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Ferreira, Jacqueline Leao Jacome. "Either/Or: jogo em Kierkegaard - Kierkegaard em jogo". Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1843/ECAP-7MFLPK.
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O jogo de escrita fabricado por Kierkegaard, em "Either/Or", constrói, propositadamente, brechas de interpretação, configurando-se o eu da escritura como autor/jogador astuto que lança mão de artifícios escriturais que se refletem na pseudonímia e na matéria narrada. O conceito de jogo, bem como o próprio ato de jogar, serão, pois, importantes à análise que aqui se intenta. Em "Either/Or", os autores sobrepostos ora se impõem como novos prospectos de leitura e releitura, ora se transformam no elemento lúdico que reverbera em torno de si mesmo enquanto categoria crítica e interpretativa relevante. Sem desconsiderarmos os fatos complexos da interioridade de Kierkegaard como, por exemplo, viver a liberdade subjetiva diante da ética e da pressão religiosa, primeiramente, avaliaremos a incidência lúdica nos seus textos, partindo da visão analítica de jogo, para depois, então, confrontarmos sua autonomia criativa (e de seus pseudônimos) com o jogo de reconstrução de sentido próprio da atividade do leitor. "Either/Or", conforme conceito formulado por Wolfgang Iser, instaura condições de comunicação e suscita o jogo de respostas decorrentes dos efeitos estéticos produzidos na mente do leitor. Se isso pode ser dito, lato sensu, sobre qualquer obra ficcional, no caso da escrita de Kierkegaard essa suspensão se dá como projeto escritural que vai sendo explicitado, simultaneamente, a seu processo de construção, de jogo levado a extremos labirínticos através das sobreposições de eus escriturais. Na análise de "Either/Or", pretendemos, além de contemplar o jogo de autorias forjadas que recortam o texto, tentar apreender a construção do discurso, partindo do princípio que Kierkegaard, ao elaborar os dois prefácios ficcionais, tanto na introdução de "Either/Or" quanto em "Diário de um Sedutor", utiliza-se da memória enquanto estratégia de criação literária. A partir dos dois prefácios citados, procuraremos estabelecer a relação comparativa entre o perfil do narrador e o universo narrado, entre o narrador, simultaneamente, sujeito e objeto da história, entre os acontecimentos passados reconstruídos, no presente, através da escrita
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Bartels, Cora. "Kierkegaard receptus". Göttingen V & R Unipress, 2002. http://d-nb.info/986275417/04.
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Bartels, Cora. "Kierkegaard receptus /". Göttingen : V&R Unipress, 2008. http://d-nb.info/986275417/04.
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Piety, Marilyn Gaye. "Kierkegaard on knowledge". Thesis, McGill University, 1994. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=28884.
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Almost no work has been done on the substance of Kierkegaard's epistemology. I argue, however, that knowledge plays a much more important role in Kierkegaard's thought than has traditionally been appreciated.There are two basic types of knowledge, according to Kierkegaard: "objective knowledge" and "subjective knowledge." I argue that both types of knowledge are associated by Kierkegaard with "certainty" and may be defined as justified true mental representation (forestilling). I also argue, however, that the meaning of 'certainty,' 'justified' and 'true' is derivative of the object of knowledge. That is, I argue that Kierkegaard employs these expressions in both an objective and subjective sense and that the latter sense is not, as it has often been interpreted to be, subjectivist.
Finally, I argue that an appreciation of the substance of Kierkegaard's epistemology reveals that the charges of irrationalism which have often been made against him, are without foundation.
5
Boucher, Éric. "L'autorité chez Kierkegaard". Thèse, Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières, 1997. http://depot-e.uqtr.ca/4840/1/000634333.pdf.
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Astner, Aurelia. "Kierkegaard und der Pietismus". Innsbruck IUP, Innsbruck Univ. Press, 2009. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&docl̲ibrary=BVB01&docn̲umber=017699232&linen̲umber=0001&funcc̲ode=DBR̲ECORDS&servicet̲ype=MEDIA.
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Barros, Wagner de. "Kierkegaard e o Tractatus". Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2017. https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/9127.
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This study aims to investigate if the relationships between Kierkegaard and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus can be assessed from considerations about the nature of language. That would provide a philosophical justification for Wittgenstein’s claim that "Kierkegaard is the deepest thinker of the last century", as an alternative to the view adopted by some scholars that the common point between the two authors is the split between the sphere of values and the sphere of facts. It would also be possible to establish a link between the reflections of the Danish philosopher and Wittgenstein’s approach to ethics in the Tractatus; this is a point that was acknowledged by scholars but remains unclear.
O presente trabalho busca investigar se as relações entre Kierkegaard e o Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus, de Wittgenstein, podem ser pensadas a partir das considerações sobre a natureza da linguagem. Assim, justificar-se-ia filosoficamente porque Wittgenstein considera “Kierkegaard o pensador mais profundo do último século”, evitando o argumento utilizado por alguns especialistas de que o ponto comum entre os autores consiste na cisão entre esfera de valores e esfera dos fatos. Além disso, seria possível articular as reflexões do filósofo dinamarquês à compreensão do estatuto da ética no Tractatus, tema reconhecido pelos intérpretes, porém ainda obscuro.
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Kuder, Paul [Verfasser]. "Heideggers Kierkegaard / Paul Kuder". Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, 2016. http://d-nb.info/112204724X/34.
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Kaplan, Eric Linus. "Kierkegaard and the Funny". Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 2018. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10283782.
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This dissertation begins by addressing a puzzle that arises in academic analytic interpretations of Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The puzzle arises when commentators try to paraphrase the book’s philosophical thesis “truth is subjectivity.” I resolve this puzzle by arguing that the motto “truth is subjectivity” is like a joke, and resists and invites paraphrase just as a joke does.
The connection between joking and Kierkegaard’s philosophical practice is then deepened by giving a philosophical reconstruction of Kierkegaard's definition of joking as a way of responding to contradiction that is painless precisely because it sees the way out in mind. Kierkegaard’s account of joking and his account of his own philosophical project are used to mutually illuminate each other. The dissertation develops a phenomenology of retroactive temporality that explains how joking and subjective thinking work. I put forward an argument for why “existential humorism” is a valuable approach to life for Kierkegaard, but why it ultimately fails, and explain the relationship between comedy as a way of life and faith as a way of life, particularly as they both relate to risk.
In the final chapter three peculiar features of Kierkegaard’s writing practice are addressed: his use of indirect communication, pseudonyms, and revocation. I explain the function of these methods to his philosophical project as I have described it in the previous chapters and conclude with a close reading of the graveyard scene in the Postscript and an analysis of how it serves to implicate the reader in existential thinking. Finally, I offer some reflections about the implications of Kierkegaard’s account of humor and subjective thinking for human self-understanding. I argue that an implication of Kierkegaard’s account is that philosophy is a risky, vulnerable, interpersonal activity, just as joking is.
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Morel, Jean. "Kierkegaard et la décision". Paris 1, 2007. http://www.theses.fr/2007PA010611.
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Qu'en est-il de ce pouvoir de dire ou bien/ou bien ? Autour du motif de la décision se déploie une réflexion philosophique d’ordre éthico-religieux essentiellement consacrée à l'œuvre de Kierkegaard qui - répond à une exigence : repenser la question tombée dans l'oubli : l'Individu. La non-pbilosopbie de Kierkegaard répond à cette urgence d’ordre éthique : retrouver la catégorie oubliée Den Enkelte mais ne vaut que dans la reprise de cette injonction : penser le singulier dans le sérieux de la décision et non, de manière traditionnelle, dans la vita contemplativa. Que n'a-t-on pas "fait" au nom de la seule pensée démoniaque ? - donne lieu à une confrontation avec Schelling et Heidegger. Autant pour l'un que pour l'autre, c'est essentiellement autour de cet impensé fondamental : la praxis humaine que se joue l'enjeu de ce débat. Notre tâche est de revenis du "Système" revisité, la dénégation de l'éthique kirkegaardienne par Heidegger. Pour cela. Hannah Arrendt ouvre la voie. - retrouve l'impensé de la temporalité humaine dans son surgissement événementiel. Une telle réflexion éthico-religieuse est ontologique. Elle est recherche de soi. Pseudonymie et autonymie sont les deux aspects paradoxaux de cette recherche d'une singuli_re/ universelle ipséité. - implique une "m"thode" qui s'est imposée à nous plutôt que nous l'avons choisie : une "phénoménologie de l'agir" dont le "principe des principes" es est la décision.
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Adam, Rodolphe. "Lacan, lecteur de Kierkegaard". Paris 7, 2003. http://www.theses.fr/2003PA070026.
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"Kierkegaard est un philosophe majeur de l'enseignement de Lacan. De 1948 à 1975, à maintes reprises, il revient dans le discours du psychanalyste. Evoqué toujours lapidairement, le penseur religieux a pourtant une fonction cruciale dans le retour à Freud. La méthodologie de l'enquête, basée sur le suivi à la lettre de toutes les références lacaniennes à Kierkegaard, vise à montrer l'enjeu que comporte ce dernier pour les concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse. La reprise par Lacan du concept freudien de répétition s'effectue toujours dans ses multiples scansions en regard du texte de Kierkegaard de 1843, " La Reprise ". Où se trouve exposée la vérité freudienne : la répétition est toujours manquée, jamais satisfaite. L'angoisse trouve aussi sa boussole chez Kierkegaard pour révéler qu'elle est ce qui ne trompe pas et son rapport au désir de l'Autre. L'instant chez Kierkegaard est également une prémisse de la fondation du temps logique. Enfin, l'existence s'avère parfaitement concordante avec l'expérience freudienne. Ces concepts amènent à relire Kierkegaard comme un penseur du réel pour Lacan, ce qui dégage ce qui n'est pas hégélien dans la psychanalyse, un réel non subordonné au rationnel. "Kierkegaard is a Lacan's teaching major philosopher. From 1948 till 1975, on several occasions, he cornes again on the psychoanalysis discours. Always evoked concisely, the religious thinker has however got a crucial function concerning Freud's coming back. The investigating methodology based on the exact reading of all the Lacanian references to Kierkegaard, aims at showing the importance that this last involues according to psychoanalysis basic concepts. Lacan's return to Freudian concept of repetition always take place on his multiples scansions facing Kierkegaard's text of 1843, "The repetition". Where is displayed the Freudian truth : répétition is always missed, never satisfied. Anguish finds also its compass with Kierkegaard to reveal that's what it doesn't deceive and its relation to the Other's desire. With Kierkegaard, instant is also a premiss of logical time founding. At last, existence proved perfectly concordant with Freudian experience. These concepts living to read again Kierkegaard as a thinker of real for Lacan, what draws what isn't Hegelian in psychoanalysis, a real not subordinated to rational
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Grøn, Arne. "Subjektivitet og negativitet : Kierkegaard /". Copenhagen : Gyldendal, 1997. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb392489304.
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Stewart, William. "Kierkegaard & Natural Religion". TopSCHOLAR®, 1988. https://digitalcommons.wku.edu/theses/2882.
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According to Kierkegaard, the knowledge of God begins with the recognition of various truths about oneself. Every individual, just by virtue of being human, has the capacity to develop an intuitive awareness of God. In this thesis, I explore the nature of this knowledge. In chapter one, I introduce a number of ideas important for understanding Kierkegaard's phenomenology of religious belief, including his distinction between objective and subjective reflection, his method (indirect communication), and his psychology. The first chapter concludes with a description of the range or domain of "natural religion." In the next chapter, I analyze the structural or formative elements of natural religion, the awakening of a God -relationship in the extremity of selfknowledge (an individual's awareness of the eternal, infinite, and possible aspects of the human "self"). In the final chapter, I explore two related peculiarities in Kierkegaard's treatment of religious knowledge: his contempt for inductive or probabilistic arguments, and his suggestion that the existence of God can become clear to a person with a different kind of certainty. I argue that although he overstates his polemic against theistic arguments, Kierkegaard is nonetheless correct in his account of the proper ground of belief in God. I conclude by juxtaposing Kierkegaard's views on belief in God with those of twentieth century probabilistic theologians and atheologians, as well as the "Reformed Epistemology" of Alvin Plantinga.
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Habbard, Anne-Christine. "Kierkegaard et le don". Paris 4, 1998. http://www.theses.fr/1998PA040114.
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Le don traverse toute l'œuvre de Kierkegaard. Il rend compte de la nature de l'existence, qui n'est pas, mais qui a à être. L'existant est à la fois donné dans sa déterminité et libre de son devenir: il est originairement endetté, et l'exister peut alors être compris comme un effort de contemporanéité à soi, dont on voit qu'il échoue aux stades esthétique aussi bien qu'éthique. L'existant ne peut plus alors qu'espérer en une grâce divine qui, en lui réouvrant ses possibles, lui réouvre une temporalité obscurcie par le péché. Le don permet également de cerner la thématique de l'angoisse et du désespoir, si prégnante chez Kierkegaard : l'angoisse est cet affolement de la liberté lorsqu'elle s'aperçoit que s'est effondré sous ses pieds la nécessité ontologique rassurante, et qu'il lui faut être disponible pour elle-même. Le désespoir est l'expression existentielle d'un refus de la dérivation : l'individu tente frénétiquement de se renfermer à tout prix sur l'enclos d'un moi privatif et autosuffisant. Seul le nouveau don de la foi lui permet alors d'aborder l'ouverture des possibles et de l'avenir sans cette panique de la liberté. Mais un don est une tâche : l'individu doit également apprendre à donner pour accueillir en vérité ce moi qu'il est. On voit par la non seulement comment la notion de communication existentielle prend sens à la lumière du don, mais, plus généralement, qu'il n'y a pas de subjectivité hors de l'intersubjectivité, portée par un rapport de sollicitude et d'amour à l'égard d'autrui. Enfin, Kierkegaard se dégage par le biais du don des présupposés de l'ontologie, entendue comme processus de totalisation et de justification perpétuelles. La raison a besoin de d'un objet réifié pour travailler, et elle ne sait que faire du sujet et du singulier. C'est pourquoi elle est finalement inapte à comprendre ces déchirures dans l'être que sont l'existence - et dieu, dont on s'aperçoit ainsi qu'il n'est pas, hors du pur don « pré-ontologique » de son amour.
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Jasmin, Jean-Christophe. "Communication et Éthique chez Kierkegaard". Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/28708.
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Aun, Fernando Santos [UNESP]. "Ironia e subjetividade em Kierkegaard". Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/93162.
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Esta dissertação procura esclarecer a singularidade da concepção kierkegaardiana do conceito de ironia e a relação estabelecida entre este conceito e a questão da subjetividade. Com essa finalidade priorizamos a análise da obra O conceito de ironia constantemente referido a Sócrates, na qual podemos investigar as distinções que Kierkegaard estabelece entre a ironia socrática, a ironia no romantismo alemão e a concepção hegeliana de ironia. Valorizamos a análise da definição de ironia como “negatividade” e também a noção de “personalidade” apresentada pelo autor. Tendo em vista que, como figura de transição, o lugar ocupado pela ironia na obra de Kierkegaard é configurado sempre no intervalo e na passagem entre várias dualidades, tais como, real e ideal; finito e infinito; interior e exterior; vida e forma ou, ainda, entre uma subjetividade e outra, defendemos ao longo da dissertação que um estudo detido da tese kierkegaardiana sobre a ironia é essencial para compreendermos alguns dos principais aspectos de sua filosofia
This dissertation aims at clarifying the singularity of Kierkegaard´s concept of irony and its relation to the subjectivity. Thus, the priority of this research is the analysis of the work: “The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates”, by Kierkegaard, in which it is possible to examine the distinctions between the Socratic irony, the irony in the German Romanticism and the Hegelian notion of irony. We focus on the analysis of irony as negativity and also on the author´s idea about “personality”. Considering the place of irony in the Kierkegaard´s work as an element of transition, that figures in between several dualisms, such as: Real and ideal; finite and infinite; interior and exterior; life and form; or also between subjectivities; we believe that a careful study of Kierkegaard´s thesis about irony is essential to understand some of the main aspects of his philosophy
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Roumbanis, Lambros. "Kierkegaard och sociologins blinda fläck". Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Sociologiska institutionen, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-40974.
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The overall aim of this dissertation is to discuss the scope as well as the limits of sociological theory. This project is undertaken with the help of Søren Kierkegaard and his unique interpretation of human existence. Taking as its point of departure the existential reality of the single individual (den Enkelte), this study also addresses the fundamental question posed by Georg Simmel, “How is society possible?” It is argued that an answer to this question needs to take into account the existential concepts of choice, authenticity, subjectivity, anxiety, faith, and responsibility. The strategy – and the implicit method – of this study is to start out from the single individual and gradually move towards society, culture and history. After addressing some theories of everyday life, such as social phenomenology and dramaturgical theory, the investigation moves on to the central sociological problem of how to construct a synthetic theory of the relation between man and society. The final theory to be discussed is the social theory of Jean-Paul Sartre, which can be seen as a reformulation and modification of the Kierkegaardian perspective, now set in dialectical relation to society and history. The main argument of the thesis is that the message that can be found in Kierkegaard’s writings represents both a reminder and a challenge to every sociological project which seeks to achieve a synthesis between individual existence and social reality. Sociological theories can neither account for the existence of the single individual in an exhaustive manner, nor fully integrate this existence into some social system. It is impossible to reduce the existence of individuals to some socially and culturally given lifeworld, because authentic faith and infinite passion constitute an inner experience that is largely hidden from the sociologist observer. A sociological incompleteness theorem is proposed, which states that sociological theories are simply incapable of dealing with certain aspects of human existence. These aspects are, from an ontological point of view, unsettled and not social in nature. This theorem can also be expressed so that there exists a blind spot in every sociological theory that tries to account systematically for the single individual. By focussing attention on the existential tension between choice and inner experience, the sociologist can however push the limits for what can be accomplished with the help of sociological theory.
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Samczuk, Ingrid Bianchini. "Kierkegaard e Guimarães Rosa: ressonâncias". Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2010. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/11545.
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Previous issue date: 2010-11-26This research had as objective to analyze resonances of Kierkegaard s philosophy on the literature of João Guimarães Rosa, which has not as yet been done in this author s set of critics. The plausibility of this confrontation between these two authors is guided by Rosas s records, in letters and interviews, about his personal interest in Kierkegaard, also demonstrated by the finding of the philosopher s works and a book on Danish language in his personal library. Besides, there are two fulcrum points to this approximation: the concern about the individual and the importance of religion over their lives and the making of their works. From this starting point, we chose to analyze five narratives of the book Primeiras estórias, which are: As margens da alegria, Os cimos, A menina de lá, A terceira margem do rio and O espelho. In these stories, the protagonists were studied in order to demonstrate in which mesure each of them would represent the stages of existence theorized by the Danish thinker: aesthetic, ethical and religious. After the analysis, the Boy in As margens da alegria and Os cimos, together with Nhinhinha in A menina de lá were identified with the kierkegaardian s aesthete. To the ethics stage belongs the narrator of A terceira margem do rio, and to the religious stage we found the father in A terceira margem do rio, as well as O espelho s narrator. About this last character, it is worth saying that, among the ones listed to this study, it is the only one that travels through the three stages, in order to complete its movement of existential subjectification
Esta dissertação propõe-se a analisar ressonâncias da filosofia de Søren Kierkegaard na literatura de João Guimarães Rosa, abordagem ainda carente na fortuna crítica do literato. A hipótese da plausibilidade de aproximação entre os dois autores pauta-se por registros de Rosa em cartas e entrevistas a respeito de seu interesse pessoal por Kierkegaard, também demonstrado pela presença de obras do filósofo e de um livro sobre a língua dinamarquesa em sua biblioteca pessoal. Somado a isso, são dois os pontos fulcrais para a aproximação de ambos: a preocupação com o Indivíduo e a importância que a religião possui tanto em suas vidas quanto para a elaboração de suas obras. A partir disso, optou-se pela análise de cinco narrativas de Primeiras estórias, a saber: As margens da alegria, Os cimos, A menina de lá, A terceira margem do rio e O espelho, nas quais foram analisados os protagonistas com o objetivo de demonstrar em que medida cada um representaria os estágios da existência teorizados pelo pensador dinamarquês: estético, ético e religioso. Após a análise, identificou-se o Menino de As margens da alegria e Os cimos, juntamente de Nhinhinha de A menina de lá, com o esteta kierkegaardiano. Ao estágio ético, pertence o narrador de A terceira margem do rio, e ao religioso pertencem tanto o pai de A terceira margem do rio quanto o narrador de O espelho. Sobre essa última personagem, vale a ressalva de que, dentre os elencados para esse trabalho, é o único que percorre os três estágios, de modo a completar seu movimento de subjetivação existencial
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Freitas, Luiz Gustavo Onisto de. "Kierkegaard e Bergman: autores éticos". Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2010. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/11836.
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Previous issue date: 2010-05-21This work is a study of cinema of the Swedish director Ingmar Bergman second point of view of the concepts of Danish philosopher Soeren Aabye Kierkegaard. According to an ethical axis common to both authors, it is observed how the cinematographic language used by Bergman presents important concepts of Kierkegaardian philosophy, like despair, anguish, faith and paradox
Este trabalho consiste em um estudo do cinema do diretor sueco Ingmar Bergman segundo o ponto de vista dos conceitos do filósofo dinamarquês Soeren Aabye Kierkegaard. De acordo com um eixo ético comum aos dois autores, observa-se como a linguagem cinematográfica utilizada por Bergman apresenta conceitos importantes da filosofia kierkegaardiana, como o desespero, a angústia, o paradoxo e a fé
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Aun, Fernando Santos. "Ironia e subjetividade em Kierkegaard /". Marília : [s.n.], 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/93162.
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Orientador: Arlenice Almeida da SilvaBanca: Silvia Saviano Sampaio
Banca: Carlos Eduardo Jordão Machado
Resumo: Esta dissertação procura esclarecer a singularidade da concepção kierkegaardiana do conceito de ironia e a relação estabelecida entre este conceito e a questão da subjetividade. Com essa finalidade priorizamos a análise da obra O conceito de ironia constantemente referido a Sócrates, na qual podemos investigar as distinções que Kierkegaard estabelece entre a ironia socrática, a ironia no romantismo alemão e a concepção hegeliana de ironia. Valorizamos a análise da definição de ironia como "negatividade" e também a noção de "personalidade" apresentada pelo autor. Tendo em vista que, como figura de transição, o lugar ocupado pela ironia na obra de Kierkegaard é configurado sempre no intervalo e na passagem entre várias dualidades, tais como, real e ideal; finito e infinito; interior e exterior; vida e forma ou, ainda, entre uma subjetividade e outra, defendemos ao longo da dissertação que um estudo detido da tese kierkegaardiana sobre a ironia é essencial para compreendermos alguns dos principais aspectos de sua filosofia
Abstract: This dissertation aims at clarifying the singularity of Kierkegaard's concept of irony and its relation to the subjectivity. Thus, the priority of this research is the analysis of the work: "The Concept of Irony, with Continual Reference to Socrates", by Kierkegaard, in which it is possible to examine the distinctions between the Socratic irony, the irony in the German Romanticism and the Hegelian notion of irony. We focus on the analysis of irony as negativity and also on the author's idea about "personality". Considering the place of irony in the Kierkegaard's work as an element of transition, that figures in between several dualisms, such as: Real and ideal; finite and infinite; interior and exterior; life and form; or also between subjectivities; we believe that a careful study of Kierkegaard's thesis about irony is essential to understand some of the main aspects of his philosophy
Mestre
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Caravedo, Joan. "Truth and Liberty in Kierkegaard". Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/119566.
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This paper proposes an introduction to the Kierkegaardian relation between freedom and truth. In order to do this, mainly paying attention to his Philosophical Fragments, it begins with the Socratic problem of acquiring truth. After this, it focuses on truth as the fruit of God’s free love, whence emerges the topic of freedom. Finally, this theme leads to the Kierkegaardian account of becoming, and specifically to the relation between possibility and reality. Throughout this exposition, the central concept that articulates this itinerary is the “instant”, understanding it as the point of convergence between the eternal and the temporal, stressing the paradox therein.El texto propone una aproximación introductoria a la relación entre libertad y verdad. Para lograr esto seguirá una ruta, amparada fundamentalmente en el texto de Kierkegaard Migajas filosóficas, que comenzará con el problema socrático en torno a la adquisición de la verdad, pasando a considerar la dación de la verdad fruto del amor gratuito de Dios, desde el cual habrá de emerger el tema de la libertad que, por último, terminará por conducirnos a la explicación kierkegaardiana del devenir y, específicamente, al tema de la relación entre posibilidad y realidad. En esta exposición, el concepto que procurará articular todo nuestro recorrido será el de instante, entendiendo este como punto de confluencia entre lo eterno y lo temporal y resaltando la paradoja aquí implicada.
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Politis, Hélène. "Le discours philosophique selon Kierkegaard". Paris 1, 1993. http://www.theses.fr/1993PA010521.
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Notre première partie récapitule les grandes étapes de la réception de l'œuvre de Kierkegaard en France ; elle explique comment certaines interprétations inexactes se sont constituées et pourquoi elles ont pu durer. La deuxième partie examine et comptabilise les lectures philosophiques de Kierkegaard, à la fois dans les samlede vaerker (œuvres complètes) et dans les papirer (papiers) danois. L'usage que Kierkegaard fait de ces lectures dans son œuvre est beaucoup plus important qu'on ne le croit ordinairement. (En complément, une longue annexe à la thèse donne la liste détaillée des références philosophiques dans les papirer). La troisième partie montre à partir d'exemples précis que c'est en commentant ou en discutant les doctrines et les concepts des philosophes (surtout Hegel), que Kierkegaard produit les siens (dialectique des stades, paradoxe, éthique, répétition, existence, etc. ). Dans une quatrième partie, plus brève, nous nous interrogeons sur les modalités philosophiques présentes jusque dans son discours indirect (écriture pseudonymique, "miettes", métaphores, etc. ). Kierkegaard, lecteur des philosophes ; Kierkegaard, philosophe lui-même et à part entière : tels sont les deux volets inséparables de notre thèseThe first part sums up the main stages in the reception of Kierkegaard's works in France; it demonstrates how some inaccurate interpretations developed and why they persisted. The second part surveys and assesses Kierkegaard's philosophical readings in the danish samlede vaerker (complete works) and papirer (papers). The use Kierkegaard makes of these readings in his works is much more important than is usually acknowledged. (A long annex to the thesis gives a detailed list of the philosophical references in the papirer. ) The third part shows with precise examples that it is through analyzing and discussing the doctrines and concepts of philosophers (above all Hegel), that Kierkegaard constructs his own notions (dialectic of stages, paradox, ethics, repetition, existence, and so forth). A shorter fourth part investigates the philosophical modalities which appear even in his more indirect means of expressions (pseudonymic writing, "philosophical fragments", metaphors, etc. ). Kierkegaard, a reader of philosophers and a fully-fledged philosopher himself: such are the two inseparable facets of our thesis
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Görgens, Ludger. "Einfalt und Bildung bei Kierkegaard /". Köln : Philosophische Fakultät der Universität zu Köln, 1994. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb35745762s.
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Tapia, Wende Matías. "Comunidad y sujeto en Kierkegaard". Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2018. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/171027.
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Goulet, Benoît. "Kierkegaard et l'existentialisme : les lectures mouniériste et maritaine de l'existentialisme moderne et l'héritage de Kierkegaard". Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/43587.
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Ce mémoire présente une analyse des influences causées par l’œuvre kierkegaardienne à l’intérieur des différentes conceptions de l’existentialisme du 20e siècle. Considérant tout d’abord deux lectures chrétiennes de l’existentialisme moderne, celle proposée dans l’Introduction aux existentialismes d’Emmanuel Mounier et celle du Court traité de l ’existence et de l ’existant de Jacques Maritain, l’auteur souligne ensuite l’héritage de Kierkegaard et met en évidence l’intérêt porté à la philosophie kierkegaardienne par ces deux penseurs de l’existence du 20e siècle. L’analyse fait ressortir les richesses et les limites de la pensée kierkegaardienne telle que l’appréhendaient Mounier et Maritain, tandis que la présentation de leurs deux conceptions de l’existentialisme aura fait voir comment l’œuvre de Kierkegaard a diversement influencé le cours de l’histoire philosophique.
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Wennerscheid, Sophie. "Das Begehren nach der Wunde : Religion und Erotik im Denken Kierkegaards /". Berlin : Matthes & Seitz, 2008. http://d-nb.info/986516767/04.
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Boldt, Joachim. "Kierkegaards "Furcht und Zittern" als Bild seines ethischen Erkenntnisbegriffs /". Berlin : de Gruyter, 2006. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2800293&prov=M&dokv̲ar=1&doke̲xt=htm.
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Doxsee, Drew. "The limits of reason subjectivity and the absolute paradox in Kierkegaard's Concluding unscientific postscript /". Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2005. http://www.tren.com.
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Lincoln, Ulrich. "Äusserung : Studien zum Handlungsbegriff in Søren Kierkegaards "Die Taten der Liebe /". Berlin : W. de Gruyter, 2000. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37635707j.
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Oganessian, Armen. "Bringing Søren Kierkegaard to the English-speaking world : an analysis of Walter Lowrie's interpretation of Kierkegaard". Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2017. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=233915.
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Kirkpatrick, Matthew D. "Kierkegaard and a religionless Christianity : the place of Søren Kierkegaard in the thought of Dietrich Bonhoeffer". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2008. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:3d3d8d6b-0fa4-41f8-89e9-ded63ac8c291.
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The central aim of this thesis is to analyse the influence of Kierkegaard on Bonhoeffer. This relationship has been almost universally recognized. And yet this area has received no comprehensive study, limited within the secondary literature to footnotes, digressions, and the occasional paper. Furthermore, what little literature there is has been plagued by several stereotypes. First, discussion is often limited to Discipleship. Second, Kierkegaard has been identified as an individualist and acosmist who rejected the church, leading many to consider Bonhoeffer the ecumenist and ecclesiologist as selectively agreeing with Kierkegaard, but ultimately rejecting his overall stance. This thesis will argue that neither stereotype is true, and suggest (a), that Kierkegaard’s influence can be found throughout Bonhoeffer’s work, and (b) that although a more stereotypical perspective may be present in SC, by the end of his life Bonhoeffer had gained a far deeper understanding across the breadth of Kierkegaard’s work. The importance of this thesis is not simply to ‘plug the gap’ of scholarship in this area, but also to suggest the importance of analysing Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer together. This will focus on three specific areas. First, alongside the influence of Kierkegaard on Bonhoeffer, it will argue for the importance of using Bonhoeffer as an interpretive tool for understanding Kierkegaard. This thesis will show how Bonhoeffer adopted and adapted Kierkegaard’s work to his own situation, forcing Kierkegaard to answer questions that were not present during his own life. In this way, we are led to compare Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer as individuals, and not simply their static declarations. Secondly, against the tendency to consider Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer’s final attacks on Christendom as unfortunate endings to otherwise profound careers, it will be suggested that these attacks stand as the fulfilment of their earlier thought. It will be argued that despite their different contexts, both Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer were led to the same conclusions concerning Christendom. Thirdly, given Kierkegaard’s submission to indirect communication and his somewhat 'prophetic' proclamations concerning one who will come after him and reform, this thesis will ask whether Bonhoeffer stands as something of a fulfilment to Kierkegaard’s thought in the guise of a Kierkegaardian ‘reformer’.
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Perarnau, Vidal Dolors. "Søren Kierkegaard: el pathos del límit". Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/321119.
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El propòsit de la tesi és llegir el pensament kierkegaardià des de la noció filosòfica de
límit com a clau hermenèutica per a entendre’n tant el contingut com la forma. És des
d’aquesta noció, fonamentalment definida per Kant des de la “frontera [Grenze]” de la
raó i radicalment criticada per Hegel des del “moviment negatiu” de tota dialèctica, que
Kierkegaard és vist com un pensador que, ultra assenyalar una infranquejable frontera
entre la filosofia i el cristianisme, el que fa és esdevenir-la ell mateix. El que mirarem
de mostrar, doncs, és com Kierkegaard, precisament pel fet de ser religiós, escenifica el
límit de la filosofia en el propi discurs i crea, així, un nou estil de filosofar, que ja no
consisteix a “conèixer” el límit, cosa que sempre ha intentat de fer la filosofia, sinó, més
aviat, a reconèixer-lo i il·luminar-lo negativament.
Amb els conceptes de paradoxa, pecat i silenci, el nostre estudi recorrerà els
moments liminars de l’obra kierkegaardiana en cerca d’una negativitat que, així com la
de la ironia socràtica, ja no és demarcada o assumida pel pensament sinó en la qual és
“crucificat” el pensament mateix. La creu, com a símbol de la religió cristiana, esdevé
així el camí i meta de tota relació amb el límit, en quant restricció i transició alhora
d’una contradicció que és la pròpia de l’ésser humà, síntesi de finitud i d’infinitud,
necessitat i possibilitat, temporalitat i eternitat.
La passió per la veritat, en la qual Kierkegaard articula tota la seva obra és, així,
la pròpia passió i mort de la raó en la creu de la incomprensió de la paradoxa (el Déuhome)
i tota l’activitat com a escriptor del pensador danès consisteix a fer-la avinent, a
patir-la en el text dels seus múltiples escrits i a fer-la patir en l’existència del seu
eventual lector. El pathos del límit com a concepte existencial i textual alhora obre així
un nou àmbit en la preocupació filosòfica del límit i ajuda a reconsiderar la figura de
Kierkegaard més enllà de l’antihegelià o el pare del existencialisme de la història de la
filosofia, per tal d’entendre’l com a filòsof amb veu pròpia, com a pensador fronterer.The purpose of this thesis is to read Kierkegaard’s thought through the philosophical notion of Limit as a hermeneutical key to understand both form and content. It is from this notion, basically defined by Kant as the boundary of reason (Grenze) and radically criticized by Hegel from the negative movement of Dialectics, that Kierkegaard is considered as an author who, besides demarcating an uncrossable boundary between philosophy and Christianity, what he makes is to become one himself. What we will try to show is, then, how Kierkegaard, precisely for the fact of being religious, performs the limit of philosophy in the same philosophical discourse and creates, in this way, a new style of doing philosophy, which consists no more about knowing the limit but acknowledging it and illuminating it negatively. With the concepts of Paradox, Sin and Silence, our study goes through the principal liminal situations of Kierkegaard’s work in searching for a negativity which, like Socratic irony, is not to be demarcated or overcome by thought, but one in which thought is itself crucified. The cross, as the symbol of Christian pathos, becomes thus the path and objective of every relation to the limit, since this happens to be the restriction and transition of our own being as humans, synthesis of finitude and infinitude, necessity and possibility, temporality and eternity. The passion for the truth in which Kierkegaard articulates all his work is thus reason’s own passion and death in the cross of the incomprehension of the paradox (the God-man) and all his activity as an author consists in making this clear, to suffer it in the texts of his multiple writings and to make its possible reader suffer as well. The pathos of limit as an existential and textual concept at the same time opens up a new sphere of action in the philosophical worry about the limit and helps to understand Kierkegaard beyond the “antihegelian” or “father of existentialism” to reconsider him as an author with a voice of his own, as a boundary thinker.
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Cattepoel, Jan. "Søren Kierkegaard als Kommunikationsanalytiker und Sozialkritiker". [S.l. : s.n.], 2005. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=975884360.
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Watts, Daniel. "Constrained spontaneity : Kierkegaard and rule-following". Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2003. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/10215/.
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This thesis interprets certain passages in Kierkegaard with reference to a problem for the theory of judgement. The problem is generated by powerful considerations to the effect that rule-governed thought essentially involves spontaneous activity. This goes against the grain of many accounts of what thoughts are, and what it means to think. Yet the notion of 'constrained spontaneity' is paradoxical- for how can one and the same act be both spontaneous and determined by rules? I explore how this puzzle informs Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel in ways that both anticipate and can be used to interpret Wittgenstein's so-called rule-following considerations. Whilst Kierkegaard's critique has often been seen to trade on a crude view of Hegel, I show how in this respect it survives the sophisticated 'non-metaphysical' readings developed by many contemporary commentators. I proceed to examine whether Kierkegaardian conceptions of 'the leap', indirect communication and imagination can furnish an understanding of constrained spontaneity. In these connections, I (i) advance an 'Inseparability Thesis' about the relation between acts and objects of thought; (ii) adumbrate a form of argument I call the rhetorical reduction, the aim of which is to elicit spontaneous agreement; and (iii) defend a 'direct imagist' account of the role of imagination in rule-following. In a Prologue to the thesis, I mediate between 'content-' and 'form-based' approaches to Kierkegaard's texts by appeal to the art of caricature. In an Epilogue, I assess parallels and disanalogies between judgement and faith in Kierkegaard' s work.
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Silva, Abigail NoÃdia Barbalho da. "A existÃncia no pensamento de Kierkegaard". Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2007. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=19952.
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nÃo hÃA ExistÃncia à um tema que assume um carÃter especial nas obras de SÃren Kierkegaard, por ser apresentado como o modo de ser especÃfico do homem, considerado como indivÃduo. Para Kierkegaard, a condiÃÃo existencial do indivÃduo à marcada por angÃstia, desespero e paradoxo. As categorias que caracterizam melhor a existÃncia sÃo a da possibilidade e a da eleiÃÃo, pois o indivÃduo tem diante de si um conjunto de realidades possÃveis, dentre as quais ele deve realizar uma escolha. Esse indivÃduo isolado permanece diante do mundo, de outros indivÃduos e de Deus, e, mediante suas escolhas, determina o seu modo de existir. Kierkegaard estabelece trÃs estÃdios da existÃncia: o estÃdio estÃtico, quando o indivÃduo escolhe o prazer como finalidade da sua vida, vivendo na imediatidade. O estÃdio Ãtico, quando a pessoa vive a exterioridade mediada pela generalidade da Ãtica. A existÃncia Ãtica consiste na relaÃÃo responsÃvel com o outro segundo o dever que, no caso do Cristianismo se fundamenta no amor. O indivÃduo, porÃm, pode perceber que a norma Ãtica aponta para o absoluto como seu fundamento, nÃo podendo por si mesma satisfazer completamente o existir concreto da individualidade. Dessa forma, o indivÃduo se volta ainda mais para a prÃpria interioridade experimentando uma repetiÃÃo, pois ele està numa relaÃÃo absoluta com o absoluto, alcanÃando aquela satisfaÃÃo pessoal denominada de beatitude eterna. Assim, tem-se o estÃdio religioso da existÃncia que, para Kierkegaard, à o mais alto que se pode alcanÃar.
SÃren Kierkegaardâs works give special meaning to the theme âexistenceâ, as the specific human mode of being, considered as an individual. According to Kierkegaard, the existential condition of individual is marked by anguish, despair and paradox of faith. The categories which best characterize the existential condition are possibility and election, since the individual faces a series of possible scenarios from which he/she must make a choice. Thus the individual stands in isolation before the world, others and God, and according to his choices, the individual determines his specific way of life. Kierkegaard conceived three types of existence: the esthetical existence if the individualâs choice is related to pleasure as the center and aim of his life, living for outwardness. The ethical existence, if the individual chooses to live the outwardness mediated by the generality of the ethics. The ethical existence consists in the responsible relationship with another based on the obligation, in the case of Christianity, is founded on love. However, the individual may find that the ethical norm points to an absolute as its foundation, and so is not able, on his/her own, to find full satisfaction in his/her own concrete existence of individuality. In this manner, the individual moves further still towards his/her own interiorness experiencing a repetition, since the individual has an absolute relation with the absolute, reaching that personal satisfaction known as eternal beatitude. And so, one has the religious stage of existence, which for Kierkegaard is the highest stage one can obtain.
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Igual, Arroyo María Jesús. "Pensée et existence : Kierkegaard et Unamuno". Paris 1, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA010514.
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L'un de nos objectifs est d'exposer la manière dont Kierkegaard fut reçu par Unamuno. Ce premier travail comprenant la récension exhaustive des références Kierkegaardiennes retrouvées dans le corpus unamunien s'avère nécessaire afin d'illustrer par des bases solides le lien entre ces deux philosophes. Dans cette relation qui ne peut être qu'à sens unique, puisque Kierkegaard (1813-1855) et Unamuno (1864-1936) ne sont pas contemporains, le penseur espagnol nous tourne vers le philosophe danois par sa façon insistante d'inviter ses lecteurs et correspondants à le connaitre, à se pencher comme lui sur la vie et les oeuvres de Kierkegaard qu'il ira jusqu'à appeler "mon frère". Notre étude se poursuit par l'exposé des différences et similitudes vis-à-vis de la seule question essentielle pour nos deux penseurs: comment se comprendre soi-même dans l'existence. Kierkegaard va s'efforcer d'y répondre par une philosophie où l'homme est toujours contemplé comme "un existant" et Unamuno par une philosophie de la vie et un rejet catégorique du néant. Ils ont en commun et leur refus de laisser dissoudre leur personnalité dans quelque instance générale que ce soit, et leur foi comme passion dans la vie.
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Guth, Valérie. "Tentation et doute religieux chez kierkegaard". Paris 4, 1988. http://www.theses.fr/1988PA040032.
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Tentation et doute religieux sont definis par kierkegaard dans un rapport d'analogie. La these decrit tout d'abord le mecanisme psychologique de la tentation, puis etudie son origine, avant d'examiner la notion d'anfoegtelse, doute religieux, qui, a travers l'exemple d'abraham, traduit l'impossibilite d'un rapport immediat a dieu pour l'existant kierkegaardien et permet de mieux caracteriser l'ambiguite du stade ethique chez kierkegaard, ainsi que de definir l'existence selon le stade religieux. La tentation nait du vertige de la liberte et se traduit par un saut qualitatif qui repond a la dialectique de l'immanence posterieure. L'origine de la tentation est attribuee successivement au diable, a la complaisance de la volonte tentee, et au dieu examinateur, qu'il faut cependant concilier avec le dieu qui ne tente personne decrit par saint jacques. C'est dans un tout autre cadre que se situe la tentation d'abraham, puisque celle-ci constitue "une epreuve ou l'ethique constitue la tentation". Dans le stade religieux, le stade ethique subit une suspension teleologique, ce qui n'est possible pour abraham qu'en vertu d'un rapport immediat a dieu et demeure impensable pour tout autre que lui. On debouche ainsi sur la categorie de doute religieux, qui exprime l'incertitude de l'existant dans le stade religieux pour determiner un devoir, et par la meme une conduite pratique, donc volontaire en evitant si possible le risque de "tenter dieu", c'est-a-dire l'orgueil, le defiThe relationship between temptation and religious doubt is defined by kierkegaard as analogical. This thesis first describes the psychological process of temptation, studies its origin, then examines the notion of anfoegtelse, or religious doubt, which expresses, throught abraham's example, the impossibility of direct relationship to god, and makes possible a definition of the ambiguity of the ethical stage in kierkegaard's philosophy. Temptation arises from liberty's anxiety and is expressed throught an improvement of the will's quality. The origin of temptation is successively assigned to the devil, to the complacency of the tempted will, and to the scrutinizing god, who is however to be conciliated with st james's god who tempts nobody. Abraham's temptation is set in quite a different context, since it is "a trial whose temptation is ethics". In the religious stage, the ethical stage is no longer a goal in itself, which is possible for abraham only in his direct relationship to god, and remains impossible to anyone else. The outcome is the category of religious doubt, which expresses the existant's absence of certainty in the religious stage, and determines a duty, and thereby a practical, and therefore volontary behaviour, avoiding -wherever possible- the risk to tempt god, i. E. Pride, challenge
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Haynes, Jeffrey. "Anxiety's ambiguity : via Kierkegaard & Heidegger". Thesis, University of Essex, 2016. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/15955/.
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This dissertation produces a systematic account of anxiety, and does so by way of interpreting the account of anxiety given to us by Kierkegaard and Heidegger. The methodology of this dissertation is such that it interprets the anxiety in Kierkegaard through Heidegger’s lens, and also interprets the anxiety in Heidegger through Kierkegaard’s lens. By this method this dissertation harmonizes the accounts of anxiety in Kierkegaard and Heidegger, and in this way produces a systematic account of anxiety by way of these two authors. In particular, this dissertation argues that anxiety in both Kierkegaard and Heidegger has a particular structure: that it is ambiguous, which means that it is structurally constituted by an antipathy (a repulsion) and a sympathy (an attraction). In harmonizing Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s accounts of anxiety in this way, this dissertation produces a systematic account of ambiguous anxiety.
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Guth, Valérie. "Tentation et doute religieux chez Kierkegaard". Lille 3 : ANRT, 1989. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb376141553.
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Dacoregio, Alexsandra Amorim. "Os modos de vida em Kierkegaard". Florianópolis, SC, 2007. http://repositorio.ufsc.br/handle/123456789/103187.
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Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-graduação em FilosofiaMade available in DSpace on 2013-07-16T03:19:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 248837.pdf: 330583 bytes, checksum: 5c8d5332db3223425b2e1cd0793c931a (MD5)
A questão dos modos de vida em Kierkegaard, é fundamental em sua teoria na medida em que constitui a base para todas as considerações dos aspectos existenciais do homem. No presente trabalho, tratamos da relação entre os modos de vida, a saber, estético, ético e religioso e para tanto, explicitamos o conceito de desespero para o autor, relacionamos os sentimentos de paixão e amor aos modos de vida, discutimos a liberdade e a solidão presentes no modo de vida religioso e por fim, relacionamos os modos de vida investigando a forma com que se passa de um para o outro e quando podem ser sobrepostos. Finalmente, fazemos considerações sobre os modos de vida discutindo a importância de cada um e a felicidade que se pode encontrar vivendo neles.
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Silva, Abigail Noádia Barbalho da. "A existência no pensamento de Kierkegaard". reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFC, 2007. http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/26177.
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SILVA, Abigail Noádia Barbalho da. A existência no pensamento de Kierkegaard. 2007. 95f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2007.Submitted by Gustavo Daher (gdaherufc@hotmail.com) on 2017-09-27T13:45:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_dis_anbsilva.pdf: 656490 bytes, checksum: 4319636990230118148f986eda4693d6 (MD5)
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Sören Kierkegaard’s works give special meaning to the theme “existence”, as the specific human mode of being, considered as an individual. According to Kierkegaard, the existential condition of individual is marked by anguish, despair and paradox of faith. The categories which best characterize the existential condition are possibility and election, since the individual faces a series of possible scenarios from which he/she must make a choice. Thus the individual stands in isolation before the world, others and God, and according to his choices, the individual determines his specific way of life. Kierkegaard conceived three types of existence: the esthetical existence if the individual’s choice is related to pleasure as the center and aim of his life, living for outwardness. The ethical existence, if the individual chooses to live the outwardness mediated by the generality of the ethics. The ethical existence consists in the responsible relationship with another based on the obligation, in the case of Christianity, is founded on love. However, the individual may find that the ethical norm points to an absolute as its foundation, and so is not able, on his/her own, to find full satisfaction in his/her own concrete existence of individuality. In this manner, the individual moves further still towards his/her own interiorness experiencing a repetition, since the individual has an absolute relation with the absolute, reaching that personal satisfaction known as eternal beatitude. And so, one has the religious stage of existence, which for Kierkegaard is the highest stage one can obtain.
A Existência é um tema que assume um caráter especial nas obras de Sören Kierkegaard, por ser apresentado como o modo de ser específico do homem, considerado como indivíduo. Para Kierkegaard, a condição existencial do indivíduo é marcada por angústia, desespero e paradoxo. As categorias que caracterizam melhor a existência são a da possibilidade e a da eleição, pois o indivíduo tem diante de si um conjunto de realidades possíveis, dentre as quais ele deve realizar uma escolha. Esse indivíduo isolado permanece diante do mundo, de outros indivíduos e de Deus, e, mediante suas escolhas, determina o seu modo de existir. Kierkegaard estabelece três estádios da existência: o estádio estético, quando o indivíduo escolhe o prazer como finalidade da sua vida, vivendo na imediatidade. O estádio ético, quando a pessoa vive a exterioridade mediada pela generalidade da Ética. A existência ética consiste na relação responsável com o outro segundo o dever que, no caso do Cristianismo se fundamenta no amor. O indivíduo, porém, pode perceber que a norma ética aponta para o absoluto como seu fundamento, não podendo por si mesma satisfazer completamente o existir concreto da individualidade. Dessa forma, o indivíduo se volta ainda mais para a própria interioridade experimentando uma repetição, pois ele está numa relação absoluta com o absoluto, alcançando aquela satisfação pessoal denominada de beatitude eterna. Assim, tem-se o estádio religioso da existência que, para Kierkegaard, é o mais alto que se pode alcançar.
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McMillan, Sylvia. "Kierkegaard and a Pedagogy of Liminality". BYU ScholarsArchive, 2013. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/etd/3624.
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There is a strain of curriculum theory especially since the reconceptionalist movement that applies existential philosophy to educational issues and questions. There is also a related branch of curriculum theory that looks especially at existentialist theology to cast light on curriculum issues from a more religious slant. Both of these strains of analysis are rooted in Kierkegaard, the father of existentialism and existential theology (Huebner, 1999; Tillich, 1948). The educational implications of the works of Kierkegaard are a subject that has been virtually unexamined in either educational or Kierkegaardian scholarship except by two scholars whose works are already 40 years old. A pedagogy of liminality aims at empowering the teacher and student to make what is being studied in the classroom something that each student will appropriate in her own way. The teacher facilitates this process by never letting the student rest for very long in any particular solution to a problem. Rather the teacher positions the student on a landscape which is filled with paradoxes. Each solution breeds a new set of questions and often equally viable though opposite solutions. The teacher thus constantly places herself and her student between dialectical poles, always reaching higher and higher syntheses in recursive process. The purpose of a pedagogy of liminality is twofold. First, it prevents the curriculum from becoming an inert object. It becomes a dynamic growing thing. Second, it requires the student to never rest in any so-called objective answer but to always be striving towards a higher answer and an even better set of questions. In this way the teacher and student in collective discourse are each appropriating the discourse uniquely in enriching their life narratives. This is consistent with Kierkegaard's primary emphasis on subjectivity and his view of objectivity as secondary and always ideally in the context and service of subjectivity. This dissertation is done in the hybrid style. The main part of the work is designed as a journal article.
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Schmidt, Jochen. "Vielstimmige Rede vom Unsagbaren Dekonstruktion, Glaube und Kierkegaards pseudonyme Literatur /". Berlin : De Gruyter, 2006. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/librarytitles/Doc?id=10154755.
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Law, David R. "Kierkegaard as negative theologian : an analysis of the hiddenness of God in the pseudonymous works of Soren Kierkegaard". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.303624.
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Lane, Keith H. "Kierkegaard and the concept of religious authorship". Tübingen Mohr Siebeck, 2010. http://d-nb.info/997693851/04.
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Dupuis, Éric. "Poétique et philosophie dans l'oeuvre de Kierkegaard". Thesis, Rennes 1, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017REN1S078.
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L’œuvre de Kierkegaard se présente sous une forme poétique, non seulement par les fictions qu’il produit, mais encore par les pseudonymes auxquels il donne la parole et qui confèrent aux textes les plus conceptuels l’apparence fictive d’un discours subjectif. La forme poétique n’est donc pas un jeu arbitraire. Elle répond aux exigences de la pensée de l’existence : une pensée subjective, car l’on n’existe pas dans l’abstraction, où il s’agit de se comprendre soi-même dans l’existence. Une pensée existentielle n’est pas un savoir objectif qui peut être transmis directement : elle nécessite une communication indirecte. Tel est le rôle de la forme poétique. Son emploi est donc essentiellement philosophique, et ne fait pas de Kierkegaard un poète. Du poète, il s’agit, au contraire, de dénoncer l’illusion, en particulier celle du romantique. Confondant la possibilité et la réalité, le poète plane au-dessus de sa propre existence. Il faut alors de l’ironie pour libérer l’individu d’une telle illusion et l’amener au commencement de la vie personnelle, d’une existence éthique. C’est pourquoi la forme poétique est, ici, ironique ; il s’agit de parler la même langue que ceux à qui l’on s’adresse, un langage esthétique, afin de les amener à une pensée véritable d’eux-même : tromper en vue du vrai. Fondée philosophiquement pour utiliser la possibilité, qui est sa forme, en vue de la réalité, qui est son horizon éthique, la poétique kierkegaardienne peut ainsi présenter à l’individu les déterminations dialectiques de l’existence, et l’ouvrir au passage de la possibilité à la réalité : un saut qualitatif, une décision qui n’appartient qu’à lui. Grâce à la forme poétique, la pensée subjective se fait maïeutique ; l’auteur s’efface pour laisser la place à celui dont parle la fiction et à qui elle s’adresse, celui que l’auteur veut éveiller à lui-même : l’individu singulierKierkegaard uses a poetic form in its works, not only by the fictions he composes but also by the pseudonyms he makes speak, who give to the most conceptual texts the fictional appearance of a subjective speech. Thus, the poetic form is not an arbitrary game. It is an answer to the requirements of the thinking of existence, a subjective thinking, for one does not exist in abstraction : be understandable oneself in one’s own existence. An existential thought is not an objective knowledge, which can be given directly : it requires an indirect communication. Such is the role of the poetic form. It is essentially a philosophic employment, and does not make a poet of Kierkegaard. On the contrary, his works tend to denounce the poet’s delusion, especially of the Romantic. The poet confuses possibility with reality, and glide above his own existence. Irony is then needed to free the subject from his delusion, and lead him to the beginning of his personal life, an ethical existence. That’s why the poetic form of Kierkegaard’s works is ironic in itself, for it is to speak the langage of those whom the speech speaks to, an aesthetic langage, in order to lead them to a true thinking of themselves : deceive toward the truth. Philosophically founded to use possibility, which is its form, with the reality in mind, which is its ethical horizon, the kierkegaardian poetic is enabled to present to the individual the dialectical determinations of existence, and show him the passage from possibility to reality : a qualitative leap, as his own decision. Through the poetic, the subjective thinking appears to be maïeutics. The author disappears to hand over the place to the one whom the fiction talks about and whom it speaks to, the one who the author wants to awaken within himself : the Individual
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Hogue, Stéphane. "Kierkegaard and the computer : some recent contributions". Thesis, McGill University, 1990. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=59649.
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This document is submitted with the permission and encouragement of the department of philosophy of McGill University in lieu of a conventional thesis. Briefly, it consists of a combined account and selective historical review of some uses of the computer in philosophy, and of a partial list of my computer-related contributions to Kierkegaard scholarship. The former deals generally with the creation, interrogation and analysis of machine-readable forms of philosophical texts. The latter deals specifically with my own work of creating and analyzing Kierkegaard-related machine-readable texts.
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Rudd, Anthony. "Kierkegaard and the limits of the ethical". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.304907.
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Cope, C. "The ethical self in Kierkegaard and Kant". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2002. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.597983.
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My thesis focuses on the Kantian influence on Kierkegaard's conception of the self and his view of the progression through the stages of existence. I argue that Kant's distinction between heteronomous and autonomous forms of willing grounds Kierkegaard's fundamental distinction between the aesthetic and ethical forms of selfhood. However, Kierkegaard is critical of Kant's account of the transition from the aesthetic to the ethical sphere, and argues that ultimately the ethical structure of the authentic self can be fully realised only within a religious framework. Within Kant's moral philosophy, an action is heteronomous when it is motivated by an individual's sensuous nature, his inclinations or his desires. The rule for action is given to the will by the object that is desired, and the will is consequently conditioned by the inclinations of the agent. According to Kant, as long as our action is motivated by the desire to realise a particular end it is dependent upon the impulses of our sensuous nature. It is only when we perform an action for its own sake, motivated by the form of the governing maxim and not the matter or purpose which it prescribes, that we can act independently of our inclinations as an autonomous moral agent. In this dissertation I show that this Kantian distinction between formal and material willing, between willing something for its own sake and willing it as a means to a desired end, lies at the heart of Kierkegaard's depiction of the aesthetic and the ethical spheres of existence. Like Kant, Kierkegaard argues that true selfhood emerges only within an ethical structure, when the heteronomy of the aesthetic sphere is transcended by the positive freedom of morality. Both Kant and Kierkegaard argue that a sincere commitment to the ethical goal presupposes a certain relation to religion. It is in his discussion of the nature of this relation that Kierkegaard begin to diverge significantly from the Kantian framework.
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Rogan, J. E. "Across Lessing's ditch : Hegel, Kierkegaard and historicality". Thesis, University of Essex, 1987. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.379380.
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