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Autor: Grafiati
Data publikacji: 4 czerwca 2021
Data aktualizacji: 6 lutego 2022

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1

Feeney, Thomas D. "Leibniz on Metaphysical Perfection". Thesis, Yale University, 2017. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10584944.

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Leibniz makes substantive use of harmony and metaphysical perfection, but he very rarely offers more than a brief gloss in direct explanation of these terms. I argue that they name the same fundamental property. The definition of metaphysical perfection (hereafter, "perfection") as unity-in-variety misleads if taken as a reduction of perfection to separately necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for anything to enjoy perfection. The definition of harmony in terms of intelligibility leads to the same underlying notion, for intelligibility is defined in terms of unity and variety.

Chapter 1 introduces the tension between Leibniz's substantive use of perfection and his demand that it meet a high standard of intelligibility. Chapter 2 argues that there is no satisfactory account of compossibility in the literature because each of the viable proposals misunderstands the role of perfection. The current dispute rests in a disagreement about the best reductive account of perfection: either to sheer variety, or to variety and unity as independently intelligible but inversely proportional criteria for perfection. Either way, incompossibility relations become externally applied limits on God's will to maximize the variety of existing substances. Leibniz rejects all such external limits. I propose a new solution, in which two possibles are compossible if and only if they are jointly thinkable, that is, if they are members of an ideal unity. This involves a distinction between the variety that does contribute to unity and the variety that does not—and this distinction requires that we already have some notion of perfection prior to the appeal to variety.

Chapter 3 develops this account of perfection and incompossibility further, by introducing another puzzle God aims to create the most perfect world, but worlds are aggregates and aggregates seem to rank too low in Leibniz's ontology to explain God's aim. What is the world that God would care for it? God, being wise, does not and would not will multiple times in creating. Rather, God creates multiple substances through a single act of will. Acts of creative will, though, are individuated by the agent's concept of the object. This suggests that groups of substances are unified into worlds by God's intellect thinking of their many essences under a single idea. This is Leibniz's limited Spinozism: he is a metaphysical atomist about existing things, but a holist about the ideal and its value.

Chapters 4 and 5 tell the story of how Leibniz came to these views. The narrative is helpful in part because it sheds some light on Leibniz's motivations. Also, I argue that the mistakes common to recent approaches to compossibility have textual support only from premature versions of Leibniz's account of perfection, versions Leibniz rejected in part because they generate the problems discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

Chapter 4 explores Leibniz's transition to philosophical maturity in the later 167os. He gave priority to the divine intellect throughout his career, but in the Paris Period, he left no work for the will at all: to exist is to be harmonious, and the existence of finite things depends directly on the divine intellect. This theory had theodicean advantages, but it also led to a necessitarianism just as absolute as Spinoza's. After studying Spinoza and leaving Paris, Leibniz placed the divine will between existence and harmony, or perfection. Perfection and harmony were now associated with God's ideas; coming to exist required, in addition, an act of God's will.

Having associated harmony with the possibles in God's mind, Leibniz now needed to explain why God does not maximize perfection by creating every substance. Chapter 5 deals with the gradual development after 1678, as Leibniz worked out how to determine the joint value of many independent substances. Just as previously he had separated existence from harmony while retaining a close connection between the two, the mature Leibniz distinguished harmony from the possible substances in God's mind. Harmony and perfection, on this final account, belong even to aggregates, which count as unities thanks only to their relation to a mind. With this in hand, Leibniz was finally in a position to argue that God leaves some possibles uncreated in order the maximize the perfection of what God does create.

Leibniz defended his commitment to a harmoniously limited, intelligible world by gradually distinguishing perfection from existence and from substantiality. Likewise, we profit by distinguishing Leibnizian perfection from (apparently) more accessible notions.

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2

Smith, Steven. "Metaphysical realism and moral realism". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.358535.

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3

Handel, James. "On content and metaphysical structure". Thesis, University of Sussex, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.311329.

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4

Harding, Matthew Ian. "Perception : a metaphysical analysis". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/21285.

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5

Carr, B. "Categorical description : Some contemporary metaphysical issues". Thesis, University of Exeter, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.379668.

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6

Haffner, John. "Post-metaphysical faith in the philosophy of Charles Taylor". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0001/MQ31213.pdf.

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7

Mariana, John D. "The indispensability of metaphysical realism". Diss., Connect to online resource - MSU authorized users, 2008.

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8

Chonabayashi, Ryo. "A defence of metaphysical ethical naturalism". Thesis, Cardiff University, 2012. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/26860/.

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This dissertation is a defence of metaphysical ethical naturalism according to which there is a moral reality which is part of the natural world. The implication of this view is that moral properties, such as moral goodness, justice, compassion and so forth are part of the natural world, and inquiries concerning these moral entities are conducted in similar empirical ways of reasoning to that in which scientific inquiries are conducted. I defend metaphysical ethical naturalism by a variety of explanationist argument in the tradition of Cornell realism. I examine preceding proposals for this argument, and focus on one version of it, which I call ‘the abductive argument for moral realism’. Although there was a suggestion about the abductive argument, the argument has not been discussed enough in the literature. This dissertation is a defence and discussion about the abductive argument which has not been properly examined. The defence of the argument requires the examination of how first-order ethical theory can be developed in the similar empirical ways scientific theories are developed. This will be an attempt to show the analogy between scientific inquiries and ethical inquiries. Describing the analogy between science and ethics, I will argue that the analogy can be best explained in terms of the approximate truth of normative theory which implies the existence of mind-independent natural moral properties.
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9

Heins, Barbara. "Giorgio de Chirico's metaphysical art and Schopenhauer's metaphysics : an exploration of the philosophical concept in de Chirico's prose and paintings". Thesis, University of Kent, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.332890.

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10

Allen, Sophie Rebecca. "Causation and the mind : metaphysical presuppositions in the philosophy of mind". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.392097.

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11

Pappas, Vangelis. "Aristotle on the metaphysical status of mathematical entities". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2019. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/290080.

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The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an account of the metaphysical status of mathematical entities in Aristotle. Aristotle endorses a form of realism about mathematical entities: for him as well as for Platonists, anti-realism, the view that mathematical objects do not exist, is not a viable option. The thesis consists of two main parts: a part dedicated to the objects of geometry, and a part dedicated to numbers. Furthermore, I have included an introductory chapter about a passage in the second chapter of Book B of the Physics (193b31- 194a7) where Aristotle endorses a form of naïve realism with regard to mathematical entities. Many of the passages that give us an insight into Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics are to be found in the third chapter of Book M of the Metaphysics. Aristotle's primary concern there, however, is not so much to present his own positive account as to provide answers to a series of (not so obvious) Platonic arguments. In the second chapter of my thesis, I discuss some of those arguments and highlight their role in Aristotle's own position about the metaphysical status of geometrical entities. In a passage that is of crucial importance to understand Aristotle's views regarding the mode of existence of the objects of mathematics (Meta. M.3, 1078a25-31), Aristotle allows for the potential existence of them. I argue that Aristotle's sketchy remarks in Meta. M.3 point towards a geometry based on the commonsensical notion of the solid. This account can be further developed if we take into consideration the purpose of the preceding chapter M.2: to refute Platonic arguments that attribute greater metaphysical status to 'limit entities' (entities bounding and within a physical body), that is, to points, lines, and surfaces. According to Aristotle, such 'limit entities' have only a potential existence-what does this claim amount to? To answer this question, I will explore a more traditional reading of this claim and I will also put forward a more radical one: from a contemporary perspective, this reading makes Aristotelian geometry a distant cousin of modern Whiteheadian or Tarskian geometries. Providing an account of the metaphysical status of number in Aristotle poses quite a few challenges. On the one hand, the scarcity of the evidence forces commentators to rely on a few scattered remarks (primarily from the Physics) and to extract Aristotle's own views from heavily polemical contexts (such as the convoluted arguments that occupy much of books M and N of the Metaphysics). On the other hand, the Fregean tradition casts a great shadow upon the majority of the interpretations; indeed, a great amount of the relevant scholarship is dominated by Fregean tendencies: it is, for example, widely held that numbers for Aristotle are not supposed to be properties of objects, much like colour, say, or shape, but second-order properties (properties-of-properties) of objects. The scope of the third chapter is to critically examine some of the Fregean-inspired arguments that have led to a thoroughly Fregean depiction of Aristotle, and to lay the foundations for an alternative reading of the crucial texts.
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12

Storozhenko, Mykyta. "Phenomenology and Metaphysical Realism". Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent158664365679686.

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13

Karagoz, Umut. "Is The Metaphysical Status Of". Master's thesis, METU, 2005. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12606862/index.pdf.

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The purpose of this study is to present the metaphysical status of &ldquo
language game&rdquo
in later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language and to deal with the revolutionary role of &ldquo
language-game&rdquo
by means of Hintikka&rsquo
s interpretation of later Wittgenstein. It is usual to divide Wittgenstein&rsquo
s work into the early and the later period. The early period is based upon the picture theory of meaning, according to which a sentence represents a state of affairs. On the other hand, the later period gives special emphasis on the actions of people and the role their linguistic activities. The early period ignored factual or cognitive meaning since it relied on mirroring the structure of state of affairs by sentences. So, early period of Wittgenstein was concluded that &ldquo
whereof we can&rsquo
t speak, thereof we must be silent.&rdquo
This idea gives clues about metaphysics of early Wittgenstein. In this sense, language is treated in abstraction from activities of human beings. In the later work, Wittgenstein emphasizes everyday usage of language in &ldquo
language-game&rdquo
as social activities of ordering, advising, measuring, and counting and so on. These different &ldquo
language-games&rdquo
make up &ldquo
form of life&rdquo
. &ldquo
Language game&rdquo
with other vital notions of later Wittgenstein, as &ldquo
form of life&rdquo
, &ldquo
agreement&rdquo
establishes language matrix. So, later period of Wittgenstein is a rejection of his early period. Actually, his treatment of philosophy and philosopher is different from his early period. In addition to this, later Wittgenstein mainly focuses on the principle of &ldquo
meaning=use&rdquo
which is called contextual theory of meaning. In his later period, Wittgenstein aims to bring back words from metaphysics to everyday usage. On the other hand, metaphysics still plays a role in his later period as his early period, although he altered his early philosophy of language. To sum up, the notion of &ldquo
language-game&rdquo
is conceptually/ ontologically prior to its rules. In this sense, Wittgenstein forms &ldquo
language-game&rdquo
as a model for the other social activities of human beings. Furthermore, &ldquo
language-game&rdquo
is regarded as a bridge between language and reality and it shows &ldquo
language-game&rdquo
s revolutionary role in later Wittgenstein.
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14

Mare, Marin Lucio. "Leibniz's More Fundamental Ontology: from Overshadowed Individuals to Metaphysical Atoms". Scholar Commons, 2016. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6311.

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I aim to offer an innovative interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy, first by examining how the various views that make up his ontology of individual substance involve a persistent rejection of atomism in natural philosophy and secondly, by exploring the significance of this rejection in the larger context of Seventeenth-century physics. My thesis is structured as a developmental story, each chapter analyzing the discontinuities or changes Leibniz makes to his views on individuation and atomism from his early to late years. The goal is to illuminate underrepresented views on individuals and atoms throughout Leibniz’s works and thus bring a clearer understanding of his philosophy. I, therefore, argue that the New System of Nature, published towards the end of Leibniz’s middle period (1695), marks an important landmark in his philosophical evolution, a radical terminological and ontological shift in his metaphysics of substance. Once Leibniz elaborates the concept of “simple substance,” the future synonym of “monad,” the problem of individuation of his early and middle years (1663-1686) becomes secondary. The focus changes from what makes substances “individual” to what makes them “simple” and truly “one,” i.e., “metaphysical” atoms. I prove that this shift was marked by a two-tiered critical confrontation: a first, direct confrontation, 1) with Descartes’ physics, through the critique of the notion of extended matter and of Descartes’ principle of individuation through shared motion and, a second confrontation, 2) with different strands of Seventeenth-century atomism, including Cartesian Gérauld de Cordemoy’s quasi-“metaphysical” atomism and its attempt at improving Descartes’ individuating principle. I claim that this double confrontation ultimately led Leibniz to formulate a more fundamental ontology, in terms of the “metaphysical atomism” of his Monadology (1714). My analysis complicates a persistent scholarly assumption in recent Leibniz studies, claiming that, throughout his entire career, Leibniz continued to hold the same fundamental positions on substance, individuation and, implicitly, atoms. Against this type of general continuity thesis, I show that: 1) far from being a constant concern, Leibniz’s interest in what makes substances individual fades towards the end of his life (New Essays 1703, correspondence with Samuel Clarke, 1714); 2) I trace the changing fate of some of Leibniz’s early and middle period views on substance and the individual (the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, space-time as individuating properties) in his late works; and 3) I prove the claim that Leibniz really embraced atomism, either for a short time or all throughout his philosophy is problematic. While he does refer to some sort of atoms during his Paris period (1672-1676), this is insufficient proof of a commitment to atomism. Instead, the episode has to be understood in the broader framework of a bundle of interrelated issues, such as the problem of the cohesion of bodies and the problem of minds or mind-like principles individuating those bodies. Thus, as I show through an analysis of Leibniz’s arguments against atomism in the correspondences with his scientific contemporaries (Christiaan Huyghens 1692-1695, Nicholas Hartsoeker 1706-1714), rejecting physical atomism remains a fundamental and surprisingly constant point of his philosophy.
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15

Johannesson, Karin. "God "pro nobis" : on non-metaphysical realism and the philosophy of religion /". Leuven : Peeters, 2007. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb41406385s.

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16

Johnson, Richard Philip. "MacIntyre, Kierkegaard, and the post-metaphysical critique of rational theology". Thesis, University of Bristol, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1983/a6dd25d9-8360-4e4a-bc6d-0a5e65a8dda0.

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17

Guo, Yunlong. "The structure of a metaphysical interpretation of science of history". Thesis, Cardiff University, 2018. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/115891/.

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The aim of this research is to reconstruct a metaphysical interpretation of the philosophy of history with regard to the spirit of historical thinking. The spirit of historical thinking is to emphasize the relation between what happened in the past and historical thinking about the past in the present. However, current philosophies of history, which are largely epistemologically oriented, have not adequately explored this relation. In order to investigate the relation between past and present, I refer to an Aristotelian philosophy of practice and politics, and adapt it to the domain of the philosophy of history, and argue the case for a metaphysical science of history. A metaphysical science of history contains two primary parts. They are the part on physis and the part on technê/phronēsis. With regard to physis that metaphysically investigates the natural generating progress of entities, I argue that the existence of historical events can be understood as a natural developing progress in which the events are ordered in a chronological sequence. Such chronological sequence is essentially the physis of history in the metaphysical sense (I characterize it as ‘Ordnungszeit’). For the part on technê/phronēsis, I demonstrate that Aristotelian knowing is for itself an action of knowing, which is located beyond a given temporal position in the past to both the past and the thinking present, and indicates the fundamental Beingness of history (I characterize it as ‘Geschehenszeit’). Finally I conclude that the historical eudaimonia, namely the pursuing of the completeness of historical knowledge, is the final presentation of actualizing Geschehenszeit, as it bridges the past and the present in accordance to the spirit of historical thinking.
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18

Acosta, López de Mesa Juliana. "Peirce's Idea of God as Metaphysical Condition for Freedom". OpenSIUC, 2011. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/theses/600.

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This thesis has as its main aim to present Peirce's project as an organic system that is able to provide a reasonable account of our complex experience of freedom. For this reason, in the first chapter I will maintain that there are three conditions of possibility for human freedom that can be established according to an attentive reading of Aristotle's works, namely, the contingency of the world, the existence of a being who can take advantage of the world's contingency, and the capacity of a person to decide his or her own idea of Happiness or final good in a human community. These conditions can be tracked, consolidated, and improved through Peirce's philosophy. It can be tracked, first of all, in their common perspective regarding the world's element of contingency and openness to growth. Second, both philosophers think that human beings have the power to decide and actively participate in the world through experience and habit. Finally, both grant an important role to community in their philosophies in order to give sense to persons' actions. After establishing this background, I will focus primarily on the detailed presentation of the first condition of possibility for freedom, that is, in Peirce's idea of God as a metaphysical condition for freedom. In the second chapter, I will explore the historical development of Peirce's cosmology, in order to show that Peirce's idea of God is not the product of a stubborn religious prejudice but a genuine achievement of his philosophy that harmonizes with his general project of an evolutionary philosophy open to critique and working hand in hand with science. Finally, in the third chapter, I will try to clarify further Peirce's idea of God in dealing with some misconceptions generated by standard religious notions of God and by the philosophical conception of the Absolute. Thus, I hope to present Peirce's idea of God as a middle ground between these two approaches. I will argue that, on the one hand, he wanted to propose an idea of God that is open to scientific critique, as is the conception of the philosophical Absolute. On the other hand, he defended an idea of God that has bearing upon our conduct of life and, therefore, is sentimental and approachable as is the idea of God proposed at least by Christian religion. As a result, Peirce's God works as a condition of possibility for freedom insofar as he is the living idea of a developmental telos open to growth. That is, Peirce provided an idea of a cosmos that shares with us the general features of being reasonable and free.
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19

Shaw, Julia Jane Anne. "Towards a metaphysical foundation for jurisprudence : a critical exposition of Kant's philosophy of law". Thesis, Lancaster University, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.268113.

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20

Miller, Elizabeth Louise. "No Metaphysics within Physics?" Thesis, Harvard University, 2014. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11403.

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This dissertation has three parts. In "Quantum Entanglement, Bohmian Mechanics, and Humean Supervenience," I defend David Lewis's metaphysical doctrine of Humean supervenience, and traditional metaphysical reductionism more generally, against an alleged holistic threat encapsulated in the non-separability argument from quantum entanglement. I argue that, contrary to popular belief, realism about quantum mechanics is compatible with Humean reductionism.
Philosophy
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21

Young, Brian Walter. "'Orthodoxy assail'd' : an historical examination of some metaphysical and theological debates in England from Locke and Burke". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.316004.

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22

Moseley, Darran A. "A philosophy of war". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1721.

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This thesis examines in four parts a collection of philosophical arguments dealing with war. The conclusions drawn are that war is a definable and applicable concept, that above the level of biological reactions war is the result of beliefs, that an objective distinction exists between aggressive and defensive actions, and that war is only justifiable in the protection of core rights. The first part analyses competing definitions of war. It is argued that the concept of war is philosophically appropriate and captures the conceptual common denominator between particular wars. The essence of war is defined as “a condition of open-ended violence”. Part Two explores the causal relationships between metaphysical and epistemological beliefs and war. It is held that war cannot be explained away as an unalterable fact of the universe, hence deterministic explanations fail in favour of the conclusion that wars are the product of ideas and ideas are volitionally obtained. The third part continues an exploration of determinist accounts of war and examines how various theories of human nature attempt to explain why war occurs. For methodological purposes human nature is trisected into biological, cultural, and rational aspects. Theories that attempt to interpret war using only a single aspect are inadequate, for each aspect must logically presuppose the existence and hence the influence of the others. It is concluded that human wars are the product of ideas, but ideas are distinguishable between tacit and explicit forms. Tacit forms of knowledge evolve through social interaction and sometimes have unintended consequences; war on the cultural level can be the product of human action but not of human design (Ferguson), hence attempts to abolish war by reason alone are bound to fail. Part Four assesses the application of ethical and political reasoning to war. It is argued firstly that morality, in the form of universalisable core rights and socially generated general rules of conduct, must not be removed from the sphere of war. Secondly it is concluded that the ideal just government exists to protect rights, from which it will follow that defensive wars and wars of intervention to protect rights are morally supportable.
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23

White, Barbara A., i mikewood@deakin edu au. "'Beyond God the father' : The metaphysical in a physical world". Deakin University. School of Literary and Communication Studies, 2002. http://tux.lib.deakin.edu.au./adt-VDU/public/adt-VDU20050825.154051.

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24

Dargan, Geoffrey David. "The possible self : an exposition and analysis of metaphysical themes in Kierkegaard's theological anthropology". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2016. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:939bc331-d3af-4144-8aac-f6fa6be95f0b.

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This thesis proposes that Søren Kierkegaard's thought - in particular, his theological anthropology - is undergirded by an inchoate metaphysics of modality. It focuses on the concept of possibility (Danish: Mulighed), arguing that possibility is a primary ingredient of the Kierkegaardian self and serves as a kind of 'engine' for the development of the individual before God. Accordingly, viewing Kierkegaard's works through the lens of possibility is a fruitful way to gain new insights into his beliefs, and clarifies what he sought to express in his authorship. Kierkegaard, I argue, formulates a multilayered account of possibility that, while not abandoning metaphysics, re-frames possibility existentially, in terms of what the self may actually become, not only in and for itself but also in relation to God. One's selfhood and one's relation to God both require an ontology of possibility. His existential concerns arise from this metaphysical footing. This thesis then considers how possibility is integral to human selfhood. Genuine selfhood is an openness towards God's eternal possibility, rather than the self's attempting to create its own eternal possibilities via some other means of actualization. If the human person, by faith, becomes 'grounded in the absolute', then that person is becoming a self precisely because God is actualizing her possibilities. God is for Kierkegaard the source of all possibility. Theologically, Kierkegaard's conception of possibility presents us with ideas that may be fruitful in further discussion of God's attributes and the ways in which God is understood to relate to the created world. Anthropology, ontology, and theology are thus inextricably linked.
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25

Deary, Janice L. ""A picture held us captive" : investigations towards an iconoclastic praxeology". Thesis, St Andrews, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/370.

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26

Elliott, Benjamin Wing. "An object under light : the metaphysical strength of light as revealed in Saint Augustine's Confessions". Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/23928.

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27

Minchin, Heather Marie. "Emotion in the digital age : Bergson's creative emotion and metaphysical methods for digital video production". Thesis, University of Exeter, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/11262.

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This PhD explores Bergsonian notions of duration and the unrepresentable characteristics of creative emotion. Contemplating emotion through Bergson’s duration assists an understanding of the measure of emotion’s quantitative multiplicity, the complexity of its qualitative multiplicity and its creative potential. The application of these ideas to the Deleuzian cinematic concepts of the movement-image and time-image, allows the exploration of digital and analogue cinematic techniques alongside the characteristics of representable and unrepresentable emotion. The analysis of emotion traverses various historical and contemporary subjects that include areas such as philosophy, science, art and digital sound and moving-image technology. Three video pieces created for this thesis illustrate and elucidate the theoretical argument. The first work deals with movement, duration and change, the second with coexistent time, memory and perception and the third with intuition the élan vital and creative emotion. Each film is intended to allow the viewer/listener to enter their own creative emotion. Thus the research revaluates and elevates the further potentials of emotion, beyond its mere representation in order to discover how its very nature, suggests new approaches to the creation of art work that is itself, able to reveal the nature and process of creative emotion.
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28

Milne, Douglas J. W., i res cand@acu edu au. "A Religious, Ethical and Philosophical Study of the Human Person in the Context of Biomedical Practices". Australian Catholic University. School of Philosophy, 2006. http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/digitaltheses/public/adt-acuvp148.26072007.

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From the book of Genesis the human person is presented as divine image-bearer, a Godlike status that is further explained in terms of the dual constitution of matter and spirit. Natural Law provides a person-centred ethic that draws on a number of human goods that emanate naturally from the human person and lead in practice to human flourishing. This theory empowers towards making ethical decisions in the interest of human persons. Aristotle explained the human being as a substantially existing entity with rational powers. By means of his form-matter scheme he handed on, by way of Boethius, to Aquinas, a ready model for the Christian belief in the dual nature of the human person as an ensouled body or embodied soul. Applying the new scientific method to the question of the human self David Hume concluded that he could neither prove nor disprove her existence. By so reasoning Hume indirectly pointed to the need for other disciplines than empirical science to explain the human person. Emmanuel Levinas has drawn on the metaphysical tradition to draw attention to the social and ethical nature of the human person as she leaves the trace of her passing through the face of the other person who is encountered with an ethical gravitas of absolute demand. The genesis of the human person most naturally begins at conception at which point and onwards the human embryo grows continuously through an internal, animating principle towards a full-grown adult person. The main conclusion is that biblical anthropology and metaphysical philosophy provide the needed structures and concepts to explain adequately the full meaning of the human person and to establish the moral right of the human person at every stage to respect and protection.
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29

Kooy, Brian Keith. "Between Being and Nothingness: The Metaphysical Foundations Underlying Augustine's Solution to the Problem of Evil". unrestricted, 2007. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-11302007-134955/.

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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007.
Title from file title page. Timothy M. Renick, committee chair; Tim O'Keefe, Louis A. Ruprecht, Jr., committee members. Electronic text (110 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Jan. 18, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 103-110).
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30

Cole, Julian C. "Practice-dependent realism and mathematics". Connect to resource, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1124122328.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005.
Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xi, 248 p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 244-248). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center
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31

Quinalia, Rineu [UNIFESP]. "Sobre o Belo em Platão: um estudo a respeito do Hípias Maior". Universidade Federal de São Paulo (UNIFESP), 2013. http://repositorio.unifesp.br/handle/11600/39309.

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O presente trabalho tem como objetivo oferecer uma leitura do Hípias Maior de Platão pretendendo discutir a respeito da possibilidade de o diálogo apresentar as primeiras discussões sobre o conceito inteligível do Belo.
This paper aims to offer a reading of Plato's Greater Hippias intending to discuss about the possibility of dialogue present the first discussions on the concept of Fine intelligible.
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32

Eddebo, Johan. "Death and the Self : A Metaphysical Investigation of the Rationality of Afterlife Beliefs in the Contemporary Intellectual Climate". Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-332097.

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This dissertation's purpose is to test the hypothesis that beliefs in the possibility of post-mortem survival can be rationally held within the context of the contemporary scientific and philosophical environment. In terms of criteria of rationality, a basic evidentialism is assumed, such that propositions which are sufficiently supported by the available evidence can be rationally held. With regard to the compatibility with contemporary science and philosophy, it follows as a further criterion that the relevant evidence must be satisfactorily anchored within the framework of these traditions. The relevant evidence concerns two levels. First, the basic level of the conceptual coherence of afterlife beliefs is addressed, so that the logical possibility of post-mortem survival can be established. Secondly, the viability of the metaphysics which are implied in the support of the logical possibility (i.e. the metaphysics needed to actualize post-mortem survival) is defended, establishing the metaphysical possibility of post-mortem survival. At this stage, reductive physicalism, which is the only position that effectively undermines post-mortem survival, is criticized, and the problem of interaction which burdens several of the survival-enabling ontologies is addressed. As for the criterion of scientific compatibility, it is further shown that contemporary physics are compatible with the survival-enabling metaphysics, and that contemporary physics can be argued to provide a moderate positive relevance with regard to these positions. The conclusion drawn is that belief in the possibility of post-mortem survival is not only rationally permissible within the framework of contemporary science and philosophy, but also rationally obligatory, i.e. that this possibility cannot rationally be denied with regard to the reviewed evidence.
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33

Matusek, Edward. "The Problem of Evil in Augustine's Confessions". Scholar Commons, 2011. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/3733.

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Augustine, the fourth-century Christian philosopher, is perhaps best-known for his spiritual autobiography Confessions. Two aspects of the problem of evil are arguably critical for comprehending his life in Books 1 through 9 of the work. His search for the nature and origin of evil in the various philosophies that he encounters (the intellectual aspect) and his struggles with his own weaknesses (the experiential aspect) are windows for understanding the actual dynamics of his sojourn. I defend the idea above by providing a fuller examination of the key role that both aspects play in his spiritual journey. Examining relevant events from Augustine's life chronologically, I analyze his philosophical wanderings from his encounter with Cicero's work Hortensius through his eventual disillusionment with the Manichaean religion, and finally, his move in the direction of Christian teachings with the help of Neo-Platonism. Along the way his philosophical questions (the intellectual aspect) and his struggles with his own depravity (the experiential aspect) have an effect on each other until his ultimate move toward Christianity resolves both problems of evil.
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34

Vasquez, Fernando. "Teism, naturalism och enkelhetsprincipen : En analys av två konkurrerande världsbilder och deras enkelhet". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-374479.

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In this essay I examine the plausibility of theism and naturalism. I will do this by applying the principle of simplicity as a criterion for measuring the probability of these two worldviews. Theism is the view that God exist as a transcendent being and that the ultimate reality is personal. Naturalism on the other side opposes theism and postulate that only the natural world exist and that the ultimate reality is impersonal. The principle of simplicity measures which of competing theories is simpler and one aspect of simplicity is that if a theory F is simpler than a competing theory H, then F postulates none or fewer ad hoc hypotheses than H. Another aspect of simplicity is that if H means postulating an explanation that goes beyond necessity and F does not, then F is simpler than H.    It is easy to think that theism, because it postulate a supernatural being, is more complex than naturalism. It is tempting to make the fast conclusion that theism is more ad hoc than naturalism, and because we can understand nature by using the naturalistic method that assumes that God does not intervene in nature, has the conclusion that theism is unnecessary. One of the reasons for making the above conclusion is because theism does not correspond well with background knowledge i.e. facts we know by experience to be true. Some philosophers assumes that we can use background knowledge to measure whether F is simpler than H. They assume that simpler metaphysical theories are those with more background assumptions into the body of the metaphysical theory. A crucial task in this essay will be to evaluate that assumption.   I propose that it is problematic to apply background knowledge when assessing the simplicity of metaphysical theories because assuming that one can measure metaphysical simplicity with background knowledge is to assume that all that exist is relatively symmetrical. Also, I suggest that naturalism is more ad hoc than theism when it comes to explain diverse phenomena in the world.
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35

Jordan, Matthew Carey. "Divine Attitudes and the Nature of Morality: A Defense of a Theistic Account of Deontic Properties". The Ohio State University, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1243652774.

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36

Polanowska, Beata. "Reading philosophy through literature : a study of Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz's novels "Farewell to autumn" and "Insatiability" and his metaphysical categories from a perspective of the philosophical work of Søren Kierkegaard". Thesis, University of Derby, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10545/208796.

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My thesis develops along several themes. I begin by looking at the relationship between literature and philosophy. I then study Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz's novels Farewell to Autumn and Insatiability, and his metaphysical categories from the perspective ofthe philosophical writing of Soren Kierkegaard. The first theme explores the question of the fusion of literature and philosophy and establishes a theoretical background for the analysis of novels through a philosophical perspective. It also provides an explanation for my choice of the hermeneutic methodology for the analysis I undertake in my thesis. The main aim of my thesis is the analysis of Witkiewicz's novels through the application of Kierkegaardian concepts. Referring to Kierkegaard's philosophy places my analysis in the domain of existentialism. I explore his concept of irony, as introduced in The Concept of Irony, and treat it not merely as a rhetorical figure but as a particular existential stance which accepts that human existence extends beyond the `here and now'. I provide an elaboration ofthe philosophical nature of Kierkegaardian irony when I explore his understanding of existence as being a process of continuous becoming in the quest for knowledge, as portrayed in The Concept of Anxiety. Subsequently, I employ Kierkegaardian philosophical irony in the analysis of Witkiewicz's work. Initially, I refer Kierkegaard's concepts to Witkiewicz's metaphysical categories and by so doing emphasize their existential character. I then employ them in the analysis of Witkiewicz's novels as I treat his narratives as a realisation of existential themes. I study the way the existential nature of Farewell to Autumn and Insatiability is manifested. The model of Kierkegaardian irony enables me to treat Witkiewicz's playfulness as a particular expression of an ironical stance. I study the variety of forms his playfulness takes. I look at the way it has been expressed in the development of his fictional world and through the language and style of the narrative, which together create the overall impression that Witkiewicz's narratives constitute a particular playful communication between the author and reader. I also indicate that this playfulness accompanies, or is an expression of, deep concern for the most fundamental questions about human existence. I indicate the direct and indirect presence of existential reflections in the text. As a result I demonstrate that Witkiewicz's novels constitute a playful, ironical expression of profoundly existential reflections about human existence, and in this way, encompass his own quest for meaning.
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37

Creighton, Theresa A. "Freedom and the Ideal Republican State: Kant, Jefferson, and the Place of Individual Freedom in the Republican Constitutional State". unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-06112008-123804/.

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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008.
Title from file title page. Melissa M. Merritt, committee chair; Andrew J. Cohen, Sandra Dwyer, committee members. Electronic text (85 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 9, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 82-85).
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38

Conway, William. "The deep extent of mental autonomy". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/1722.

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The central aim of this thesis is to argue that the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation presents a stronger constraint on what counts as a satisfactory statement of the relation between the mental and the physical than can be acknowledged within the metaphysical framework of non-reductive physicalism. Although the chief merit of non-reductive physicalism appears to be its ability to respect the irreducibility of mental concepts to physical concepts, whilst respecting the primacy of the physical ontology, I claim that its commitment to the principles of physicalism prevents that framework from being able to accommodate what I will refer to as the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation. The deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation manifests itself in the fact that the work carried out by mentalistic explanations is completely separate from the work carried out by physicalistic explanations. I claim that the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation cannot be recognised within a metaphysical framework which claims to recognise the primacy of the physical ontology because recopsing deep autonomy requires giving up the assumption that the mental must be related to the physical in the manner appropriate to discharging such metaphysical principles. I defend the claim that we can recognise the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation if we take our successful explanatory practices as the starting point of our investigation, and only then revert to the question of how best to articulate the relation between the mental and the physical. My claim is that there is an intrinsic connection between the nature of the mental and the nature of human relationships, and I therefore suggest that the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation ought to be understood in connection with the autonomous nature of human relationships. The basic ideas in this thesis are derived by combining features of Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations with features of John MacMurray’s approach to human relationships. On the basis of this combination, I argue for the more specific claim that there is an intrinsic connection between what it means to say that an individual has the capacity to think and what it means to say that he has the capacity to be involved in various types of human relationships. This connection is then used to develop a non-causal account of human action to challenge the physicalist ’s causal account, which will be used to support the claim that mentalistic explanations are autonomous with respect to physicalistic explanations in the deeper sense. I conclude by arguing that the considerations which put us in position to recognise the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation ought to constrain our statement of the relation between the mental and the physical, and I suggest that this statement should be consistent with the way in which mentalistic and physicalistic explanations carry out their work in our explanatory practices. I claim that individuals are subject to mentalistic explanations in so far as they have a life to live in the world with other people, and that individuals are subject to physicalistic explanations in so far as human beings are creatures whose life has a natural biological dimension. But rather than identifying the mental with the physical, and thereby compromise the deeper extent of the autonomous nature of mentalistic explanation, I suggest that this relation might be understood in terms of the fact that the mental is embedded in the dimension of human life which is constituted by the involvement of individuals in various types of relationshps with each other, and that the dimension of human life in which physicalistic explanations are operative is presupposed as the causal background which must be in place if individuals are to have such a life to live in the world.
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39

Fromm, Wikström Linda. "Gud och vardagsspråket : En religionsfilosofisk förutsättningsanalys". Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska fakulteten, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-122168.

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The main purpose of this dissertation is to answer the question of how one can understand the fact that we mean very different things when we say that God exists and when we say that chairs, mountains and trees exist, and that it is still a matter of existence. On the one hand it seems that we talk about the same thing when we say that something exists, irrespective of what it is, on the other hand it seems to be a question of very different things depending on what it is we are talking about as existing. This dissertation seeks to give an understanding of the relation between the concept of truth and the concept of reality. The conclusion is not only that we presuppose these concepts in everything we do, say, believe and think, but that we presuppose a specific understanding of these concepts, namely a concept of objective truth and a concept of an external and mind independent reality. In this dissertation it is also argued that our use of these concepts and that we use them in everything we do – that they are as basic as they are – says something about how it is, about reality. The use of these concepts does not only say something of what we conceptually presuppose but it also says something about what we assume in relation to reality. The conceptual aspect, in this way, has consequences ontologi.
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40

Duguid, Callum James. "Humean metaphysics and the philosophy of science". Thesis, University of Leeds, 2017. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/18464/.

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Humeanism is often taken to be a prime example of metaphysics which has failed to be sufficient attention to contemporary science. I argue that these claims have been made too hastily: there are moves available to Humeans which bring the account closer to scientific practice while still preserving the spirit of the view. The thesis comprises two parts. In the first half, I deal with the Best System Account of laws, and consider how it ought to treat initial conditions. From there, I turn to the question of whether Humean laws can explain events. This has recently been a topic of renewed interest in the literature and I disentangle the various claims philosophers have made on behalf of Humeanism. From these, I identify three promising responses to the argument that Humean explanations are circular. In the second half of the thesis, I consider how the Humean approach to laws can be extended to cover symmetry principles when the latter are understood as laws of laws. In response to a problem concerning properties and language, I suggest that the account go language-relative. The result of this is a regularity-based approach that can incorporate both laws and their symmetries into a single unified framework. Finally, I draw upon some examples from biology to indicate how the account can deal with the special sciences.
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41

Stow, Diana L. "Metaphysics and pornography". Thesis, University of Sussex, 1991. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.336153.

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42

Hoffman, Dylan Kirk. "Jung and Plotinus| The Shadow of Metaphysics, the Metaphysics of Shadow". Thesis, Pacifica Graduate Institute, 2016. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10242189.

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This study provides a comparative analysis, using dialectical hermeneutics, of the philosophy of Plotinus and the depth psychology of C. G. Jung. While coming from different historical contexts, they each address the nature of unconsciousness, or the unconscious. This study concentrates in particular on one archetypal aspect of the unconscious that Jung calls the shadow. According to Jung, the shadow is a psychological dynamic that both hides from our awareness certain aspects or depths of our own inner reality, and also, when recognized, mediates our initial confrontation with those fuller realities. The first aim of this study is to analyze Jung’s view of the psyche, through the lens of shadow, to reveal the shadow in Jung’s work, examining how he denies or disavows metaphysical reality as a legitimate domain of depth psychological inquiry. Secondly, the biographical and historical backgrounds to this shadow are explored, and the potential consequences of it are discussed. Finally, Plotinus’ ancient perspective on unconsciousness and what he understands as the metaphysics of shadow are brought into dialogue with Jung. The goal is to address the shadow in Jung’s work—what his view of depth psychology denies to depth psychology, offering another way of understanding the psyche, and the shadow in particular, that includes metaphysical reality as a legitimate domain of depth psychological experience and analysis.

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43

Cifone, Michael C. "Structuralism and natural philosophy method, metaphysics and explanation /". College Park, Md.: University of Maryland, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/9479.

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Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Maryland, College Park, 2009.
Thesis research directed by: Dept. of Philosophy. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
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44

Kochiras, Hylarie Nelson Alan Jean. "Force, matter, and metaphysics in Newton's natural philosophy". Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008. http://dc.lib.unc.edu/u?/etd,1886.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008.
Title from electronic title page (viewed Dec. 11, 2008). "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy." Discipline: Philosophy; Department/School: Philosophy.
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45

Tester, Steven. "Kant's metaphysics of mind and rational psychology". Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Philosophische Fakultät I, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/17029.

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Die Dissertation diskutiert die kantische Metaphysik des Geistes anhand der in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft und den aus dem Nachlass veröffentlichten Vorlesungen zur Metaphysik geleisteten Auseinandersetzung mit der rationalen Psychologie seiner Vorgänger, insbesondere Baumgarten und Wolff. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass Kant die Meinungen seiner Vorgänger nicht uneingeschränkt zurückweist, sondern die Vorstellung der Seele als Substanz in seine Diskussion der Personalität, mentaler Kräfte, der Möglichkeit einer Körper-Seele Interaktion sowie der Willensfreiheit teilweise beibehält. Ein Verdienst dieser Interpretation ist es, die Kontinuität zwischen Kants vorkritischer Position und seiner kritischen Philosophie aufzuzeigen. Darüber hinaus soll aber auch auf eine wichtige Funktion der kantischen Metaphysik des Geistes für seine praktische Philosophie hingewiesen werden.
This dissertation considers Kant’s discussions of the metaphysics of mind in his critical encounter with the rational psychology of Baumgarten, Wolff, and others in the Critique of Pure Reason and his lectures on metaphysics. In contrast with prevailing interpretations, I argue that Kant does not offer a straightforward rejection of his predecessors but that he retains some commitments to the substantial view of the self and modifies others within the framework of transcendental idealism to provide accounts of the nature of personhood, mental powers, the possibility of mind-body interaction, and the possibility of freedom of the will. This interpretation of Kant reveals continuity between Kant’s pre-critical and critical positions on the metaphysics of mind and points forward to a role for aspects of Kant’s metaphysics of mind in his practical philosophy.
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46

McLeod, Stephen K. "Modality and anti-metaphysics". Thesis, University of Glasgow, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.364089.

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47

Ooms, Renard Nicole Marie Anne. "Plato's metaphysics of explanation". Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.324884.

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48

Oliver, Alexander Duncan. "The metaphysics of sets". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.319538.

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49

Katayama, Errol G. "Aristotle on artifacts : a metaphysical puzzle /". Albany (N.Y) : State university of New York press, 1999. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb371816451.

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50

Schlosser, Markus E. "The metaphysics of agency". Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/163.

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Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind. In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.
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