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Marsili, Orietta. "The anatomy and evolution of industries : technological change and industrial dynamics". Thesis, University of Sussex, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.298739.
Pełny tekst źródłaAsplund, Marcus. "Essays in industrial economics". Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), 1995. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-877.
Pełny tekst źródłaLeao, Joao Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Essays in industrial economics". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/45904.
Pełny tekst źródłaIncludes bibliographical references.
This dissertation consists of three chapters in Industrial Economics. Chapter 1 is the product of joint work with Filippo Balestrieri. In chapter 1 we examine the use of lotteries among horizontal differentiated goods as a mechanism to price discriminate consumers. We use the linear city model to represent a market with two differentiated goods. We show that the optimal selling strategy for a multi product monopolist implies offering at least one lottery with probability 1/2. This result is in stark contrast with the the optimal selling strategy of a single product monopolist that attempts to price discriminate consumers based on the probability of delivering the good. Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) show that the single good monopolist does not offer lotteries. We then examine the use of lotteries among the differentiated goods in the case of a market with two competing firms, each one producing one good. We define two different cases depending on whether the market is fully covered. We call fully covered market the case in which the equilibrium prices of the two firms are such that all consumers buy one good. We show that if the market is fully covered, no lotteries are offered in equilibrium. However, when the market is not fully covered the optimal selling strategy may include offering lotteries. With more than two firms selling differentiated goods, even in a fully covered market, lotteries can be used in equilibrium. In this case, firms might be worse off than in the case where no lotteries are provided. Chapter 2 examines firms optimal pricing policy when they sell a storable good of repeated consumption to time-inconsistent consumers. Consumers with time-inconsistent preferences might struggle to make optimal consumption decisions over time. Sophisticate consumers, aware of their time-inconsistent preferences, often try to limit their consumption of certain goods by strategically rationing the quantities they purchase.
(cont.) On the other hand, naive consumers, unaware of their time-inconsistent preferences, may stockpile tempting goods at "home" not realizing that the higher availability of the good might lead them to overconsume the good.It is shown that if consumers are time-consistent, quantity discounts don't increase the firms' profit. In contrast, if firms face naive time-inconsistent consumers, the optimal pricing policy is to use small quantity discounts as a device to increase sales. These consumers take advantage of quantity discount with the intention of saving on future purchases. However, after buying the good they can not resist and overconsume it. We also show that even if consumers are sophisticated, firms still use quantity discounts. Sophisticated time-inconsistent consumers realize that increasing the quantity purchased often leads them to overconsume the good. Hence, they require a significant quantity discount to increase the quantity purchased. Offering a quantity discount leads them to stockpile the good "at home" and hence promotes overconsumption. Chapter 3 analyzes the use of exclusive dealing agreements to prevent the entry of rival firms. An exclusive dealing agreement is a contract between a buyer and a seller where the buyer commits to buy a good exclusively from the seller. Exclusive dealing agreements are one of the most common vertical restraints used by firms. Aghion and Bolton (1987) were the first to show that an incumbent seller may want to use exclusive dealing agreement that prevents the entry of a rival seller. They argue that an incumbent seller and a buyer sign an exclusive dealing contract in order to extract surplus from a more efficient entrant seller.
(cont.) We propose an alternative explanation for the use of exclusive dealing agreements to prevent entry when the buyer is a downstream distributor that also faces the threat of entry. The idea is that the entry of more efficient upstream seller, by decreasing the market power of the upstream firms, makes entry in the downstream market more attractive. This can lead to further entry in the downstream market and to an increase in the competition faced by the downstream firms. Since part of the bigger surplus created by the entry of a more efficient seller is captured by the downstream entrant firms, entry in the upstream market does not necessarily benefits the incumbent downstream firms.
by Joao Leao.
Ph.D.
LOVARELLI, ALESSIO. "Essays in Industrial Economics". Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2023. https://hdl.handle.net/10281/403018.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe thesis consists of two independent projects. The first uses the real options methodology for the analysis of policies for the development of new renewable plants. I propose a subsidy scheme that increases over time and a price cap, in order to increase the speed of the development of new production capacity and contain spending. The second paper, on the other hand, represents the anti-competitive behavior of a digital company, a data intermediary, which extracts information from consumers and subsequently allocates it strategically to product firms, allowing them to offer personalized prices. Furthermore, the intermediary is able to exploit the scale effects, typical of data production technologies, to consolidate its monopolistic position.
Brugger, Antony. "Industrial economics within Whyalla : the economics of monopoly /". Title page and contents only, 1988. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09AR/09arb891.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaDiogo, José Victor. "Política industrial : uma tipologia de análise e o caso brasileiro para políticas industriais verdes /". Araraquara, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/150208.
Pełny tekst źródłaCoorientador: José Ricardo Fucidji
Banca: José Eduardo de Salles Roselino Junior
Banca: Eduardo Strachman
Resumo: O presente trabalho é dividido em dois artigos. O primeiro tem como objetivo lançar mão a uma nova tipologia para as políticas industriais, elencando quatro tipos essenciais de política. Nesses quatro tipos estão dispostos os principais referenciais teóricos a respeito do tema. Essa forma de sistematização tornará a tarefa de análise e classificação das políticas industriais mais simples. Além disso, é feita uma breve revisão do papel do Estado Brasileiro no processo de industrialização nacional para ilustrar a importância da boa formulação e implantação de políticas industriais para o desenvolvimento do Brasil. O segundo artigo tem como objetivo fundamental o de mapear o debate atual a respeito do que se entende por política industrial verde. Para tanto, uma revisão da literatura internacional sobre o tema foi feita com vistas a 1) enquadrar teoricamente os principais conceitos tratados quando se discute políticas industriais verdes e 2) a partir da literatura examinada, lançar luz sobre a recente experiência brasileira no desenho de políticas industriais, mais especificamente com relação à PITCE, à PDP e ao PBM.
Abstract: This dissertation is divided into two articles. The first one aims at launching a new typology for industrial policies, listing four essential types of policy. Within these four types are available the main theoretical references on the subject. This form of systematization will make the task of analysis and classification of industrial policies simpler. In addition, a brief review of the role of the Brazilian State in the process of national industrialization is made to illustrate the importance of good formulation and implementation of industrial policies for the development of Brazil. The second article has as its fundamental objective to map the current debate regarding what is meant by green industrial policy. To do so, a review of the international literature on the subject was made with a view to 1) theoretically frame the main concepts treated when discussing green industrial policies and 2) from the literature examined, shed light on the recent Brazilian experience in policy design Particularly with regard to PITCE, PDP and PBM.
Mestre
Al-Ghamri, Sami Salah Abdulla. "Industrial development in Saudi Arabia". Thesis, Aberystwyth University, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.303457.
Pełny tekst źródłaZulehner, Christine. "Essays in empirical industrial economics". Doctoral thesis, [S.l.] : [s.n.], 2001. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=964726475.
Pełny tekst źródłaLarsen, Bradley Joseph. "Essays on industrial organization economics". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/81045.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 189-201).
The first chapter quantifies the efficiency of a real-world bargaining game with two-sided incomplete information. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and Williams (1987) derived the theoretical efficient frontier for bilateral trade under two-sided uncertainty, but little is known about how well real-world bargaining performs relative to the frontier. The setting is wholesale used-auto auctions, an $80 billion industry where buyers and sellers participate in alternating-offer bargaining when the auction price fails to reach a secret reserve price. Using 300,000 auction/bargaining sequences, this study nonparametrically estimates bounds on the distributions of buyer and seller valuations and then estimates where bargaining outcomes lie relative to the efficient frontier. Findings indicate that the observed auction-followed-by-bargaining mechanism is quite efficient, achieving 88-96% of the surplus and 92-99% of the trade volume which can be achieved on the efficient frontier. This second chapter examines a common form of entry restriction: occupational licensing. The chapter studies how occupational licensing laws affect the distribution of quality and how the effects of licensing on quality vary across regions of differing income levels. The study uses variation in state licensing requirements for teachers and two national datasets on teacher qualifications (input quality) and student test scores (output quality) from 1983-2008. Results show that more restrictive licensing may lead first-year teachers of high input quality to opt out of the occupation. For teachers who remain in the occupation longer, stricter licensing increases input quality at most quantiles. The distribution of student test scores increases with stricter licensing, primarily in the upper half of the distribution. For most forms of licensing studied, input and output quality improvements due to stricter licensing occur in high-income rather than low-income districts. The third chapter (co-authored with Denis Chetverikov and Christopher Palmer) proposes a simple approach for estimating distributional effects of a group-level treatment when there are unobservable components at the group level which may be correlated with the treatment. Standard quantile regression techniques are inconsistent in this setting, while grouped instrumental variables quantile regression is consistent. The study illustrates the estimation approach with several examples, including applications from the first two chapters of this thesis.
by Bradley Joseph Larsen.
Ph.D.
Herrera, Araujo Daniel Andres. "Essays on Environmental economics, Health economics and Industrial organization". Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015TOU10059/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaLe résumé en anglais n'a pas été communiqué par l'auteur
Wang, Hao. "Three essays in industrial organization". Connect to resource, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view.cgi?acc%5Fnum=osu1261316064.
Pełny tekst źródłaOlimov, Jafar M. "Three Essays on Industrial Organization". The Ohio State University, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1366979858.
Pełny tekst źródłaMcCloughan, Patrick. "A stochastic simulation model of industrial concentration". Thesis, University of East Anglia, 1993. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.333558.
Pełny tekst źródłaDaniels, Timothy C. (Timothy Craig). "Strategic oligopoly model for industrial economics". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/59119.
Pełny tekst źródła"June 2010." Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Several years ago, Professor Robert Pindyck of the MIT Sloan School of Management created an oligopoly strategy game for use in his course 15.013: Industrial Economics for Strategic Decisions. This game divided the class up into "firms" (generally consisting of two students each) and randomly formed industries, each consisting of three firms. Students competed throughout the semester in a fictitious market for a heterogeneous good, each firm providing price and production inputs on a weekly basis. The purpose of the game was to provide a hands-on tool to teach students how industry competitors interact, and how forces such as signaling, collusion, demand fluctuations, and emotion affect industry and firm performance. Although the game was carried out successfully for several years, issues surfaced over time. In particular, the Excel model used to run the weekly calculations was set up awkwardly and was therefore difficult to use. Additionally, the memo distributed to students to explain the game was disorganized, lacked sufficient examples, and contained errors. Finally, Professor Pindyck desired to implement the game in other courses with other professors, and this was not possible without a thorough document containing instructions for running the game as well as in-depth background information on the theory behind the calculations. The work carried out for this thesis aimed to fix these problems. Specifically, I rebuilt the Excel model to operate in a simpler and more user-friendly fashion. Additionally, I revised the student memo to rectify the issues described above. Finally, I created a new manual to allow professors and TAs run the game in their courses.
by Timothy C. Daniels
M.B.A.
Toivanen, Otto Iisakki. "Industrial economics studies in insurance markets". Thesis, University of Warwick, 1994. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/106901/.
Pełny tekst źródłaSinkinson, Michael. "Essays on Industrial Organization". Thesis, Harvard University, 2012. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10295.
Pełny tekst źródłaLiu, David (David Jing). "Essays in industrial organization". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/118045.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 93-95).
This thesis consists of three empirical essays in industrial organization. The first chapter examines the welfare effects of intertemporal price discrimination in market for airfare using a novel structural model of dynamic consumer search. I model how consumers search for airline tickets over time using data gathered from an internet travel agent. My model features sophisticated consumers with rational beliefs about future price movements who make optimal decisions based on their beliefs. Using data on daily price and quantity in monopoly markets, I estimate the demand for airfare and calculate consumer welfare. I compare welfare to a counterfactual market in which airlines cannot price discriminate. The second chapter quantifies the impact of company-wide incentive plans on total company performance. I identify five airlines that have introduced employee incentive programs that offer monthly bonuses to all company employees as long as the company achieves a certain performance level in flight on-time performance. I present evidence that these programs are effective at increasing employee performance in spite of the temptation to be a free rider. My analysis uses Mahalanobis matching to compare each route's performance with the best matching control flight, taking advantage of the large volume of flight data available. In the third chapter I examine the role of reputation in an online marketplace that specializes in unreliable products. Using data gathered from video game resale platform G2A, I examine how buyers and sellers utilize the wide array of reputation information available. I find that buyers on this platform have an understanding of their probability of encountering a negative transaction and will utilize more reputation information in less reliable markets.
by David Liu.
Ph. D.
Zhang, Hongkai Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Essays on industrial organization". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/111343.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
This thesis consists of three chapters on information transmission and utilization in marketplaces and their implications on firm competition and quality discovery. The first chapter analyzes the dynamic effect of sponsored search advertising on quality discovery on the Taobao.com retail platform. In a stylized model, a new product's boosted exposure from sponsored search ads could help the platform to infer how well the product converts exposure to sales (the quality measure) and award top organic search ranks accordingly. Hence, sellers with higher private quality signals would bid more aggressively for sponsored ads, which accelerates the platform's discovery of these high-quality products. An empirical analysis echoes the stylized model and reveal a synergy between the platform's PC and mobile interfaces. The second chapter (co-authored with Sara Fisher Ellison and Christopher M Snyder) studies price dynamics for computer components sold on a price-comparison website. We estimate a dynamic model of competition, backing out structural estimates of managerial frictions. The estimated frictions are substantial, concentrated in the act of monitoring market conditions rather than entering a new price. Coupled with supporting reduced-form statistical evidence, our analysis provides a window into the process of managerial price setting and the microfoundation of pricing inertia, issues of growing interest in industrial organization and macroeconomics. The third chapter analyzes the revelation of hard information in a buyer-seller relationship. The seller can choose whether and when to credibly reveal quality information and some buyers, called prosumers, have greater taste for quality than others. This paper first analyzes an alternating bargaining game allowing endogenous delay between communications in the fashion of Admati and Perry(1987), and constructs an equilibrium with delayed revelation of quality. The paper then analyzes an informed principal problem and found that under certain conditions, both seller types choose the same truth-telling mechanism that maximizes the revenue of the seller type with high quality. In both games, a high quality seller hides his quality information before the buyer acts in order to extract surplus from prosumers.
by Hongkai Zhang.
1. Accelerated Quality Discovery through Sponsored Search Advertising in Online Marketplaces -- 2. Costs of Managerial Attention and Activity as a Source of Sticky Prices: Structural Estimates from an Online Market -- 3. Keeping Good Quality as a Surprise.
Ph. D.
Jang, Youngjun Ph D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Essays in industrial organization". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/98689.
Pełny tekst źródłaTitle as it appears in MIT Commencement Exercises program, June 5, 2015: Essays on industrial organization Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references.
The first chapter investigates the effects of technological advances on the retail gasoline market. Since 2008, a Korean government website has posted daily prices of all gasoline stations. Combined with the rapid increase of smartphone and mobile technologies, this price information service may have changed the consumer search environment significantly. Using daily price data, sales data, and regional smartphone penetration rates, I find that price dispersion among gasoline stations and markups increase slightly when the smartphone penetration rate increases, even while additional descriptive evidence suggests that demand is becoming more price-sensitive. Structural estimation of a two-type consumer search model finds that the proportion of highly informed consumers increases as the smartphone penetration rate increases. A counterfactual analysis confirms that observed price changes are consistent with theoretical models of pricing, given the structurally estimated parameters. The second chapter studies consumer decisions at gasoline pumps, using a detailed transaction level dataset. About 36% of regular gasoline consumers chose to simply fill up, while the remaining 64% of consumers spent pre-selected dollar amounts. Descriptive analyses show that consumers become more active in quantity choices at gasoline pumps, and less likely to simply fill up, when retail prices are on an upward trend and when the current price level is unexpectedly high. Reduced-form results suggest that consumers expect that gasoline prices tend to move to the average price over time. The third chapter analyzes the effects of ability grouping on the academic performance of high school graduating students in Korea. About half of the regions in Korea have adopted an equalization policy (EP), which means that students are randomly assigned. For the other non-EP regions, students are sorted among schools based on ability levels. I utilize a difference-in- differences strategy to exploit the adoption of the EP, an exogenous policy shift. I find that after the EP, performance of students above the median dropped 1.4% in terms of national percentiles, while that of students below the 30% percentile jumped 1.3%. In addition, there was an increasing trend in the achievement levels in the treatment regions, but after the introduction of the EP, this trend vanished.
by Youngjun Jang.
Chapter 1. The Chapter 2. Chapter 3. effect of the Internet and Mobile Search Technologies on Retail Markets : Evidence from the Korean Gasoline Market -- How Do Consumers React to Price Movements? : Evidence from Consumers Filling Up Their Cars -- Ability Grouping and Student Achievement : Effects of the Equalization Policy in Korea
Ph. D.
Grondahl, Samuel Isaac. "Essays in industrial organization". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/128997.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from student-submitted PDF of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 192-200).
This thesis is a collection of three chapters that investigate burgeoning empirical issues in industrial organization. In the first chapter, I study platform fee policy with a specific focus on two-sided online marketplaces. The main contributions of the paper are threefold. First, I study a setting with coordinated price experimentation along the three different fee dimensions that are common to such marketplaces. Second, I describe the empirical impact of incomplete fee salience on equilibrium outcomes. Finally, I quantify the network externalities that must be present in order for observed fees to constitute an equilibrium. In the paper, I begin by developing a tractable model of the platform's problem that generates testable predictions and yields equilibrium conditions in terms of estimable quantities. Then, using estimates from experimental data obtained from a large online marketplace, I quantify the salience and network effects.
To conclude, I consider the counterfactual level and composition of equilibrium platform fees under when these effects are muted or absent. In the second chapter, using data from the same source as in chapter one, I study small sellers competing on the supply side of online marketplaces. As these platforms grow and markets become increasingly disintermediated, an important concern is whether small sellers, who may have limited experience or attention, can individually compete effectively with larger, often professional sellers operating on the same marketplaces. To answer this question, I develop and estimate a structural model that incorporates essential features of the empirical setting, including large and rapidly changing choice sets and buyer heterogeneity. Using the estimated model, I compute optimal pricing policies under various informational and computational restrictions.
I find that small sellers adhering to a simple strategy can obtain nearly optimal expected revenue and that this strategy's information requirements are easily satisfied in the online setting. Additionally, I present suggestive evidence that sellers learn to approximate such a strategy through repeated market interactions. In the third and final chapter, I investigate the industrial impacts of firm control rights, which confer discretion over firm policy and are usually shared between debt and equity holders. Control rights operate along a continuum and are difficult to measure. As a proxy, I consider the discontinuous shift in control from equity holders to creditors due to loan covenant violations, a common form of technical default. This paper contributes to the growing covenants literature in two ways. First, I consider the impact of and response to covenant violations at the industry level, inclusive of firms never in technical default.
Second, I empirically document the effects of violations on contemporary product markets. I find that control rights transfers to creditors make firms tough in product markets, consistent with the predictions of a stylized model, and that markups decline at the industry level, though the declines are sharpest for firms directly affected.
by Samuel Isaac Grondahl.
Ph. D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics
Gama, Velazquez Adriana. "Essays in industrial organization". Diss., University of Iowa, 2014. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/4632.
Pełny tekst źródłaOyofo, Philip A. "Economies of scale in selected Nigerian industrial aggregate". DigitalCommons@Robert W. Woodruff Library, Atlanta University Center, 1985. http://digitalcommons.auctr.edu/dissertations/3058.
Pełny tekst źródłaHa, Dong Soo. "Total factor productivity growth in Korean manufacturing from 1983 to 1998". free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 2002. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p3060101.
Pełny tekst źródłaAl-Malki, Majid Abdullah. "Industrial development in Qatar in a changing world". Thesis, Durham University, 1994. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1706/.
Pełny tekst źródłaClydesdale, Greg. "Industrial leadership : a historical analysis of merchant shipping". Lincoln University, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/10182/1712.
Pełny tekst źródłaSkinner, David. "Forecasting models of activity in industrial and commercial building". Thesis, University of Salford, 1999. http://usir.salford.ac.uk/26916/.
Pełny tekst źródłaAlsalman, M. H. "Industrial subsidies in Kuwait : An economic analysis and evaluation". Thesis, University of Manchester, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371901.
Pełny tekst źródłaChatterji, R. "The behaviour of industrial prices in India 1947-1977". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.372866.
Pełny tekst źródłaWollmann, Thomas G. "Essays on Industrial Organization". Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17467215.
Pełny tekst źródłaBusiness Economics
Gertner, Robert H. "Essays in theoretical industrial organization". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14892.
Pełny tekst źródłaPostrel, Steven Robert. "Three essays in industrial organization". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14364.
Pełny tekst źródłaChiou, Lesley C. "Empirical essays in industrial organization". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/33838.
Pełny tekst źródłaIncludes bibliographical references.
In this dissertation, I present three empirical essays that encompass topics in industrial organization. The first essay examines the degree of competition and spatial differentiation in the retail industry by exploiting a unique dataset that describes a consumer's choice of store, product of purchase, item price, and demographics. I estimate a consumer's choice of retailer in the sales market for DVDs among online, mass merchant, electronics, video specialty, and music stores, and I allow for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for store types and disutility of travel. A consumer's traveling cost varies by income, and substitution occurs proportionately more among stores of the same type. The second essay investigates an intriguing puzzle in the movie industry: "why do studios cluster their big theatrical hits during the July 4th weekend?" A series of recent papers by Einav (2002) indicate that although the underlying demand for theatrical movies remains high around Labor Day, studios tend to release their high quality movies at the beginning of the summer. I employ data from the home video industry to provide more evidence on whether booms in theatrical revenues are supply- or demand-driven and to investigate why firms might cluster their releases as they do.
(cont.) The third essay presents examples based on actual and synthetic datasets to illustrate how simulation methods can often mask identification problems in the estimation of mixed logit models. Typically, simulation methods approximate an integral (that does not have a closed form) by taking draws from the underlying distribution of the random variable of integration. The examples reveal how a "low" number of draws can generate estimates that appear identified, but in fact, are either not theoretically identified by the model or not empirically identified by the data. The number of draws required to reveal the identification problem will depend on the data, model, and type of draws used. These examples emphasize the importance of checking the stability of the estimates with respect to the number of draws.
by Lesley C. Chiou.
Ph.D.
Campbell, Arthur (Arthur Donald). "Social networks in industrial organization". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/49714.
Pełny tekst źródłaIncludes bibliographical references (p. 141-145).
Chapter 1 studies the optimal strategies of a monopolist selling a good to consumers who engage in word of mouth communication. The monopolist uses the price it charges to influence both the proportion of the population that is willing to purchase the good and the pattern of communication that takes place within the social network. I find a number of results: (i) demand is more elastic in the presence of word of mouth; (ii) the monopolist reduces the price to induce additional word of mouth for regular goods, however for goods whose valuation is greater for well connected individuals the price may, in fact, be greater; (iii) the optimal pattern of diffusion involves introductory prices which vary up and down; and (iv) exclusive (high priced) products will optimally target advertising towards individuals with many friends whereas common (low priced) products will target individuals with fewer friends. Chapter 2 presents a model of friendship formation in a social network. During each period a new player enters the social network, this player searches for and forms friendships with the existing population and all individuals play a prisoner's dilemma game with each of their friends. The set of friendships a player forms reveals some information to a friend about how likely she is to subsequently cooperate. Cooperative types are able to separate themselves from uncooperative types by becoming friends with people who know one another.
(cont.) The threat of communication amongst people who know one another prevents an uncooperative type mimicking a cooperative type. Chapter 3 analyzes the effects of policies which support electricity generation from intermittent technologies (wind, solar). I find that intermittent generation is a substitute for baseload technologies but may be complementary or substitutable for peaking/intermediate technologies. I characterize the long run implications of this for carbon emissions.
by Arthur Campbell.
Ph.D.
Lu, Min. "Essays on international economics and industrial organization". Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/31391.
Pełny tekst źródłaArts, Faculty of
Vancouver School of Economics
Graduate
Galgau, Olivia. "Essays in international economics and industrial organization". Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210773.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe first chapter aims to bring together the literature on economic integration, firm mobility and investment. It contains two sections: one dedicated to the literature on FDI and the second covering the literature on firm entry and exit, economic performance and economic and business regulation.
In the second chapter I examine the relationship between the Single Market and FDI both in an intra-EU context and from outside the EU. The empirical results show that the impact of the Single Market on FDI differs substantially from one country to another. This finding may be due to the functioning of institutions.
The third chapter studies the relationship between the level of external trade protection put into place by a Regional Integration Agreement(RIA)and the option of a firm from outside the RIA block to serve the RIA market through FDI rather than exports. I find that the level of external trade protection put in place by the RIA depends on the RIA country's capacity to benefit from FDI spillovers, the magnitude of set-up costs of building a plant in the RIA and on the amount of external trade protection erected by the country from outside the reigonal block with respect to the RIA.
The fourth chapter studies how the firm entry and exit process is affected by product market reforms and regulations and impact macroeconomic performance. The results show that an increase in deregulation will lead to a rise in firm entry and exit. This in turn will especially affect macroeconomic performance as measured by output growth and labor productivity growth. The analysis done at the sector level shows that results can differ substantially across industries, which implies that deregulation policies should be conducted at the sector level, rather than at the global macroeconomic level.
Doctorat en sciences économiques, Orientation économie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
Duran, Rustu. "Essays on industrial organisation and behavioural economics". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2017. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:194bf89c-5240-4b18-bdf2-d27d0ec639cd.
Pełny tekst źródłaGenchev, Bogdan Georgiev. "Essays in Industrial Organization and Health Economics:". Thesis, Boston College, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:108915.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe unifying theme of this dissertation is the growing importance of pharmaceutical products in health care and in society more broadly. The first two chapters use structural and reduced-form models to study the effects of various policies on the choice and utilization of prescription drugs. The third chapter surveys the empirical literature on the competitive effects of a class of pricing arrangements used in the pharmaceutical and many other industries. Chapter 1. One of the criticisms leveled against direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs is that it overemphasizes the use of pharmaceuticals at the expense of other forms of treatment. In “Choice of Depression Treatment: Advertising Spillovers in a Model with Complementarity,” I study how antidepressant TV ads affect demand for psychotherapy. Antidepressant advertising can increase demand for therapy if the products are complements or if advertising has spillover effects. To disentangle the different channels, I develop a discrete-choice demand model that allows for complementarity between products, advertising spillovers, and flexible unobserved preference heterogeneity. Individual-level panel data on treatment choices and price variation allow me to separately identify complementarity and correlated preferences, whereas the average price of TV advertising, used as an instrument, identifies the causal effect of antidepressant ads on demand for each product. The results indicate that even though antidepressants and psychotherapy are substitutes, drug advertising increases demand for therapy through a spillover effect. Allowing for time-invariant and time-varying unobservables that can be correlated across products critically affects the estimated degree of complementarity and advertising elasticities. Chapter 2. While prescription drugs have enabled the cost-effective treatment of a myriad of diseases, many pharmaceuticals come with potential for abuse. The growing use of opioid medications for chronic pain led to widespread misuse, addiction, and skyrocketing overdose death rates. In “Did Plain-Vanilla Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs Reduce Opioid Use? Evidence from Privately Insured Patients,” I explore whether prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) with no registration or use mandates were effective in reducing the utilization of opioid prescription drugs. Exploiting the staggered introduction of such programs between 2008 and 2010, I use difference-in-differences to estimate their causal effect on the number of prescriptions, days supply, and dosage per capita. Based on data from privately insured adults, the estimation results reveal that PDMPs successfully reduced opioid utilization, especially of high-dosage prescriptions. A battery of robustness checks suggests that the estimated effects are caused by the PDMPs and not by confounding factors such as broader trends in health care, attrition, out-of-state purchases, or other anti-opioid policies. Chapter 3. The assumption that buyers pay the same price for each unit of the good they purchase underlies many economic analyses. However, linear pricing is one of many pricing arrangements used in practice. In “Empirical Evidence on Conditional Pricing Practices: A Review,” Julie Holland Mortimer and I review the existing empirical studies on the competitive impact of conditional pricing practices (CPPs), under which the price of a product may depend on a quantity, share, bundling, or other requirement. Examples of CPPs include all-units and loyalty discounts, full-line forcing contracts, and exclusivity arrangements. A common thread unifying the empirical literature is that CPPs often have both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and that their net effect may depend on the details of the arrangements and the characteristics of the markets in which they are used
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020
Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: Economics
Popov, Anton, David G. 1980 Atkin i Keith Chen. "Essays in industrial organization and urban economics". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/129003.
Pełny tekst źródłaCataloged from student-submitted PDF of thesis. "Chapter 3, written with professors David Atkin and Keith Chen"--Page 4.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 169-173).
First two chapters of this thesis study the wholesale and retail tier of the beer supermarket sales. In the first chapter, I am interested in consolidation of distributors in the beer industry and its interaction with the uniform pricing by retailers. I build a theoretical model which illustrates how distributor consolidation in a set of counties may affect retail prices in all counties, depending on how strong the incentive of retail chains to price uniformly is. I test the predictions of the model using Nielsen scanner price data. I study two events of distributor consolidation in Ohio in 2009-2011, which followed upstream MillerCoors joint venture in 2008. In one of the events, distributor consolidation has no price effects. In another, bigger event, prices of consolidated brands (Miller, Coors, Heineken and Modelo) in treated counties increase by 0.46% relative to the control ABI brands. I find no evidence of prices in other counties being affected.
The findings are consistent with some cases of my theoretical model. The implications of this study are that modeling distribution tier and uniform pricing by retailers may be important for horizontal merger practitioners, both for retrospective analysis and for forecasting. Chapter 2 is devoted to the reasons for uniform pricing. I estimate the model, introduced in the first chapter, where supermarket chains have an incentive to set a uniform price for a given product across different locations. The model includes a product-specific baseline price which a supermarket chain sets, and a penalty for deviation from this baseline price. A single store will not deviate from the baseline price, if the marginal profits from doing so are smaller than the penalty parameter. My estimates suggest that the penalty for a dollar change from a benchmark price in a given week is around $12 to $16. Uniform pricing leads to suboptimal choice of prices relative to a problem with no penalty.
There is substantial price re-optimization, which, however, does not affect profits much, due to changes in prices having a small first-order effect around the optimum. Supermarket chains only lose 0.4% of profits from pricing uniformly. Effects on consumers are highly heterogeneous across locations and weeks, with change in consumer surplus varying from -0.55$ to 1.92$ per consumer per week. I show that change in consumer surplus due to uniform prices is positively correlated with income, with higher income zip codes benefiting more from uniform pricing. This effect, although economically meaningful in aggregate, is not large for an average consumer. Chapter 3, written with professors David Atkin and Keith Chen, adds to the literature studying knowledge spillovers in modern cities. The returns to face-to-face interactions are of central importance to understanding the determinants of agglomeration.
However, the existing literature studying patterns of geographic proximity in patent citations or industrial co-location has struggled to disentangle the benefits of face-to-face interactions from other spatial knowledge spillovers. In this paper we attempt to more directly measure face-to face interactions using highly granular worker geolocation data in Silicon Valley. To understand the degree to which knowledge flows result from their interactions, we study the relationship between cross-firm worker meetings and cross-citations between their firms. To navigate endogeneity concerns due to firms organizing meetings with firms they wish to learn from, we focus on serendipitous meetings--measured by the interactions of workers in neighboring firms in very different industries--that play a central role in the urban theories of Jane Jacobs.
The subset of these chance meetings occurring during work-hours also serve as costs shifters to meeting face-to-face rather than remotely, allowing us to separately identify the returns to planned meetings. Our results suggest substantial knowledge spillovers from face-to-face interactions, including increases in citations resulting from serendipitous meetings that are a third as large as the elasticity with respect to physical distance.
by Anton Popov.
Ph. D.
Ph.D. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics
FUMAGALLI, EILEEN. "Topics in political economics and industrial organization". Doctoral thesis, Università Bocconi, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/11565/4051031.
Pełny tekst źródłaCREA, GIOVANNI. "ESSAY IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION". Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/334530.
Pełny tekst źródłaLandesmann, M. A. "Industrial structures and international competition : Disproportional growth in interdependent economies". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371680.
Pełny tekst źródłaBelussi, Fiorenza. "Industrial innovation and firm development in Italy : the Veneto case". Thesis, University of Sussex, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.297118.
Pełny tekst źródłaAju, A. "Reindustrialisation and government industrial research institutes in an inert economy". Thesis, University of Manchester, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.233039.
Pełny tekst źródłaGowers, Robin. "A study of the British industrial wage structure 1900-1926". Thesis, University of Essex, 1998. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.388572.
Pełny tekst źródłaKim, Kee Hyo. "Engines of growth industrial policy and the Korean motor industry /". Thesis, Online version, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?did=1&uin=uk.bl.ethos.337677.
Pełny tekst źródłaYin, Xingmin. "China's industrial structure in transition : concentration and performance 1980-1990". Thesis, University of Sussex, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.359151.
Pełny tekst źródłaCovert, Thomas Rutford. "Essays in Industrial Organization and Finance". Thesis, Harvard University, 2014. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:11561.
Pełny tekst źródłaHawkins, Jenny Rae. "Essays in Industrial Organization". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/202519.
Pełny tekst źródłaLai, Zhenyu. "Essays in the Industrial Organization of Internet Markets". Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17467354.
Pełny tekst źródłaEconomics
Almutawakel, Yahya Y. "Import substitution as an industrial strategy in the Yemen Arab Republic". Thesis, University of East Anglia, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.316137.
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