Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq”

This article seeks to analyze the concept of wujūd in Islamic philosophy, including the Peripatetic (al-Ḥikmat al-Mashā’iyyat) and Illuminationist (al-Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq) schools. The study employs a discourse analysis approach, using data collected from an analysis of Islamic philosophy literature with a focus on the concept of wujūd in these two schools. The findings of the study show that despite using the same term, the concept of external reality has different meanings in different schools of Islamic philosophy. The Peripatetic school interprets wujūd as the basis of reality, but its extension varies depending on the differences in māhiyat (essence). The Illuminationist school, on the other hand, interprets wujūd as an addition to external reality, as the fundamental element is māhiyat. One of the novel contributions of this study is to highlight the sensitivity of the concept of essence in Islamic ontology, as evidenced by the different meanings of wujūd in the two schools of Islamic philosophy. However, both schools agree that wujūd is manifested as a mental reality, a predication for māhiyat. In mental reality, the fundamental element is māhiyat.

Suhrawardī has presented arguments to support the existence of wājib al-wujūd in many of his works. One of the most fundamental of these arguments, which also has a forward-looking feature, is the one he presents in his books al-Talwīḥāt and Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq. To prove the existence of God, Suhrawardī devised three arguments in al-Talwīḥāt and one argument in Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq, all of which are interpretations of the ṣiddīqīn argument. In this article four of Suhrawardī’s arguments, three of them in al-Talwīḥāt and one of them in Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq are reviewed. the main aim of this study is to analyze and explain Suhrawardī’s arguments, due to their importance in philosophy and theology, with the descriptive-analytical method and using library-based collecting data. The arguments presented in the al-Talwīḥāt are succinct, and what made these claims essential was the evaluation of their robustness and content. The significance of his first and third arguments in this book is that they do not require the denial of the vicious circle as a precondition, and by assuming the likelihood of both the vicious circle and infinite regress, the necessity of existence is demonstrated. On the other hand, his argument in Ḥikmah al-Ishrāq, which, like his second argument, is based on the refutation of the vicious circle and infinite regress, includes innovative features and should be investigated thoroughly.

La présente étude, centrée sur Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (549/1155-587/1191 ou début 1192) Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, développe quelques explorations préliminaires sur sa remarquable épistémologie de la présence, en mettant l'accent sur son postulat de la priorité de l'unité de l'expérience par la présence. En outre, cette étude devrait ouvrir la voie à une réponse aux défis lancés par Tony Street et d'autres sur la compatibilité de la critique de Suhrawardī à l'égard d'Ibn Sīnā avec le développement d'un syllogisme temporel et modal qui semble assez proche de celui d'Ibn Sinā. Les modalités de Suhrawardī, selon nous, devraient être comprises comme les différentes façons dont un prédicat se relie à son sujet plutôt que comme des opérateurs propositionnels. La modalité nécessairement nécessaire relie d'une part, les présences réelles du terme sujet aux présences réelles du terme prédicat immédiatement (c'est-à-dire que le prédicat s'applique à chaque individu instanciant le sujet au moment même où cette actualisation du sujet a lieu) ; d'autre part, la modalité nécessairement contingente exprime une relation entre les termes qui n'est pas basée sur la présence réelle du prédicat mais sur des présences qui pourraient devenir réelles au cours d'une certaine période de temps. De plus, la prédication nécessairement nécessaire admet soit : une simple conversion : (correspond au prédicable par définition chez Aristote, par exemple tout humain est nécessairement un être rationnel par nécessité, et tout être rationnel est nécessairement un humain par nécessité) ou non (correspond au prédicable par genre chez Aristote, par exemple tout humain est nécessairement un animal rationnel par nécessité, mais tout animal n'est pas nécessairement humain par nécessité). La prédication nécessairement contingente est nécessaire car elle attribue une capacité en tant que potentiel inhérent au sujet - c'est-à-dire qu'elle peut être attribuée en tant que capacité non actualisée de toute présence du sujet. Elle est contingente, car cette capacité s'actualise une fois et une fois non. La prédication contingente nécessaire peut également être déclinée : en admettant une simple conversion (correspond au prédicable par proprium chez Aristote, comme les capacités apprises d'être lettré ou musicien, et les capacités ou potentialités non apprises comme la capacité de rire - puisque chaque humain a le potentiel (qua human) d'être lettré ou musicien par nécessité et vice-versa) et en n'admettant pas cette conversion (correspond à une capacité inhérente au genre du sujet, comme la capacité de respirer telle qu'elle est attribuée de manière contingente aux humains par nécessité, non pas parce qu'ils sont des humains, mais parce qu'ils sont des animaux - ce qui est le genre de l'humain). Alors que l'attribution d'une capacité non acquise, telle que la respiration, à toutes les instances d'un terme sujet, implique de montrer que chaque individu qui incarne le sujet, actualise cette capacité au moins à un moment (ou à des séquences de moments) ; l'attribution d'une capacité acquise à un sujet universellement quantifié, revient à affirmer une telle contingence à l'égard du genre entier - par exemple, l'attribution de la capacité nécessaire mais contingente de l'alphabétisation aux humains suppose qu'au moins un individu, au moins à un moment, actualise l'alphabétisation (pas nécessairement toujours le même individu). Dans les dernières parties de notre thèse, nous montrerons comment ces notions façonnent la théorie du syllogisme de Suhrawardī du syllogisme. La partie 4 contenant une traduction en français de toutes les parties d'al-Ishrāq, concernant la logique, fait partie intégrante de la thèse. Son intégration comme partie de la thèse s'explique par le fait qu'à notre connaissance, il n'en existe à ce jour aucune traduction française
The present study, centered on Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (549/1155-587/1191 or at the beginning 1192) Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, develops some preliminary explorations on his remarkable epistemology of presence, with a special accent on his postulate of the priority of the unity of experience through presence. Furthermore, this study should pave the way to answer the challenges of Tony Street and others on the compatibility of Suhrawardī's critique of Ibn Sīnā with the development of a temporal and modal syllogism which seems quite close to that of Ibn Sinā. Suhrawardī's modalities, we claim should be understood as the different ways a predicate relates to its subject rather than as propositional operators. The necessarily necessary modality relates actual presences of the the term subject to acual presences of the predicate term immediately (i.e. the predicate applies to every individual instantiating the subject at the same very moment when that actualization of the subject takes place) ; on the other hand, the necessarily contingent modality expresses a relation between the terms that is not based on actual presence of the predicate but presences that might become actual during a stretch of time. Moreover, the necessarily necessary predication admits either : a simple conversion : (corresponds to Aristotle's predicable by definition, e.g. every human is necessarily a rational being by necessity, and every rational being is necessarily a human by necessity) or not (corresponds to Aristotle's predicable by genus, e.g. every human is necessarily an animal rational being by necessity, but not every animal is necessarily human by necessity). Necessarily contingent predication is necessary since it attributes a capacity as a potential inherent to the subject - i.e. it can be attributed as a non acualized capacity of every presence of the subject. It is contingent, since this capacity actualizes once and once not. Necessary contingent predication, can also be declined : by admitting simple conversion (corresponds to Aristotle's predicable by proprium, such as the learned capacities of being literate or being a musician, and the unlearned capacities or potentialities such as the capacity of laughing - since every human has the potential (qua human) to be literate or being a musician by necessity and viceversa) and by not admitting this conversion (corresponds to a capacity inherent to the genus of the subject, such as the capacity of breathing as contingently attributed to humans by necessity, not because they are humans, but because they are animals - which is the genus of human). Whereas predicating an unlearned ability, such as breathing, to all instances of a subject term, involves showing that each indvidual that instances the subject, actualizes this capacity at least at one moment (or sequences of moments); attributing an acquired ability to a universally quantified subject, is tantamount to asserting such a contingency with respect to the entire genus—for example, attributing the necessary but contingent capacity of literacy to humans assumes that at least one individual, at at least one time, actualizes literacy (not necessarily always the same individual) In the final parts of our thesis, we will show how these notions shape Suhrawardī theory of syllogism. Part D, containg a translation into French of all sections of al-Ishrāq concerning logic, constitutes an integral part of the thesis. Its integration as part of the thesis can be explained by the fact that, as far as we know, there is up to now no French translation of it

In Ḥikmat al-ishrāq, Suhrawardī takes Ibn Sīnā’s ideas in an entirely different direction. Whereas Ibn Sīnā was most concerned with how we can have imagination if we do not have a body anymore, Suhrawardī circumvents this problem by insisting that all particular perception is through non-physical images called ‘suspended images’. He makes these images into a fourth ontological category, next to intellects, souls, and bodies. As such, he is able to speak of a ‘world of suspended images’. Previously, scholars have emphasized the role they play in spiritual experience, but Suhrawardī in fact argues that with every act of particular perception, they play a role, whether it is hearing a sound or experiencing something in a dream. At the end of the chapter, some of the possible antecedents other than Ibn Sīnā are considered.