Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „Medical geography – congresses”

Health is not merely absence of disease or informity, it is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being. Infact, health is dynamic equilibrium between man and his environment. A commission on medical geography was made by international Geographical Union (IGU) and its report was discussed at IGU congress in Washington in 1952. Since then the analysis of health and disease through man-environment relationships has attracted the attention of geographers to work in medical geography. In this context, present article seeks to analyse the development, purpose and field of medical geography. It also attempts to analyse environmental control of disease and susceptibility and prospects of medical geography in Nepal. Finally, it concludes that geographers can make major contributions to help reduce suffering of human health and increasing longevity if they are able to establish causal links between specific disease and environment.The Geographical Journal of Nepal, Vol. 7, 2009: 33-40

Through the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, the United States expanded its size by over 800,000 square miles. But neither President Thomas Jefferson nor Congress knew exactly what they had bought until 1806, when Meriwether Lewis and William Clark returned from their famous expedition. One of the most significant contributions of the Expedition was a better perception of the geography of the Northwest. Lewis and Clark prepared approximately 140 maps and filled in the main outlines of the previously blank map of the northwestern United States. Robert I. Field has done much the same for the vast territory of U.S. health care regulation.On the front cover of Fields new book, Health Care Regulation in America: Complexity, Confrontation, and Compromise, is a picture of a giant three-dimensional labyrinth. Rarely is cover art so perfectly appropriate.

Background/Purpose: The presentation of scientific studies at major meetings serves to rapidly share study results with the scientific community. On the other hand, full-text publication of abstracts in peer-reviewed journals ensures the dissemination of science. This study examines the publication rate (PR) of meeting abstracts presented at the European Society for Surgical Research (ESSR) congresses and determines/compares the factors affecting the PRs. Methods: All presentations at the ESSR congresses held during 2008-2011 were retrospectively assessed. Manuscripts indexed in PubMed were included. The meeting year, journal impact factor (IF) in the publication year, study type, presentation type, time to publication and geographic origin of studies were assessed. Results: Among a total of 1,368 oral and poster abstracts, 48.7% (n = 391) of the oral presentations (OPs) and 29.7% (n = 168) of the poster presentations (PPs) were published in medical journals indexed in PubMed. The mean IF of the journals was 2.696 (0.17-14.95). The journals that published OPs had a higher IF than the journals in which PPs were published (2.944 vs. 2.118; p < 0.001). The PR was also higher in the OP group than in the PP group of journals (p < 0.001). The time to publication was 17.5 months (−166 to 82) and was shorter for PPs than for OPs (14.02 vs. 19.09 months; p = 0.01). According to the study type, experimental studies had a significantly higher PR (53.7%; p < 0.001); however, there was no significant difference in PR in terms of the prospective or retrospective nature of clinical studies. The clinical studies were also compared according to the IF values of the journals in terms of the prospective or retrospective nature of the study, and no significant difference was found (p = 0.62). Conclusion: The ESSR congress is an efficient meeting for researchers from varied surgical disciplines and has a PR equivalent to that of similar scientific meetings. The congress has achieved a PR of 40.9% over 4 years with an average IF of 2.696 and a mean time to publication of 17.5 months, which is equivalent to that of similar scientific meetings. OPs have a higher PR in journals with greater IF values as compared with PPs.

After a three-year quarantine from the deadliest global pandemic of the last century, ASTES is organizing to gather all health professionals in Tirana, The 6th Albanian Congress of Trauma and Emergency Surgery(ACTES 2022) on 11-12 November 2022, with the topic Trauma & Emergency Surgery and not only...with the aim of providing high quality, the best standards, and the best results, for our patients ...ACTES 2022 is the largest event that ASTES (Albanian Society for Trauma and Emergency Surgery) has organized so far with 230 presentations, and 67 foreign lecturers with enviable geography, making it the largest national and wider scientific event.The scientific program is as strong as ever, thanks to the inclusiveness, where all the participants with a mix of foreign and local lecturers, select the best of the moment in medical science, innovation, and observation.The scientific committee has selected all the presentations so that the participants of each medical discipline will have something to learn, discuss, debate, and agree with updated methods, techniques, and protocols.I hope you will join us on Friday morning, and continue the journey of our two-day event together.

ImportanceTimely access to medical care is an important determinant of health and well-being. The US Congress passed the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act in 2014 and the VA MISSION (Maintaining Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks) Act in 2018, both of which allow veterans to access care from community-based clinicians, but geographic variation in appointment wait times after the passage of these acts have not been studied.ObjectiveTo describe geographic variation in wait times experienced by veterans for primary care, mental health, and other specialties.Design, Setting, and ParticipantsThis is a cross-sectional study using data from the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Corporate Data Warehouse. Participants include veterans who sought medical care from January 1, 2018, to June 30, 2021. Data analysis was performed from February to June 2022.ExposuresReferral to either VHA or community-based clinicians.Main Outcomes and MeasuresTotal appointment wait times (in days) for 3 care categories: primary care, mental health, and all other specialties. VHA medical centers are organized into regions called Veterans Integrated Services Networks (VISNs); wait times were aggregated to the VISN level.ResultsThe final sample included 22 632 918 million appointments for 4 846 892 unique veterans (77.3% male; mean [SD] age, 61.6 [15.5] years). Among non-VHA appointments, mean (SD) VISN-level appointment wait times were 38.9 (8.2) days for primary care, 43.9 (9.0) days for mental health, and 41.9 (5.9) days for all other specialties. Among VHA appointments, mean (SD) VISN-level appointment wait times were 29.0 (5.5) days for primary care, 33.6 (4.6) days for mental health, and 35.4 (2.7) days for all other specialties. There was substantial geographic variation in appointment wait times. Among non-VHA appointments, VISN-level appointment wait times ranged from 25.4 to 52.4 days for primary care, from 29.3 to 65.7 days for mental health, and from 34.7 to 54.8 days for all other specialties. Among VHA appointments, wait times ranged from 22.4 to 43.4 days for primary care, from 24.7 to 42.0 days for mental health, and from 30.3 to 41.9 days for all other specialties. There was a correlation between wait times across care categories and setting (VHA vs community care).Conclusions and RelevanceThis cross-sectional study found substantial variation in wait times across care type and geography, and VHA wait times in a majority of VISNs were lower than those for community-based clinicians, even after controlling for differences in specialty mix. These findings suggest that liberalized access to community care under the Veterans Access, Choice, and Accountability Act and the VA MISSION Act may not result in lower wait times within these regions.

Abstract As Congress considers renewing the Acute Hospital Care At Home (AHCaH) waiver, which provides a full hospital payment for Hospital at Home (HaH) care, evaluating uncertainty around the future of HaH payment is critical. Our qualitative study explored HaH leaders’ experiences with implementing HaH (N=18, clinical/medical directors, operational and program managers) from 14 new and pre-existing programs across the U.S. We conducted semi-structured interviews with HaH programs diverse by size, urbanicity, and geography. We analyzed transcripts using a thematic approach. Participants across settings and regions wanted greater clarity about the waiver’s future. Lack of clarity affected staffing (nurses reluctant to take temporary jobs) and investment in establishing programs (building EMR components, changing workflows, creating inpatient processes in an outpatient setting). Programs adapted to uncertainty in multiple ways: 1) operating parallel waiver and non-waiver programs; 2) seeking to determine/ calculate the HaH value for their institution; 3) determining which patients would benefit most from HaH; and 4) seeking additional health system financing options beyond the CMS reimbursement (new programs) or relying on existing contracts with payers (existing programs). Implementing HaH is a complex and resource intensive process. Greater clarity from CMS regarding the waiver’s future state will encourage programs to invest the resources that they need to establish their programs long-term. Waiver extension/ permanence would also enable programs to develop and test measures of value, making rigorous evaluations possible to optimize different HaH components.

Continuing the trendline of 2020, North Korea’s key priorities in 2021 were to tighten its belt economically and control the COVID-19 pandemic. Those two goals were related. With its healthcare system no match for such a public health crisis, the government continued its utmost effort to prevent a COVID-19 disaster through the near-complete closure of its borders, severely hampering vital trade with China. As seen in the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of North Korea, however, chairman Kim Jong-un also prioritized maintaining an assertive stance toward the United States, even to the point of abjuring negotiations with Washington that might have unlocked vaccines or medical assistance. Instead, North Korea frequently criticized the US’s “hostile position” and carried out a variety of missile tests, which seemed more provocative and capable throughout the year. Pyongyang also restarted the Yongbyon nuclear facilities for producing fissile materials. This assertive and provocative behavior was emboldened by steadily closer ties with traditional allies, notably China and Russia. Meanwhile, North Korea largely showed a cold, dismissive attitude to its southern counterpart.

AbstractThis paper argues that the concept of moral economy, formulated by E.P. Thompson and developed in Asian contexts by James Scott and Paul Greenough can be usefully employed to analyse the peasant narratives of Premchand, one of the greatest writers in Hindi-Urdu literatures. But such an application is possible only if the concept is expanded further. In Premchand's works related to peasantry we find several ideological currents. However, the idea of peasantry's own cultural resources in opposition to other social groups appears to be predominant in his later works. There is a sense of centrality of peasant culture which Premchand and some others among the Hindi literary intelligentsia came to acquire, and deployed for various purposes—against colonial regime, against the products of colonial modernity (e.g., factories, English schools, courts, medical profession), against the new urban middle classes and their culture, against urbanism as a whole and, sometimes, even against the Congress, the representative of organized nationalism. Distinct from both the everyday forms of resistance and open rebellion, Premchand visualizes a comprehensive peasant paradigm in opposition to colonialism, and urban middle-class perspectives.

AbstractThe interwar period has recently been described as a highly internationalist one in South Asia, as a series of distinct internationalisms—communist, anarchist, social scientific, socialist, literary, and aesthetic1—took shape. At the same time, it has been argued that the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937 drew to a close various opportunities for international association (at least, temporarily). Taking into account both these contradistinctive developments, this article deals with another—and thus far largely overlooked—South Asian internationalism in the form of wartime Indian humanitarianism. In 1938, the Indian National Congress helped organize an Indian medical mission to China to bring relief to Chinese victims of the Second Sino-Japanese War. By focusing on this initiative, this article traces the ideas, the practices, and the motives of Indian political humanitarianism. It argues that such initiatives, as they became part of much wider global networks of humanitarianism in the late 1930s and early 1940s, created new openings for Indian nationalists to establish international alliances. This article also examines the way in which political humanitarianism enabled these same nationalists to perform as independent leaders on an international stage, and argues that humanitarianism served as a tool of anti-colonial emancipation.

Physical and emotional wellness, as well as access to healthcare, are foundations for successful resettlement. Without feeling healthy, it is difficult to work, to go school, or take care of a family. Many factors can affect refugee health, including geographic origin and refugee camp conditions. Refugees may face a wide variety of acute or chronic health issues (Office of Refugee Resettlement, ORR Annual Report to Congress 2014; http://www.acf.hhs.gov). Resettlement of refugees in Uganda is usually supported by concerted efforts of UNHCR, Governments through the Office of the Prime Minister, OPM with support from host communities, local and international Non-Governmental Organizations. Due to resource constraints and local factors, immigrants are often subjected to poor living conditions which coupled with inadequacy inessential medical supplies might significantly affects quality of care and health service delivery and hence, rendering refugees to poor health status. This study was conducted from 2013-2014 to assess the determinants of health status of Congolese refugees living in Nakivale refugee settlement, in Isingiro district- South Western Uganda. A cross-sectional study design was used involving mixed techniques of both qualitative and quantitative KAP survey. The study focussed on Congolese refugee population in Nakivale Refugee settlement. 2401 key informants’ interviews and 8 focus group discussions respectively were conducted targeting service providers and beneficiaries/Congolese refugees in this case. The data was analysed using SPSS ver.20, 2011. Although majority (97%) of respondents sought medical services from established health facilities, findings confirm a high level of ill health prevalence among Congolese refugees in Nakivale camp, however, the difference in health services and perceived health status in camp versus the one in DRcongo is insignificant ( p=0.000) with respondents perceiving their health status as worse than when they were their own Country before the resettlement. Identified key challenges affecting access &amp; uptake of available health services includes: language barrier; inadequate drugs; and the long distances to access health facilities. The health status of refugees could be improved by addressing the challenges related to language, drug supplies in addition to humanising conditions of shelter, providing appropriate waste disposal facilities while proving adequate food rations and clean &amp; safe drinking water.

Abstract Lack of diversity in clinical trials research has significant health consequences because medications and treatments have varying effects on people based on their demographic, socio-economic, and geographic characteristics. This study uniquely adopts the legal estrangement theory to explain the causes for limited diversity in federally funded clinical trials and offers multi-level strategies that researchers, institutions, the US Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), and Congress can take to increase diversity in clinical trials. Legal estrangement is a theory that represents detachment and alienation from those who created the law. From February to March 2023, researchers reviewed legal and medical literature, news stories, and federal regulations to identify barriers contributing to limited diversity in clinical trials. Using the legal estrangement theory as an overarching guide, three broad themes across the clinical trials literature (i.e., procedural injustice, vicarious marginalization, and structural exclusion) were identified. Procedural injustice refers to when people perceive not being treated with dignity and respect. Vicarious marginalization refers to negative experiences that collectively contribute to feelings of alienation. Structural exclusion refers to the way policies that seem to be race or class-neutral have disproportionate effects on marginalized communities. We found that researcher implicit bias and stereotyping contribute to procedural injustice and vicarious marginalization by discouraging prospective people from joining clinical trials. Structural barriers like inaccessibility to participant-friendly educational materials, ambiguity in grant reporting requirements, lack of strong substantive grant standards, exclusion of LGBTQI+ individuals from grant enrollment reports, and budgetary constraints limit efforts to increase participant diversity in clinical trials. To improve diversity in clinical trials, we recommend improving transparency and communication, building meaningful partnerships with community leaders, requiring cultural competency training for researchers, incorporating automatic and non-autonomic recruitment strategies to circumvent bias, strengthening substantive NIH grant standards, adding gender identities to grant enrollment reports, and requesting greater Congressional funding for clinical trials research. Thus, to improve diversity in federally funded clinical trials, a multi-faceted approach that involves researchers, academic institutions, community members, HHS, and Congress are recommended to reduce procedural injustice, vicarious marginalization, and structural exclusion. Future research is needed to explore the connection between structural barriers to access to clinical trials and disparities in cancer care management and patient outcomes. Citation Format: Cilgy M. Abraham, Denalee M. O'Malley. Mapping the legal estrangement theory onto known barriers in recruiting diverse participants to clinical trials [abstract]. In: Proceedings of the 16th AACR Conference on the Science of Cancer Health Disparities in Racial/Ethnic Minorities and the Medically Underserved; 2023 Sep 29-Oct 2;Orlando, FL. Philadelphia (PA): AACR; Cancer Epidemiol Biomarkers Prev 2023;32(12 Suppl):Abstract nr A133.

This paper offers estimates of US foreign-born populations that are eligible for special legal status programs and those that would be eligible for permanent residence (legalization) under pending bills. It seeks to provide policymakers, government agencies, community-based organizations (CBOs), researchers, and others with a unique tool to assess the potential impact, implement, and analyze the success of these programs. It views timely, comprehensive data on targeted immigrant populations as an essential pillar of legalization preparedness, implementation, and evaluation. The paper and the exhaustive estimates that underlie it, represent the first attempt to provide a detailed statistical profile of beneficiaries of proposed major US legalization programs and special, large-scale legal status programs. The paper offers the following top-line findings: Fifty-eight percent of the 10.35 million US undocumented residents had lived in the United States for 10 years or more as of 2019; 37 percent lived in homes with mortgages; 33 percent arrived at age 17 or younger; 32 percent lived in households with US citizens (the overwhelming majority of them children); and 96 percent in the labor force were employed. The Citizenship for Essential Workers Act would establish the largest population-specific legalization program discussed in the paper. 7.2 million (70 percent) of the total undocumented population would be eligible for legalization under the Act. Approximately two-thirds of undocumented essential workers reside in 20 metropolitan areas. The populations eligible for the original Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and for permanent residence on a conditional basis and removal of the conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 are not only ready to integrate successfully, but in most cases have already done so. A high percentage are long-term residents, virtually all have completed high school (or attend school), a third to one-half have attended college, and the overwhelming majority live in households with incomes above the poverty level. The median household income of California, Illinois, New York, and New Jersey residents that are eligible for the original DACA program is higher than the US median household income. New York and New Jersey residents that are eligible for removal of conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 also have median incomes above the US median household income. The total eligible for removal of conditions on permanent residence under the Dream Act of 2021 have median household incomes that are 99 percent of the US median income. Unlike populations eligible for most special legal status and population-specific legalization programs, childhood arrivals can be found in significant numbers and concentrations in communities throughout the United States, particularly in metropolitan areas. More than 1.8 million persons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras would be eligible for TPS if the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated Guatemala for TPS and re-designated El Salvador and Honduras. Local communities can best prepare for legalization by collaborating on: (1) the hard work of assisting individual immigrants to meet their immigration needs; (2) dividing labor, integrating services, screening the undocumented for status, and building legal capacity; and (3) implementation of special legal status programs. This collective work should be viewed as a legalization program in its own right. The populations eligible for legalization and legal status under the programs analyzed in the paper have overlapping needs and large numbers of immigrants would be eligible for more than one program. However, substantial differences between these populations in size, geography, length of residency, education, socio-economic attainment, and English language proficiency argue for distinct preparedness and implementation strategies for each population. The paper also makes several broad policy recommendations regarding legalization bills, special legal status programs, and community-based preparedness and implementation efforts. In particular, it recommends that: Congress should pass broad immigration reform legislation that includes a general legalization program or, in the alternative, a series of population-specific programs for essential workers, childhood arrivals, agricultural workers, persons eligible for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) and Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), and long-term residents. In the interim, the Biden administration should also designate and re-designate additional countries for TPS. Immigration reform legislation should allow the great majority of US undocumented residents to legalize, should reform the underlying legal immigration system, and should provide for the legalization of future long-term undocumented residents through a rolling registry program. Congress, the relevant federal agencies, and advocates should ensure that any legalization program be properly structured and sufficiently funded, particularly the work of CBOs, states, and localities. Local communities should continue to build the necessary partnerships, capacities, skills, and resources to implement a legalization program. They should do so, in part, by collaborating on special legal status programs such as DACA, TPS, and naturalization campaigns, as well as through the steady-state work of assisting immigrants in their individual immigration cases and funding their representation as necessary in removal proceedings. Section I of the paper describes the populations that would be eligible for legalization under pending bills and that are potentially eligible for special legal status programs. Section II presents top-line findings based on the Center for Migration Studies’ (CMS’s) estimates and profiles of these populations. The report offers estimates of each population by characteristics — such as length of time in the country, English language proficiency, education, household income, health insurance, and homeownership — that are relevant to preparedness and implementation activities. Section III makes the case for immigration reform and a broad legalization program. Section IV offers detailed recommendations on the substance, structure, and implementation of these programs.

El presente escrito es presentado por el International Center for Law and Religion Studies (“ICLRS”), un instituto académico dentro de la Facultad de Derecho de Brigham Young University en los Estados Unidos. ICLRS escribe para aportar sus consideraciones y valoraciones técnicas sobre las importantes y entrelazadas preguntas que este caso presenta con respecto a los derechos de igualdad y libertad religiosa a fin de que éstas sean consideradas como útiles para el desarrollo de la jurisprudencia en esta materia. 2. ICLRS es un líder global en el estudio académico del derecho internacional y comparado concerniente a la religión, la libertad de religión o de creencia y los demás derechos que atañen a estos temas. ICLRS colabora con distinguidas instituciones académicas, gobiernos y la sociedad civil a través del mundo para organizar congresos, talleres y seminarios que cuentan con expositores destacados internacionales. Desde el año 2000 ICLRS ha realizado casi 900 eventos de este tipo en más de 50 países con el objetivo de fomentar entendimiento entre personas d1e distintas opiniones, difundir conocimiento técnico y fortalecer la pericia local en la materia. Frecuentemente, ICLRS presenta comentarios técnicos sobre proyectos de ley que afectan a la religión, hasta la fecha en más de 50 países. Genera libros y artículos continuamente sobre derecho y religión, a menudo en colaboración con expertos en el extranjero. 3. Por estas consideraciones y de conformidad con el artículo 44 del reglamento de El presente escrito es presentado por el International Center for Law and Religion esta Honorable Corte , ICLRS tiene el interés legítimo de pronunciarse ante la Honorable Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos a través del presente amicus curiae. 4. Por otro lado, ICLRS no tiene ningún conflicto de intereses respecto de las partes y no recibirá ningún beneficio económico ni por elaborar este escrito ni como resultado del eventual fallo en el caso.

Este estudo realiza um levantamento de alterações recentes no Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC) e discute seus avanços e limitações na garantia e promoção de direitos. Além de analisar brevemente a trajetória das alterações dos critérios de acesso ao BPC entre 1996 e 2016, o trabalho se debruça sobre iniciativas de modernização da gestão do BPC como a obrigatoriedade de inscrição no Cadastro Único para Programas Sociais (CadÚnico), a implementação do INSS Digital e novos procedimentos de revisão e atualização cadastral. Também se discute as mudanças decorrentes da Lei no 13.982/2020, aprovada pelo Congresso Nacional no início da pandemia da covid-19, e novas medidas administrativas e regulatórias apresentadas pelo Executivo no contexto do enfrentamento da pandemia. Por fim, se aponta para a necessidade de um equilíbrio entre as estratégias de aprimoramento da política, aumento da eficiência estatal e a garantia da função precípua do BPC de oferecer proteção a um grupo populacional em situação de grande vulnerabilidade.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo principal avaliar a sustentabilidade do setor de energia no Brasil comparado aos países da Organização para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico (OCDE), a fim de contribuir para a análise do que falta fazer em relação aos requisitos necessários contidos no Accession Roadmap, documento aprovado pelo Conselho Ministerial da OCDE em junho de 2022. Destaca-se a necessidade de que o Brasil seja aderente aos princípios da OCDE, que o país assegure a proteção efetiva do meio ambiente e da biodiversidade e adote políticas de mudanças climáticas em consonância com os objetivos do Acordo de Paris. Neste sentido, procede-se à análise comparativa da sustentabilidade do setor de energia brasileiro com a dos países da OCDE. As conclusões apontam não só para o elevado grau de sustentabilidade brasileiro como também sugerem que o mercado de carbono, em negociação no Congresso Nacional, pode ser um passo importante no processo de adesão do Brasil à OCDE, por se tratar de instrumento econômico compatível com o princípio poluidor-pagador.

O assunto em investigação é o grupo focal como ferramenta de produção de dados em estudos sobre crenças no ensino-aprendizagem de línguas estrangeiras. Nossa intenção é auxiliar no planejamento e aplicação de grupos focais que tratem sobre esse tema. Realizamos estudo bibliográfico e relato de nossa própria experiência em planejar e aplicar o instrumento. Nosso referencial teórico incluiu Barbosa (2012), Backes et al (2011), Autor (2018), Morgan (2013), Santos, Silva e Jesus (2016), Teixeira e Maciel (2009), Trad (2009), entre outros. Resultados indicam que o uso do grupo focal é apropriado para produzir dados sobre crenças a respeito do ensino-aprendizagem de idiomas, contanto que haja planejamento e preparação do pesquisador de maneira antecipada e adequada. ASCHIDAMINI, I.M.; SAUPE, R. Grupo focal – estratégia metodológica qualitativa: um ensaio teórico. Cogitare Enfermagem, Curitiba, v. 9, n. 1, p. 9-14, 2004.KINOSHITA, L. Crenças e expectativas sobre ensinar/aprender a ser professor de língua estrangeira (Representações de graduandos, formadores e agentes governamentais: o caso da formação docente inicial na Unifesspa). 2018. 774 f. Tese (Doutorado em Educação) – Faculdade de Educação, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2018.BACKES, D.S. et al. Grupo focal como técnica de coleta e análise de dados em pesquisas qualitativas. O Mundo da Saúde, São Paulo, v. 35, n. 4, p. 438-442, 2011.BARBOSA, J.A.G. A utilização do Grupo Focal como método de coleta dados em pesquisa qualitativa na saúde e na enfermagem. Periódico Científico do Núcleo de Biociências, Belo Horizonte, v. 02, n. 03, p. 38-46, ago./set. 2012.BARCELOS, A.M.F. Reflexões acerca da mudança de crenças sobre ensino e aprendizagem de línguas. Revista Brasileira de Linguística Aplicada, v. 7, n. 2, p. 109-138, 2007.______. Metodologia de pesquisa das crenças sobre a aprendizagem de línguas: estado da arte. 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Rio de Janeiro, 2007. p. 1-15.PAIVA, V.L.M.O. Caleisdoscópio: fractais de uma oficina de ensino aprendizagem. Memorial. UFMG, 2002.PAJARES, M. F. Teachers’ beliefs and educational research: cleaning up a messy construct. Review of Educational Research, v. 62, n. 3, p. 307-332, 1992.SANTOS, R.C.S.; SILVA, A.C.T.; JESUS, M.P. O grupo focal como técnica de coletas de dados na pesquisa em educação: aspectos éticos e epistemológicos. In: ENCONTRO INTERNACIONAL DE FORMAÇÃO DE PROFESSORES, 9., 2016. Anais... Aracaju, 2016.SILVA, J.R.S.; ASSIS, S.M.B. Grupo focal e análise de conteúdo como estratégia metodológica clínica-qualitativa em pesquisas nos distúrbios do desenvolvimento. Cadernos de Pós-Graduação em Distúrbios do Desenvolvimento, São Paulo, v.10, n.1, p.146-152, 2010.TEIXEIRA, S.R.; MACIEL, M.D. Grupo focal: Técnica de coleta de dados e espaço de formação docente. In: ENCONTRO NACIONAL DE PESQUISA EM EDUCAÇÃO EM CIÊNCIAS, 7., 2009, Florianópolis. Anais... 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Photo by 14825144 © Alita Xander | Dreamstime.com ABSTRACT The US government's approach to the War on Drugs has created laws to deter people from using illicit drugs through negative punishment. These laws have not controlled illicit drug use, nor has it stopped the opioid pandemic from growing. Instead, these laws have created a negative bias surrounding addiction and have negatively affected particularly vulnerable patient populations, including pregnant women with substance use disorder and newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome. This article highlights some misconceptions and underscores the challenges they face as they navigate the justice and healthcare systems while also providing possible solutions to address their underlying addiction. INTRODUCTION Pregnant women with substance use disorder require treatment that is arguably for the benefit of both the mother and the fetus. Some suggest that addiction is a choice; therefore, those who misuse substances should not receive treatment. Proponents of this argument emphasize social and environmental factors that lead to addiction but fail to appreciate how chronic substance use alters the brain’s chemistry and changes how it responds to stress, reward, self-control, and pain. The medical community has long recognized that substance use disorder is not simply a character flaw or social deviance, but a complex condition that requires adequate medical attention. Unfortunately, the lasting consequences of the War on Drugs have created a stigma around addiction medicine, leading to significant treatment barriers. There is still a pervasive societal bias toward punitive rather than rehabilitative approaches to addiction. For example, many women with substance use disorder lose custody of their baby or face criminal penalties, including fines and jail time.[1] These punitive measures may cause patients to lose trust in their physicians, ultimately leading to high-risk pregnancies without prenatal care, untreated substance misuse, and potential lifelong disabilities for their newborns.[2] As a medical student, I have observed the importance of a rehabilitative approach to addiction medicine. Incentivizing pregnant women with substance use disorder to safely address their chronic health issues is essential for minimizing negative short-term and long-term outcomes for women and their newborns. This approach requires an open mind and supportive perspective, recognizing that substance use disorder is truly a medical condition that requires just as much attention as any other medical diagnosis.[3] BACKGROUND The War on Drugs was a government-led initiative launched in 1970 by President Richard M. Nixon with the aim of curtailing illegal drug use, distribution, and trade by imposing harsher prison sentences and punishments.[4] However, it is worth noting that one can trace the roots of this initiative back further. In 1914, Congress enacted the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act to target the recreational use of drugs such as morphine and opium.[5] Despite being in effect for over four decades, the War on Drugs failed to achieve its intended goals. In 2011, the Global Commission on Drug Policy released a report that concluded that the initiative had been futile, as “arresting and incarcerating tens of millions of these people in recent decades has filled prisons and destroyed lives and families without reducing the availability of illicit drugs or the power of criminal organizations.”[6] One study published in the International Journal of Drug Policy in the same year found that funding drug law enforcement paradoxically contributed to increasing gun violence and homicide rates.[7] The Commission recommended that drug policies focus on reducing harm caused by drug use rather than solely on reducing drug markets. Recognizing that many drug policies were of political opinion, it called for drug policies that were grounded in scientific evidence, health, security, and human rights.[8] Unfortunately, policy makers did not heed these recommendations. In 2014, Tennessee’s legislature passed a “Fetal Assault Law,” which made it possible to prosecute pregnant women for drug use during pregnancy. If found guilty, pregnant women could face up to 15 years in prison and lose custody of their child. Instead of deterring drug use, the law discouraged pregnant women with substance use disorder from seeking prenatal care. This law required medical professionals to report drug use to authorities, thereby compromising the confidentiality of the patient-physician relationship. Some avoided arrest by delivering their babies in other states or at home, while others opted for abortions or attempted to go through an unsafe withdrawal prior to receiving medical care, sacrificing the mother's and fetus's wellbeing. The law had a sunset provision and expired in 2016. During the two years this law was in effect, officials arrested 124 women.[9] The fear that this law instilled in pregnant women with substance use disorder can still be seen across the US today. Many pregnant women with substance use disorders stated that they feared testing positive for drugs. Due to mandatory reporting, they were not confident that physicians would protect them from the law.[10] And if a woman tried to stop using drugs before seeking care to avoid detection, she often ended up delaying or avoiding care.[11] The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) recognizes the fear those with substance use disorders face when seeking appropriate medical care and emphasizes that “obstetric–gynecologic care should not expose a woman to criminal or civil penalties, such as incarceration, involuntary commitment, loss of custody of her children, or loss of housing.”[12] Mandatory reporting strains the patient-physician relationship, driving a wedge between the doctor and patient. Thus, laws intended to deter people from using substances through various punishments and incarceration may be doing more harm than good. County hospitals that mainly serve lower socioeconomic patients encounter more patients without consistent health care access and those with substance use disorders.[13] These hospitals are facing the consequences of the worsening opioid pandemic. At one county hospital where I recently worked, there has been a dramatic increase in newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome born to mothers with untreated substance use disorders during pregnancy. Infants exposed to drugs prenatally have an increased risk of complications, stillbirth, and life-altering developmental disabilities. At the hospital, I witnessed Child Protective Services removing two newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome from their mother’s custody. Four similar cases had occurred in the preceding month. In the days leading up to their placement with a foster family, I saw both newborns go through an uncomfortable drug withdrawal. No baby should be welcomed into this world by suffering like that. Yet I felt for the new mothers and realized that heart-wrenching custody loss is not the best approach. During this period, I saw a teenager brought to the pediatric floor due to worsening psychiatric symptoms. He was born with neonatal abstinence syndrome that neither the residential program nor his foster family could manage. His past psychiatric disorders included attention deficit disorder, conduct disorder, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, intellectual developmental disorder, and more. During his hospitalization, he was so violent towards healthcare providers that security had to intervene. And his attitude toward his foster parents was so volatile that we were never sure if having them visit was comforting or agitating. Throughout his hospital course, it was difficult for me to converse with him, and I left every interview with him feeling lost in terms of providing an adequate short- and long-term assessment of his psychological and medical requirements. What was clear, however, was that his intellectual and emotional levels did not match his age and that he was born into a society that was ill-equipped to accommodate his needs. Just a few feet away from his room, behind the nurses’ station, were the two newborns feeling the same withdrawal symptoms that this teenager likely experienced in the first few hours of his life. I wondered how similar their paths would be and if they would exhibit similar developmental delays in a few years or if their circumstance may follow the cases hyped about in the media of the 1980s and 1990s regarding “crack babies.” Many of these infants who experienced withdrawal symptoms eventually led normal lives.[14] Nonetheless, many studies have demonstrated that drug use during pregnancy can adversely impact fetal development. Excessive alcohol consumption can result in fetal alcohol syndrome, characterized by growth deficiency, facial structure abnormalities, and a wide range of neurological deficiencies.[15] Smoking can impede the development of the lungs and brain and lead to preterm deliveries or sudden infant death syndrome.[16] Stimulants like methamphetamine can also cause preterm delivery, delayed motor development, attention impairments, and a wide range of cognitive and behavioral issues.[17] Opioid use, such as oxycodone, morphine, fentanyl, and heroin, may result in neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome, in which a newborn may exhibit tremors, irritability, sleeping problems, poor feeding, loose stools, and increased sweating within 72 hours of life.[18] In 2014, the American Association of Pediatrics (AAP) reported that one newborn was diagnosed with neonatal abstinence syndrome every 15 minutes, equating to approximately 32,000 newborns annually, a five-fold increase from 2004.[19] The AAP found that the cost of neonatal abstinence syndrome covered by Medicaid increased from $65.4 million to $462 million from 2004 to 2014.[20] In 2020, the CDC published a paper that showed an increase in hospital costs from $316 million in 2012 to $572.7 million in 2016.[21] Currently, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the prevalence of newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome is unknown. I predict that the increase in opioid and polysubstance use during the pandemic will increase the number of newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome, thereby significantly increasing the public burden and cost.[22] In the 1990s, concerns arose about the potentially irreparable damage caused by intrauterine exposure to cocaine on the development of infants, which led to the popularization of the term “crack babies.”[23] Although no strong longitudinal studies supported this claim at the time, it was not without merit. The Maternal Lifestyle Study (NCT00059540) was a prospective longitudinal observational study that compared the outcomes of newborns exposed to cocaine in-utero to those without.[24] One of its studies revealed one month old newborns with cocaine exposure had “lower arousal, poorer quality of movements and self-regulation, higher excitability, more hypertonia, and more nonoptimal reflexes.”[25] Another study showed that at one month old, heavy cocaine exposure affected neural transmission from the ear to the brain.[26] Long-term follow up from the study showed that at seven years old, children with high intrauterine cocaine exposure were more likely to have externalizing behavior problems such as aggressive behavior, temper tantrums, and destructive acts.[27] While I have witnessed this behavior in the teenage patient during my pediatrics rotation, not all newborns with intrauterine drug exposure are inevitably bound to have psychiatric and behavioral issues later in life. NPR recorded a podcast in 2010 highlighting a mother who used substances during pregnancy and, with early intervention, had positive outcomes. After being arrested 50 times within five years, she went through STEP: Self-Taught Empowerment and Pride, a public program that allowed her to complete her GED and provided guidance and encouragement for a more meaningful life during her time in jail. Her daughter, who was exposed to cocaine before birth, had a normal childhood and ended up going to college.[28] From a public health standpoint, more needs to be done to prevent the complications of substance misuse during pregnancy. Some states consider substance misuse (and even prescribed use) during pregnancy child abuse. Officials have prosecuted countless women across 45 states for exposing their unborn children to drugs.[29] With opioid and polysubstance use on the rise, the efficacy of laws that result in punitive measures seems questionable.[30] So far, laws are not associated with a decrease in the misuse of drugs during pregnancy. Millions of dollars are being poured into managing neonatal abstinence syndrome, including prosecuting women and taking their children away. Rather than policing and criminalizing substance use, pregnant women should get the appropriate care they need and deserve. I. Misconception One: Mothers with Substance Use Disorder Can Get an Abortion If an unplanned pregnancy occurs, one course of action could be to terminate the pregnancy. On the surface, this solution seems like a quick fix. However, the reality is that obtaining an abortion can be challenging due to two significant barriers: accessibility and mandated reporting. Abortion laws vary by state, and in Tennessee, for instance, abortions are banned after six weeks of gestation, typically when fetal heart rhythms are detected. An exception to this is in cases where the mother's life is at risk.[31] Unfortunately, many women with substance use disorders are from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and cannot access pregnancy tests, which could indicate they are pregnant before the six-week cutoff. If a Tennessee woman with substance use disorder decides to seek an abortion after six weeks, she may need to travel to a neighboring state. However, this is not always a feasible option, as the surrounding states (WV, MO, AR, MI, AL, and GA) also have restrictive laws that either prohibit abortions entirely or ban them after six weeks. Moreover, she may be hesitant to visit an obstetrician for an abortion, as some states require physicians by law to report their patients' substance use during pregnancy. For example, Virginia considers substance use during pregnancy child abuse and mandates that healthcare providers report it. This would ultimately limit her to North Carolina if she wants to remain in a nearby state, but she must go before 20 weeks gestation.[32] For someone who may or may not have access to reliable transportation, traveling to another state might be impossible. Without resources or means, these restrictive laws have made it incredibly difficult to obtain the medical care they need. II. Misconception Two: Mothers with SUD are Not Fit to Care for Children If a woman cannot take care of herself, one might wonder how she can take care of another human being. Mothers with substance use disorders often face many adversities, including lack of economic opportunity, trauma from abuse, history of poverty, and mental illness.[33] Fortunately, studies suggest keeping mother and baby together has many benefits. Breastfeeding, for example, helps the baby develop a strong immune system while reducing the mother’s risk of cancer and high blood pressure.[34] Additionally, newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome who are breastfed by mothers receiving methadone or buprenorphine require less pharmacological treatment, have lower withdrawal scores, and experience shorter hospital stays.[35] Opioid concentration in breastmilk is minimal and does not pose a risk to newborns.[36] Moreover, oxytocin, the hormone responsible for mother-baby bonding, is increased in breastfeeding mothers, reducing withdrawal symptoms and stress-induced reactivity and cravings while also increasing protective maternal instincts.[37] Removing an infant from their mother’s care immediately after birth would result in the loss of all these positive benefits for both the mother and her newborn. The newborns I observed during my pediatrics rotation probably could have benefited from breastfeeding rather than bottle feeding and being passed around from one nurse to the next. They probably would have cried less and suffered fewer withdrawal symptoms had they been given the opportunity to breastfeed. And even if the mothers were lethargic and unresponsive while going through withdrawal, it would still have been possible to breastfeed with proper support. Unfortunately, many believe mothers with substance use disorder cannot adequately care for their children. This pervasive societal bias sets them up for failure from the beginning and greatly inhibits their willingness to change and mend their relationship with their providers. It is a healthcare provider’s duty to provide non-judgmental care that prioritizes the patient’s well-being. They must treat these mothers with the same empathy and respect as any other patient, even if they are experiencing withdrawal. III. Safe Harbor and Medication-Assisted Treatment Addiction is like any other disease and society should regard treatment without stigma. There is no simple fix to this problem, given that it involves the political, legal, and healthcare systems. Punitive policies push pregnant women away from receiving healthcare and prevent them from receiving beneficial interventions. States need to enact laws that protect these women from being reported to authorities. Montana, for example, passed a law in 2019 that provides women with substance use disorders safe harbor from prosecution if they seek treatment for their condition.[38] Medication-assisted treatment with methadone or buprenorphine is the first line treatment option and should be available to all pregnant women regardless of their ability to pay for medical care.[39] To promote continuity of care, health officials could include financial incentives to motivate new mothers to go to follow-up appointments. For example, vouchers for groceries or enrollment in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) may offset financial burdens and allow a mother to focus on taking care of her child and her recovery. IV. Mandated Substance Abuse Programs Although the number of people sentenced to state prisons for drug related crimes has been declining, it is still alarming that there were 171,300 sentencings in 2019.[40] Only 11 percent of the 65 percent of our nation’s inmates with substance use disorder receive treatment, implying that the other 89 percent were left without much-needed support to overcome their addiction.[41] It is erroneous to assume that their substance use disorder would disappear after a period without substance use while behind bars. After withdrawal, those struggling with substance use disorder may still have cravings and the likelihood of relapsing remains high without proper medical intervention. Even if they are abstinent for some time during incarceration, the underlying problem persists, and the cycle inevitably continues upon release from custody. In line with the recommendations by Global Commission on Drug Policy and the lessons learned from the failed War on Drugs, one proposed change in our criminal justice system would be to require enrollment and participation in assisted alcohol cessation programs before legal punishment. Policy makers must place emphasis on the safety of the patient and baby rather than the cessation of substance use. This would incentivize people to actively seek medical care, restore the patient-physician relationship, and ensure that they take rehabilitation programs seriously. If the patient or baby is unsafe, a caregiver could intervene while the patient re-enrolls in the program. Those currently serving sentences in prisons and jails can treat their substance use disorder through medication assisted treatment, cognitive behavioral therapy, and programs like Self Taught Empowerment and Pride (STEP). Medication assisted treatment under the supervision of medical professionals can help inmates achieve and maintain sobriety in a healthy and safe way. Furthermore, cognitive behavioral therapy can help to identify triggers and teach healthier coping mechanisms to prepare for stressors outside of jail. Finally, multimodal empowerment programs can connect people to jobs, education, and support upon release. People often leave prisons and jail without a sense of purpose, which can lead to relapse and reincarceration. Structured programs have been shown to decrease drug use and criminal behavior by helping reintegrate productive individuals into society.[42] V. Medical Education: Narcotic Treatment Programs and Suboxone Clinics Another proactive approach could be to have medical residency programs register with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as Narcotic Treatment Programs and incorporate suboxone clinics into their education and rotations. Rather than family medicine, OB/GYN, or emergency medicine healthcare workers having to refer their patients to an addiction specialist, they could treat patients with methadone for maintenance or detoxification where they would deliver their baby. Not only would this educate and prepare the future generation of physicians to handle the opioid crisis, but it would allow pregnant women to develop strong patient-physician relationships. CONCLUSION Society needs to change from the mindset of tackling a problem after it occurs to taking a proactive approach by addressing upstream factors, thereby preventing those problems from occurring in the first place. Emphasizing public health measures and adequate medical care can prevent complications and developmental issues in newborns and pregnant women with substance use disorders. Decriminalizing drug use and encouraging good health habits during pregnancy is essential, as is access to prenatal care, especially for lower socioeconomic patients. Many of the current laws and regulations that policy makers initially created due to naïve political opinion and unfounded bias to serve the War on Drugs need to be changed to provide these opportunities. To progress as a society, physicians and interprofessional teams must work together to truly understand the needs of patients with substance use disorders and provide support from prenatal to postnatal care. There should be advocation for legislative change, not by providing an opinion but by highlighting the facts and conclusions of scientific studies grounded in scientific evidence, health, security, and human rights. There can be no significant change if society continues to view those with substance use disorders as underserving of care. Only when the perspective shifts to compassion can these mothers and children receive adequate care that rehabilitates and supports their future and empowers them to raise their children. - [1] NIDA. 2023, February 15. Pregnant People with Substance Use Disorders Need Treatment, Not Criminalization. https://nida.nih.gov/about-nida/noras-blog/2023/02/pregnant-people-substance-use-disorders-need-treatment-not-criminalization [2] Substance Use Disorder Hurts Moms and Babies. National Partnership for Women and Families. June 2021 [3] All stories have been fictionalized and anonymized. [4] A History of the Drug War. Drug Policy Alliance. https://drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war [5] The Harrison Narcotic Act (1914) https://www.druglibrary.org/Schaffer/library/studies/cu/cu8.html [6] The War on Drugs. The Global Commission on Drug Policy. Published June 2011. https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/the-war-on-drugs [7] Werb D, Rowell G, Guyatt G, Kerr T, Montaner J, Wood E. Effect of drug law enforcement on drug market violence: A systematic review. Int J Drug Policy. 2011;22(2):87-94. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2011.02.002 [8] Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011 [9] Women NA for P. Tennessee’s Fetal Assault Law: Understanding its impact on marginalized women - New York. Pregnancy Justice. Published December 14, 2020. https://www.pregnancyjusticeus.org/tennessees-fetal-assault-law-understanding-its-impact-on-marginalized-women/ [10] Roberts SCM, Nuru-Jeter A. Women’s perspectives on screening for alcohol and drug use in prenatal care. Womens Health Issues Off Publ Jacobs Inst Womens Health. 2010;20(3):193-200. doi:10.1016/j.whi.2010.02.003 [11] Klaman SL, Isaacs K, Leopold A, et al. Treating Women Who Are Pregnant and Parenting for Opioid Use Disorder and the Concurrent Care of Their Infants and Children: Literature Review to Support National Guidance. J Addict Med. 2017;11(3):178-190. doi:10.1097/ADM.0000000000000308 [12] Substance Abuse Reporting and Pregnancy: The Role of the Obstetrician–Gynecologist. https://www.acog.org/en/clinical/clinical-guidance/committee-opinion/articles/2011/01/substance-abuse-reporting-and-pregnancy-the-role-of-the-obstetrician-gynecologist [13] R. Ghertner, G Lincoln The Opioid Crisis and Economic Opportunity: Geographic and Economic Trends. ASPE. Office of Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. DHHS Revised September 11, 2018 https://aspe.hhs.gov/reports/economic-opportunity-opioid-crisis-geographic-economic-trends [14] Midon, M. Z., Gerzon, L. R., & de Almeida, C. S. (2021). Crack and motor development of babies living in an assistance shelter. ABCS Health Sciences, 46, e021215-e021215. And for example, see Crack Babies: Twenty Years Later : NPR https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126478643 [15] Williams JF, Smith VC, the Committee on Substance Abuse. Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders. Pediatrics. 2015;136(5):e20153113. doi:10.1542/peds.2015-3113 [16] CDC Tobacco Free. Smoking During Pregnancy. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Published April 11, 2022. https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/health_effects/pregnancy/index.htm [17] Abuse NI on D. What are the risks of methamphetamine misuse during pregnancy? National Institute on Drug Abuse. https://nida.nih.gov/publications/research-reports/methamphetamine/what-are-risks-methamphetamine-misuse-during-pregnancy [18] CDC. Basics About Opioid Use During Pregnancy | CDC. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Published July 21, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/pregnancy/opioids/basics.html [19] Honein MA, Boyle C, Redfield RR. Public Health Surveillance of Prenatal Opioid Exposure in Mothers and Infants. Pediatrics. 2019;143(3):e20183801. doi:10.1542/peds.2018-3801 [20] Winkelman TNA, Villapiano N, Kozhimannil KB, Davis MM, Patrick SW. Incidence and Costs of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome Among Infants with Medicaid: 2004–2014. Pediatrics. 2018;141(4):e20173520. doi:10.1542/peds.2017-3520 [21] Strahan AE, Guy GP Jr, Bohm M, Frey M, Ko JY. Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome Incidence and Health Care Costs in the United States, 2016. JAMA Pediatr. 2020;174(2):200-202. doi:10.1001/jamapediatrics.2019.4791 [22] Ghose R, Forati AM, Mantsch JR. Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Opioid Overdose Deaths: a Spatiotemporal Analysis. J Urban Health Bull N Y Acad Med. 2022;99(2):316-327. doi:10.1007/s11524-022-00610-0 [23] Mayes LC, Granger RH, Bornstein MH, Zuckerman B. The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Rush to Judgment. JAMA. 1992;267(3):406-408. doi:10.1001/jama.1992.03480030084043 [24] NICHD Neonatal Research Network. The Maternal Lifestyle Study. clinicaltrials.gov; 2016. https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/study/NCT00059540 [25] Lester BM, Tronick EZ, LaGasse L, et al. The maternal lifestyle study: effects of substance exposure during pregnancy on neurodevelopmental outcome in 1-month-old infants. Pediatrics. 2002;110(6):1182-1192. doi:10.1542/peds.110.6.1182 [26] Lester BM, Lagasse L, Seifer R, et al. The Maternal Lifestyle Study (MLS): effects of prenatal cocaine and/or opiate exposure on auditory brain response at one month. J Pediatr. 2003;142(3):279-285. doi:10.1067/mpd.2003.112 [27] Bada HS, Bann CM, Bauer CR, et al. Preadolescent behavior problems after prenatal cocaine exposure: Relationship between teacher and caretaker ratings (Maternal Lifestyle Study). Neurotoxicol Teratol. 2011;33(1):78-87. doi:10.1016/j.ntt.2010.06.005 [28] N, P, R. Crack Babies: Twenty Years Later. NPR. Published May 3, 2010. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126478643 [29] Miranda L, Dixon V, September CRP on, 30, 2015. How States Handle Drug Use During Pregnancy http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/maternity-drug-policies-by-state [30] NCDAS: Substance Abuse and Addiction Statistics [2023]. NCDAS. https://drugabusestatistics.org/ [31] (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-216). [32] Institute G. Interactive Map: US Abortion Policies and Access After Roe. https://states.guttmacher.org/policies/ [33] Whitesell M, Bachand A, Peel J, Brown M. Familial, Social, and Individual Factors Contributing to Risk for Adolescent Substance Use. J Addict. 2013;2013:579310. doi:10.1155/2013/579310 [34] CDC. Five Great Benefits of Breastfeeding. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Published July 27, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpao/features/breastfeeding-benefits/index.html [35] Welle-Strand GK, Skurtveit S, Jansson LM, Bakstad B, Bjarkø L, Ravndal E. Breastfeeding reduces the need for withdrawal treatment in opioid-exposed infants. Acta Paediatr. 2013;102(11):1060-1066. doi:10.1111/apa.12378 [36] Ilett KF, Hackett LP, Gower S, Doherty DA, Hamilton D, Bartu AE. Estimated dose exposure of the neonate to buprenorphine and its metabolite norbuprenorphine via breastmilk during maternal buprenorphine substitution treatment. Breastfeed Med Off J Acad Breastfeed Med. 2012;7:269-274. doi:10.1089/bfm.2011.0096 [37] Pedersen CA, Smedley KL, Leserman J, et al. Intranasal Oxytocin Blocks Alcohol Withdrawal in Human Subjects. Alcohol Clin Exp Res. 2013;37(3):484-489. doi:10.1111/j.1530-0277.2012.01958.x [38] Montana SB0289. https://leg.mt.gov/bills/2019/billhtml/SB0289.htm [39] Mullins N, Galvin SL, Ramage M, Gannon M, Lorenz K, Sager B, Coulson CC. Buprenorphine and Naloxone Versus Buprenorphine for Opioid Use Disorder in Pregnancy: A Cohort Study. J Addict Med. 2020 May/Jun;14(3):185-192. doi: 10.1097/ADM.0000000000000562. PMID: 31567599. [40] Drug Related Crime Statistics [2023]: Offenses Involving Drug Use. NCDAS. https://drugabusestatistics.org/drug-related-crime-statistics/ [41] Association APH. Online only: Report finds most U.S. inmates suffer from substance abuse or addiction. Nations Health. 2010;40(3):E11-E11. [42] Principles of Drug Addiction Treatment: A Research-Based Guide (Third Edition) | NIDA Archives. Published January 17, 2018. http://archives.nida.nih.gov/publications/principles-drug-addiction-treatment-research-based-guide-third-edition

Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. 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