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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Knowability"
Wójcik, Arkadiusz. "The Knowability Paradox and Unsuccessful Updates". Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 62, nr 1 (1.06.2020): 53–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/slgr-2020-0013.
Pełny tekst źródłaWilliamson, Timothy. "Knowability and Constructivism". Philosophical Quarterly 38, nr 153 (październik 1988): 422. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2219707.
Pełny tekst źródłaJago, M. "Closure on knowability". Analysis 70, nr 4 (24.08.2010): 648–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anq067.
Pełny tekst źródłaChalmers, D. J. "Actuality and knowability". Analysis 71, nr 3 (18.05.2011): 411–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr038.
Pełny tekst źródłaDouven, Igor. "The Knowability Paradox". Ars Disputandi 6, nr 1 (styczeń 2006): 163–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2006.10819919.
Pełny tekst źródłaWilliamson, Timothy. "Definiteness and Knowability". Southern Journal of Philosophy 33, S1 (marzec 1995): 171–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.1995.tb00769.x.
Pełny tekst źródłaDeVidi, David, i Tim Kenyon. "Analogues of Knowability". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81, nr 4 (grudzień 2003): 481–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713659757.
Pełny tekst źródłaHand, Michael, i Jonathan L. Kvanvig. "Tennant on knowability". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77, nr 4 (grudzień 1999): 422–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048409912349191.
Pełny tekst źródłaHeylen, Jan, i Felipe Morales Carbonell. "Concepts of Knowability". Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso, nr 23 (26.12.2023): 287–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.22370/rhv2023iss23pp287-308.
Pełny tekst źródłaMurzi, Julien. "Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability". Philosophical Studies 149, nr 2 (19.02.2009): 269–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9349-y.
Pełny tekst źródłaRozprawy doktorskie na temat "Knowability"
Percival, P. R. "Infinity, knowability and understanding". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.384322.
Pełny tekst źródłaKubyshkina, Ekaterina. "La logique de l'agent rationnel". Thesis, Paris 1, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018PA01H208.
Pełny tekst źródłaMany-valued logics is a family of non-classical logics, which is characterized by the fundamental fact that they do not restrict the truth values to only truth and falsity. According to this line of inquiry, Kleene (1938) constructed a logic that is based on the idea that every proposition is either true, or false, but there exist propositions for which the truth value is unknown. The formalisation of this idea leads to the introduction of a third assignment of truth value to propositions, interpreted as “unknown”. However, this formalisation contains an ambiguity, because it does not permit the resolution of a contradiction between the fact that every proposition is either true or false, and the fact that there exist propositions for which the assignment of truth value is neither “true” nor “false”. The initial aim of the present thesis is to explore Kleene’s idea in order to introduce and analyse a new many-valued logic, to be called the logic of a rational agent, that is founded on Kleene’s ideas, but that eliminates the above-mentioned ambiguity.The logic of a rational agent models the reasoning of an agent, taking into account the knowledge (or ignorance) of the classical truth value of a proposition that the agent can have. On the technical level, we introduce diverse definitions of entailment relations and construct consistent and complete semantics on this base. We then show the interest inherent in such a formalisation, by proposing an application of this logic to a famous epistemological problem, known as the “knowability paradox”. On the epistemological level, the logic of a rational agent permits us to offer an analysis of the notion of ignorance, as understood independently from the notion of knowledge. Such a formalization
Liu, Mo. "Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Quantification And Normative Systems". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université de Lorraine, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023LORR0077.
Pełny tekst źródłaWe live in a world where information is constantly being updated. Logics with dynamic operators are capable of reasoning about multi-agent information change. Dynamic epistemic logic is the logic of knowledge change. For example, in public announcement logic, an announcement restricts the domain to states where it is true to represent the consequences of knowledge change. A generalization of dynamic epistemic logic is the extension with quantification. It bridges an interesting gap between propositional modal logic and first-order logic in expressivity and decidability. Arbitrary public announcement logic extends public announcement logic by adding quantification over all announcements. It is more expressive than modal logics and public announcement logic, but undecidable. In this thesis, we propose some novel versions of arbitrary public announcement logic. Firstly, we can restrict the quantification from over all announcements to over subsets of them. To be specific, the announcements involved could use only a subset of all propositional variables or implied or implying a given formula. Even though these variants of arbitrary public announcement logic are still undecidable, we show there is an interesting hierarchy of relative expressivity of them. Another approach is based on the idea of packing operators together. Packed operators represent more complex notions and also restrict the expressivity of languages. The notion of "knowability'' can be interpreted as "there is a possible information change after which the agent knows something''. It is natural to represent by the package of a quantified dynamic operator and a epistemic operator. In this thesis, we propose logics of knowability using such packed operators. We show that if there is no restriction on announcements, then the logic of knowability is more expressive than public announcement logic, but undecidable; if we only quantify over boolean announcements, then the logic has the same expressivity as propositional modal logic. Besides the extension with quantification, in this thesis, we also combine dynamic epistemic logic with normative system. Arrow update logic contains modalities that specify which relations should be preserved after updating by source and target conditions. It is designed to reason about multi-agent belief change. We can also use it to represent the notion of "norm'' which regulates behaviors of agents in a consequential way. We propose normative arrow update logic which combines arrow update logic and normative temporal logic. It also concludes additive, multiplicative and sequential combination of norms. Normative arrow update logic can distinguish between static and dynamic ways to consider norms as dynamic epistemic logic. We show its relative expressivity with other related logics, its decidability, and complexity
Řičař, Jiří. "Otázka přirozené poznatelnosti Boha u Tomáše Akvinského a její recepce u vybraných současných autorů". Master's thesis, 2016. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-348233.
Pełny tekst źródłaKsiążki na temat "Knowability"
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. The knowability paradox. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2006.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaJoe, Salerno, red. New essays on the knowability paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaPohle, Joseph. God: His knowability, essence, and attributes : a dogmatic treatise. St. Louis, Mo: B. Herder, 1985.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaKennedy, Philip. Deus humanissimus: The knowability of God in the theology of Edward Schillebeeckx. Fribourg, Switzerland: University Press, 1993.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaLipskiy, Boris, Stanislav Gusev, Grigoriy Tul'chinskiy i Boris Markov. Fundamentals of Philosophy. ru: INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC., 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/1014627.
Pełny tekst źródłaKvanvig, Jonathan L. Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2006.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaKvanvig, Jonathan L. Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2008.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaKvanvig, Jonathan L. Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2006.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaSalerno, Joe, red. New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199285495.001.0001.
Pełny tekst źródłaPohle, Joseph. God: His Knowability, Essence And Attributes. Kessinger Publishing, LLC, 2007.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaCzęści książek na temat "Knowability"
McCain, Kevin. "Knowability Paradox". W Epistemology: 50 Puzzles, Paradoxes, and Thought Experiments, 231–34. New York: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003121091-51.
Pełny tekst źródłaUsberti, Gabriele. "The Paradox of Knowability". W Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, 345–77. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24605-0_9.
Pełny tekst źródłaWen, Xuefeng, Hu Liu i Fan Huang. "An Alternative Logic for Knowability". W Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, 342–55. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_25.
Pełny tekst źródłaJohn, Maya. "(Un)Knowability of a Disease". W Pandemic Perspectives, 23–45. London: Routledge, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003480297-3.
Pełny tekst źródłaSalerno, Joe. "Knowability and a New Paradox of Happiness". W Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game-Theoretical Semantics, 457–74. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-62864-6_19.
Pełny tekst źródłavan Rooij, Robert. "Nonmonotonicity and Knowability: As Knowable as Possible". W Outstanding Contributions to Logic, 53–65. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47843-2_3.
Pełny tekst źródłaUsberti, Gabriele. "The Paradox of Knowability from an Intuitionistic Standpoint". W Advances in Proof-Theoretic Semantics, 115–37. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22686-6_7.
Pełny tekst źródłaCarrara, Massimiliano, Daniele Chiffi i Davide Sergio. "A Multimodal Pragmatic Analysis of the Knowability Paradox". W Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, 195–209. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58507-9_9.
Pełny tekst źródłaCohen, Michael. "A Dynamic Epistemic Logic with a Knowability Principle". W Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, 406–10. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48561-3_33.
Pełny tekst źródłaPrebble, Mark. "Public Value, Knowability, and Legitimacy: A Thought Experiment". W Challenges to Public Value Creation, 99–107. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-46030-2_7.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenia konferencji na temat "Knowability"
Baltag, Alexandru, Nick Bezhanishvili i David Fernández-Duque. "The Topology of Surprise". W 19th International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning {KR-2022}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/kr.2022/4.
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