Gotowe bibliografie tematyczne / Intentionalism

Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Intentionalism”

Autor: Grafiati
Data publikacji: 4 czerwca 2021
Data aktualizacji: 11 marca 2023

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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Intentionalism"

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van Mazijk, Corijn. "Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47, nr 4 (2017): 499–517. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2016.1255500.

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AbstractThis paper discusses Husserl’s theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found inIdeas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl (i) covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is (ii) essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that (iii) the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In the third part, I show that Husserl also (iv) offers resources against intentionalism’s exclusive concern with propositional content.
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MITROVIĆ, BRANKO. "INTENTIONALISM, INTENTIONALITY, AND REPORTING BELIEFS". History and Theory 48, nr 3 (październik 2009): 180–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2303.2009.00503.x.

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Hulbert, Frederick. "In Defence of Moderate Actual Intentionalism". Aesthetic Investigations 4, nr 2 (6.09.2021): 236–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.58519/aesthinv.v4i2.11917.

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The extent to which the artist’s intentions are a relevant consideration in the interpretation of art has long been the subject of critical debate. Initially, I outline the various interpretive positions which have been established, specifically focusing on the debate between hypothetical intentionalism and moderate actual intentionalism. Then I look at some previous test cases which have, as yet, failed to demonstrate a decisive victory for either side. Finally, I offer two new test cases, one from the field of contemporary visual art and the other from literary theory. I argue that the former serves to debunk hypothetical intentionalism and the latter lends support to the moderate actual intentionalist position.
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Iseminger, Gary. "Actual Intentionalism vs. Hypothetical Intentionalism". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54, nr 4 (1996): 319. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/431914.

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ISEMINGER, GARY. "Actual Intentionalism Vs. Hypothetical Intentionalism". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54, nr 4 (1.09.1996): 319–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1540_6245.jaac54.4.0319.

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Byrne, Alex. "Intentionalism Defended". Philosophical Review 110, nr 2 (kwiecień 2001): 199. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2693675.

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Byrne, A. "Intentionalism Defended". Philosophical Review 110, nr 2 (1.04.2001): 199–240. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-2-199.

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Michaels, Walter Benn. "Intentionalism, Again". Law & Literature 1, nr 1 (marzec 1989): 89–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1535685x.1989.11015644.

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Nickel, Bernard. "Against intentionalism". Philosophical Studies 136, nr 3 (26.09.2006): 279–304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-2013-2.

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Michaels, Walter Benn. "Intentionalism, Again". Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 1, nr 1 (kwiecień 1989): 89–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/27670193.

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Rozprawy doktorskie na temat "Intentionalism"

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Hager, Steven Christopher. "An Incompatibility between Intentionalism and Multiple Authorship in Film". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2009. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/57.

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The multiple authorship view for film is the claim that multiple authors exist for almost any given film. This view is a recent development in opposition to the longstanding single authorship view which holds that there is only one author for every film, usually the director. One of the most often-cited reasons in support of the multiple authorship claim is that multiple authorship views more successfully explain the following fact about filmmaking better than single authorship views: filmmakers’ intentions sometimes conflict with each other during the production of a film. However, since multiple authorship views cannot adequately explain how a single filmic utterance can result from conflicting intentions, I want to argue that the single authorship view should be reinstated in those special cases where two or more agents are involved in the production of a filmic utterance and where the intentions of those agents are incompatible.
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Grewal, Siddhant. "Intentionalism as metacriticism : a reassessment of the intentional fallacy". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2016. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/88752/.

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In 1946, Monroe C. Beardsley and W. K. Wimsatt published an article, “The Intentional Fallacy,” which objected to the critical practice of treating claims about an artist as claims about her work. Thus was inaugurated what today is known as the intentionalism debate. I begin by offering a certain conception of the debate—not quite a novel conception, for it corresponds more or less to what Beardsley and Wimsatt took themselves to be doing, but one which, in recent decades, has increasingly been supplanted by something very different. I argue for the priority of this original conception, which is concerned primarily with the language and norms of criticism, over the more recent conceptions which focus on analyses of meaning. I then propose a view which defends the artist’s relevance against the objections of Beardsley and Wimsatt, so understood. The interest of my view lies in its circumvention of what many have (incorrectly) thought essential to the position to which Beardsley and Wimsatt were objecting.
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Hoyer, Steven. "Intention and interpretation". Thesis, McGill University, 1993. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=68104.

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This thesis is in two chapters. Chapter one is about intentions. Literary theorists have, by and large, dismissed their relevance to interpretation, so it will be useful to consider what exactly is being ignored. Therefore, I devote chapter one to a clarification of the nature and role(s) of intention within the interlocking network of basic propositional attitudes. I argue that intentions incorporate both a functional and a representational dimension, triggering actional mechanisms and structuring the process of practical reasoning.
Chapter two is about interpretation. I open the chapter with an examination of extreme conventionalist theses, arguing that their success depends on an unjustifiably strict demarcation between intentionality and textuality. Appropriating aspects of Donald Davidson's work in the philosophy of language, I argue for the recognition of linguistic communication as a form of intentional action. I then defend this thesis against more moderate conventionalist theories to offer a viable approach to the interpretation of literary works.
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Shallcross, Wendy L. "Enhanced attention to "motionese" do infants prefer infant-directed to adult-directed action? /". Click here for download, 2006. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/villanova/fullcit?p1434312.

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Fehross, Anson. "Against intentionalism: a reappraisal of artefactual metaphysics, with an eye to weaponry". Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/12460.

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It is commonplace to talk of weapons being ‘misused’ in certain contexts. We might say that whenever a policeman uses a Taser on a struggling suspect to force compliance that he has ‘misused’ his weapon. This might be justified by reference to the intention of a designer, who wished the Taser to be a purely defensive weapon. What is of note is that such a claim is predicated on the acceptance on a prior metaphysical outlook: that in order to determine the nature of a weapon, or any artefact whatsoever, we must turn to the intentions of the designer. This is emblematic of intentionalism, the metaphysical outlook that artefact kinds are determined by reference to the intention of the designer. Intentionalism represents the default view within contemporary analytic philosophers of technology. I intend to provide an account that undermines this view, supplanting it with what I term the optimality account. Under this account we ought to define artefacts by reference to their capacity to function well as tokens of a particular artefact type. This thesis has two main goals. The first is to provide a persuasive account of why we should reject the claim that artefacts are defined by their designer’s intentions. In so doing, weaponry will be utilised as both a focus and a case study of why such an account is grossly inadequate to the data before us. Second, the account given here will provide a positive account of artefact metaphysics that will link the nature of weapons to their capacity to be optimal as means of harming others.
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Bordini, D. "THE TRANSPARENCIES AND THE OPACITIES OF EXPERIENCE. INTENTIONALISM, PHENOMENAL CHARACTER, AND MOODS". Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/236976.

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According to Intentionalism, what it’s like to undergo a conscious experience (i.e. its phenomenal character) is nothing over and above what that experience represents (i.e. its intentional content). This view is usually thought to be directly and strongly supported by introspective evidence and, in particular, by the following introspective datum, the so-called transparency of experience: in introspection one is not aware of the intrinsic qualities of one’s experience, but the only features one is directly aware of appear as properties of mind-independent, external objects of the world. (Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995, 2000) This suggests that all that there is about our conscious experience is nothing over and above its intentional content. In this dissertation, I focus on and address the issue of the transparency of experience and its relations with Intentionalism. More precisely, I consider why and how transparency exactly supports Intentionalism, what is the scope of transparency, what exactly is its strength, and what are the consequences on Intentionalism in case transparency fails. In particular, I argue for these two interconnected claims: (1) experience is not transparent in the sense required by Intentionalism; (2) introspection does not support Intentionalism but, on the contrary, offers strong reasons against it. In order to develop my argument, I consider the case study of moods, namely, affective states like anxiety, depression, elation, grumpiness, gloominess, irritation, etc. The discussion on moods provides the following two main results. (i) At least some moods–– e.g., undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation––are genuinely undirected, as long as they are not other-presenting experiences. This is not dependent on some deficiency/inability of the introspector, but it is a fact about their phenomenal character: it is constitutively part of what it’s like to be in those moods. (ii) The fact that those experiences are not other-presenting leads to conclude that they are also fully opaque experiences (i.e. entirely non-transparent experiences). Indeed, as I argue, one minimal condition for transparency is being other-presenting. These two results have important consequences both on Intentionalism and on transparency. For what concerns the consequences on Intentionalism, the opacity of undirected moods is not only a mere lack of evidence in support of Intentionalism; rather, it constitutes a source of evidence against it. That undirected moods are opaque, indeed, means that their phenomenal character, as it is revealed in introspection, is such that it cannot be identified with intentional content. So, I argue, if one considers transparency as a strong evidence in support of the claim that phenomenal character is intentional content, then, and for the same reasons, one should also accept that opacity is strong evidence against that claim. Thus, Intentionalism as a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character is to be rejected because the opacity of undirected moods offers introspective direct and strong evidence against it. On the other hand, as for transparency, with Kind’s (2003) distinction between strong and weak transparency at hand, I argue that transparency should not be rejected altogether, but rather revised in its strength and thereby understood in terms of weak transparency, where this means the following: although difficult, it is still not impossible to be introspectively aware of the qualities of the experience. Thus, I claim, experience is not strongly transparent (i.e. the way the intentionalist would like it to be) but weakly transparent. Hence, my twofold conclusion: (1) experience is not transparent in the (strong) sense required by Intentionalism; (2) introspection does not support Intentionalism but, on the contrary, offers strong evidence against it. Although these results suggest a rejection of Intentionalism, my final suggestion is that this is to be done in a constructive way. So, in the very final paragraphs I offer some general considerations on how to make sense of an alternative view that keeps the best of the intentionalist proposal and, at the same time, drops what is wrong with it.
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Arborelius, Jon. "Den implicite författaren : En diskussion kring begreppet "implicit författare", med en exemplifierande analys av Karl Ove Knausgårds roman Min kamp". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Litteraturvetenskapliga institutionen, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-242763.

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Uppsatsen undersöker och diskuterar begreppet "implicit författare" med utgångspunkt i en hypotetisk-intentionalistisk tolkningsmodell för skönlitterära texter. Uppsatsens syfte är att fördjupa och precisera begreppet "implicit författare", samt att visa hur begreppet kan vara behjälpligt vid en analys av ett skönlitterärt verk. Uppsatsen avslutas med en exemplifierande analys av inledningen till Karl Ove Knausgårds roman Min kamp.
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Söderberg, Vendela. "”Hur blir man medborgare, om man ingenting vet om livet runt omkring? Först när man själv har hamnat i fällan, får man omsider kunskap.” : En komparativ och kvalitativ textanalys om Gulags framställning i skolböcker 1970-2010". Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Historia, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-45767.

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”Min farfar pratade inte om det han var med om i Stalins Gulagläger om man inte pressade honom.” Detta skriver historikern Anton Weiss-Wendt om sin farfar, Helmut Weiss, som förlorade 20 år av sitt liv i Gulag.  Den här historien och fler därtill, kände världen inte till. Sovjetunionens sönderfall inträffade år 1991 och censuren upphävdes. Tidigare hemligstämplade dokument av politiska makthavare offentliggjordes och allmänheten i väst fick kunskap om Gulaglägren i första hand tack vare nobelpristagaren Aleksandr Solzjenitsyns böcker.  Genom en komparativ och kvalitativ textanalys av sex skolböcker från olika decennier och en granskning av styrdokument kommer jag i den här uppsatsen att undersöka hur historiedidaktik och officiella riktlinjer har påverkat läroböckernas innehåll. Detta med Gulag framställning i skolböcker i Sverige som det centrala forskningsområdet.
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Weiss, Jeremy. "A Feeling Theory of Feelings". The Ohio State University, 2016. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1462182103.

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Hussin, Nora Anniesha Binte. "Interaction from an activity theoretical perspective comparing learner discourse of language face-to-face, in chat and in audio conferencing in second language learning /". Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B41758146.

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Książki na temat "Intentionalism"

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Intentional horizons: The mind from an epistemic point of view. Paderborn: Mentis, 2009.

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Velleman, J. David. Practical reflection. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

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Rausch, Adly. Kritische Analyse des handlungstheoretischen Ansatzes in der Psychologie. Regensburg: S. Roderer Verlag, 1992.

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Steller, Birgit. Vorsätze und die Wahrnehmung günstiger Gelegenheiten. München: Tuduv, 1992.

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Neppl, Rainer. Intentionalität: Eine Spezialbibliographie deutschsprachiger psychologischer Literatur. Trier: Zentralstelle für Psychologische Information und Dokumentation, Universität Trier, 1994.

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The complete vision board kit: Using the power of intention to fulfill your dreams. New York: Atria Books, 2008.

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Assaraf, John. The complete vision board kit: Using the power of intention to fulfill your dreams. New York: Atria Books, 2008.

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Bratman, Michael. Intention, plans, and practical reason. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987.

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Bratman, Michael. Intention, plans, and practical reason. Stanford, Calif: Center for the Study of Language and Information, 1999.

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Open minds: The social making of agency and intentionality. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2012.

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Części książek na temat "Intentionalism"

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Aalto-Heinilä, Maija. "Intentionalism". W Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 1–7. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_1125-1.

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von Savigny, Eike. "Against intentionalism". W The Social Foundations of Meaning, 84–99. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-73464-9_6.

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Funkhouser, Eric. "Intentionalism and divided mind accounts". W Self-Deception, 135–70. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | Series: New problems of philosophy: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315146782-4.

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Pendoley, Kathryn, i Sarah Arnaud. "Intentionalism, Ambivalent Emotions, and the Body". W The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence, 197–215. New York, NY : Routledge, 2021.: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429030246-13.

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Livingston, Paisley. "Authorial Intention and the Varieties of Intentionalism". W A Companion to the Philosophy of Literature, 399–419. Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444315592.ch21.

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Yoshimi, Jeffrey. "Intentionality". W SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, 39–45. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26698-5_5.

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Kersten, Fred. "Intentionality". W Contributions to Phenomenology, 350–55. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-5344-9_79.

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Sistare, C. T. "Intentionality". W Responsibility and Criminal Liability, 93–118. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-2440-6_6.

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Engelsted, Niels. "Intentionality". W Catching Up With Aristotle, 41–48. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-51088-0_5.

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Amerini, Fabrizio. "Intentionality". W Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, 1–8. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1151-5_245-2.

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Streszczenia konferencji na temat "Intentionalism"

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De Preester, Helena. "Intentionality, Representation, and Anticipation". W COMPUTING ANTICIPATORY SYSTEMS: CASYS 2001 - Fifth International Conference. AIP, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.1503699.

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Schmidt, Jon A. "The Intentionality of Design". W Structures Congress 2011. Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/41171(401)94.

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Zhuo, Huihui, Sanqing Hu, Mark H. Myers, Jianhai Zhang, Wanzeng Kong, Yu Cao i Robert Kozma. "Causality analysis during shared intentionality". W 2016 12th World Congress on Intelligent Control and Automation (WCICA). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wcica.2016.7578790.

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Tenenberg, Josh, i Yifat Ben-David Kolikant. "Computer programs, dialogicality, and intentionality". W the tenth annual conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2632320.2632351.

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Julià, Pere. "Intentionality, self-reference and anticipation". W The first international conference on computing anticipatory systems. AIP, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.56302.

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Oganov, A. "SEMANTIC INTENTIONALITY OF ARTISTIC TEXT". W Aesthetics and Hermeneutics. LCC MAKS Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.29003/m2559.978-5-317-06726-7/118-120.

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The article examines the ontological status of a work of art. The main attention is paid to the characteristics of its being aspect and the ability to generate meanings. An attempt is made to substantiate the self-sufficiency of the work. The question of the relationship between artistic reality and objective reality is considered from the standpoint of aesthetic distance,externality in relation tothe latter. The appeal tothe concept of play is conditioned by the aim to model the way of being of a work of art.
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Gong, Tao, James W. Minett i William S. Y. Wang. "Coevolution of language and intentionality sharing". W 2009 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cec.2009.4983124.

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Mircică, Nela. "Rhetoric and Intentionality in the Political Discourse". W WLC 2016 World LUMEN Congress. Logos Universality Mentality Education. Cognitive-crcs, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.15405/epsbs.2016.09.74.

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Mitsuya, Takashi, i Kevin Munhall. "Intentionality and categories in speech motor control". W ICA 2013 Montreal. ASA, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1121/1.4800727.

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Serrano, Milene, Maurício Serrano i Carlos José Pereira de Lucena. "UBIQUITOUS SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT DRIVEN BY AGENTS’ INTENTIONALITY". W 11th International Conference on Enterprise Information Systems. SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.5220/0001857400250034.

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Raporty organizacyjne na temat "Intentionalism"

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Hillestad, Torgeir Martin. The Metapsychology of Evil: Main Theoretical Perspectives Causes, Consequences and Critique. University of Stavanger, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.31265/usps.224.

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The purpose of this text or dissertation is to throw some basic light on a fundamental problem concerning manhood, namely the question of evil, its main sources, dynamics and importance for human attitudes and behaviour. The perspective behind the analysis itself is that of psychology. Somebody, or many, may feel at bit nervous by the word “evil” itself. It may very well be seen as too connected to religion, myth and even superstition. Yet those who are motivated to lose oneself in the subject retain a deep interest in human destructiveness, malevolence and hate, significant themes pointing at threatening prospects for mankind. The text is organized or divided into four main ordinary chapters, the three first of them organized or divided into continuous and numbered sections. A crucial point or question is of cause how to define evil itself. It can of cause be done both intentional, instrumental and by consequence. Other theorists however have stated that the concept of evil exclusively rests on a myth originated in the Judean-Christian conception of Satan and ultimate evil. This last argument presupposes evil itself as non-existent in the real rational world. It seems however a fact that most people attach certain basic meaning to the concept, mainly that it represents ultimately bad and terrible actions and behaviour directed toward common people for the purpose of bringing upon them ultimate pain and suffer. However, there is no room for essentialism here, meaning that we simply can look “inside” some original matter to get to know what it “really” is. Rather, a phenomenon gets its identity from the constituted meaning operating within a certain human communities and contexts loaded with intentionality and inter-subjective meaning. As mentioned above, the concept of evil can be interpreted both instrumental and intentional, the first being the broadest of them. Here evil stands for behaviour and human deeds having terrifying or fatal consequences for subjects and people or in general, regardless of the intentions behind. The intentional interpretation however, links the concept to certain predispositions, characteristics and even strong motives in subjects, groups and sometimes political systems and nations. I will keep in mind and clear the way for both these perspectives for the discussion in prospect. This essay represents a psychological perspective on evil, but makes it clear that a more or less complete account of such a psychological view also should include a thorough understanding or integration of some basic social and even biological assumptions. However, I consider a social psychological position of significant importance, especially because in my opinion it represents some sort of coordination of knowledge and theoretical perspectives inherent in the subject or problem itself, the main task here being to integrate perspectives of a psychological as well as social and biological kind. Since humans are essential social creatures, the way itself to present knowledge concerning the human condition, must be social of some sort and kind, however not referring to some kind of reductionism where social models of explanation possess or holds monopoly. Social and social psychological perspectives itself represents parts of the whole matter regarding understanding and explanation of human evil. The fact that humans present, or has to represent themselves as humans among other humans, means that basically a social language is required both to explain and describe human manners and ways of being. This then truly represents its own way or, more correctly, level or standard of explanation, which makes social psychology some sort of significant, though not sufficient. More substantial, the vision itself of integrating different ontological and theoretical levels and objects of science for the purpose of manifesting or make real a full-fledged psychological perspective on evil, should be considered or characterized a meta-psychological perspective. The text is partially constructed as a review of existing theories and theorists concerning the matter of evil and logically associated themes such as violence, mass murder, genocide, antisocial behaviour in general, aggression, hate and cruelty. However, the demands of making a theoretical distinction between these themes, although connected, is stressed. Above all, an integral perspective combining different scientific disciplines is aimed at.
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