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Williams, Pedro S. "Metaphysics of normativity". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2015. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/81672/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStow, Diana L. "Metaphysics and pornography". Thesis, University of Sussex, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.336153.
Pełny tekst źródłaWinkler, Rafael. "Nature, technics, metaphysics". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.443962.
Pełny tekst źródłaWhittington, Lee John. "Metaphysics of luck". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20409.
Pełny tekst źródłaWith these two considerations in mind, the latter of which that can only be held through the adoption of the modal account of luck I have offered, the problem may be resolved.
Carmichael, Chad. "Foundations of metaphysics /". May be available electronically:, 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/login?COPT=REJTPTU1MTUmSU5UPTAmVkVSPTI=&clientId=12498.
Pełny tekst źródłaSaha, Bishnupriya. "Possibility of Metaphysics". Thesis, University of North Bengal, 2022. http://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/4782.
Pełny tekst źródłaEvans, Deborah Jasmine Elizabeth. "Writing against the other : a comparative study of temporality in the early existential narrative of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir". Thesis, University of Sussex, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.340854.
Pełny tekst źródłaHoffman, Dylan Kirk. "Jung and Plotinus| The Shadow of Metaphysics, the Metaphysics of Shadow". Thesis, Pacifica Graduate Institute, 2016. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10242189.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis study provides a comparative analysis, using dialectical hermeneutics, of the philosophy of Plotinus and the depth psychology of C. G. Jung. While coming from different historical contexts, they each address the nature of unconsciousness, or the unconscious. This study concentrates in particular on one archetypal aspect of the unconscious that Jung calls the shadow. According to Jung, the shadow is a psychological dynamic that both hides from our awareness certain aspects or depths of our own inner reality, and also, when recognized, mediates our initial confrontation with those fuller realities. The first aim of this study is to analyze Jung’s view of the psyche, through the lens of shadow, to reveal the shadow in Jung’s work, examining how he denies or disavows metaphysical reality as a legitimate domain of depth psychological inquiry. Secondly, the biographical and historical backgrounds to this shadow are explored, and the potential consequences of it are discussed. Finally, Plotinus’ ancient perspective on unconsciousness and what he understands as the metaphysics of shadow are brought into dialogue with Jung. The goal is to address the shadow in Jung’s work—what his view of depth psychology denies to depth psychology, offering another way of understanding the psyche, and the shadow in particular, that includes metaphysical reality as a legitimate domain of depth psychological experience and analysis.
BOGEA, DIOGO BARROS. "METAPHYSICS OF WILL, METAPHYSICS OF IMPOSSIBLE: THE PULSIONAL DIMENSION AS EXCLUDED MIDDLE". PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2016. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=27203@1.
Pełny tekst źródłaCOORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
Nietzsche e Heidegger delineiam os caminhos que se entrecortam dando origem ao nosso horizonte de questões: É ainda possível um pensamento que resista ao mesmo tempo à tentação de uma fundamentação absoluta, mas também ao furor desenfreado da maquinação calculadora? É ainda possível um pensamento que se coloque em condições de compreender e também de se posicionar criticamente tanto em relação aos fundamentalismos nostálgicos, quanto em relação à pura efetividade e produtividade que a tecnociência nos impõe? É possível, afinal, distanciar-se da metafísica tradicional sem recair na ingenuidade anti-metafísica de uma superação definitiva e segura? É ainda possível uma outra metafísica? Partindo desse universo inicial de questões procuramos apontar que a metafísica da vontade, ao menos tal como desenvolvida por Nietzsche e pela psicanálise, traz ao primeiro plano uma dimensão estranha à tradição metafísica ocidental: a dimensão pulsional, este terceiro historicamente excluído entre matéria e espírito, corpo e mente, unidade e multiplicidade, mesmidade e diferença, configurando uma outra metafísica nem redutível à metafísica tradicional, nem simplesmente antimetafísica.
Nietzsche and Heidegger determinate the paths that intersect here giving birth to our horizon of questions: Is it possible a thought that resists the temptation of an absolute basis, but also to unbridled fury calculator machination? It is also possible that a thought is put in a position to understand and also to position itself critically in relation to both nostalgic fundamentalisms, and to pure effectiveness and productivity that technoscience imposes on us? It is possible, after all, to distance itself from traditional metaphysics without falling back into naivety anti-metaphysical definitive and safe overcome? Is it still possible to conceive any kind of other metaphysics? From this initial universe of questions we seek to point out that the metaphysics of the will, at least as developed by Nietzsche and psychoanalysis, brings to the fore a dimension strange to the Western metaphysical tradition: the instinctual dimension, this third historically excluded between matter and spirit, body and mind, unity and multiplicity, sameness and difference, setting another metaphysical not reducible to traditional metaphysics, nor simply anti-metaphysical.
Schlosser, Markus Ernst. "The metaphysics of agency /". St Andrews, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/163.
Pełny tekst źródłaBernecker, Sven. "The metaphysics of memory". [Dordrecht] Springer, 2002. http://d-nb.info/98670685X/04.
Pełny tekst źródłaOliver, Alexander Duncan. "The metaphysics of sets". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.319538.
Pełny tekst źródłaSchlosser, Markus E. "The metaphysics of agency". Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/163.
Pełny tekst źródłaBradley, Mark Christopher. "The metaphysics of qualia". Thesis, University of Leeds, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.493563.
Pełny tekst źródłaStoute, Dick A. "The metaphysics of information". Thesis, University of Reading, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.630446.
Pełny tekst źródłaMiller, Elizabeth Louise. "No Metaphysics within Physics?" Thesis, Harvard University, 2014. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11403.
Pełny tekst źródłaPhilosophy
Boothroyd, David. "Metaphysics and the other". Thesis, University of Warwick, 1987. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2539/.
Pełny tekst źródłaTahko, Tuomas E. "The necessity of metaphysics". Thesis, Durham University, 2008. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/2256/.
Pełny tekst źródłaMcLeod, Stephen K. "Modality and anti-metaphysics". Thesis, University of Glasgow, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.364089.
Pełny tekst źródłaOoms, Renard Nicole Marie Anne. "Plato's metaphysics of explanation". Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.324884.
Pełny tekst źródłaAytemiz, Volkan. "Theology in Aristotle’s Metaphysics". Thesis, University of Sussex, 2011. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/6335/.
Pełny tekst źródłaBlack, Joshua David. "Peirce's conception of metaphysics". Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2017. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/18188/.
Pełny tekst źródłaSimpson, Matthew William Harris. "Non-representationalism and metaphysics". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2017. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/267949.
Pełny tekst źródłaGraham, Andrew J. (Andrew John). "The significance of metaphysics". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/68914.
Pełny tekst źródła"September 2011." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 74-78).
In this thesis, I investigate the nature of metaphysics and the role it plays in our broader theoretical pursuits. In doing so, I defend it against various criticisms and offer a novel conception of why metaphysical disputes are important. In Chapter One I address the general question of when disputes are defective and when they are worth taking seriously. I first criticize one popular way of answering this question that appeals to the difference between verbal and factual disputes. Verbal disputes involve divergence in what the participants mean by their terms and some think that metaphysical disputes are defective in this way. I argue that this approach fails because the verbal/factual distinction is incapable of doing the work this view requires of it. I then offer an alternative view where the status of a dispute depends on its role in our theorizing. Worthwhile (or, as I call them, significant) disputes are those with appropriate connections to the rest of our theorizing while defective (or insignificant) disputes are insular, with no implications for anything beyond themselves. In Chapter Two I apply the framework developed in the previous chapter to a pair of ontological disagreements: those over the existence of concrete possible worlds and coincident material objects, like a statue and its clay. The question is whether ontological disputes like these have the requisite theoretical connections to render them significant. I argue that they do. I then address some general reasons for doubting their significance, arguing that they are not compelling. In Chapter Three I contrast my approach with some other recent defenses of metaphysics, with particular focus on the views developed by Theodore Sider. Metaphysics is, on these views, an inquiry into the world's fundamental structure. I argue that this approach is unsatisfactory because it cannot guarantee that metaphysical disputes are significant in the way I describe. It thus threatens to render metaphysics irrelevant to our other theoretical activities, undermining many of its legitimate successes, like the role theorizing about metaphysical modality played in the development of modal logics applicable in many different fields.
by Andrew Graham.
Ph.D.
McKitrick, Jennifer (Jennifer Louise) 1964. "The metaphysics of dispositions". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9368.
Pełny tekst źródłaIncludes bibliographical references.
As Nelson Goodman put it, things are full of threats and promises. A fragile glass, for example, is prone to shatter when struck. Fragility is the glass's disposition, shattering is the manifestation of the disposition, and striking is the circumstances of manifestation. The properties of a fragile glass which are causally efficacious for shattering constitute the causal basis of the glass's fragility. The glass can remain fragile even if it never shatters. One can say of the fragile glass, with certain qualifications, that if it were struck, it would shatter. This much is common ground among philosophers who discuss dispositions. In my dissertation, I defend three claims about dispositions that are more controversial. Some philosophers have claimed that dispositions are causally impotent. I disagree. In my first chapter, I defend the claim that dispositions can be causally efficacious with respect to their manifestations. Among the arguments I consider is the "no work" argument, according to which a disposition's causal basis causally explains its manifestation, leaving no causal work for the disposition to do. I respond to this argument by challenging the Principle of Explanatory Exclusion, according to which complete explanations exclude competitors. Furthermore, many philosophers hold that all dispositions must have independent causal bases. In my second chapter, I challenge this view, and defend the possibility of bare dispositions. I argue that the concept of a bare disposition is coherent, and show why arguments recently offered against bare dispositions, such as those based on the Truth Maker Principle, do not succeed in demonstrating that they are impossible. Another common assumption about dispositions is that they must be intrinsic properties of the objects that have them. In my third chapter, I challenge this assumption, and argue that some dispositions are extrinsic properties. Consider the property vulnerability. It seems dispositional in character; something which is vulnerable is susceptible to harm, but is not necessarily being harmed right now. However, it seems as if something could lose the property of being vulnerable without undergoing any intrinsic change. Build a fortress around the vulnerable object and it ceases to be vulnerable.
by Jennifer McKitrick.
Ph.D.
Clark, Michael John. "The metaphysics of grounding". Thesis, University of Manchester, 2013. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-metaphysics-of-grounding(b967c39a-efc9-4e62-b785-fc02fec20a89).html.
Pełny tekst źródłaCorti, Alberto. "The Metaphysics of Spin". Doctoral thesis, Urbino, 2022. http://hdl.handle.net/11576/2701957.
Pełny tekst źródłaChua, David. "Metaphysical accounts of modality: A comparative evaluation of Lewisian and neo-Aristotelian modal metaphysics". Thesis, Department of Philosophy, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/9001.
Pełny tekst źródłaHoffmann-Kolss, Vera. "The metaphysics of extrinsic properties". Frankfurt, M. [i.e.] Heusenstamm Paris Lancaster New Brunswick, NJ Ontos-Verl, 2008. http://d-nb.info/1002533007/04.
Pełny tekst źródłaNey, Alyssa L. "The metaphysics of unified science /". View online version; access limited to Brown University users, 2005. http://wwwlib.umi.com/dissertations/fullcit/3174649.
Pełny tekst źródłaWilson, Aaron. "The metaphysics of privileged properties". Thesis, University of Manchester, 2016. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-metaphysics-of-privileged-properties(3e025ad0-b4c5-4a71-b2dd-e04520da54c8).html.
Pełny tekst źródłaStein, Nathaniel. "The metaphysics of Aristotelian explanation". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.530078.
Pełny tekst źródłaAdams, Danielle Helen. "The metaphysics of divine causation". Thesis, University of Leeds, 2016. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/15561/.
Pełny tekst źródłaRoche, David. "Biodiversity: Its Measurement and Metaphysics". University of Sydney. Unit for the History and Philosophy of Science, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/819.
Pełny tekst źródłaBell, Ian Hamilton. "Metaphysics as an Aristotelian science". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape11/PQDD_0005/NQ41400.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaDe-Blacquiere-Clarkson, Richard. "The metaphysics of mental representation". Thesis, Durham University, 2011. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/833/.
Pełny tekst źródłaGibb, Sophie Catherine. "The metaphysics of mental causation". Thesis, Durham University, 2002. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3863/.
Pełny tekst źródłaKirchin, Simon Thomas. "The metaphysics of ethical values". Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.339961.
Pełny tekst źródłaHay, Michael Charles Munro. "Russell on logic and metaphysics". Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.272639.
Pełny tekst źródłaBoulding, Jamie Timothy. "The multiverse and participatory metaphysics". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2019. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/290140.
Pełny tekst źródłaPage, James Hampton. "On the metaphysics of numbers". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14139.
Pełny tekst źródłaSmith, Thomas. "The metaphysics of corporate agency". Thesis, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2007. http://sas-space.sas.ac.uk/804/.
Pełny tekst źródłaDoyle, Tsarina. "Nietzsche on epistemology and metaphysics". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2002. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/73124/.
Pełny tekst źródłaBuiles, David(David Alan). "The empirical relevance of metaphysics". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/127150.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from the official PDF of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
Are metaphysical debates relevant to ordinary empirical inquiry? This dissertation collects a series of papers which answers in the affirmative. The first part of the dissertation is concerned with inductive inference. I argue that we shouldn't expect the world to be amenable to induction if orthodox versions of Humeanism or Non-Humeanism are correct. I then develop and defend a hybrid view, a 'Humean Non-Humeanism', which has a better hope of vindicating inductive inference. The second part of the dissertation is concerned with self-locating belief. While puzzles regarding self-locating belief are often motivated by certain fanciful thought experiments, it has recently been argued that the epistemology of self-locating belief is of central concern to many of the deepest questions in fundamental physics: including the interpretation of quantum mechanics, large-scale cosmology, and the (alleged) fine-tuning of the universe. I begin by arguing that the correct epistemology of self-locating belief is also relevant to classic debates in the metaphysics of time. By exploiting the fact that different theories in the metaphysics of time classify different sorts of facts as 'merely indexical' facts, it can be shown that different views in the metaphysics of time make different empirical predictions. I then turn to argue for the correct epistemology of self-locating belief on metaphysical grounds. I first argue for some conditional claims: if one holds certain (controversial) metaphysical views regarding the nature of objects, properties, and identity across time, then one should uphold a particular theory of self-locating belief. I then go on to argue for an overall metaphysical picture that vindicates these views concerning the nature of objects, properties, and identity across time.
by David Builes.
Ph. D. in Linguistics
Ph.D.inLinguistics Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
Roche, D. M. "Biodiversity its measurement and metaphysics /". Connect to full text, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/819.
Pełny tekst źródłaTitle from title screen (viewed Apr. 24, 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science to the Unit for the History and Philosophy of Science, Faculty of Science. Degree awarded 2002; thesis submitted 2001. Includes bibliography. Also available in print form.
Benschop, Hans Peter. "Berkeley on method and metaphysics /". Leiden : Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, 1992. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb357653445.
Pełny tekst źródłaBell, Ian. "Metaphysics as an Aristotelician science /". Sankt Augustin : Academia, 2004. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb39114570h.
Pełny tekst źródłaSpencer, Cara (Cara J. ). 1971. "On the metaphysics of belief". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9767.
Pełny tekst źródłaIncludes bibliographical references (leaves [119]-121).
There is a traditional picture of belief, according to which someone's having a belief is that person's standing in a certain relation to an abstract object, a proposition. My dissertation examines the metaphysical demands that two problems for this picture of belief make on these abstract objects. The first problem comes to us from Frege's "On Sense and Reference," and the second concerns a certain sort of one's beliefs about oneself, which I call "indexical belief." Frege notes that someone can believe that Hesperus is Hesperus without believing that Hesperus is Phosphorus. It is a short step from Frege's observation to the claim that the sentence "A believes that Hesperus is Hesperus" could be true while "A believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus" is false. Quine has insisted that we cannot address this problem by taking either of these sentences to express a predication of the referent of both names, the planet Venus, as then both sentences would express the same predication of the same object, and this stands in evident tension with the fact that they can differ in truth value. In a recent response to Frege's problem, Mark Richard has taken exactly the route Quine has warned against. In my first chapter, I show that Richard's response is unsuccessful. I then consider the implications of the failure of his response on his proposed semantics for belief and the philosophical motivation he provides for it. I argue that his semantics for belief ascriptions stands in serious tension with its purported philosophical motivation. In the second and third chapters, I turn to the problem about indexical belief. The task of the second chapter is to identify this problem. To this end, I consider three of John Perry's arguments that the traditional picture of belief cannot accommodate indexical belief. I show that even if these arguments are sound, they give us no reason to think that the problem about indexical belief is in any way unique. I then suggest that there is a special problem about indexical belief, despite the failure of these three arguments to isolate it. Special difficulties attend an account of what it is to retain a tensed belief over time, and I suggest that the special problem about indexical belief is, in brief, a generalization of this problem about retention of tensed belief. In the third chapter, I raise the problem about indexical belief in a new way, as arising from a tension between several intuitively plausible claims about the relationship between beliefs and desires, on the one hand, and actions, on the other. This presentation of the problem brings out how the problem is special. I survey several solutions to this problem, including one due to Perry. I then argue that Perry's solution cannot characterize the specific kind of similarity between the beliefs of two different people who share an indexical belief. It allows too much to count as shared indexical belief. Thus Perry's solution inadequately addresses what I have suggested is the unique problem about indexical belief. Finally, I suggest that Frege's response to the problem I raise points the way towards an emendation of Perry's account that will enable it to suitably characterize the special way in which different people can share an indexical belief.
by Cara Spencer.
Ph.D.
Chambers, Ethan. "A Humean metaphysics of character". Thesis, Cardiff University, 2018. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/111840/.
Pełny tekst źródłaBasu, Saheli. "Samkhya metaphysics : some philosophical problems". Thesis, University of North Bengal, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1266.
Pełny tekst źródła