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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Intensional logic"
Anderson, C. Anthony. "Zalta's intensional logic". Philosophical Studies 69, nr 2-3 (marzec 1993): 221–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00990086.
Pełny tekst źródłaMajkić, Zoran. "Conservative Intensional Extension of Tarski's Semantics". Advances in Artificial Intelligence 2013 (26.02.2013): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/920157.
Pełny tekst źródłaPriest, Graham. "Intensional paradoxes." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 32, nr 2 (marzec 1991): 193–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093635745.
Pełny tekst źródłaLeone, Nicola, Luigi Palopoli i Massimo Romeo. "MODIFYING INTENSIONAL LOGIC KNOWLEDGE". Fundamenta Informaticae 21, nr 3 (1994): 183–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.3233/fi-1994-2132.
Pełny tekst źródłada Costa, Newton C. A., i Décio Krause. "An Intensional Schrödinger Logic". Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38, nr 2 (kwiecień 1997): 179–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1039724886.
Pełny tekst źródłaFitting, Melvin. "First-order intensional logic". Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 127, nr 1-3 (czerwiec 2004): 171–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.apal.2003.11.014.
Pełny tekst źródłaJiang, Yue J. "An intensional epistemic logic". Studia Logica 52, nr 2 (1993): 259–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01058391.
Pełny tekst źródłaBull, R. A., i Johan van Benthem. "A Manual of Intensional Logic." Journal of Symbolic Logic 54, nr 4 (grudzień 1989): 1489. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2274837.
Pełny tekst źródłaPayne, Jonathan. "Extensionalizing Intensional Second-Order Logic". Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56, nr 1 (2015): 243–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00294527-2835092.
Pełny tekst źródłaCocchiarella, Nino B. "Conceptualism, realism, and intensional logic". Topoi 8, nr 1 (marzec 1989): 15–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00138676.
Pełny tekst źródłaRozprawy doktorskie na temat "Intensional logic"
Martins, Francisco Gomes. "A lÃgica das entidades intensionais". Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2012. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=8392.
Pełny tekst źródłaUm grave problema presente quando aplicamos semÃntica composicional, que atribui simples valores de verdade a frases, à que quando essas seqÃÃncias estÃo presentes em alguns contextos especÃficos, a substituiÃÃo de certas expressÃes com a mesma referÃncia pode cambiar o valor de verdade da frase maior ou entÃo impedir que inferÃncias vÃlidas sejam realizadas. Por exemplo, da afirmaÃÃo "Pedro acredita que Alexandre o Grande foi aluno de AristÃteles", nÃo se pode inferir corretamente neste contexto de crenÃa que a substituiÃÃo de "Alexandre o grande" por "o vencedor da batalha de Arbela" seja vÃlida porque eventualmente Pedro pode nÃo saber que "Alexandre o Grande à o vencedor da batalha de Arbela" e por isso a verdade das premissas nÃo garante a verdade da conclusÃo: "Pedro acredita que o vencedor da batalha de Arbela foi aluno de AristÃteles". A conclusÃo nÃo se segue pois ela nÃo depende da relaÃÃo de identidade efetiva entre âAlexandre o Grandeâ e âO vencedor da Arbelaâ, e sim depende, de maneira contingente, do conjunto de crenÃas de Pedro; ou ainda, segundo Frege, depende do sentido que Pedro associa a descriÃÃo âAlexandre o Grandeâ. Em contextos intensionais a verdade da conclusÃo (apÃs substituiÃÃo) depende de uma maneira especÃfica da maneira de conceber o nome em questÃo, por isso a substituiÃÃo entre nomes cujo referente à o mesmo, mas que diferem em sentido, nÃo funciona em todos os casos. O fato à que Frege nunca estabeleceu critÃrios de identidade para o sentido (Sinn), apenas reservou-se a declarar simplesmente que o sentido à o "modo de apresentaÃÃo" da referÃncia. Pretendemos apresentar critÃrios de identidade para o sentido em geral, e em contextos intensionais, em particular. Os sucessores de Frege, dentre eles o lÃgico Alonzo Church e o filÃsofo Rudolf Carnap foram os primeiros a estabelecer que duas expressÃes tÃm o mesmo sentido se e somente se sÃo sinonimamente isomorfas e intensionalmente isomorfas, respectivamente. Tais critÃrios devem ser entendidos à luz dos pressupostos lÃgicos de Church em sua LÃgica do Sentido e da DenotaÃÃo (LSD) e das idÃias de Carnap â muitas delas constituintes do programa filosÃfico do Positivismo lÃgico, em seu livro Meaning and Necessity. Mais recentemente, Pavel Tichà estabeleceu de maneira mais exata o que à o sentido e sua identidade atravÃs do Procedural isomorphism o qual constitui um dos fundamentos da LÃgica Intensional Transparente (TIL).
A feature of the distinction between extensionalism and intensionalism, which has been widely taken as a criterion to separate the two positions, is that within an extensionalist logic, substitution is possible salva veritate (that is, without thereby changing the truth-value of the statement concerned) with respect to identical instances of some basic logical form â and in an intensionalist logic it is not. The different logical forms with respect to which such substitution might take place accounts for some of the variety of different extensionalisms on offer in the current philosophical landscape. So our starting-point is Fregeâs puzzle. This question is frequently accepted as one of the foundations of modern semantics. To explain why a true sentence of the form âa = bâ can be informative, unlike a sentence of the form âa = aâ, Frege introduced an entity standing between an expression and the object denoted (bezeichnet) by the expression. He named this entity Sinn (sense) and explained the informative character of the true âa=bâ-shaped sentences by saying that âaâ and âbâ denote one and the same object but differ in expressing (ausdrÃcken) distinct senses. The problem, though, is that Frege never defined sense. The conception of senses as procedures that is developed here has much in common with a number of other accounts that represent meanings, also, as structured objects of various kinds, though not necessarily as procedures. In the modern literature, this idea goes back to Rudolph Carnapâs (1947) notion of intensional isomorphism. Church in (1954) constructs an example of expressions that are intensionally isomorphic according to Carnapâs definition (i.e., expressions that share the same structure and whose parts are necessarily equivalent), but which fail to satisfy the principle of substitutability. The problem Church tackled is made possible by Carnapâs principle of tolerance (which itself is plausible). We are free to introduce into a language syntactically simple expressions which denote the same intension in different ways and thus fail to be synonymous. TichÃâs objectualist take on âoperation-processesâ may be seen in part as linguistic structures transposed into an objectual key; operations, procedures, structures are not fundamentally and inherently syntactic items, but fully-fledged, non-linguistic entities, namely, constructions.
Fritz, Peter. "Intensional type theory for higher-order contingentism". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b9415266-ad21-494a-9a78-17d2395eb8dd.
Pełny tekst źródłaBlackburn, Patrick Rowan. "Nominal tense logic and other sorted intensional frameworks". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/6588.
Pełny tekst źródłaKavvos, Georgios Alexandros. "On the semantics of intensionality and intensional recursion". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2017. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f89b46d8-b514-42fd-9321-e2803452681f.
Pełny tekst źródłaLavers, Peter Stanley. "Generating intensional logics : the application of paraconsistent logics to investigate certain areas of the boundaries of mathematics /". Title page, table of contents and summary only, 1985. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09ARM/09arml399.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaFontaine, Matthieu. "Argumentation et engagement ontologique de l’acte intentionnel : Pour une réflexion critique sur l’identité dans les logiques intentionnelles explicites". Thesis, Lille 3, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013LIL30025/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaIntentionality is that faculty of human mind whereby it is directed towards objects of all kinds. It is recorded linguistically in verbs such as "to know", "to believe", "to fear", "to hope". Intentional statements such as "John thinks that Nosferatu is a vampire" or "Oedipus loves Jocasta" challenge classical logical laws such as existential generalization or substitution of identical. I propose here an analysis grounded on explicit intentional logics, i. e. logics in which languages are enriched by means of specific operators expressing intentionality. Some original aspects of the meanings of intentional statements are grasped within argumentative practices, more specifically in the context of dialogical logic. I focus more specifically on fictionality, a paradigm in which logical, linguistic and metaphysical considerations are naturally embedded. I defend an artifactual theory in which existence and identity criteria for fictional entities are defined by means of the notion of ontological dependence relation. That notion faces several difficulties overcome here in a modal-Temporal semantics in which an innovating approach to the artifactual diemnsion of fiction is defended. Ultimately, a combination of that theory to a semantic for the fictionality operator is suggested. This enable us to articulate external and internal viewpoints on fictionality
Wansing, Heinrich. "Displaying modal logic /". Dordrecht [u.a.] : Kluwer, 1998. http://www.gbv.de/dms/ilmenau/toc/24662969X.PDF.
Pełny tekst źródłaWespel, Johannes. "Zur semantischen Feinstruktur in propositionalen Einstellungskontexten". [S.l. : s.n.], 2004. http://www.bsz-bw.de/cgi-bin/xvms.cgi?SWB11244071.
Pełny tekst źródłaMertens, Amélie. "Nouvel éclairage sur la notion de concept chez Gödel à travers les Max-Phil". Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015AIXM3120/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaOur work aims at studying the unpublished texts of Kurt Gödel, known as the Max-Phil, in which the author develops his philosophical thought. This study follows the specific issue of conceptual realism which is adopted by Gödel in his published texts (during his lifetime or posthumously), and according to which concepts are independent of our definitions and constructions. We want to show that a consistent interpretation of the Max-Phil is possible. To do so, we propose an interpretation of some excerpts, which, even if it is only hypothetical, can give new elements in order to answer open questions of the published texts, e.g. questions about conceptual realism. This last position is not understandable without explaining Gödel’s notion of concept. For him, concepts are logical and objective entities, and they are at the core of a theory of concepts, which is conceived as an intensional logic, following Leibniz’s scientia generalis. The analysis of the Max-Phil underlines that we can understand the notion of concept and the primacy of conceptual realism over mathematical realism only in the light of Gödel’s metaphysical frame, i.e. of a monadology inspired by Leibniz. Thus the Max-Phil shows how Gödel reinvestigates Leibnizian monadology, and offers some clues on the modifications he makes on it in order to include concepts. The examination of this metaphysical frame tends to elucidate the relationships between objective concepts, subjective concepts (as we know them) and symbols (through which we express concepts), and also the relationship between logic and mathematics
Rondogiannis, Panagiotis. "Higher-order functional languages and intensional logic". Thesis, 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/1828/5960.
Pełny tekst źródłaKsiążki na temat "Intensional logic"
Imre, Ruzsa. Intensional logic revisited. Budapest: Published by the author, L. Eötvös University, 1991.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłade Rijke, Maarten, red. Advances in Intensional Logic. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8879-9.
Pełny tekst źródłaJ. F. A. K. van Benthem. A manual of intensional logic. Stanford, Calif: Center for the Study of Language and Information, 1985.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaCenter for the Study of Language and Information (U.S.), red. A manual of intensional logic. Wyd. 2. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information, 1988.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaAllan, Ramsay. WH-questions and intensional logic. [Brighton]: University of Sussex School of Cognitive Studies, 1988.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaA manual of intensional logic. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, 1985.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaFox, Chris. Foundations of intensional semantics. Malden MA: Blackwell Pub., 2005.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaSlater, B. H. Intensional logic: An essay in analytical metaphysics. Aldershot [Hampshire, England]: Avebury, 1994.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaZalta, Edward N. Intensional logic and the metaphysics of intentionality. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1988.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaBjørn, Jespersen, Materna Pavel i SpringerLink (Online service), red. Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic: Foundations and Applications of Transparent Intensional Logic. Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2010.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaCzęści książek na temat "Intensional logic"
Gochet, Paul. "Intensional logic". W Handbook of Pragmatics, 1–12. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/hop.11.int2.
Pełny tekst źródłaGochet, Paul. "Intensional logic". W Handbook of Pragmatics, 1–12. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/hop.14.int2.
Pełny tekst źródłaGochet, Paul. "Intensional logic". W Handbook of Pragmatics, 330–36. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/hop.m.int2.
Pełny tekst źródłaGochet, Paul. "Intensional logic". W Philosophical Perspectives for Pragmatics, 153–62. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/hoph.10.13goc.
Pełny tekst źródłaGoertzel, Ben, Matthew Iklé, Izabela Freire Goertzel i Ari Heljakka. "Intensional Inference". W Probabilistic Logic Networks, 1–16. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-76872-4_12.
Pełny tekst źródłaKeenan, Edward L., i Leonard M. Faltz. "The Intensional Logic". W Boolean Semantics for Natural Language, 272–376. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6404-4_4.
Pełny tekst źródłaDovier, A., E. Pontelli i G. Rossi. "Intensional Sets in CLP". W Logic Programming, 284–99. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24599-5_20.
Pełny tekst źródłaMuñoz-Hernández, Susana, Julio Mariño i Juan José Moreno-Navarro. "Constructive Intensional Negation". W Functional and Logic Programming, 39–54. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24754-8_5.
Pełny tekst źródłaFitting, Melvin. "Intensional Logic— Beyond First Order". W Trends in Logic, 87–108. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3598-8_5.
Pełny tekst źródłaBraüner, Torben. "Intensional First-Order Hybrid Logic". W Applied Logic Series, 153–69. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0002-4_7.
Pełny tekst źródłaStreszczenia konferencji na temat "Intensional logic"
Vokorokos, Liberios, Zuzana Bilanova i Daniel Mihalyi. "Linear logic operators in transparent intensional logic". W 2017 IEEE 14th International Scientific Conference on Informatics. IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/informatics.2017.8327286.
Pełny tekst źródłaVlk, Tomas. "Topic/Focus articulation and intensional logic". W the 12th conference. Morristown, NJ, USA: Association for Computational Linguistics, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.3115/991719.991784.
Pełny tekst źródłaBlot, Valentin, i Jim Laird. "Extensional and Intensional Semantic Universes". W LICS '18: 33rd Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3209108.3209206.
Pełny tekst źródłaFeng Jiang, Yuefei Sui i Cungen Cao. "An ontology-based first-order intensional logic". W 2008 IEEE International Conference on Granular Computing (GrC-2008). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/grc.2008.4664731.
Pełny tekst źródłaMokhov, Serguei A., i Joey Paquet. "Using the General Intensional Programming System (GIPSY) for Evaluation of Higher-Order Intensional Logic (HOIL) Expressions". W 2010 Eighth ACIS International Conference on Software Engineering Research, Management and Applications. IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/sera.2010.23.
Pełny tekst źródłaMokhov, Serguei A., i Joey Paquet. "A Type System for Higher-Order Intensional Logic Support for Variable Bindings in Hybrid Intensional-Imperative Programs in GIPSY". W 2010 IEEE/ACIS 9th International Conference on Computer and Information Science (ICIS). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icis.2010.156.
Pełny tekst źródłaBirkedal, Lars, i Rasmus Ejlers Mogelberg. "Intensional Type Theory with Guarded Recursive Types qua Fixed Points on Universes". W 2013 Twenty-Eighth Annual IEEE/ACM Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS 2013). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/lics.2013.27.
Pełny tekst źródłaCastellan, Simon, Pierre Clairambault i Glynn Winskel. "The Parallel Intensionally Fully Abstract Games Model of PCF". W 2015 30th Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/lics.2015.31.
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