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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Insanity (law) – wales"
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Bastani, Amir, and Colin Gavaghan. "Challenges to "a Most Dangerous Doctrine" or a "Fantastic Theory" of Volitional Insanity." Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 47, no. 4 (2016): 545. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/vuwlr.v47i4.4788.
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In theory, an insanity defence can take two forms: the cognitive form (C-insanity) and the volitional form (V-insanity). The defence of C-insanity recognises that a disordered state of mind can make the ability to understand the nature of an action impossible. On the other hand, V-insanity is recognised in some common law jurisdictions, such as all jurisdictions in Australia except for Victoria and New South Wales, and is a full defence. It recognises that a disordered state of mind can make the exercise of self-control impossible. However, that disordered state of mind does not necessarily affect the understanding of the nature of the act impossible.
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Rix, Keith J. B. "Towards a more just insanity defence: recovering moral wrongfulness in the M'Naghten Rules." BJPsych Advances 22, no. 1 (2016): 44–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/apt.bp.115.014951.
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SummaryThis article describes how the M'Naghten Rules, which govern the law of insanity in England and Wales, came into existence. In relation to knowledge of the wrongfulness of the alleged act, the article reveals how the Court of Appeal has sought to limit the defence, whereas the courts of first instance, and a number of other jurisdictions, have adopted interpretations of the Rules that accord more closely with the law of insanity as it existed at the time of Daniel McNaughtan's trial and that the Rules were probably meant to formulate. Three cases are used to illustrate the difficulties resulting from the position adopted by the Court of Appeal. It is suggested that in cases where the insanity defence is raised, justice is likely to be better served by addressing specifically and separately the accused's understanding or appreciation of the moral wrongfulness of the alleged act and their knowledge as to whether the alleged act is contrary to the law of the land.
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Mason, James. "Unfitness to Plead, Insanity and the Law Commission: Do We Need a Diagnostic Threshold?" Journal of Criminal Law 85, no. 4 (2021): 268–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022018321995430.
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This article examines one aspect of the new test of effective participation at trial proposed by the Law Commission of England and Wales. This proposal aims to replace the current criteria for fitness to plead originating from Pritchard and developed more recently in M (John). Specifically, this article offers a critical examination of the Commission’s refusal to incorporate a so-called ‘diagnostic threshold’ within their proposed test. After reviewing the arguments for and against this decision, attention is drawn to the clear presence of diagnostic thresholds within other areas of law, such as the mental condition defence of insanity. Overall, the Commission’s proposals are a vast improvement upon the archaic rules of present day, and, contrary to the views of some scholars, their decision to omit a diagnostic criterion is no exception to this. In fact, the implications of this decision reach far beyond the particular context of unfitness proceedings and ultimately cast doubt on the significance of diagnostic thresholds in all areas of law. By focusing exclusively on the relationship between unfitness to plead and the defence of insanity, this piece demonstrates how both tests can be reformulated so as to avoid any explicit reference to a diagnostic criterion.
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Walsh, Dermot. "Do we need community treatment orders in Ireland?" Irish Journal of Psychological Medicine 27, no. 2 (2010): 90–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0790966700001130.
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AbstractObjectives: Re-admissions to inpatient psychiatric care are now so frequent as to be designated the ‘revolving door’ phenomenon and constitute 72% of admissions to Irish inpatient psychiatric units and hospitals. It is commonly believed that treatment non-adherence with aftercare following inpatient discharge contributes to readmission. Attempts to improve adherence and reduce or shorten readmission through compulsory community treatment orders have been made in several countries including Scotland in 2005 and, from November 2008, England and Wales. Provision for conditional discharge in Ireland has already been furnished by the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 but has been compromised by the inability to impose enforcement of conditions. The paper aims to determine whether compulsory community treatment orders are effective in improving adherence and reducing re-admission and whether, in consequence, their introduction in Ireland should be considered.Method: The legislative measures adopted to improve treatment adherence and thereby reduce re-admissions are presented. The evidence of their effectiveness is examined.Results: Evaluation of the effectiveness of community treatment orders is limited and hindered by confounding factors. What evidence there is does not provide convincing evidence of their utility.Conclusions: It is concluded that there is insufficient evidence to advocate their early introduction in Ireland in civil mental health legislation. Instead a wait and see policy is suggested with critical assessment of the outcome of such developments in Scotland and England and Wales. In addition further research on the characteristics of revolving door patients in Ireland and the circumstances determining their readmission is advocated. There is an anomaly in the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006 which allows of conditional discharge but does not provide for its enforcement.
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McDiarmid, Claire. "After the age of criminal responsibility: a defence for children who offend." Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 67, no. 3 (2016): 327–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.53386/nilq.v67i3.121.
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In Scotland, the age of criminal responsibility is 8, although children cannot be prosecuted until they are 12. In England and Wales, for all purposes, the age is 10. This article argues that a further mechanism is needed to protect the young who do wrong within the criminal process and it argues for a new, bespoke defence, to be available to young people from the age of criminal responsibility until they attain the age of 18. It looks firstly at criminal capacity – what it is that needs to be understood fairly to hold anyone criminally responsible – and draws on material from developmental psychology and neuro-science, as well as looking at the child’s lived experience, to provide some evidence that the young may, without fault, lack this capacity. It then examines the use of age generally in law, and the age of criminal responsibility within this. Next, it considers existing lack of capacity defences – nonage, diminished responsibility, insanity (or mental disorder) and absence of mens rea – to consider their suitability for use by young and immature defendants. Finally, it presents a proposal for the form of the new defence, taking into account the need for balance with the public interest in conviction of the guilty. Throughout, it notes and analyses the Law Commission’s proposals in this respect.
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Mason, James. "The Willed Trance: Volition, Voluntariness and Hypnotised Defendants." Journal of Criminal Law, October 5, 2020, 002201832096355. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022018320963551.
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Traditionally, jurists have distinguished between voluntary/involuntary behaviour via the theory of volition. Though perceived as the conventional approach, this paper argues that the volitional understanding of voluntariness is an inadequate instrument for assessing complex behaviours which seemingly portray a striking level of intelligence and purposiveness on the part of the accused. In particular, the phenomenon known as hypnotically-induced behaviour, which forms the focus of this paper, is one such troublesome case. To this end, the version of the volitional theory most staunchly advocated by Professor Michael Moore is singled out for scrutiny, due to his strong sentiments supporting the application of his philosophy to these aforementioned behaviours. In contrast to Moore, this paper suggests that the position most recently proposed by the Law Commission of England and Wales within their discussion paper on the defences of insanity and automatism is to be preferred. Specifically, the Commission recommend substituting the theory of volition for that of ‘control’ as a means for assessing the voluntariness of any given behaviour. This paper submits that a theory of control has two major advantages over the traditional theory of volitionalism. First, the possession/absence of control more accurately reflects the contemporary system of criminal law in England and Wales. Second, a theory of control is more conceptually defensible as an explanation for why behaviours performed under hypnosis are typically perceived as involuntary.
Rozprawy doktorskie na temat "Insanity (law) – wales"
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Goldberg, Samuel. "Gender, Insanity and Moral Obligation: Widows and the Action for Testamentary Incapacity in Late-Colonial New South Wales." Thesis, Department of History, 2021. https://hdl.handle.net/2123/24915.
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The enactment of a Testator’s Family Maintenance Act in 1916 is rightly remembered as a signature achievement of New South Wales’ early feminists, providing protection against the destitution that a cruel will could inflict upon a testator’s family. Yet in the decades before its passage, a challenge to a husband’s testamentary capacity offered an alternative mechanism by which a widow could challenge a will. This thesis explores the stories of the widows who braved the action for testamentary incapacity, in order to recover its social and cultural significance. It identifies the courtroom as a site of dense cultural discourse, in which dominant tropes of gender, insanity and moral obligation structured the court’s consideration of a widow’s claim. It shows that widows played upon these tropes, deploying them in narratives of virtue and transgression to win substantive relief. The action for testamentary capacity thus offered hope for disinherited widows seeking to break the financial shackles posthumously imposed by their husbands. However, in demanding the sublimation of their lived experience to fit dominant cultural narratives, the action excluded women who were unable to perform the necessary identity, perpetuating the same inequality that widows came to court to address.
Książki na temat "Insanity (law) – wales"
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Grubin, Donald. Fitness to Plead in England and Wales. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.
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Grubin, Donald. Fitness to Plead in England and Wales. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.
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Grubin, Donald. Fitness to Plead in England and Wales. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.
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Grubin, Donald. Fitness to Plead in England and Wales. Taylor & Francis Group, 2015.
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Grubin, Donald. Fitness to Plead in England and Wales. Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.
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Nielsen, Kim E. Money, Marriage, and Madness. University of Illinois Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252043147.001.0001.
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Money, Marriage, and Madness is a story of the medical profession, a woman’s wealth and the gendered property laws in which she operated, marital violence, marriage and divorce, institutional incarceration, and an alleged bank robbery. Dr. Anna B. Miesse Ott lived in a legal context governing money, marriage, and madness that nearly all nineteenth-century women shared. She benefited from wealth, professional status as a physician, and whiteness, but they did not protect her from the vulnerabilities generated by sexism and ableism. After an 1856 marriage and divorce, Ott served for nearly twenty years as a physician in Madison, Wisconsin and garnered additional wealth. In 1873, her husband and local physicians testified to her insanity, as well as her legal incompetency, and Ott entered the gates of the Wisconsin State Hospital for the Insane where she remained until her 1893 death. Her decades of institutionalization reveal daily life in a late nineteenth-century asylum and the permeability of its walls. Tracing the stories told of her after her death enables analyses of the impact of the diagnosis of mania and institutionalization on our memory of her. In addition, this book explores historical methods, ethics, and dilemmas confronted when historical sources are limited and come not from the subject but from those with greater power.
Części książek na temat "Insanity (law) – wales"
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Mackay, Ronnie. "The Insanity Defence in English Law." In The Insanity Defence. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854944.003.0002.
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Abstract This chapter discusses the legal development of the defence of insanity in England and Wales which is based on the famous M’Naghten Rules. As such it contains an analysis of problems that have arisen in the application of the insanity and automatism defences through a discussion of recent case law, including an analysis of how the ‘external factor’ doctrine has influenced the distinction between sane and insane automartism. It also includes an evaluation of the author’s empirical research on the defence, together with a discussion of how a new test for the insanity plea was introduced as a result of litigation in the Channel Island of Jersey.
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Ormerod, David, and Mark Dsouza. "Reforming the Insanity Defence in England and Wales." In The Insanity Defence. Oxford University PressOxford, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854944.003.0003.
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Abstract English law’s insanity defence has been subjected to sustained and cogent criticism. It is outdated in its understanding of psychiatry and was devised for trial procedures that are unrecognizable to those familiar with modern day practice. The defence is little used but has generated a disproportionate number of appeals. It creates arbitrary distinctions in application by its requirement for a ‘disease of the mind’, and its relationship with sane automatism and pleas based on intoxication is complex and incoherent. Controversially it imposes a legal burden of proof on the defendant. The scope for reform is obvious. With an increasingly enlightened attitude to mental health issues in the criminal justice system, there is an opportunity for law reform to create a defence which deals fairly and equitably with mentally disordered offenders. The Law Commission for England and Wales—whose statutory function is to ensure that the law is as fair, modern, and simple as possible—examined the defence and prepared a discussion paper tentatively proposing a new defence for someone ‘not criminally responsible by reason of medical condition’. This chapter explores the Commission’s work and assesses the prospects for further reform and legislation.
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Loveless, Janet, Mischa Allen, and Caroline Derry. "6. Defences of incapacity and mental conditions." In Complete Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780192855947.003.0006.
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This chapter examines the use of incapacity and mental condition defences for criminal offences in England and Wales. It discusses the general principles of the excusatory defence of insanity and of automatism as distinct from diminished responsibility and explores the notion that insanity is out of date and unrelated to contemporary classifications of mental illness. It considers whether insanity can be pleaded for all crimes and explains that intoxication will rarely reduce criminal liability. It explains and clarifies the Majewski rule and how it works. It also considers intoxicated mistake. The chapter evaluates arguments for and against the age of criminal responsibility and analyses court decisions in relevant cases.