Rozprawy doktorskie na temat „Nietzsche”

The aim of this study is to examine the relation between Nietzsche&rsquo
s perspectivism and his doctrine of the will to power and to show that perspectivism is almost a direct and natural consequence of the doctrine of the will to power. Without exploring the doctrine, it is not possible to understand what Nietzsche&rsquo
s perspectivism is and what he trying to do by proposing it as an alternative to traditional epistemology. To this aim, firstly, Nietzsche&rsquo
s doctrine of the will to power is explained in detail. Next, in order to provide a deeper understanding of the doctrine, its relation with Darwinism and the claims which say that it is a metaphysical principle are analyzed. Afterwards, Nietzsche&rsquo
s construction of the world as becoming out of will to power is investigated. Nietzsche&rsquo
s conception of interpretation as power struggle and its role in perspectivism explained. Then, how Nietzsche&rsquo
s construction of the world as becoming and his concept of interpretation as power struggle emerge as perspectivism is explained. After that, in order to present the differences between Nietzsche&rsquo
s perspectivism and traditional understanding of epistemology, Nietzsche&rsquo
s critiques of some of the fundamental assumptions of traditional epistemology, i.e., causality, logic, and subject-object and apparent-real world distinctions, are investigated. Finally, Nietzsche&rsquo
s understanding of truth based on his perspectivism is inquired. Its relation with correspondence, pragmatic and coherence theories of truth is explored to show that Nietzsche&rsquo
s understanding of truth could not be comprehended through these theories. Consequently, it is claimed that the tendency to attribute a truth theory to Nietzsche&rsquo
s perspectivism, which is prevalent in the current Nietzsche studies, stems from commentator&rsquo
s, consciously or unconsciously, ignoring of the relation between his perspectivism and his doctrine of the will to power.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia
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Desde seus primeiros escritos Nietzsche se ocupou de questões relacionadas ao conhecimento e à verdade, ocorre, porém, que seu objetivo não é formular uma nova teoria do conhecimento ou reformular as concepções tradicionais, mas questionar a valor da verdade, indicando que os filósofos jamais a colocaram em questão. Em conseqüência dessa superestimação da verdade está o ódio instintivo contra a vida e seus pressupostos: tudo o que é transitório e efêmero foi negado em nome do conhecimento racional e objetivo. A proposta de Nietzsche é que a interpretação metafísica - que nega e falsifica a vida- seja substituída por uma interpretação afirmativa, com conceitos leves e dançantes, que se reconhece como interpretação provisória. O eterno retorno diz à vida o grande Sim, aceita o destino e deseja o seu retornar eterno. É um sim dionisíaco, que deseja o que a vida tem mais exuberante e belo, mas também o que ela tem de mais horrível e miserável.

Richard Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology (perspectivism) to be a helpful tool in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead as something that we create. He also found perspectivism to be a helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. The Nietzsche that provides perspectivism is “The Good Nietzsche”. Rorty, however, conceived of Nietzsche’s ideas as being absolutely useless when it comes to politics, along with his ideas regarding morality, the Will to Power, and the Übermensch. These are the ideas of “The Bad Nietzsche”. Rorty’s actual usage of Nietzsche’s ideas, however, defies such easy, self-defined categorization, because these ideas extend outside of their spheres into the realm of politics in Rorty’s own writings. Most traditional analyses of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rorty as it regards politics tend to focus on Nietzsche. By focusing on Rorty’s appropriation of Nietzsche, through looking at his extensive writings and interviews, a more subtle, and complex relationship between Nietzsche’s various ideas and Rorty’s politics is seen to exist.

Richard Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology (perspectivism) to be a helpful tool in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead as something that we create. He also found perspectivism to be a helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. The Nietzsche that provides perspectivism is “The Good Nietzsche”. Rorty, however, conceived of Nietzsche’s ideas as being absolutely useless when it comes to politics, along with his ideas regarding morality, the Will to Power, and the Übermensch. These are the ideas of “The Bad Nietzsche”. Rorty’s actual usage of Nietzsche’s ideas, however, defies such easy, self-defined categorization, because these ideas extend outside of their spheres into the realm of politics in Rorty’s own writings. Most traditional analyses of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rorty as it regards politics tend to focus on Nietzsche. By focusing on Rorty’s appropriation of Nietzsche, through looking at his extensive writings and interviews, a more subtle, and complex relationship between Nietzsche’s various ideas and Rorty’s politics is seen to exist.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
Ascetism became known for the efforts made by metaphysician to reach their spiritual purpose. Nietzsche published a critique on ascetical ideals in the III Dissertation of the Genealogy of Morals because ascesis had taken transcendental life as a reference for all values beyond this life which is immanent. An ascetic metaphysical morality emphasized the dualism this life another life , which Nietzsche contested by stating it had philosophically originated with Plato as morality against nature . Thus, by returning to the cradle of Western culture, Nietzsche propounds a revision of ascesis based on transcendence, immutability, and truth from the standpoint of life, this life a constant flow, concerned exclusively with change, with outward aspects. In a nutshell, such ascesis refers to becoming a follower of Dionysus, to lead a dionysian life: a whirl of forces that continuously come together and apart, creating centres of will to power, giving rise to everything alive or, in other words, everything that appears and disappears into what is commonly called reality . Therefore, anyone willing to go further ahead of what is ordinary in the contemporary world could only demand of oneself the utmost self-overcoming, the utmost self-control in order to attain a quintessential spiritualization of instincts instead of the sterilization that transcendent values have long prescribed to the body as a rule for life. This hypothetical being is embodied in ascetic Nietzsche , here represented as a dionysian ascetic set against the ascetical ideal
O ascetismo ficou conhecido pelos esforços dos metafísicos para alcançar seus objetivos espirituais . Nietzsche dedicou, em especial, uma crítica aos ideais ascéticos na III Dissertação de A Genealogia da Moral, porque a ascese tomara a vida transcendente como referencial de todos os valores para além desta vida, que é imanente. Uma moral ascética metafísica reforçava o dualismo esta vida outra vida que Nietzsche combatia e que afirmava ter-se estabelecido filosoficamente com Platão, enquanto moral contranatureza . Assim, indo à origem da cultura ocidental, Nietzsche propõe que uma ascese com base na transcendência, no imutável, na verdade , seja revista a partir de uma perspectiva da vida, desta vida, fluir constante, com lugar somente para a mudança, para aparências . Trata-se, enfim, daquilo que, no filósofo seguidor de Dionísio , não é outra coisa senão uma vida dionisíaca, um baile de forças que se organizam e se desorganizam constantemente em centros de vontades de poder, originando tudo o que existe, ou, em outras palavras, tudo o que aparece e tudo o que desaparece naquilo que, normalmente , é denominado realidade. Portanto, alguém que deseja estar além do que seja o comum na contemporaneidade só poderia exigir de si o máximo de auto-superação, de um domínio de si mesmo, para se realizar em uma espiritualização dos instintos no lugar da castração que os valores transcendentes têm proposto para o corpo como vida. Este alguém se configura em Nietzsche asceta que, aqui, é apresentado como asceta dionisíaco contra o ideal ascético

Dissertação de Mestrado em Filosofia Política
Este trabalho foi suscitado pela enorme divulgação e variabilidade da receção das ideias de Nietzsche em distintos contextos sociais e culturais. Tal facto comporta um certo número de dificuldades, ironias e paradoxos. A imensa “popularidade” desta obra deve ser considerada irónica, face ao páthos aristocrático e “inatual” que o filósofo inquestionavelmente lhe pretendeu imprimir. A sua imensa atualidade é também inseparável duma ambivalência constitutiva relativamente ao tema da “doença”: Nietzsche considerou viver numa época “doente”, tendo entretanto o próprio sido assombrado por aquela em sentido estrito, o que sugere uma possível origem médica da sua atitude. Em que medida esta dificuldade na relação com a doença se mantém no atual acolhimento da sua obra? Este problema entronca noutro, relativo ao modo como os aspetos diretamente políticos, inegavelmente presentes na obra de Nietzsche, se imbricam e mutuamente condicionam com traços mais estritamente pessoais da sua vida. Considerámos primeiramente a obra de Domenico Losurdo Nietzsche, il ribelle aristocratico – Biografia intellettuale e bilancio critico, de 2002, cujo lançamento foi marcado por várias polémicas, em parte ligadas à assunção explícita dum tratamento da obra de Nietzsche em chave de leitura eminentemente política; mas também pela discussão suscitada pelo mesmo quanto à tradição de traduções da obra nietzschiana, alegadamente marcada pelo que designa depreciativamente por “hermenêutica da inocência”. O Nietzsche de Losurdo é, por oposição ao que propõe esta hermenêutica, um filósofo totus politicus, mas ainda assim, ou precisamente por isso, autor duma obra dotada de inegável “excedente teórico”. Procedemos depois à apresentação dum grupo de leituras “pós-modernas” da obra de Nietzsche, concretamente as correspondentes aos trabalhos de Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault e Gianni Vattimo. Este grupo de autores, sem embargo de inegáveis especificidades de cada um e de todos eles, evidencia tendências comuns para ler em Nietzsche um defensor do lúdico, da ligeireza e da criatividade, um proponente do caráter infindável da interpretação e da “morte do sujeito”, um adversário da reductio ad unum imposta ao pensamento pela tradição racionalista e dos bloqueios à vida instituídos pela própria filosofia da história. A leitura quer de Losurdo quer deste outro grupo de autores foi parcialmente mediada por intervenções, cronologicamente mais próximas de nós, de Jan Rehmann e Stefano Azzarà, entre outros. Em termos gerais colhemos a impressão de que a leitura de Losurdo é mais credível quanto à sua fundamentação interpretativa, ou à autenticidade da captação do sentido atribuído pelo próprio Nietzsche à sua obra. Isso obviamente não invalida a fecundidade das inspirações que esta última tenha suscitado nos seus leitores “pós-modernos”, mas recomenda muita prudência quanto à forma como elucubrações nela possivelmente inspiradas possam ser apresentadas enquanto “interpretações” da obra nietzschiana. A leitura de Losurdo, entretanto, apesar de muito sólida quanto à fidelidade textual e contextual da Verstehen, coloca ela própria vários problemas, de entre os quais se destacam as limitações associadas à estrita politização do quadro de leitura, o qual deveria ser alargado de modo a poder integrar com maior eficácia aspetos propriamente psicológicos ou pessoais da obra e da vida de Nietzsche.

Nietzsche s'était constamment opposé à la métaphysique sans déraciner pour autant son propos du domaine de la philosophie. Ce paradoxe de l'anti-philosophie encore philosophique accomplit, malgré Heidegger, l'idée platonicienne de "gigantomachie" et esquive lucidement les deux figures pascaliennes de l'excès (exclure la raison ou n'admettre qu'elle). En se voulant "philosophe à part entière" tout en se considérant "philosophe à part", Nietzsche hissait au niveau de la pensée la tension qui marqua, durant sa vie solitaire, ses rapports complexes avec l’Allemagne. Pour lui, "être un bon allemand, c'est se dépouiller du germanisme". Ainsi, "l'esprit libre" de toute servitude idéologique dessine dans l'espace de la pensée, le portrait indécidable du voyageur "sans-patrie" dans le monde de la vie. La vie et la pensée de Nietzsche témoignent d'une unité qui invite les interprètes d'ordinaire partisans et pressés, à considérer patiemment, à comprendre ce paradoxe de l'appartenance distante. De Heidegger aux écoles françaises, la réception de Nietzsche se fait sur un mode caricatural, exclusif : le propos nietzschéen est tantôt réduit à accomplir-achever l'épopée du platonisme qu'il tournait pourtant en dérision, tantôt "déporté" du domaine philosophique vers celui des idéologies politiques ou mystiques. Cette étude propose non seulement d'élucider la double dérive idéologique de l'interprétation de Nietzsche, mais aussi de montrer que le malaise qu'elle manifeste invite le lecteur à retrouver, par-delà la mauvaise foi des "ruminants universitaires", le "différentialisme", l'enthousiasme délirant des interprètes révolutionnaires, le mode paradoxal de "l'enracinement" de la critique nietzschéenne dans la tradition philosophique. Soutenu par un sens musical de la mesure et un souci généalogique de l'harmonie, le propos nietzschéen se "rapporte" constamment aux différentes écoles en concurrence dans l'histoire de la philosophie tout en se montrant irréductible à aucune d'elles, "inclassable" parce que prompt à conjurer la démesure inhérente à tout esprit de système
Nietzsche refused to be considered as a metaphysician but this in no way implies his uprooting from the field of philosophy. Despite heidegger's opinion, this paradox (i. E. To be a philosopher, but not to be a metaphysician) serves the platonian theory of "gigantomachia" in the same way as Nietzsche thwarted the two kinds of excesses described by Pascal : either idolizing reason or rejecting it. His being a full-fledged philosopher did not eclipse the oddness of his thinking. Nietzsche successfully transferred his ambiguous germanism to the philosophical level. According to him, "being a good german paradoxically implies some degree of freedom from germanism" on the individual's part. Thus, the "free mind" (i. E. Released of all ideological slavery) draws and reproduces, in the area of thought, the fading portrait of the homeless traveler in the social existence. Nietzsche's life and thought are so inextricably intertwined that a time-consuming interpretation is highly preferable to any biased reading. Ranging from Heidegger to the french schools, Nietzsche's philosophy is often interpreted in an exclusive and ideological way. Some consider it as the ultimate achievement of platonism even though this metaphysics was constantly mocked by nietzsche himself. While others suggest such an exaggerated discrepancy between his outlook and the philosophical tradition that he is finally labelled either a politician, a mystic thinker or a deranged individual. This following study proposes to highlight and to question these two kinds of caricatures; then to bring out the general feeling of discom fort inherent to the interpretation of nietzsche's thought. It should be read as a way of calling hasty reader's attention to prudence and patience. Consequently, an ideal reading should go beyound the interpreter's bad faith, dogmatism or exegetic arrogance to understand how the nietzschean dispute is paradoxically (and musically) rooted in the philosophical tradition

This thesis analyzes pain with respect to Nietzsche'
s Dionysus-Crucified distinction. This distinction, which Nietzsche underlies, reveals his philosophical project. The meaning of pain is at the core point of this distinction. These two deities symbolizes attitudes towards life and pain in it. Dionysus represents the affirmation of becoming and tragic wisdom
and Crucified (Christ) represents despise and escape from life or ascetic ideals. In this sense, the dissertation will first trace Nietzsche'
s world view. Then the following discussions will present a detailed analysis of ascetic ideals (and their genealogical roots), and tragic wisdom from the perspective of Nietzsche for consideration.

The purpose of this study is to explain and evaluate Nietzsche&rsquo
s criticisms of Kantian morality. Kantian morality has greatly influenced western moral thought. Nietzsche&rsquo
s criticisms focus on the scientific and universal character of this philosophy. This work focuses on the ideas of &lsquo
freedom&rsquo
, &lsquo
autonomy&rsquo
, &lsquo
individual virtues&rsquo
and &lsquo
morality as a science&rsquo
. In order to understand and analyze Nietzsche&rsquo
s critiques, his epistemological criticisms are also evaluated.

I show that we have reason to believe a view on scientific theory change can be discerned in what I call the “Copernicus passages” of Nietzsche’s published work—specifically, the incommensurability thesis. Since this view denies what Maudemarie Clark calls the “equivalence principle,” she claims incommensurability cannot reasonably be attributed to Nietzsche. I argue, however, that we can reasonably attribute incommensurability to Nietzsche in the Copernicus passages, so my reading should not be ruled out. The first upshot to this project is that I provide a reading of passages that have received no scholarly attention to date. The second upshot is that we can understand Copernicus in light of the broader, better-known themes in Nietzsche’s published work: Nietzsche’s moral skepticism about the value of self-denial motivates his opposition to the ascetic ideal and to the emerging dogmas of scientists.

The thesis maintained here is that Nietzsche belongs to and revitalizes a rhetorical tradition which has competed with philosophy for cultural and educational dominance. The general strategy of the thesis is to draw comparisons between Nietzsche and those aspects of the Sophists' activity that were attacked by Plato, in order to challenge philosophy's claim to moral and intellectual superiority over rhetoric. The first chapter considers the allegation that philosophy is demonstrably superior to rhetoric because it has a proper method and can achieve positive results. Against this, it is argued that philosophy is distinguished from rhetoric by its values, not its methodological purity; the remaining chapters probe this conflict of values. Chapter two explores the charge that rhetoric is both manipulative and open to manipulation, notes how Nietzsche's texts have been subject to these two criticisms, and counters them by challenging philosophy's models of manipulation and education. Chapter three examines the rival educational ideals of philosophy and rhetoric, arguing that the key differentiating feature is rhetoric's pragmatism. It shows how this feature has been used to disparage rhetoric, and argues that Nietzsche develops a form of pragmatism that meets the philosophical attack effectively. Chapter four considers the suggestion that rhetoric is less rational than philosophy because it employs looser argumentation, and argues that, at least as manifested by Nietzsche, rhetorical argumentation produces a superior rationality - according to an alternative perspective on reason and science. Chapter five considers the claim that the eloquence of rhetoric is to be condemned for seducing and confusing the seeker after truth; this is countered by developing the Nietzschean dictum that art is worth more than truth. The main conclusion is that, through Nietzsche's development of the ancient tradition, rhetoric emerges as a real alternative "love of wisdom".

La recherche se propose de repérer les prémisses théoriques et d'analyser les lectures qui accompagnent le choix de l'aphorisme chez Nietzsche. La structure de l'aphorisme (ses caractéristiques stylistiques et philosophiques) est étroitement liée à la pensée de l'auteur et à sa conception critique, métaphorique, psychophysiologique du langage. L'aphorisme est l'expression d'un genre philosophique qui prévoit à la fois la force analytique de la définition et la valeur cognitive de la métaphore. L'esprit d'analyse, dans l'attention qu'elle porte à l'élément particulier, repropose une modalité qui caractérise le style de la décadence. Dans l'aphorisme, le style de la décadence ne signifie pas l'incapacité de maîtriser la crise de la forme, mais vaut en tant que possibilité d'augmenter la visibilité – et donc la connaissance – du détail. L'aphorisme, comme forme de la définition et de la différence, permet de saisir la relation que l'élément particulier établit avec le devenir des forces dont il fait partie. L'aphorisme, en effet, est une remise en question (hinterfragen) aporétique. En replaçant le détail dans sa complexité structurale, l'aphorisme témoigne l'intention de renouveler l'écriture du grand style. L'aphorisme peut être interprété comme une constellation (Benjamin): configuration éclairante d'idées qui se cristallisent au fur et à mesure dans l'élément particulier qui est leur champ de force et qui vivent dans une pause de tension avec l'environnement. Conforme à la force analytique au sein duquel il se structure, l'aphorisme adhère pleinement à la reconstruction nietzschéenne d'un parcours qui, à partir du modèle exemplaire de Stendhal, ramène, à travers le XVIIe siècle français, la Renaissance et l'Humanisme, au classicisme grec et romain
This research aims both to identify the theoretical presuppositions behind Nietzsche's choice of the use of aphorism and to analyse the readings which support his choice. The structure of aphorism (i. E. Its stylistic and philosophic characteristics) is closely related to the author's thought and to his critical, metaphoric, and psycho-physiological conception of language. Aphorism represents the expression of a philosophic genre which takes into account both the analytic strength of defining and the cognitive value of metaphor. The spirit of analysis, in its attention to the particular, presents a modality which characterizes a decadent style. In aphorism, however, the decadent style does not correspond to an inability to master the crisis of the form, rather it is used to consider the possibility of magnifying the visibility – and therefore the knowledge – of the particular. Aphorism, as the form of the definition and of the difference, allows us to individuate the relation established between the particular and the forces to which it it belongs. Aphorism is, in actual fact, an innermost and aporetic questioning. By placing the detail in its true structural complexity, aphorism embodies Nietzsche's intention to renew a writing of high style. Aphorism can be interpreted as a constellation (Benjamin): an illuminating configuration of ideas which every time crystallise in a partiular as their forcefield and which live in a pause of tension with the surrounding. Aphorism, in accordance with the strength of its analytical structure, fully adheres to the Nietzschean route that, from the example set by Stendhal and through the French XVII century, the Reinassance and the Humanism, ultimately lead us back to the Latin and Greek spirit

Nietzsche et Nabokov ont de nombreux points communs : tous deux apatrides, ils ont choisi la Suisse comme terre d’exil ; ayant perdu l’un comme l’autre leur père et leur frère, ils ont fréquenté les mêmes milieux bien que séparés d’une génération. Peut donc se poser la question suivante : de quelle manière l’aîné germanophone a-t-il influencé son cadet, écrivain trilingue, passerelle entre plusieurs cultures contemporaines ? C’est à cette question que tente de répondre cette thèse. Outre les liens directs et indirects grâce auxquels Nabokov a accédé à l’œuvre de Nietzsche, ce travail s’attache à mettre en évidence ce que l’écrivain a réellement retiré comme incitation essentielle de ses lectures nietzschéennes, à savoir la maîtrise parfaite de la culture hellénique, la connaissance des cultes de l’Hellade antique, la compréhension partielle du grec ancien ainsi que, et surtout, une familiarité certaine avec l’œuvre d’auteurs hellènes expliqués par un Nietzsche-éducateur. Il nous faut cependant dès à présent nuancer ce propos, en précisant que si l’influence de Nietzsche sur Nabokov fut déterminante – ce que nous nous démontrerons –, elle ne fut néanmoins ni exclusive, ni totale. Suivant l’opinion développée par Nietzsche dans son premier grand travail, La Naissance de la Tragédie, Nabokov choisit Socrate, l’ennemi de Dionysos, comme adversaire. L’anti-socratisme combatif de Nabokov occupe ainsi la première moitié de sa vie, celle d’écrivain russophone. Il en sort victorieux et continue d'avoir recours aux idées nietzschéennes quand il écrit en anglais, les portant à la gloire dans ses Lolita, Ada ou l’ardeur ou Feu Pâle. Par conséquent, la totalité des notions introduites par Nietzsche dans la philosophie – « Éternel Retour », « volonté de puissance », « petit homme », « surhomme » – prennent place sur les pages de Nabokov jusqu’à y faire apparaître, et plus d’une fois, Zarathoustra le dionysiaque et Nietzsche en personne. Les études nabokoviennes souffrent de l'imposture scientifique qui s'est introduite dans l'Université française via l'ex-URSS (ex. Buhks) ; la partie critique de notre thèse démontre l'inculture et la nuisibilité des publications de ces Soviétiques
Nietzsche and Nabokov have a lot in common: they were both stateless, they chose Switzerland as their country of exile; both lost their father and a brother, they both used to frequent the same circles, even though there was one generation between them. Therefore, the question arises: in what way did the senior of the two, who wrote in German, influence his junior counterpart, a writer working in three languages, bridging many contemporary cultures? This thesis attempts to address this question. Besides the direct and indirect links, thanks to which Nabokov better understood Nietzsche’s works, this dissertation seeks to document what the writer actually did extract from his readings of Nietzsche, attempts to get to grips with the perfect mastery of the Hellenic culture, to explore the ancient Helladic cults, to partly understand ancient Greek, and, above all, to acquire a certain familiarity with the work of Hellenistic writers explained by Nietzsche in his role as an educator. In keeping with Nietzsche’s ideas elaborated in his first masterpiece, The Birth of Tragedy, Nabokov chose Socrates, Dionysos’s enemy, as the adversary. Nabokov’s strong anti-Socratism absorbed him for the first part of his life when he wrote in Russian. He emerged victorious and continued to go back to Nietzschéen ideas when he wrote in English, raising them to glory in Lolita, Ada, or Ardor : a family chronicle and Pale Fire. As a result, the totality of concepts introduced by Nietzsche in philosophy – “eternal recurrence”, “will to power”, “small man”, “superman” – take their place in Nabokov’s works up to the point where they are made to appear more than once embodied in Zarathoustra the Dionysian and Nietzsche. The Nabokov studies are badly affected by the scientific imposture that was introduced in the French University via the USSR (ex. Buhks) ; the critic part of our thesis proves the lack of culture and the nuisance of this Soviet publications

La problématique traitée dans ce travail consiste à s’interroger sur les aspects « politiques » de la pensée de Nietzsche, et surtout sur sa dimension européenne et ses enjeux. Il n’est pas question ici de cataloguer Nietzsche de philosophe politique, ni sa philosophie de philosophie politique, dans le sens académique du terme. Mais essayer de montrer, à travers sa philosophie du sens et de la valeur, de sa méthode généalogique, les démarches et propositions de ce philosophe au « marteau » pour tenter d’éradiquer le nihilisme dans le but d’œuvrer pour une « grande politique » et favoriser l’avènement d’un « nouveau européen » dans une « nouvelle Europe ». En effet, cette Europe dont parle Nietzsche n’a rien à voir avec ce qu’on conçoit généralement comme l’Occident, et cette Europe ainsi que les européens dont il parle n’ont pas vraiment d’existence réelle, repérable avec des frontières, si on se place sur le plan géographique et géopolitique. Dans ce travail je tiens à souligner la contrainte de la sécularisation, et d’autres aspects du dépassement du nationalisme, qui est aussi un dépassement du nihilisme. Nietzsche était, peut-être, l’un des plus acides contempteurs des illusions européennes en démontrant – espérant par la même occasion éradiquer - cette fiction d’une Europe « non-contradictoire », platement conciliatrice, mais à la fois individualiste et revendicatrice d’une égalité des droits. Comportements dénoncés par le philosophe car ce vent pollué par le nationalisme, la puissance industrielle mercantile au détriment de la création vitale ne peuvent mener qu’à une catastrophe en étouffant, en empêchant le jaillissement, l’apparition de l’individu créateur, artiste. Les valeurs se sont donc déjà instituées dans un sens négatif et malsain, et ce dénigrement de la vie n’est pas politiquement indifférent. Ce n’est pas là un vitalisme simpliste. L’homme moderne occidental est le résultat de cette histoire. L’histoire est le résultat de cette « hominisation » inversée qui se fait par le troupeau, et qui est aussi une forme de déshumanisation programmée. C’est Dionysos qui constitue le remède à cette maladie, ce Dieu grec est le héros qui vaincrait cette européocentrisme et le chauvinisme. Soulignons que ce projet qui consiste à critiquer l’égalitarisme comme « dressage », privilégie le retour au texte et non pas la « construction conceptuelle ». Entre autres travaux pour cela : ceux de Patrick Wotling, Paolo D’Iorio, Giuliano Campioni, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter, Peter Sloterdijk,…Pour éviter toute confusion, malgré la partie « caractéristiques de la philosophie du sens et de la valeur » qui distinguera la « grande politique », soulignons ces quelques points : d’abord la séparation d’avec le vouloir-vivre de Schopenhauer, ensuite l’évaluation d’une transcendance de l’instinct qui fait que Nietzsche quitte le plan de l’irrationalisme furibond, enfin la forme du refus du darwinisme. Ainsi on peut parler d’une volonté de puissance qui n’est plus ramenée à une catégorie volitionnelle, et dotée d’une motivation (par exemple l’oppression physique et militaire ou l’accumulation du capital).Sa reconquête des valeurs doit être replacée dans un contexte mieux compris, et d’abord repensant le nôtre. Il n’est que de songer aux Règles pour le parc humain de Sloterdijk, en réponse à Heidegger, mais qui n’est que le prolongement de l’opposition dressage / élevage (Zähmung / Züchtung) qu’avait thématisée Nietzsche en faveur de ce que seraient de « bons européens ». Ainsi on comprend que les enjeux « politiques » consistent en réalité aux choix de civilisation (Kultur) qui engagent une conception purement anthropologique de l’homme. Seule une métaphysique de la culture permettra alors de dépasser le nihilisme européen et ses nombreuses versions éco-théologiques
The main theme of this work is that of the “political” aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, particularly in terms of its European dimension and the issues at stake. The aim here is not to label Nietzsche as a political philosopher or his philosophy as political philosophy in the academic sense of the term. Rather, the aim is to show, through his philosophy of meaning and value, and his genealogical method, the approaches adopted and proposals made by this philosopher and his “hammer”, as a means of eradicating nihilism in order to work towards “greater politics” and thus encourage the arrival of a “new European” in a “new Europe”. This Europe of which Nietzsche spoke had nothing in common with what is generally perceived as being the West. His Europe, and its Europeans, do not really exist, and, from a geographical and geopolitical point of view, have no easily identifiable borders. In this work, we underline the restrictions of secularisation, and other aspects that go beyond nationalism, which is in itself a concept that goes beyond that of nihilism. It may be said that Nietzsche had the most acerbic contempt for European illusions, showing – and hoping to thus eradicate – the fiction of a “non-contradictory” Europe, a Europe that is blandly conciliatory but also both individualistic and demanding of equal rights. Such behaviour was denounced by Nietzsche because this wind of change, polluted by nationalism and mercantile industrial power to the detriment of vital creation, can only end in catastrophe, suffocating and preventing the resurgence or appearance of the individual creator, the artist. Values have thus already been adopted in a negative, unhealthy sense and denigrating life in this way is not indifferent from a political point of view. It is not a question of simplistic vitalism. Modern Western man is the result of this history. And this history is the result of the inverted “hominisation” produced by the herd effect, and which is also a sort of programmed dehumanisation. The cure for this ill is Dionysus, the Greek god who was the hero that conquered European centricity and chauvinism. It should be stressed that this project, which consists in criticising egalitarianism as a form of “domestication”, favours a return to the text, and not “conceptual construction”. This theme has also been studied by other authors, such as Patrick Wotling, Paolo D’Iorio, Giuliano Campioni, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Peter Sloterdijk, to name but a few.To avoid any confusion, and despite the section on the “characteristics of the philosophy of meaning and values” which will identify the “greater politics”, we would like to stress the following points: first of all, the departure from Schopenhauer’s will to live, followed by an evaluation of the transcendence of instinct which shows that Nietzsche moved away from the level of furious irrationalism and, finally, the form taken by the refusal of Darwinism. It is thus possible to speak of a desire for power which is no longer reduced to being a volitional category, but which has become motivated (for example, physical and military oppression, or the accumulation of capital).Nietzsche’s reconquest of values needs to be approached within a context that is better understood, starting with a re-evaluation of our own. This recalls Sloterdijk’s Rules for the Human Zoo, written in response to Heidegger, but which is merely an extension of the domestication/breeding opposition (Zähmung/Züchtung) that Nietzsche conceptualised in favour of what would make “good Europeans”.It is thus that we can understand that the “political” stakes are, in reality, civilisation choices (Kultur), which require a purely anthropological conception of man. Only the metaphysics of culture can thus make it possible to go beyond European nihilism and its many eco-theo-logical versions

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Ciências da Educação, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação, Florianópolis, 2016.
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Esta pesquisa aborda o corpo em Nietzsche sob a ótica do problema da unidade do sujeito. Centra-se, sobretudo, na crítica do filósofo à noção de sujeito da tradição humanista, a qual, segundo ele, decorre de um longo processo histórico forjado, desde o princípio, pela dicotomia platônica entre corpo e alma. No decorrer do trabalho pretende-se apresentar como a tradição filosófica ocidental conceituou o corpo, e como, de certa forma, nossa ?cultura educacional? parece tributária dessa conceituação. As fontes principais de investigação sobre o corpo em Nietzsche são constituídas da seção ?Dos desprezadores do corpo?, presente em Assim falou Zaratustra, e de alguns aforismos do autor, de outras obras, que dialogam com o tema em questão. Parte-se da hipótese que, ao se considerar e investigar a noção de corpo em Nietzsche, novas possibilidades podem surgir para se pensar a educação.

Abstract : This research addresses the body in Nietzsche from the problem of the unity of the subject perspective. It mainly focuses on the criticism of the philosopher to the subject of humanistic tradition notion, which, he said, stems from a long wrought historical process by a Platonic dichotomy between body and soul since the beginning. This essay aims to clarify how the Western philosophical tradition had conceptualized the body, and how, in a way, our "educational culture" seems debtor of this concept. The main sources of this research about the body in Nietzsche come from the chapter "The despisers of the body" of the book Thus Spoke Zarathustra. They also come from some author aphorisms from other works that dialogue with the main theme of this essay. It starts with the hypothesis that, when considering and investigating the notion of the body in Nietzsche, new possibilities may arise to think about education.

Mit der Behauptung, dass seine eigene Philosophie als »umgedrehter Platonismus« verstanden werden soll, stellt Nietzsche seine Beziehung zum platonischen System dar. Dieses Forschungsprojekt sucht nach einer neuen Variation dieser Darstellung, um die philosophischen Analogien beider Autoren aufzuspüren. Das erste Kapitel beschäftigt sich mit einer Erläuterung des Begriffes „umgedrehter Platonismus“, womit die Differenz zwischen diesen beiden Systemen definiert wird. Diese Diskrepanz ist spürbar in vier verschiedene Bereichen: metaphysisch, axiologisch, gnoseologisch und ästhetisch. Das zweite Kapitel behandelt die Rolle des Apollinischen und des Dionysischen in der nietzscheschen Theorie. Die beiden Konzepte werden mit dem des platonischen Eros verglichen, da diese es dem Menschen ermöglichen, die sinnliche Welt zu verlassen und eine Ur-Realität kennenzulernen. Das dritte Kapitel analysiert die Verurteilung der Kunst in Platon’s „Staat“. Der griechische Philosoph strebt die wahre Kenntnis an und verbindet seine ästhetischen Überlegungen mit der Idee der Wahrheit. Nietzsche bearbeitet diese Verbindung zwischen Ästhetik und Erkenntnistheorie unter dem Begriff »amor fati«. Das vierte Kapitel ist der Physiologie der Liebe gewidmet. Nietzsche verwandelt der Erkenntnisprozess in eine leidenschaftliche Liebe. Die Erkenntnis nimmt die Form einer Passion an und kristallisiert sich allmählich und nach einem langen Prozess mit Höhen und Tiefen in »amor fati«. »Amor fati« schafft eine Ästhetisierung der Erkenntnis und Epistemologiesierung der Ästhetik. Somit liegt Nietzsches Erkenntnistheorie parallel zu jener Platons.
By claiming that his philosophy should be understood as “inverted Platonism” Nietzsche defined his relationship to the Platonic system. This research project aims to articulate a new understanding of this relationship by analyzing philosophical similarities between the two authors'' respective philosophies. The first chapter is dedicated to the explanation of the term “inverted Platonism” and articulates the differences between Plato''s and Nietzsche''s systems. These discrepancies are manifested in four main areas: the metaphysical, the axiological, the gnosiological and the aesthetic. The second chapter deals with the roles of the Apollonian and the Dionysian in Nietzschean theory. Both concepts are compared with the Platonic Eros, as they invite man to abandon the sensual world and instead to commune with the very origin of reality. The third chapter analyzes Plato´s denunciation of art in “The Republic”. The Greek philosopher seeks true knowledge and connects his aesthetic concerns with the idea of Truth. Nietzsche refers to the cynosure between aesthetics and cognitive theory as “amor fati”. The fourth chapter is dedicated to the physiology of love. Nietzsche transforms the cognitive process into a passionate love. Cognition assumes the shape of passion, slowly crystallizing over time, with many twists and turns, into “amor fati”. “Amor fati” aestheticizes cognition and epistemologizes aesthetics. Therefore Nietzsche''s cognitive theory is actually equivalent to that of Plato.

Purpose and framing of questions. The objective of this study has been to problematize the concept of "health" by studying the philosopher Nietzsche's writings on the subject and by analyzing four PE teachers' thoughts on his view of health. This has been achieved by examining the following questions: What types of health does Nietzsche describe, and how are these promoted and inhibited according to him? How does a Nietzschean view of health stand visavi the one expressed by the Swedish national curriculum? What do teachers think about the Nietzschean concept of health and its potential applicability in physical education? Theory and Method. The literary study had a hermeneutic approach and was conducted according to a qualitative analytical method, in addition the so-called three-step method was used to create a definition of "health" on the basis of Nietzsche's use of the term. The source material consisted of Nietzsche's overall philosophical writings (ca 2600 pages) in order to give a complete picture of his view of health. The four interviews consisted of open enquiries, which were conducted according to a qualitative interviewing technique. The selection of respondents was made from convenience. Results. The study showed that Nietzsche uses "health" in varying contexts and applies it to several different subjects: he writes about cultural, spiritual, physical, mental health, and relates these categories to humanity as a whole and to the individual. Nietzsche argues that healthy human beings sublimate their urges instead of repressing them, look for invigorating challenges, preserve themselves through rest and a healthy lifestyle, are free from resentment, affirm life even when it is most difficult, and practice moderation. The view of health expressed in the curriculum is considerably narrower than Nietzsche's, as it relates the term "health" solely to questions of physical activity and lifestyle. Conclusion. We suggest that Nietzsche's health philosophy should be used by physical education teachers as a heuristic tool to problematize health, as his approach has a philosophical depth and an inquisitorial variation which rarely occurs in the health discourse of physical education teachers, which would be broadened, deepened, and stimulated by inviting more alternative approaches.
Syfte och frågeställningar. Undersökningens syfte har varit att problematisera begreppet "hälsa" genom att studera filosofen Nietzsches skrifter om ämnet och att analysera fyra idrottslärares tankar om hans hälsosyn. Detta har åstadkommits genom att besvara följande frågeställningar: Vilka typer av hälsa beskriver Nietzsche, och hur menar han att dessa främjas respektive hämmas? Hur ställer sig en Nietzscheansk hälsosyn till den uppfattning om hälsa som förespråkas av svenska skolans styrdokument? Vad anser verksamma idrottslärare om det Nietzscheanska hälsokonceptet och dess eventuella applicerbarhet i idrottsundervisningen? Teori och Metod. Litteraturstudien hade en hermeneutisk ansats och genomfördes enligt en kvalitativ innehållsanalytisk metod, dessutom har den så kallade trestegsmetoden använts för att skapa en definition av "hälsa" utifrån Nietzsches användning av begreppet. Det litterära urvalet bestod av Nietzsches samlade filosofiska skrifter (ca 2600 sidor) i syfte att ge en fullständig bild av hans syn på hälsa. De fyra intervjuerna var av öppen karaktär och genomfördes enligt en kvalitativ intervjuteknik. Respondenturvalet gjordes av bekvämlighetsskäl. Resultat. Litteraturstudien visade att Nietzsche använder "hälsa" i varierande kontexter och applicerar det på flera olika subjekt: han talar bl.a. om kulturell, andlig, fysisk, själslig hälsa, och relaterar dessa kategorier till artens respektive individens välbefinnande. Nietzsche hävdar att en hälsosam människa sublimerar sina drifter istället för att förtränga dem, söker efter stärkande utmaningar, vet att bevara sig genom vila och goda levnadsvanor, är fri från ressentiment, bejakar livet även när det är som svårast, och lever måttfullt. Läroplanens hälsosyn är betydligt smalare än Nietzsches och använder begreppet "hälsa" uteslutande i anknytning till fysisk aktivitet samt livsstil. Slutsats. Vi föreslår att Nietzsches hälsofilosofi bör användas av idrottslärare som ett heuristiskt redskap för att problematisera hälsa, då hans sätt att närma sig ämnet har ett filosofiskt djup och en inkvisitorisk variation som sällan förekommer i idrottsläraryrkets hälsodiskurs, vilken skulle vidgas, fördjupas och stimuleras genom att bjuda in fler alternativa synsätt.

Il tema centrale di questa tesi di laurea è il concetto di arte nella filosofia di Friedrich Nietzsche. Il mio interesse per questo tema nasce dallo studio attento dei testi nietzscheani, e dalla conseguente ipotesi che l'arte rivesta un ruolo essenziale nella filosofia di questo autore. In questo scritto, pertanto, mi propongo di studiare le seguenti questioni: che cosa Nietzsche intenda con la parola 'arte'; quale ruolo l'arte svolga nella sua filosofia; se vi sia un'estetica nietzscheana vera e propria, e quali caratteristiche essa potrebbe presentare. Per adempiere a tali fini, questo scritto è stato strutturato in due parti: la prima è dedicata alla puntuale esegesi dei principali testi di Nietzsche. I capitoli seguono l'ordine cronologico delle sue opere, in modo tale da poter ripercorrere l'evoluzione della concezione dell'arte attraverso la progressiva maturazione del pensiero di questo autore. In ciascun capitolo si ripresentano gli stessi nuclei tematici, che vengono di volta in volta illuminati da una diversa prospettiva, e sui quali vengono sollevate nuove questioni. I risultati principali a cui mira questa prima parte sono: l'inserimento dell'estetica nel quadro globale della filosofia di Nietzsche; la derivazione del concetto di arte da quello di salute; la derivazione, a sua volta, di quest'ultimo dalla posizione nietzscheana rispetto al problema della verità; l'evidenziazione dell'aspetto etico-pratico delle suddette questioni. La seconda parte espone organicamente i capisaldi della mia ipotesi interpretativa guadagnati nella prima parte, e li confronta con alcuni dei testi principali della letteratura critica che si sono occupati del binomio Nietzsche-arte.

Resumo: O objetivo deste estudo é investigar a constituição do antiplatonismo de Nietzsche. Para isto, foram pesquisadas quatro questões: os fundamentos filosóficos de Nietzsche que possibilitam conceber a filosofia platônica como uma metafísica de valores; o modo Nietzsche entende o platonismo por meio da história; de que forma se dá a negação da moral platônico-cristã (niilismo); e abordar a concepção de vontade de poder para entender quais valores Nietzsche defende. A resposta da primeira pergunta baseada na obra ‘Além do Bem e do Mal’, justifica os motivos que levaram Nietzsche a negar o platonismo; a da segunda, buscou compreender como o platonismo se desenvolve ao longo da história; a da terceira, alicerçada no conceito de niilismo, justifica o modo como e por que o platonismo é negado; e, o último, por meio da concepção de vontade de poder, evidencia os valores defendidos por Nietzsche (vida e vontade de poder). A pretensão central, portanto, é explicitar os motivos que levaram Nietzsche romper com a moral vigente na época e propor nova moral. Para dar sustentação a este objetivo, o autor recorre à obra nietzschiana, platônica e de comentadores, extraindo delas os fundamentos que explicam e justificam a real constituição do antiplatonismo de Nietzsche. Como resultado, pode-se dizer, que a pesquisa evidenciou o processo de inversão do platonismo. Com isso, chega-se a compreensão de que a filosofia de Platão reduz a visão que se pode ter do mundo e priva o homem de conhecer as coisas na sua forma real e que, por meio da vontade de poder, o homem consegue experimentar o mundo em suas múltiplas dimensões. este modo, é possível criar novos modos de apreender e interpretar o mundo.

In recent years, Nietzsche's moral philosophy has been receiving more and more attention in the English speaking moral philosophical community. This study is a contribution to the ongoing debate in this area. Its central aim is to understand Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality in relation to his own particular understanding of modernity. For Nietzsche modernity is a condition in which the individual is committed to the antithetical moral value schemes of master and slave moralities, whilst failing to recognise that this is so. These value schemes are antithetical in regard to the stance they take towards existence. A master morality is one that affirms life, whereas a slave morality is one that denies life. The thesis begins by looking at Nietzsche's characterisation of the problem of morality. For Nietzsche, Christian morality has become a problem because, in the light of the death of God, it has lost its foundations. He argues that we should attempt to assess the value of these Christian values. His method of doing so is a psychological-historical one, which he calls genealogy. This thesis examines Nietzsche's genealogy of Christianity in detail and treats it as a serious historical account rather than as illustrative fiction as some scholars have done in the past. I argue that some of the problems that one encounters when treating genealogy as history stem from the fact that commentators have placed too much emphasis on Nietzsche's work, On the Genealogy of Morality, and that his other genealogical texts deserve equal attention. I then show how this genealogy supplies the modem human being with the necessary self-knowledge in order that it can recognise its commitment to antithetical value schemes. Finally, this thesis examines some of the issues that surround Nietzsche's attempt to aid the modem human being in overcoming its commitment to Christian values.

In this thesis, I draw on Wittgensteinian philosophical thought to critically explore Nietzsche’s diagnosis of (and proposed therapy for) the alleged malaise in modernity. In chapter 1, I argue that Wittgenstein’s concepts of aspect-seeing and certainty provide the resources to resolve several apparently contradictory claims Nietzsche makes about the predicament of his fellow moderns. I show that the condition Wittgenstein calls ‘aspect-blindness’ offers a unified account of the predicament Nietzsche describes. In chapter 2, I explore Nietzsche’s claim that some overarching framework (what Wittgenstein calls a ‘form of life’) has ‘died’. I argue that the pathological attitude of Wittgenstein’s interlocutor towards frameworks provides the most satisfactory model for understanding the nature of the supposed ‘death’ of frameworks in modernity. In chapter 3, I argue that Nietzsche’s proposed remedy for the malaise of modernity is a form of therapy akin to Wittgenstein’s attempt to free his readers from a picture which holds them captive. I show that our understanding of Nietzsche’s therapeutic method will be improved if we bear in mind certain distinctions and ambiguities highlighted by Wittgensteinian discussion of pictures. In chapter 4, I address the concern that Nietzsche appears to characterise modernity in two contradictory ways as both excessively and insufficiently emotional and excessively and insufficiently sceptical. I resolve the appearance of contradiction by showing that (on Nietzsche’s view) the moderns are inherently prone to extreme shifts between poles and that many of the apparent emotions and ideals of the moderns are ‘fake’.

This thesis develops a radical Nietzschean approach to social change. Its subject area is how social entities – for example, institutions, practices, norms, values, cultures – are reproduced or transformed. Its ethical and political starting point is one of resistance to capitalism. Its philosophical starting point is the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. Its approach is eclectic, reading Nietzsche with post-Nietzschean philosophy and work in developmental psychology, evolutionary biology, anthropology, feminist theory, and more. The thesis starts with Nietzsche's conception of history in On the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche sees social transformation resulting from multiple contingent encounters of bodies with diverse ‘modes of valuation’ and forms of life. This view opposes the universalist approach Nietzsche calls ‘English Genealogy’, which runs from Hume through Darwin down to contemporary liberal ‘cultural evolution’ theories. The middle part of the thesis investigates Nietzsche's views on social processes following two main strands: the ‘psycho-physiology’ of sub-individual drives he develops in Dawn and other texts of the ‘free spirit’ period; and his encounter with Darwinism. These chapters offer accounts of mimetic and performative incorporation of values; of normalisation and subjectivation; and an ‘ecological’ approach to social evolution drawing on multi-dimensional accounts of heredity, Developmental Systems Theory, and Felix Guattari's conception of ‘the three ecologies’. The last part of the thesis applies these ideas to today's social struggles. It uses Nietzsche's Genealogy to understand technologies of domination at work in contemporary capitalism, alongside Foucault's work on power and Judith Herman's study of psychological trauma. The concluding chapter looks at how Nietzsche's thought can help develop projects of resistance to capitalism, drawing on James Scott's study of the ‘weapons of the weak’, and feminist debates on identity. Working with Nietzsche on resistance both brings out the power and takes us to the limits of his philosophy of self-transformation.

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We intend with this work to examine the issue of forgetfulness from the Nietzschean perspective. Every human action has the intrinsic characteristics of unpredictability and irreversibility. Starting from this assumption, we know then that man is free to initiate their actions and, when this occurs, there is always a purpose in action. Notwithstanding, one can‘t calculate or predict with absolute certainty what will trigger that action, regardless of its results will be misfortune or fortune. Nietzsche tells us about the important human ability to forget. This ability would be related and would move in a constant power struggle with other capacity also of great importance: the memory. We will highlight the concept of "forgetting" in Nietzsche‘s philosophy. This concept will be related to other essential concepts to understand the meaning of activity assigned to oblivion in Nietzsche. We will analyze mainly the concepts of memory, history, promise, resentment, guilt and moral. Forgetting in Nietzsche‘s work is a key concept to understand what he means by a strong health. Forgetting enables to man the emergence of the new again and again.
Pretendemos com esse trabalho examinar o tema do esquecimento a partir da perspectiva nietzschiana. Toda ação humana tem as características intrínsecas de imprevisibilidade e irreversibilidade. Mas, ainda assim, não se pode calcular ou prever com absoluta certeza o que desencadeará aquela ação, sejam os resultados dela infortúnio ou fortuna. Nietzsche nos fala sobre a importante capacidade humana de esquecer. Essa capacidade estaria relacionada e se moveria num jogo constante de forças com outra capacidade também de grande importância, a memória. Destacaremos o conceito de ―esquecimento‖ na filosofia nietzschiana. Esse conceito se relacionará com outros conceitos essenciais para a compreensão do sentido de atividade atribuído ao esquecimento em Nietzsche. Para tanto, analisaremos os conceitos memória, história, promessa, ressentimento, culpa e moral, principalmente. O esquecimento em Nietzsche é um conceito fulcral para se compreender o que ele quer dizer com uma saúde forte. O esquecimento é o que possibilita no homem o surgimento do novo sempre.

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo compreender o sentido que Nietzsche confere ao riso no interior de seu pensamento. Para tanto, foi preciso considerar o riso à luz do conceito de vontade de potência, de modo a determinar o aspecto sob o qual Nietzsche o interpreta e o motivo pelo qual esse riso é digno de seus investimentos filosóficos. Deste modo, partimos com a noção de que o riso se exprime como um juízo avaliativo: atitude valorativa que, no caso da valoração nobre, manifesta (e quer) aumento de forças. A partir desse primeiro tópico, analisamos o conceito de gaia ciência [alegre saber], apresentado em livro homônimo, com o qual o riso se irradia pelo pensamento e se torna um fator imprescindível diante das questões e tarefas a que Nietzsche se coloca. Aqui, o riso atua como páthos afirmativo e efeito da elevação de potência; os pensamentos a ele correspondentes são igualmente afirmativos, o que, por sua vez, permite um vigor filosófico para a crítica radical dos valores. A idiossincrasia desse riso de Nietzsche, se vê, pois, realçada quando o cotejamos com temas tais como a linguagem, o estilo, a crítica e o conceito de tartufesco. Com efeito, a partir de tais considerações procuramos esboçar algumas linhas acerca da relação do riso com a ideia do além-do-homem, bem como compreender a inovação que Nietzsche promove na história do pensamento filosófico sobre o riso.
The present dissertation aims to comprehend the meaning that Nietzsche gives to laughter within his thought. Therefore, it was necessary to accept laughter under the concept of will to power in order to precise the aspect in witch Nietzsche interprets it and the motive that makes laughter worthy of his philosophical investments. Thus, we start with the notion of laughter as an evaluative judgment, an evaluative attitude, which in the case of noble valuation, manifests (and wants) increase of forces. From this topic, we analyzed the concept of a gay science(presented in the eponymous book); in witch, laughter became an important factor regarding the issues that Nietzsche arise. Here, laughter works as an affirmative páthos and effect of an elevation of power, the thoughts related to laughter are correspondingly affirmative, which in turns allows a philosophical strength towards the radical critics of values. The idiosyncrasy of Nietzsches laughter highlights when collated with themes as language, style, critics and the concept of tarffufe. Indeed, from these considerations we may be able to outline a conclusion on laughters relation with the idea of overman, and understand the innovation that Nietzsche promotes on the history of philosophical thought about laughter.

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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES
It has been having as supporter for some texts of the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, the objective of this research is investigate the hierarchy (Rangordnung) and the concept of type (Typus). However, the intent this research doesn’t aim only to interpret the possible hierarchical relations between some types, but also extract this task some hierarchical criteria. The hierarchical criteria of the creation is developed, in a certain measure, as a conducting wire for the chapters, it has been interpreted in the following typological relations: free spirit, and captive spirit, tragic and Socratic, and lord and slave. About these types: Are all the creators? No, not all of them are creators, however, it is not only this characteristic that organizes the hierarchically types, but also the difference between their creations is an important distinguishing point: are signs of affirmation and courage in the face of life, or expressions of fatigue, self-indulgence, escape, fear, and hatred? Do the creations these types raise or impoverish man and life? The concept of creation as a criterion is interpreted – to a large measure – based on the discourse of Thus spoke Zarathustra, entitled, the three metamorphoses. Accordingly, the free spirit is creator, but only of itself exactly; it represents the lion for his courage, being a high hierarchical to be free of the current duties, as opposed to the camel. The camel is captive, because it does not create, only it usually reveres what it has already been created, it is accommodated to the present by its fear of creating. The Dionysian tragic is analogous to the spirit as a child, they both claim life and lie with the unceasing creation. The Socratic also creates, however, as a reaction to the mythological creation of the tragic, and as escape from existence, being more analogous to the camel for its unceasing belief and search of the truth. The Noble type is creator, and analogous to the child, therefore, when subordinating the plebeian type in favor of the creation and of cultivate of a superior type, it makes with innocence and without compassion. Another characteristic is that its creation comes itself from the affirmation and reverence, it is of the first command. The slave creates with hatred and resentment, reacting to the lord’s creation, being more analogous to the camel. Its creation enables an impoverishment, because it aims to conserve the majority, rather than strong type, it has been making this the last one corrupts itself, and it considers itself “bad” in contrast with the flock of “good” men.
Tendo como sustentáculo alguns textos do filósofo alemão Friedrich Nietzsche, o objetivo desta pesquisa é investigar a hierarquia (Rangordnung) e a noção de tipo (Typus). Contudo, o intento deste trabalho não visa apenas interpretar as possíveis relações hierárquicas entre alguns tipos, mas também extrair dessa tarefa alguns critérios hierárquicos. O critério hierárquico da criação é desenvolvido, em certa medida, como um fio condutor para os capítulos, sendo interpretado nas seguintes relações tipológicas: espírito livre e espírito cativo, trágico e socrático, e senhor e escravo. Sobre esses tipos pergunta-se: Todos são criadores? Não, nem todos são criadores, no entanto, não é apenas essa característica que organiza os tipos hierarquicamente, mas também a diferença entre as suas criações é um ponto distintivo importante: são sinais de afirmação e coragem perante a vida, ou expressões de cansaço, comodismo, fuga, medo e ódio? As criações desses tipos elevam ou empobrecem o homem e a vida? O conceito de criação enquanto critério é interpretado – em grande medida – com base no discurso de Assim falou Zaratustra, intitulado Das três metamorfoses. Nesse sentido, o espírito livre é criador, mas apenas de si mesmo; ele representa o leão pela sua coragem, sendo um tipo hierarquicamente elevado por ser livre dos deveres vigentes, ao contrário do camelo. O cativo é o camelo, pois não cria, apenas reverencia habitualmente o que já foi criado, é acomodado ao presente pelo seu medo de criar. O trágico dionisíaco é análogo ao espírito como criança, ambos afirmam a vida e a mentira com a incessante criação. Já o socrático também cria, no entanto, como reação à criação mitológica do trágico, e como fuga da existência, sendo mais análogo ao camelo pela sua incessante crença e busca da verdade. O tipo Nobre é criador, e análogo à criança, pois, ao subordinar o tipo plebeu em prol da criação e do cultivo de um tipo superior, o faz com inocência e sem compaixão. Outra característica é que sua criação vem da afirmação e da reverência de si, é de primeira ordem. Já o escravo cria com ódio e ressentimento, reagindo à criação do senhor, sendo mais análogo ao camelo. Sua criação possibilita um empobrecimento, pois visa a conservar a maioria, ao invés do tipo forte, fazendo com que esse último se corrompa e se considere “mau” em contraste com o rebanho de homens “bons”.

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Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche is still practically unknown among those who study the philosophy of law. Nietzsche studied several topics related to the science and to the philosophy of law, approaching juridical questions from a philosophic point of view and approaching philosophic questions from a juridical point of view, making several concepts transferations which goal is to make a critic of the law in modernity, a critic of the moral values that come from it, and also to propose an ethic that characterizes itself by a transvaloration of the western values. The genealogy of the primitive law in contrast with the paradigms of modern law, confirms both Nietzsche´s critics and ethic proposals. Having the law and the relations between Nietzsche and the free-thinker David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874) as conductors, the purpose of the present work is to find a philosophy of law in Nietzsche s thinking and to bring more visibility for that segment of Nietzsche s thought
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche continua praticamente desconhecido entre aqueles que estudam a filosofia do direito. Nietzsche estudou diversas questões relacionadas à ciência e à filosofia do direito, abordou questões jurídicas através de uma perspectiva filosófica e abordou questões filosóficas através de uma perspectiva jurídica, perfazendo uma transferência de conceitos com a finalidade de efetuar uma crítica do direito na modernidade, dos valores morais dele decorrentes e propor uma ética que se caracteriza pela transvaloração dos valores ocidentais. A genealogia do direito primitivo em contraste com os paradigmas do direito da modernidade, ratifica a crítica e a proposta ética de Nietzsche. Tendo o direito como fio condutor, e também a relação de Nietzsche com o livre-pensador David Friedrich Strauss, o presente trabalho tem por objetivo achar uma filosofia do direito no pensamento de Nietzsche e trazer maior visibilidade para esse segmento do pensamento nietzscheano

In this thesis, I use the work of Friedrich Nietzsche to offer a detailed account of existential sin. I show that existential sin as a form of self-understanding is deeply embedded in the Christian theological tradition, and that Nietzsche’s account of existential sin should be understood as part of this same tradition. In my reading of On the Genealogy of Morality I show that we need to place sin in close relation to bad conscience, guilt and the genealogical method itself. However, despite being grounded in Christian thought and dependent upon the figure of the Christian God in its origin and emergence, I follow Nietzsche in positing that existential sin continues to exist after the death of God. It is by considering sin as not only a form of self-understanding, but also as a cultural memory, that we can make sense of this claim. For Nietzsche existential sin is at its root a mistaken understanding of human nature that has taken hold of us through Christianity. However, I argue that we need to consider existential sin as a socio-historical answer to the ontological problem of meaningless suffering. Existential sin responds to a fundamental experience of the human condition. With this in mind, in the final chapter of the thesis I examine possible avenues of redemption from post-Christian sin. What options are open to the person suffering from post-Christian sin-consciousness if she cannot turn to religious narratives? I argue that Nietzsche’s redemptive method of genealogy is not sufficient, and that life-affirmation is too demanding. However, a weaker version of life-affirmation in which meaningless suffering is affirmed as necessary, but not desired, does provide a promising alternative answer to the problem of meaningless suffering.

La presente investigación está consagrada a hacer una interpretación de la filosofía de Nietzsche con la finalidad de localizar en ella los elementos suficientes para el surgimiento de un pensamiento poscristiano. Dicha pretensión sigue una estructura conformada por tres ejes temáticos: 1. La crítica de Nietzsche al cristianismo; 2. La crítica a la cultura moderna; y 3. Elementos para un pensamiento poscristiano. Bajo esta estructura interpretativa, la filosofía de Nietzsche se ha mostrado capaz de hacer frente a la décadence y al nihilismo que hasta entonces habían embargado el decurso de la historia. Asimismo, tras hacer la crítica a la hegemonía de estas dos categorías sobre el suelo de la cultura, Nietzsche nos proporciona un pensamiento comprometido con la vida, capaz de volcar el nihilismo hacia una lógica activa y auténticamente creativa. Esto último es lo que conformaría el término de una época y el inicio de otra: la época poscristiana.

De un modo u otro, la cuestión de la amistad siempre resuena en las páginas de Nietzsche. De un modo u otro, también nos enfrentamos con su obra desde las posibilidades que esa cuestión brinda al pensamiento, posibilidades que, tal vez, nos coloquen en la paradoja de la imposible amistad con la misma filosofía de Nietzsche.

Tomando en cuenta el título completo de El nacimiento de la tragedia del espíritu de la música título que alude al problema filológico de los orígenes- puede comprenderse mejor la concepción nietzscheana del arte y su crítica de las teorías estéticas tradicionales. El planteamiento aristotélico que subyace a estas teorías parte de la separación entre obra, autor y público, es decir del principio artístico de lo apolíne.Tal separación no es válida en el caso de la tragedia. Nietzsche rompe con la tradición aristotélica que convierte a la tragedia en un drama para la lectura, poniendo énfasis en la totalidad del espectáculo dramático

Cette thèse développe tout d’abord les trois classiques acceptions du terme fragment d’où sont tirées les trois statuts classiques d’un texte. En se basant sur Héraclite, les moralistes français classiques et les romantiques allemands, une généalogie est tracée à partir des notions de maxime, d’aphorisme, et de fragment, généalogie d’où se dégage notre concept de fragment(s) qui dissout tous les statuts du texte en un seul, et qui se résume ainsi : sous la maxime, c’est l’aphorisme qui affleure, et sous l’aphorisme, c’est le fragment(s) qui parle. Puis, à partir des conceptualisations linguistiques et philosophiques de Deleuze et Guattari, et grâce à Blanchot et Eisenstein, est construit le concept de fragment(s) qui se définit comme l’instant de la rencontre qu’est l’expérience d’un processus de subjectivation désindividualisant (entre auteur, œuvre et lecteur) au seuil de l’éternel retour. Enfin, fort de ce concept est proposée une saisie du texte nietzschéen – lecture(s) de Nietzsche. Reprenant l’histoire éditoriale des textes de Nietzsche (histoire qui mêle philologie et philosophie dans la figure nietzschéenne du centaure), sont alors construites les quatre annexes à cette thèse – qui en sont le corps même. À côté de trois intégrées au corps de la thèse, la quatrième – tournant autour de la méthode généalogique telle que définie par Nietzsche ou Foucault – est l’objet du second tome (ex corpore thesis). Ces vade-me(te)cum sont des prélèvement de fragment(s) au sein des Œuvres philosophiques complètes éditées par Colli et Montinari et se veulent en même temps, comme la présente thèse même, théorie et pratique du fragment(s)
First of all, this thesis evolves the three classics acceptations of the term fragment of which the three classics status of a text derive from. By being based on Heraclitus, the classics French moralists and the German romantics, a genealogy is drawn from the notions of maxim, aphorism and fragment, genealogy of which emerge our concept of fragment(s), which dissolve all the text's status in only one, and is thus summed up: through the maxim, the aphorism is showing, and through the aphorism, the fragment(s) is speaking. Then, from Deleuze and Guattari's linguistic and philosophical conceptualisations, and thanks to Blanchot and Eisenstein, the concept of fragment(s) is constructed, which is defined as the instant of the meeting that is the experiment of a process of deindividualizing subjectivation (between author, work and reader), on the threshold of the eternal return. Finally, armed with this concept, a grasp of the Nietzschean's text is proposed – reading(s) of Nietzsche. By reviewing the editorial history of Nietzsche's texts (history which combine philology and philosophy in the Nietzschean's figure of the centaur) the four appendix of this thesis are then constructed – and they are forming one body with it. Besides three of them included in the body thesis, the fourth – about the genealogical method that is defined by Nietzsche or Foucault – is the second volume's subject (ex corpore thesis). These vade-me(te)cum are picking of fragment(s) within the Oeuvres philosophiques complètes edited by Colli and Montinari and are meant to be as the same time, as this actual thesis, theory and practice of the fragment(s)

Ce travail s'efforce de préciser le statut de la physiologie dans la pensée de Nietzsche, qui prend de manière générale "le corps comme fil conducteur ". Notre point de départ est l'idée que le corps lui-même " connaît" et " pense ", la pensée consciente n'étant qu'un épiphénomène de cette forme primitive d'appréhension du monde. Cela oblige à réévaluer la physiologie philosophique de Nietzsche, rarement étudiée pour elle-même. Adopter ce point de vue fondamental, génétiquement premier, permet en outre de mieux comprendre l'éthique naturaliste de Nietzsche et de proposer une nouvelle interprétation de la "grande politique ", à partir notamment d'un rapprochement avec le projet platonicien d'élevage d'une aristocratie du corps et de l'esprit. Nous examinons tout particulièrement l'approche physiologique dans son rapport à la question de l'héritage axiologique, puisque les jugements de valeur sont hérités pour Nietzsche.

Qand on lit les ouvrages qui paraissent sur friedrich nietzsche depuis plus de cent ans, on ne peut qu'etre etonne de la multiplicite des interpretations proposees au sujet de cet auteur (interpretations differentes, quand elles ne son pas contradictoires : chretien et antichretien, philosemite et antisemite, psychologue de l'ame feminine et misogyne. . . ). Quand on lit, le texte de nietzsche en entier, il n'est pas possible de ne pas relever une inquietude veritablement obsessionnelle de l'auteur, quant a la lecture de son texte. Philologue classique de formation, nietzsche est conscient du role actif joue par le lecteur dans le devenir de l'ecrit 'abandonne' par l'ecrivain. Cette prise de conscience, l'amene a tisser dans la trame de son texte un veritable portrait du lecteur ideal : un ami, alter ego dans la souffrance, comme lui philologue ayant su depasser la philologie traditionnelle en l'ouvrant vers les perspectives philolosophiques, mais egalement poete et musicien. Nietzsche est tres conscient de l'impossibilite de trouver ce lecteur, monstre de perfections. Par contre, il sait tres bien quels lecteurs il refuse : le grand public, le fanatiques, les partis politiques et les representants de la culture allemaznde de son epoque dans un futur plus ou moins proche de la sienne. Ensuite le philologue disseque l'activite de lecture. Il sait ce que peuvent subir certains livres entre les mains des lecteurs (les ecrits de democrite, pascal, scot erigene, schopenhauer. . . ). Les lecteurs jugent en fonction de la culture de leur epoque, et par la lecture, ils introduisent dazns le texte leurs propres valeurs et en fonction des forc qui les habitent (leur volonte de puissance), ils interpretent ce que l'auteur a dit, puis presentent cette interpretati comme le sens du texte. Or nietzsche a peur de ce que les mauvazis lecteurs vont pouvoir faire de ses textes. Parce que ces lecteurs risquent d'introduire par leur interpretation des valeurs que nietzsche justement denonce par son choix d'ecriture. Le texte nietzscheen, n'est pas un discours charge de sens a expliquer, mais une perspective a
When one reads the works written about nietzsche over more than a hundred years, one cannot help but be surprises by the number of interpretations offered about this author (different interpretations, often contradictory, christian and anti-christian, philosemite and antisemite, psychologist of the female soul and misotynist. . . ). When one read the complete works of nietzsche it is impossible not to highlight a truly obsessional worry about the people reading his texts. Having a classic philologian education, nietzsche is conscious of the active role played by the reader in thefuture of the writing 'abandoned' by the author. This awareness, brings him to weave the portrait of the ideal reader into the theme of his work : a friend, an alter ego of his sufferance, a philologist like himself who has managed to surpass traditional philology by opening it to philosophical perspectives, but also a poet and a musician nietzsche is very conscious of the impossibility of finding this reazder, the perfect monster. On the other hand, he knows full well the readers he refuse : the general public, the fanatics, the political parties and the german culture of the period. His hope of being well-read, brings him to hope of finding the right readers in another country france, in another epoch in the near or distant future. Then the philologian dissects the activity of reading. He knows what certain books can undergo in the hands of some readers (the writings of democriteus, pascal, scot erigene, schopnhauer. . . ). The readers base their judgement on the culture of their period, and by their reading, they introduce their own values into the texts. Their internal forces of holding power (die wille zur macht) lead them to interprete what the author has said and ther present the interpretation as being the meaning of the text. However, nietzsche was afraid of what the wrong type of reader was going to do to his works because, by their interpretation they risked inteoducing the very values that

Contre l'éducation moderne qui instille des valeurs dévitalisantes, dresse et domestique pour le plus grand péril de la vraie culture qui élève l'homme au lieu de le rapetisser, Nietzsche propose l'éducation dionysiaque. Le problème de l'ennoblissement de l'homme a très tôt préoccupé Nietzsche. C'est pourquoi il prône l'élevage d'individus de caractère, les aristocrates de l'esprit qui ouvrent la voie au surhumain. L'éducation comme promotion de la plus haute noblesse de l'homme ne doit pas procéder à l'éradication de la puissance mais bien plutôt à sa promotion. Ce n'est donc pas l'homme théorique qui doit être visé, mais l'homme total qui prend le corps pour guide, parce qu'il en appelle au réarmement des pulsions et des affects que les Morales ont jusqu'ici condamné. Et c'est le philosophe médecin et législateur qui doit désormais être au centre de l'éducation en lieu et place des théologiens et des sacerdotaux. Parce qu'elle est par-delà bien et mal, l'éducation dionysiaque est dure pour les ratés et les avortons. En face d'eux, il y a ceux qui sont mûrs pour cette éducation qui fait la promotion de la vie. L'éducation nietzschéenne permet la distinction entre le type fort et le type faible
Against Modern education which imposes painful values, erects and domesticates individuals at the risk of real culture which promotes the individual instead of making him seek and smaller, Nietzsche proposes the dionysiac education. Nietzsche was the earliest to have expressed concern on the problem of ennobling man. Therefore, had he advocated the education of individuals who have potentiality, and the education of spirited aristocrats which paves the way to superpower human. Education as a human highest production and as the expression of man's highest mobility must not any more proceed to the eradication of power, but on the contrary, it must proceed to promoting power. Therefore, its target will not be the theoretical man, but simply man in his entirety, that man who considers corporal cogito as guide because it brings about the rejection of intellectual garbage's together which pulsions that moralities have so far condemned. The incorporation of new values imposes itself as consequences. Henceforth, it is the responsibility of the surgeon philosopher and legislator to be at the centre of education rather than theologians and sacerdotals. Because education represents among other things, good and evil, dionysiac education is a tough one for rascals and runts and allow then the distinction between aware of it and strong on the one hand, and, the sick and weak individuals on the other one

Ce travail se propose, non pas de presenter un expose, ni encore moins une synthese de la philosophie ou de la theologie de nietzsche. En effet, etant donne le caractere extrement fragmentaire et disperse de la pensee nietzscheenne, une telle entreprise serait, desle depart, vouee a l'echec. Ce que nous nous donnons comme tache est de faire ressortir le paradoxe tel que nietzsche l'exprime par son ecriture et, donc, par la diversite de perspectives et de relectures qu'il opere dans les domaines de l'art, de la science, de la religion, de la morale, de la philosophie et de la culture en general. On ne trouvera donc pas, dans cette these, un chapitre qui exposerait de maniere suivie et systematique ce que serait le paradoxe chez nietzsche. En effet, si nous concevons le texte nietzscheen comme ecart, comme ce qui resiste ou echappe a la priose du discours en tant que tel, ce serait se meprendre que de vouloir trouver un fondement ou un modele garantissant et expliquant la pluralite de sens qu'entraine le deploiement de son ecriture. Autant dire que la pensee nietzscheenne ne se donne que dans la mesure meme ou elle se masque, se re-lit, se "dedit" et se derobe a toute mainmise, a toute maitrise et a toute interpretation
Our purpose, in this work, is not to explain, nor to present a synthesis of nietzsche's philosophy and theology. Since his thought is extremely fragmentary and scattered throughout his writings, such a task would be condemned, from the beginning, to the failure. Our purpose, indeed, is to stress the paradox as it appears through nietzsche's writing and, so, through the vaiety of perspectives, of readings and reinterpretations on the fields of art, science, religion, moral, philosophy and on the other cultural expressions. Therefore, no chapter will explain systematically, formally or constinously what would constitute the nietzschean paradox. Since we conceive the nietzsche's text to be a detour or a way which resists and avoids all leading and controlling discourse, it would be unreasonable to seek a ground or a standard by which his writing and its diversity of meanings would be assured and justifyed. That being so, nietzsche's thought develops through and from a continous play of "contradictions", anbiguities, masks and reevaluations

La conception nietzschéenne du corps s’oppose à la conception mécaniste qui domine la science de son temps : le corps n’est pas composé d’atomes en mouvement ; il forme une hiérarchie de volontés de puissances. En même temps, le corps constitue mon moi véritable : l’existence d’un principe intellectuel extérieur au corps est une illusion. Dans la mesure où l’essence du corps est l’essence même du monde, c’est-à-dire la volonté de puissance, et que le corps constitue également le lieu de mon expérience la plus intime, il est l’authentique fil conducteur de la connaissance. Pourtant, le corps ne se révèle pas à lui-même immédiatement : en tant que volonté de puissance, il interprète, c’est-à-dire transforme et falsifie ; et une telle transformation s’opère également au sein de la conscience intime. Aussi, le corps, fil conducteur de la connaissance, est également principe d’erreur. La connaissance, qui n’est pas possible en dehors du corps, ne saurait donc pourtant être gagnée que contre le corps, c’est-à-dire au terme d’un effort ascétique
Nietzsche’s comprehension of the body is opposed to the mechanistic conception which dominates the science of his time: the body is not composed of atoms in motion; it forms a hierarchy of wills to power. At the same time, the body is my authentic self: the existence of an intellectual principle outside the body is an illusion. Insofar as the essence of the body is the essence of the world, that is to say, the will to power, and the body also is the place of my most intimate experience, it forms the true way to knowledge. However, the body does not reveal itself to itself immediately: As will to power, he interprets, that is to say, transforms and falsifies; and such a transformation also takes place in the inner consciousness. Therefore, the body, only way to knowledge, is also principle of error. Knowledge, which is not possible outside the body, can though be won only against the body, that is to say, as result of an ascetic effort