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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Hiérarchie de compensation"
Maux, Laurent Le. "L'émergence d'une banque supérieure sous le régime de la liberté bancaire". Recherches économiques de Louvain 70, nr 2 (2004): 193–221. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0770451800011477.
Pełny tekst źródłaSemedo, Gervasio, Laurent Gautier i Kamel Malik Bensafta. "Pôles de convergence, gains dynamiques de l’intégration économique et monétaire en Afrique de l’Ouest : une approche en termes de clusters". Articles 88, nr 1 (11.02.2013): 37–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1014026ar.
Pełny tekst źródłaDenommé, Robert T. "De quelques usages de la Révolution dans la littérature romantique". Tocqueville Review 9, nr 1 (styczeń 1988): 83–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/ttr.9.1.83.
Pełny tekst źródłaDenommé, Robert T. "De quelques usages de la Révolution dans la littérature romantique". Tocqueville Review 9 (styczeń 1988): 83–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/ttr.9.83.
Pełny tekst źródłaRozprawy doktorskie na temat "Hiérarchie de compensation"
Krautkraemer, Anneliese. "Payments for environmental services under imperfect competition". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Université Clermont Auvergne (2021-...), 2023. https://theses.hal.science/tel-04620431.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe thesis studies the optimal implementation of payments for environmental services (PES) under imperfect competition. It draws lessons from public economics for regulators on how to implement PES to protect biodiversity. The results show cases where PES is ineffective at promoting biodiversity. The thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on PES, while Chapters 3, 4 and 5 each examine an aspect of imperfect competition.Chapter 3 designs the second-best PES and environmental tax under imperfect competition. Farmers allocate their land between conventional agriculture, organic agriculture, and buffer strips. The regulator sets an environmental tax on conventional agriculture as it causes environmental damages, and a PES on buffer strips as they favor biodiversity. The conventional sector is perfectly competitive, while the organic sector is organized under an oligopoly. We show that the second-best environmental tax is higher than the marginal damage while the PES is lower than the marginal benefit. We then include the social cost of public funds (MCF). The environmental tax increases and the PES decreases with the MCF as long as demand for the conventional good is inelastic. We thus highlight a contributory component of the incentive tax. Chapter 3 also identifies specific scenario where the PES is ineffective.Chapter 4 studies the efficiency of additionality-based PES. They can address budget constraint concerns by only paying for additional environmental services. We look at a farmer who allocates his land between organic production, conventional production causing environmental damage, or grass strips generating biodiversity. Using a two-period model, we introduce a PES in the final period, rewarding the additional grass strips provided by the farmer. We show that the additionality-based PES distorts the behavior in the initial period in order to get more payment in the final period. The second-best PES to limit this behavior equals the discounted difference of the marginal environmental benefits obtained in each period. We define the second-best value of environmental taxes in the presence of the additionality-based PES. They no longer equal the marginal damage and adjust to account for the distortions caused by PES. We then introduce market power in the organic market. Market power reduces the distortion due to the PES in the initial period but reduces the organic production quantity in the final period. The second-best PES depends on the size of both effects and environmental taxes under market power have to be amended. In any case, Chapter 4 shows that an additionality-based PES never achieves environmental efficiency, even in a competitive market framework.Chapter 5 focuses on the “no net loss principle” of a biodiversity protection policy, accompanied by the Avoid Reduce Compensate (ARC) sequence and studies the behavior of a developer facing this policy. The analysis highlights the difficulty of transposing the concepts of the ARC sequence into economic analysis. Assuming perfect information, we show that the demand for compensation does not depend on its price, unlike the supply of compensation. Under asymmetric information, the developer behaves strategically. He simultaneously defines his demand for offsets and the level of damage reduction based on the offset price. In the end, the project choice is made based on the price of the offset. Chapter 5 shows that the mitigation hierarchy is ineffective under asymmetric information
Mokbel, Rita. "Systemic risk in financial economic institutions". Thesis, Besançon, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016BESA2080.
Pełny tekst źródłaFinancial crisis pose important theoretical problems on creating reliable indicator of stability of financial systems on which basis the regulators could intervene. The thesis proposes a dynamic model of banking system were the central bank can calculate an indicator of potential defaults taking into consideration the probability for a bank to default and the losses encountered in the financial network, a methodology that can improve the measurement, monitoring, and the management of the systemic risk. The thesis also suggests a clearing mechanisms : 1- in a model with seniority of liabilities and one type of liquid asset whose fire sale has a market impact, 2 - in a model with crossholdings among the banks whose interbank liabilities may be senior and junior and with one liquid asset whose firing sale has a market impact