Rozprawy doktorskie na temat „Market competition”
Kliknij ten link, aby zobaczyć inne rodzaje publikacji na ten temat: Market competition.
Utwórz poprawne odniesienie w stylach APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard i wielu innych
Sprawdź 50 najlepszych rozpraw doktorskich naukowych na temat „Market competition”.
Przycisk „Dodaj do bibliografii” jest dostępny obok każdej pracy w bibliografii. Użyj go – a my automatycznie utworzymy odniesienie bibliograficzne do wybranej pracy w stylu cytowania, którego potrzebujesz: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver itp.
Możesz również pobrać pełny tekst publikacji naukowej w formacie „.pdf” i przeczytać adnotację do pracy online, jeśli odpowiednie parametry są dostępne w metadanych.
Przeglądaj rozprawy doktorskie z różnych dziedzin i twórz odpowiednie bibliografie.
1
Ball, Catherine. "Local Markets : Competition and Market Structure". Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.527635.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
This thesis examines competition in three local markets: homebuilding, estate agency and groceries. It uses and extends the methodology developed by Bresnahan and Reiss in their seminal work in the 1990s, whereby the relationship between market structure and market size is used to evaluate how competition varies with finn numbers. U sing data from the homebuilding market, the rationale for using the Ordered Probit rather than count data alternatives to estimate these models is explored. Contrary to the existing literature, it is shown that the choice of estimator can significantly affect the results. In addition, several extensions to the Bresnahan and Reiss methodology are proposed. Firstly, the model is generalised to allow analysis of the persistence of certain effects as the number of finns in the market increases. It is shown that estate agents are able to profit from price discrimination and market segmentation, even in relatively unconcentrated markets. Secondly, a methodology is proposed to analyse the effects of competition on market expansion by augmenting the model with sales data. It is shown that increased competition between estate agents leads to a transfer of surplus but no increase in the size of the market. Thirdly, the model is extended in two ways to allow for competition between differentiated finns. When finn level data on differentiation is not available, the effect of the scope for differentiation is analysed. It is shown that markets with greater scope for differentiation are more profitable for estate agents. However, as finns can be identified by type, a more strategic approach is used to analyse the competition between different grocery formats. It is shown that small supermarkets, when located near at least one specialist store (e.g. a butcher or baker), negatively affect the profits of large supermarkets; a result that differs from previous studies by competition authorities.
2
Kang, Kyeong-Hoon. "Market structures and competition in system markets". College Park, Md. : University of Maryland, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/1698.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Maryland, College Park, 2004.Thesis research directed by: Economics. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
3
Bastos, Paulo R. "Unionised labour markets, product market competition and economic integration". Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.444659.
Pełny tekst źródła
4
Lörtscher, Simon. "Competition between market making intermediaries /". Berlin : dissertation.de, 2006. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/508393108.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródła
5
Sassi, Syrine. "Essays on production market competition". Thesis, Paris Est, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PESC0125.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
L’objectif de cette thèse est d’étudier le rôle que joue la concurrence sur le marché des biens et services dans la prise des décisions ainsi que sur la valeur de la firme. En particulier, elle met l’accent sur l’impact de la pression concurrentielle sur le choix de la source de la dette, l’efficience des décisions d’investissement dans le capital humain, et le coût des fonds propres. Cette thèse est organisée en trois essais.Dans un premier essai, nous nous intéressons à l’effet de la concurrence sur le marché des biens et services sur la prise des décisions de financement, et particulièrement le choix de la source de la dette. À partir d’un échantillon de 3 831 entreprises américaines cotées au cours de la période 2001-2013 et en utilisant une nouvelle mesure de concurrence reflétant les menaces concurrentielles qui pèsent sur les entreprises, nous constatons que les entreprises faisant face à une concurrence accrue ont moins tendance à recourir à la dette bancaire. Ce résultat soutient l’hypothèse que la concurrence joue un rôle de gouvernance efficace qui, par conséquent, peut être substitutif à la fonction de surveillance et de contrôle des prêteurs bancaires. De plus, nos résultats montrent que l’impact négatif de la concurrence sur le recours à la dette bancaire est plus important pour les entreprises qui sont plus susceptibles d’être sensibles à la pression disciplinaire exercée par le marché, particulièrement les entreprises exposées à la pression concurrentielles et les entreprises ayant de sévères contraintes financières.Le deuxième essai examine l’impact de la concurrence sur le marché des biens et services sur l’efficience des décisions d’investissement des entreprises, et particulièrement l’investissement dans le capital humain, un sujet qui a été largement ignoré par les recherches antérieures. L’analyse empirique se base sur un échantillon de 18 957 observations durant la période 1998-2001. Les résultats montrent que l’intensification de la concurrence sur le marché des biens et services est négativement liée à l’efficience de l’investissement dans le capital humain. De plus, nous constatons que ce lien est plus important pour les entreprises risquées ainsi que les entreprises ayant des coûts importants associés à l’investissement dans le capital humain. Dans l’ensemble, nos résultats suggèrent que la concurrence sur le marché des biens et services augmente le risque de défaut des entreprises qui, par conséquent, réduisent leurs activités d’investissement, conduisant à un problème de sous-investissement dans le capital humain.Dans le troisième essai, nous examinons si la concurrence sur le marché des biens et services pourrait influencer la valeur de l’entreprise à travers son impact sur le taux de rentabilité exigé par les actionnaires, ou le coût des fonds propres. L’utilisation d’un large échantillon d’entreprises américaines cotées en bourse durant la période 1998-2013 montre que la concurrence sur le marché des biens et services a un effet négatif sur le taux de rentabilité exigé par les actionnaires. Les analyses additionnelles ont montré que cet effet négatif est particulièrement significatif dans les entreprises qui souffrent principalement d’une mauvaise gouvernance. Ce résultat suggère que la concurrence joue un rôle de gouvernance qui permet de discipliner le comportement discrétionnaire des dirigeants, notamment en les incitant à fournir plus d’effort pour protéger leur entreprise contre le risque de faillite. Par conséquent, ce rôle de gouvernance améliore les attentes des investisseurs à l’égard des perspectives futures de l’entreprise et réduit ainsi le taux de rentabilité exigé ou le coût des fonds propresThis dissertation investigates the effect of product market competition on corporate decisions and firm valuation. It is a collection of three essays. The first one examines the role of competition in driving the choice of debt source. Using a large sample of U.S. listed firms over the period 2001-2013, we show that product market competitive pressure is negatively associated with bank debt financing. This result is consistent with the view that competition plays an effective governance role that disciplines managers, and hence substitutes for the need to bank strict monitoring. In further analysis, we also show that the negative impact of competition on bank debt financing is stronger for firms with a higher exposure to competition and tighter financial constraints as they are more sensitive to external market discipline.The second essay explores whether product market competition matters for investment decisions, and more specifically labor investment decisions. To test our research hypotheses, we consider a large sample of U.S. listed firms over the 1998-2013 period and provide strong evidence that product market competitive pressure distorts labor investment efficiency. This result highlights the risk-increasing effect of competition. To the extent that firms in competitive industries have lower profit margins and higher bankruptcy risk, they are more willing to under-invest in labor in order to reduce labor costs and avoid further earnings declines. In addition, our cross-sectional tests show that the negative impact of competition on labor investment efficiency is intensified for firms with a higher exposure to competition, tighter financial constraints, and higher labor unionization rates.The third essay further investigates the implications of product market competition by examining its impact on the cost of equity capital which is viewed as one of the key considerations for managers in their investment and financing decisions. We employ a large panel of U.S. listed firms from 1998 to 2013 and find that firms facing intense competitive pressure have a lower cost of equity financing. Additionally, we show that the role of competition in reducing equity financing costs is more pronounced for firms with a higher exposure to competition and firms with poorer governance quality. Taken together, our findings suggest that product market competition serves as an external disciplinary mechanism that improves investors’ beliefs in the stock market, hence leading to a lower cost of equity capital
6
Blank, Malin, i Anna Maria Persson. "The Swedish food retail market : An econometric analysis of the competition on local food retail markets". Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-2521.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
The Swedish food retail market contains of three major actors, ICA, KF and Axfood, all in all dominating 75 percent of the total market shares. The scant number of retailing actors indicates that the Swedish food retail market is a highly concentrated oligopoly, which as a fact has given rise to definite discussions and argumentations concerning the market situation. But is the food retail market imperfect and how do we reach a workable competition? Economic theory does not provide any clear answer on these questions, but is rather divided into two fundamentally different approaches to define competition: the static and the dynamic perspective on competition.
In an attempt to examine the competition on local Swedish retail markets, the purpose of this study is to carry out an econometric model estimating the situation. The model serves to explain the variation of ICA’s achievements measured in terms of turnovers obtained in the company. The explanatory variables composing the model are divided into three separate groupings: degreeof market concentration, storespecific factors and region-specific factors. Furthermore, in order to find out which one of the competitive explanations best fits the reality, the regression results are interpreted from a static and a dynamic perspective of competition. In part, we also aim to compare the results with the outline of the Swedish competition law.
We found that the level of concentration obtained in our material is high and is steadily increasing. We also found that stores do not, in any great extent, use price, service and quality as competitive methods. Thus, to gain competitive advantage, market actors must find other ways to carry out strategic market activities. The region-specific variables had either none or very little influence on ICA’s turnover. According to these findings, neither the static nor the dynamic perspective of competition is solely able to produce an accurate method for reaching a state of a workable competition. Instead, a combination of the static and the dynamic ideas may be regarded as the most advantageous way to generate suitable conditions for competition to be efficient. Therefore, in order to promote workable competition, the Swedish competition law must consist of a balance between the static and the dynamic view of competition.
7
Andree, Kai, i Mike Schwan. "Collusive market sharing with spatial competition". Universität Potsdam, 2012. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2012/6214/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
This paper develops a spatial model to analyze the stability of a market sharing agreement between two firms. We find that the stability of the cartel depends on the relative market size of each firm. Collusion is not attractive for firms with a small home market, but the incentive for collusion increases when the firm’s home market is getting larger relative to the home market of the competitor. The highest stability of a cartel and additionally the highest social welfare is found when regions are symmetric. Further we can show that a monetary transfer can stabilize the market sharing agreement.
8
Higaki, Yusuke. "Competition in the Japanese potato market". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape10/PQDD_0003/MQ44181.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródła
9
Higaki, Yusuke. "Competition in the Japanese potato market". Thesis, McGill University, 1997. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=20571.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
The Japanese vegetable market is characterized by a general tendency towards the concentration of production by region. Amongst all vegetables, potato production has the highest level of concentration. Eighty-six percent of the total market quantity is accounted for by Hokkaido, the largest production prefecture amongst the 47 prefectures in Japan. The Herfindahl Index for prefectures in the Japanese potato market was 0.74 in 1994, indicating that the fewness of producers was equivalent to a market where total output was shared equally by only 1.35 producers. Under this highly concentrated situation, existence of monopolistic power, or more generally, oligopolistic power, of the large scale producers can be suspected.In this thesis, the level of competition in the Japanese Potato market was evaluated employing conjectural variations analysis based on a monthly data for 1989 to 1995 to reveal the nature of the market. Four wholesale markets, in four large consumption areas, and eight production areas in differ ent geographical locations in were analyzed.
The conclusion from the results of the empirical analysis is that, despite the high level of concentration in production, all producing regions including the dominant producer, Hokkaido, seem to have behaved competitively.
One implication for the competitive behavior of these large producers is the imperative to maintain their share in the market against potential competitors, resulting in price setting close to the marginal cost.
10
Mitchell, Lawrence. "Competition in an evolving stochastic market". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/4352.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
"In an efficient market all identical goods must have only one price." So states the aptly named law of one price. In the real world, however, one may easily verify that identical products are often sold for different prices. This thesis develops an extension of the Bertrand model in economics to include spatially localised competition to explain this price variation, which is then studied through simulation methods and theoretical analysis. Our model studies the effect that local heterogeneities in the environment experienced by sellers have on successful pricing strategies. Taking inspiration from models of evolutionary dynamics, we define the fitness of a seller and evolve seller prices through selection and mutation. We find three distinct steady states in our model related to the probability that a seller experiences competition for a buyer, mediated by the number of bankrupt sites in the system. When competition-free sales are unlikely, the system collapses on to a single price. If temporary monopoly situations do exist sellers can accumulate capital and variation in prices is stable. In this scenario, sellers spontaneously separate into two classes: cheap sellers – requiring sales to every potential buyer; and expensive sellers – requiring only occasional sales. Finally, we find an intermediate regime in which there is a single highly favoured price in the system which oscillates between high and low extrema. We study the properties of these steady states in detail, building a picture of how globally uncompetitive sellers can nonetheless survive if competition is strictly local. We show how the system builds up correlations, leading to niches for expensive sellers. These niches change the nature of the competition and allow for long-term survival of uncompetitive sellers. Not all expensive prices are equally likely in the steady state and we analyse why (and where) peaks in the price distribution appear. We can do this exactly for the early time dynamics of the model and extend the argument more qualitatively to the steady state. This latter analysis allows us to predict, for an observed steady distribution, the minimum price an expensive seller should charge to guarantee profit. The oscillatory ‘steady state’ is qualitatively reminiscent of boom and bust cycles in the global market. We study methods to suppress the oscillations and suggest ways of avoiding catastrophic crashes in the global economy – without negatively affecting the ability of outliers to make large profits.
11
Yi, Long, i 易龍. "Product market competition and investment efficiency". Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/206682.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
This thesis consists of two essays on the impacts product market competition has on the real investment efficiency of firms. While the first essay looks at this question through the corporate governance angle and finds product market competition complements institutional investors in disciplining firms, the latter one studies the impacts from an information production point of view and concludes competition reduces the incentive of firms to acquire information thereby reduces investment efficiency.
Using product market competition as a proxy for external corporate governance, the first essay documents a sizeable difference between the governance impact of institutional investors on firms with strong and weak external corporate governance. Higher institutional ownership is associated with real efficiency of firms, but only when external corporate governance is strong. The real efficiency is reflected in higher investment sensitivity to investment opportunities and higher firm value. Utilizing the passing of business combination laws as a negative shock to external corporate governance, the essay identifies that firms with higher institutional ownership suffer a larger decrease in real efficiency, suggesting external corporate governance such as product market competition is critical for institutional investors in disciplining firms.
The second essay attempts to figure out the impact of product market competition from an ex ante point of view. Specifically, how does product market competition change the incentive of firms to acquire information about investment opportunities ex ante? The essay provides both a model and a series of extensive empirical tests. The model features a two-stage Bayesian game in differentiated products market competition. This essay finds that competition causes firms to acquire less information and that investment becomes more inefficient in competitive industries. Empirically investment efficiency is measured by a latent variable technique and related to competition using a Herfindahl-Hirschman index as well as more exogenous measure such as trade costs. The panel regression analysis provides strong support for the theory and shows that investment is more efficient in concentrated industries.published_or_final_version
Economics and Finance
Doctoral
Doctor of Philosophy
12
Tian, Lin. "Banking market competition and corporate innovation". Thesis, University of Surrey, 2017. http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/841800/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
By using the U.S. data, this study shows that state-level banking market competition, measured by Panzar-Rosse (1984) H-statistic, increases the number of patents and citations generated by firms and improves corporate innovation efficiency, supporting market power hypothesis. Greater banking competition is also found to enable innovative firms to adopt more ambitious innovation policies and have more flexibility to experiment with new technologies. The investigation of the heterogeneity of banking competition effects at the state-level shows that regional innovation in the states with lower R&D intensity benefits more from improved competition in local banking markets where additional innovation makes a greater marginal economic contribution. At the firm-level, such favourable effects vary across firm characteristics and innovative firms, with greater dependence on external finance and being financially constrained, enjoy a greater benefit from increased banking competition. The research also examines the role of information specialisation and finds that the banking competition effects are stronger for firms operating in informationally opaque industries and having more specialised information. It implies that banks benefit from the economies of scale in more specialised information acquisition when allocating credit supply. Finally, the research reveals novel evidence on the substitution effects of competition in a wider region and neighbour-state to local banking market in financing corporate innovations. The finding shows ‘how local is local banking market’ depends on the operating scope and information transparency of borrowing firms and local banks have an information advantage over distant banks in financing local businesses and informationally opaque corporate innovation activities.
13
Zaouras, Michalis. "Essays on market structure and competition". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2012. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/57065/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
My thesis consists of two relatively independent topics. In the first topic I empirically inves- tigate the factors that determine the presence of the independent coffee shops in the market of Central London. In the second topic I present a theory of cartel detection. The common feature of these topics is that I investigate the demand side effects on market structure and its impact on competition. To be more specific, in the first topic I build a simple theoretical model of product differentiation in adjacent markets, based on Mazzeo (2002). For the empirical estimation I have constructed a unique dataset of coffee shops in Central London. I further manage to identify differences on demand characteristics across markets by utilizing data on people’s mo- bility from the tube stations and provide evidence for the existence of product differentiation. It is found that residential areas with high employment, areas with small business density and leisure areas increase the profitability of the independent coffee shops. A counterfactual analysis is also presented. In the second topic I investigate the cartel’s strategies and likelihood of collusion when the buyers of the cartel are able to report its existence to the anti-trust authority. I char- acterize the cartel’s optimal behavior when the buyers are actively monitoring the cartel’s members and are able to report a cartel to an anti-trust authority1. I present a simple static model and I show that the likelihood of collusion increases as the willingness of the buyers to report increases (cost of reporting decreases). Furthermore, it is shown that it is optimal for an anti-trust authority to decrease the cost of reporting (a trade-off between price reductions in existing cartels and increased likelihood of cartel formation is identified). Finally, alterna- tive cartel strategies are also explored in this topic. As for the last point, I show that the threat of exclusion (foreclosure) and price discrimination are robust strategies that prevent buyers from reporting.
14
Olofsson, Elias. "An economic study on forest resource competition : How market imperfections and increased competition affect woody feedstock markets". Licentiate thesis, Luleå tekniska universitet, Samhällsvetenskap, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-68410.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
Forestry and forest industry sectors have vital roles in the economy, both on a national and regional level. Due to the significant role of these sectors on the economic system, it is important to understand how competition issues impact market outcomes. In this licentiate thesis, competition problems affecting woody feedstock markets have been examined from two different perspectives: (a) imperfect competition, and (b) increased competition. The overall purpose of the thesis is to analyze how these two different competition issues will influence woody feedstock markets; and hopefully the results can help to increase the general knowledge of the subject of competition. To undertake this objective, three articles were written: (i) one review, (ii) one modeling, and (iii) one policy application; where the former examines imperfect competition, and the two latter, the implications of increased competition due to changing market conditions. The review article analyzed the competitive situation on forest product markets (i.e., roundwood markets). This was done by asking the general research question “What conclusions can be made from the research literature regarding the market characteristics for competitive forest product markets?” The study was motivated by the realization that the market condition may entail that forest product are subject to imperfect competition. A comprehensive article search was conducted using a number of different keywords on three different web-based search engines. The search was then expanded upon based on initial search results. The purpose of the first article was to review and assess the current state of knowledge relating to the competitive situation on forest product markets; and to increase the general understanding of how competition issues affect efficiency and allocation on forest product markets. In the second article, a regional partial equilibrium (PE) model was outlined and developed. The model, defined as the Norrbotten County Forest Sector Model (NCFSM), is comprised of three geographical regions in northern Sweden and Finland, and includes all the major forest industries in these regions and the iron- and steel industry (ISI) sector, a prospective wood user. The addition of the ISI sector represents a novelty in terms of modeling the value-chain of woody material in a Swedish context. Data for the NCFSM was collected from a combination of open sources, official national statistics, and personal correspondence with industry representatives. In the final article, the NCFSM was applied to assess how woody feedstock markets are affected by the introduction of the ISI sector to the marketplace. Three different market scenarios were formulated, and model output for each scenario was then compared to a business-as-usual baseline without the ISI sector. The overall result of the thesis indicates that there are quite clear implications from either imperfect or increased competition on the market outcome. This result is not unexpected. However, to what degree these competition aspect currently or potentially influence feedstock markets are more ambiguous. The result of the review article is inconclusive. In the review it is suggested that this result may be due to regional rather than sectoral differences, and that the degree of market imperfection varies over time. It has been suggested that the exertion of market power will follow the general conjectures of the economy, meaning that imperfect competition outcomes are more prevalent during economic downturns. In the review it is also suggested that the size of the individual forest industry will influence market delineation, where an increased business activity will decrease the probability of an imperfect market outcome. That is, as the industrial operation becomes larger, the procurement of woody materials will become more important since the economic implications (i.e., losses) of running out of materials increase with production. Thus, larger forest industries come to be more occupied with acquiring woody materials, thereby maintain production and securing long-term profitability, then engaging in short-term profit maximization schemes. The results from the third article suggests that increased feedstock competition, caused by the introduction of the ISI sector, will raise feedstock prices. The welfare variable remained relatively unchanged over the three scenarios when compared to the baseline, though some regional welfare redistribution effects are observed. Prices for primary woody materials, i.e., sawlogs and pulpwood, will mainly experience small changes from increased competition. Secondary woody materials, i.e., harvesting residues and industrial woody by-products, will experience greater price shifts, up to 650%. This outcome leads to secondary woody materials being priced above pulpwood. Such a market outcome is highly improbable, since there are incentives for market actors to substitute the expensive commodities with a cheaper woody feedstock. The overall results can be interpreted as ii indicating the intrinsic conflict of increased demand for a finite resource that is already used; the improbability of the ISI sector substituting fossil fuels with biofuels; and the importance of inter-regional trade for optimal allocation of woody materials.
15
Nilsson, Arvid. "Market transparency". Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.) (EFI), 2001. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/578.htm.
Pełny tekst źródła
16
Wegberg, Marcus Jacobus Allegonda Maria van. "Multi-market competition theory a conceptual framework /". Maastricht : Maastricht : Universitaire Pers Maastricht ; University Library, Maastricht University [Host], 1994. http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=6586.
Pełny tekst źródła
17
Povel, Paul. "Financial contracts, bankruptcy and product market competition". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1998. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/858/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
This thesis consists of three self–contained game–theoretic analyses of the contractual relationship between borrowers and lenders. A key element of this relation concerning their strategic variables than their opponents. Optimal contracts for different environments are derived and studied. They include ‘bankruptcy’ games, which are designed to structure the parties’ bargaining under certain circumstances. The first chapter questions the idea that being a unique lender to a firm is better than sharing the lender’s role. Even borrowers with poor prospects will apply for loans, if their main goal is to be financed, and re–financed if necessary. With one lender, refinancing is always provided once former loans are ‘sunk’. With two lenders, the situation may be different: inefficient negotiations have to determine how the overall loss is allocated. Some borrowers may therefore not be refinanced, and this may keep borrowers with poor prospects from applying for loans. The second chapter extends this model by adding a timing dimension: a borrower finds out about poor prospects earlier than his lender. He can ask for refinancing, or simply ‘wait and pray’. Either ‘soft’ contracts or ‘tough’ contracts may be optimal contracts: ‘soft’ contracts treat the borrower well if he asks for refinancing, while ‘tough’ contracts don’t (and the lender will not have the option of refinancing). ‘Hybrid’ contracts are strictly worse than the two ‘pure’ types. From this we draw conclusions for the design of bankruptcy laws, and for empirical work on bankruptcy. The third chapter analyses the interdependence of financial and production decisions. Debt contracts are frequently thought to lead to excessive risk taking — in a Cournot setup this means excessive production. At the same time, debt is a costly type of financing, which should reduce production. This conflict is analysed in a setting which allows to endogenise ‘debt’ contracts. The main result is that there is no excessive production, and financial constraints reduce output. However, for large levels of ‘inherited’ debt, it may be that output increases in the level of debt.
18
Liang, Jia-Wen. "Relative performance evaluation and product market competition /". view abstract or download file of text, 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/uoregon/fullcit?p3061955.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2002.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 75-77). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
19
Fleitas, Perla Sebastian, i Perla Sebastian Fleitas. "Essays on Inertia, Dynamics and Market Competition". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/625583.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
The central goal of my dissertation is to answer important questions about market design in health care when consumers have inertia, using modern industrial organization tools. The presence of consumer inertia in several markets has been well established in the literature, although we still know very little about how inertia affects the way markets work. In my dissertation, I shed light on these issues in the context of different institutional settings of health care sectors in different countries. Health care markets are extremely relevant because of their huge impacts on the quality of life and on mortality of individuals. In times when the expenditure on health care is increasingly high in modern economies, a better understanding of how these markets work is needed in order to decrease costs and improve their performance. The first chapter disentangles the effects of reductions in switching costs and in the length of contracts (lock-in) on consumer welfare, using quasi-experimental variation in the length of contracts in the Uruguayan health care system. In the second chapter, I study the effect of supply-side firm responses in terms of pricing and offering of new products, on consumer welfare in Medicare Part D in the U.S. Finally, the third chapter studies the effects of increased competition induced by reductions of consumer inertia, on quality and returns to skills for physicians, using uniquely detailed data from the Uruguayan health care sector. The use of tools from the field of industrial organization allows me to combine a solid theoretical background with clearly identified reduced-form and structural models, to analyze the welfare implications of equilibrium behavior in these markets, and to evaluate policy interventions and regulations aimed at improving welfare.
20
WANG, Yanchen. "Essays on market competition and law enforcement". Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2018. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/37.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
My Ph.D. dissertation contains both theoretical and empirical studies on market competition and law enforcement. The first study, entitled “Piracy, Counterfeiting, and Market Competition”, is a theoretical study and investigates the economic consequences of intellectual property law enforcement by looking at two types of intellectual property infringement, piracy and counterfeiting. To investigate how the market power changes in the presence of piracy, we start with a static model made up of two horizontally and vertically differentiated goods, genuine product and pirated product. The representative consumer's utility is a function of the consumption of the two goods. The consumer can choose to buy one out of the two differentiated goods but faces a potential legal cost if he purchases the pirated product. The legal cost is exogenous and decided by the policy maker. We show that, as the level of law enforcement enhances, the substitutability between genuine product and pirated product decreases, and the market power of the genuine product producer increases. This makes the two products less likely to belong to the same antitrust relevant market, confirming the conjecture raised by Lin (2018). Next, we explore how anti-counterfeiting efforts under the intellectual property law affect market competition, by setting up a two-stage game made up of four firms: two branded firms and two counterfeiters. In the first stage, each branded firm can take anti-counterfeiting effort independently and simultaneously, which only affects its corresponding counterfeiter. In the second stage, four firms compete in the Cournot’s framework. We show that two branded firms’ decision variables are strategic substitutes, and the negative externality exists for branded firm to take anti¬-counterfeiting efforts. Due to the negative externalities, we confirm that the private anti-counterfeiting efforts chosen by branded-good producers are higher than the industrial optimum. The second study, entitled ^The Volcker Rule, Bank Stability and Bank Liquidity^, is an empirical study and focuses on the latest bank regulation, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Specifically, we focus on section 619of Dodd-Frank Act, which is commonly known as “Volcker Rule” and imposes restrictions on banks’ ability to engage in proprietary trading activities. Using the passage of the Volcker Rule as an exogenous shock, we employ the difference-in¬differences analysis to investigate the effect of Volcker Rule on bank risk and liquidity creation. We find a significant reduction on proprietary trading among regulated bank holding companies (BHCs). In the meantime, we find that the enforcement of Volcker Rule induces a significant increase in liability-side liquidity creation and a decrease in the off-balance sheet liquidity creation. Our findings shed light on the trade-off of Volker Rule implementation in the United States.
21
Wills-Johnson, Nick. "Competition in a spatial retail petroleum market". Thesis, Curtin University, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/197.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
This thesis examines the behaviour of retail petroleum markets, with a case study examining prices in Perth, Australia. The aim of the thesis is two-fold. Firstly, it aims to extend the Edgeworth Cycles literature by showing how a simple, distance-based model of duopolistic competition can give rise to Edgeworth Cycles. Secondly, it makes use of the results of this model to build a model of the structure of the Perth market and to explore competition in that network.In the empirical component of the thesis, I explore whether network structure influences both the prices charged by each retail petroleum outlet and the shape of price cycles exhibited by each retail petroleum outlet. In addition, having performed a spectral analysis on prices and finding that most retail petroleum outlets do not follow a single cycle, but in fact use cycles of differing lengths, mostly seven and ten-day cycles, I explore whether network structure influences these choices or not. In the empirical analysis, I find evidence that network structure does, in fact, influence both price and the nature of cycles.
22
Burton, Dawn. "Banks go to market". Thesis, Lancaster University, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.331964.
Pełny tekst źródła
23
Mastel, Michael Kenneth. "Price competition in the hard spring wheat market: A market specific analysis". Thesis, Montana State University, 2002. http://etd.lib.montana.edu/etd/2002/mastel/MastelM2002.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
Price competition between the United States and Canada in the hard spring wheat markets of Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia are examined using annual data over a thirty year period. A four-equation system of supply and demand functions is used to estimate parameters that measure the price relationship of U.S. and Canadian hard spring wheat in each market. The models were estimated with three stage least squares procedures. Besides the parameters measuring price movement of hard spring wheat in the South Korean and Indonesian markets, results are generally not statistically different from zero. Supply and demand equations in the Japanese market have common estimated parameters that are the correct sign and statistically significant. Econometric results of the Japanese market indicate that the United States and Canada are acting as noncolluding oligopolists. Comparing the mixed results of the South Korean and Indonesian markets with those of the Japanese market suggest that the United States and Canada are not competing as strongly in the Japanese market as they are in South Korea and Indonesia.
24
Gal, Michal S. "Competition policy for small market economies, market conditions under the magnifying glass". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/NQ53773.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródła
25
Channagiri, Ajit Tejaswi. "COMPETITION, STATUS AND MARKETS". UKnowledge, 2018. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/management_etds/11.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
Extant research within competitive dynamics recognizes a positive relationship between high levels of competitive activity and firm performance, but the cognitive and psychological antecedents to competitive activity are far less clearly understood. I explore the role of a specific psychological antecedent - status, in impacting firms’ motivations to launch competitive moves against rivals. The key question, which extant literature does not seem fully equipped to answer, is when and under exactly what circumstances lower-status firms become motivated to launch action against higher-status ones and vice-versa. I use the stimulus-response model in social cognition to build theory which helps to answer the question by considering structural properties of market engagement. The specific structural property of market engagement that I focus on is market commonality, or the extent to which a rival is a significant player in markets important to a focal firm. I predict that a rival’s market commonality with a focal firm and its status relative to the focal firm have independent and positive effects on the extent to which the focal firm pays attention to the rival, that a rival’s market commonality with a focal firm and its status relative to the focal firm interact negatively to predict the focal firm’s motivation to launch action against that rival, and that a rival’s relative status and market commonality with a focal firm interact positively to predict the extent to which the focal firm pays attention to the rival. I test theory through a field study on gourmet food trucks in Lexington and an experiment through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk tool. Results provide broad support for the hypotheses. Three consequences follow from my study – that high-status firms are likely to come under attack from lower-status firms with whom they do not compete in markets, that they are unlikely to be paying attention to those lower-status firms when first attacked, and that they are likely to become aware of and motivated to act against those lower-status firms only after the lower-status firms have occupied key markets. My study contributes to the literatures in competitive dynamics, status, multi-market contact, and entrepreneurial action.
26
Kallio, A. Maarit I. "Studies on competition in the Finnish wood market /". Helsinki : Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration, 2001. http://aleph.unisg.ch/hsgscan/hm00051872.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródła
27
Feleke, Shiferaw Tesfaye. "Global competition for the Japanese fruit juice market". [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2006. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0014761.
Pełny tekst źródła
28
Almgren, Teresia. "Barriers to market entry and EC Competition law". Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Management and Economics, 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-2468.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
Hinder för marknadstillträde är viktigt i många avseenden. För ett företag som slår sig in på en ny marknad är det viktigt att veta vilka hinder det möter. För konkurrensrättsliga myndigheter är det nödvändigt att veta vilka hinder som existerar för att exempelvis kunna avgöra om ett företag har en dominerande ställning. Det är också nödvändigt att känna till hindren för att säkerställa en fri tillgång till marknaden.
Det saknas dock en generellt accepterad definition av hinder för marknadstillträde. Detta gör det svårare för de olika parterna på marknaden att veta om de handlat på ett otillåtet vis. Saknaden av en generellt accepterad definition och en klar åsikt om vad anses vara otillåtet enligt konkurrensrättsliga regler leder också till komplicerade och tidskrävande rättsliga processer.
Jag presenterar en rad olika definitioner samt en översikt av olika hinder för att klargöra ämnet. Jag diskuterar vilka hinder som är av intresse från ett konkurrensrättsligt perspektiv samt varför de är av intresse.
Jag kommer till slutsatsen att från ett konkurrensrättsligt perspektiv så är det inte definitionen i sig som är viktigast, utan man måste avgöra om ett hinder är otillåtet på individuell basis. Vid avgörande måste hänsyn tas till en rad olika faktorer, expempelvis den relevanta marknaden, vilken sorts hinder det gäller, hindrets effekt på marknaden, om hindret genererar några positiva effekter mm.
Barriers to entry are important from many aspects. For a firm entering a market it is important to know which barriers it is facing. From a competition authority’s perspective it is necessary to know the extent of entry barriers to determine for example if a firm enjoys a dominant position. It is also necessary to know the entry barriers in order to create provisions to ensure free market entry.
However, there is not one generally accepted definition of entry barriers. This makes it difficult for players in the market to assess when they are conducting a prohibited action. The lack of a standard definition and a clear opinion of what constitutes a prohibited barrier according to competition law also result in a more complicated and time-consuming judicial process.
I provide the reader with different definitions in order to clarify the matter. I also present an overview of barriers to entry. I also discuss which barriers are interesting from a competition law perspective and why they are of interest.
I conclude that, from a competition law perspective, it is not the definition of entry barriers that is of most interest. The most important question is without doubt whether the individual barrier constitutes an infringement to EC competition policy. That assessment must be done on an individual basis and it is an assessment that is dependant on many factors, such as the relevant market, the type of barrier, the affect the barrier have on the market, any pro-competitive effects etc.
29
Spagnolo, Giancarlo. "Essays on managerial incentives and product-market competition". Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.] (EFI), 1999. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/500.htm.
Pełny tekst źródła
30
Ekelund, Mats. "Competition and innovation in the Swedish pharmaceutical market". Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics (Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.) (EFI), 2001. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/559.htm.
Pełny tekst źródła
31
Wes, Marina. "Gains from trade : competition and the factor market". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1996. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1420/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
How do international trade and economic integration alter competitive pressures in economies. Can economic integration increase welfare by alleviating factor market distortions. What are the precise channels through which trade triggers welfare gains. This thesis examines how economic integration can alter competitive pressures in both product and factor markets. Endogenising product market imperfections, the new trade theory highlighted a number of previously unrecognised sources of gains from trade. This thesis will suggest that further gains from trade can be derived by endogenising factor market imperfections. Although these gains have been commonly alleged to by practitioners, they have hardly been formalised. Chapter 2 empirically assesses the importance of the various channels through which procompetitive gains from trade may be attained. Using a panel of 2400 Mexican firms between 1984-1990, it is shown that markups fell with trade liberalisation. It is also suggested that liberalisation has increased total factor productivity of the firms in the sample. The remainder of the thesis is of a theoretical nature. Chapter 3 focuses on the market for intermediate inputs in the presence of hold-up. In a closed economy, a bilateral monopoly is operating and inefficiencies arise in both product and factor markets. As the economy opens up to trade, procompetitive effects suppress the margin between prices and marginal costs increasing allocative efficiency. If downstream firms become internationally mobile, productive gains may arise from increasing returns to scale and intensified competition in the input market. Chapter 4 focuses on the unionised labour market. If countries are symmetric, trade will increase competition in the product market raising labour demand. The effect on wages is ambiguous. If firms are internationally mobile, the threat of firm mobility reduces both wages and unemployment.
32
Nier, Erlend Walter. "Financial structure, managerial incentives and product market competition". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1999. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1584/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
This dissertation provides a contribution to the understanding of the interactions between the firm's financial structure and its operating decisions. The main idea is that financial structure impacts the payoff to the firm's decision-maker and that this impact on the managerial payoff will in turn affect his optimal response when confronted with different possible operating decisions. A particular focus is on the case where the manager's optimisation problem arises in a strategic environment in which the firm competes with rival firms in a product market. The first main chapter reconsiders the strategic effect of debt, as first analysed by Brander and Lewis (1986), under the novel assumption that quantity choices are made by managers whose objective is to avoid bankruptcy. The basic result is that quantity choices, which are strategic substitutes under profit maximisation, may turn into strategic complements when the quantity choice is made by managers. This reversal in the nature of competition arises under reasonable assumptions on the firm's profit function. It allows debt to be used to sustain more collusive product market outcomes than in the benchmark case where firms maximise profits, thereby avoiding, and indeed reversing, the pro-competitive limited liability effect of debt, as described by Brander and Lewis (1986). Delegation of the quantity choice to a bankruptcy-averse manager is shown to occur in a dominant strategy equilibrium. The next chapter analyses the effect of asymmetric information between a firm and its outside investors on the firm's competitive position in a model where first-period competition is followed by a financing stage a la Myers and Majluf (1984). Interim profit generated by the competition stage takes the role of financial slack and determines the extent to which external equity finance is required for a new investment opportunity. The full set of equilibria of the financing game is characterised and financial slack is formally analysed as a comparative statics variable. Using this the firm's first period objective is derived from first principles. In contrast to models of predatory behaviour, one finds that in the presence of an adverse selection problem the need to finance externally may provide a strategic benefit rather than a strategic disadvantage. The reason is that the adverse selection problem may induce speculative behaviour, which will make the firm more aggressive vis a vis its rival. The last main chapter analyses a model where the firm's manager is asked to make an informed investment decision after evaluating the prospects of an investment project. In this model, which exhibits both moral hazard and hidden information on the part of the manager, different remuneration schemes are discussed and the optimal contract between financial investor and manager is derived. Assuming the manager is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability, a benefit from diversification is shown to exist, in that the right incentives can be provided more cheaply when the manager is supervising more than one project. This occurs even though the projects are technologically unrelated and choices made on one project do not constrain the choices on any other project.
33
Dick, Astrid A. (Astrid Andrea) 1972. "Essays on market structure, competition and consumer behavior". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8410.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2002.Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis is a collection of essays on market structure, competition and consumer behavior. In Chapter 1 I develop and estimate a structural model of demand for commercial bank deposit services, which allows me to analyze consumer response to various bank characteristics, as well as to measure the consumer welfare in light of the responses of banks to the regulatory changes in the period 1993-1999. My main finding is that, while concentration has increased in some banking markets, most experience a slight increase in welfare. I also find that consumers respond to account fees and deposit rates in making their deposit institution choices, and respond positively to the staffing and geographic density of branches, age, size and geographic diversification of banks. In Chapter 2 I study banking market structure and examine the effects of the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act in 1994, which allowed for nationwide branching in the U.S., on various aspects of banking firms and markets, including quality of service. The results suggest that the industrial structure of banking markets can be explained by the endogenous sunk cost model of Sutton (1991). While concentration at the regional level has increased dramatically, deregulation has left almost intact the market structure of MSA markets. A significant portion of the observed increase in bank quality can be traced to the implementation of nationwide branching, with banks offering larger branch networks for consumers.
(cont.) Chapter 3, co-authored with Erik Brynjolfsson and Michael D. Smith, applies a flexible demand model to examine heterogeneous consumer behavior and estimate search benefits and costs across consumers types, based on a unique data set obtained from a major U.S.-based online shopbot. Consumer benefits to search are estimated using a compensating variations approach, by comparing the welfare generated by the first set of offers shown to the consumer in the default screen, and that generated by the entire set of offers. The benefits to searching lower screens are $1.65 for the median consumer, and the cost of carrying an exhaustive search of the offers is a maximum of $1.40 for the median consumer that chooses to search lower screens.
by Astrid A. Dick.
Ph.D.
34
Doulis, Kimon Theofanis. "Essays on competition, market structures and public goods". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/20459.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
Chapter one focuses on optimal pricing in markets of consumption chains. These are markets in which one good is necessary for access to further consumption goods. I analyse optimal pricing for different market structures, focusing on the case of an integrated monopolist and the case of separate firms being in competition across markets, but not within markets. I then compare the outcomes of different market structures using basic welfare measures. I show that, compared to the first best allocation, the allocation implemented under the integrated monopolist tends to have significantly lower consumer surplus and larger producer surplus. Aggregate welfare is surprisingly not much smaller under the integrated firm when compared to a welfare maximising allocation. In some settings the integrated monopolist even implements a welfare maximising allocation. The paper explains and highlights how these results depend largely on which assumptions are made about the information available to consumers. The second chapter contributes towards the existing literatures on lobbying and on media bias by combining and extending features of both. It aims to analyse optimal slanting policies of interest or media groups and their effect on the distribution of public opinion and its evolution over time by introducing an intertemporal model of grassroots lobbying or media bias. I also allow for more general results than existing models by making fewer distributive assumptions and by allowing for further incentives of agents. In the chapter I combine demand and supply side models for bias. A main focus lies on how optimal slanting, the distribution of public opinion and its evolution over time depend on competition. The chapter aims to examine in which circumstances competition in the media market or the existence of multiple rival lobby groups can be detrimental. It shows how this can be the case because competition can create an incentive to split the public up and cater only to the own market. This can lead to a loss of the middle ground and increased dispersion of public opinion. The third chapter aims to extend the existing literature on the (in)efficiencies of voluntary contribution mechanisms for public goods. The existing body of research tries to analyse how group size affects the outcomes of such mechanisms asymptotically, while I also focus on results for given group sizes and the effect of the level of group heterogeneity in combination with group size. Agents are ex post heterogeneous in the existing literature; I also allow for them to be heterogeneous ex ante. This means that agents do not only have different valuations for the public good ex post, but different agents are also perceived differently by other agents ex ante. I show that a form of price discrimination can be used when agents are ex ante heterogeneous. Not using such price discrimination is shown to be costly in terms of efficiency in small groups. Small heterogeneous groups are outperformed by their homogeneous counterparts when price discrimination is not applied. However, this inefficiency in small groups can be eliminated by using price discrimination. The use of price discrimination becomes irrelevant in large groups and heterogeneous groups always outperform their homogeneous counterparts, whether price discrimination is used or not.
35
Liu, Chung-Shin. "Impact of Product Market Competition on Expected Returns". Thesis, University of Oregon, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12143.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
x, 94 p. : ill. (some col.)This paper examines how competition faced by firms affects asset risk and expected returns. Contrary to Hou and Robinson's (2006) findings, I find that cross-industry variation in competition, as measured by the concentration ratio, is not a robust determinant of unconditional expected stock returns. In contrast, within-industry competition, as measured by relative price markup, is positively related to expected stock returns. Moreover, this relation is not captured by commonly used models of expected returns. When using the Markov regime-switching model advocated by Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), I test and find support for Aguerrevere's (2009) recent model of competition find risk dynamics. In particular, systematic risk is greater in more competitive industries during bad times and greater in more concentrated industries during good times. In addition, real investment by firms facing greater competition leads real investment by firms facing less competition, supporting Aguerrevere's notion that less competition results in higher growth options and hence higher risk in good times.
Committee in charge: Dr. Roberto Gutierrez, Chair; Dr. Roberto Gutierrez, Advisor; Dr. Diane Del Guercio, Inside Member; Dr. John Chalmers， Inside Member； Dr. Bruce Blonigen， Outside Member
36
Caldwell, Sydnee Christian. "Essays on imperfect competition in the labor market". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/122228.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
Thesis: Ph. D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics, 2019Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. "The second half of TOC page numbers are off by 2 pages"--Disclaimer Notice page.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 309-319).
This thesis consists of three chapters on imperfect competition in the labor market. The first chapter (joint with Nikolaj Harmon) explores the relationship between an individual's wages and the quality of her opportunities at other firms (her outside options). To overcome the fact that many factors that shift an individual's outside opportunities also impact her productivity at her current job, we develop a novel identification strategy that generates within-individual (and within-firm-by-occupation) variation in workers' information about their outside options. This strategy, which we implement using linked employer-employee data from Denmark, exploits the fact that individuals often learn about labor market opportunities through their social networks. We find that increases in labor demand at former coworkers' current firms increases an incumbent worker's job-to-job mobility and wage growth.
Consistent with theory, larger changes are necessary to induce a job-to-job transition than to induce a wage gain. Tests that exploit within-firm or within-firm-and-occupation variation and tests that exploit different subsets of an individual's former coworkers confirm that the results are not driven by unobserved changes in demand for workers' skills. Finally, we use our reduced form moments to identify a structural search model incorporating both posting and bargaining firms. We find that bargaining is more prevalent among high skilled workers. The second chapter (joint with Oren Danieli) investigates the role that cross-sectional differences in individuals' outside options play in generating between-group wage inequality. We use a two-sided matching model to micro-found a measure of workers' outside options, which we call the "Outside Options Index" (001). The index is similar to those used in the industrial organization literature to measure concentration (e.g.
the Herfindal-Hirschman Index, the HHI). We then use German administrative data to estimate this index and use two sources of quasi-random variation: (1) the introduction of high-speed trains and (2) a standard shift-share instrument to identify the elasticity between our index and wages. When we combine these two ingredients, we find that roughly 1/3 of the gender wage gap in Germany can be explained by differences in options, mostly the result of differences in effective labor market size (commuting costs). The third chapter (joint with Emily Oehlsen) asks whether, in the absence of commuting costs, firms with market power have an incentive to pay women less than men. We use data from a series of experiments at Uber where we offered random subsets of male and female drivers higher "wages". Drivers varied both in the size of the wage increase and in whether they could drive for Uber's main competitor, Lyft.
These two sources of variation allow us to experimentally identify: (1) Frisch elasticities and (2) firm substitution elasticities. We find that women have Frisch elasticities double those of men on both the intensive and extensive margin. However, unlike the prior literature, we find that women are not less likely to shift between firms in response to changes in relative wages. The results suggest that, at least in the gig economy, firms have little incentive to wage discriminate between men and women based on their labor supply choices. JEL Codes: JOO, J31, J42
by Sydnee Christian Caldwell.
Ph. D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics
37
Wang, Yongying. "Corporate governance and product market competition : tree essays". Thesis, Normandie, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017NORMC018/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
Ma thèse intitulée “Gouvernance d'entreprise et concurrence sur le marché des produits” est composée de trois chapitres théoriques relevant essentiellement de l'Économie Industrielle. L'objectif principal est d'étudier comment le marché des produits interagit à la fois avec l'intérêt des parties prenantes lorsque l'information est parfaite et avec les incitations managériales (statiques et dynamiques) lorsque l'information est imparfaite.Le premier chapitre porte sur les interactions entre le mode de concurrence sur le marché des produits (Cournot vs. Bertrand) et les relations (conflictuelles ou conciliantes) entre les principaux acteurs (actionnaires, consommateurs et employés) lorsque l'intérêt des consommateurs est pris en compte dans la fonction objectif de la firme. Nous considérons un duopole symétrique où les firmes négocient préalablement avec les syndicats sur le salaire versé aux employés et puis se concurrencent entre elles sur le marché des biens. Nous montrons que l'orientation client (mesurée par le degré de prise en compte du surplus des consommateurs) peut inverser la hiérarchie traditionnelle entre les équilibres de Cournot et les équilibres de Bertrand. Une concurrence en prix (par rapport à une concurrence en quantité) est à même d'atténuer les conflits entre les actionnaires et les consommateurs et entre les actionnaires et les employés.Le deuxième chapitre examine comment les incitations managériales pourraient interagir avec la concurrence sur le marché des produits dans un contexte de sélection adverse et d'aléa moral. Nous considérons un oligopole de Cournot composé de n firmes identiques dont le coût marginal initial est une information privée du manager. L'effort du manager, qui est non observable, réduit indirectement le coût marginal initial. Dans un tel contexte, nous montrons qu'à l'optimum les paiements incitatifs versés aux managers ne sont pas nécessairement influencés par la concurrence sur le marché des produits.Le troisième chapitre étudie comment le contrat optimal entre l'actionnaire et le manager (résolution d'aléa moral répété) peut influencer la stabilité d'un cartel. Nous considérons un cartel composé de deux firmes identiques et dans chaque firme un actionnaire neutre à l'égard du risque offre un menu de contrats à un manager averse au risque. L'effort du manager influence le coût marginal de la firme (comme au chapitre 2) à chaque période. Nous montrons que, contrairement au cas où l'information est parfaite, le degré d'aversion au risque du manager n'impacte pas la stabilité du cartel lorsque le contrat optimal à long terme est mis en place. Le contrat optimal résout le problème d'aléa moral répété et limite également le pouvoir discrétionnaire du manager sur la décision de conduite du marché (collusion, déviation, ou compétition)My thesis entitled « Corporate governance and product market competition : three essays » is a theoretical research in industrial organization. The primary objective is to investigate how product market (competition or collusion) interacts with the top-level design of corporate governance, which concerns specifically the stakeholders' relationships and managerial incentives (static and dynamic) under imperfect information. It is mainly based on three chapters dealing with different subtopics of this theme.The first chapter examines how social concern and product market competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand) may influence the relationships (conflicting or conciliating) between main stakeholders (shareholders, consumers and employees). We consider two identical firms, both taking care of the interests of consumers in their objective functions and allowing their employees' wages be negotiated with labor unions. We show that social concern may reverse the traditional ranking between Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. Our model also shows that price competition (compared to quantity competition) can to some extent attenuate the shareholders' conflicts with both consumers and employees.The second chapter investigates how managerial incentive payment under both adverse selection and moral hazard might interact with product market competition. We consider a Cournot oligopoly market consisting of n identical managerial firms, of which the initial marginal cost is the manager's private information and his unobservable effort indirectly reduces the initial level of marginal cost. We show with this setting that the optimal incentive payment solving informational problems is not necessarily influenced by product market competition.The third chapter studies how the optimal contract between shareholder and manager (solving repeated moral hazard) may influence the stability of a cartel. We consider a cartel consisting of two identical firms, within each a risk neutral shareholder offers a menu of contracts to a risk-averse manager who may shirk in each period. The manager's unobservable effort influences the firm's marginal cost (as in chapter 2). We show in contrary with the benchmark case (under perfect information) that the degree of risk-aversion plays no longer a role upon the stability of collusion: when the managerial compensation is independent of gross profit, the implementation of the optimal long-term contract solves repeated moral hazard but also constrains the manager's discretion over the decision of market conduct (collusion, deviation, or competition)
38
Lau, Kwai-hin Kenneth. "Competitive marketing behaviour in Hong Kong telecommunications market /". Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1996. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B18003461.
Pełny tekst źródła
39
Curtis, Kenneth H. Marko Paul J. Parma John J. "Understanding market segments and competition in the private military industry". Monterey, California : Naval Postgraduate School, 2009. http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/MBAPR/2009/Dec/09Dec%5FCurtis%5FMBA.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
"Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009."Advisor(s): Dew, Nicholas ; Hudgens, Bryan J. "December 2009." "MBA Professional report"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on January 27, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Private military contractor (PMC), Private Security Company (PSC), Private Military Firm (PMF), Private Military (PM), Military Contracting, Acquisition, Government-outsourced Services, Industry Landscape, Market Segments, Business Rivalry, Competition. Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-77). Also available in print.
40
Brisimi, Vasiliki. "The interface between competition and the internal market : market separation under Article 102TFEU". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:10e3935d-ce31-437c-94b6-5d67af5d4e15.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
The thesis explores the interface between competition law and market integration, in the application of Article 102TFEU. It focuses on ‘market separation’ and addresses conduct that has the intent, or effect, of hindering cross-border trade, either in the form of geographic price discrimination or in the form of exclusionary abuses, in which out-of-State competitors are affected. In doing so, the thesis delves into a comparative analysis of the Treaty requirements under Article 102TFEU when applied in market separation cases and the Treaty requirements under the free movement provisions. It begins with a comparison of the objectives of the two sets of provisions and assesses how their historical link is echoed, presently, in the requirement of ‘effect on trade’ under Article 102TFEU (Chapter I). Following this, the thesis explores the asymmetry as between the addressees of the two sets of provisions (Chapter II). It is argued that ‘undertaking with a dominant position’, as a distinct condition of the application of Article 102TFEU, is the outer limit to any expansive view of direct horizontal applicability of the freedoms. Therefore, alleged market separation by dominant undertakings should be subject to Article 102TFEU alone. Subsequently, the material scope of the prohibitions contained in the two sets of provisions is addressed. Here, it is argued that, in the vast majority of market separation cases, there is nothing special about the interface between competition law and the Internal Market. Rather, the inherent limits of economic integration, as reflected in the notion of trade barriers, should also be taken into account under the enforcement of Article 102TFEU against dominant undertakings (Chapter III). Tensions between competition law and the Internal Market may, nevertheless, arise when non-economic values, as reflected in the notion of justified trade barriers, come into play. In these cases, the interface between competition law and the Internal Market is better conceptualised as a question of unclear attribution of the market distorting effect to the undertaking and/or the State (Chapter IV). A revised defence of shared responsibility for the market separation is proposed, which would render the legality of State intervention under the free movement provisions a necessary condition for the application of Article 102TFEU against the dominant undertaking (Chapters V and VI).
41
Esmer, Burcu. "Essays in empirical corporate finance: covenant violations, market timing and product market competition". Diss., University of Iowa, 2011. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/1219.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
This thesis comprises of three chapters. The first essay is sole-authored and is titled `Creditor Control Rights and Managerial Risk Shifting.' The second essay is titled `Creditor Control Rights and Product Market Competition' and is joint work with Professor Matthew T. Billett and MiaoMiao Yu. The third essay is sole-authored and is titled `Merger Waves, Pseudo Market Timing, and Post-Merger Performance.' Chapter one examines agency conflicts around violations of bank loan covenants. Recent evidence shows that corporate policies change significantly following financial covenant violations. These changes are attributed to increased creditor influence over borrowing firms in ways that benefit both shareholders and debtholders. In this essay, I investigate whether shareholders engage in activities counter to creditors' interests following violations. I find that the expected negative relation between volatility and investment reverses for firms once they violate a covenant, consistent with risk-shifting behavior. This behavior is more pronounced in firms with high CEO portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility and firms with high CEO equity ownership. Moreover, I document a significant increase in firm risk in the year following the violation. Overall, these findings suggest that even in the presence of increased creditor control risk shifting still occurs. The prior conclusions that shareholder-debtholder incentives are congruent at violations do not appear to be the case. Chapter two documents that debt covenants have a profound impact on firms' product market behavior. By examining financial covenant violations from 1996 to 2007, we show that once firms violate a covenant, they experience a substantial decrease in their market share. We also show that firms exhibit poor long-term abnormal returns following covenant violations. In contrast, their rivals grow market share and exhibit significantly positive abnormal returns after their peer firm violates a covenant. Overall, these findings suggest that creditor influence over firms have dramatic effects on product market outcomes and rival firm behavior. Chapter three questions whether managers time the market when they make merger decisions. Merger and acquisition waves seem to correspond with market tides, cresting with bull markets. A contentious debate exists over whether this trend indicates managerial market timing ability. Pseudo market timing, introduced by Schultz (2003, Journal of Finance 58, 483-517), provides an alternative hypothesis to explain abnormal performance following events even when managers cannot time the market. I find that acquiring firms which use stocks as the method of payment exhibit negative long-run abnormal returns in event-time, but not in calendar time. Simulations reveal that even when ex ante expected abnormal returns are zero (i.e. managers have no market timing ability), median ex post performance for acquirers is significantly negative when event-time is used. These findings support pseudo market timing as an explanation for acquiring firm underperformance in the context of stock mergers.
42
Bäcklund, Elin. "Environmental Policy and Market Structure". Thesis, Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för ekonomi, samhälle och teknik, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-54703.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
The question of how to design efficient environmental policies has become one of the most important questions of our time, but finding the answer it is not easy. Simple models of environmental regulation do not take into account the complexity of real markets. One aspect that is sometimes ignored is the market structure of the regulated industry. This critical review of the literature shows that market structure can both influence and be influenced by environmental regulation and that determining the optimal environmental policy is complicated.
43
Fagulha, Bernardo Moura Gonçalves. "Banif Bank: Value creation in the Maltese market". Master's thesis, NSBE - UNL, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10362/9468.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and EconomicsThe entry in a new market is always a major strategic challenge for a firm: competing in different regions and dealing with the specific conditions. This work project describes the entry of a new bank in the Maltese market, by exploring a new positioning. Through the real case of Banif Bank, this case intends to evaluate the potential of value creation in that industry, by first assessing its attractiveness and profitability. Then, Banif Bank positioning is analized to conclude if it can create a competitive advantage that would be sustainable in the long term.
44
El, Diri Malek Taisir Mohammed. "Earnings management, management compensation, managerial ability and market competition". Thesis, University of Leeds, 2016. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/15572/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
As a result of the agency problem, earnings management may take place due to the high contracting costs, shareholders’ bounded rationalities, and information asymmetry. Therefore, three main groups of motives have been identified to explain earnings management behaviour at the contracting, capital market, and external levels. While the previous studies have individually examined those motives, this thesis provides evidence that they interact in determining earnings management behaviour. The first empirical chapter of this thesis focuses on the contracting factors and examines the impact of earnings management on executive compensation conditioned on managerial ability. It finds that managers who utilize accrual earnings management receive higher compensation than those who undertake real earnings management. However, high quality managers are rewarded less for accrual earnings management and punished less for real earnings management. The second empirical chapter examines the non-linear effect of market concentration as an external motive of earnings management. It documents that accrual earnings management increases in concentrated markets as the quantity of information decreases. However, the sophisticated real earnings management starts to substitute for discretionary accruals at higher levels of market concentration when the quality of information declines. The third empirical chapter combines factors from the contracting and external motives. It examines the effect of market competition on the relationship between managerial ability and earnings management. The results show that in the face of increased competition, high quality managers manipulate earnings via accruals rather than more costly real earnings management. Overall, the results of this thesis show that management compensation is a crucial factor in assessing the costs of earnings management at the firm level. An optimal level of market concentration exists and should be considered by the regulators. Finally, understanding how industry level factors influence managerial decisions at the firm level is essential to explaining earnings management behaviour.
45
Ren, Qun. "Market share competition in the Chinese online game industry". Thesis, Bournemouth University, 2010. http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/17505/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
This study investigates the impacts of pricing innovations and other non-pricing dimensions on the market share competition of dominant Chinese online game companies. The empirical context of my research is the strategic behaviour of online game operators (i.e. the companies who operate online games) in the Chinese online game market – the most active market in the world with strong network effects. According to the literature review, previous pricing studies have focused mainly on the evaluation of traditional pricing theories and their limited validity for the information economy. Velu (2005) pointed out how dominant firms in a market with strong network effects adopt business innovations to sustain their market dominance. This study first investigates the validity of Velu‟s theory and then aims to develop and expand the theory of pricing practice by discussing how dominant companies integrate pricing and other non-pricing dimensions during market share competition. With the application of an analytical synthesis, this study covers large parts of the traditional economy and information economy literature by linking the concepts of „within‟ and „across‟ theories of pricing and competition. It finally brings together different theories and adopts Bouwman and MacInnes‟ virtual web idea as an original conceptual framework to give an insight into how the pricing process and other internal and external factors impact differently on the market share competition. The study adopts a descriptive multiple-case study strategy including five dominant Chinese online game companies and employs qualitative data collected from 64 interviewees and reliable secondary data from documentations and archival records.The findings suggest that, instead of devoting all their efforts to pricing innovation, the companies have turned to an exploration of their internal resources to enhance their competitiveness. Superficially, as an influential external factor, government regulations have constrained the operation of imported games. The study also discusses two internal themes that influence each company‟s competitive strength. They are: how to deal with the exodus of talent and how to handle strategic alliance management. There seems to be no previous research concerning the relationship between pricing innovation and market dominance within a new economy‟s service sector. As a consequence, this research should provide insights into this academic blind spot and rationalize the diversity of strategic theory within the specific industry.
46
Marini, Marco. "Wages determination and firm's behaviour under strategic market competition". Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 1998. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1472/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
It is commonplace in wage determination models and, in general, in economic models as a whole, to treat the workers' outside option as given. The main purpose of the present work is to remove, in various ways, this assumption. The work is organized as follows. The first chapter is devoted to introducing the thesis topic and the related literature. The second chapter describes an economy in which the workers hired by a firm acquire without cost a firm-specific skill that enables them to potentially become independent producers. Thus, by modelling explicitly the workers' decision to stay or to leave the firm, a stable earning profile for the economy is characterized. Such a stable earning profile can allow for a workers' compensation higher than the basic neoclassical wage and for pay differentials across industries even for initially homogenous workers. The third chapter shows that the existence of a concrete outside option for firms' managers can induce, under specific circumstances, oligopolistic firms to adopt restrictive output practises. In particular, the conditions under which, in a Cournot oligopoly, existing firms behave more collusively than in a standard Cournot model, are carefully defined. The fourth chapter considers the problem of producer co-operatives' (PCs) stability. It shows that PCs' instability argued in the literature can fail to hold in very competitive and low barrier-to-entry markets in which, potentially, dismissed members have a chance to set up new firms. In the fifth and conclusive chapter a new concept of core-stability for n-cooperative games is introduced and applied both to the problem of cartel formation under oligopoly and to an economy with a public good. Such a solution concept, denoted o-core, assumes that when a coalition deviates from an agreement, it possesses a first-mover advantage with respect to all other players.
47
Zou, Kailin. "Essays on competition in the Hong Kong banking market". Thesis, Cardiff University, 2014. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/70022/.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
The aim of the thesis is to investigate three banking issues related to competition, which are switching costs, collusion, and the competitive conditions in the Hong Kong banking sector during the period 1997 to 2012. For this purpose, a database consisting of an unbalanced panel of annual observations for 18 licensed banks incorporated in Hong Kong is used. This thesis comprises three empirical essays as follows: The first essay uses a structural model presented by Kim et al. (2003), which explores the significance and the magnitude of switching costs in Hong Kong’s bank loan market. Overall, I find that switching costs are significant in the Hong Kong bank loan market. The average point estimate of switching costs based on the entire sample is 0.1947. The results suggest that the existence of switching costs raises the price-cost margin by 52 basis points. Furthermore, the results also suggest that the estimated switching costs during the bad times are slightly higher than that in good times. On average, 2.54% of the customer’s added value is attributed to the lock-in effect generated by switching costs. The second essay measures the degree of collusion and the nature of the competitive conditions in the Hong Kong bank loan market using the conjectural variation approach. I jointly estimate a system of a log demand function, a pricing equation, and a trans-log cost system, and use the conjectural variation parameter to identify the degree of collusion. The estimated conjectural variation parameter is insignificant, which suggests that banks in Hong Kong operate in a competitive fashion in the loan market and the behaviour of the banks is consistent with a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium in price, with no significant evidence of collusion on pricing. The third essay investigates the degree of competition in the Hong Kong banking sector using the Panzar-Rosse approach. The novelty of this essay is to solve the problem of the system’s residuals correlation in the Panzar-Rosse model by jointly estimating equations using the SUR approach. My results suggest that the Hong Kong bank market can be characterized as monopolistic competition and the level of competition of interest market is higher than competition level of the non-interest market.
48
Dao, Mai TT. "Shareholder Ratification of The Auditor and Audit Market Competition". FIU Digital Commons, 2009. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/84.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
In my dissertation, I examine factors associated with firms’ submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification and test if shareholder ratification of auditor selection is associated with the extent of price competition in the audit market (as measured by audit fees) and audit quality (as measured by clients’ earnings management). The dissertation is motivated from the recent recommendation of the U.S. Treasury’s Advisory Committee on Auditing Profession (ACAP) regarding the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification votes. The ACAP suggests that this practice may improve the competition in the audit market; yet, there is no empirical evidence supporting the ACAP’s recommendation. My dissertation attempts to fill the gap in the literature on an issue of current interest to the auditing profession. I find that firm size, CEO-Chair duality, insider ownership and institutional ownership are associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. However, I do not find an association between audit committee variables and the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The second essay investigates the association between auditor ratification and audit fees. Audit fees are higher in firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification. The finding is not consistent with the increased price competition predicted by the ACAP. The third essay of my dissertation examine whether the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification is associated with earnings management. I find that firms that submit auditor selection for shareholder ratification are more likely to have lower level of earnings management. Overall, the results suggest that the same factors that are associated with higher quality monitoring also may be associated with the submission of auditor selection for shareholder ratification vote. The results call into question the one-size-fits-all approach recommended by the ACAP.
49
Rakestraw, Joseph Raymond. "International Evidence on Product Market Competition and Firm Value". Diss., Virginia Tech, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73029.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenie:
Economic theory and empirical research suggests product market competition can result in both positive and negative capital market effects. Specifically, research suggests competition reduces agency costs, but also reduces profitability. I examine the relation between product market competition and firm value in an international setting, focusing on how the relation varies with firm- and country-specific characteristics. I document lower values for firms in more competitive industries. However, the negative relation between competition and firm value is less pronounced for firms with higher firm-level liquidation risk, stronger country-level investor protection mechanisms, and higher firm-level transparency. These findings are consistent with an agency cost benefit resulting from product market competition.Ph. D.
50
Ko, Hin-Cheung Annie. "Product market competition, corporate governance and pay-performance sensitivity". HKBU Institutional Repository, 2009. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/1063.
Pełny tekst źródła