Gotowe bibliografie tematyczne / Market power

Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Market power”

Autor: Grafiati

Data publikacji: 4 czerwca 2021

Data aktualizacji: 22 czerwca 2024

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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Market power"

Weiss, Jürgen. "Market Power and Power Markets". Interfaces 32, nr 5 (październik 2002): 37–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/inte.32.5.37.74.

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Morris, John R. "Finding Market Power in Electric Power Markets". International Journal of the Economics of Business 7, nr 2 (lipiec 2000): 167–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13571510050084514.

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Raj, Aniket, Utkarsh Gupta, Prabhakar Tiwari i Asheesh K. Singh. "Market power analysis of the Indian power market". International Journal of Engineering, Science and Technology 13, nr 1 (9.07.2021): 39–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ijest.v13i1.6s.

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Emerging electricity reforms in the power market aims at removing the monopolistic oligopoly power market and promoting competition in the market by providing opportunities to more producers. This paper seeks to investigate various existing structures of the Power Market. Indian Energy Exchange (IEX) and Power Exchange India Limited (PXIL) facilitates transparent trading of electricity, a larger market spectrum and allows the participation of other players in the market. Market power is an indicator of an non-competitive market, that is increase in the market power will result in the degradation of competition. This research will help modify the current parameters (HHI Index and Concentration ratio) which are used for measuring the market power of the power markets. As there is always deviation in unconstrained cleared volume and actual cleared or scheduled volume, deviation arises due to the volume of electricity that could not be cleared because of congestion in the power exchange. The researchers have also examined the Indian Power market and analyzed different developed power markets of the world like the US Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) and the Nordpool.

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Lines, Thomas. "Markets, prices and market power". International Journal of Green Economics 2, nr 3 (2008): 295. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijge.2008.021424.

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Ansink, Erik, i Harold Houba. "Market power in water markets". Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64, nr 2 (wrzesień 2012): 237–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.10.002.

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Twomey, Paul, i Karsten Neuhoff. "Wind power and market power in competitive markets". Energy Policy 38, nr 7 (lipiec 2010): 3198–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.031.

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Cope III, Robert F., David E. Dismukes i Rachelle F. Cope. "Modeling regional electric power markets and market power". Managerial and Decision Economics 22, nr 8 (2001): 411–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.1031.

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Brennan, Donna, i Jane Melanie. "Market power in the Australian power market". Energy Economics 20, nr 2 (kwiecień 1998): 121–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0140-9883(97)00010-8.

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Kaplow, Louis. "Market definition, market power". International Journal of Industrial Organization 43 (listopad 2015): 148–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.05.001.

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Ito, Koichiro, i Mar Reguant. "Sequential Markets, Market Power, and Arbitrage". American Economic Review 106, nr 7 (1.07.2016): 1921–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141529.

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We develop a framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and restricted entry in arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using microdata from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In the presence of market power, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing, reducing consumer costs but increasing deadweight loss. (JEL D42, D43, L12, L13, L94, Q41)

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Rozprawy doktorskie na temat "Market power"

Baumann, Dominique Cristian. "Market coupling in the power markets". reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/12174.

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Submitted by Luana Rodrigues (luana.rodrigues@fgv.br) on 2014-10-21T18:45:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Versão Final - Dominique.pdf: 2899721 bytes, checksum: e06d28c3a380d3af7d793bd8d8660b36 (MD5)
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The thesis analyses the European Unions’ effort to create an integrated pan-European electricity market based on “market coupling” as the proposed allocation mechanism for interconnector transfer capacity. Thus, the thesis’ main focus is if market coupling leads to a price convergence in interlinked markets and how it affects the behavior of electricity price data. The applied research methods are a qualitative, structured literature review and a quantitative analysis of electricity price data. The quantitative analysis relies on descriptive statistics of absolute price differentials and on a Cointegration analysis according to Engle & Granger (1987)’s two step approach. Main findings are that implicit auction mechanisms such as market coupling are more efficient than explicit auctions. Especially the method of price coupling leads to a price convergence in involved markets, to social welfare gains and reduces market power of producers, as shown on the example of the TLC market coupling. The market coupling initiative between Germany and Denmark, on the other hand, is evaluated as less successful and illustrates the complexity and difficulties of implementing market coupling initiatives. The cointegration analysis shows that the time series were already before the coupling date cointegrated, but the statistical significance increased. The thesis suggests that market coupling leads to a price convergence of involved markets and thus functions as method to create a single, integrated European electricity market.
A dissertação analisa o esforço dos sindicatos europeus para criar um mercado pan- europeu de electricidade integrada baseada em 'mercados combinados', como o mecanismo de alocação de capacidade de transferência de energia entre diferentes sistemas. Assim, o foco principal do estudo é se a integração do mercado leva a uma convergência de preços nos mercados interligados, e como isso afeta o comportamento dos preços de energia elétrica. Os métodos de investigação são uma revisão bibliográfica estruturada qualitativa e uma análise quantitativa de dados de preços de energia elétrica. A análise quantitativa se baseia em estatísticas descritivas das diferenças de preços absolutos e em uma análise de cointegração de acordo com a abordagem de Engle e Granger (1987). As principais conclusões são que os mecanismos de leilões implícitos, tais como a integração de mercado são mais eficientes que os leilões explícitos. Especialmente, o método de acoplamento de preços leva a uma convergência de preços nos mercados envolvidos, a ganhos de bem-estar social e reduz a o poder dos produtores no mercado, como mostra o exemplo da integração mercado TLC. A iniciativa mercados combinados entre a Alemanha ea Dinamarca, por outro lado, é avaliada como de menor sucesso e ilustra a complexidade e as dificuldades de implementação de iniciativas de integração de mercado. A análise de cointegração mostra que as séries temporais já estavam cointegradas antes da data de integração, mas a significância estatística aumentou. A tese sugere que a integração do mercado leva a uma convergência dos preços dos mercados envolvidos e, portanto, funciona como método para criar um mercado de eletricidade único e integrado na Europa.

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Le, Coq Chloé. "Quantity choices and market power in electricity markets". Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), 2003. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-566.

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Competitive power markets from different countries exhibit a common market design, especially because of the nature of electricity (lack of storage, inelastic load, and strong seasonal effects on multiple time scales). For example, a majority of countries have created a spot market where electricity is traded hourly. The design of the spot markets reflected an ambition of providing strong incentives for efficient and least-cost production. Subsequently, the spot market price has been considered as a reference price for other existing electricity markets such as the contract market or the real-time market. However, empirical studies on electricity markets find some evidence of abnormally high markups. The literature on the electricity spot market mainly focuses on the producers' pricing decisions. The present thesis argues that quantity choices, both in terms of available as well as contracted quantities, are crucial for understanding market power in electricity markets.
Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2003 [4], iii, [1] s., s. 1-6: sammanfattning, s. 7-119, [5] s.: 4 uppsatser

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Le, Coq Chloé. "Quantity choices and market power in electricity markets /". Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (EFI), 2003. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/615.htm.

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Samseth, Eivind, i Geir Anders Haga. "European Power Market Model". Thesis, Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Institutt for industriell økonomi og teknologiledelse, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:no:ntnu:diva-21073.

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We develop and present a stochastic power market model to study the short-term spot market in Northern Europe. The model is formulated as a Mixed Linear Complementarity Problem using Conjectural Variations for the market power representation. The power producers and the transmission system operator simultaneously solve a profit maximization problem to reach a Nash-Equilibrium. The model results show dispatch, transmission and prices in 2010 and 2020 for different stochastic wind forecasts. We see a clear distinction between technologies used for base load and for balancing the market. Prices in Norway and Denmark will increase towards 2020 and decrease in Germany and the Netherlands. We study how our market power representation can be adjusted to be as realistic as possible, the effect of wind uncertainty, how robust the power system is with respect to volatile prices and the effect of the carbon price and bio power feed-in tariffs. Because of the uncertain wind there is an increase in natural gas dispatch compared to a deterministic case. The model is also decomposed with Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition technique. Unfortunately the decomposed model is not able to solve as big problems as the non-decomposed model. However we show significant algorithmic improvements and are able to reduce the number of iterations on a small problem from 183 to 17.

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Peng, Ni. "Market power and mergers". Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/market-power-and-mergers(50b08a07-76d5-41d3-821a-7fb33c71bebc).html.

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This thesis presents three essays on the motives for mergers and the determinants of U.S. horizontal merger antitrust case selection. These essays contribute to the debate on whether mergers increase social welfare and on the efficiency of antitrust intervention. The first essay explores the market power motive for horizontal mergers by examining the relation between the announcement wealth effects to merging firms and their reliant corporate customers. Large sample studies generally conclude that efficiency considerations drive horizontal mergers and find little market power, which implies a non-negative wealth effect relation between these two parties along the supply chain. When I examine the endogenous stock market reactions to merger announcements with instrumentation, however, my results overturn this inference: I find that greater abnormal returns to merging firms systematically relate to lower abnormal returns to reliant customers. This wealth transfer effect exists for deals in industries with little foreign competition but not for deals in industries with intense foreign competition. These results suggest that increased market power is a key driver of horizontal mergers. In the second essay, I investigate the determinants of U.S. antitrust invention by examining horizontal merger antitrust case selection in the U.S. manufacturing sector during 1980-2009. I find no evidence supporting the consumer protection claim of the government's antitrust agencies. Instead, I find that the likelihood of antitrust intervention is negatively related to foreign import pressure. Hitting a market concentration hurdle criterion also predicts intervention. In addition, industry rivals seem able to exert pressure for antitrust intervention to avoid a competitive disadvantage. I identify two rival groups that account for the demand for antitrust regulation, local rivals and rivals producing less specialised products. The third essay examines the motives for related mergers from the perspective of product market similarity. Using Hoberg and Phillips' (2014) text-based product similarity measure, I find that when an acquirer's product is more similar to those of its rivals, a related merger results in a greater post-merger product price and lower market share for the combined firm. Moreover, for related mergers in more homogenous product markets, the stock market reactions to the merger announcement are higher for the combined firm and for product market rivals, but lower for reliant corporate customers. Overall, the evidence on both product market real performance and stock market reactions is consistent with the wealth transfer effect of related mergers, and suggests that the primary motive for firms to merge with product market competitors is to gain market power rather than to achieve efficiencies.

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Neuhoff, Karsten Michael. "Market power in networks". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.620062.

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Godby, Robert William. "The effect of market power in emission permit markets". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape16/PQDD_0011/NQ30139.pdf.

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Pham, Thao. "Market power in power markets in Europe : the Cases in French and German woholesale electricity markets". Thesis, Paris 9, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PA090019/document.

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Les deux derniers siècles ont connu une révolution exceptionnelle dans l'organisation des marchés électriques dans le monde entier. Ainsi, traditionnellement organisé autour de monopoles verticalement intégrés et soumis à la régulation, le secteur électrique connait un processus de réforme et évolue vers une organisation décentralisée qui favorise les mécanismes du marché. Le passage des tarifs régulés à des prix du marché, compte tenu des structures concentrées et les caractéristiques particulières de l'industrie électrique, accroît la possibilité que certaines entreprises puissent manipuler les prix du marché en exerçant leur pouvoir de marché. Les questions de "pouvoir de marché" dans un secteur donné ont été abondamment étudiées dans la littérature de l'économie Industrielle depuis la fin des années 1970, mais des études théoriques et empiriques de "pouvoir de marché dans les marchés électriques" n'ont été développées que récemment. Dans cette thèse, nous essayons de mener une recherche approfondie autour des questions de pouvoir de marché sur les marchés de gros de l'électricité en Europe. Nous conduisons des études empiriques dans deux des plus grands marchés européens: la France (sur des données 2009-2012) et l'Allemagne (sur des données de 2011), en utilisant des méthodes économétriques et des modèles de simulation des marchés électriques. Le sujet semble pertinent dans la période de transition énergétique en Europe
The two last centuries have witnessed an exceptional revolution in the organization of electric power markets worldwide. The industry's organization has changed from vertically integrated monopolies under regulation to unbundled structures that favor market mechanisms; known as reform process in Europe. The shift to reliance on market prices, given concentrated structures and particular characteristics of electricity industry, raises a possibility that some firms could influence the market prices by exercising their market power. The issues of "market power" in a given industry have been abundantly employed in the literatureof Industrial Organization since the late 1970s but theoretical and empirical studies of "market power in electricity markets" have only been developed recently. In this thesis, we attempt to carry out an insight research around market power questions in deregulated wholesale electricity markets in Europe, as regarding the way of defining and measuring it. We carry out empirical studies in two of the biggest liberalized electricity markets in Europe: France (2009-2012's data) and Germany (2011's data), using econometric regressions and electricity simulation models as main methodologies. The subject is particularly relevant inthe context of energy transition in Europe (transition energetique in France and Energiewende in Germany)

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Vickery, D. Jason (David Jason) 1969. "REITs & market power : an analysis of market power theory and antitrust policy". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/70718.

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Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture, 1998.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 30-31).
During the late 1980's and early 1990's, Real Estate Investment Trust ("REITs") accumulated large portfolios of properties. During this period, REITs were able to grow through acquisitions alone, arbitraging their low cost of capital relative to private asset valuations. This changed the real estate industry and for the first time, real estate entities have concentrated ownership in an industry traditionally characterized by fractionalized ownership. Today, there is tremendous pressure from the public markets for REITs to continue to grow. This has lead the management of REITs to seek alternative growth strategies. These strategies include cost economies of scale, branding, growth of non-real estate related revenue, vertical integration, and exertion of market power. This thesis studies market power in real estate, focusing specifically on whether REITs are currently exerting market power. The first part of the paper reviews the economic theory of market power and the antitrust laws. Economic concepts such as elasticity of supply, elasticity of demand, barriers to entry and market contestability are examined in a real estate context. The antitrust laws and the government's definitions of market power and relevant markets are reviewed and applied to the real estate industry.
by D. Jason Vickery.
S.M.

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Subramaniam, Thiagarajah Natchie. "Essays in Market Power Mitigation and Supply Function Equilibrium". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/321578.

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Market power mitigation has been an integral part of wholesale electricity markets since deregulation. In wholesale electricity markets, different regions in the US take different approaches to regulating market power. While the exercise of market power has received considerable attention in the literature, the issue of market power mitigation has attracted scant attention. In the first chapter, I examine the market power mitigation rules used in New York ISO (Independent System Operator) and California ISO (CAISO) with respect to day-ahead and real-time energy markets. I test whether markups associated with New York in-city generators would be lower with an alternative approach to mitigation, the CAISO approach. Results indicate the difference in markups between these two mitigation rules is driven by the shape of residual demand curves for suppliers. Analysis of residual demand curves faced by New York in-city suppliers show similar markups under both mitigation rules when no one supplier is necessary to meet the demand (i.e., when no supplier is pivotal). However, when some supplier is crucial for the market to clear, the mitigation rule adopted by the NYISO consistently leads to higher markups than would the CAISO rule. This result suggest that market power episodes in New York is confined to periods where some supplier is pivotal. As a result, I find that applying the CAISOs' mitigation rules to the New York market could lower wholesale electricity prices by 18%. The second chapter of my dissertation focuses on supply function equilibrium. In power markets, suppliers submit offer curves in auctions, indicating their willingness to supply at different price levels. Although firms are allowed to submit different offer curves for different time periods, surprisingly many firms stick to a single offer curve for the entire day. This essentially means that firms are submitting a single offer curve for multiple demand realizations. A suitable framework to analyze such oligopolistic competition between power market suppliers is supply function equilibrium models. Using detailed bidding data, I develop equilibrium in supply functions by restricting supplier offers to a class of supply functions. By collating equilibrium supply functions corresponding to different realizations of demand, I obtain a single optimal supply function for the entire day. Then I compare the resulting supply function with actual day-ahead offers in New York. In addition to supply function equilibrium, I also develop a conservative bidding approach in which each firm assumes that rivals bid at marginal costs. Results show that the supply functions derived from equilibrium bidding model in this paper is not consistent with actual bidding in New York. This result is mainly driven by the class of supply functions used in this study to generate the equilibrium. Further, actual offers do not resemble offers generated by the conservative bidding algorithm.

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Książki na temat "Market power"

Milton, Gregory B. Market Power. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137012753.

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A, Holt Charles, i Isaac R. Mark, red. Experiments investigating market power. Amsterdam: JAI, 2002.

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Great Britain. Office of Fair Trading. Assessment of market power. London: Great Britain, Office of Fair Trading, 1999.

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Inc, Public Utilities Reports, Management Exchange Inc i EXNET, red. Market power: Conference materials. New York, N.Y: Exnet, 1996.

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David, Bowman. Market power and inflation. Washington, D.C: Federal Reserve Board, 2003.

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Ezra, Hausman, American Public Power Association i Synapse Energy Economics (Firm), red. LMP electricity markets: Market operations, market power, and value for consumers. Washington, D.C: American Power Association, 2007.

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Holly, Sean. Market valuation, uncertainty and firm's market power. Sheffield: Sheffield University, School of Management, 1993.

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W, Cooper Russell. Exhuming Q: Market power vs. capital market imperfections. [Minneapolis, MN]: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Dept., 2001.

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W, Cooper Russell. Exhuming Q: Market power vs. capital market imperfections. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.

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Peterson, Wallace C., red. Market Power and the Economy. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2673-8.

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Części książek na temat "Market power"

Goodwin, Neva, Jonathan M. Harris, Julie A. Nelson, Pratistha Joshi Rajkarnikar, Brian Roach i Mariano Torras. "Markets with Market Power". W Microeconomics in Context, 557–89. Wyd. 5. New York: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003252207-23.

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Goodwin, Neva, Jonathan M. Harris, Julie A. Nelson, Pratistha Joshi Rajkarnikar, Brian Roach i Mariano Torras. "Markets with Market Power". W Principles of Economics in Context, 391–412. 2nd edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, 2019.: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429438752-19.

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Savage, Ian. "Market Power". W The Economics of Railroad Safety, 99–103. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5571-1_12.

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Brush, Thomas. "Market Power". W The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 991–96. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-00772-8_493.

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Brush, Thomas. "Market Power". W The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management, 1–6. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-94848-2_493-1.

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Tanaka, Makoto, Antonio J. Conejo i Afzal S. Siddiqui. "Market Power". W International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, 155–95. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-92871-1_5.

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Førsund, Finn R. "Market Power". W Hydropower Economics, 265–300. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-7519-5_11.

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Tremblay, Victor J., i Carol Horton Tremblay. "Market Power". W Springer Texts in Business and Economics, 311–40. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-3241-8_12.

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Barkley, Andrew, i Paul W. Barkley. "Market power". W Principles of Agricultural Economics, 337–62. Third edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge textbooks in environmental and agricultural economics: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429284793-13.

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Barkley, Andrew, i Paul W. Barkley. "Market power". W Principles of Agricultural Economics, 369–97. Wyd. 4. London: Routledge, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003367994-13.

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Streszczenia konferencji na temat "Market power"

David, A. K. "Market power in generation markets". W APSCOM 2000 - 5th International Conference on Advances in Power System Control, Operation and Management. IEE, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/cp:20000400.

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Soleymani, S., A. M. Ranjbar, A. Jafari, A. R. Shirani i M. Ranjbar. "Market power monitoring in electricity market by using market simulation". W 2006 IEEE Power India Conference. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/poweri.2006.1632562.

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Lusan, D. A., Z. Yu i F. T. Sparrow. "Market gaming and market power mitigation in deregulated electricity markets". W IEEE Power Engineering Society. 1999 Winter Meeting (Cat. No.99CH36233). IEEE, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pesw.1999.747272.

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Baldick, Ross. "Market power, market power mitigation, and efficiency". W Energy Society General Meeting. IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pes.2010.5590131.

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Zeiselmair, Andreas, Ryan Harper, Simon Koppl i Alexander Bogensperger. "Market power assessment in regional smart markets". W 2020 17th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/eem49802.2020.9221930.

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Bjorndal, Mette, Victoria Gribkovskaia i Kurt Jornsten. "Market power in a power market with transmission constraints". W 2010 7th International Conference on the European Energy Market (EEM 2010). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/eem.2010.5558749.

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"Session 22: Market power and market strategies". W 2011 European Energy Market (EEM). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/eem.2011.5953124.

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Stoilov, Dimo, Luben Stoilov i Georgi Stoilov. "Momentary power market". W 2008 IEEE International Conference on Electro/Information Technology (EIT 2008). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/eit.2008.4554339.

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Zhong, Jin, i Kankar Bhattacharya. "Reactive power market design and its impact on market power". W Energy Society General Meeting. IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pes.2008.4596717.

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Rong Fu, Ping Wei, Guoping Jiang, Xifeng Zhou, Qiulan Wan i Guoqing Tang. "New market power driven multistage transmission expansion strategy in power markets". W 2006 IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pes.2006.1708889.

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Raporty organizacyjne na temat "Market power"

Kaplow, Louis. Market Definition, Market Power. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, maj 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21167.

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Ito, Koichiro, i Mar Reguant. Sequential Markets, Market Power and Arbitrage. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, grudzień 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20782.

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Hanley, Maria, ShangMin Lin, C. Elise Logan, Bob Wallace, Pamela Shirley, Thomas Bucher, Jovan Ilic i Marija Prica. Power Market Primers. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), kwiecień 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1556069.

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De Loecker, Jan, i Jan Eeckhout. Global Market Power. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, czerwiec 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24768.

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Berger, David, Kyle Herkenhoff i Simon Mongey. Labor Market Power. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, marzec 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25719.

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Eeckhout, Jan, i Laura Veldkamp. Data and Market Power. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, maj 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30022.

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Azar, José, Steven Berry i Ioana Marinescu. Estimating Labor Market Power. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, sierpień 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30365.

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Silva Monroy, Cesar Augusto, Verne William Loose, James F. Ellison, Ryan Thomas Elliott, Raymond Harry Byrne, Ross Guttromson i Leigh S. Tesfatsion. New wholesale power market design using linked forward markets :. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), kwiecień 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1095932.

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Allen, Jason, Robert Clark i Jean-François Houde. Search Frictions and Market Power in Negotiated Price Markets. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, luty 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w19883.

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Cooper, Russell, i Joao Ejarque. Exhuming Q: Market Power vs. Capital Market Imperfections. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, marzec 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w8182.

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