Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front”

The inhabitants of the overseas departments and collectivities of France have, of late, been reconsidering their relationships both to each other and to the former imperial metropole. In 2011 Mayotte, previously classified as an overseas collectivity, acceded to full French and European status as an overseas department of France following a referendum. This decision to, in the words of the social scientist François Taglioni, further ‘anchor’ the island in the republic has commonly been understood as a pragmatic decision as much as an ideological one. It was a way of distancing Mayotte from the political turmoil in neighbouring independent Comoros, as well as an indicator of the improbability of a small island nation achieving full sovereignty in a multipolar, resource hungry world. The narrative that self-determination must necessarily be obtained through national independence is still prevalent in the language of certain independence movements, including that of the Kanak people of New Caledonia. But it has been repeatedly tested at the ballot box, not least in November 2018 when New Caledonians voted in a referendum on their constitutional future. This referendum – and the further two due to follow it before 2022 – will be observed with interest by other self declared nations in waiting. Some anticipate, not a reclaiming of local sovereignty in the event of independence, but rather a transferral of economic hegemony from France to China, a prospect hinted at by Emmanuel Macron during a visit to Nouméa in 2018. However, the demographic minority status of the Kanak people whom the independentist Kanak and Socialist Liberation Front (Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste;FLNKS) claims to represent, coupled with divisions within the movement, means it is very hard to predict the contours of a future independent New Caledonian state.

The French-ruled territory of New Caledonia, or Kanaky, as Indigenous pro-independence campaigners call their cigar-shaped islands, voted on their political future on 4 November 2018 amid controversy and tension. This was an historic vote on independence in a ‘three-strikes’ scenario in the territory ruled by France since 1853, originally as a penal colony for convicts and political dissidents. In the end, the vote was remarkably close, reflecting the success of the pro-independence Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) in mobilising voters, particularly the youth. The referendum choice was simple and stark. Voters simply had to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the question: ‘Do you want New Caledonia to attain full sovereignty and become independent?’ In spite of prophecies of an overwhelming negative vote, the ‘no’ response slipped to a 56.4 percent vote while the ‘yes’ vote wrested a credible 43.6 percent share with a record turnout of almost 81 percent. New Caledonia is expected to face two further votes on the independence question in 2020 and 2022. The author of this article reported as a journalist on an uprising against French rule in the 1980s, known by the euphemism ‘les Évènements’ (‘the Events’). He returned there three decades later as an academic to bear witness to the vote and examine the role of digital media and youth. This article reflects on his impressions of the result, democracy and the future.

The Albanian Communist Party was born as a Bolshevik-style party, endowed with a non-Bolshevik but social democratic program, such as popular democracy. To shed light on the factors that determined the arrival of the communist regime in Albania, it is necessary to start the analysis from its roots, that is, since the establishment of the communist regime in Albania. For his part, although the communist regime was established in Albania immediately after the end of World War II, the roots of the phenomenon must be sought from the beginning of the war, even a few months earlier when Albania was invaded on April 7, 1939, by fascist Italy. When Albania was invaded by fascist Italy, no one inside or outside the country predicted, nor could have predicted, that at the end of World War II, the Albanian Communist Party would take power into its own hands. There were subjective and objective reasons for this. First of all, when World War II broke out, Albania was the only country in the Balkans that did not have a Communist Party. However, the absence of the Communist Party was largely a subjective factor. The establishment of the communist regime in Albania was for objective reasons a completely paradoxical phenomenon. Albania, the youngest state in Europe, at the same time its most backward state, with a population of one million and forty thousand inhabitants, had no developed industry, ie no working class in the eyes of the proletariat, as conceived by Marxist doctrine. According to Marxist definitions, Albania was a micro-bourgeois country, that is, without capitalist owners and capitalist institutions, to the extent that they justified the socialist revolution. In addition, the Albanian population was overwhelmingly still illiterate. There were only a few isolated nuclei or communist groups with few members composed mainly of artisans and students, who were further characterized by ideological perversion and worse still by political rivalries between them. The question before historians is this: How can it be explained that despite all these disadvantages, the Albanian Communist Party, which was founded two and a half years after the occupation of the country by fascist Italy, on November 8, 1941, managed to face the war against the occupiers within three years. Nazi fascists and against internal nationalist factors, to take political power in Albania at the end of the Second World War? In addition, how is it that the Albanian Communist Party, unlike its Eastern European counterparts, seized political power on its own, without the presence of Soviet armies, which are not known to have invaded Albania? Albania's position during the Second World War and especially the National Liberation War must be judged by ourselves, regardless of who led it. We must judge it as we do in every historical event. The communist dictatorship that was established in Albania should not blind us to the judgment we give in the national liberation war. The communist regime is not a necessary offspring of the National Liberation War. In my opinion, the establishment of the communist regime is the result of mistakes made during the national liberation war, it is a consequence of the poverty of the political culture of the Albanian people, the lack of traditional political parties, the naivety of the Communist Party leaders, the illusions of united nationalists with the National Liberation Front, of myopia, of the leaders of the National Front, which were used by Enver Hoxha to realize under the umbrella of patriotic war his dictatorial ambitions. Received: 25 December 2023 / Accepted: 25 February 2024 / Published: 23 April 2024

AbstractThis article analyzes the revolutionary diplomacy of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) through the prism of Nicaraguan and Western European relations during the final decade of the Cold War. It contends that —despite the FSLN's ideological affiliation with Third World national liberation movements, Cuba, and the socialist bloc—the campaign to influence Western European foreign policies was central to the Sandinista government's international strategy. By pushing Western European governments to play a prominent role in Central America's violent Cold War conflicts, the Sandinistas sought to undermine US power in the isthmus and alter the inter-American dynamics that shaped their region's history up to the late 1970s. Furthermore, by building financial ties with Western European countries, the FSLN could avoid complete financial dependency on the Soviet bloc and strengthen Nicaragua's image as a nonaligned state. The Sandinistas’ campaign to challenge US hegemony in Central America through a pragmatic outreach to Western Europe was largely successful, but it came at the cost of implementing domestic reforms that ran counter to their own ambitions. Ultimately, this prompted the FSLN to hold elections in 1990, which resulted in their removal from power.

At the time of the First Round of the Gando Communist Party Incident, the majority of the individuals involved were in their 20s to 30s, with a significant number hailing from Hamgyeong Province. They received education on the Korean Peninsula and in Gando, and some had studied abroad in China, Russia, and Japan. Many of these individuals engaged in various social activities while working in the fields of education and media. Some of them also made efforts to stabilize the Korean community following The Gando Massacre. Those involved in this incident had been actively engaged in the independence movement since the March 1st Movement. They participated in the March 1st Movement on the Korean Peninsula and in Gando, and subsequently joined various organizations of National Movement and Socialist Movement, leading the independence movement in the early 1920s through activities such as independence movement fund-raising, anti-Japan armed struggle, and socialist movement both within and outside the Korean Peninsula. From immediately after the First Round of the Gando Communist Party Incident until liberation, they continued their independence movement in various ways. Some of them died while enduring hardships in prison, and some also persisted in their struggle even while incarcerated. Independence activists involved in the incident participated in the formation of Dongmanguyeokguk, a subordinate organization of the Korean Communist, and actively engaged in the organizational activities of the National United Party based on the National Cooperation Front. In other words, Dongmanguyeokguk was not only an integrated organization for various socialist groups but also a group with the character of the National United Party in the Dongman area, involving independence activists engaged in the national movement.

Abstract: After declaring the country's independence from Portugal in June 1975, the Mozambique Liberation Front focused its efforts on building a modern nation-state and implementing a development strategy to pave the way for a socialist society. The initial lack of cadres for building and managing a postcolonial national state and the new state economy led it to request the international cooperation and solidarity of the Global Left. The aim of this paper is to analyze the notions and practices of international solidarity among leftist Chilean and Argentine exiles who assumed the role of professional-technical cooperators in independent Mozambique between 1976 and 1986. The working method is based on a qualitative analysis of the information obtained from oral sources, documents of the period, and specialist literature.

It is now six years since the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) toppled the regime of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Even today, the nature of the FSLN - its road to power, its political complexion and orientation, and its objectives - remains the subject of heated debate. Some still argue that the Sandinista regime is a nationalistic, non-aligned, although radical, Third World government. Others emphasize the Marxist-Leninist overtones characterizing its seizure and consolidation of power, its foreign relations, and its efforts to introduce socialist transformation to Nicaraguan society.Basically, there are two exaggerated views of Nicaraguan foreign policy: one depicts Nicaragua as a communist pawn of Moscow and Havana; the other views Nicaragua as a classical non-aligned Third World nation. Neither school of thought reflects the complex reality of Nicaraguan politics and foreign policy.

The article defines the preconditions and main directions of cooperation between the USSR and Nicaragua in the conditions of the Sandinista revolution in 1979–1990. The topic of the article is relevant for studies of Soviet foreign policy in Latin America in economic, military, ideological and socio-cultural aspects, and it also allows to identify the prerequisites for the return to cooperation between the Russian Federation and Nicaragua in the post-Soviet period of history. The article applies the paradigm of neorealism in international studies, which makes it possible to determine the resources of influence, interests and institutional framework of the USSR’s foreign policy towards Nicaragua, to compare the declared and real tasks of foreign policy. Comparative-historical and structural-functional methods are used.The course of the Soviet foreign policy towards revolutionary Nicaragua had both geopolitical and ideological motivations. Nicaragua was a promising springboard for the establishment of revolutionary regimes in other countries of Central America. The country also occupied a key position for the construction of an inter-oceanic canal, an alternative to the Panama Canal. In Soviet literature of the 1980s the Sandinista revolution was seen as national-liberation, anti-imperialist, but not socialist. Soviet experts positively assessed the strategic alliance of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) with the supporters of the revolution among the believers. Sandinism was regarded as an effective, albeit controversial, revolutionary ideology. The periodization of the Soviet foreign policy towards Nicaragua during 1979–1990 is substantiated: the establishment of cooperation relations (1979–1981), the highest point in cooperation (1982–1987), the curtailment of cooperation as the national reconciliation policy (1987–early 1990) was unfolding. The main factor in the dynamics of bilateral relations were the strategic interests of the USSR in Central America, which changed dramatically under the influence of perestroika. The defeat of the FSLN in the 1990 elections was largely the result of the Soviet foreign policy deideologization and the collapse of socialism in the Eastern European countries.

De tekenaar Frans van Immerseel publiceert reeds in dienst van de Vlaamse collaboratiepers voor hij als vrijwilliger naar het oostfront vertrekt. In zijn werk kunnen verschillende categorieën worden onderscheiden. Hij bezorgt tekeningen in een martiale, vitalistische stijl als illustraties bij bijdragen in De SS Man. Voorts is hij de auteur van karikaturen die de evolutie van de oorlog becommentariëren. Tussendoor publiceert hij een kort, apolitiek stripverhaal. Tenslotte verschijnen in De Arbeidskameraad twee reeksen realistische tekeningen over Vlaanderen.Zowel inhoudelijk als vormelijk onderscheidt zijn werk zich nauwelijks van dat van voor of na de oorlog, behalve dan dat er een uitgesproken nationaalsocialistische gezindheid uit naar voren komt. Niet zelden recycleert hij tekeningen en hij past ze aan naargelang de eisen die door de tijd of de uitgever worden gesteld. Na de bevrijding worden de oorlogstekeningen als het ware uit zijn oeuvre weggeknipt of na de nodige cosmetische ingrepen weer in omloop gebracht. ________Frans Van Immerseel and the art of collaborationThe designer Frans Van Immerseel already published work in the service of the Flemish collaboration press before he left as a volunteer for the Eastern Front. Various categories may be distinguished within his work. For his illustrations to contribute to The SS Man he provided drawings in a martial vitalistic style. He is also the author of caricatures commenting on the evolution of the war. At the same time he published a short apolitical comic strip. Finally two series of realistic drawings about Flanders were published in De Arbeidskameraad.Both in form and in content his work hardly varies from that of before or after the war, except for the fact that it shows a very clear cut national socialist mentality. He frequently recycled drawings and adapted them according to the demands of the time or the publisher. After the liberation his war drawings were in a manner of speaking deleted from his work or put back into circulation after undergoing the required cosmetic adjustments

The article deals with copying Soviet alcohol legislation by the People's Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine on the region's territory. All this happened during Transcarpathia's preventive Sovietization in 1944 – 1945, from the liberation of Transcarpathia from Hungarian-German invaders on October 28, 1944. It should be noted that officially Subcarpathian Rus' was part of Czechoslovakia before signing the agreement on the reunification of Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The treaty was signed on June 29, 1945, and ratified by the Provisional National Assembly of the Czechoslovak Republic on November 22, 1945, and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on November 27, 1945. The Transcarpathian region was created by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Decree on January 22, 1946. The next day the legislation of the USSR was introduced here. It should be noted that the People's Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine copied the experience of the Soviet Union regarding alcohol policy. It consisted of establishing a monopoly on the production and sale of alcoholic beverages, complete state control over the production of wine and vodka products. One of the first laws of the People's Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine was decrees on the nationalization of distilleries and the brewery of Count Schönborn-Buchheim in Pidhoryany. Later, church distilleries were nationalized. Thus, a half dozen enterprises for the production of alcohol were nationalized in Transcarpathian Ukraine. By separate resolutions, the People's Council regulated the prices of alcohol, vodka, and beer. We also briefly consider the industrial capacity of enterprises for the production of vodka, alcohol, beer, and point out the potential opportunities for winemaking in Transcarpathian Ukraine. After the signing of the reunification agreement, on July 6, 1945, a separate resolution of the People's Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine established a trust of the alcohol and vodka industry at the People's Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine food industry department, to which the distilleries of Transcarpathian Ukraine were subordinated. That was one of the steps in preparation for implementing the industrial complex of Transcarpathia to the All-Union. The resolution of the People's Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine controlled «the production of alcoholic beverages and the prosecution of production without permits». At the same time, the leadership of the People's Council of Transcarpathian Ukraine often resorted to using the products of distilleries for their purposes, the military council of the 4th Ukrainian Front, «security police», etc.

Significantly decimated in the battles that befell it at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, the 18th Croatian NOU Brigade, after a short consolidation in Semberija, went to Posavina, in order to promote the communist, anti-fascist struggle among the predominantly Croatian population there, and tried to win him over to join her ranks. At the same time, on the military front, the Brigade was supposed to assist the already existing partisan units of the 16th Muslim Brigade and the Posavina-Trebavian partisan detachment in eliminating enemy groups. At that time, there were already well-organized village guards made up of local Ustasha and former home guards in the Croatian villages of Bosnian Posavina, while in the Serbian villages local Chetniks had already been in command for three years, and these two armed groups had a generally correct relationship with each other. The short-term stay of the 18th Croatian NOU Brigade was therefore not overly successful in either of the two mentioned plans, which is why its stay in Bosnian Posavina is reduced to just a few sentences in socialist historiography. Nevertheless, the short stay of the 18th Croatian Brigade in Posavina was not without events. First, on March 4, 1944, the brigade entered the village of Domaljevac, where its members ravaged the parish office of the local pastor, otherwise an ardent supporter of the Ustasha movement, Ante Tepeluk. Bogomir Brajković gave a speech in front of the gathered peasants, which did not bear much fruit. Brajković gave the same speech in the village of Matići a few days later, on March 13 of the same year, but he did not succeed in arousing the interest of the local population there either. The communists within the brigade tried to present themselves to the local Croatian population as a kind of continuation of the pre-war politics of the Croatian Peasant Party, of which individuals, such as the aforementioned Brajković, were indeed members. The Croatian population in Posavina, due to previous experiences fighting against the partisans, had already organized their village guards quite well, so the fighting that took place in mid-March was fierce and disastrous for the partisan brigade. At least nine partisans were killed in the military actions, while around 14 were wounded. The partisans briefly managed to occupy some villages, hold some propaganda speech, but due to the great insecurity, they retreated to the south after that. During the brigade's attack on Orašje, the partisans were joined by some local inhabitants, Bosniaks, which will be the beginning of animosity between Bosniaks and Croats in this area that will culminate in March 1945, but also the creation of connections that will be used in the coming times when a large number of members of the green cadre and members of the SS transferred to the national liberation units. In one military operation, the brigade captured five local legionnaires and sentenced them to death. The sentence was carried out on three, while two managed to escape. The brigade also had several firefights with Chetnik units in Posavina, which were of varying fortunes for them. In one attack, they managed to destroy a small Chetnik headquarters in the village of Batkuši and liquidate the local leader Ignjat Bijelić. In the second skirmish, which took place in the village of Blaževac, Pavle Gajić's Chetniks inflicted a heavy defeat on the brigade. The 18th Croatian Brigade withdrew from Posavina when the German 13th SS Division appeared in these areas. The aim of this work is, on the basis of available historical sources and historiographical and memoir literature, to show in detail the stay of this Brigade in Posavina, with special reference to its activities in the area of today's municipalities of Orašje and Domaljevac-Šamac, that is, the eastern part of Posavina County.

While a stalemate in the predominantly Tamil North and East of Sri Lanka continues despite Indian intervention on the government's behalf, in the Sinhala South death squads associated with the pseudo People's Liberation Front, the JVP, have been ruthlessly eliminating its opponents. The United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), having created and nurtured popular racism for over thirty years in order to get into power (through a ready-made Sinhalese majority of 70 per cent of the population), * would now like to draw back from the brink of another crippling civil war, this time in the South. But they are unable to do so because the JVP has taken up the Sinhala cause and pushed it to the point of social fascism through assassination and murder. Popular racism based on Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism promoted in the schools and expressed in song, textbook and media served to fuel the anti-Tamil pogroms of 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983, in which thousands were killed at the hands of street mobs. Some of the most violently anti- Tamil propaganda (deriving inspiration from mythical Sinhalese history) has emanated from the present government. Colonisation of Tamil areas by Sinhalese was justified on the pretext of protecting ancient Buddhist shrines. And it is an open secret that ministers hired their own hit squads in the 1983 pogrom. When, in a bid to end the unwinnable war with the Tamils, the UNP signed the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987, allowing Indian troops to operate on Sri Lankan soil, it alienated the very Sinhala nationalists it had itself fostered. And it was the JVP which capitalised on the resentment over India's interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs. Accusing the UNP government (and other supporters of the Accord) of treachery, it enlarged and deepened popular racism into fanatical patriotism. But what has given the JVP terror tactics a hold over the population has been the steady erosion of democratic freedoms, on the one hand, and the self-abasement of the Left, on the other. Both the SLFP and UNP governments have postponed elections to stay in power, but the UNP went further and got itself re-elected en bloc on a phoney referendum to postpone elections. Local elections were never held under the SLFP and whatever elections took place under the UNP have either been rigged and/or carried out under conditions of massive intimidation. In the process, the political literacy that the country once boasted has been lost to the people and, with it, their will to resist. At the same time the collaborationist politics of the Left in the SLFP government of 1970-77 have not only served to decimate its own chances at the polls (it obtained not a single seat in the election of 1977) but also to leave the working-class movement defenceless. So that it was a simple matter for the UNP government to crush the general strike of 1980, imprison its leaders and throw 80, 000 workers permanently out of work. And it has been left to the JVP to pretend to take up the socialist mantle of the Left even as it devotes itself to the racist cause of the Right, and so win the support of the Sinhala-Buddhist people. In the final analysis the choice before the country is that of two terrors: that of the state or that of the JVP. Below we publish an analysis of the situation as at October 1988, put out by the underground Campaign for Social Democracy in the run up to the presidential elections.

This essay studies United States Marxist perspectives on China during US radicalism's decline in the mid-1970s. By the late 1960s, China's apparent synthesis of socialist and nationalist traditions inspired US Marxists to theorize a Chinese-led united front against American imperialism. However, China's opening up to the West in 1972 revealed US Marxists’ differing frameworks for understanding socialism and national liberation. Partly because of the confusion that followed, Marxist internationalism soon lost its intellectual weight on the US far left. Using archived Marxist periodicals from 1973 to 1979, I trace how this happened and what it meant for revolutionaries’ opposition to American empire.

The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) is commonly understood as a Cold War-era puppet terrorist group that was intent on destabilizing the nascent socialist government in Mozambique. Since Mozambique ended one-party rule in 1994, this organization continues to serve as the leading democratic opposition to the majority government of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). This paper argues that, contrary to common understanding, external actors had a limited role in RENAMO’s development and success relative to often neglected internal factors. Through an examination of RENAMO’s external support base, its evolution, and its recruitment patterns, as well as popular discontent with FRELIMO, this paper will explain the party’s successful transition to democratic politics.

Political, financial and operational supports given to these small states to the separatist freedom movement (OPM) has been done in a spirit of togetherness among the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). This international organization based on identity of Melanesian brotherhood which formed in 1986 by 4 small states in the Pacific Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon and Vanuatu, also by Kanak National Liberation Front from New Caledonia. This organization was keen enough to promote the freedom movement of OPM to achieve independence Papua, that was why Indonesia tried to achieve the membership of Melanesian Spearhead Groups (MSG), because Indonesia has a strong argument that as an island country, it has 11 million Melanesian decendants on its scattered island as Papua, Mallocca, Buton, Southeast Nusa) characterized by their hair type, skin color, body figures and have similarities to the Melanesian in the south pacific. The emergence of political maneuver that continue to attack sovereignty of the Indonesian government against Papua, raising a view of a need to have a grand strategy to enhance more understanding and gaining supports from the small island states regarding the free movement for Papua, especially in the UN forum through public diplomacy in the perspective of communication among nations.

Introduction In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the West were complex and nuanced. These various roles developed over time but were all grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and thwarting challenges to it. These facets of Qaddafi’s public self accord with the model of “persona” described by Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a revolutionary leader, Qaddafi was engaging in a form of public performance aimed at delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and export his revolutionary ideals. The trajectory of his persona begins in the early days of his coming to power as a charismatic leader during a “time of distress” (Weber) and culminates in his bloody end next to a roadside drainage culvert. In between these points Qaddafi’s persona underwent refinement and reinvention. Coupled with the legacy he left on the Libyan political system, the journey of Muammar Qaddafi’s personas demonstrate how political personality can be the salvation or damnation of an entire state.Qaddafi: The Brotherly RevolutionaryCaptain Muammar Qaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969 at the age of just 27. He was the leader of a group of military officers who overthrew King Idris in a popular and relatively bloodless coup founded on an ideology of post-colonial Arab nationalism and a doing away with the endemic corruption and nepotism that were the hallmarks of the monarchy. With this revolutionary cause in mind and in an early indication that he recognised the power of political image, Qaddafi showed restraint in adopting the trappings of office. His modest promotion to the rank of Colonel was an obvious example of this, and despite the fact that in practical terms he was the supreme commander of Libya’s armed forces, he resisted the temptation to formally aggrandize himself with military titles for the ensuing 42 years of his rule.High military rank was in a way irrelevant to a man moving to change his persona from army officer to messianic national leader. Switching away from a reliance on military hierarchy as a basis for his authority allowed Qaddafi to re-cast himself as a leader with a broader mission. He began to utilise titles such as “Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC) and “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution.” The persona on display here was one of detached impartiality and almost reluctant leadership. There was the suggestion that Qaddafi was not really acting as a head of state, but merely an ordinary Libyan who, through popular acclaim, was being begged to lead his people. The attraction of this persona remained until the bitter end for Qaddafi, with his professed inability to step aside from a leadership role he insisted he did not formally occupy. This accords with the contention of Weber, who describes how an individual favoured with charisma can step forward at a time of crisis to complete a “mission.” Once in a position of authority, perpetuating that role of leadership and acclamation can become the mission itself:The holder, of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them. His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master—so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through ‘proving’ himself. But he does not derive his ‘right’ from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader. (Weber 266-7)As his rule extended across the decades, Qaddafi fostered his revolutionary credentials via a typical cult of personality approach. His image appeared on everything from postage stamps to watches, bags, posters and billboards. Quotations from the Brother Leader were set to music and broadcast as pop songs. “Spontaneous” rallies of support would occur when crowds of loyalists would congregate to hear the Brotherly Leader speak. Although Qaddafi publicly claimed he did not like this level of public adoration he accepted it because the people wanted to adore him. It was widely known however that many of these crowds were paid to attend these rallies (Blundy and Lycett 16).Qaddafi: The Philosopher In developing his persona as a guide and a man who was sharing his natural gifts with the people, Qaddafi developed a post-colonial philosophy he called “Third Universal Theory.” This was published in volumes collectively known as The Green Book. This was mandatory reading for every Libyan and contained a distillation of Qaddafi’s thoughts and opinions on everything from sports to politics to religion to the differences between men and women. Whilst it may be tempting for outsiders to dismiss these writings as the scribbling of a dictator, the legacy of Qaddafi’s persona as political philosopher is worthy of some examination. For in offering his revelations to the Libyan people, Qaddafi extended his mandate beyond leader of a revolution and into the territory of “messianic reformer of a nation.”The Green Book was a three-part series. The first instalment was written in 1975 and focuses on the “problem of democracy” where Qaddafi proposes direct democracy as the best option for a progressive nation. The second instalment, published in 1977, focuses on economics and expounds socialism as the solution to all fiscal woes. (Direct popular action here was evidenced in the RCC making rental of real estate illegal, meaning that all tenants in the country suddenly found themselves granted ownership of the property they were occupying!) The final chapter, published in 1981, proposes the Third Universal Theory where Qaddafi outlines his unique solution for implementing direct democracy and socialism. Qaddafi coined a new term for his Islamically-inspired socialist utopia: Jamahiriya. This was defined as being a “state of the masses” and formed the blueprint for Libyan society which Qaddafi subsequently imposed.This model of direct democracy was part of the charismatic conceit Qaddafi cultivated: that the Libyan people were their own leaders and his role was merely as a benevolent agent acceding to their wishes. However the implementation of the Jamahiriya was anything but benevolent and its legacy has crippled post-Qaddafi Libya. Under this system, Libyans did have some control over their affairs at a very local level. Beyond this, an increasingly complex series of committees and regional groupings, over which the RCC had the right of veto, diluted the participation of ordinary citizens and their ability to coalesce around any individual leader. The banning of standard avenues of political organisation, such as parties and unions, coupled with a ruthless police state that detained and executed anyone offering even a hint of political dissent served to snuff out any opposition before it had a chance to gather pace. The result was that there were no Libyans with enough leadership experience or public profile to take over when Qaddafi was ousted in 2011.Qaddafi: The Liberator In a further plank of his revolutionary persona Qaddafi turned to the world beyond Libya to offer his brotherly guidance. This saw him champion any cause that claimed to be a liberation or resistance movement struggling against the shackles of colonialism. He tended to favour groups that had ideologies aligned with his own, namely Arab unity and the elimination of Israel, but ultimately was not consistent in this regard. Aside from Palestinian nationalists, financial support was offered to groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines), Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa), ETA (Spain), the Polisario Front (Western Sahara), and even separatist indigenous Australians. This policy of backing revolutionary groups was certainly a projection of his persona as a charismatic enabler of the revolutionary mission. However, the reception of this mission in the wider world formed the basis for the image that Qaddafi most commonly occupied in Western eyes.In 1979 the ongoing Libyan support for groups pursuing violent action against Israel and the West saw the country designated a State-Sponsor of Terror by the US Department of State. Diplomatic relations between the two nations were severed and did not resume until 2004. At this point Qaddafi seemed to adopt a persona of “opponent of the West,” ostensibly on behalf of the world’s downtrodden colonial peoples. The support for revolutionary groups was changing to a more active use of them to strike at Western interests. At the same time Qaddafi stepped up his rhetoric against America and Britain, positioning himself as a champion of the Arab world, as the one leader who had the courage of his convictions and the only one who was squarely on the side of the ordinary citizenry (in contrast to other, more compliant Arab rulers). Here again there is evidence of the charismatic revolutionary persona, reluctantly taking up the burden of leadership on behalf of his brothers.Whatever his ideals, the result was that Qaddafi and his state became the focus of increasing Western ire. A series of incidents between the US and Libya in international waters added to the friction, as did Libyan orchestrated terror attacks in Berlin, Rome and Vienna. At the height of this tension in 1986, American aircraft bombed targets in Libya, narrowly missing Qaddafi himself. This role as public enemy of America led to Qaddafi being characterised by President Ronald Reagan (no stranger to the use of persona himself) as the “mad dog of the Middle East” and a “squalid criminal.” The enmity of the West made life difficult for ordinary Libyans dealing with crippling sanctions, but for Qaddafi, it helped bolster his persona as a committed revolutionary.Qaddafi: Leader of the Arab and African Worlds Related to his early revolutionary ideologies were Qaddafi’s aspirations as a pan-national leader. Inspired by Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser from a young age, the ideals of pan-Arab unity were always a cornerstone of Qaddafi’s beliefs. It is not therefore surprising that he developed ambitions of being the person to bring about and “guide” that unity. Once again the Weberian description of the charismatic leader is relevant, particularly the notion that such leadership does not respect conventional boundaries of functional jurisdictions or local bailiwicks; in this case, state boundaries.During the 1970s Qaddafi was involved in numerous attempts to broker Arab unions between Libya and states such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. All of these failed to materialise once the exact details of the mergers began to be discussed, in particular who would assume the mantle of leadership in these super-states. In line with his persona as the rightly-guided revolutionary, Qaddafi consistently blamed the failure of these unions on the other parties, souring his relationship with his fellow Arab leaders. His hardline stance on Israel also put him at odds with those peers more determined to find a compromise. Following the assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981 Qaddafi praised the act as justified because of Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.Having given up on the hope of achieving pan-Arab Unity, Qaddafi sought to position himself as a leader of the African bloc. In 2009 he became Chairperson of the African Union and took to having himself introduced as “The King of Kings of Africa.” The level of dysfunction of the African Union was no less than that of the Arab League and Qaddafi’s grandiose plans for becoming the President of the United States of Africa failed to materialise.In both his pan-Arab and pan-Africa ambitions, we see a persona of Qaddafi that aims at leadership beyond his own state. Whilst there may be delusions of grandeur apparent in the practicalities of these goals, this image was nevertheless something that Qaddafi used to leverage the next phase of his political transformation.Qaddafi: The Post-9/11 Statesman However much he might be seen as erratic, Qaddafi’s innate intelligence could result in a political astuteness lacking in many of his Arab peers. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Qaddafi was the first international leader to condemn the attacks on America and pledge support in the War on Terror and the extermination of al-Qaeda. Despite his history as a supporter of terrorism overseas, Qaddafi had a long history of repressing it at home, just as with any other form of political opposition. The pan-Islamism of al-Qaeda was anathema to his key ideologies of direct democracy (guided by himself). This meant the United States and Libya were now finally on the same team. As part of this post-9/11 sniffing of the wind, Qaddafi abandoned his fledgling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program and finally agreed to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the Pan Am 107 flight downed over Lockerbie in 1987.This shift in Qaddafi’s policy did not altogether dispel his persona of brotherly leadership amongst African nations. As a bloc leader and an example of the possibility of ‘coming in from the cold’, Qaddafi and Libya were reintegrated into the world community. This included giving a speech at the United Nations in 2009. This event did little to add to his reputation as a statesman in the West. Given a 15-minute slot, the Libyan leader delivered a rambling address over 90 minutes long, which included him tearing up a copy of the UN Charter and turning his back to the audience whilst continuing to speak.Qaddafi: The Clown From the Western point of view, performances like this painted Qaddafi’s behaviour as increasingly bizarre. Particularly after Libya’s rapprochement with the West, the label of threatening terrorist supporter faded and was replaced with something along the lines of a harmless clown prince. Tales of the Libyan leader’s coterie of virgin female bodyguards were the subject of ridicule, as was his ardour for US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Perhaps this behaviour was indicative of a leader increasingly divorced from reality. Surrounded by sycophants dependent on his regard for their tenure or physical survival, as well as Western leaders eager to contrast his amiability with that of Saddam Hussein, nobody was prepared to draw attention to the emperor’s new clothes.Indeed, elaborate and outlandish clothing played an increasing role in Qaddafi’s persona as the decades went on. His simple revolutionary fatigues of the early years were superseded by a vast array of military uniforms heavily decorated with medals and emblems; traditional African, Arab or Bedouin robes depending on the occasion; and in later years a penchant for outfits that included images of the African continent or pictures of dead martyrs. (In 2009 Vanity Fair did a tongue-in-cheek article on the fashion of Colonel Qaddafi entitled Dictator Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion. This spawned a number of similar features including one in TIME Magazine entitled Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.)The Bedouin theme was an aspect of persona that Qaddafi cultivated as an ascetic “man of the people” throughout his leadership. Despite having many palaces available he habitually slept in an elaborate tent, according once again with Weber’s description of the charismatic leader as one who eschews methodical material gain. This predisposition served him well in the 1986 United States bombing, when his residence in a military barracks was demolished, but Qaddafi escaped unscathed as he was in his tent at the time. He regularly entertained foreign dignitaries in tents when they visited Libya and he took one when travelling abroad, including pitching it in the gardens of a Parisian hotel during a state visit in 2007. (A request to camp in New York’s Central Park for his UN visit in 2009 was denied; “Inside the Tents of Muammar Gaddafi”).The role of such a clown was unlikely to have been an aim for Qaddafi, but was instead the product of his own increasing isolation. It will likely be his most enduring character in the Western memory of his rule. It should be noted though that clowns and fools do not maintain an iron grip on power for over 40 years.The Legacy of Qaddafi’s Many Personas Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was a clever and complex leader who exhibited many variations of persona during his four decades of rule. These personas were generally facets of the same core self-belief of a charismatic leader, but could be conflicting, and often confusing, to observers. His eccentricities often hid a layer of deeper cunning and ambition, but ultimately led to his marginalisation and an impression by world leaders that he was untrustworthy.His erratic performance at the UN in 2009 perhaps typifies the end stages of Qaddafi’s leadership: a man increasingly disconnected from his people and the realities of what was going on around him. His insistence that the 2011 Libyan revolution was variously a colonial or terrorist inspired piece of theatre belied the deep resentment of his rule. His role as opponent of the Western and Arab worlds alike meant that he was unsupported in his attempts to deal with the uprising. Indeed, the West’s rapid willingness to use their airpower was instrumental in speeding on the rebel forces.What cannot be disputed is the chaotic legacy this charismatic figure left for his country. Since the uprising climaxed in his on-camera lynching in October 2011, Libya has been plunged in to turmoil and shows no signs of this abating. One of the central reasons for this chaos is that Qaddafi’s supremacy, his political philosophies, and his use of messianic persona left Libya completely unprepared for rule by any other party.This ensuing chaos has been a cruel, if ironic, proof of Qaddafi’s own conceit: Libya could not survive without him.References Al-Gathafi, Muammar. The Green Book: The Solution to the Problem of Democracy; The Solution to the Economic Problem; The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory. 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