Rozprawy doktorskie na temat „Human (Philosophy)”

"What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god: the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals! And yet to me what is this quintessence of dust?" In his angry and depressed state, Hamlet finds no consolation in his fellow human beings, but that's not to say that he doesn't attribute them with many fine qualities. But what are we to make of this 'quintessence of dust'? What a piece of work is a (hu)man? How are we to understand ourselves? What's more to the point perhaps is, why should we try? One reason springs to mind immediately that we can point to in order to justify an attempt at such understanding. It is surely true that by way of a greater understanding of ourselves we can come to a more complete understanding of 'the way things are' per se. By coming to a greater and more complete understanding of being a human being we can start to see how what we are informs the way we are and vice versa. For instance, the sort of beings that we are as human beings allows us to experience the world around us in a particular way, it may 'open' the world up to us in some respects, whilst 'closing' it off in others. The kind of understanding that I am aiming for involves an exploration and clarification of what it is to be human; what it is to exist as a human being and if there is anything unique about being a human being. If we look for a dictionary definition of 'human being' we find something like the following: "Of or belonging to the genus Homo ... any man or woman or child of the species Homo Sapiens., Defining human beings in this way places them firmly in the 'natural order' of things, it makes them one species amongst many. Admittedly human beings are probably the most complex species in the natural world, but nevertheless they are open to understanding in just the same way as any other species be it an oyster, a cat or a chimpanzee. If we are to take this 'speciesistic', biological line then, we should aim to understand human beings in purely natural, materialistic terms supplied by the 'best' theory that science can offer to us at the time of investigation. In doing this though we might worry that we are missing out on something 'special' about human beings, surely there is something that sets human beings apart from the rest of the animal kingdom, for instance the fact that human beings possess the kind of consciousness that they do. In fact this worry goes deeper than just worrying about human beings being 'special' in some way and whether or not they are the only species that possess such consciousness. Indeed, we might think that there is in general something special about each animal species; namely that each one possesses a distinctive viewpoint upon the world and that this is only accessible if one is a member of that species. This is precisely the sort of worry aired by Nagel. Of course if Nagel is right, then human beings should have no problem with access to what it is like to be human beings, but he also argues that such access can never be explained in purely scientific, naturalistic terms. His argument focuses on attempts to capture experience from the objective perspective of science and he claims that "no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically that there is something it is like to be that organism.' This being the case, if a scientific naturalist account is to succeed '''something it is like to be' features must be given a physicalist account." Nagel denies that this is a possibility, he claims that: "Every subjective phenomenon is, essentially, connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view." According to Nagel, materialist philosophies rest on the fundamental principle that the whole of reality can be described in objective physical terms. The physically objective world is the only world there is and it exists independently of subjective human or animal perspectives. He describes the materialist conception of reality as saying that underneath the different appearances of things there must lie a reality that is independent of how things appear to human beings or any other animals. The world would exist even if there were no human or other observers in it; hence its true nature must be detachable from how it seems to any observers. This means that according to materialist philosophies, if we wish to reach a conception of the world as it objectively is we have to not think of it from an individual point of view or perspective, and not think of it from a general human perspective. The physical world as it is in itself contains no points of view and nothing that can appear only to one particular point of view. Whatever it contains can be apprehended by a general rational consciousness divorced from the sensory organs of particular individuals or species. Although this conception of reality has been immensely useful in the development of physics, Nagel believes that it cannot be the whole story. He argues that the subjective perceptual points of view which are left out of the objective account continue to exist, furthermore they are the necessary conditions of human beings acquiring evidence about the physical world. Human beings cannot collect evidence except from their spatio-temporal location and this means they must have a perspective; as well as this, the objective conception of the world is formed by mental activity. For Nagel then, a complete explanation of reality will have to take account of these things because they are also part of reality. In his arguments against a scientific, objective conception of reality, Nagel appears to take an overly positivistic view of science and of philosophical analyses that take science seriously. However, I think Nagel is correct though in his attack on materialist theories of mind (and by implication, human beings) even if there are some problems with his arguments.7 In the next chapter I will show how materialist, conventionally naturalistic theories of human beings miss out on essential features of them, and also how non-naturalist accounts miss out on much the same sort of features. Much of this is due to both of them working with the same sort of disengaged view of the world, just the sort of view that Nagel is so critical of. I don't believe that Nagel's criticisms should make us give up on a naturalist programme altogether though. Rather what we need to do is to draw it in as inclusive a way as possible, a way that takes into account not just the 'objective' features of the world, but also the 'subjective' features of human experience of the world. In Chapter 2, I outline just such an inclusive, broad framework. Such a framework provides us with the opportunity to explore the continuity between human beings and other non-human animals, whilst at the same time preserving the uniqueness of being human without having to resort to any form of unnecessary or distorting humanism. In other words, it allows us to place human beings alongside other non-human animals firmly in the 'natural order' whilst at the same time recognising human beings unique characteristics. The most interesting of these characteristics is human beings' 'personhood', which I will explore in Chapter 6. However, human beings are also uniquely 'social' beings and I shall look at this fact in Chapter 4 and show how being a social being is an essential feature of being human. This sociality depends in part upon the 'lived' nature of the human beings bodies and I shall look in detail at this in Chapter 3. However, I believe we also need to guard against any unwarranted humanism whereby human beings are overly distanced from other non-human animals. To this end I shall show how human beings can be regarded as unique but at the same time as continuous with the rest of the 'animal kingdom' in Chapter 5. In the course of this thesis, my primary aim is not to provide conclusive or damning arguments against either conventional naturalism or non-naturalism; rather I hope to weave together the components of an alternative picture, one that presents a more convincing, persuasive and plausible alternative - broad naturalism. As Sherlock Holmes says: "One's ideas must be as broad as Nature if they are to interpret Nature." In other words I intend to show that to come to anything like a full understanding of what it is like to be a human being we have to adopt a broadly naturalistic framework. Conventional naturalism and non-naturalism will be shown to be lacking because they cannot fully account for human beings' experience of the world or of how they are 'at home' in their world. However, at the same time by taking the broad approach we can accept that there are 'truths' in both conventional pictures and weave these into a cohesive whole that can account for the experience of being a human being. Most of all though a broadly naturalistic account will allow us to see what a wonderful 'piece of work' a human being truly is.

The overwhelming majority of philosophical discussions about the relationships between humans and animals concern the human use and treatment of animals in contexts such as those of food production, scientific experimentation, and pet-keeping. By contrast, the kinds of affective bonds that do - or might conceivably - occur between humans and animals, have received very little philosophical attention. In this dissertation, my main, but not exclusive, concern is with the latter issue. More specifically, I am primarily concerned with the question of whether human-animal relationships can be meaningful. Because pet animals are the clearest candidates for meaningful relationships with us, they will be the focus of my discussion. I argue that at least some human-pet relationships can be meaningful, even if they are not among the most meaningful relationships in our lives. Thereafter, I shall turn to one question about the treatment and use of animals on which the earlier question bears, namely the question of whether the practice of having pets is permissible.

The thesis explores the role of human understanding in R.G. Collingwood's philosophy. I examine four major areas: the role of psychology, the unity of mind (i.e. unity of thoughts and emotions), the role of art and the case of fairy tales as a source of historical knowledge. These themes taken together expound a coherent way to see human understanding: with psychology Collingwood suggests the form that human understanding cannot assume the unity of mind is Collingwood's idea of how we experience an activity, that is, as an undivided whole of emotions and thoughts (and in some respects sensations or feelings too), that exist in every activity as elements that cannot be distinguished or separated. When we come to the forms that an activity can take I argue, using art and fairy tales, that human understanding in Collingwood's system should be seen as a shift from the knowledge of the united spirit (as propounded in Speculum Mentis) to the knowledge of the historical consciousness. The knowledge of the united spirit is achieved through a dialectic scale of the different forms of experience, which individually, in isolation from one another, are not epistemologically valid. In the historical consciousness the forms of experience are epistemologically autonomous and are found within history, all being manifestations of the historical mind.

Thesis (M.S.)--Central Connecticut State University, 2001.
Thesis advisor: Gavro Altman. " ... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in International Studies." Includes bibliographical references (leaf [73]). Also available via the World Wide Web.

The moral philosophy of Dai Zhen can be summarised as "fulfil desires and express feelings". Because he believed that life is the most cherished thing for all man and thing, he maintains that "whatever issues from desire is always for the sake of life and nurture." He also claimed that "caring for oneself, and extending this care to those close to oneself, are both aspects of humanity" He set up a strong monastic moral philosophy based on individual human desire and feeling. As the title 'Dai Zhen's philosophy of the ethical human being' demonstrate, human physical body and activities of life is ethical base of philosophy of Dai Zhen. He regards the cause of activities for life is desire and feeling and he claimed that it is the prime concern of his moral philosophy. He set up a strong monastic moral philosophy base on the individual human desire and feeling to establish man as the moral subjectivity. Dai Zhen applied a systematic research agenda and built on palaeography and phonology to reconstruct the meaning of the Canons to become a sage by using the "meanings" of words as a method of reconstructing the "intentions" of the words of Canons, rather than by using metaphysics and intuitive meditation.

In my thesis I propose a new interpretation of Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. I claim that this Book must be read in the light of the Introduction to the Treatise. Thus, my interpretation revolves around Hume's intention of creating a new system of the sciences on the basis of his science of man. In this thesis I pay close attention to the following subjects: the analysis of the 'vulgar'; Hume's discussion about the impact of predispositions on our ideas; the distinction between the concept of causation and the process of causation. Finally, I discuss Hume's position on the question of the simplicity and complexity of ideas.

The general purpose of this study was to examine transformations of human agency in natural contexts. Existing theoretical formulations have primarily been confined to laboratory investigations. Moreover, the principles generated by such theories have not been validated beyond the laboratory setting. With this purpose in mind, there were two immediate aims of the study. The first aim was to contribute to counselling theory by assessing five prominent theories of human agency and providing a basis from which to potentially establish more adequate theoretical formulations. The second aim was to contribute to counselling practice by providing concrete information and a more informed basis through which to enhance agency in clients. A multiple case study design integrating intensive interviewing and Q-methodology was utilized for the study. Ten individuals, five women and five men, ranging in age from 28 to 64, were identified through a network of contacts for participation in the study. Based upon convergence of qualitative evidence from interviews and quantitative evidence from Q-sorts, rich, detailed narrative accounts of transformation were constructed for each individual. Each account was validated by the individual for whom each was written and by an independent reviewer. Through a comparative analysis of the ten diverse accounts of transformation, extensive commonality was identified. Twenty-two common themes were extracted from the accounts that portrayed significant features of the transformation. Based on these themes, an abstract story of the common pattern revealed in the transformation was plotted. Individual aspects of each of the theories of agency were validated as well as qualified in some important ways. In addition, the results extended these theories in three main ways. First, the results indicated that transformations of human agency were complex wholes that involved a configuration of features rather than any one or two isolated features. Second, the findings indicated that context played a critical role in transformations of agency. And third, the results emphasized the important role of powerful emotions in the process of transformation. The results of this study also generated a beginning holistic portrait of transformation which has implications for counsellors in terms of understanding and facilitating transformations of agency in clients.
Education, Faculty of
Educational and Counselling Psychology, and Special Education (ECPS), Department of
Graduate

In this dissertation I outline and argue for a new approach to Seneca's moral philosophy - with particular emphasis on the notion that human misery can only be eliminated through philosophy. I argue that a careful reading of Seneca's philosophical texts reveal that a concern for philosophical progress dominates Seneca's writing. This concern manifests itself both in what might be called practical projects in Seneca's philosophical work - including his approaches to reading, writing, teaching, and advising his audience - and in his more theoretical accounts of the nature of philosophy and its role in producing a sound mind. Seneca's concern for philosophical progress shapes his works both substantively and methodologically. This is true of his account of the nature of philosophy and the structure of philosophical discourse, his understanding of philosophical pedagogy, and his approach to reading and writing philosophical texts. The concern for progress is perhaps most pressing on the issue of the emotions. Here, too, Seneca is devoted to helping the audience in a principled, if restrained, way. I argue that Seneca's conception of philosophy as therapy is both more subtle and more successful that those accounts available from his Stoic predecessors.

This dissertation explores ideas about human agency and conduct as these are expressed in the Indian epic known as the Mahabharata (the "Great Bharata"). Two concepts in particular retain our attention: daiva, the power that comes from the gods, and purusakara, the power that comes from human beings (purusas). One current of thought holds that human life and the course of history are governed exclusively by external agencies ("the gods" or chance). On the other hand, the epic also carries the commanding message that the lives of individuals and societies may be changed for the better through human initiative (purusakara) in accordance with the dharma, the moral order sanctioned by religious tradition. The issue is finally reduced to the question: who is the real agent of action?
The analysis concludes that the question can only be resolved in the context of epic ideas about the nature of the human being. But humanity is simply a stage in the spiritual evolution of all life towards the realization of the unity of existence as the manifestation of a Supreme Person (paramapurusa; purusottama) or a Supreme Self (paramatman). Souls (atmans) are embodied as human beings at the stage when consciousness develops into the self-consciousness of an ego (ahamkara), which arrogates to itself the notion of self-determination or "freedom." In reality, however, the soul is not free but trapped in a cycle of rebirth, which can be broken only by the abandonment of all notion of agency, action and control over the fruits of the action. The epic therefore operates at two levels. In terms of the mundane tasks and responsibilities of daily life, particularly the responsibilities of the king, the human being is regarded as enjoying a modicum of freedom and self-determination to chart the course of his or her future evolution. From the higher perspective of the unity of all life, however, this self-concept is inherently flawed. The actions of such a being spring from unconscious motives prompted by the higher purposes that govern the course of the cosmos as a whole.

What is the role of philosophy in the human rights project?4 And what is the role of human rights in creating a better world? These are the questions at the core of a dispute between the philosopher John Tasioulas and the historian Samuel Moyn, although it takes considerable work to see past the cross-talk and arrive at this core. In this paper I will show that disentangling the arguments of Moyn and Tasioulas is a fruitful task that lights a path towards advancing both human rights and global justice. Specifically, I will show that while human rights play a crucial role in bettering the world, it is in the interests of global justice for that role to be strictly delimited. Philosophers of human rights are necessary for this process of delimitation. The irony is that Moyn, instead of discrediting philosophers of human rights, actually helps us to better understand the urgency of their work.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2007.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 208-225).
Repetition is avoided in countless human languages and at a variety of grammatical levels. In this dissertation I ask what it is that makes repetition so bad. I propose that at least three distinct biases against repetition exist. First, repetition of articulatory gestures is relatively difficult. This difficulty results in phonetic variation that may lead to categorical phonological avoidance. I call this set of claims the Biomechanical Repetition Avoidance Hypothesis (BRAH), and support it with evidence from cross-linguistic patterns in repetition avoidance phenomena, articulatory data from music performance, and a series of phonetic experiments that document the proposed types of phonetic variation. Based on these data, I give an evolutionary account for antigemination in particular. The second anti-repetition bias is a perceptual deficit causing speakers not to perceive one of a sequence of repeated items, of any conceptual category. This bias is already well-documented, as are the grammatical effects (primarily haplology). I provide here the evidence of gradient variation in production bridging the two, from avoidance of homophone sequences in English corpora. The third factor is a principle disallowing the repetition of syntactic features in certain configurations within a phase domain. I document categorical effects of it in Semitic syntax of possession and relativization. These elicit repair strategies superficially similar to those of phonology (specifically, deletion and epenthesis/insertion). Repetition effects, then, are traceable to a variety of independent, functional biases. This argues against a unitary, innate constraint against repetition. Rather, multiple anti-repetition biases result in particular avoidance patterns, with their intersection producing additional asymmetries. Possible categorical repairs are further constrained by the nature of the formal grammatical system.
by Mary Ann Walter.
Ph.D.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2009.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 99-100).
Contemporary philosophy of human rights is dominated by two seemingly opposed approaches. This dissertation is concerned with the choice between them. The traditional approach to human rights is characterized by the belief that human rights are moral rights that all human beings possess simply in virtue of their humanity. The political approach to human rights is characterized by the belief that human rights are those rights that possess an essential political function. Each approach faces a unique challenge, and attending to how each challenge is met reveals that the two approaches are more similar than first supposed. However, there remains an important difference between the two approaches regarding the concept of a human right. I argue that the conceptual claim made by the political approach is false. In Chapter One I focus on the traditional approach to human rights. It has an unclear connection to the existing international political discourse and practice of human rights. I call the challenge for the traditional approach the demand of taking the practice seriously. I argue that the traditional account can do so in at least three important ways that demand might be understood. In satisfying this demand, the traditional approach is shown to be in agreement with the political approach in an important way. In Chapter Two I focus on the political approach to human rights. In focusing on the existing political practice of human rights, the political approach can appear overly descriptive in nature. Its challenge is to account for the distinctive moral authority of human rights.
(cont.) I call this challenge the normativity challenge and I argue that the political approach has an effective answer to this concern. However, that answer is indistinguishable from that offered by the traditional approach. Thus, the political approach is shown to be in agreement with the traditional approach in an important way. However, there is an important difference between the two approaches. The political approach ties the concept of a human right to a distinctive political function. The traditional approach rejects this conceptual claim. In Chapter Three I argue that the political approach's conceptual claim is false.
by Sean Jamison Holland.
Ph.D.

Within the framework of some of Dilthey's themes such as historicity, finitude and the ineffability of all human productions, the A. approaches the problem of Subjectivity in relation to the Human Sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) which, conceived as forms of self-reflection of historical life itself, put in evidence a Subject compelled to redefine its cognitive possibilities. This task leads Dilthey to a hermeneutical proposal, the main value of which lies in not having eluded facticity and temporality proper to life, and in having proposed them as domains where all intellectual activity finds its limits and the openness to new possibilities of sense.
En el marco de algunos temas diltheyanos como la historicidad, la finitud y la inefabilidad de todas las producciones humanas, el artículo se propone abordar la problemática del sujeto en relación con las ciencias del espíritu (Geisteswissenschaften), las que, concebidas como formas de autorreflexión de la propia vida histórica, ponen en evidencia un sujeto obligado a redefinir sus posibilidades cognoscitivas. Esta tarea conduce a Dilthey al planteamiento de una propuesta hermenéutica, cuyo valor fundamental radica en no haber eludido la facticidad y temporalidad propias de la vida, y en haberlas planteado como ámbitos donde toda actividad intelectual encuentra sus límites y la apertura de nuevas posibilidades de sentido.

This thesis is essentially programmatic. This is not to say that it should be seen as a prolegomenon to any future metaphysics of body and mind; I can hardly claim such an exulted status for what I have to say. Rather, I am content to raise certain questions and indicate certain directions in which I believe a more systematic investigation of these issues should take us. Equally, I also hope that enough of a case can be made out here for the claim that such an investigation, if not a full-fledged prolegomenon, is essential if we are to free ourselves from a fundamental impasse in contemporary philosophy of mind. It is no exaggeration to say that Cartesianism continues to stride our thought like a colossus, informing and shaping our conceptualisations of what it is to be a subject of thought and experience, as well as our more general conceptualisations of what we take the world to be and what our relationship with it actually is. The Cartesian turn in philosophy has generally left us with a framework of binary categories in which only a divisive account of these conceptualisations is possible. This is because these Cartesian binaries are not simply oppositional but are oppositional in ways such that their terms are construed as being intrinsically autonomous and exclusionary, with a privileging of one of the terms in each case.

The main concern of environmental philosophy has been to find value for nature. The thesis is an attempt to link a theory of nature, a theory of human nature and a theory of value, which Andrew Brennan stipulated for a viable environmental philosophy. The problem is set forward in Part I where a definition of nature is explored. The complexity of the task leads to a brief history of the concept of nature (after a criticism of other historical accounts by three environmental philosophers) whereby two opposing explanations of nature and human nature are revealed: teleological and non-teleological. Part II traces the decline of teleological explanation in favour of non-teleological explanations and the development of two main explanations of human nature in relation to nature that are prevalent today: Ultra-Darwinism (a reductionist explanation of human nature) and postmodernism. An analysis of these two positions shows that neither have an adequate metaphysics for finding value for nature, and this is revealed by an examination of two different types of environmental philosophy influenced respectively by the two opposing views. In Part III the problem of values is discussed with particular emphasis on moral values. An argument for objective values based on objective knowledge is put forward as well as a theory of human nature which leads to the conclusion that teleological explanations link a theory of nature, a theory of human nature and a theory of value more satisfactorily than the non-teleological explanations of Ultra-Darwinism and postmodernism. The relevance of this conclusion to the problems of the environment is shown.

Despite its prominence as a pejorative term in moral and political philosophy, the phenomenon of ethnocentrism has escaped the focused attention of moral and political philosophers. Little sustained effort has been devoted to its in-depth analysis. This thesis attempts to fill in that gap in the philosophical literature, with a particular focus on the analysis of ethnocentrism as a problem, or rather a set of problems, facing the theory and practice of human rights. The thesis begins by drawing a core distinction between ethnocentrism as a moral phenomenon (i.e., a form of moral partiality), on the one hand, and as an epistemological phenomenon (i.e., a mode of judgment), on the other. After singling out the epistemological aspect of ethnocentrism as its main focus, the thesis argues for four interlocking claims. The first claim is that ethnocentrism represents an unwarranted mode of judgment, and thus an epistemic hazard that ought to be avoided if at all possible (Chapter One, §3). This claim is defended at length against the version of political constructivism advanced by John Rawls, which, by grounding political argument exclusively in ideas and values embedded in a common public culture, implicitly justifies a form of ethnocentrism (Chapter Two). The second claim is that moral argument cannot avoid ethnocentrism by grounding itself, as some have thought, in judgments upon which there is broad moral consensus, or rather by avoiding any appeal to judgments that are the subject of marked dissensus (Chapter Three and Chapter Four). Thirdly, the thesis argues that ethnocentrism is, if avoidable, only so to a limited extent (Chapter Six, §2). And fourthly, it offers an outline of how this limited form of avoidance might work (Chapter Five and Chapter Six, §3).

Few philosophers, today, are doing more than simple recognition of Levinass debt to phenomenology when a thorough explication of how phenomenological methodology impacts Levinass work is needed. This dissertation is the needed discussion of methodology that has been so absent in Levinas as well as in so many of his interpreters. The purpose, herein, is to synthesize Levinass work, explicating it in terms of transcendental methodology, the result of which reveals Levinass claims to be more defensible when understood in these terms than when the full rigor of this methodology is not properly grasped. First, to connect Levinas to transcendental phenomenology a correct perspective of the phenomenological tradition is needed. I argue that phenomenology is a methodology that discloses those horizons that condition experience such that appearance takes on meaning. I further argue that it is important to see this disclosure as something open-ended and ongoing rather than a method capable of fully revealing a final telos. Levinas fits into this methodology by providing the ethical as just such a horizonal condition, while his constant returning to this theme highlights the need to keep reworking the description of its meaningful impact on experience. Second, I defend Levinas from those who claim his work cannot be phenomenological, based on what they see as an implied Jewish tradition informing his description. I argue that what must be understood is that Levinass reference to God, Biblical stories, and Jewish wisdom impose an unsettling language that is introduced to replace traditional phenomenological language that does not always allow for the goals phenomenology sets for itself. This imposition does not use the Jewish tradition to make his argument but as a vocabulary far better at describing the ethical condition than what is commonly used in phenomenology. The final step of explication involves the actual application of the methodology, now understood aright, to Levinass claims about the other, the self, and the ethical. The result is that once we understand the ethical as the infinite originative horizon out of which the conscious ego emerges, later interpretations of Levinas will be able to successfully move beyond his work.

The contemporary human being realizes that their activity influences the surrounding world and themselves. At the same time, the occurrences that have taken place in the 20th and 21st century make them recognize the fact of the existence of the multidimensional cultural crisis and that they have reached the “turning point.” These happenings inspire to reflection on the creative activity of the human being; they make us realize that it is really important, in relation to that activity, to exercise the virtue of wisdom, i.e. the constant predisposition to create the good. When you are citing the document, use the following link http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/34304

Kant and Fichte's respective accounts of evil share many similarities. This paper seeks to determine if and identify where the two accounts diverge. Due to the systematic nature of German Idealist writing, it is impossible to compare the relevant doctrines of Kant and Fichte and passages in a vacuum. Each explanation belongs to a broader account of evil which itself fits into an even more expansive moral philosophy. Thus, the paper has two goals, one belonging to history of philosophy, the other to moral philosophy. The former involves analyzing the differences that exist between the accounts of evil provided by Kant in Part One of Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Fichte in section 16 of his System of Ethics. The latter furthers our understanding of self-conceit by comparing Kant and Fichte's explanations of this evil disposition. Ultimately, Fichte's account helps to explain the Kantian doctrine taken from Rousseau of 'unsociable sociability.'

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, September 2006.
"August 2006."
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-80).
My dissertation asks whether there is a human right to democracy. This is a difficult question, not least because there is no consensus about either what democracy requires or how to interpret human rights. The introduction aims to alleviate these sources of confusion about the question itself, in addition to presenting the main arguments in favor of a human right to democracy, and my rationale to focus more narrowly on a question of toleration. The main discussions are organized around the idea that if democratic peoples should tolerate undemocratic peoples, then a human right to democracy does not exist. Part 1 uses discussions about corporate agency and the conditions of corporate responsibility to argue that a group's capacity for responsible collective agency depends on four things: its ability to form collective intentions, an internal culture that orients the formation of personal intentions to act in accordance with those collective intentions, agents authorized to act (vicariously) for the group, and an effective internal practice of public accountability. I also suggest reasons why it is sometimes appropriate for a collective entity to authorize the agents acting on its behalf to use coercion.
(cont.) Part 2 uses these ideas of responsible collective agency and the grounds of legitimate coercion to interpret Rawls's idea of a people as a normative conception of collective self-determination. I explain why a people (in Rawls's sense) meets the four conditions of responsible collective agency, why democracy is not necessarily required for collective self-determination, and also why a people's government should possess coercive authority. Part 3 addresses directly whether democratic peoples should tolerate undemocratic peoples. Traditionally, theorizing about toleration tends to focus on the domestic relations of a given society, and is thus not clearly relevant to questions of toleration among peoples. Therefore, the bulk of Part 3 is devoted to developing an idea of international toleration. Based on this idea of international toleration, and the value of the self-determination of peoples, I argue that democratic peoples should tolerate undemocratic peoples. I conclude that a human right to democracy does not exist.
by Karim Abdul-Matin.
Ph.D.

The relationship between horse and human has been one of mystery and deep fascination for ages, inspiring countless myths, works of art, dreams, and an entire other world of equine obsessed humans who center their lives around their horses. This research explores, through imaginal, embodied, narrative, and intuitive inquiry methods, the complexities of this trans-species relationship. The purpose of this embodied autoethnographic inquiry is to inspire a different way of imagining the individuation process as it occurs in the context of the horse-human relationship. Through this transformative process the authentic Self has the opportunity to evolve to a more integrated state of consciousness that is informed by the immersion in a trans-species engagement, which challenges human bias and anthropocentric psychological theory.

Questioning and re-imagining our ways of relating across species lines, the ego becomes the apprentice of an in-between realm that is created when horse and human engage. The integration of such trans-species experiences between horse and human challenges psychological constructs that are centered around individualism and anthropocentrism. A re-visioning of the psychological concept of dream animals, their purpose, symbolism, and autonomy are explored through a discussion of accounts of dreaming with horses, creating an interinforming reality between dreaming and waking worlds, and apprenticing the ego through dreaming experiences. Through the interfaces of horse and human, the body is awakened to a new way of being in the world and the deeply imbedded construct of dualistic modes of experiencing is challenged through the dismemberment of old ways of being. From this place of dismemberment, a new imagining of riding through an exploration of archetypal image and the deconstruction of popular assumption is reached, with careful consideration on behalf of Equus. Taking into consideration the fact that our lives are intricately interwoven with other than human species, this research calls for the integration of a trans-species ethic within depth psychology with the hope of re-conceptualizing the ultimate importance of a more harmonious human-animal relationship.

The thesis 'Human Potentiality in the Early Writings of Karl Marx' considers the notion of human potentiality as employed in Marx's early texts and in those of his humanist followers. A distinction is made between an Open Humanism and a Closed Humanism. A Closed Humanism, in gesturing towards a Communist future, makes illegitimate use of the notion 'human potential', such that it assumes too easily that men, in fact, possess large amounts of unrealised potential and also makes unwarranted value judgements as to how it may be best realised. An Open Humanism, on the other hand, is proposed as a philosophically tenable means of referring to and justifying a Communist future. Rather than sketching the human content of the future, it maintains that, in the free conditions of Communism, men would be subject to the demands of a problematic of the good life. This problematic, is a reworking of a traditional philosophical question, most commonly associated with Aristotle, of how potentialities which are common and peculiar to human beings are related to the question of how they ought to live.

Daisaku Ikeda is the Buddhist leader of one of the most visible religious movements today, the Soka Gakkai International (SGI). In this thesis, the main research question concerns the peace philosophy of Ikeda and its contribution to peace theory. Daisaku Ikeda and the SGI have been the subject of several scholarly studies in the fields of religious history and sociology. The focus of this research is on the significance of Ikeda's contributions in the field of peace studies, where his work has not yet been the subject of systematic investigation. It is argued that the originality of Ikeda's philosophy of peace resides in two main elements. First, the starting point is consistently human life and its potential for peace and happiness, not the omnipresence of conflict. Second, he offers a coherent system linking the individual, dialogical and global levels, which can be represented as a triangle made of three conceptual frameworks, that of Humanistic Psychology (Human Revolution), Communicative Rationality (Dialogue) and Cosmopolitan Democracy (Global Civilization). It is also argued that while being inspired by Ikeda's Buddhist spirituality and his loyalty to his mentor Josei Toda, this secular humanist approach to peace offers an effective and original way for all people to participate in the construction of a better world, regardless of their religious or ideological affiliation, social background or cultural practices.

vii, 50 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number.
Emmanuel Levinas has recently been given much attention for the resources that his writing could provide for an ethics of the non-human. While some commentators dismiss the humanistic biases of Levinas' analyses in favor of expanded sites of application, others argue that Levinas' anthropocentrism is central to his philosophy. This debate is resolved by demonstrating that Levinas' analysis oflanguage and separation in Totality and Infinity is an analysis of the hW11an on!.v. For Levinas, ethics signifies the peculiar way ofbeing in the world that is found in the site of the human. This way of being in the world is the emergence of concems about justice, the emergence of reason and discourse, but it does not restrict moral consideration to hwnans. Despite Levinas' own tendency to align the non-human animal against the ethical, there is nothing in Levinas' analysis that prevents granting full moral consideration to the non-human.
Adviser: Ted Toadvine

The growth of an individual into mature selfhood is the primary basis of the Lawrentian relationship. Lawrence describes a mystical kind of rebirth of the self into a deeper level of the unconscious. He says that one should explore the impulses and desires of the unconscious in order to find a deeper, more fulfilled self. Ursula of The Rainbow and Paul of Sons and Lovers are the characters who most successfully begin this growth into separate selfhood. According to Lawrence the journey into the unconscious is to be accomplished through sensual experiences. He mistrusts the intellect because he feels that the mind distorts reality. The bodily sensations are more concrete, and therefore more real. Lawrence demonstrates in Walter Morel of Sons and Lovers, Birkin and Ursula of Women in Love, and Connie and Mellors of Lady Chatterley's Lover that spontaneous, sensual experiences are necessary to live a fully sensual life. For Lawrence, the failure to discover the deepest, sensual self results in the need to control others. Characters who embrace abstract intellectualism and modern industrialism are the ones who attempt to force every living thing into submission to their egos. The compulsion to dominate others gives the characters a temporary feeling of fulfillment but is ultimately destructive. Gertrude, Miriam, Gerald, and Hermione are destructive characters who strive to control others. They are weak and dependent, needing another person's strength of self to feel complete. The acknowledgement of a separate self is crucial to Lawrence's philosophy of relationships. According to his philosophy a person discovers the separate, fundamental self at the unconscious level through sensual experiences. Abstract intellectualism and industrialism are responsible for causing man's alienation from himself; his failure to discover and acknowledge a deeper self generates destructiveness which is manifested in his domination of other living beings.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Toledo, 2010.
Typescript. "Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Philosophy." "A thesis entitled"--at head of title. Title from title page of PDF document. Bibliography: p. 80-87.