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1
Filin, Nikita A., i Alexander S. Khodunov. "Protest Movement in Iran in 2022: A Test for Political Stability". Asia and Africa today, nr 7 (15.12.2024): 41–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s032150750031365-3.
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The article analyzes protest activity in Iran in the autumn of 2022. The 2022 protests turned out to be unprecedented in the entire post-revolutionary history of Iran, both in scale and in the radicalism of demands and probably by the number of victims. The active phase of the protests lasted about two months, and the most active group of protesters were secular-minded women who demanded the abolition of Islamic restrictions on clothing. The protests brought together representatives of a variety of social groups, from students and the middle class to urban workers and national and religious minorities, especially Sunni Muslims (Kurds and Baluchis). The authorities were able to take control of the situation through various measures (forceful actions and, subsequently, a broad amnesty in honor of the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution) and flatly refused to make concessions to the protesters. Currently, the situation in Iran is relatively calm due to improving economic dynamics, but protests in the coming years are quite possible.
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Filin, Nikita A., Vladimir O. Koklikov i Alexander S. Khodunov. "MASS PROTESTS IN IRAN IN THE AUTUMN OF 2022. FACTORS, DYNAMICS, REACTION OF THE AUTHORITIES". RSUH/RGGU Bulletin. Series Political Sciences. History. International Relations 4, nr 3 (2023): 332–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-6339-2023-4-332-346.
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The protests in the autumn of 2022 began after the death of the Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini, for which the opposition blamed the Islamic regime’s morality police. The initial demands for the abolition of the morality police very quickly gave way to radical demands for the elimination of the Islamic regime and the resignation of the Supreme Leader. The protests quickly spread to hundreds of cities and villages in all provinces of the country. Up to 2 million people took part in them. The protests were emphatically secular in nature, and the main slogan of the protesters was the slogan “Woman, life, freedom”. By and large, the mass protests in the autumn of 2022 proved to be the most intense, radical and bloody since the Islamic revolution, as the regime officials themselves admit. Despite the fact that the regime was able hold on, there are the risks of recurrence of similar mass actions in the coming years. If Iran manages to reach an agreement with the United States to lift sanctions, it will have a positive impact on economic development, but political reasons for discontent will remain. Therefore, Iran needs serious domestic political and economic reforms. The protest movement in Iran is in many ways similar to the mass protests in the Arab East during the Arab Spring, which indicates similar socio-political issues.
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Dunaeva, Elena, Nina Mamedova i Vladimir Sazhin. "IRAN: PROBLEMS AND PROTESTS". Eastern Analytics 13, No 4 (2022) (2022): 9–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.31696/2227-5568-2022-04-009-030.
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This paper analyzes the causes, course, driving forces, modus operandi, and goals of the September-November 2022 protest movement in Iran following the death of a girl detained by the patrol guidance police for wearing an inappropriate hijab. A comparison is made between the ongoing protests and the opposition movements of previous years. The article begins with a brief analysis of the economic situation in the country during the first year of President Raisi's government, and reveals the main problems of economic development. The authors proceed from the fact that the economic crisis as a result of the imposition of sanctions has not been overcome, despite the positive growth of the country's GDP in the last two years. The problems in the social and cultural sphere are exacerbated as a result of generational changes, and the limitations of political life as a result of the consolidation of power in the hands of radical conservative forces. Their attempts to increase control over the observance of Islamic norms of dress and behavior, bans on cultural events lead to increased discontent in Iranian society. Young generations are actively fighting for freedom of choice and the right to make their own decisions. Society's conflict potential is increasing, which threatens the existence of the Islamic Republic. The government's efforts to suppress the movements by force do not lead to their extinguishment, and the forms of protest are changing. While radical forces call for harsher reprisals against protesters, many politicians of both moderate conservative and liberal orientations call for public dialogue and reforms in order to solve the most serious problems and preserve the Islamic regime.
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Panwar, Kanika, i Vikas Kumar Sihag. "Protest Movements, Social Media, and the Role of Law Enforcement". International Journal of Information Systems and Social Change 14, nr 1 (1.01.2023): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijissc.314590.
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From the Iranian green movement (2009) through the London riots (2011) and the recent anti-hijab protests in Iran, protest movements have been accompanied by considerable social media activity globally. Social media users have been involved in the quick production and distribution of audio-visuals online with protest hashtags, rumors, and sometimes fabricated information. The impact of these movements demonstrates that social media can potentially play an important role in organizing large-scale socio-political events, posing a challenge for law enforcement agencies. This research aims to evaluate and analyze the use of social media for mass mobilization throughout significant protest movements from 2010 to 2022, as well as to investigate the use of social media as a tool by LEAs. This exploratory research examines the theoretical and empirical research on the use of social media for mass mobilization, social protests, and the involvement of law enforcement authorities. The discussion has shown that social media does not drive protest movements but offers momentum to them.
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Melnik, A. V. "The Current Socio-political and Legal Status of Iranian Women as a Factor in the Protest Movements of 2022–2023 in Iran". Koinon 4, nr 1-2 (2024): 96–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/koinon.2024.04.1.2.007.
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After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranian women lost many of the rights granted during the Pahlavi dynasty. For more than 40 years, they have been following clearly defined norms and rules, and refuse to comply with it leads to sanctions, often serious (for example, stoning, arrest, etc.). All this time, Iranian women have been fighting for their rights, but their actions have not given noticeable results in politics. In September 2022, Maxa Amini died, who was arrested by the Iranian vice police for improperly wearing a hijab. This news shocked Iranian society, in particular its female part. In this regard, a wave of protest movements against police brutality swept through the country, as well as rallies for the advancement of women. The purpose of this article is to analyze the socio-political and legal situation of Iranian women as one of the key factors of the protest movements of 2022-2023. The basis of this research is primarily the analysis of news publications, as well as the works of such theorists as I. A. Popova, A.V. Mikhaleva, S. R. Mokhtari, N. M. Mammadova, S. de Beauvoir. This analysis made it possible to systematize the information and identify future trends in the development of the protest movement.
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Miri Ashtiani, Hadi. "The Rhymes of Zhina Movement; Content Analysis of Revolutionary and Protest Music of Iran 2022". Freedom of Thought Journal, nr 13 (czerwiec 2023): 75–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.53895/ftj1312.
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The Zhina movement that erupted following the death of Mahsa Zhina Amini, under custody for allegedly wearing her headscarf incorrectly, is Iran's most prolonged and pervasive movement since the 1979 revolution—repeatedly referred to as a revolution by the actors who participated in the movement as well as political analysts. This movement has had many cultural, social, and political influences. Music as a critical cultural manifestation, artistic self-expression, and an integral part of people's daily life both affected the movement and was impacted by it. This article takes a closer look at the protest and revolutionary songs published since the beginning of the Zhina movement in September 2022. Using a qualitative content analysis approach, it explores the contents published during the movement concerning meaning-making, collective imagination, and representation of Iran's social and political situation. Ten main themes were extracted, including oppression, resistance, the conflict between good and evil, the connection between previous social movements, representation of slogans, symbols, and victims, woman and embodiment, homeland, nations and ethnicities, religion, action request, and desired future vision.
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Lebedev, S. V. "The resilience of monarchies in the Greater Middle East: The lightning rod effect, crackdown on protest, and patrimonial links". Humanities and Social Sciences. Bulletin of the Financial University 12, nr 6 (25.02.2023): 103–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.26794/2226-7867-2022-12-6-103-108.
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The paper examines the factors that allowed the Greater Middle East monarchies to survive the protests known as the “Arab Spring”. The author considers the popular argument in scientific and media-political discourse about the culturally conditioned legitimacy of the Middle Eastern monarchies, and also presents several cases of successful anti-monarchist revolutions in the region (Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Yemen). In addition, the work develops the idea that it can conditionally divide all the monarchies of the Greater Middle East into two types: individualistic and clan. The paper shows that patrimonial ties, which have been carefully built over several decades, are an important element in the stability of monarchies.
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Paivandi, Saeed. "Unaccomplished Protest Movements in Iran and the Challenge of Building a Collective Imaginary of Political Change". Freedom of Thought Journal, nr 13 (czerwiec 2023): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.53895/ftj1301.
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The post-green movement years in Iran are marked by the emergence of a new generation of protest movements that no longer aim to reform the Islamic Republic by calling for a radical change in the political system. The two popular Movements in 2017 and 2019, severely repressed by the state, are examples of this political rupture and this paradigmatic shift. These popular protest movements, largely using social networks, were spontaneous, without leadership or political project. The Woman, Life and Freedom Movement that emerged from September 2022 in the context of a society in political impasse, was original and unprecedented. Despite the bloody repression, the Movement that was triggered after the death of Mahsa Aminin, the young girl arrested by the morality police caused a wide political crisis in Iran. The young girls and boys involved in this Movement protested against deficiencies and injustices that were directly linked to the authentic and human needs of individuals in modern society. This time too, the actors of the movement knew very well against what they were contesting without being able to propose an alternative project and a new horizon for society. The purpose of this text is to make a critical reading of these unaccomplished movements which, despite their ampleness or the legitimacy of their protest, fail in mobilizing the whole of society around a collective imaginary and imposing significant political change.
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Khalili, Mostafa. "From “Green Movement” to “Woman, Life, Freedom”: Continuity and Change in the Evolution of the Protest Movement in Iran". Protest 3, nr 1 (27.06.2023): 133–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667372x-bja10045.
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Abstract The “woman, life, freedom” protest movement that started in September 2022 and lasted for several months is arguably the largest set of demonstrations in Iran since the formation of the Islamic Republic. Its most noticeable characteristic compared to the “Green Movement” in 2009, has been the radicalization of slogans and the transformation of the demands from the quest for reform to seeking regime change. This article briefly examines the socio-political processes that triggered the disappointment of the public with top-down reform, resulting in the gradual radicalization of protesters’ demands between those two movements. It is argued that the failure of the reformists to implement sustainable top-down transformation in politics gave rise to the rapid spread of nationwide bottom-up, unorganized forms of resistance. While their forms, aims, and mobilization incentives have been highly diverse, participants converge in perceiving regime change as the only alternative solution.
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Navarro, Celina, i Luiz Peres-Neto. "“Hair for Freedom” Movement in Iran: Interreligious Dialogue in Social Media Activism?" Religions 14, nr 5 (4.05.2023): 602. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel14050602.
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After the death of Masha Amini at the hands of the Iranian Morality Police for not wearing the hijab, in accordance with what they considered appropriate in September 2022, a social media campaign called “Hair for Freedom” was sparked on different platforms, with videos of women cutting their hair in protest over Iranian women’s rights and Amini’s death. This paper analyzes whether this digital feminist movement enacted an interreligious dialogue (IRD). Based on content analysis and topic modeling of the publications retrieved from three major platforms, Twitter, Instagram, and TikTok, the results indicate that this was mainly a Western movement focused on women’s bodies as a political symbol in authoritarian Islamic regimes and has not achieved an IRD since most social media posts reproduced the hashtag #HairForFredom without opening a religious discussion. As observed in other digital movements, conclusions indicate that social media activism does not offer an opportunity to engage in dialogues to enlighten the public sphere. On the contrary, the focus appears to provide users with the opportunity to enhance their reputation by engaging in popular social media campaigns that promote social change.
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Tabrizikahuo, Gholamreza, Keyvan Salehi, Hossein Keshavarz Afshar i Yaser Madani. "Phenomenological representation of biosociality in female-headed households". Applied Family Therapy Journal 4, nr 1 (2023): 193–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.61838/kman.aftj.4.1.11.
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Aim: The number of Female Headed Households heads of households in Iran is currently increasing; And the general consensus on the issue of their vulnerability has led many studies to unravel their issues. One of the most important, especially in Iran, is the social relations of these women and the expectations that society has of them. The purpose of this research is to study the lived experience of these women in their social relationships. Methods: This research was conducted by phenomenological method. The research fild was the city of Mashhad and the participants were female-headed households in the winter 2022 who were selected by purposive sampling method with maximum distribution. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews which in the 21st case ended with theoretical saturation. Data analysis was performed by Colaizzi method. Results: Female-headed households make changes in their social relationships in the four dimensions of living body, relationships, social space and time before and after household heading. For one group the body is somthing that carries the honor and for another group is a tool to protest the status quo. Lived relationships also fluctuate in a wide range from social distance to complete freedom. They all agree that the social environment is insecure and unreliable for them. Some have a positive attitude towards the past, some have a negative attitude, some try to forget the past and live in the present and some surrender to their destiny, and finally some try to change their lived-world according to their current situation. Conclusion: It is necessary for the support systems of these women to take their social relations seriously and pay attention to all four dimensions of their physical life, social space, communication and time.
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Druzhilovsky, S. B. "SOCIAL PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN". MGIMO Review of International Relations, nr 4(43) (28.08.2015): 216–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-4-43-216-221.
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The article deals with causes and distinctive features of social protest movements in Iran through the prism of the effect that historic and contemporary developments have on them. The author analyses the most important factors that influence social activity during periods of exacerbating internal tensions in Iran. Great importance is attached to the Shia clergy ́s role in leading protest movements in the country before the Islamic revolution. Besides, the author evaluates the capacity of the ruling clergy to halt protests and ensure the majority ́s loyalty to the governing regime. Considerable attention is paid to the characteristics of the so-called «green movement» in which during 2011–2012. Again loudly declared himself to speak in support of popular uprisings in several Arab countries during the «Arab Spring». Under the influence of these events in Iran have again begun a protest against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In this regard, the Iranian authorities placed under house arrest of several opposition leaders, including Mousavi. Since then, the situation in Iran in general has stabilized. Moreover, the leaders of the «green» M. Mousavi and M. Kyarubi made a number of harsh anti-Western statements, in which he accused the West of choosing «wrong way» to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue by introducing anti-Iranian sanctions. They are, from the point of view of the opposition leaders, especially not hit the economic interests of the Iranian government and the Iranian citizen. The election in November 2013 the new president of Iran representative of the liberal camp Hassan Rouhani also had a positive impact on the containment of the Iranian opposition street protests.
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Khosrokhavar, Farhad. "The 2022-23 Social Protests and theDelegitimizationof the Islamic Republic". Freedom of Thought Journal, nr 13 (czerwiec 2023): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.53895/ftj1315.
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The movement that shook Iran from September 2022 to March 2023 carries with it major anthropological and sociological innovations. Women, for the first time, are the promoters of the movement, not just a supplement to men. The movement combines two types of demands: existential (the appropriation of women's bodies by themselves through the rejection of the compulsory veil) and political (the end of the dictatorship and the establishment of political pluralism). The movement also creates for the first time the conditions for an inclusive ethnicity that proclaims the unity of Iran while respecting its ethnic and religious diversity. The movement targeted the theocratic state which had become hyper-repressive and totalitarian. Without organization and leadership, the movement has not been able to overthrow the Islamic State, but it has revealed its major crisis and illegitimacy.
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Rivetti, Paola. "Writing in Turbulent Times. Introduction to the Roundtable on the 2022–23 Iranian Protests". Iranian Studies 56, nr 3 (lipiec 2023): 553–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/irn.2023.19.
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The editorial decision to publish a roundtable on the 2022–23 protests in Iran has come with challenges and obvious limitations due to access and immediacy. The ambition of this intervention is to offer some initial reflections and some analytical instruments in the hope that they will be useful for future publications. We also want to write in this moment because we want to register its characteristics—emotions running high, the quick detours of power relations between the state and the protesters, the uncertainty, the changing political weight of the diaspora—along with the difficulty of doing analytical work in the midst of such processes.
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Bernard Hanish, Dr Shak. "THE INTERPLAY OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IRAQI 2019 UPRISING". International Journal of Social Science and Economic Research 08, nr 04 (2023): 582–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.46609/ijsser.2023.v08i04.002.
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The Social Movements and Political Violence: An International Case paper will define political violence in a general and theoretical sense. It will classify major types of political violence and concentrate on major four types of political violence. Then, it will apply a particular one to an international case of social movement, specifically in Iraq where a popular uprising took place in October 2019 and is currently affecting politics in Iraq. Iraq has witnessed a new wave of protests, but it was unprecedented and almost unique and has distinctive characteristics. These protests included the masses of protesters who felt the flaws of the system and the corruption of the authority, and they realized that the political elite as a whole is unable and/or unwilling to implement their demands. Protesters practiced a variety of methods in expressing their demands, ranging between peaceful demonstrations, civil disobedience, and armed clash. They were accompanied by bloody violent incidents that killed over 800 people and injured tens of thousands. The paper will examine the reasons for the protest, and how and why the government and some armed pro-government groups used violence and assassinations against activists. What was the reaction to the violence? What was the result of the uprising? Did it reach its goals? and what are the prospects of repeated demonstrations and the possibility of regime change? The paper will analyze that and present a future outlook of such a social movement.
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Jafari, Peyman. "Revolt with a Revolutionary Perspective". Iranian Studies 56, nr 3 (lipiec 2023): 569–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/irn.2023.17.
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At the zenith of the Women, Life, Freedom (WLF) protests in October to December 2022, the call for (general) strikes became a rallying point for activists who were seeking to increase the protests’ social reach and political strength in the face of increasing state repression. Therefore labor provides an advantageous analytical lens for exploring some of the constraints and potentials of the social dynamics of the WLF protests.
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Shahrokni, Nazanin. "Bodies in Revolt, Challenging the State in Iran". Current History 122, nr 848 (1.12.2023): 323–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/curh.2023.122.848.323.
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The protests that erupted across Iran in 2022 after the death of a woman arrested for noncompliance with a headscarf requirement were not only about religious dress codes. They were a culmination of years of growing discontent over broader questions involving the place of women in the Islamic Republic and other grievances about the reach of an overbearing state and perceived social and political injustices. The erosion of civil society has made it difficult to sustain the protests’ momentum, as the state moves to co-opt businesses and the public into enforcing its decrees, but the uprising is part of a longer-term, nonlinear process of dissent-driven change in Iran.
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Afzali, Mehdi. "IRAN’S POSITION IN THE WORLD IN TERMS OF REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS". Scientific Review. Series 2. Human sciences, nr 3-4 (2020): 5–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.26653/2076-4685-2020-3-4-01.
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The article discusses the concepts of refugees and asylum seekers in Iran, in this study the key statistics and studies of forced migration, are considered and in this concept the definition and statistics of number of Iranian refugees and asylum seekers is developing a form to understand the scale, reasons, and the direction of forced migration mobility from Iran since it has been one of the main destination and origin countries of forced migration. As the number of refugees and asylum seekers continues to grow, concerns are growing about the formation and the type of Iranian diasporas who are living in the other countries that will impact on certain socio-political structure of the country, especially those had left the country after the 1979 Islamic revolution and Iran-Iraq war from 1980-1988. Although so far we know that, the reasons of forced migration is depended on many social factors, whether and how this type of migration consequences will affect the internal socio-political situation of Iran is still unclear and is hardly possible due to data quality, lack of data and timing issues, however, in long run as a result of forced migration and increase in the number of refugees and asylum seekers will have a negative impact on the refugees’ perception towards their country and the current regime. Moreover, forced migration has emerged in the world tightly related to social problems, Findings in this study show that, this type of migration has increased in Iran after controversial presidential election and the “green movement” protest in 2009 which stimulated forced migration from Iran to European countries, and it has formed a very political diaspora, that is consists of specialists, liberals, activists, etc. therefore, Iran as one of the main countries of origin and destination of refugees and asylum seekers experiences the forced migration because of the factors such as: human rights for political activists and defenders, prisoners’ rights and treatment, women’s right and rights of religious minorities, that have increased the illegal methods of emigration, people were smuggled across the borders, and many of people have used different methods such as changing religion as a tool to apply for asylum on the grounds that conversion from Islam is punishable by the Islamic republic of Iran.
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Shahi, Afshin, i Ehsan Abdoh-Tabrizi. "IRAN’S 2019–2020 DEMONSTRATIONS: THE CHANGING DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL PROTESTS IN IRAN". Asian Affairs 51, nr 1 (2.01.2020): 1–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2020.1712889.
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Eliassi, Barzoo. "Minoritized Communities in Iran: The Struggle for Unconditional Equality". Iranian Studies 57, nr 2 (kwiecień 2024): 303–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/irn.2024.6.
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Following the tragic murder of Jina Mahsa Amini, a Kurdish woman, in 2022, subsequent protests in 2022–23 presented a significant intersectional challenge to the Islamic Republic of Iran's (IRI) political order, revealing deep-seated issues of ethnic, economic, gender, and political discrimination. Originating in the Kurdish region, these protests quickly spread across Iran and its diaspora, offering a glimpse of potential intersectional solidarity cutting across ethnic, gender, and religious lines. Notably, Kurds and Baluchis played a leading role in the protests, bearing the highest toll in terms of lives lost and injuries sustained. The Iranian regime responded ruthlessly, employing military violence to supress dissent and systematically dehumanizing these communities in an attempt to undermine their vocal opposition to the exclusionary and hierarchical rule rooted in Persian and Shiite dominance. Throughout history, the Kurds have consistently stood at the vanguard of resistance against the political authority in Tehran, as well as challenging the dominance of Persian and Shiite supremacy. This enduring opposition is instrumental to understanding the widespread, well-articulated, and mobilized resistance to the IRI's abuses of power. This resistance finds its epitome in the Women, Life, Freedom social movement.1
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Shakali, Swara. "Iraqi protests of 2019-2020: the perspective of Baghdad and Erbil". Конфликтология / nota bene, nr 2 (luty 2020): 35–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0617.2020.2.33442.
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This article is dedicated to examination of mass protests that unfolded in Iraq since the second half of 2019 until the beginning of 2020 and involved even northern part of the country (with prevailing Kurdish population). The core demand of protesters in the Arab part of the country consisted in amendment of the existing administrative system (“Muhasasa"), which issued quotas for the representatives of ethnic and religious groups of the country (Shiite and Sunni Arabs, and Kurds). Separate protests were also recorded in the Iraqi Kurdistan. The novelty of this research consists in examination of Iraqi protests at the present state, as well as from the perspective of relations between the central government of Iraq and Kurdish Autonomy. The conclusion is made that the key factor of protests consists in dissatisfaction of population with the quality of rendered services, low effectiveness of government apparatus, and high level of corruption. Although there is no direct correlation between protests in northern and southern parts of the country, the very fact of disturbances among the Kurds testifies to the existence social tension in northern Iraq. Theoretically, neglecting the demands of Arab population may lead to the proliferation of protests across the country.
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Rezaee, Rita, Mahmoudreza Peyravi, Katayoun Jalali, Sepehr Avazzadeh i Milad Ahmadi Marzaleh. "Exploring the Lived Experiences of Older Adults in Iran During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Phenomenological Study". Salmand 18, nr 2 (1.07.2023): 148–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.32598/sija.2022.2023.4.
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Objectives Since older people make up a great percent of the population is Iran, and they experienced higher mental, physical, and emotional pressures due to quarantine and lockdown during the COVID-19 pandemic, the present study aims to investigate the lived experiences of older adults during the COVID-19 pandemic in Iran. Methods & Materials This qualitative phenomenological study was conducted in Fars, Kermanshah, and Tehran provinces of Iran from October 1, 2021 to January 30, 2022. The data were collected through interviewing 16 older adults. Data analysis was done by Smith’s interpretative phenomenology analysis. Results Of 16 older adults, 9 were male and 7 were female, with a mean age of 73 years. Their lived experiences were classified into three main categories: Psychological tensions, resilience (healing) measures, and economic tensions. Conclusion Iranian older people experienced various types of tensions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Social distancing and quarantine increased the concerns about their mental health. Therefore, it is very important to identify and analyze the psychological concepts and protective factors along with preparing practical guidelines to protect their mental health during the COVID-19 pandemic.
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Malashenko, A. "Conflicts in the Middle East: prospects for escalation in the context of general regional instability in the 2020s". Pathways to Peace and Security, nr 1 (2021): 120–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/2307-1494-2021-1-120-132.
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The article analyses Middle Eastern conflicts in the early 2020s. The main focus is on the situation in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, three Middle Eastern conflicts that are progressing, with no solution in sight. These conflicts motivated by social, economic and political reasons became a progression of those protests that have started in 2011 and have been called “The Arab Spring”. These “revolutions” have been promoted by Islamist movements and groups whose activity became one of key factors of perpetual tensions in the region. So far, attempts by conflict parties to find consensual solutions have remained rather unsuccessful. Positive resolution of actual and potential conflicts in the Greater Middle East to a significant extent still depends on external regional and non-regional actors, such as Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the United States. However, each actor involved in these conflicts and in conflict management pursues its own goals. These actors try to retain their positions and influence in these Middle Eastern countries and in the region as a whole. According to the forecast made in the article, more conflicts in the region may be foreseen (in Iraq, the Persian Gulf states etc.) that could form the next wave of the “Arab Spring”.
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Voynova, Mariya Vladimirovna. "Main stages of developing environmental legislation of Islamic Republic of Iran on environmental protection of Caspian Sea". Oil and gas technologies and environmental safety 2023, nr 2 (22.05.2023): 69–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.24143/1812-9498-2023-2-69-82.
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The article focuses on the environmental legislation of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which regulates, among other things, the issues of protecting the environment of the Caspian Sea. Iran, like other Caspian states, is aware of the need to protect and protect the Caspian marine environment, on which the state of the coastal provinces and the well-being of the local population depend. There are examined the main legal acts of Iran related to the management of the quality of water resources, the protection of the marine environment from pollution, the protection of biological resources. Iran’s domestic environmental legislation was formed in the second half of the 20th century, but the most important regulations for the protection of the environment of the Caspian Sea were adopted during the last 25 years. In general, the national legislation of Iran is aimed at protecting the environment, while providing the population with water resources and protecting surface and groundwater from pollution, including the marine waters of the Caspian Sea, is especially important for the republic. The direction of Iran’s environmental legislation is consistent with the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea of 2018, which has not yet been ratified by the republic. In this Convention, the Caspian states have undertaken to protect and preserve the ecological system of the Caspian Sea and all its components, not to carry out activities that damage biological diversity, and also to bear responsibility for damage caused to the ecological system of the Caspian Sea. In the next decade, Iran plans to prepare a national action plan for the republic on protecting the marine environment, biodiversity, combating marine pollution, public participation and capacity building, as well as increasing coastal and marine protected areas, which gives some hope for the ratification of the Convention on the Legal status of the Caspian Sea.
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Ababakr, Amer. "Federalism As a Tool for Ethnic Conflict Resolution: A Case Study of Iraq". Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 13, nr 2 (5.03.2022): 56. http://dx.doi.org/10.36941/mjss-2022-0017.
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Due to ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversities, there is potential for ethnic conflicts and ethnic tensions in community, but the emergence and occurrence of ethnic conflicts depend on the state's approach to managing or suppressing ethnic, linguistic, and cultural variations. Federalism is one of the most important mechanisms that governments adopt to manage ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversities. But the function of federalism in reducing ethnic conflicts is not necessarily positive, and in some cases, it has led to an escalation of ethnic conflicts. Accordingly, the central question is to examine whether federalism is a system to resolve or reduce ethnic conflicts? With an emphasis on ethnic conflicts in Iraq. The research hypothesis is that federalism, through the creation of bureaucratic structures, the development of political parties, the identification, and acceptance of cultural and linguistic commonalities, will restrict and reduce ethnic violence and conflict but not necessarily ethnic protest.
Received: 26 December 2021 / Accepted: 28 February 2022 / Published: 5 March 2022
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Kohan, Mehr-Afarin. "Politics of the body in the 'woman, life, freedom' movement in Iran". Psychotherapy & Politics International 20, nr 4 (16.12.2022): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/ppi.v20i4.06.
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On 16 September 2022, nationwide protests broke out in Iran in reaction to the death of a 22-year-old girl, Mahsa Amini, who was killed by the morality police for not wearing a ‘proper hijab’ and led to the first women-led movement in Iran. This commentary explores the importance of this movement and historical moment as it relates to the form of resistance that is being exercised in fighting against the oppression of women under the current gender apartheid of the Islamic Republic. I examine the main slogans, symbols, and icons of this movement in the context of the politics of the body and a reclaiming of women’s bodies in a fight against a patriarchal dictatorship.
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Rigi, Jakob. "Iran at the crossroads of democracy and dictatorship". Focaal 2012, nr 63 (1.06.2012): 129–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2012.630114.
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The protest movement that emerged in Iran in the wake of the presidential election of 2009 has seen a subsequent decline due to the combined effects of repression and the timidity of the reformist leadership. The growing conflict between Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad around the upcoming parliamentary election of March 2012 has created a new political crisis. The radical section of the movement tries to use this split to launch a subversive strategy against the Islamic regime. Alternatively, Khamenei tries to rid himself of the last vestiges of the autonomy of any elected institution and establish a full theocratic dictatorship. Iranian society has two choices—either to subvert the Khamenei regime or to be subjugated by it.
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Allam, Mohamed F., i Ghada E. EL-D. Amin. "BCG Vaccine does not Protect Against COVID-19". Open Respiratory Medicine Journal 14, nr 1 (26.11.2020): 45–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.2174/1874306402014010045.
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A recent article by Jop de Vrieze (March 23, 2020) suggested that BCG vaccine could protect against COVID-19 infections. The arguments were that several European countries, like Italy, Spain, France, and Germany, which are badly affected by COVID-19, and the USA stopped vaccination of the general population by BCG and excluded it from their routine vaccination schedule. Many people started to receive doses of BCG based on that hypothesis even before its confirmation. We think that the BCG vaccine could not protect against COVID-19 because several countries like China and Iran, which are severely affected by COVID-19, still include the BCG vaccine in its routine vaccination schedule. Other arguments include that the BCG vaccine improves cell-mediated immunity with little effect on humoral immunity; Immunity against viruses, in general, is mainly humoral.
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Wong, Tiffany. "Introduction – The German Law Journal's Human Rights Symposium (2012)". German Law Journal 13, nr 1 (styczeń 2012): 52–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200020356.
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My motivation in putting together this Human Rights Symposium for the German Law Journal (GLJ) is based on a number of events in the news this year: recent outbreaks of political protests in Libya and Egypt, on-going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and natural disasters in Haiti and Japan, that have re-opened questions about human rights in the 21st century on a global scale.
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Mueller, Chelsi. "Memory Politics in Bahrain: The Invocation of the Early Modern Past in the Aftermath of the February 14, 2011 Uprising". History & Memory 35, nr 1 (marzec 2023): 141–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/ham.2023.a885271.
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Abstract: On February 14, 2011, protests broke out in Bahrain led by the mostly Shi'i opposition against the Sunni Al Khalifa ruling family. After a failed attempt to appease the protestors, the Al Khalifa government blamed Iran for the unrest and invited Saudi and Emirati troops to enter Bahrain and crush the uprising. This article explores how and why the events of an earlier crisis, which began with a Shi'i uprising in 1922 and widened to include Iranian nationals in 1923, was remembered and communicated by states and social groups in the aftermath of the 2011 protests, both in scholarly articles and in the digital media. These contested narratives of Bahrain's past are located within the politically charged context of the 2011 uprising to shed light on the relationship between memory and politics in Bahrain.
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Musaeva, Salikhat Ibragimovna. "The Role of Shiite Clergy in the Constitutional Movement at the Initial Stage of the First Iranian Revolu-tion of 1905–1911". Islamovedenie 12, nr 2 (2.06.2021): 34–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.21779/2077-8155-2020-12-2-34-44.
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The article highlights the history of the development of the Constitutional Movement in Iran in 1905-1906, i.e. in the first period of the Iranian Revolution of 1905–1911, and the participa-tion of the Shiite clergy in it. Shiite clergy, dissatisfied with the attempt of the Shah and his entou-rage to weaken their rights in the area of legal proceedings, as well as with the government's policy aimed at “Europeanizing” Iran, took an active part in the protest movement. The article reflects the period of the emergence of secret revolutionary societies in the country, created by representatives of advanced bourgeois intelligentsia of Iran. The leaders of Shiite clergy joined them, and later began to create and lead such societies themselves. The author focuses on the role and influence of Shiite clergy in the revolutionary activities of various secret societies, such as “Enjomene Mahfi”, which included the main leaders of Shiite clergy of Tehran: Ayatollah Sayyid Abdollah Behbehani and Said Mohammed Tabatabai, politician M. Kermani and others. These organizations carried out a great deal of work among the believers: they published political leaflets, appeals to the Iranian people, called on the people to speak out against the Shah's tyranny and European penetration. The revolu-tion showed the potential of Shiite clergy as an active factor in the socio-political history of Iran.
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Rahimpoor, Razzagh, Fatemeh Sarvi, Samira Rahimnejad i Seyed Mohammad Ebrahimi. "Occupational exposure to BTEX and styrene in West Asian countries: a brief review of current state and limits". Archives of Industrial Hygiene and Toxicology 73, nr 2 (1.06.2022): 107–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/aiht-2022-73-3634.
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Abstract The aim of introducing occupational exposure limits (OELs) is to use them as a risk management tool in order to protect workers’ health and well-being against harmful agents at the workplace. In this review we identify OELs for benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene (BTEX), and styrene concentrations in air and assess occupational exposure to these compounds through a systematic literature search of publications published in West Asian countries from 1980 to 2021. OELs for BTEX and styrene have been set in Iran and Turkey to levels similar to those in European countries and the US. The search yielded 49 full-text articles that cover studies of exposure assessment in six countries, but most (n=40) regard Iran. Average occupational exposure to benzene of workers in oil-related industries is higher than recommended OEL, while average occupational exposure to other compounds is lower than local OELs (where they exist). Currently, information about levels of occupational exposure to BTEX and styrene is insufficient in West Asian countries, which should be remedied through OEL regulation and application. Furthermore, coherent research is also needed to determine actual levels of occupational exposure, dose-responses, and the economic and technical capacity of local industries to address current issues.
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Koybaev, Boris G. "The Allied Powers in Iran during World War II: the fight against German agents". Vestnik of North-Ossetian State University, nr 2(2021) (25.06.2021): 44–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.29025/1994-7720-2021-2-44-49.
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On the eve of the Second World War, Iran’s relations with Germany in the field of political, trade, economic, military and cultural relations significantly increased. At the same time, Iran’s relations with the Soviet Union and Britain were deteriorating. Many attempts to enter Iran, especially to gain access to Iranian oil, have also been made by the United States. They were actively opposed by the USSR and Great Britain, and the latter acted more decisively and persistently, which caused the anger of Washington. All this prompted Tehran to search for a “third force” that could protect Iran from the encroachment of the USSR and Great Britain on its interests. And such a” third force “ Iran found in the person of Germany, which after Hitler came to power began to develop intensively in military and economic terms. Reza Shah was impressed by Hitler, who, in turn, expressed interest in cooperation with Iran, as a large state in the Middle East, which occupied an important place in the plans of Nazi Germany to conquer world domination. As you know, the fascist leadership after the implementation of the Barbarossa plan intended to defeat Great Britain, but first to capture its pearl-British India. Berlin hoped to implement these plans in alliance with Iran, using its territory for subversive and aggressive actions against India. It was also intended to seize the AIOC oil fields, because the Axis powers did not have their own sources of oil.
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Robie, David. "REVIEW: When journalists are reluctant to write about the travails of a troubled trade". Pacific Journalism Review : Te Koakoa 9, nr 1 (1.09.2003): 208–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v9i1.774.
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Review of Attacks on the Press in 2002, Committee to Protect Journalists, New York, 2003. Freedom of the Press throughout the World, 2003, Reporters Sans Frontières, Paris, 2003. Live News: A survival Guide for journalists, International Federation of Journalists, Brussels, 2003. Dangerous Assignments: covering the Iraq War, Committee to Protect Journalists, New York, 2002.
When the press come under attack, many reporters find themsevles in a dilemma, notes foreign correspondent Serge Schmemann, a member of The New York Times' editorial board. Writing the preface to the annual New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists' Attacks on the Press for volume 2002, he reminds journalists of who knows better than the failings of the press than they do.
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TRUEVTSEV, K. M. "MIDDLE EAST: MORPHOLOGY OF AND POST-CONFLICT DESIGN". Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 10, nr 2 (2.11.2017): 143–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-2-2.
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This article looks at the structure and the dynamics of the Middle Eastern crisis set in motion by the events of the Arab Spring. At the heart of the crisis was Syria, where antigovernment protests broke out in early 2011, almost in parallel with other countries also affected by the Arab Spring. Starting from late March 2011, the unrest morphed into a civil war, leading to a large-scale crisis engulfing the country by the end of the year. At first, the opposition to the Syrian regime consisted of numerous groups with varying political affiliations – from liberals to Islamists – however, by early 2012, radical Islamism came to dominate the opposition forces. And by the end of the same year, the opposition was spearheaded by an openly terrorist organization – the al-Nusra Front, an outgrowth of the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda. Over the same period, regional and international forces were becoming more and more involved in the Syrian crisis. Since 2012, in parallel with the Syrian crisis, there has been another internal conflict raging in the Middle East, namely in Iraq, with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) taking the foreground and combining groups of Iraqi al-Qaeda militants with Baathist underground forces. In 2014–2015, ISIL took hold of large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq, effectively turning the Syrian civil war into a regional conflict. In addition to Syria and Iraq, the ongoing crisis has involved – either directly or indirectly – such actors as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and a number of other regional powers. Turkey has been indirectly involved in the Syrian crisis since its very beginning, but starting from 2016 its engagement in the conflict has become much more active – not only in Syria, but also in Iraq. In 2013, Iran started to interfere in the Syrian crisis directly, using its Shia allies, and expanded its presence onto Iraq in 2014. Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s participation in the Syrian conflict has been indirect, mainly through military and financial assistance provided to their clients inside the country. However, Saudi Arabia’s activities in Syria have started to decline in 2015, due to its military involvement in Yemen, which – in a broader context – can be perceived as a peripheral component of the large regional conflict. In addition to the above mentioned components, one could also name a number of other equally important factors to the crisis. One of them is that the ranks of al- Nusra and ISIL militants have been reinforced not only by people coming from the Arab countries, but also from the citizens of Western Europe, North America and the former USSR. Another factor has been the growing role of Kurdish groups in the confrontation with the terrorists, especially with ISIL. This has led to the creation of a Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. At the same time, an armed confrontation began in Turkish Kurdistan, which Turkey views as a threat to its territorial integrity. The Syrian crisis has also been marked by involvement of global powers, such as the US and Russia. The US-led international coalition has not succeeded in changing the course of the conflict – on the other hand, Russia’s involvement since the second half of 2015 has made a significant difference. With the end of the campaign against ISIL already in view, and with the prospects for a successful intra- Syrian settlement, it would seem reasonable to raise the question of the post-conflict configuration of the region, which is discussed at the end of the article.
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Ghanbari Motlagh, Mohadeseh, i Masoud Kiadaliri. "Zoning of Areas with Susceptibility to Oak Decline in Western Iran". Quaestiones Geographicae 40, nr 1 (1.03.2021): 75–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/quageo-2021-0006.
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Abstract Zagros forests have the greatest impact on soil and water protection in western Iran. Despite this, a significant part of these forests, especially in Ilam province, have suffered a lot due to the phenomenon of oak decline. The first and most fundamental thing a person must know when combating this issue is the distribution of these areas in forests. Therefore, using the parameters affecting the decline in the forests of Ilam province and based on fuzzy logic, a map of susceptible to oak decline areas was prepared. In this study, the parameters of temperature and precipitation, slope, aspect, altitude, distance from farmlands, roads and forest density were selected as effective parameters and fuzzy gamma overlap method was used. The results showed that more than 77% of the oak forests in the province are highly and extremely susceptible to the decline. This confirms the need for rapid action to plan and protect these forests. In addition, the fuzzy method is proposed, which is considered as a fast and efficient method in preparing such maps for other areas.
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Oboudi, Behnam, Balint Dolnego, Ekaterina Glebova, Mohammad Hasan Abdollahi i Gabor Geczi. "DECISION-MAKING OF FOOTBALL REFEREES BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: PSYCHOLOGICAL, COMMUNICATIVE, AND FUNCTIONAL FACTORS". Russian Journal of Information Technology in Sports 1, nr 1 (8.02.2024): 21–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.62105/2949-6349-2023-1-1-21-42.
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This study aimed to prioritize the effects of COVID-19 and stadiums without spectators on the judgment of football referees, assistant football referees, futsal referees, and beach soccer referees in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches
were used to collect the data. The qualitative section involved interviews with 15 refereeing experts, while the quantitative section involved male and female football referees, futsal referees, and beach soccer referees in Iran (n=339). Following the interviews, a researcherdesigned questionnaire with 14 questions was electronically distributed among the referees. They were asked in general about the impact of the absence of spectators on their performance. To identify the factors and components affecting referees, factor analysis was conducted using SPSS software. Additionally, first- and second-order confirmatory factor analysis (SEM) was performed using LISREL software to validate the components. Finally, the identified factors were ranked using the Friedman test. It was found that stadiums
without spectators benefited young and inexperienced referees, as they were able to judge matches more effectively. The closed doors format also resulted in less psychological pressure on referees, players, and coaches, since there were no spectators to protest mistakes or poor performance.
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Vodyanov, I. N. "On the Role of the Media in Political Processes: the Arab Spring". Communicology 11, nr 3 (1.10.2023): 86–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.21453/2311-3065-2023-11-3-86-99.
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This article analyses the potential of the media in modeling different political processes. It examines theoretical aspects of media influence in instigating revolutionary and destabilising events and describes the key communicative-psychological tools of influence. The article also analyses the specifics of media policy to reinforce protest sentiments in Iran during the recent mass demonstrations. It describes in details the role and strategy of the media in the context of the Arab Spring, using the revolutionary events in Egypt and other Arab countries as an example. The article concludes that the media, including the “new media”, actively using Internet platforms and social media, plays an increasingly important role in shaping public opinion for certain political purposes.
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MOKHTARI, SEYEDEH REZVANEH, i BEHROOZ MOKHTARI. "A STUDY OF FAMILY ADVOCATE LAWS AND POLICIES IN IRAN (POST-ISLAMIC REVOLUTION)". Caspium Securitatis: Journal of Caspian Safety & Security 1, nr 1 (2021): 81–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.21672/2713-024x-2021-1-1-081-092.
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The study of social developments in Iran indicates slow but wide-ranging changes in recent years. With the Islamic Revolution (1979), Iranian society gradually faced increasing waves of fundamental cultural changes. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as the crossroads of Islam and modern law, considers the family as the fundamental unit of society and a sacred institution and therefore has always advocated “family. Based upon the tenth article of the Iranian constitution all laws, legal measures, regulations, and planning related to the family must be based on Islamic law and ethics (Islamic sharia) in order to facilitate its formation, protect its sanctity and strengthen family relations. The number of laws and policies and bills that were introduced in the period after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and in direct or indirect connection with the family institution is proof of this claim. This qualitative research has studied those policies and laws (1979 to 2020) that have represented the aim of advocating “Family”. Critical analysis has been used in the text as amethod of research. According to the results of the analysis, while “Governmental” reactions to “Family” issues have been mostly of economic essence and conservative approach, “Judicial” reactions have remained more responsible in case of addressing the contemporary problems of the “Family” institution. It is noteworthy that a review of legal policies shows that changes in the institution of the family have been identified by the government. A finding that shows the relative independence of the legal sphere from the sphere of government action. After the Iranian revolution, policies and programs have been implemented to support the family in the face of the challenges of modernization. Therefore, the purpose of this essay is to study the changes and developments of the family in the context of law and policy making and its impact on Iranian policy in the field of family.
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Ghammari, Fawzieh, Kousar Heidari i Habib Jalilian. "Financial protection and equity in the healthcare financing system in Iran: a cross-sectional study among slum dwellers with type 2 diabetes". BMJ Open 14, nr 5 (maj 2024): e081989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2023-081989.
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ObjectivesThis study was conducted to assess financial protection and equity in the healthcare financing system among slum dwellers with type 2 diabetes (T2D) in Iran in 2022.DesignCross-sectional study.SettingPrimary care centres in Iran were selected from slums.ParticipantsOur study included 400 participants with T2D using a systematic random sampling method. Patients were included if they lived in slums for at least five consecutive years, were over 18 years old and did not have intellectual disabilities.Primary and secondary measuresA self-report questionnaire was used to assess cost-coping strategies vis-à-vis T2D expenditures and factors influencing them, as well as forgone care among slum dwellers.ResultsOf the 400 patients who participated, 53.8% were female. Among the participants, 27.8% were illiterate, but 30.3% could read and write. 75.8% had income below 40 million Rial. There was an association between age, education, income, basic insurance, supplemental insurance and cost-coping strategies (p<0.001). 88.2% of those with first university degree used health insurance and 34% of illiterate people used personal savings. 79.8% of people with income over 4 million Rial reported using insurance to cope with healthcare costs while 55% of those with income under 4 million Rial reported using personal savings and a combination of health insurance and personal savings to cope with healthcare costs. As a result of binary logistic regression, illiterate people (adjusted OR=16, 95% CI 3.65 to 70.17), individuals with low income (OR 5.024, 95% CI 2.42 to 10.41) and people without supplemental insurance (OR 1.885, 95% CI 0.03 to 0.37) are more likely to use other forms of cost-coping strategies than health insurance.ConclusionsAs a result of insufficient use of insurance, cost-coping strategies used by slum dwellers vis-à-vis T2D expenditures do not protect them from financial risks. Expanding universal health coverage and providing supplemental insurance for those with T2D living in slums are recommended. Iran Health Insurance should adequately cover the costs of T2D care for slum dwellers so that they do not need to use alternative strategies.
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Khadem Makhsuos Hosseini, L. "Iranian Women’s Veiling as a Gender Performance: Since Premodern Era to the Current Age". Concept: philosophy, religion, culture 5, nr 1 (1.04.2021): 110–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2541-8831-2021-1-17-110-120.
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Iranian women’s veiling, as one of the major concerns of both women and the state, has been the subject of various studies. The present study in its broad range of investigation covers discussion of Iranian women’s hijab since pre-modern Iran to the current age. Meanwhile, it is more than a new historicist reflection on the way discourses construct norms. Here, within the framework of Butler’s performative theory, veiling is approached as a gender performance, which constructs and represents the identity of the wearer. The question is how Iranian women’s veiling as a gender performance is associated with competing discourses, and how recitations of veiling give them agency. It is hypothesized that women are not simply imposed the norm of veiling by the dominant discourses; rather, as active agents they can change the norms as they perform deviated recitation of norm of veiling. Veiling as a signifier has given different significations in each era, ranging from modesty, backwardness, nationalism, revolutionary, to displaying protest. We address the meanings that different dressing styles represent in three eras of pre-constitutional, post-constitutional, and postrevolutionary in Iran. Homogenized imposed veiling by Islamic authorities in pre-modern Iran, withdrew with secularization of state, was invoked as sign of revolution against the state, re-imposed by the state and ultimately fashioned by women. Thus, veiling in Iran is burdened with more cultural and even political meaning. In each discourse, the performance of veiling style defines women’s subjectivity as normal or abject. Women to be identified as viable subject perform the norms of religious or secularized modern discourse. The two produced binary polar, representing two kinds of subjectivities produced a gap between veiled, unveiled women or properly veiled and misveiled women. The imposed, removed and re-imposed hijab has not been the terminal decision of discourses. It is confirmed that today, Iranian women, supplied with education and global media can reflexively consider and fashion their identity. Nowadays, Iranian women’s fashion hijab is a deviated recitation of the idealized norm to resist the imposed norm. Fashion hijab as a deviated recitation of originally intended hijab by Islamic state is a threat to the Islamic discourse. Therefore, it is regarded as soft war imposed by Western culture on Iran. It is concluded that there has been a dialectical relationship between veiling performance of subjects as agents and viability of the dominant discourse.
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Ломакин, Б. Е. "Modelling media image of an event in comparative media discourse analysis". Cherepovets State University Bulletin, nr 2(119) (15.04.2024): 86–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.23859/1994-0637-2024-2-119-6.
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В статье предлагается метод сопоставительного изучения медиадискурсов, основанный на сравнительном анализе разных медиаобразов одного события. Каждый медиаобраз моделируется в виде набора ключевых слов, сгруппированных по микротемам. Применение метода демонстрируется на материале двух наборов медиатекстов, взятых из The Guardian и Le Monde и посвященных беспорядкам в Иране осенью 2022 г. Показано, что в рассмотренной группе текстов The Guardian использует апелляцию к ценностям для формирования образа врага, в то время как Le Monde стремится показать более сложную картину происходящего. The article proposes a new method of comparative media discourse analysis based on comparison of two media images of the same event, each media image being represented as a collection of key words by micro topics. The method is applied to two sets of media texts describing Iran street protests in late 2022, the first set taken from The Guardian, the second – from Le Monde websites. The research shows that while The Guardian portrays Iranian government as an enemy by appealing to British cultural values, Le Monde delineates a more complex vision of the event.
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Vameghi, Meroe, Mohammad Saatchi, Giti Bahrami, Farin Soleimani i Marzieh Takaffoli. "How did we protect children against COVID-19 in Iran? Prevalence of COVID-19 and vaccination in the socio-economic context of COVID-19 epidemic". PLOS ONE 19, nr 5 (9.05.2024): e0303043. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0303043.
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Introduction The COVID-19 pandemic posed significant risks to children worldwide. This study aimed to assess the COVID-19 protection status of children and explored the relationship between household socio-economic status and COVID-19 morbidity and preventive measures, including vaccination and mask-wearing, in two cities in Iran. Method A population-based cross-sectional study was conducted from July to October 2022 among 7 to 18-year-old children and their families in Tehran and Karaj. A total of 3,022 samples were selected using stratified multistage cluster sampling. Data were collected through interviews with children and adults, using questionnaires and was analyzed with Stata software version 14. Results The analysis focused on 2,878 children with a median age of 12. Over half (54%) reported that the pandemic negatively affected their family’s financial status, with 45% describing its impact on children’s needs as negative or very negative. Just under 50% of respondents consistently wore masks during the study period, and around 54% had received at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine. Reasons for not getting vaccinated included concerns about side effects, ineligibility for the target age group, and overcrowding at vaccination sites. The odds of not getting vaccinated were significantly lower for children aged 15–18, with boys more likely to refuse vaccination than girls. Conclusion The financial impact of the pandemic in Iran affected families’ ability to meet their children’s needs. Moreover, low vaccination acceptance rates increased children’s vulnerability to health problems and contributed to COVID-19 infections. Efforts should be made to increase vaccination acceptance, particularly among immigrant populations.
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Podrezov, M. A. "Do Shia-Sunni Tensions Affect Iranian-Saudi Relations?" Concept: philosophy, religion, culture 7, nr 2 (17.06.2023): 50–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2541-8831-2023-2-26-50-62.
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Today the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is one of the defining factors in the Middle East political arena. The Islamic world's division into Shiite and Sunni is often considered a factor affecting bilateral relations between Tehran and Riyadh. Iran positions itself as the center of gravity for all the Shiites in the region, while Saudi Arabia seeks to form an anti-Iranian alliance on a Sunni basis. This article assesses the impact of the doctrinal tensions between these two branches of Islam on the Iranian approach towards its relations with Saudi Arabia. For this purpose, the author analyses the rhetoric of Iranian officials, clerics, and state-run media in the context of the main concepts of the Iranian contemporary religious ideology. The author concludes that criticism of Saudi Arabia has lost its religious connotation and Tehran does not position its confrontation with Riyadh as a fight against the enemies of Islam or apostates. The traditional epithets classifying their holders as supporters of the forces of darkness and actively used against the Western countries and Israel are not cited by critics of the Saudi dynasty. Moreover, the criticism of Wahhabism as a religious movement is not linked to the kingdom's current political leadership. On the contrary, the Iranian criticism of the Saudi foreign and domestic policies focuses on condemning the Saudi authorities' infringement on human rights and media freedom, supporting the protest movement in Iran, and fighting the Houthis. Even the persecution of Shiites in Saudi Arabia, to which the Iranian press has devoted considerable attention, is viewed from the perspective of the global concept of human rights, rather than as the struggle of one religious group against another. The kingdom itself is not considered an ideological enemy of Iran, which since the Islamic Revolution has been the US and Israel. The statements by some representatives of the Iranian political establishment on the need for peaceful coexistence between the two countries, along with the March 2023 agreements on normalizing bilateral relations indicate Tehran's pragmatic approach to interaction with Riyadh which is not affected by the ShiaSunni controversy in its dogmatic and religious dimensions.
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Mayorov, Andrey V. "Juvenile Victimology: Review of the 1st International Scientific and Practical Conference". Victimology 10, nr 3 (13.07.2023): 259–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.47475/2411-0590-2023-10-3-259-262.
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On June 1, 2023, the first online conference “Juvenile Victimology” was held in conjunction with the International Children’s Day . Scientists from leading universities of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Dagestan, Iran, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey discussed the existing problems of protecting children’s rights and their interests from criminal offenses, presented the results of ongoing research on juvenile victimization in our country and abroad, and proposed victimological measures to protect child victims of crime . The materials of the conference are published in the current issue of the journal Victimology .As a result of the scientific event, it was decided to hold the conference “Juvenile Victimology” on a regular basis .
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Krylov, German L. "The Key Features of the Sadrist Movement (“At-Tayyar As-Sadri”) as a Player in the Political Process in Present-Day Iraq". Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, nr 1 (2022): 179. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640015337-8.
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The Sadrist Movement (“at-Tayyār as-Sadri”) broke into Iraqi politics in the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's government as a result of the US invasion in 2003. The previously clandestine movement emerged from the shadows and proved to be a powerful force that dramatically adjusted Washington's plans for Iraq. Muqtada as-Sadr who positions himself as an anticorruption fighter and champion of equality and social justice, united under his umbrella people of sundry political views: from graduates of Shia religious schools to secular-minded left-wingers. As-Sadr’s personality, shaded by the haloed figure of his father-martyr, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq as-Sadr, plays an essential role in consolidating such a vast variety of beliefs. Meanwhile, the absence of strict hierarchy and organizational structure inside the movement prevents Muqtada as-Sadr from effectively managing the “sadrist current”, which at the same time is strongly influenced by his own instable and unpredictable character. An old ally of Iran with the history of effective cooperation dating back to the times of anti-American resistance, as-Sadr maintains substantial independence from Tehran, despite his uttered support for the “Wilāyat al-Faqīh” theory understood in large part identically with the ideological doctrine of the Islamic Republic, as it seems from as-Sadr’s declarations. This makes him a hard but indispensable partner of Iranians in Iraq. In general, as-Sadr prefers to avoid taking serious political responsibilities, feeling comfortable in a specific métier of gadfly and dissenter. However, he provided vital support for the government in crucial moments, as his supporters actively participated in the operations of popular mobilization forces against ISIS, as well as in actions aimed to moderate and curb the mass protests in 2019–2020. As-Sadr also repeatedly advocated the idea of the popular mobilization forces integration into the structures of the federal army, thus contributing to the latent government-led campaign of re-establishing the state’s monopoly on armed operations.
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Rahimdel, Mohammad Javad. "INJURY ANALYSIS OF IRAN’S MINING WORKPLACES". Rudarsko-geološko-naftni zbornik 36, nr 1 (2021): 15–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.17794/rgn.2021.1.2.
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Mining is a high-risk industry that exposes operators and workers to a high level of occupational health and safety hazards caused by vehicle accidents, blasting, or collapse. This paper aims to analyse the serious and fatal accidents in Iran’s mines over a six-year period, from 2012 to 2017. The data sources were the statistical results of the occupational accidents reported by the National Statistical Centre of Iran and the importance measure of incidents defined by the questionnaires received from the mine safety and health experts. This research presents a model for the prioritization of the mining workplace based on the weighted injury risk of the occupational incidents in the mining industry. The results of this work show that the coal mines of Iran have the highest work-related incidence rate which requires special safety attention. Moreover, the total temporary disability risk is currently at the lowest level in all mining activities, while the fatality risk has significantly increased in the coal mines in recent years. The results obtained from this study are helpful to detect the dangerous mining workplaces and to protect workers from workplace hazards by considering the safety guidelines.
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Al Jabori, M. "Iraq ∙ Conflicts, Protests and Bad Management: Is There a Way Out for Iraq’s Public Procurement Problems?" European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review 16, nr 3 (2021): 260–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.21552/epppl/2021/3/14.
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Lawandow, Atoor. "Women, the Homeland, and the Sectarian Frontier: ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suwaydī's Narrative Accounts of Persian Campaigns in Ottoman Iraq". Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association 9, nr 2 (wrzesień 2022): 267–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.2979/tur.2022.a902158.
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ABSTRACT: In this article I analyze the texts of the Ottoman-Iraqi author ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Suwaydī (1721–1785) to investigate whether models of participation in national processes available to women in Ottoman Iraq emerged as a result of the Ottoman Empire's adaptation of European nationalism or whether these models existed in some form prior to and helped accelerate the acceptance of European nationalism by the Ottomans. A close reading of al-Suwaydī's accounts of historical events shows that the relationship between women and the state was one in which women were cast as objects of protection. In al-Suwaydī's narratives of encounters with the Shiʿi-Persian Other, women are signifiers of ethnic and sectarian difference and objects of men's protection. Prior to the emergence of Europe as "Other" and as a threat to Ottoman hegemony, men's honor was tied to cloistering women to protect them from falling into captivity or corruption at the hands of Shiʿi Persians, who were cast as Other.
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Melkumyan, Elena. "Evolution of Civil Society in Kuwait (1961–2020)". Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, nr 1 (2023): 141. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640021372-7.
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The article is devoted to the analysis of the development of civil society in Kuwait, one of the oil–producing monarchies of the Gulf region, which was distinguished by a high degree of civic activity. The purpose of the article is to trace the stages of the development of civil society in the context of domestic and international situation dynamics. The role of several key political events from the history of the country in the direction of civil activism of its inhabitants is shown The first stage refers to the period when the country gained political independence. At that time, the formation of civil society was influenced by the Kuwaiti crisis, when Iraq put forward claims to Kuwait as part of its state, which led to the growth of civil consciousness.The next stage was the period following the Iraqi aggression against the country in August 1990, creating another factor of civil society mobilization aimed at resisting the occupiers and protecting its national identity. Its further transformation takes place during the mass protests of 2011, to the present state. At that time, civil activity in Kuwait reached a peak level, especially among youth groups, but soon began to decline under the influence of turbulence that became reality of the region and related threats to society as a whole. Mass protests demonstrated that civil activity in Kuwait reached a peak level, especially among youth groups, but soon began to decline under the influence of turbulence that engulfed the region and related threats to society as a whole. The non-governmental organizations that emerged at that time were fragmentary. Most of them were created on the basis of the interests of small groups that solved tasks that had no significance for the broad strata of Kuwaiti society.