of universals consists of not a single problem but rather a network of problems. The aim of this study is to reconsider the problem of universals which involves the three interrelated problems: ontological problem of predication, the linguistic problem of predication and the problem of abstract reference. Any adequate account for the problem of universals must deal with these problems. Nominalism, Trope theory, and Realism are three major theories that have proposed solutions to the problem of universals. In this study, these accounts have been discussed and it has been tried to reveal whether any of these accounts can deal with these problems. As a conclusion, this study proposes that among the theories that try to deal with the problem of ontological predication and the problem of abstract reference, only Object-Trope theory and Armstrong&rsquo
s Realism have been successful. However, Object-Trope theory is found to be a bit more superior to Armstrong&rsquo
s Realism when Ockham&rsquo
s razor is appealed to.

In this thesis, I aim to motivate a particular philosophy of mathematics characterised by the following three claims. First, mathematical sentences are generally speaking false because mathematical objects do not exist. Second, people typically use mathematical sentences to communicate content the truth of which does not require mathematical objects to exist. Finally, in using mathematical language in this way, speakers are not doing anything out of the ordinary: they are performing straightforward assertions. In Part I, I argue that the role played by mathematics in our scientific explanations is a purely expressive one, merely allowing us to say more than we otherwise would be able to about, or yielding a greater understanding of, the physical world. Mathematical objects to not need to exist for mathematical language to play this role. This proposal puts a normative constraint on our use of mathematical language: we ought to use mathematically presented theories to express belief only in the consequences they have for non-mathematical things. In Part II, I will argue that what the normative proposal recommends is in fact what people generally do in both pure and applied mathematical contexts. I motivate this claim by showing that it is predicted by our best general means of analysing natural language. I provide a semantic theory of applied arithmetical sentences and show that they do not purport to refer to numbers, as well as a pragmatic theory for pure mathematical language use which shows that pure mathematical utterances do not typically communicate content that implies the existence of mathematical objects. In conclusion, I show the hermeneutic fictionalist position that emerges is preferable to any alternative which interprets mathematical discourse as aimed at describing a domain of independently existing abstract mathematical objects.

Si nos théories physiques peuvent décrire les traits les plus généraux de la réalité, on sait aussi que pour le faire, elles utilisent le langage des mathématiques. On peut alors légitimement se demander si notre capacité à décrire, sinon la nature intime des objets et phénomènes physiques, du moins les relations et structures qu’ils instancient, ne vient pas de cette application des mathématiques. Dans cette thèse, nous soutenons que les mathématiques sont si efficacement applicables en physique tout simplement parce que la réalité décrite par les physiciens est de nature quantitative. Pour cela, nous proposons d’abord une ontologie des quantités, puis des lois de la nature, qui s’inscrit dans les débats contemporains sur la nature des propriétés (théorie des universaux, théorie des tropes, ou nominalisme), et des lois (régularités, ou relations entre universaux). Ensuite, nous examinons deux sortes d’application des mathématiques : la mathématisation des phénomènes par la mesure, puis la formulation mathématique des équations reliant des grandeurs physiques. Nous montrons alors que les propriétés et les lois doivent être comme notre ontologie les décrit, pour que les mathématiques soient légitimement, et si efficacement, applicables. L’intérêt de ce travail est d’articuler des discussions purement ontologiques (et très anciennes, comme la querelle des universaux) avec des exigences épistémologiques rigoureuses qui émanent de la physique actuelle. Cette articulation est conçue de manière transcendantale, car la nature quantitative de la réalité (des propriétés et des lois) y est défendue comme condition d’applicabilité des mathématiques en physique
Assuming that our best physical theories succeed in describing the most general features of reality, one can only be struck by the effectiveness of mathematics in physics, and wonder whether our ability to describe, if not the very nature of physical entities, at least their relations and the fundamental structures they enter, does not result from applying mathematics. In this dissertation, we claim that mathematical theories are so effectively applicable in physics merely because physical reality is of quantitative nature. We begin by displaying and supporting an ontology of quantities and laws of nature, in the context of current philosophical debates on the nature of properties (universals, classes of tropes, or even nominalistic resemblance classes) and of laws (as mere regularities or as relations among universals). Then we consider two main ways mathematics are applied: first, the way measurement mathematizes physical phenomena, second, the way mathematical concepts are used to formulate equations linking physical quantities. Our reasoning has eventually a transcendental flavor: properties and laws of nature must be as described by the ontology we first support with purely a priori arguments, if mathematical theories are to be legitimately and so effectively applied in measurements and equations. What could make this work valuable is its attempt to link purely ontological (and often very ancient) discussions with rigorous epistemological requirements of modern and contemporary physics. The quantitative nature of being (properties and laws) is thus supported on a transcendental basis: as a necessary condition for mathematics to be legitimately applicable in physics

In his defense of negative freedom, Isaiah Berlin&rsquo
s main target is the political voluntarism of enlightenment rationalism which has paved way to totalitarian and authoritarian political regimes of the 20th century which brought the sacrifice of individual freedom. For Berlin, in contrast to Platonic realism of enlightenment rationalism in which there is a substantial belief in reason&rsquo
s capacity for giving us the knowledge of the supreme good, the nominalist foundations of negative freedom can provide us a secure grounding in the justification of the rights over the goods. By declaring the inviolable rights and relying on the principle of neutrality, negative freedom eliminates the risk of political voluntarism stemming from enlightenment rationalism or scientism. Since the 1980s, in Turkey, political and social oppositions to Rousseauian enlightenment of the Turkish state have deployed the epistemic and political tools of negative freedom. This appeal has aimed to open a legitimate space for the language of freedom as non-intervention under which each individual chooses his personal values without the fear of state intervention. In contrast to the interventionist claims of state, negative freedom, it has been believed that, has provided a secure grounding for the rights of individuals. Besides, the meta-ethical thesis of the incommensurability of human goods has also been employed for delegitimizing the substantial belief in the monism of the republican regime which relied on the assumption presenting the republican way of life as the supreme good. This missionary zeal for the re-construction of the republic on the premises of negative freedom has not, however, gone unchallenged. Against such identification of democracy with free-market and value pluralism, the republican front defends the restoration of the foundational ideals of the republic by returning to the substantial understanding of national sovereignty under the formulation of &lsquo
militant democracy&rsquo
. In this study, even though I agree with the nominalist epistemology of negative freedom which manifests a skeptic and agnostic attitude toward the power of reason and the insistence of negative freedom on the necessity of the priority of right, I have demonstrated the reasons behind the failure of negative freedom in justifying the priority of the right over the goods. Actually, my analysis has already displayed that concerning the radical consequences of the thesis of incommensurability, it is doubtful whether negative freedom can provide political conditions even for the cause of peace without the presence of absolute sovereign as suggested in Hobbes&rsquo
s political theory. At this point, I have argued that we should take into consideration the achievements of the ideal of autonomy in grounding the priority of the right over the good. Contrary to Berlin&rsquo
s distorted representation of autonomy, I believe that the critical rationalism of autonomy and its understanding of law will protect us not only from the metaphysics of enlightenment rationalism and scientism, but also from the metaphysics of historicism envisaged by Berlin&rsquo
s version of negative freedom.

I here develop a specific version of the deflationary theory of truth. I adopt a terminology on which deflationism holds that an exhaustive account of truth is given by the equivalence between truth-ascriptions and de-nominalised (or disquoted) sentences. An adequate truth-theory, it is argued, must be finite, non-circular, and give a unified account of all occurrences of “true”. I also argue that it must descriptively capture the ordinary meaning of “true”, which is plausibly taken to be unambiguous. Ch. 2 is a critical historical survey of deflationary theories, where notably disquotationalism is found untenable as a descriptive theory of “true”. In Ch. 3, I aim to show that deflationism cannot be finitely and non-circularly formulated by using “true”, and so must only mention it. Hence, it must be a theory specifically about the word “true” (and its foreign counterparts). To capture the ordinary notion, the theory must thus be an empirical, use-theoretic, semantic account of “true”. The task of explaining facts about truth now becomes that of showing that various sentences containing “true” are (unconditionally) assertible. In Ch. 4, I defend the claim (D) that every sentence of the form “That p is true” and the corresponding “p” are intersubstitutable (in a use-theoretic sense), and show how this claim provides a unified and simple account of a wide variety of occurrences of “true”. Disquotationalism then only has the advantage of avoiding propositions. But in Ch. 5, I note that (D) is not committed to propositions. Use-theoretic semantics is then argued to serve nominalism better than truth-theoretic ditto. In particular, it can avoid propositions while sustaining a natural syntactic treatment of “that”-clauses as singular terms and of “Everything he says is true”, as any other quantification. Finally, Horwich’s problem of deriving universal truth-claims is given a solution by recourse to an assertibilist semantics of the universal quantifier.

Fait de langue omniprésent et multiforme (impliquant des données morpho-syntaxiques et lexicales), la négation constitue véritablement un stylème de la moralistique classique. Focalisation, incidence, forclusion, négation uniceptive, implicite, préfixale, lexématique, problèmes de polarité et de scalarité : le statut central de la négation permet de saisir un positionnement énonciatif commun aux quatre auteurs du corpus autant qu’une prise de position philosophique spécifique à chacun d’eux. L’ambiguïté pragmatique communément associée à la négation est levée, dès lors que l’on admet la possibilité d’une lecture à plusieurs niveaux : la négation descriptive correspond à la représentation traditionnelle du discours moraliste comme une parole solitaire, isolée entre deux blancs typographiques. Mais précisément, lorsqu’on considère cette parole comme un discours adressé, la dimension polémique de la négation apparaît pleinement, plus précisément sa portée contre-doxique et métalinguistique. Les moralistes dénoncent le caractère faussé du discours commun ; ils conçoivent la négation comme un moyen de rompre le lien de référentialité abusif établi par celui-ci entre des concepts moraux et des comportements qui n’ont de vertueux que l’apparence. De l’héritage apophatique, sensible chez Pascal, jusqu’au prénihilisme chamfortien, en passant par l’anthropologie négative de La Rochefoucauld et l’immanentisme anti-artificialiste de la morale chez Vauvenargues, la négation offre une grille de lecture nouvelle pour étudier l’évolution du genre moraliste
Based on quantitative data, this study shows how essential negation is in the understanding of moralistique as a literary genre that can be identified as such through precise formal elements. I examine many aspects of negation, including the questions of scope, internal and external negations, restricted negation, forclusion, implicit negation, prefixal and lexematic negation and polarity scales. Not only is negation a linguistic scheme (involving various morpho-syntactic as well as lexical patterns) but it also works as a stylistic device which the moralists make a constant and specific use of. Whereas it is commonly held that negation is pragmatically ambiguous, I argue that, in focusing on the moralist as a spectator of society, the critiques have implicitly considered negation to be mostly descriptive. While correct, this interpretation should be qualified. The main aspect of the moralists’ negation rests in its polemical power. The moralists intend to rectify a biased use of words resulting from a false conception of moral values. Therefore, these writers do not say what things are as much as what they are not. From Pascal’s apophatic views, through La Rochefoucauld’s negative anthropology and Vauvenargues’ refusal of artificial morality, to Chamfort’s prenihilistic philosophy, negation appears as a new way to get a better understanding of the evolution of moralistique

Aquesta tesi se centra en el fenomen de la genericitat en rus, una llengua sense articles, i es compara la manifestació de la genericitat en llengües amb articles, com l’anglès i algunes llengües romàniques. L’objectiu principal d’aquesta recerca és estudiar com es codifica la genericitat en rus. Investigo si les propostes teòriques existents per a l’anàlisi dels nominals genèrics en llengües amb articles són també aplicables a les llengües sense articles. Proposo que la genericitat a nivell nominal permet fer referència a classes d’individus de manera directa o indirecta. Mitjançant el primer tipus un SN fa referència a una clase intensionalment, mentre que en el segon cas un SN fa referència a una suma d’individus que pot ser reinterpretada com a referent d’una classe. Demostro que la genericitat a nivell nominal, o sigui, la referència directa a una classe, en rus es codifica mitjançant nominals escarits morfofonològicament singulars, per als quals el Nombre semàntic i sintàctic és absent. A diferència de l’anglès i les llengües romàniques, on l’expressió sintàctica de la definitud és necessària, en rus aquests nominals són semànticament indefinits. Tanmateix, com que són conjunts unitaris es caracteritzen per denotar unicitat. Argumento que aquesta unicitat no és el resultat de l’aplicació d’un operador semàntic, sinó que és ‘ontològica’. Analitzo les construccions definidores en rus com un entorn en el qual es troben SNs amb referència a classe i demostro que són frases copulatives no predicatives que expressen una relació d’identitat/identificació entre dos conceptes nominals. En aquesta tesi també estudio els nominals plurals que es refereixen a sumes d’individus, els quals en determinades circumstàncies poden legitimar una referència genèrica indirecta a una classe. Aquests nominals són escarits en rus i en anglès, i definits en les llengües romàniques. La font de la genericitat en aquest cas és el tipus de predicat (predicats que seleccionen arguments que denoten classes i predicats psicològics amb subjecte experimentador) o el tipus d’oració (p.e., oració caracteritzant). Argumento que, independentment del fet que els plurals genèrics siguin escarits o obertament definits en una llengua determinada, semànticament es caracteritzen per la maximalitat, la identificabilitat i la pressuposició d’existència, la qual cosa els fa similars als nominals amb una interpretació definida. Els nominals plurals escarits del rus es diferencien dels nominals definits de l’anglès i de les llengües romàniques pel fet que s’interpreten en un domini no afitat: els plurals genèrics no poden ser restringits per la localització espacio-temporal o l’ancoratge anafòric. Proposo que els ‘efectes de definitud’ dels nominals genèrics es codifiquen sintàcticament i semànticament mitjançant un article definit en el cas de les llengües romàniques, o pragmàticament en el cas dels nominals plurals escarits del rus (i possiblement de l’anglès). Finalment, discuteixo la qüestió més general de quines són les possibles interpretacions dels nominals escarits en rus, perquè la genericitat és només una de les interpretacions que aquests nominals poden tenir en aquesta llengua. Per això, és molt important entendre no sols com es deriva aquesta interpretació genèrica sinó també amb quina altra lectura es relaciona. Argumento que els nominals escarits del rus són semànticament indefinits i que les altres interpretacions (definides i genèriques) a les quals es poden associar s’infereixen pragmàticament. Els nominals escarits en rus no donen lloc a una pressuposició de singularitat, i la seva definitud (percebuda pels parlants) és una inferència ja sigui de l’assumpció d’unicitat ontològica, la topicalitat o la familiaritat del referent.
Esta tesis se centra en el fenómeno de la genericidad en ruso, una lengua sin artículos, y se compara la manifestación de la genericidad en lenguas con artículos, como el inglés y algunas lenguas románicas. El objetivo principal de esta investigación es estudiar cómo se codifica la genericidad en ruso. Investigo si las propuestas teóricas existentes para el análisis de los nominales genéricos en lenguas con artículos son también aplicables a las lenguas sin artículos. Propongo que la genericidad a nivel nominal permite hacer referencia a clases de individuos de manera directa o indirecta. Mediante el primer tipo un SN hace referencia a una clase intensionalmente, mientras que en el segundo caso un SN hace referencia a una suma de individuos que puede ser reinterpretada como referente de una clase. Demuestro que la genericidad a nivel nominal, o sea, la referencia directa en una clase, en ruso se codifica a través de nominales escuetos morfofonològicament singulares, para los cuales el Número semántico y sintáctico es ausente. A diferencia del inglés y las lenguas románicas, donde la expresión sintáctica de la definitud es necesaria, en ruso estos nominales son semánticamente indefinidos. Aun así, como que son conjuntos unitarios se caracterizan para denotar unicidad. Argumento que esta unicidad no es el resultado de la aplicación de un operador semántico, sino que es 'ontológica'. Analizo las construcciones definidoras en ruso como un entorno en el cual se encuentran SNs con referencia a clase y demuestro que son frases copulativas no predicativas que expresan una relación de identidad/identificación entre dos conceptos nominales. En esta tesis también estudio los nominales plurales que se refieren a sumas de individuos, los cuales en determinadas circunstancias pueden legitimar una referencia genérica indirecta en una clase. Estos nominales son escuetos en ruso y en inglés, y definidos en las lenguas románicas. La fuente de la genericidad en este caso es el tipo de predicado (predicados que seleccionan argumentos que denotan clases y predicados psicológicos con sujeto experimentador) o el tipo de oración (p.e., oración caracterizadora). Argumento que, independientemente del hecho que los plurales genéricos sean escuetos o abiertamente definidos en una lengua determinada, semánticamente se caracterizan por la maximalidad, la identificabilidad y la presuposición de existencia, lo cual los hace similares a los nominales con una interpretación definida. Los nominales plurales escuetos del ruso se diferencian de los nominales definidos del inglés y de las lenguas románicas por el hecho que se interpretan en un dominio no restringido: los plurales genéricos no pueden ser restringidos por la localización espacio-temporal o el anclaje anafórico. Propongo que los 'efectos de definitud' de los nominales genéricos se codifiquen sintácticamente y semánticamente mediante un artículo definido en el caso de las lenguas románicas, o pragmáticamente en el caso de los nominales plurales escuetos del ruso (y posiblemente del inglés). Finalmente, discuto la cuestión más general de cuáles son las posibles interpretaciones de los nominales escuetos en ruso, porque la genericidad es solo una de las interpretaciones que estos nominales pueden tener en esta lengua. Por eso, es muy importante entender no solo cómo se deriva esta interpretación genérica sino también con qué otra lectura se relaciona. Argumento que los nominales escuetos del ruso son semánticamente indefinidos y que las otras interpretaciones (definidas y genéricas) a las cuales se pueden asociar se infieren pragmáticamente. Los nominales escuetos en ruso no dan lugar a una presuposición de singularidad, y su definitud (percibida por los hablantes) es una inferencia ya sea de la asunción de unicidad ontológica, la topicalitat o la familiaridad del referente.
This thesis focuses on the phenomenon of genericity in Russian, a language without articles, in comparison to English and Romance, languages with articles. The main goal of this research is to study how genericity is encoded in Russian. I propose that there is direct and indirect reference to kinds. The former is encoded in Russian by means of morphophonologically singular bare nominals, which are devoid of semantic and syntactic Number. Unlike English and Romance, where such NPs are preceded by a definite article, in Russian these nominals are semantically indefinite, but being singleton sets they are characterised by uniqueness. I argue that this uniqueness does not come as a result of an application of a semantic operator, it is ‘ontological’. I analyse definitional sentences in Russian as an environment where kind-referring NPs are found, showing that they are non-predicational copular sentences which express an identity/identificatiton relationship between two nominal concepts. Next, I study plural nominals which refer to sums of individuals that under certain circumstances may have a generic reference (indirect reference to kinds). Such nominals are bare in English and Russian, and definite in Romance languages. The source of genericity in this case is the type of predicate (kind-level for subjects and subject-experiencer for objects) or the type of sentence (characterising statement). I argue that, regardless of whether generic plurals are bare or overtly definite in a given language, they are characterised by maximality, identifiability and presupposition of existence, which makes them similar to nominals with a definite interpretation. They are different from NPs with a definite interpretation by the unboundedness of their domain: generic plurals cannot be restricted by spatiotemporal localisation or anaphoric anchoring. I propose that the 'definiteness effects' of generic nominals are encoded semantically by means of a definite article, as it is the case in Romance languages, or pragmatically by means of bare plural nominals in Russian (and possibly, in English).Further, I address a more general question of a possible semantic analysis of bare nominals in Russian, because genericity is only one of the interpretations they may have. So, it is highly important to understand not only how this interpretation is derived but also what it is derived from. I argue that Russian bare nominals are semantically indefinite and the other interpretations (definite and generic) they can be associated with are inferred pragmatically. Bare nominals in Russian do not give rise to a presupposition of uniqueness, and their perceived definiteness is either the result of 'ontological' uniqueness, topicality, or familiarity of the referent.

How are we to understand the development or management not as a general activity that all humans engage in but as a specialist activity associated with a particular group within the work organization? (Grey 1999 p. 565). My purpose in writing this thesis is to unsettle the naturalness or the assertion that managers are "an agency or control" (Thompson and Mchugh 1995 p. 362). I argue that the stories or managers tell make two claims that unsettle this assertion. I suggest that managers are the result a series or historical processes through which they colonised the co-ordination and control within organisations. In making this argument I adopt a Foucaultian approach or looking at firsts: that is "a moment or discontinuity a moment when something new emerges" (Kendall 2001 p. 2). Then using an actor-network framework I examine how 'this' first came to be. I examine how three early managers, Daniel McCallum, Fredrick Taylor and Chester Barnard, colonised the firm. Their stories reveal that managers actively negotiated their way into the firm. This is the managers' first unsettling claim - managers are no-one's agents but their own. I then argue that the process or negotiation required managers to construct a rationality or 111anagernent. This rationality or management was in essence a body or knowledge about what it meant to be a manager. This knowledge was constructed around the notion that profit was a "question or control" (Legge 1995 p. 15). To investigate this I take up Edwards's suggestion that managers have sought control in two ways: technologically - through the structure of work, and socio-organisalionally - through the structure of the organisation. Therefore I seek out the two managers who were first to construct their management knowledge around these two techniques of control. I find Daniel McCallum, who was the first to use socio-organizational structures when he colonised the New York and Eire Railroad Company in 1854. I also find Fredrick Taylor, who was the first to use technological structures when he colonised Midvale Steel Company in 1878. I argue that the knowledge about management these two managers constructed served two purposes. First, this knowledge made the domain of management visible and enabled the actions of managers to be rendered meaningful. This is follows Foucault's notion of power/knowledge (Foucault 1993). Second, this knowledge enabled managers themselves both to exist and to occupy a position of privilege in the firm. This follows Hacking's notion of dynamic nominalism, which suggests, "a new body of knowledge brings into being a new class of people or institutions that can exercise a new kind of power" (Hacking 1986 p. 27). I conclude that it is through the construction of this management knowledge that managers were able to colonise co-ordination and control in the firm. What the stories of McCallum, Taylor and Barnard also tell us is that this colonisalion required more than simply knowledge of control. This is the managers' second unsettling claim. Control was not enough to secure the existence of managers - managers also had to construct manageable workers. McCallum and Taylor both struggled lo sustain their existence as managers because workers were reluctant to accept the constraints that management imposed. Essentially their workers were not amenable to management. I argue that Barnard was the first to resolve this problem when he introduced industrial psychology into his management practice. Industrial psychology made the motivations of workers visible to managers. I suggest that this was not unlike the process Rose has identified that constructed governable populations under liberal governance (Rose 1990). I argue both processes share the same foundation, namely the use of the psy-sciences to construct calculable souls. Finally I conclude by reflecting on what the stories that McCallum, Taylor, and Barnard tell us of the future of managers. What these three managers tell us is that they secured their existence by promising owners profit and by psychologising the workers. I am tempted to conclude further and suggest that managers tomorrow will secure their existence in much the same way. However, this is not something McCallum, Taylor and Barnard actually tell us so, in the spirit of actor-network theory, I stop short.

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo analizar la efectividad de las “tasas nominales negativas" empleadas por algunos bancos centrales europeos para la consecución de diferentes objetivos de política monetaria durante el periodo posterior a la crisis financiera internacional; contrastar las herramientas convencionales de política monetaria con las no convencionales; comparar los resultados obtenidos en los distintos países bajo estudio; determinar aspectos positivos y negativos de dichas herramientas no convencionalesy formular propuestas para la eliminación del Effective Lower Bound.
Fil: Martin Navarro, Marcelo Alejandro. Universidad Nacional de Cuyo. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas.

The American poet Susan Howe (1937-present) began her career as a visual artist, but owing to a dearth of information about her early collages it has been difficult to say anything substantive about how they might have shaped her poetic practice. In 2010, she placed her collages on archive. Along with a number of personal interviews with Howe, this heretofore unavailable material has enabled me to consider Howe's subsequent work in a new light and to establish significant links between her early visual aesthetics and the poetics of bibliography, historiography, and elegy for which she is now known. Howe's collages, like her poetry, focus on details that are at risk of vanishing from cultural memory and printed record. For this reason, I argue that her work evinces an 'elegaic materialism', or a way of reading, viewing, and thinking about texts that is attuned to loss. If “history is the record of the winners,” as Howe says, then one way of rescuing marginalized perspectives is by regarding manuscripts as drawings, thereby rescuing the concrete particulars deemed irrelevant by editors and historians. As Howe's late work turned increasingly toward elegy, her early aesthetic contributed to a nuanced poetics of personal loss and to a series of astonishing new formal tropes. The Introduction to this thesis discusses Howe's materialism in the context of current literary theory and textual scholarship. Chapter 1 concerns itself with Howe's art historical context. Chapter 2 analyses a selection of her word-drawings. Chapter 3 considers Howe's transition to poetry. Chapter 4 addresses her turn to archival documents in her middle period. Chapter 5 looks at the influence on Howe of documentary film, especially in connection with the task of representing a lost loved one, and Chapter 6 discusses her two most recent elegies, The Midnight and THAT THIS. A Coda completes the circle by once more considering Howe in the context of the visual arts at the moment she was selected to exhibit at the 2014 Whitney Biennial.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The study investigates the nature of Xitsonga deverbatives that are derived from three types of syntactic verbs, namely intransitive verbs, monotranstive verbs and ditransitive verbs .The aim is to determine the classes in which nominalisation occurs as well as to determine the semantic features which occur with these deverbatives in various noun classes. The three types of verbs are further distinguished into agentive verbs and non-agentive verbs. The deverbatives that are examined in this study are arranged in terms of Levin (1993)’s semantic classification of verbs. The focus of this study is on the verbs without derivational suffixes. However, few deverbatives with derived verbal forms have been included. The nominal morphology of Xitsonga is also examined in this study The study is conducted within the framework of four assumptions in morphology and lexical semantics, namely lexeme-based theory, X-bar syntax, lexical semantic properties of verb classes advanced by Levin (1993), and the Generative Lexicon theory advanced by Pustejovsky (1995), specifically the assumption about the meta-entry for a lexeme. The study illustrates that nominalisation in Xitsonga, in particular, and in African Languages in general occurs through the affixation of the class prefix and the nominal suffix onto the verb stem. The study found that the deverbal nominals occur in a similar morphological structure to that of nonderived nouns. It was also demonstrated that Xitsonga deverbatives may be classified in terms of Busa’s view of distinguishing between stage-level nominals and individual-level nominals. The study has established that nominalisation in Xitsonga is a phenomenon that occurs in classes 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 14 with both agentive and non-agentive verbs as verb stems. It however, found that the most productive classes are 1, 3,5,7,and 14. The study demonstrated that class 1 deverbatives refer strictly to humans, while deverbatives in other classes refer to various things. The data examined in this study revealed that in general, Xitsonga deverbatives exhibit the following semantic features across various noun classes: [Actor], [Experiencer], [Theme], [Patient] [Result], [Event], [Act], [State], [Artifact], [Instrument]. [Excessive act], [Excessive state], [Place], [Expert], [Excessive actor], [Excessive experiencer], [Excessive theme], and [Excessive patient].
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die studie ondersoek die aard van deverbatiewe naamwoorde in Xitsonga wat afgelei word vanaf drie soorte werkwoorde, naamlik, intransitiewe, enkel-transitiewe en dubbel-transitiewe werkwoorde. Die doelstelling van die studie is om te bepaal in watter naamwoordklasse nominalisering kan voorkom, en wat die semantiese kenmerke is van die deverbatiewe wat in die verskillende naamwoordklasse voorkom. Die drie tipes werkwoordklasse word voorts onderskei in terme van agentiewe en nieagentiewe werkwoorde. Die deverbatiewe naamwoorde wat in die studie ondersoek word, word verder onderskei volgens die klassifikasie van semantiese werkwoordklasse van Levin (1993). Die studie fokus op naamwoorde afgelei van werkwoorde sonder afleidingsagtervoegsels. Nietemin is enkele werkwoordvorme met afleidings-agtervoegsels ingesluit. Die studie ondersoek ook die naamwoordmorfologie van Xitsonga. Die studie is onderneem binne die raamwerk van vier breë weergawes van morfologie, sintaksis en leksikale semantiek, naamlik morfeem-lekseem gebaseerde teorie, X-balk sintaksis, Levin (1993) se semantiese werkwoordklas klassefikasie, en Generatiewe Leksikon Teorie van Pustejovsky (1995), in die besonder die aanname van die meta-inskrywing vir die lekseem. Die studie bevestig dat nominalisering in Xitsonga, soos in die Afrikatale in die algemeen, manifesteer deur die affiksering van 'n prefiks en 'n suffiks aan die werkwoordstam waarvandaan die naamwoord afgelei word. Die studie het bevind dat afgeleide naamwoorde in 'n soortgelyke morfologiese struktuur voorkom as nie-afgeleide naamwoorde in Xitsonga. Daar is ook bevind dat Xitsonga deverbatiewe geklassifiseer kan word in terme van Busa se onderskeid tussen fase-vlak en individuele-vlak nominate. Die studie het bevind dat nominalisering in Xitsonga voorkom in klasse 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 en 14, afgelei van sowel agentiewe as nie-agentiewe werkwoord stamme. Daar is bevind dat die mees produktiewe klasse, klas 1, 3, 5, 7 en 14 is. Die studie het voorts aangetoon dat klas 1 deverbatiewe slegs mensverwysing het, terwyl die deverbatiewe in ander klasse na 'n verskeidenheid semantiese entiteite verwys. Volgens die data wat ondersoek is, volg dit dat Xitsonga deverbatiewe in die algemeen, die volgende semantiese kenmerke vertoon oor die verskillende naamwoordklasse: [Akteur], [Ervaarder], [Tema], [Pasiënt], [Resultaat], [Gebeurtenis], [Aksie], [Toestand], [Artifak], [Instrument], [Oordrewe aksie], [Plek], [Ekspert], [Oordrewe akteur], [Oordrewe ervaarder], [Oordrewe tema] en [Oordrewe pasiënt].
NKOMISO: Dyondzo leyi yi kambisisa xivumbeko xa mavitimpfelelo ya Xitsonga lama ya pfelelaka ya suka eka tinxaka tinharhu ta maendli ma le ka vulongoloxamarito, ku nga, maendli yo pfumala xiendliwa, maendli ya xiendliwa xin’we, na maendli ya swiendliwa swimbirhi. Xikongomelo i ku lava ku kumisisa mitlawa ya maviti leyi pfumelelaka mpfelelo wa maviti ku humelela ni ku kumisisa swihlawulekisi swa tinhlamuselo leswi kumekaka eka mavitimpfelelo eka mitlawa yo hambanahambana. Tinxaka tinharhu ta maendli ti tlhela ti hambanyisiwa ku ya hi maendli ya nghingiriko ni maendli yo pfumala nghingiriko. Mavitimpfelelo lama kambisisiwaka eka dyondzo leyi ma longoloxiwa hi ku ya hi maavelo ya maendli ya Levin (1993). Mhakankulu leyi dyondzo leyi yi langutanaka na yona yi le ka maendli mo pfumala swilandzi swa mpfelelo. Hambiswiritano, mavitimpfelelo ma nga ri mangani lama nga na swilandzi swa mpfelelo ma katsiwile eka dyondzo leyi. Mofoloji ya Xitsonga ya kambisisiwa na yona eka dyondzo leyi. Dyondzo leyi yi endliwa hi ku landza endlelo leri katsaka mavonelo ma mune eka mofoloji ni le ka semantiki, ku nga Lexeme -based theory, X – bar syntax, lexical semantics properties of verb classes leyi tumbuluxeke hi Levin (1993), na Generative Lexicon theory leyi tumbuluxeke hi Pustejovsky (1995), ku kongomisiwa ngopfu eka meta-entry ya rito.Dyondzo leyi yi kombisa leswaku mpfelelo wa maviti eka Xitsonga, hi ku kongomisa, na le ka tindzimi ta Xintima hi ku angarhela, wu va kona hikokwalaho ka ku lungeleriwa ka xirhangi xa ntlawa na xilandzi xa riendli eka nsinya wa riendli. Dyondzo leyi yi kumile leswaku mavitimpfelolo ma tirhisa xifaniso xa murhi xo fana na xa maviti mo ka ma nga ri ma mpfelelo. Ku tlhele ku kombisiwa leswaku mavitimpfelelo ya Xitsonga ma nga aviwa hi ku landza vonelo ra Busa (1996) ro hambanyisa exikarhi ka mavitipfelelo lama thyiwaka munhu hi ku landza mhaka leyi humelelaka hi nkarhi wolowo ni lama ya thyiwaka munhu hi ku ya hi mhaka leyi fambelanisiwaka na munhu wa kona, hambi a nga ri ku yi endleni hi nkarhi wolowo. Dyondzo leyi yi kumile leswaku mpfelelo wa maviti eka Xitsonga I mhaka leyi humelelaka eka mitlawa ya maviti ya 1,3,4,6,7,8,9, and 14 eka maendli ya nghingiriko ni yo pfumala nghingiriko. Hambiswiritano, ku kumekile leswaku mitlawa leyi mpfelelo wu humelelaka ngopfu eka yona I ya 1,3,5,7, and 14. Dyondzo leyi yi kombisile leswaku mavitimpfelelo ma le ka ntlawa wa 1 ma kongomisa eka vanhu, loko mavitimpfelelo ma le ka mitlawa yin’wana ma kongomisa eka swilo swo hambanahambana.Vuxokoxoko lebyi kamberiweke eka dyondzo leyi byi paluxile leswaku hi ku angarhela mavitimpfelelo ma humesa swihlawulekisi leswi landzelaka swa tinhlamuselo eka mitlawa ya maviti yo hambanahambana: [Muendli], [Mutokoti], [Nkongomelo], [Mutwisiwa ku vava], [Mbuyelo], [Xiendleko], [Nghingiriko], [Xiyimo], [Ximakiwa], [Xitirho], [Nghingiriko wo tlurisa], [Xiyimo xo tlurisa], [Ndhawu], [N’wavuswikoti], [[Muendli wo tlurisa], [Mutokoti wo tlurisa], [Nkongomelo wo tlurisa], na [Mutwisiwa ku vava wo tlurisa].

Thesis (PhD (African Languages))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The relationship between deverbative noun classification and their effect on the semantic meaning of the derived deverbal nominal has been the focus of many studies in linguistics, with special reference to African languages in recent years. The study maintains that the descriptive analysis of deverbal nominals in African languages does not fully interrogate the predicate argument structures of the verbs that host these deverbal nominals. This thesis is an investigation of how the syntactic properties of verbs from which deverbal nouns are derived are invoked in explaining the argument structure and event structure properties of deverbal nouns, particularly in Xhosa. The analysis presented here is situated in terms of a lexical semantic representation drawing on Pustejovsky (1996) and Busa (1996), which aims to capture linguistically relevant components of meaning. Chapter 1 presents the purpose and aims of the study, and states the theoretical paradigm on which this study is couched, namely Pustejovsky’s (1996) generative lexicon theory as well as the methodology for conducting the research. Chapter 2 contains a literature review on deverbal nominals in African languages. This chapter explores the general definitions of concepts, the descriptive nature of deverbal nominals from various African languages, noun classification and the morphology of African nouns. Chapter 3 reports on an examination of the generative lexicon theory. This theory contains multiple levels of representation for different types of lexical information required, namely the argument structure, the event structure, the qualia structure and the lexical inherent structure. For the purposes of this study, the first three levels of representation were used for analysis. Chapter 4 contains the systematic classification of deverbal nominals that are derived from various semantic verb classes and are considered under their derivation from intransitive, transitive and di-transitive verbs, respectively. The first lexical schematic representation for each verb class gives a classification of various deverbal noun classes 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 14 in instances where the noun class applies. The second schematic representation details how these various verb classes are classified/categorised in terms of their semantic type. There are various noun class nominalisations for each verb class, which serve as a representative for each group of the various verb classes. Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis of various deverbal nouns derived from different verb classes utilising the generative lexicon theory as a source of reference, particularly the first three levels of representation. The compositionality and the semanticality of derived nominals within the predicate argument structures are demonstrated. Chapter 6 summarises the findings of all previous chapters in this study.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die verhouding tussen die klassifikasie van deverbatiewe selfstandige naamwoorde en hul uitwerking op die semantiese betekenis van die afgeleide deverbatiewe nominaal was die fokus van talle studies in linguistiek, met spesiale verwysing na Afrikatale in die afgelope jare. Hierdie studie doen aan die hand dat die deskriptiewe analise van deverbatiewe nominale in Afrikatale nie die predikaat-argumentstrukture van die werkwoorde wat hierdie deverbatiewe nominale bevat, ondersoek nie. Die tesis behels ’n ondersoek na die manier waarop die sintaktiese eienskappe van werkwoorde waaruit deverbatiewe selfstandige naamwoorde afgelei word, aangewend word om die argumentstruktuur- en gebeurestruktuureienskappe van deverbatiewe selfstandige naamwoorde, veral in Xhosa, te verklaar. Die analise is gegrond op ’n leksikaal-semantiese ontlening aan Pustejovsky (1996) en Busa (1996), met die doel om linguisties toepaslike betekeniskomponente vas te lê. In hoofstuk 1 word die doel en doelstellings van die studie uiteengesit, asook die teoretiese paradigma waarop die studie berus, naamlik Pustejovsky (1996) se generatieweleksikonteorie. Die navorsingsmetodologie word ook in hierdie hoofstuk uiteengesit. Hoofstuk 2 bevat ’n literatuuroorsig oor deverbatiewe nominale in Afrikatale. In hierdie hoofstuk word ondersoek ingestel na die algemene definisies van konsepte, die beskrywende aard van deverbatiewe nominale in verskeie Afrikatale, die klassifikasie van selfstandige naamwoorde asook die morfologie van selfstandige naamwoorde in Afrikatale. In hoofstuk 3 word verslag gedoen oor die ondersoek van die generatieweleksikon-teorie. Hierdie teorie bevat veelvuldige vlakke van verteenwoordiging vir verskillende soorte leksikale inligting wat vereis word, naamlik die argumentstruktuur, die gebeurestruktuur, die qualiastruktuur en die leksikaal-inherente struktuur. Vir die doel van hierdie studie is op die eerste drie vlakke van verteenwoordiging tydens die analise gefokus. Hoofstuk 4 bevat die stelselmatige klassifikasie van deverbatiewe nominale wat uit verskeie semantiese werkwoordklasse afkomstig is, en oorweging geniet op grond van hul afstamming van onderskeidelik intransitiewe, transitiewe en ditransitiewe werkwoorde. Die eerste leksikaal-skematiese verteenwoordiging vir elke werkwoordklas gee ’n klassifikasie van verskeie klasse van deverbatiewe selfstandige naamwoorde, naamlik 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11 en 14, in gevalle waar die selfstandigenaamwoordklas van toepassing is. Die tweede skematiese verteenwoordiging sit uiteen hoe hierdie verskillende werkwoordklasse in terme van hul semantiese soort geklassifiseer/gekategoriseer word. Daar is verskeie nominaliserings vir selfstandigenaamwoordklasse vir elke werkwoordklas, wat as ’n verteenwoordiging vir elke groep van die onderskeie werkwoordklasse dien. Hoofstuk 5 bevat ’n gedetailleerde analise van verskeie deverbatiewe selfstandige naamwoorde wat uit verskillende werkwoordklasse afgelei is met behulp van die generatieweleksikon-teorie as ’n verwysingsbron, spesifiek die eerste drie vlakke van verteenwoordiging. Die samestelling en semantiek van afgeleide nominale in die predikaatargument-strukture word ten toon gestel. Hoofstuk 6 bevat ’n opsomming van die bevindinge in die voorafgaande hoofstukke.

In this paper I present evidence from Cherokee (Iroquoian, Southern Iroquoian) which refutes accounts of the distinction between process and result nominals based on the presence or absence of AspectP in the nominal’s functional structure. I argue that Cherokee has result nominals which contain aspect morphology, directly contradicting the proposal of Alexiadou (2001) that such nominals must lack an AspectP, and suggest that some other mechanism must be at play to account for the syntactic and semantic differences between result and process nominals.

Cette enquete a pour but de confronter la linguistique saussurienne a une tradition nominaliste et empiriste concernant la signification des signes linguistiques, afin de determiner la pertinence d'une lecture nominaliste de la theorie saussurienne. Dans ce but, on utilise la theorie lockienne des mots comme mediateur. Dans une premiere partie, on confronte la theorie lockienne des mots a la linguistique saussurienne et on montre en quoi la notion saussurienne d'arbitraire radical est irreductible a l'arbitraire conventionnel lockien. Dans une seconde partie, on met en evidence les principes directeurs qui definissent l'unite d'une tradition nominaliste, d'ockham a berkeley et hume. On analyse la relation de la philosophie lockienne a cette tradition. Dans une troisieme partie, on confronte la theorie saussurienne aux principes nominalistes et empiristes ainsi degages, et on montre que ces principes sont operatoires dans le texte saussurien. Dans une derniere partie et en guise de conclusion, on analyse en quoi une linguistique d'inspiration saussurienne, qui se fonde sur des principes nominalistes et empiristes, est incompatible avec une linguistique d'inspiration chomskyenne, enparticulier avec l'hypothese d'un langage de la pensee, emise par j. Fodor ; on montre en quoi il existe une affinite profonde entre la theorie saussurienne et les analyses de n. Goodman concernant signes et symboles.

Thomas Hobbes est sans doute mieux connu comme philosophe politique que comme homme de science et ses longues querelles avec John Wallis en mathématiques et Robert Boyle en physique n’ont guère encouragé les historiens des sciences à prêter attention à son œuvre scientifique. Pourtant, Hobbes conçut la philosophie comme une science et se considérait comme le fondateur non seulement d’une science nouvelle : la philosophie civile, mais aussi de la science de l’optique - récemment renouvelée à la faveur de la découverte du télescope - et même des mathématiques. Mais à quoi Hobbes pense-t-il quand il parle de science ? Aux mathématiques qu’il admire tant ? A la philosophie naturelle de Galilée ? Ou à la médecine de Harvey ? En quel sens la philosophie civile est-elle une science et quel est le statut des mathématiques ? Telles sont les questions que nous abordons à partir d’une analyse du De Corpore et des dix premiers chapitres du De Homine traduits du latin. L’interprétation proposée ici consiste à réaffirmer l’unité du système des Éléments de la philosophie et à souligner la dimension matérialiste et réaliste de la science hobbesienne. Bien que Noel Malcolm ait définitivement établi que Hobbes n’est pas l’auteur du Short Tract on first principles, nous montrons que le tournant scientifique de Hobbes est profondément marqué par son intérêt pour l’optique qu’il renouvela sur la base d’une ontologie matérialiste et des principes du mécanisme hérités de Galilée
Thomas Hobbes is perhaps best known as a political philosopher than as a scientist and his too long quarrels with John Wallis in mathematics and Robert Boyle in physics did little to encourage historians of science to pay attention to his scientific work. Yet Hobbes conceived of philosophy as a science and considered himself the founder not only of a new science: civil philosophy, but also the science of optics - recently renewed thanks to the discovery of the telescope - even mathematics. But what Hobbes has in mind when he talks about science? Mathematics he so admires? Galileo’s natural philosophy? Or Harvey’s medicine? In what sense civil philosophy is a science and what is the status of mathematics? These are the issues we discuss from an analysis of De Corpore and the first ten chapters of De Homine translated from Latin. The interpretation proposed here is to underline the unity of the system of the Elements of philosophy and emphasize the materialistic and realistic nature of Hobbesian science. Although Noel Malcolm has definitively established that Hobbes is not the author of Short Tract on First Principles, we show that Hobbes’s shift to science was deeply marked by his interest in the science of optics he renewed on the basis of a materialist ontology and principles inherited from Galilee mechanism

Questo lavoro offre una trattazione sistematica della sintassi delle espressioni nominali latine. Dopo aver messo in evidenza le diverse realizzazioni dell’aggettivo nelle lingue del mondo, il Capitolo I delinea una storia di questa classe di parole, così come si può ricostruire dalle testimonianze antiche. Il Capitolo II offre uno status quaestionis aggiornato al 2011 relativo allo studio delle espressioni nominali latine nei diversi ambiti della ricerca linguistica moderna. La parte centrale della tesi è costituita dai Capitoli III, IV e V, che propongono un’analisi sintattica degli elementi costitutivi dell’espressione nominale latina, e cioè dei determinanti, dei possessivi, dei complementi al genitivo, degli aggettivi e delle espressioni di quantità. La scelta di presentarli in quest’ordine non è casuale, ma, al contrario, rispetta la gerarchia di inserimento di ciascun elemento in una struttura nominale che si sviluppa dal basso verso l’alto e che è universale.
This work is a systematic syntactic analysis of Latin nominal expressions. Chapter I begins with a survey of different cross-linguistic realizations of the adjective, and proposes a history of the development of the adjective as a word class, as it emerged from Greek and Latin ancient grammars. Chapter II offers a status quaestionis, updated at 2011, on the study of Latin nominal expressions in different fields of modern linguistic research. The core part of the thesis consists of Chapters III, IV and V, and offers a syntactic analysis of the elements which can constitute the nominal expression, that is, of the determiners, possessives, argumental genitives, adjectives and quantity expressions, respectively. The order in which these elements are presented mirrors the universal hierarchy of the syntactic structure in which they are projected.

This dissertation explores several aspects of nominal syntax of Resian, an underdescribed highly endagered Slovenian dialect spoken in the Northeast of Italy. From a descriptive point of view, this thesis aims at providing an empirical base related to the syntax of Resian nominals by implementing most recent advances in the formal study of nominal expressions. From a theoretical point of view, its goal is to contribute to the ongoing debate on the presence of the DP layer in articleless Slavic languages. The claim is that Resian has developed the definite article, though visible only in certain syntactic enviroments. As a consequence, null Ds are possible if certain structural conditions are satisfied. Chapter 1 offers an overview of socio(linguistic) situation of Resian, some of the properties of Resian grammar ascribed to the contact with Romance, and methodology implemented in the thesis. Chapter 2 contains theoretical framework of the dissertation, including the debate on the presence of DP in article-less nominals, a matter of considerable debate within Slavic linguistics, and the view of the nominal structure endorsed in the thesis. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the description of Resian nominal syntax along with systematic comparison with Slavic and Romance. Chapter 4 and 5 are devoted to the elaboration of the main proposal.
Il presente lavoro esamina alcuni aspetti di sintassi nominale in resiano, un dialetto sloveno parlato in Friuli, annovereato tra i trenta dialetti d’Italia a rischio. Come primo obiettivo la tesi si prefigge di fornire una base empirica relativamente agli aspetti sintattici del dominio nominale, fondata su criteri più formali. Come secondo obiettivo, di interesse prettamente teorico, la tesi si propone di contribuire alla disputa sulla presenza della proiezione funzionale del determinante (DP) anche nelle lingue slave che non possiedono l’articolo definito. L’ipotesi principale, difesa in questa tesi, è che il resiano abbia sviluppato l’articolo definito, seppur esso sia visibile solamente in alcuni contesti sintattici. Di conseguenza, nella tesi viene sostenuto che il D nullo sia possibile a patto che determinate condizioni strutturali siano soddisfatte. Il primo capitolo offre una descrizione della situazione sociolinguistica del resiano, nonché una breve descrizione linguistica con particolare riferimento ai tratti grammaticali generalmente attribuiti al influsso esercitato dalle lingue romanze circostanti. Il capitolo si conclude con la descrizione della metodologia utilizzata nella tesi. Il secondo capitolo discute il quadro teorico di riferimento, sia per quanto riguarda la mappatura tra sintassi e semantica di espressioni nominali senza articolo, sia per quanto concerne la struttura nominale adoperata nella tesi. Il terzo capitolo contiene la descrizione della sintassi nominale in resiano, insieme a un confronto sistematico con le lingue romanze e lo sloveno. Negli ultimi due capitoli viene elaborata l’ipotesi principale.

À la suite d'Agrippa, maint sceptique a argué de la pluralité des systèmes pour ruiner toute ambition de vérité philosophique : des systèmes contradictoires ne pouvant être vrais simultanément, leurs prétentions respectives s'annulent. L'argument n'a pourtant de valeur que si la pluralité des systèmes est elle-même irrationnelle. Or plusieurs philosophes ont rationalisé la diversité des systèmes philosophiques, suggérant par là que la raison puisse s'approprier sa propre limite ; notamment Kant, dans l'" Histoire de la raison pure " qui conclut la Critique de la raison pure (1781) ; Hegel, dans les Leçons sur l'histoire de la philosophie (1805-1830) ; Victor Cousin, dans Du Vrai, du beau et du bien (1828) et l'Histoire générale de la philosophie (1863) ; Charles Renouvier, dans l'Esquisse d'une classification systématique des doctrines philosophiques (1885-1886) ; et Jules Vuillemin, dans Nécessité ou contingence (1984).Étudier de manière interne chacune de ces entreprises permet de déterminer quels en sont les critères fondamentaux, la forme mathématique générale, et le but philosophique. L'histoire kantienne de la raison pure, injustement dédaignée, repose sur les concepts fondamentaux du criticisme, structure maint chapitre des trois Critiques, et annonce la paix philosophique perpétuelle dont est porteur le criticisme. Les Leçons de Hegel ne sont ni un résumé empirique ni une histoire biaisée de la philosophie : fondées sur la Logique et la Phénoménologie, elles mettent au jour la dialectique interne des systèmes. La classification de Renouvier n'est pas, comme on le dit parfois, a posteriori, mais repose au contraire sur le jeu a priori d'une table des catégories et d'une théorie de la contradiction. Enfin, la classification vuilleminienne des systèmes, qui s'appuie sur une classification des formes de prédication, généralise la classification kantienne. Seule la classification de Victor Cousin s'avère finalement a posteriori.Ancrées dans les concepts fondamentaux de chacune de ces doctrines, ces classifications montrent qu'un système peut construire l'image des autres et de leurs relations aussi rigoureusement qu'il décrit le monde : les relations entre systèmes ne sont pas moins structurales que les systèmes eux-mêmes.

La question posee est celle de la nature de la signification et de ses implications noetiques et ontologiques. Elle est posee a propos du nominalism de guillaume d'occam dont ce travail veut exposer et evaluer les arguments. La premiere partie s'attache a la theorie de la connaissance et met en evidence la conception linguistique de la pensee (penser c'est parler). Ce faisant elle examine la question du scepticisme et celle du materialisme, compatibles avec la semantique d'occam. La deuxieme partie expose cette semantique proprement dite et souligne le primat de la relation de monstration (parler c'est montrer). Elle expose dans le detail la theorie de la supposition, et critique l'interpretation nominalisme de la predication (theorie des deux noms). La troisieme partie envisage les implications ontologiques du nominalisme : engagement aux individus substantiels et qualitatifs actuels, mais aussi possibles; desengagement par rapport aux categories ( theorie de la connotation), et aux universaux. L'ontologie est ainsi presentee comme une conclusion et non comme une premisse de l'argumentation occamiste. On met en evidence une circularite de celle-ci est conclue a une petition de principe du nominalisme
The topic is the nature of signification and meaning and its noetical and ontological implications. This work considers william ockham's so-called nominalism, and tries to expose and evaluate his main arguments. First part deals with theory of knowledge and underlines the linguistic conception of thought (thinking is speaking). It considers the possibility of both skepticism and materialism, compatible with ockham's semantics. This semantics is the subject of second part, which points out the primacy of monstration (speaking is showing). Theory of supposition is fully detailed and a criticsm is made of the nominalistic interpretation of predication (two names theory). Third part focuses on the ontological implications of nominalism. Ontological commitment to individuals, subatances and qualities, not only actual but also possible. Uncommitment with respect to categories (connotation theory) and to universals. Ontology is thus presented as a conclusion and not as a premiss of ockham's argumentation which is criticized as circular. As a conclusio, nominalism is convinced to beg the question

This thesis investigates within a generative framework a cluster of morphological and syntactic facts in the Old Babylonian variety of Akkadian, whose common property, despite many divergences, is the occurrence of structurally reduced nominal constituents. Akkadian nominals, whilst in their normal morphosyntactic form fairly rich both inflectionally and in their capacity to support complex nominal constituents, appear in various restricted syntactic contexts in reduced forms, entailing the loss of affixal expression of features (especially case, as well as gender and number), the barring of modifiers, as well as other restrictions. These phenomena may be divided into several major categories, one of which has clear parallels in well-studied Semitic languages (the nominal-internal 'construct state'), and others which do not have such parallels, including nouns in the construct-state morphological form as heads of relative clauses and the 'stative' (a peculiar form of nominal predication). Each of these phenomena is described, investigated and analysed in successive chapters, both individually and in terms of their interrelations and differences, and their possible implications for various aspects of generative syntactic theory are explored. For example, the investigation of the Akkadian construct state construction has important implications for aspects of the general generative theory of these constructions; construct-headed relative clauses both for this and for the theory of headed relative clauses, especially for the ongoing debate concerning the internal/external status of the head and some of the fine properties of the 'raising analysis'; the stative suggests the hitherto unrecognised existence of denominal incorporation to a verbal head producing a copula-like interpretation. This is the first extended generative study both of the Akkadian construct state and of the other phenomena mentioned above.

Studies within the cartographic approach seek to contribute to the mapping of universal hierarchies of functional projections. The present work is an investigation of ordering restrictions between the modifiers within complex nominals (Levi, 1978) that express thematic roles, and which do not form a compound with the head noun. I show here that there is indeed a rigid hierarchy of semantic relations within complex nominals suggesting an extension of the functional projections proposed by Scott (2002) for adjectival modifiers (such as ColourP, LengthP, MaterialP etc.). The resulting hierarchy strongly resembles that found within the clausal syntactic domain of circumstantials argued for by Schweikert (2005) and Takamine (2010) in German and Japanese, respectively. As a consequence, my analysis provides support for the syntactic origin of many complex nominals that have often been referred to as (lexical) compounds.
Studi effettuati nell’ambito del “quadro cartografico” cercano di contribuire alla mappatura delle gerarchie universali di proiezioni funzionali. Il lavoro attuale si presenta come indagine sulle restrizioni d’ordine tra i modificatori di “nominali complessi” (complex nominals – Levi, 1978) che esprimono ruoli tematici e che non formano un composto con la testa (N°). Qui dimostro che esiste una gerarchia rigida di relazioni semantiche all’interno dei nominali complessi suggerendo un’estensione delle proiezioni funzionali proposte da Scott (2002) per i modificatori aggettivali (quali ColourP, LengthP, MaterialP, etc.). Dal lavoro risulta una gerarchia che assomiglia chiaramente a quella trovata all’interno del dominio sintattico di circonstanziali (circumstantials) sostenuta da Schweikert (2005) per la lingua tedesca e da Takamine (2010) per la lingua giapponese. Di conseguenza l’analisi svolta qui offre sostegno all’origine sintattica di molti nominali complessi che nella letteratura sono stati categorizzati come composti (lessicali).

Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, Florianópolis, 2017.
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Nesta tese defendo que as propriedades naturais desempenham um papel central no realismo modal de David Lewis. Para argumentar em favor desta tese apresento: uma explicação bottom-up da metafísica top-down de mundos possíveis; uma proposta de uma nova definição de um; e, a fusão natural, uma nova operação mereológica. Para cumprir esses objetivos, no primeiro capítulo eu contextualizo a discussão; no segundo capítulo apresento a retomada da discussão sobre universais na filosofia contemporânea e argumento que, considerando as diversas formulações do problema, o nominalismo de semelhanças associado ao realismo modal pode ser visto como uma boa resposta ao problema. Ademais, discuto a alternativa apresentada por Devitt na qual defende que o alegado problema dos universais é na verdade um pseudoproblema. No terceiro capítulo, apresento uma ontologia mínima de propriedades, discuto as definições existentes de propriedades naturais e apresento uma proposta de uma nova definição, além de, uma discussão sobre teorias da similaridade. Ainda neste capítulo, apresento os papéis da racionalidade e da fundamentação, usados para classificar a utilidade teórica das propriedades naturais. A respeito do primeiro papel, mostro como as propriedades naturais beneficiam a definição dos termos do pacote nomológico, e no que diz respeito ao segundo papel, apresentou possíveis aplicações a conhecidos da filosofia analítica da segunda metade do século XX, como o problema da indeterminação da tradução, o novo enigma da indução e o problema de Kripkestein. No capítulo quarto, apresento algumas variedades do realismo filosófico, considero as vantagens teóricas de se assumir o realismo científico como pano de fundo e discuto uma utilidade teórica adicional das propriedades naturais, a saber: a solução para o problema da elegibilidade da referência ou, o paradoxo de Putnam. No capítulo quinto, abordo a mereologia e mostro como essa teoria é importante para conectar diversos aspectos do realismo modal de Lewis. Para tal, discuto a relação entre as teses da composição como análoga à identidade, a inocência ontológica da mereologia e o argumento da vagueza em favor do universalismo mereológico. Apresento uma nova operação de fusão natural, que pode ser utilizada para minimizar os problemas da composição irrestrita.

Abstract : I argue in this dissertation that natural properties play a central role in David Lewis' modal realism. To argue in favor of this thesis I present: a bottom-up explanation of a top-down possible world metaphysics; a new definition of natural properties and natural fusion, a new mereological operation. To achieve these aims, in the first chapter, I contextualize the discussion, in the second I resume the discussion about universals in contemporary philosophy and argue that, considering the distinct formulations of the problem, class nominalism combined with modal realism might be the best solution. Furthermore, I discuss Devitt's solution in which he defends that the problem about universals is, in fact, a pseudo problem. In the third chapter, I introduce a minimal ontology of properties, regarding natural properties, I discuss the existing definitions, present a new one and discuss some theories of similarity, a notion that is in the core of the definition I propose. Besides, I present how natural properties benefit the definition of terms of nomological package, linked to its fundamentality role. I also present some applications related to the rationality role that encompass some well-known philosophical problems of the second half of 20th century. In the fourth chapter, I present some varieties of philosophical realism, I consider the theoretical advantages of taking scientific realism as background and I discuss one more utility of natural properties, the solution to the problem of eligibility of reference or, the Putnam's paradox. In the fifth chapter, I discuss how mereology is important to link several aspects of Lewis' modal realism. For such, I discuss the relation between composition as identity and ontological innocence of mereology and I present the natural fusion mereology, a new mereological operation that aims to minimize the problems of unrestricted composition.