Rozprawy doktorskie na temat „Lebanese Foreign public opinion”

For about the last decade, education reformers have stressed the role of teachers in translating policy reforms into classroom practice. In Lebanon, the 1997 revised English curriculum, which follows learner-centred teaching, has as one of its objectives to enable learners to communicate effectively in English. To meet such an objective, the reformers called for the use of cooperative learning (CL) as it maximises the learners' exposure to meaningful input and output in a democratic, cooperative environment. However, to date a lot of the graduates from Lebanese Public High Schools (LPHS), unlike their counterparts in the private sector, are not proficient enough in English to produce one complete sentence in that foreign language. The aim of this study was therefore to investigate the extent to which the conceptions of teaching that LPHS teachers of English as a foreign language (EFL) have, in general, as well as of CL in particular, are congruent with the curricular reforms and hence implemented into their classroom practice, and thereby investigating one possible reason for their graduates' low proficiency in English. Using a case study design, the researcher examined six Lebanese EFL teachers, purposively sampled, in four LPHS in one city in South Lebanon. Data, collected through observation, interviews, document analysis, and a researcher diary, were compared to ensure credibility. These data, which were analysed thematically, yielded the categories and sub-categories which constitute the results of this research. Major findings showed that (a) there were incongruities between teachers' reported conceptions and their practice; while their reported conceptions lie within learner-centred teaching, their practice, influenced by their learning experiences as language learners as well as their school culture and professional context, was more traditional and teacher-centred, (b) CL was almost absent in their practice, and in only a few occasions were group or pair work activities employed, (c) their teacher preparation was mostly theoretical and traditional, (d) the minimal support provided to EFL teachers in their professional context and the incompatible school culture with the curricular reforms reflected negatively on their practice. Conclusions were drawn as follows: (1) teachers' conceptions of teaching were mostly incongruent with the curricular reforms, and hence these reforms were not translated into the teachers' classroom practice properly, (2) the strong influence of the participants' images of their memorable teachers as language learners, coupled with the participants' inadequate understanding of learner-centred teaching, made the participants equate their friendly attitudes to students with learner-centred teaching, (3) the absence of communication and collaboration between teacher education programme, curriculum designers, and LPHS led to inadequate teacher training, (4) their poor teacher preparation and the inappropriate school culture and context in terms of the physical environment, orientation, and preparedness reinforced the teachers' more established conceptions of what constitute good teaching and discouraged the participants' few attempts to implement traces of these curricular reforms in their classes, and (5) the poor implementation of curricular reforms and the reliance on more traditional teaching, which focuses on form, accuracy, and memorisation, were hence one possible factor responsible for LPHS graduates' low proficiency. The researcher suggested necessary pedagogical implications that are likely to improve the implementation of curricular reforms in LPHS, the most important of which were (a) adjusting the reforms to be in harmony with LPHS professional context as well as culture, (b) more coordination and communication between teacher training programmes, schools, and curriculum designers, and (c) revising the teacher education programme and upgrading teachers' qualifications. Finally, the thesis ends with recommendations for further research.

Are foreign policy officials responsive to policy preferences of the mass media and the public in making their decisions? That question has dogged scholars for decades but there has been little agreement among them on what is the true nature of mass media- and public opinion-foreign policy link. In terms of mass media impact, there are two media theories which dominate the debate. First, the CNN Effect theory claims that, by their nature, the mass media have the power to compel policy officials to adopt their policy preferences. Second, the Manufacturing Consent theory counters with the claim that foreign policy is too serious a matter for officials to yield to mass media demands. Scholars are similarly divided on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy. Lacking in almost all the known studies is an appreciation that foreign policy emerges out of a process involving policy stages. These policy stages have different characteristics. In addition to the nature of those stages in themselves, relationships between policy actors - including the mass media, the public and officials - are different in those stages. Officials tend to react differently at each stage of policy when pressured by the mass media and public opinion. Therefore, in this study, I propose that we will have a better understanding of mass media and public opinion influence on foreign policy officials if we study official responsiveness or sensitivity at the stages of the foreign policy process - policy initiation, policy implementation and policy review. I further argue that official responsiveness to mass media and public opinion depends largely on the stage of policy. For this research, I carried out a case study of Britain's war with Iraq in 2003 to test my theory. Principally, I tried to answer the question: Does foreign policy officials' responsiveness to mass media and public opinion depend on the stage of policy? I found that official response to the mass media and public opinion was not as precise as suggested by the dominant camps in the debate. More importantly, Official response to mass media and public opinion varied in the stages of policy. Specifically, I found that British officials were most responsive to mass media and public opinion at the policy initiation stage, very unresponsive at the implementation stage and even more unresponsive at the policy review stage. As a result of the variations in official responsiveness at the stages, I argue that there is a need to re-evaluate the way we study mass media- and public opinion-foreign policy link. To better understand the impact of the mass media and public opinion on foreign policy, I conclude that we need to examine how policy actors interact at different stages of the foreign policy process.

Theodore Roosevelt is considered by many historians to have been one of the most skilled practitioners of foreign policy in American history. But while he continues to draw � considerable interest from scholars, one facet of his diplomacy continues to be poorly understood: the impact of public opinion. There was a discernable evolution in his relationship with public opinion over the course of his tenure, even if many core ideas and practices were already present when he took office. The President was often discouraged by the state of public opinion. In his view, Congress was often a poor partner in conducting foreign policy; sensationalist newspapers had considerable influence; the ideas and policy preferences of many Eastern elites were usually ill-conceived; and the broader public's ignorance and apathy about international affairs were troublesome. But these concerns were balanced by other factors. He had a better working relationship with the Senate than he was willing to admit. He had more success in gaining favourable newspaper coverage than all but . a few Presidents. And he believed strongly in the American system of governance and had faith in the common sense of most of his countiymen. Given these multifaceted ideas about the nature of American opinion, it is not surprising that Roosevelt placed considerable importance upon shaping and educating it. This was both a means to facilitating his foreign policy goals and a way to build and maintain political supp01t. In fact, the two were closely linked. While he enjoyed considerable success in shaping opinion, he also suffered notable setbacks. In the final analysis, public opinion played a key role in Roosevelt's conduct of foreign policy, though its degree of influence in his decision-making process varied according to circumstances. Three main variables seemed to have shaped his behaviour: the impo11ance of a policy to Roosevelt, his perception about the intensity and sources of opposition to it and the level of suppo11 among the broader public.

This thesis seeks to be a contribution to a broader debate on how public opinion builds up its perceptions on foreign policy and foreign affairs. Its two main objectives are to examine: (a) which are the determinants that explain public opinion knowledge on foreign affairs; and (b) whether public opinion is sensitive to framing effects on this issue. The analysis was done by mixing quantitative methods and survey experiments, while its novelty is that brings unprecedent evidence from Latin America. The main findings of the thesis are two-fold. On the one hand, Latin American public opinion knowledge on foreign affairs is low. In this regard, both traditional individual variables and contextual ones, namely the size of the city, are useful to predict a person\'s knowledge. On the other, public opinion perceptions regarding foreign policy, either presented on a general or specific way, are sensitive to framing effects.<br>Esta tese procura ser uma contribuição para um debate mais amplo sobre como a opinião pública constrói suas percepções sobre política externa e assuntos internacionais. Os dois principais objetivos são examinar: (a) quais são os determinantes que explicam o conhecimento da opinião pública a respeito de assuntos internacionais; e (b) se a opinião pública é sensível a efeitos de enquadramento sobre esta questão. A análise foi feita misturando métodos quantitativos e pesquisas de opinião pública experimentais, enquanto sua novidade é que traz evidências sem precedentes da América Latina. As principais conclusões da tese são duplas. Por um lado, o conhecimento da opinião pública latino-americana sobre assuntos externos é baixo. A este respeito, tanto as variáveis individuais tradicionais como as contextuais - o tamanho da cidade - são úteis para prever o conhecimento de uma pessoa. Por outro lado, as percepções da opinião pública em relação à política externa, apresentadas de forma geral ou específica, são sensíveis aos efeitos de enquadramento.

The purpose of this thesis is to test the ‘rational public’ theory first espoused by Page and Shapiro (1988) for the Australian case. I aim to ascertain whether the Australian public, at the aggregate level, has the capacity to form ‘rational’ opinions on foreign policy issues. I do this by testing three major hypotheses using collective opinion data from the Australian Election Study (AES) 1987 – 2010: 1) opinion will be durable, or stable over time, 2) opinion will be coherent, and 3) opinion will respond reasonably, as predicted, to such triggers as changing international situations, elite cues, and particular events or trends. I found considerable support for all three hypotheses. Aggregate Australian opinion was as stable as US, Canadian, German, French, Italian, and Dutch opinion when using comparable measures, and more stable when using methods specific to the AES dataset. Opinion was also coherent, and, in most cases, responded to available directly and indirectly experienced triggers, as posited. I also performed a sub-set of tests for all three of these major hypotheses on the group of respondents who professed to have ‘no interest’ in politics, often referred to as the inattentive public, and found they held slightly less stable and coherent opinions overall, but were more responsive: results which lend further weight to the overall ‘rational public’ hypothesis. These results for the Australian case enable cross-national comparison to determine whether the ‘rational public’ thesis is generalisable, or whether it is dependent on such factors as a state’s position in the international system, its political institutions, or its political culture. I also envisage this thesis as providing a basis for further research into the functioning of Australian democracy as regards the public opinion, media, and policy-making nexus, incorporating further cross-national comparison. PAGE, B. I. & SHAPIRO, R. Y. 1988. Foreign policy and the rational public. Journal of conflict resolution, 32, 211-247.

The United States has been increasingly concerned with the transnational threat posed by infectious diseases. Effective policy implementation to contain the spread of these diseases requires active engagement and support of the American public. To influence American public opinion and enlist support for related domestic and foreign policies, both domestic agencies and international organizations have framed infectious diseases as security threats, human rights disasters, economic risks, and as medical dangers. This study investigates whether American attitudes and opinions about infectious diseases are influenced by how the issue is framed. It also asks which issue frame has been most influential in shaping public opinion about global infectious diseases when people are exposed to multiple frames. The impact of media frames on public perception of infectious diseases is examined through content analysis of newspaper reports. Stories on SARS, avian flu, and HIV/AIDS were sampled from coverage in The New York Times and The Washington Post between 1999 and 2007. Surveys of public opinion on infectious diseases in the same time period were also drawn from databases like Health Poll Search and iPoll. Statistical analysis tests the relationship between media framing of diseases and changes in public opinion. Results indicate that no one frame was persuasive across all diseases. The economic frame had a significant effect on public opinion about SARS, as did the biomedical frame in the case of avian flu. Both the security and human rights frames affected opinion and increased public support for policies intended to prevent or treat HIV/AIDS. The findings also address the debate on the role and importance of domestic public opinion as a factor in domestic and foreign policy decisions of governments in an increasingly interconnected world. The public is able to make reasonable evaluations of the frames and the domestic and foreign policy issues emphasized in the frames.

This thesis examines the historical problem of determining the relationship between a government's perception of public opinion and the decisions it takes. We introduce evidence for the social habits of the Cabinet in order to suggest new formulations of 'élite' and 'mass' public opinion. We argue that parliamentary opinion was generally more important in decision-making for the Cabinet, except at moments of extreme crisis when a conception of 'mass' opinion became equally significant. These characterization of mass opinion were drawn from a set of stereotypes about public opinion which academic and political theorization had produced. It is argued that this theorization was stimulated by ongoing debates about mass communication, the importance of the ordinary man in democracy and the outbreak of the first world war during the inter-war period. The thesis begins with an introduction to the methodological problems involved, followed by one chapter on theorization about public opinion in the inter-war period. Three diplomatic crises are considered in the case study chapters: the withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference in 1933, the German reoccuption of the Rhineland in 1936 and the threat of invasion of the Sudetenland in 1938. Two further chapters examine the role of public opinion in protests to Germany about the treatment of the Jews in 1933 and in 1938. It is argued that perceptions of public opinion played a much more important role in decision-making than has hiterto been thought. The most significant argument posits that perceptions of public opinion were equally as important as military considerations in the decision to refuse the Godesberg terms in 1938. More generally, the way in which politicians used public opinion rhetorically is described and the limits of the usefulness of the term for historians are suggested.

The title of this thesis is 'British Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire (1876-1908). The thesis explores the 'cultural dimension1 of relations between the Ottoman Empire and Britain in this period, involving an examination of ideas about and representations of Ottoman society and its peoples. The overall aim is to stress the importance of these representations in in influencing and affecting relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire. Nineteenth-century writings about the Ottoman Empire produce strong images of Ottoman society and steroetypes of the Turkish and Christian populations. These images are reconstructed and their significance examined. The approach is contextual and perceptions are analysed in the historical, material and cultural framework of late Victorian Britain. Descriptions of Ottoman society are treated as representations of that complex reality, with varying degrees of accuracy and inaccuracy, reflecting or distorting conditions in the Empire. In addition the relationship between older ideas and ideas developing at a new historical conjuncture of late nineteenth-century imperialism are considered important factors in determining the overall image of the Ottoman Empire in the late Victorian mind. In these ways the conclusion stresses the importance of, and the relationship between ideas about the Ottoman Empire, and the concrete factors of inter-state relations of which they are part. As such the subject contributes to an understanding of the multi-dimensional nature of nineteenth-century relations between a weak and strong state in the International system, and the degree to which culture and ideas are informed by these relationships of power. The study contributes to a greater understanding of the Eastern question and sheds light on many of the ideas that have come to influence modern historiography about the Ottoman past and the appreciation of Ottoman and European diplomatic history.

This thesis examines the interplay of public opinion, national identity and foreign policy during the period 1785-1815, focusing on three consistently interconnected countries: the Netherlands, France and Great Britain. The Netherlands provides the centrepiece to the study, which considers how the Dutch were perceived as a nation, a people and as a political entity, at both governmental and popular levels, in the three countries throughout the period. Public opinion is theorised as a two-part phenomenon. Active public opinion represents the collated thoughts and responses of a certain public to an event or set of circumstances. Latent public opinion represents the sum of generally-accepted underlying social norms, stereotypes or preconceptions; the perceptions and representations latently present in unconscious mentalités. The thesis examines how perceptions and representations of the Netherlands in all three countries fed into public opinion and, ultimately, into national identity either of the self or the ‘other’. It then investigates the extent to which the triangular policies of Britain, France and the various incarnations of the Dutch state were shaped by popular perceptions, identities and opinion. While active opinion is shown to have generally been of negligible importance to the policy-making process, it is argued that the underlying themes of latent opinion often provided the conceptual background that politicians from all three countries used to make policy. The influence of latent opinion was often as much unconscious as deliberate. Latent opinion was rarely the inspiration for foreign policy, but it frequently provided the boundaries of expectation within which policy was formed.

At the end of the nineteenth century, English-Canadians and Americans faced each other across the border with old animosities. Many Canadians adhered to familiar ideas of Loyalism, imperialism and anti-Americanism to differentiate the Dominion from the republic. In the United States, on the other hand, lingering notions of anglophobia and "Manifest Destiny" caused Americans to look upon the British colony to the north as a dangerous and unnatural entity. America's rise to world power status and the Anglo-American rapprochement, however, forced Americans and Canadians to adapt to the new international reality. Emphasizing their shared language, civilization, and forms of government, many English-speaking North Americans drew upon Anglo-Saxonism to find common ground. Indeed, Americans and Canadians often referred to each other as members of the same "family" sharing the same "blood," thus differentiating themselves from other races. As many of the events of the rapprochement had a North American context, Americans and English-Canadians often drew upon the common lexicon of Anglo-Saxon rhetoric to undermine the old rivalries and underscore their shared interests. Though the predominance of Anglo-Saxonism at the turn of the century proved short-lived, it left a legacy of Canadian-American goodwill, as both nations accepted their shared destiny on the continent and Canada as a key link in the North Atlantic Triangle.

Thesis advisor: James Cronin<br>This paper examines the esoteric and essentially negativist character of international reaction to the Spanish Civil War. While the mass of the foreign public, (specifically in the United States, Britain, and Ireland), remained apathetic, several interest groups became deeply involved in the conflict. Analysis of the reasons why each group became interested, the methods they used to win supporters, and the effectiveness of those methods in shaping the historical legacy of the war constitutes the bulk of the paper. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of the Roman Catholic Church and the Communist Party in Britain and the United States. The inquiry concludes with an analysis of the historical trends which have erased the Spanish Civil War from the popular consciousness even while it remains vital to specific political constituencies<br>Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2004<br>Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences<br>Discipline: History<br>Discipline: College Honors Program

I examine the formation of a "foreign policy" ideology and how it shapes the preferences and decisions of individuals during foreign policy events. Following from earlier research on the structure of a foreign policy ideology, two dimensions are identified as important determinants of individual preferences: a militant dimension and a cooperative dimension. To understand the determinants of an individual's ideology, a bottom-up, value driven approach is employed that explores influences that are both psychological (values, beliefs, traits) and sociological (groups, environment). As to the impact of ideology on preferences, I explore how ideology influences preferences in the context of support for military intervention, leader evaluation during times of war, and casualty tolerance. Beyond simply shaping preferences, one novel aspect of my research is exploring if ideology can modify the impact of external stimuli, such as elite cues and environmental context, on individual preferences. Following from research on "motivated reasoning" my theory argues that ideology colors the way new information is interpreted and accepted. In essence, ideology can filter the influence exerted by partisan/elite cues and environmental context (i.e. casualties, mission purpose).

This thesis examines public opinion towards the participation opinion of the British Auxiliary Legion in the Spanish Civil War. It is based on an analysis of British newspapers, periodicals and political discussion between 1835 and 1838. It suggests that, although there was some degree of support for the foreign policy of Lord Palmerston in sending the legion to aid liberalism in the Peninsula, yet that support declined rapidly. In spite of Palmerston's eventual claim that intervention in Spain had been worthwhile, public opinion was not to reflect the view that his policy had been a right one, or that the British Auxiliaries had been indispensable to the cause of Spanish constitutionalism.

Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, February 2014.<br>"February 2014." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 64-66).<br>Despite the benefits of economic globalization, popular opposition to foreign investment continues to influence policy debates. What explains opposition to foreign investment? Standard political economy theories suggest that support for international trade, immigration, and investment all depend on the impact these policies have on potential earnings in the labor market. According to standard models, those who stand to benefit economically from international exchange are expected to be more supportive than those who will face increased competition and declining wages. An analysis of four cross-national surveys from 57 countries provides empirical evidence that public opinion on foreign investment is not determined by economic self-interest, but rather by evaluations of the national economy, political ideology, and attitudes about the United States. These findings have implications for understanding the debate over globalization policy and domestic support for further liberalization around the world..<br>by Joyce Lawrence.<br>S.M.

This item is only available in print in the UCF Libraries. If this is your Honors Thesis, you can help us make it available online for use by researchers around the world by following the instructions on the distribution consent form at http://library.ucf.edu/Systems/DigitalInitiatives/DigitalCollections/InternetDistributionConsentAgreementForm.pdf You may also contact the project coordinator, Kerri Bottorff, at kerri.bottorff@ucf.edu for more information.<br>Bachelors<br>Sciences<br>Political Science

This thesis examines Quebec public opinion towards the Spanish Civil War. It is based on a systematic analysis of editorials and articles from ten Montreal-based newspapers, representing divergent points of view. It suggests that, contrary to the popular interpretation, Quebec francophones did not unanimously support General Franco during the war; nor did all of the province's anglophones endorse the cause of the Spanish Popular Front. Support for General Franco and the Spanish Republic in Montreal transcended linguistic lines, and cleavages other than language, such as religion, ideology and social class, influenced public opinion towards the war.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007.<br>Thesis Advisor(s): Jansen, Erik. "December 2007." Description based on title screen as viewed on Jan. 18, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-103). Also available in print.

Since Federation Australia had largely regarded Japan as a nation that posed a direct threat to its way of life, a view seemingly proved correct in World War Two. Yet by the end of the 1950s, a mere fifteen years after the war ended, Australians were more positive about their Japanese neighbours than ever before. This thesis seeks to explore why public opinion moved so dramatically over these years by studying a select series of events, ranging from the Treaty of Peace with Japan to art exhibitions, throughout the decade.

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2003.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Race has been used as an instrument of domination and separation of the South African population for a long time. The dawn of the democratic dispensation in 1994marked a shift from the policy of racial separation to the creation of the non-racial democratic South Africa. However, political parties in this country have constantly re-politicised race in the post apartheid era mainly for political gain. The purpose of this study will be to describe, explain and analyse how political parties in South Africa use the crisis in Zimbabwe to racialise politics in this country. The study will show that the dilemma facing political parties in South Africa is that they cannot avoid focusing on racial issues. The focus is on four main political parties, the ANC, the PAC, the NNP and the DA. The study specifically looked at the following issues in Zimbabwe: the Land crisis, the 2003 March presidential elections and the economic crisis to see how they have influenced political discourse in South Africa. As anticipated, predominantly black parties have shown some empathy with Robert Mugabe's government, while predominantly white parties have called for a more confrontational measure against Mugabe's government. Nonetheless, this study found no conclusive evidence to suggest that the crisis in Zimbabwe has fuelled race conflict in this country. But that race is politicised by parties in South Africa for political gain.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In Apartheld-Suid-Afrika was rasse verskille gebruik as 'n instrument van onderdrukking en skeiding van die bevolking. Met die totstandkoming van demokrasie in 1994 het 'n verskuiwing van 'n rasse-beleid na 'n nie-rassige, demokratiese Suid-Afrika gelei. Politieke partye politiseer egter steeds ras in post-Apartheid Suid-Afrika vir politieke gewin. Die doel van hierdie studie is om te beskryf, verduidelik en te analiseer hoe politieke partye die krisis in Zimbabwe gebruik om politiek in Suid-Afrika steeds gebonde ras te hou. Hierdie studis al aandui dat politieke partye in Suid-Afrika nie die fokus van ras identiteite kan vermy nie. 'n Moontlike rede hiervoor is dat politieke partye in Suid-Afrika 'nsolidariteit met hul kiesers wil behou. Die studie fokus op vier van die mees prominente politieke partye in Suid-Afrika naamlik: ANC, PAC, NNP en die DA. Om elke party se stand-punt op hierdie onderwerp te verstaan, gaan die studie fokus op die volgende punte in Zimbabwe: grondhervorming, die 2003Presidensiële verkiesing en die impak wat die ekonomiese krisis in Zimbabwe op die politieke gebied gehad het. Soos verwag, het partye met histories oorheersende swart oortuigings empatie met Robert Mugabe se regering betoon. Mugabe word gesien as 'n slagoffer van onsimpatieke wit settelaars wat vasklou aan hul eertydse voorregte. Terwyloorwegende wit partye vra vir strenger optrede teenoor die regering van Robert Mugabe. Nie te min, het hierdie studie geen uitsluitende bewyse gevind wat aandui dat die krisis in Zimbabwe konflik rasse in Suid- Afrika aangespoor het nie. Dit is egter belangrik om in ag te neem dat die politisering van ras grootliks deur partye gebruik word om ondersteuning te werf.

The purpose of this study is to inquire if there are dispositions of any type. of newscast carried by ABC News about Nigeria and if these newscasts are positively or negatively inclined. The analysis quantified and verified that while the broadcast content of ABC News presentations on Nigeria have been objectively covered, the newscasts have taken stereotypical patterns. This, thereby establishes the need for ABC News, being an example of American network news, to diversify and cover stories of social and human interest in Nigeria and other Third World countries. The study concludes that a true maxim of news coverage is needed as a guide to unbiased, unslanted or cliched news presentations.

This thesis concentrates on two discrete contexts in which Jewish and imperial concerns converged: the Boer War and the British Mandate for Palestine. For Britain's Jews, the Boer War represented a rare and uncomfortable moment in which the Jewish Question achieved relative prominence. However the war also generated a different set of 'Jewish questions', leading the Anglo-Jewish establishment to refine its own understanding of patriotic and imperial duty. The case of Palestine, by contrast produced less straightforward and predictable outcomes. Ottoman entry into World War I, which prompted both British and Zionist considerations into the merits of a Jewish homeland as part of the imperial system, created an acute conflict for British Jewry's communal leadership. Although not negating the advantages of a British-Jewish Palestine either to the Empire or to Jews in need of refuge, its decision to oppose the Balfour Declaration privileged at some cost a distinctive reading of Jewish interests over a more obvious synthesis of national and sectarian goals. Despite continued objections to Zionism's ideological outlook and its pursuit of statehood, the Anglo-Jewish establishment located in the interwar development of a British-Jewish Palestine a means to advance both Jewish communal and imperial agendas. As the alliance between the Zionists and Britain unravelled in the final decade of the Mandate, British Jews eager to safeguard their position as well as their vision of Palestine's future would persist in defending this relationship. In its exploration of the evolution of Anglo-Jewish attitudes towards Britain, the Empire and Mandatory Palestine, this thesis aims to address both thematic and chronological gaps in the historiography of Anglo-Jewry. By drawing attention to the uniqueness of Anglo-Jewry's imperial connection to Palestine and to the domestic impact of British involvement, my work also contributes to scholarship on Zionism and the Mandate Finally, it offers a framework for considering the impact of, and relationship to, Empire of minority groups residing in Britain.

Les études académiques récentes sur l'influence de l'opinion publique sur les interventions militaires dans les démocraties occidentales concluent pour la plupart que l’opposition du public n’a pas empêché le président de faire usage de la force. Ces études se concentrent souvent sur le choix d'intervenir dans un conflit donné et omettent d'analyser les ajustements apportés à l'intervention elle-même du fait de l'opinion publique. Cette étude tente au contraire de montrer qu'on ne peut comprendre l’influence de l'opinion publique si l'on se limite à la décision d'intervenir et n’étudie pas les décisions connexes liées à la conduite et à la réussite d'une intervention: le choix des moyens humains et financiers, les objectifs, la stratégie de communication. La littérature scientifique actuelle omet également de dévoiler la manière dont l'exécutif tente de gérer la contrainte de l'opinion publique et comprendre ainsi quelle est sa véritable marge de manœuvre vis-à-vis de celle-ci. En effet, l’opinion publique et la présidence s’influencent mutuellement : le président est souvent contraint de trouver un compromis entre les objectifs politiques et militaires désirés et ce que le public est prêt à accepter. En incluant l'impact de l'opinion publique sur la mise en œuvre des opérations militaires, cette recherche conclut que le public américain a eu une influence majeure sur le degré d'engagement, les objectifs et la durée des interventions militaires de l'après Guerre froide. Notre étude s’appuie principalement sur des entretiens avec des responsables politiques impliqués dans le processus décisionnel ayant conduit à l’usage de la force après la Guerre froide. Ce processus décisionnel sera analysé à travers cinq études de cas<br>Recent qualitative studies of the relationship between public opinion and U.S. foreign policy put decisions into the following two categories: the President tends to lead or to follow public opinion; public opinion influences decision-making, constrains the decision, or has no impact. These studies typically research the initial decision to intervene, but fail to examine the subsequent decisions to sustain and win a war: financial and human means, conduct, objectives, duration, and communication. I argue that these elements of a winning strategy are impacted by concerns with public support at home. The impact of public opinion on the decision whether to use force is better understood when analyzing the compromise between the perception of anticipated public opinion and the necessities of a military campaign. Public opinion impacts the strategy, the timing, and length of an intervention, and inversely, those elements impact the anticipated public opinion and ultimately the decision to use force or choose a different course of action. The president can expect to influence public opinion and raise the acceptability of an intervention through various means. As a consequence, there is a back-and-forth process between anticipated public support for a given intervention and the consideration of the use of force. Contrary to the current literature, which tends to conclude that the president enjoys a substantial margin for maneuver, an analysis of post Cold War cases of interventions, limited interventions, and military escalations shows that anticipated public opinion limited the president's margin for maneuver and influenced not only the decision to intervene but also the military strategy and in the end, the result of the intervention. These findings contradict the realist paradigm for which only the structure of the international system matters and domestic politics are irrelevant in the study of international relations

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2006.<br>Title from first page of PDF file (viewed September 19, 2006). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 366-373).

This study compares how English and French Canadian intellectuals viewed American society from 1891 to 1945. During the period under study, the Dominion experienced accelerated industrialization and urbanization, massive immigration, technological change, and the rise of mass culture. To the nation's intellectuals, many of these changes found their source and their very embodiment in the United States. America, it was argued, was the quintessence of modernity, having embraced, among other things, secularism, democracy, mass culture, and industrial capitalism.<br>In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Canadian hostility to the United States and continental integration was expressed in two conservative discourses: that of English Canadian imperialism and French Canadian nationalism. Despite their fundamental divergence on the national question; both imperialists and nationalistes shared an essentially antimodern outlook, and anti-Americanism was their logical point of convergence.<br>By contrast, the most passionate Canadian defenders of American society could be found among liberal and socialist intellectuals like F. R. Scott and Jean-Charles Harvey. They saw continental integration and Canadian-American convergence as both inevitable and desirable. Intellectual continentalism reached its summit of influence during the 1930s and 1940s.<br>The present study is based on the analysis of some 520 texts found essentially in the era's periodical literature. Each, at least in part, explores some aspect of American life or of the relationship between Canada and the United States. Unlike most previous scholarship, which has tended to view anti-American sentiment merely as an expression of Canadian nationalism, this study is more concerned with Canadian intellectuals as thinkers on the left, the right, and the centre.<br>The comparative, pan-Canadian nature of this study reveals that English and French Canadian intellectuals shared common preoccupations with respect to the United States. However, the tone and emphasis of their commentary often differed. In English Canada, where political institutions and the imperial bond were viewed as the mainstays of Canadian distinctiveness, writing on the United States tended to deal primarily with political and diplomatic issues, in Quebec, where political institutions were not generally viewed as vital elements of national distinctiveness, social and cultural affairs dominated writing on the United States.

This dissertation focuses generally on consumer behavior, and particularly on consumer attitudes toward products of foreign origin for the purpose of developing a theory that will assist in explaining and predicting this phenomenon. Existing research in the area of country of origin effects upon consumer attitudes toward foreign-made products demonstrates significant methodological limitations such as single cue approaches., The major objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the development of a theory based upon the expectancy-value attitude concept to better explain and predict consumer attitudes toward products of foreign origin. To achieve this objective, the research attempts to overcome the limitations identified in attitude research and specific methodological deficiencies in research focusing on attitudes toward products of foreign origin by: 1. utilizing the expectancy-value approach; 2. basing operationalization of the attitude concepts on Likert-like scales and subjective conditional probabilities; 3. measuring the operationalized attitudes both directly and indirectly via beliefs and evaluations; 4. simultaneously including multiple extrinsic cues; 5. including pictorial cues in the questionnaire; and 6. performing and reporting validity and reliability tests. The general model developed in this research, representing the theory of attitudes toward products of foreign origin is the Foreign Product Attitude Model (FPAM). This dissertation will concentrate on an extracted part of the total model, namely the relationships between the informational stimuli cues and the attitudinal response. The informational extrinsic informational cues include the country of origin, the brand name, the store image and an involvement covariate. By concentrating on the above relationships it is hoped that this study will contribute to a better understanding of the direct effects of the informational stimuli upon the attitude toward a product of foreign origin. The country of origin effect and the other extrinsic cues (brand name and store image) were found to have significant effects on consumer attitudes toward products, explaining almost 20 percent of the total variance.

The mass media's role in informing the American public is critical to public support for government policies. The media are said to set the national agenda. This view is based on the assumption of selective coverage they give to news items. Media coverage also influences the salience the public attaches to issues. However, media agenda effect has been challenged by Lang and Lang (1983). These scholars, in their media agenda-building theory, argued that the success of media effect on national agenda is dependent on group support. In order to test this theory, time-related data on South Africa crises, media coverage"of South Africa, American public reactions, congressional, and presidential apartheid-related activities, between 1976 and 1988, were analyzed. Congressional anti-apartheid policies were the dependent and others, the independent variables. The theory made analysis of the data amenable to the additive adopted to test for the significance of the interactive variables, indicated that these variables were negatively related to congressional anti-apartheid policies. The additive model was subsequently analyzed. The time series multiple regression analysis was used in analyzing the relationships. Given autocorrelation and multicollinearity problems associated with time series analysis, the Arima (p, d, q) model was used to model the relationships. This model was used to indicate support, or nonsupport, for the time series regression analysis. The result of the additive model indicated that South African political crises were negatively related to congressional anti-apartheid actions. It also showed that the relationship between the American public reactions and congressional anti-apartheid policies was greater in comparison to all other independent variables. The presidential actions taken against South Africa were negatively related to Congress' anti-apartheid actions. Television had the greatest relationship with congressional anti-apartheid actions compared to newspapers and magazines.

A finalidade dessa dissertação de mestrado é apresentar uma proposta de criação de tipologia da Opinião Pública em relação à Política Externa Brasileira. Para isso, foi utilizada a pesquisa survey Opinião Pública o Brasil, a América e o Mundo, realizada em 2011 pelo Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicos CDE em parceria com o Instituto de Relações Internacionais da Universidade de São Paulo IRI/USP. E, para a criação da tipologia, foi usada como base a pesquisa de Eugene Wittkof, Faces of Internacionalism Public Opinion in American Foreign Policy (1990), onde abordou os padrões das elites e da massa em relação ao grau de apoio ao envolvimento internacional dos Estados Unidos. Dessa forma, foi criado quatro grupos de atitude em Política Externa: Isolacionista, Internacionalista, Conciliadores e Intervencionista. Para criar a tipologia brasileira, os grupos foram adaptados para a realidade do país e foram recriados: Isolacionista, Internacionalista Soft Line, Internacionalista Moderado e Internacionalista Hard Line. O presente trabalho tomará como base algumas perspectivas teóricas do debate de Análise de Política Externa e de Opinião Pública, com o intuito de buscar entender como a sociedade brasileira opinião pública - se posiciona em relação à postura do Brasil no sistema internacional, através de sua política externa. Para efeito de análise, dois temas foram pré-selecionados, sobre violação de direitos humanos e em caso de golpe contra um governo democraticamente eleito, todos em relação à outro Estado. Além da criação de uma tipologia brasileira, foi realizado o cruzamento entre algumas variáveis para caracterizar os grupos tipológicos. De maneira ampla, os resultados encontrados mostraram que a maioria da opinião pública defende uma postura mais internacionalista moderada do Brasil no Sistema Internacional.<br>The purpose of this master thesis is to present a proposal for a typology of creating public opinion in relation to the Brazilian Foreign Policy. Within this regard, it is applied the survey \"Public Opinion - Brazil, America and the World\"(held in 2011 by the Centre de Investigación y Docencia Economic - CDE in partnership with the International Relations Institute of the University of São Paulo - IRI / USP), was applied. In order to create a typology, research of Eugene Wittkof, Faces of Internationalism Public Opinion in American Foreign Policy (1990). This research had been addressed the standards of the elites and the mass in relation to the degree of support for international involvement USA. Thus, it was created four attitude groups in Foreign Policy: isolationist, Internationalist, conciliators and Interventional. In order to create the Brazilian typology groups, theses groups have been adapted to the reality of the country as isolationist, Internationalist Soft Line, Internationalist Moderate and Hard Line. The bases of this work it is related to some theoretical perspectives of Foreign Policy Analysis and discussion of public opinion. The main goal is to try to understand how the Brazilian society - public opinion it is positioned in relation to Brazil\'s standards in the international system, through its foreign policy. For purposes of analysis, two topics are selected. The first one is about violation of human rights and the second one, supposing that a coup against a democratically elected government occurs (in relation to another State). It was necessary, to understand the structure of these typological groups. Therefore a cross checking among the variables was realized. Broadly, the results demonstrate that the majority of public opinion advocates to moderate internationalist group, in Brazil in the International System.

The object of analysis of this dissertation is the historical analysis of the Institute for Studies in International Politics (Ispi), from its founding in Milan in 1933 until it was compulsory mothballed after September 8th 1943. In confronting Ispi, the attempt is to approach Italy’s international involvements during the interwar period from an unusual but meaningful standpoint. As a matter of fact, Ispi turns out to be a challenging as well as controversial subject of study. In fact, even if at first sight the Institute seemed to be nothing more than a propagandistic machine, to gain both domestic and external consensus to the policies of the fascist regime, a thorough analysis of Ispi highlights a more complex story to tell, which is deeply linked with the way in which the international environment was thought and structured in the aftermath of the First World War. The Institute is considered as a meeting point of two separate wider historical phenomena: the interwar European and Transatlantic debate on international relations, animated by a number of national institutions that where born in the 1920s and 1930s, Ispi among them; the intellectual history of Italy in the fascist period, in particular as regards conceptions related to politics, international relations and historiography. In this way, the dissertation tries to handle two different historiographies and methodologies: that of transnational history, necessary to map the debate on International Relations that took place in the interwar period both in its cultural and organizational features, and that of intellectual history. The two layers can’t be divided: the international background that “prepared” the birth of Ispi have to be seen together with the peculiar relationship between the Institute and the Fascist foreign policy. In other words, the main purpose of the research is to achieve a meaningful historical account more able to identify transfers and exchanges of ideas, without overlooking the national context: the attempt to define what is Ispi and why it was founded has to be accompanied with an in-depth understanding of the political environment in which it developed its activities. Ispi was founded in 1933 when fascism’s international position was reaching its peak: after all the fascist regime appeared to be a system of government able not only to stabilize a complex society after the First World War, but it also managed to shrug off the impact of the financial crisis from 1929 and the increase in unemployment of the early 1930s that market economies across the West experienced. For these reasons, Italy’s fascism was perceived as a viable solution and it seemed to promise answers to questions liberal democracies were still facing. Against this backdrop, the Institute was performing a twofold task: while it was supporting a solid and pregnant document-based scientific research on international affairs, it also pursued the precise pedagogical aim of forming a strong national conscience of foreign affairs, in accordance with the fundamental directives of Fascist foreign policy, in short «an Institute which marries science with propaganda». Pierfranco Gaslini, the first director of Ispi, strongly believed that Italy needed a body able to shape a new political culture which was the result of interests and political patterns linked to the liberal period, as well as with new aspirations and watchwords which saw the fascist regime as a reliable answer to satisfy them. The director was able to understand the qualitative changes which characterized the sphere of international relations after the first world war and, to some degree, he recognized the necessity of placing a filter between political decisions and the masses. Against this background, the creation and development of Institutes of International Affairs, nation-based think tanks with the twofold aim of providing national and international elites with qualitative works on international affairs as well as creating an “informed” public opinion, provided Gaslini with the push he needed to found a similar body in Italy. In short, on one hand the consensus created by Ispi in favor of the regime was clear; on the other hand it tried to manage a factual situation in which the realm of foreign policy was linked with a series of aspirations and forces which were more influential than in the past. Indeed, the latter represented a new and lively field of action shared by the various European nations: in this perspective the astonishing growth of the Institute of International Affairs’ movement in the 20s and 30s can be seen as an absolute necessity of various national establishments to guide or impose a top-down mechanism with the aim of controlling the flow of information to the general public, rather than the expression of a new internationalism. The majority of the members of Ispi and its collaborators shared a common political and ideological background with Mussolini’s aspirations, and it was equally clear that fascism was conceived as the driving force of Italian foreign policy. Against this background, it is clear, as I showed with the analysis of some articles drawn by the two journals of the Institute, that if on one hand it is plausible to place the start of an Italian tradition of foreign policy studies during the interwar period, on the other hand it is equally clear the intimate connection between the sphere of research and political aims. The fact that Ispi was thought as a centre of research which was dealing with international problems, in general, allowed to mix different perspectives and attitudes. This constitutes a crucial reason in order to understand why very different intellectual personalities and political figures met together in Ispi. Nevertheless, the fact that the Institute aimed at collecting all the most important specialists with an interest in international relations, it didn’t mean that Gaslini was able to impose a coherent and logical cultural project to his collaborators. As a matter of fact, there was a continuous compromise between the directives of the “centre” and the effective work of the scholars involved in this activity, as if this preliminary freedom guaranteed by the Institute had as a consequence a dispersion of forces and an inability to constitute a solid amalgam. Eventually, this work reveals how Italian specialists conceived public opinion, which was a new and important weapon to use in the field of international politics against other governments: a top-down construction which had the duty to control in every step the exchange of information and meanings from the realm of political decisions and events to an “informed” public. This doesn’t mean that Ispi, and the scholars who were working in it, was a passive instrument with a mere function of control and selection. The Institute, especially with the collaboration of the Roman School directed by Volpe, produced a series of historical works embracing various themes but basically focused on a new reflection of the Italian past functional to the political aspirations of their time. In this perspective, it can be said that there was a connection between this new wave of historical studies and the stimulus derived from the political environment. Members of Ispi as “cultural mediators” were trying to improve the sector of cultural international relations, supporting a specific idea of Italy which contributed to the formation of those cultural assumptions behind Italian foreign policy during the interwar period. In this perspective, Ispi constitutes an institutional framework from which to investigate some of the most important specialists in international relations and their attempts to develop their works and analysis in constant relationship with the Institute and the political context. Given all this astonishing variety of studies, actors and themes that one can find in the history of Ispi during the 30s and early 40s, I argue that the Institute represents a meaningful vantage point from which to comprehend on one hand the weaknesses, the limits and ingenuity of a particular class of intellectuals and experts in international relations and their degree of support for the foreign policy of the fascist regime; on the other hand the effort to help the Italian nation to overcome structural defects and deficiencies which the Italian state had not been able to remove is undeniable. In accomplishing this “mission”, indeed with different accents and motivations, all members of Ispi shared the belief that Italy had to become a great power and, in their Eurocentric view, they considered the world of international relations as a hierarchical environment in which the strongest nations had to come to terms with each other in order to create a harmonic system with different hegemonic spheres of influence. In this perspective what was the relationship between the effective policies of the fascist regime and the reflections made by the members of Ispi? First of all, it is necessary to identify a fault line that sits above the Italian military action against Ethiopia in 1935-36. The Ethiopian war represented a “before and after” for the activities of the Institute: if before the invasion of the North African state Ispi, as I reported through the examination of the journals «Rassegna di Politica Internazionale» and «Relazioni Internazionali», was trying to act as a real transnational think tank, involving a wide range of different non-state actors, once Italy had its own empire the ever-increasing activities of the Institute suffered a loss of dynamicity and maneuvering space. As a matter of fact, in the first phase of the Institute (1933-1935), Ispi tried to pursue a multidirectional cultural diplomacy hosting key personalities from the political and cultural world. It tried to create contacts especially with the British conservative establishment (through the figures of Muriel Currey, Luigi Villari, Charles Petrie) and the Hungarian revisionist front as well as weaving links with analogous foreign institutions. After the Ethiopian war, the activism which characterized Italy in the former period in almost every international fora as well as its willingness to see its “rights” recognized within the international system built in Versailles, gave way to an increasingly imperialistic conception of the international environment, as though the colonial enterprise had rekindled the aspirations and latent desires of the Italian nation. the Ethiopian war had resulted in the political and cultural isolation of Italy, making scorched earth of that prestige internationally reached till then. These factors heavily affected Ispi’s activities and the previous attempts to create transnational diplomatic channels with foreign intellectual and political figures. Consequently, there was a transformation of Ispi which followed the changes of the international situation after the Ethiopian war, from a “transnational think tank” to an institute more concerned with research and divulgation of works related to foreign/international politics, with the desire of developing a political culture on foreign affairs within the national boundaries. On the other hand Gaslini tried to keep alive the Study Office and a peculiar way of doing research which gave priority to a vast use of documents and a taste for inter-disciplinarity. Ispi was trying to produce an innovative cultural project capable of linking historiography and politics, a study of an “imagined” national past with an in-depth analysis of the international context. The aim was to provide Italy with a more solid political culture in order to help the government both meet the requirements of being a Great Power, and fulfilling what was thought to be an Italian imperial mission. The ambiguous position occupied by Ispi during the fascist regime as well as the contradiction that was revealed at the beginning of this research, which was a claim for the unity of scientific research and propaganda made by Gaslini, can be understood in the relationship that the Milanese Institute established with the liberal Italian past. Ispi didn’t want to make a decisive break with the past, in fact it presented itself as an instrument to achieve that national unity which couldn’t be reached in Italy before the First World War: a sort of sacred mission which could have been reached walking arm in arm with the fascist regime. On the other hand there was a break to the extent that parlamentarism was considered as a bad disease, and a new sense of hierarchy and order emerged which couldn’t be challenged by “individualism” and more in general by all those “vicious” principles which were considered as an attack against the State and the Nation. Against this backdrop Ispi developed a sui generis political and historiographical laboratory that saw the collaboration of a large number of scholars, who differed from each other as regards political and cultural interests, but they participated in the initiatives of the Institute specifically because its cultural projects were able to rely upon a broader basis in respect of the most pressing political aims of the fascist regime. This is why, at least until a certain point, the members of Ispi and its collaborators didn’t feel that particular contradiction between a serious and autonomous study of international/foreign politics and a dictatorial environment which, at the beginning, was not so assertive in shaping a coherent and unidirectional foreign policy. Indeed, its history was heavily affected by the fascist regime, and in a broader perspective it assumed a specific physiognomy as well as a peculiar position at the crossroad of political, cultural and propagandistic national concerns. Nevertheless, these specific features didn’t confine Ispi to an isolated environment with no contacts or exchanges with foreign institutes or personalities. Suffice it is to say that the very idea of founding a series of Institutes of International Affairs capable of studying and disseminating a more scientific knowledge regarding foreign matters was born out of the Peace Conference of Versailles by some Anglo-American representatives; that almost all the members of Ispi went abroad to complete their education; that Ispi was one of the Institutes which participated at the annual International Studies Conference, whose original name was International Conference of Institutions for Scientific Study of Politics. This is why I think that this research has made it possible both to find new materials in order to better understand the relationship between culture and politics during the fascist regime, and more specifically to investigate what were the themes, aspirations and interests of Ispi’s members and the political directives of the dictatorship, as well as to start a reflection about the development of the Institutes of International Affairs. Investigating both how they treated and exploited international information and what kind of relationship they had with their governments allows to better understand the nexus between international politics, foreign policy and public opinion and how it was changing during the interwar period.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003.<br>Thesis advisor(s): Donald Abenheim, Daniel J. Moran. Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-76). Also available online.