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Macdonald, B. J. "Freedom, responsibility, and Frankfurt-style cases". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2014. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1435550/.
Pełny tekst źródłaEvans, Blake W. S. "Determined Freedom: On Moral Responsibility Between Chance and Necessitation". Ohio University Honors Tutorial College / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ouhonors1619724559950428.
Pełny tekst źródłaHildebrand, Carl H. "Kant and Moral Responsibility". Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/20641.
Pełny tekst źródłaBürgler, Lilian. "Speak: what ought I to ________? freedom revealed in radical inquiry /". Diss., Connect to the thesis, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10066/686.
Pełny tekst źródłaKelsey, E. Benjamin. "Freedom and forfeiture responding to Galen Strawson's basic argument /". unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08152008-154026/.
Pełny tekst źródłaTitle from file title page. Eddy Nahmias, committee chair; Sebastian Rand, Timothy O'Keefe, committee members. Electronic text (58 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 8, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 58).
Lustila, Getty L. "Hume on the Nature of Moral Freedom". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/118.
Pełny tekst źródłavan, Zwol Erik. "Responsibility, spontaneity and liberty". Thesis, University of Canterbury. Humanities, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/5763.
Pełny tekst źródłaEnehammar, Agnes. "Freedom with responsibility : The path to equivalence and fairness in upper secondary education?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för pedagogik, didaktik och utbildningsstudier, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-146013.
Pełny tekst źródłaWendel, Philipp. "State responsibility for interferences with the freedom of navigation in public international law /". Berlin [u.a.] : Springer, 2007. http://deposit.d-nb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2991082&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
Pełny tekst źródłaKelsey, Eli Benjamin. "Freedom and Forfeiture: Responding to Galen Strawson's Basic Argument". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2008. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/46.
Pełny tekst źródłaStasytytė, Indrė. "Laisvės ir atsakomybės sampratos formavimas pradinėse klasėse". Master's thesis, Lithuanian Academic Libraries Network (LABT), 2006. http://vddb.library.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2006~D_20060602_133511-37021.
Pełny tekst źródłaMohd, Sani Mohd Azizuddin Bin. "Social responsibility' and the theory and practice of freedom of political speech in Malaysia". Thesis, Keele University, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.436194.
Pełny tekst źródłaWilley, Susan Gzehoviak. "Religion news and social responsibility : the Dallas Morning News experience /". free to MU campus, to others for purchase, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/mo/fullcit?p9951134.
Pełny tekst źródłaMiller, Maggie. "A Preference for Freedom: Kantian Implications for an Incompatibilist Will and Practical Accountability". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1228.
Pełny tekst źródłaKnob, Benjamin B. "The way to freedom in existential philosophy". Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2009. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/1291.
Pełny tekst źródłaBachelors
Arts and Humanities
Philosophy
Campos, Heber Carlos de. "The Arminian libertarian doctrines of freedom and responsibility evaluated according to biblical-reformed doctrine of sin". Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1992. http://www.tren.com.
Pełny tekst źródłaAslam, Muhammad Wali. "Operation Iraqi Freedom : the United States and the idea of 'great power responsibility' in international society". Thesis, University of Leeds, 2007. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/199/.
Pełny tekst źródłaChoy, Emmett. "Hong Kong's Economic Freedom and Income Inequality". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2013. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/718.
Pełny tekst źródłaWennerberg, Karin. ""Du kan väl säga till mig lite schysstare" : En essä om ansvar och frihet". Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Lärarutbildningen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-30239.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe purpose of this essay is to examine the concept of responsibility, mainly in terms of human responsibility among primary school children. Through two narratives based on my experience working as a teacher at leisure-time centers for school children, I am analyzing the concept of responsibility and what it means to me in my daily work. The perspectives and theories I have used include psychotherapist Jesper Juul's distinction between personal and social responsibility, mentalization and the philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre and Ann Heberleins existentialist approach. My conclusions are that the world of today places high demands on the human ability to navigate as moral beings. As a teacher I am faced with the task to strengthen the students' ability of mentalization and agency and support them in their development to become future citizens.
Takayashiki, Masahito. "Autonomy in Modern Japanese Literature". Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/4021.
Pełny tekst źródłaTakayashiki, Masahito. "Autonomy in Modern Japanese Literature". University of Sydney, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/4021.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis dissertation aims to examine the manner in which the concept of autonomy (jiritsu) is treated in modern and contemporary Japanese literature. This examination will be performed by analysing the autonomous attitude of a contemporary Japanese writer Nakagami Kenji (1946–1992). This dissertation focuses on examining Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing. We will explore the manner in which his act of writing appears to be a paradox between self-identification and the integration into the collective. Then, we will observe the possibility in which Nakagami’s ambivalent attitude is extended to cover Maruyama Masao’s relative definition of autonomy and Karatani Kōjin’s interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s notion of freedom and responsibility. Nakagami’s attempt is certainly not confined to only his works. The notion of autonomy may be applied to perceive a similar thought that was represented by previous writers. We will also examine various never-ending autonomous attempts expressed by Sakaguchi Ango, Miyazawa Kenji and Nakahara Chūya. Moreover, we will analyse how Nakagami’s distrust of the modern Japanese language and his admiration of the body as an undeniable object are reflected in his major novels in detail and attempt to extend this observation into the works of the theatrical artists in the 1960s such as Betsuyaku Minoru, Kara Jūrō, Hijikata Tatsumi and Terayama Shūji and contemporary women writers such as Tsushima Yūko, Takamura Kaoru, Tawada Yōko and Yoshimoto Banana. These writers and artists struggled to establish their autonomous freedom as they encountered the conflict between their individual bodies that personifies their personal autonomy and the modern Japanese language that confines them in the fixed and submissive roles in present-day Japan. In this dissertation, I would like to conclude that Nakagami Kenji’s ambivalent attitude towards his act of writing can be an eternal self-legislation, that is, his endless attempt to establish autonomous freedom, which evolves from the paradox between the individual (body) and the collective (language).
Gosal, Vladislava. "Common-sense knowledge of social changes in Ukraine : social representations of freedom and responsibility in the public and private spheres". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.615808.
Pełny tekst źródłaGibbs, Alexis P. S. "A critical study of international higher education development : capital, capability, and a dialogical proposal for academic freedom as a responsibility". Thesis, University of Stirling, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/20054.
Pełny tekst źródłaAngeli, Oliviero. "Freedom of Movement and Emigration Pressures: A Defence of Immigration Fees". De Gruyter, 2016. https://tud.qucosa.de/id/qucosa%3A71068.
Pełny tekst źródłaРоманинець, М. Р., i M. R. Romanynets. "Ґенеза ідеї відповідальності в праві: філософсько-правовий вимір: дисертація". Thesis, ЛьвДУВС, 2012. http://dspace.lvduvs.edu.ua/handle/1234567890/786.
Pełny tekst źródłaФілософсько-правове розуміння ґенези ідеї відповідальності в праві осмислено на тлі становлення і розвитку філософсько-правової думки, в контексті різних інтерпретацій відповідальності з урахуванням історичних особливостей еволюції права та акцентуванням на сутнісних характеристиках відповідальності та її співвідношенні із свободою й справедливістю. Правова відповідальність розглядається як зумовлена історичними, соціальними та культурно-світоглядними умовами усвідомлена необхідність суб’єкта права виконувати вимоги правових норм, яка забезпечує йому гарантовану суспільством і державою можливість безперешкодної реалізації свободи. Вихідною точкою у формуванні правової відповідальності є особа, суб’єкт права, яка реалізує її однаково і через права, і через обов’язки у конкретних правовідносинах. Результати дослідження засвідчують, що право є мірою відповідальності особи, забезпечуючи кожному суб’єкту права рівну міру свободи і відповідальності, що розкриває ідею справедливості права. The philosophical and legal understanding of the genesis of the idea of responsibility in law interpreted against the background of the formation and development of philosophical and legal thought in the context of different interpretations of responsibility with regard to historical features of the evolution of law and its focus on the essential characteristics of responsibility and its relationship with freedom and justice. Legal liability is considered as due to historical, social and cultural-attitudinal terms of perceived need to comply with the subject of the law, which provides him guaranteed by the state and society without hindrance of freedom. The starting point in shaping the legal liability is a person, entity that implements it, as by law, so by the specific legal responsibility. The results show that law is largely the responsibility of the person providing each entity the right to equal degree of freedom and responsibility, which reveals the idea of justice law.
Morad, Iris. "Freiheit und Verantwortung : Überlegungen im Anschluss an Peter Bieri". Phd thesis, Universität Potsdam, 2013. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2014/6921/.
Pełny tekst źródłaIn the discussion on free will and responsibility, brain research supports the belief that humans are determined and that deliberation and decision-making take place in the brain. We can therefore not be held responsible for our decisions and actions. The role of philosophy in this discussion is to determine if we are responsible for our decisions and judgments in spite of being determined or if free will and determinism principally exclude each other. However, these are not the questions asked in this paper on free will and responsibility. It is based on the assumption that a certain degree of freedom exists because this assumption constitutes the first step towards freedom. This paper is about the connection between free will and responsibility and what it means for us as individuals and as members of a community of people. The goal is to show that we are able to acquire additional freedom, that freedom needs education and cannot exist without responsibility. The study supports Peter Bieri´s hypothesis that it is possible and necessary to develop freedom and education – not in the sense of schooling or formation – for making responsible decisions and taking responsible actions; however, it rejects Bieri´s hypothesis that conditional freedom is a prerequisite for free will. In addition, this work goes beyond the approach taken by Peter Bieri by offering a possible solution for our freedom and the related issue of responsibility. The suggested solution lies in an education that lets us understand our mutual connectedness and interdependence and leads us to acknowledge the rights and needs of others in the same way as our own. It is a type of education which is not just knowledge-driven but also includes certain rational and emotional skills. It is an education considered as learnable and teachable. To be able to impart this education as a necessary prerequisite for our freedom and responsibility towards ourselves and others, it is important that we understand our true being. The study therefore presents factors affecting us and shaping us as human beings. These factors influence our free will and responsibility by supporting or limiting our decisions, our judgment and, hence, our actions. The presentation of these factors outlines our options to design a self-responsible life in which we are responsible to others. The paper shows that freedom is impossible without responsibility and that, by abdicating our responsibility, we are loosing our freedom.
Suddes, Thomas. "The National News Council, 1973-1984 : a history /". View abstract, 2009. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3360317.
Pełny tekst źródłaFavero, Roberto Carlos. "Humanismo: uma releitura existencial de Albert Camus e Jean Paul Sartre". Universidade do Vale do Rio do Sinos, 2006. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/2014.
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Humanismo, uma releitura existencial de Albert Camus e de Jean-Paul Sartre é o tema da presente dissertação, que consiste no exercício filosófico de criar um mundo possível nessa vida. Acreditar no mundo e no verdadeiro humanismo é o que nos falta. Nós perdemos, completamente, o senso de valorizar, respeitar e dar condições necessárias, para que o ser humano se realize na sua plenitude e com referenciais éticos. O racional tornou-se o irracional; o humano, o inumano. Acreditar no homem significa, principalmente, suscitar acontecimentos, atitudes, ainda que corriqueiras, mas que visem a redescobrir a essência do humanismo. É necessário, pois, urgentemente, uma redefinição em nosso próprio conceito de humanismo que nos impulsione a um compromisso humanizador.A proposição básica dos filósofos, Camus e Sartre, é que: como é impossível salvar tudo, salve-se, ao menos, o corpo de cada indivíduo. Que homem algum seja vítima, carrasco e omisso perante o próprio homem. Ambos nos pedem um mundo, onde não se mate, onde
Humanism, an existential rereading of Albert Camus and Jean-.Paul Sartre, is the subject of this presentation, which consist of a philosophical pratice of creating a possible world in this life. Believing in the humanism, is what is missing for us. We have los completely, meaning that, valuing, respecting and giving the necessary conditions for the human being became inhumane. Beliving in humanity means maily rousing humanism. Therefore, it is urgently necessary to redefine our own concept of humanism which compels us to a humanising compromise.The basic propositions of the philosophers, Camus and Sartre, as it is impossible for us to save everything, unless each individual body can be saved. That the man is a victim or cruel and not neglectin before the humanity itself. Both require a world in which crimes against humanity and at least evil, terrorism, violence, social exclusion, and prejudices will be outlawed.Sartre introduces to us freedom and an absolute value. The existentialism puts the humanity befor
Favero, Roberto Carlos. "Perspectivas éticas a partir de O ser e o nada em Sartre". Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2015. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/3688.
Pełny tekst źródłaMade available in DSpace on 2015-05-27T16:44:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Roberto Carlos Favero.pdf: 966635 bytes, checksum: 853590da02b3bfb1cb690d19da8baf4f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-01-14
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A presente tese tem por objetivo mostrar a amplitude e as derivações do conceito de liberdade em O Ser e o Nada de Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). Nessa perspectiva, trata-se de uma análise que visa investigar as condições de possibilidade do conceito de liberdade sartreana como fundamento para um compromisso ético-moral que se traduza em responsabilidade para com a sociedade. Essa abordagem se justifica na medida em que o conceito de liberdade em Sartre é contestado pela tradição filosófica como um conceito destituído de qualquer compromisso ou implicação moral,sendo assim, a liberdade sartreana passou a ser tomada como sinônimo de liberdade total ou absoluta. Assim, para alcançar o objetivo, investigou-se a ideia de liberdade em Sartre. A questão central que norteia esse estudo apresenta-se na obra O Ser e o Nada, na qual o autor constrói argumentos para o estudo fenomenológico do ser e do aparecer do ser, a consciência da qual se pode esperar uma perspectiva ética. A pergunta que orienta a pesquisa está assim formulada: é possível deduzir um compromisso ético-moral de uma obra cuja intenção principal é realizar um tratado sobre a ontologia fenomenológica? Demonstra-se que, para Sartre, a liberdade é a condição própria do homem e que, se o autor tivesse o propósito de construir uma Filosofia Moral, conclui-se que essa teria por base a atitude de engajamento. Depois analisam-seas implicações éticas da filosofia sartreana, que se tornam mais evidentes à medida que o homem se dá conta de suas limitações e, sobretudo, de sua situação existencial, que é marcada por um estado de angústia, acrescido pelas dificuldades geradas no convívio humano, no qual aparece a má-fé.O último capítulo, no qual é apresentado o argumento maior da tese, identifica a ideia de liberdade em Sartre associada à ideia de responsabilidade, que é igualmente radical na condição humana. Nesse sentido, o existencialismo sartreano está afastado de qualquer relativismo. A partir de O Ser e o Nada,fundamenta-se e redimensiona-se uma ética que, de forma absoluta, realiza-secomo liberdade. Assim, nessa conclusão, mostra-se que os conceitos liberdade-responsabilidade, na compreensão sartreana, são indissociáveis e permitem inferir uma ética humanista.
The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the breadth and the derivations of the concept of freedom in Being and Nothingness of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980). This is an examination designed to investigate the conditions of possibility of Sartre's concept of freedom as the foundation for an ethical-moral commitment, which expresses itself in responsibility towards the society. This approach is justified as far as the concept of freedom in Sartre is contradicted by the philosophical tradition as a concept devoid of any commitment or moral implication. Thus, the Sartrean freedom came to be as synonymous with complete or absolute freedom. To achieve the aim, we investigated the idea of freedom in Sartre. The central question guiding this study is presented in the book Being and Nothingness, in which the author constructs arguments for the phenomenological study of being or appearing to be, the conscience of that can be expected an ethical perspective. The question that guides the search is thus formulated: it is possible to deduce an ethical-moral commitment to a work whose main intention is undertake a treatise on phenomenological ontology? We demonstrate that, for Sartre, freedom is the very condition of men and if the author had intended to build a Moral Philosophy, this would be based on the attitude of engagement. In the following chapter we deal with the ethical implications of Sartre's philosophy, which become more apparent as the men realizes his limitations and, above all, his existential situation, which is marked by a state of anguish, increased by the difficulties generated in human society, in which the bad faith appears. The final chapter, where we present the main argument of the thesis identifies the idea of freedom in Sartre associated with the idea of responsibility, which is also radical in the human condition. The Sartrean existentialism is away from relativism. From Being and Nothingness is rooted in and resizes an ethic that, in absolute terms, as freedom is realized. In our conclusion, we show that the concepts freedom-responsibility in Sartre's understanding are inseparable and allows us to infer a humanistic ethics.
Mawhinney, A. J. "Non-state service provision and state responsibility : international human rights standards and protection of the freedom of religion in the primary school system in the Republic of Ireland". Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.432652.
Pełny tekst źródłaWännström, Sanna. "Transparency. Accountability. Democracy : Access to EU Documents between Ideal and Reality". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för ABM, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-296627.
Pełny tekst źródłaDen här masteruppsatsen behandlar tillgänglighetsfrågor i samband med EU:s arkiv- och dokumenthantering och dess roll och betydelse för demokratin inom EU. Först undersöktes förordning 1049/2001 med hjälp av en textanalys för att ta reda på hur EU värderar öppenhet. Därefter vändes fokus till de fall där tillgång till dokument nekats, trots Europeiska Ombudsmannens råd. Slutligen sammanfördes dessa komponenter för att skapa en bild av spänningsfältet mellan ideal och realitet. Studien visar att öppenhet framställs mycket positivt i förordningen. Emellertid stämmer den bilden inte överens med fallmaterialet. Detta visar hur EU i de enskilda fallen försökt motverka utvecklingen mot ökad öppenhet. En trolig slutsats vore att EU stödjer koncepten öppenhet och ansvarsskyldighet i teorin, men att attityden i praktiken snarare ligger nära begreppet ”responsibility” (Lewin 2007), som möjliggör en mer restriktiv inställning till öppenhet. Det lagliga ramverket är därmed inte den enda faktorn som påverkar hur tillgängliga EU:s handlingar verkligen är och vilken roll de spelar för demokratin inom unionen. Denna masteruppsats är skriven inom mastersprogrammet i ABM (arkiv, bibliotek, museum), inriktning arkivvetenskap.
Gonzalez, Ariel. "The Incompatibility of Freedom of the Will and Anthropological Physicalism". Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2014. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/1591.
Pełny tekst źródłaB.A.
Bachelors
Philosophy
Arts and Humanities
Lindström, Leo Ingrid. "Scribo ergo sum : Aspectos existenciales en tres novelas tardías de Carmen Martín Gaite". Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Institutionen för spanska, portugisiska och latinamerikastudier, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-8399.
Pełny tekst źródłaРувін, О. Г., i O. H. Ruvin. "Принцип свободи у державотворенні: філософсько-правовий вимір: дисертація". Thesis, ЛьвДУВС, 2010. http://dspace.lvduvs.edu.ua/handle/1234567890/787.
Pełny tekst źródłaДисертацію присвячено дослідженню особливостей реалізації принципу свободи у державотворенні на основі залучення трьох способів аналізу: філософсько-правового, теоретико-правового, нормативно-правового. У роботі обґрунтовано, що свобода особи як ознака її правового статусу включає два аспекти: об’єктивний (зовнішня свобода) і суб’єктивний (внутрішня свобода), де зовнішня свобода – зміст права, тоді як внутрішня − умова існування права; єдність обох аспектів свободи особи зумовлює і єдність правоохоронних інтересів та об’єктивних інтересів кожної конкретної особи. Констатовано стратегічні підходи щодо дослідження поняття і структури законодавчого регулювання свободи особи та громадянина, що зумовлює наявність суб’єктивного аспекту правового регулювання; виокремивши ознаки поняття «зловживання свободою особи та громадянина», запропоновано методи усунення такого зловживання і проведено структуризацію правового механізму забезпечення свободи у державі. Dissertation is devoted research of features of realization of principle of freedom in creation of the state on the basis of bringing in of three methods of analysis: philosophical-legal, teoretyko-legal, normatively legal. It is well-proven that forming process democratically legal the states characterized providing and constitutional defense of freedom of person and citizen on the basic defending of their rights and freedoms. On the basis of research of freedom in the system of other constitutionally confirmed concepts, principles, norms, in their intercommunication and influence grounded two aspects interpretation of freedom of person in a right enplaned it objective and subjective display In-process grounded, that freedom of person as sign of it legal status includes two aspects: objective (external freedom) and subjective (internal freedom), where external freedom is maintenance of right, while internal the condition of existence of right; unity of both aspects of freedom of person is predetermined by unity of law-enforcement interests and objective interests of every concrete person. Strategic approaches are formulated in relation to research of concept and structure of the legislative adjusting and its value in providing of freedom of person and citizen which stipulates the presence of subjective aspect of the legal adjusting; selecting the signs of concept «abuse of freedom of person and citizen», the methods of removal of such abuse are offered and conducted it is conducted in a structure of legal mechanism of providing of freedom in the state.
McGowan, Wayne S. "Thinking about the responsible parent : freedom and educating the child in Western Australia". University of Western Australia. Graduate School of Education, 2004. http://theses.library.uwa.edu.au/adt-WU2005.0014.
Pełny tekst źródłaAfagnon, Alexis Dossa. "Gnose et totalitarisme : le problème du mal et la responsabilité". Thesis, Strasbourg, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018STRAC002/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaWhat moral qualification can be attributed to Nazi criminals? Are they crazy? Can we blame them unreservedly for their actions? If we can not make totalitarian evil imputable like the gnostic evil, the assimilation of totalitarianism to a Gnostic recidivism by Eric Voegelin invites us to think freshly about the problem of the responsibility of mass criminals. On the one hand, "situationism", which implies that it is the situation that transforms individuals into mass murderers and "dispositionalism" that designates the importance that individual dispositions can have for mass criminals, and On the other hand, the illusion and the ideology characterized, both by the exclusion of reality, make the question of the imputation of genocidal criminals complex. If the latter can not be exculpated, the complexity of the question of their imputation is undeniable. This complexity is perhaps an invitation to reconsider the underlying cause of this type of evil: the gnostic dualism of good and evil, whose own is to want to put an end to evil. But the rage to end evil leads often to barbarism
Sternschein, Ruben Gerardo. "A natureza humana e a liberdade no pensamento de S. R. Hirsch". Universidade de São Paulo, 2017. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8158/tde-08022018-110121/.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis research project consists of an analysis of the several works by Samson Raphael Hirsch (1808-1888) in order to ascertain the system of thought upon which many of his controversial conclusions are based, with special emphasis on the topic of free will. Relying on the hypothesis that a coherent system exists, I have investigated how Hirschs work approached the idea of free will, the degree of consistency in said approach, its internal coherence and its relationship with other topics discussed by the author. According to the hypothesis, Hirsch\'s idea of human freedom is summarized as follows: all individuals are limited and determined by both genetic information and personal history. However, those factors do not impose one single attitude for each new circumstance, but rather delimit a context of options. One of all such options is the divine option, the one that most matches the essence and mission of a given person. Only this option is chosen in full freedom, devoid of influences or limiting determinants. Thus, divine heteronomy is, retrospectively, the essence of human autonomy. The circumstantial factors mentioned above are perceived as tools for the development of the divine purpose, which reveals itself as the most authentic fulfillment of the individual. In order to reflect better on the issue, I identified a few relevant and recurring topics for a more detailed analysis (Psychology and Epistemology, Nature and Matter, History and Time, and Politics). Those issues are the bases used for the discussion in this work about freedom in Hirschs work, and as such the chapters that compose the thesis were named accordingly. I have also compared Hirsch\'s perceptions with those of the main authors who have delved on the same topic. These ideas are reviewed in light of existing research on Hirsch, and, finally, of the historical and philosophical context under which he produced his works.
Pequeno, Marcos Antônio Pimentel. "Entre biocentrismo e antropocentrismo: uma ecologia democrática para o enfrentamento da questão ambiental". Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2014. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/5664.
Pełny tekst źródłaCoordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
The ecological issue is one of the most disturbing and complex problems of our time because it calls into question the future of humanity. This research is the result of a reflection on the philosophical dimension of environmental issues. It has been guided by the central thesis that a democratic ecology is the political option most indicated to create the conditions that can agglutinate some needed alternatives to the confrontation of the above question. Accordingly, the general objective aims to reflect on the range and limits of a democratic ecology with a liberal nature. To accomplish this, we face as central axis of the thesis the controversy between anthropocentrism and biocentrism and its impact on various fields that characterize the complex human-nature relationship, especially in ethical and political levels. The course of this work began, in the first chapter, with a study of the theoretical assumptions of the ecological problem, which sent us to an analysis of the foundations of modernity, exposing its dualistic and anthropocentric face governed by the categoris reason and freedom.Then, the research was directed to the current ecological debate that can be synthesized around the existing controversy between biocentrism and anthropocentrism. Therefore, in Chapter2, we exposed the main authors and environmental trends that can be defined as biocentric. In Chapter3, we presented the "moderate anthropocentric" proposal with democratic and liberal nature contained in the texts of Luc Ferry, Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus. Finally, in the fourth chapter, it was made a reflection on the various dimensions of the ecological problem: ontological, ethic-political, legal, technological, sociocultural and educational; aiming to demonstrate the validity of our central thesis that recognizes the responsibility as a fundamental ethical category and the importance of education, awareness, the state's role as an environmental manager, and of the technology as auxiliary tools for coping with the afore mentioned problem. We hope, thereby, that our choice of a philosophical reflection, grounded in the perspective of a democratic ecology with a moderate anthropocentric nature, can contribute to the current ecological debate in Brazil, wich is still dominated by a largely biocentric stance.
A questão ecológica é um dos mais inquietantes e complexos problemas de nosso tempo porque põe em xeque o futuro da humanidade. Esta pesquisa é o resultado de uma reflexão acerca da dimensão filosófica da questão ambiental. Foi norteada pela tese central de que uma ecologia democrática é a opção política mais bem indicada para criar as condições que possam aglutinar algumas alternativas necessárias para o enfrentamento da referida questão. Nesse sentido, o objetivo geral visa refletir acerca dos alcances e dos limites de uma ecologia democrática de cunho liberal. Para alcançar este objetivo, enfrentamos como eixo central da tese a polêmica entre antropocentrismo e biocentrismo e suas repercussões nos vários âmbitos que caracterizam a complexa relação homem-natureza, principalmente nos níveis ético e político. O percurso deste trabalho iniciou-se, no primeiro capítulo, com um estudo dos pressupostos teóricos do problema ecológico, o que nos remeteu a uma análise dos fundamentos da Modernidade expondo a sua face dualista e antropocêntrica regida pelas categorias razão e liberdade. Em seguida, a pesquisa foi direcionada ao debate ecológico atual que pode ser sintetizado em torno da polêmica existente entre biocentrismo e antropocentrismo. Nesse sentido, no capítulo 2, expusemos os principais autores e correntes ambientais que podem ser definidos como biocêntricos. No capítulo 3, apresentamos a proposta antropocêntrica moderada de cunho democrático e liberal contida nos textos de Luc Ferry, Michael Shellenberger e Ted Nordhaus. Por fim, no quarto capítulo, foi efetuada uma reflexão acerca das várias dimensões do problema ecológico: ontológica, eticopolítica, jurídica, tecnológica, sociocultural e educacional; visando demonstrar a validade de nossa tese central que reconhece a responsabilidade como categoria ética fundamental e a importância da educação, da sensibilização, do papel do Estado como gestor ambiental, e da tecnologia como instrumentos auxiliares de enfrentamento do supracitado problema. Esperamos assim que a nossa opção por uma reflexão filosófica, assentada numa perspectiva de ecologia democrática de cunho antropocêntrico moderado, possa contribuir com o debate ecológico atual no Brasil, ainda dominado por uma postura majoritariamente biocêntrica.
Silva, Paulo Cesar Gondim da. "O conceito de liberdade em o ser e o nada de Jean-Paul Sartre". Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, 2010. http://repositorio.ufrn.br:8080/jspui/handle/123456789/16480.
Pełny tekst źródłaThis dissertation aims to address the concept of freedom from the perspective of the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre with reference to the main work Being and Nothingness. After presenting the concept of freedom we will try to show that it is related to the notion of responsibility, which will lead, ultimately, to define the Sartrean philosophy as a philosophy of action. In the first chapter we will present in passing the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, philosopher from which Sartre will develop his concept of freedom. The Husserlian notion of consciousness (intentionality) is the way to develop his analysis of Sartre phenomenon of being. From this analysis Sartre submits their concepts of being in-itself and being for-itself. Being initself is defined as the things of the world devoid of consciousness, are the things that surround us. The In-itself has as its main brand positivity: it is what it is, is all that can be said about him. In turn being For-itself is the very being of man, which differs radically from the In-itself. The For-itself has as its main intentionality, ie, its ability to project outside itself in existence. That's when Sartre shows that this type of being realizes its existence on the basis of a constant nihilation. Here comes the notion of anything. Among the relations of the For-itself with the surrounding world stands a very special: relationship between consciousnesses. It is when we discuss the issue of another. Intersubjectivity, through sartrean analysis of look, show that the For-itself assumes a new existential dimension: the being-for others. That's when Sartre will emphasize his notion of conflict. The conflict in intersubjectivity would come from the fact that you want to take another- For-itself as an object. Given this we will analyze what Sartre called the concrete relations with others. The philosopher submit such relations in the form of ducts and conduits assimilation of ownership. In the first my-self to try to "get lost" in the consciousness of another, ownership of my conduct in-itself tries to "take ownership" of the subjectivity of the other and try to treat others as things, as objects. In this sense Sartre examines the experiences of love, masochism, indifference, desire and sadism. Following this route we will enter the land of freedom itself, which is the major theme of our work. Since Sartre defines the For-itself as a being that is projected to create your way of being, it can only define it as freedom. The freedom of the For-itself is taken in terms of autonomy of choice. Once the For-itself has no way of being a thing as being in-itself, it just may be picking up, that is, making your being. Here Sartre speaks of the anguish that would be the symptom of freedom itself. The fact that the For-itself have to choose on whether the call as one being distressed. However, in most cases the For-itself tries to escape from the anguish of freedom and takes refuge in bad faith. After setting the man (For-itself) as freedom Sartre defends that he is totally responsible for what he does of himself. Once the philosopher holds that man is not predetermined, ie, does not have an a priori essence, his philosophy has as its basic assumption the action. If Sartre argues that the For-itself must constantly choose your way of being, the action is the basis on which man will exercise his own freedom. In this sense we conclude the work with an approach to work Existentialism is a Humanism, which represent the entry of the philosopher on the practical aspects of life
A presente disserta??o tem por objetivo abordar o conceito de liberdade sob a ?tica do fil?sofo franc?s Jean-paul Sartre tendo como refer?ncia principal a obra O Ser e o Nada. Ap?s a apresenta??o do conceito de liberdade iremos tentar mostrar que o mesmo est? relacionado com a no??o de responsabilidade, o que nos levar?, em ?ltima an?lise, a definir a filosofia sartreana como uma filosofia da a??o. No primeiro cap?tulo iremos apresentar en passant a fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl, fil?sofo a partir do qual Sartre ir? desenvolver seu conceito de liberdade. A no??o husserliana de consci?ncia (intencionalidade) ser? o caminho para Sartre desenvolver sua an?lise do fen?meno de ser. Dessa an?lise Sartre apresentar? seus conceitos de ser Em-si e ser Para-si. O ser Em-si ? definido como as coisas do mundo desprovidas de consci?ncia; s?o as coisas que nos circundam. O Em-si tem como marca principal a positividade: ele ? o que ?; ? tudo que pode ser dito a respeito dele. Por sua vez o ser Para-si ? o pr?prio ser do homem, o qual difere radicalmente do Em-si. O Para-si tem como marca principal a intencionalidade, isto ?, sua capacidade de se projetar para fora de si na exist?ncia. ? quando Sartre mostrar? que esse tipo de ser realiza sua exist?ncia na base de uma nadifica??o constante. Aqui surgir? a no??o de nada. Dentre as rela??es do Para-si com o mundo circundante destaca-se uma muito especial: a rela??o entre consci?ncias. ? quando abordaremos a quest?o do outro. Na intersubjetividade, atrav?s da an?lise sartreana do olhar, mostraremos que o Para-si assume uma nova dimens?o existencial: o ser-para-outro. ? quando Sartre ir? enfatizar sua no??o de conflito. O conflito na intersubjetividade viria do fato de o Para-si querer tomar o outro Para-si como objeto. Diante disso analisaremos aquilo que Sartre chamar? de rela??es concretas com o outro. O fil?sofo apresentar? essas rela??es na forma de condutas de assimila??o e condutas de apropria??o. Nas primeiras meu Para-si tenta perder-se na consci?ncia do outro; nas condutas de apropria??o meu Para-si tenta apropriar-se da subjetividade do outro bem como tenta tratar os outros como coisas, como objetos. Nesse sentido Sartre analisar? as experi?ncias do amor, do masoquismo, da indiferen?a, do desejo e do sadismo. Ap?s esse percurso entraremos no terreno da pr?pria liberdade, que ? o tema maior de nosso trabalho. Uma vez que Sartre define o Para-si como um ser que se projeta para criar o seu modo de ser, s? lhe resta defini-lo como liberdade. A liberdade do Para-si ? tomada em termos de autonomia de escolha. Uma vez que o Para-si n?o tem o modo de ser de uma coisa, como o ser Em-si, ele s? pode existir escolhendo-se, isto ?, fazendo seu ser. Aqui Sartre falar? da ang?stia, que seria o sintoma da pr?pria liberdade. O fato de o Para-si escolher-se na exist?ncia o p?e como um ser angustiado. Contudo, na maioria das vezes o Para-si tenta fugir da ang?stia da liberdade e se refugia na m?-f?. Ap?s definir o homem (Para-si) como liberdade Sartre defender? que ele ? totalmente respons?vel por aquilo que fizer de si. Uma vez que o fil?sofo defende que o homem n?o ? pr?-determinado, isto ?, n?o possui uma ess?ncia dada a priori, sua filosofia ter? como pressuposto b?sico a a??o. Se Sartre defende que o Para-si deve escolher constantemente o seu modo de ser, a a??o ser? a base sobre a qual o homem ir? exercitar sua pr?pria liberdade. Nesse sentido concluiremos o trabalho com uma abordagem ? obra O Existencialismo ? um Humanismo, a qual representar? a entrada do fil?sofo nas quest?es pr?ticas da vida
Ковальова, О. В., i O. V. Kovalova. "Філософсько-правові засади реалізації принципів справедливості і відповідальності у діяльності органів внутрішніх справ: дисертація". Thesis, ЛьвДУВС, 2014. http://dspace.lvduvs.edu.ua/handle/1234567890/750.
Pełny tekst źródłaУ дисертації здійснено першу у вітчизняній науці спробу комплексно дослідити філософсько-правовий вимір фундаментальних засад реалізації принципів справедливості та відповідальності в діяльності органів внутрішніх справ. Обґрунтовано методологічний потенціал філософсько-правової науки, що дозволило досліджувати реалізацію принципів справедливості та відповідальності в діяльності органів внутрішніх справ крізь призму онтологічного, гносеологічного, аксіологічного, праксеологічного, герменевтичного та антропологічного аспектів. Запропоновано визначення понять «справедливість» та «відповідальність» як філософсько-правових полідисциплінарних категорій, що, перебуваючи в когерентному зв’язку, відображають конкретно-історичні уявлення про міру належного (моральний аспект), міру відповідності різних соціальних явищ та вчинків (соціальний аспект), трактування цієї міри у свідомості особи (психологічний аспект), закріплення в нормах права (правовий аспект), відображення в гуманітарній політиці держави (політичний аспект), актуалізації в системі загальносуспільних ідей, поглядів (ідеологічний аспект). The thesis presents a first attempt in science research complex philosophical and legal aspects of implementing the principles of fundamental principles of justice and accountability in the work of the police. The methodological potential philosophical and legal doctrine which allowed studying the implementation of the principles of justice and accountability in the activities of internal affairs in the light of the ontological, epistemological, axiological, praxeological, hermeneutic and anthropological aspects. A definition of «fairness» and «responsibility» as a philosophical and multidisciplinary legal categories, while in coherent communications reflect specific historical understanding of the proper measure (moral dimension), as compliance of various social phenomena and behavior (social aspect), the interpretation of this measure in the mind of the person (psychological aspect), enshrined in law (legal aspects), reflected in the humanitarian policy of the state (the political aspect), updating the system general public ideas, beliefs (ideological dimension).
Fonseca, Tania Schneider da. "Uma teoria semicompatibilista sobre responsabilidade moral : John Fischer e o controle de direcionamento". Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos, 2018. http://www.repositorio.jesuita.org.br/handle/UNISINOS/7397.
Pełny tekst źródłaMade available in DSpace on 2018-11-01T11:28:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tania Schneider da Fonseca_.pdf: 1196065 bytes, checksum: 6650454e54f549cdd2039dee6b94da86 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-08-27
CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior
Quais são as condições necessárias e suficientes para responsabilizar moralmente o comportamento do agente? Várias respostas a essa pergunta têm sido dadas na história recente da filosofia. De um lado, diversos filósofos acreditam que o critério especificando essas condições poderia ser compatível com a tese determinista. Por outro lado, há aqueles que negam que esse critério possa conciliar-se com a visão de um mundo determinista. Tradicionalmente, a liberdade enquanto uma capacidade para agir de outro modo é defendida como uma condição necessária para a responsabilidade moral. Com o seu artigo de 1969, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, Harry Frankfurt mudou o curso do debate sobre o problema da vontade livre. Ele forneceu exemplos hipotéticos, por meio de experimentos de pensamento, de agentes que, conforme ele argumentou, embora não pudessem ter agido de outro modo, ainda assim seriam moralmente responsáveis pelas suas ações. O artigo de Frankfurt entusiasmou muitos filósofos, destacadamente John Fischer, a repensar o problema da responsabilidade moral. Para Fischer, Frankfurt teria mostrado que o debate não diz mais respeito ao problema de demonstrar a compatibilidade entre liberdade e determinismo, mas, sim, à questão da compatibilidade da responsabilidade moral com o determinismo. Para lidar com essa questão, e qualificar a posição de Frankfurt, Fischer desenvolve o que ele denomina de uma posição semicompatibilista. Essa posição responderia às objeções incompatibilistas, assim mostrando a compatibilidade da responsabilidade moral com o determinismo. Esse trabalho é dedicado a um estudo dessa posição. A tese defendida é a de que o semicompatibilismo proposto por Fischer de fato responde às principais objeções dos incompatibilistas, e é mais vantajosa se comparada à posição compatibilista tradicional, que defende que a capacidade para agir de outro modo seria uma condição necessária para a responsabilidade moral.
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the moral responsible agency? Many answers to this question have been given in the recent history of philosophy. On the one side, some philosophers believe that the criterion specifying these conditions could be compatible with the determinist’s worldview. On the other side, there are those who deny that this criterion and the determinist’s position could be ever reconciliated. Traditionally, freedom as a capacity to do otherwise has been defended as a necessary condition for moral responsibility. In 1969, when “Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” (1969) was published, Harry Frankfurt changed the course of the discussion about the free will problem. Frankfurt showed, through some thought experiments, agents that, he argued, were moral responsible for their actions even though they could not have acted otherwise. Frankfurt’s essay pushed several philosophers, remarkably John Fischer, to rethink the problem of moral responsibility. For Fischer, Frankfurt showed that the debate should not be about the compatibility between freedom and determinism, but rather should address the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. To deal with this problem, and to further qualify Frankfurt’s position, Fischer develops, as he calls it, a semicompatibilist position. This position, he claims, successfully address the objections from the incompatibilists, thus showing that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. This study is an investigation of this position. The thesis defended is that the semicompatibilism proposed by Fischer does indeed answers the main incompatibilist’s objections, and it is better than the traditional compatibilist position, which argues that the capacity to do otherwise is a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
Ladeira, Fernando de Oliveira Domingues. "Regulação estatal e assistência privada à saúde: liberdade de iniciativa e responsabilidade social na saúde suplementar". Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie, 2011. http://tede.mackenzie.br/jspui/handle/tede/1009.
Pełny tekst źródłaFundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa
The Brazilian State is featured by the incorporation of several social rights as well as values and goals to be implemented. The quest for a social reality transformation through the implementation of social justice and through the construction of a free and sympathizing society has not only the State as an actor, but also the individuals. Although the freedom of economic initiative is recognized as a principle, an act detached from constitutional goals and disconnected from legitimate values of economic activities is not authorized. This private social responsibility recognition from individual acting indispensability as an actor, and not as a simple spectator of social transformation justifies the State performance through regulation tools in order to have economic activities comply with constitutional goals being, therefore, in the implementation of social transformation sought by constitutional guidelines, the legitimacy to impose the behaviors to be accomplished by individuals. Nevertheless, it is in health insurance where the indispensability of the State action is shown, from the observation that the market has not enough tools to avoid the practice of misuses in detriment of consumers. At the same time constitutional recognition of public relevance for private health insurance indicates the requirement for a sharpest regulation, in view of the rights involved. Therefore, the public relevance for private health insurance, the evidence of market insufficiency as a control tool for the sector and the need of private agents to take over an active role in social transformation legitimate the State action. This recognition allows the conclusion that initiative freedom does not set impediment to State control and regulation of private activities. This paper, therefore, aims to investigate the initiative freedom of health insurance companies to its social responsibilities as an explanation for the narrow state control of health insurance agreements.
O Estado brasileiro caracteriza-se pela incorporação de inúmeros direitos sociais, assim como valores e objetivos a serem implementados. A busca da transformação da realidade social pela implementação da justiça social e construção de uma sociedade livre e solidária tem como atores não só o Estado, mas também os particulares. Ainda que seja reconhecida a liberdade de iniciativa econômica como princípio, não está autorizado um agir desvinculado dos objetivos constitucionais e desconectado dos valores legitimadores das atividades econômicas. Esse reconhecimento da responsabilidade social privada, a partir da imprescindibilidade do agir individual como ator, e não mero expectador, da transformação social, justifica a atuação do Estado por meio de instrumentos de regulação para conformar as atividades econômicas aos objetivos constitucionais, estando, pois, na implementação da transformação social buscada pelas diretrizes constitucionais, a legitimidade para imposição de comportamentos a serem realizados pelos particulares. Mas é na saúde suplementar que se evidencia a imprescindibilidade da atuação do Estado, a partir da constatação de que o mercado não possui instrumentos suficientes para evitar a prática de condutas abusivas em detrimento dos consumidores. Ao mesmo tempo, o reconhecimento constitucional da relevância pública da assistência privada à saúde indica a exigência de regulação mais contundente, ante a sensibilidade dos direitos envolvidos. Assim, a relevância pública da assistência privada à saúde, a evidência da insuficiência do mercado como mecanismo de controle do setor e a necessidade de assunção pelos agentes privados de papel ativo na transformação social legitimam a atuação do Estado. Esse reconhecimento permite a conclusão de que a liberdade de iniciativa não configura óbice para a fiscalização e regulação estatal das atividades privadas. Busca-se, portanto, por meio desse trabalho, a conformação da liberdade de iniciativa das operadoras de planos de saúde à sua responsabilidade social como justificativa para o estreito controle estatal dos contratos de planos de saúde.
Puşcaşu, Carmen Gina. "La notion de "juridiction" au sens de l'article 1er de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme". Thesis, Montpellier 1, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013MON10012.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe « jurisdiction » concept as provided by Art. 1 of the European convention for human rights is directly connected to the more complex topic of attracting the responsibility of the States - party to such Convention and, implicitly, to the procedural matter of Strasbourg Court's competence. The interconnection between these elements has lead to an autonomous case-law interpretation of the « jurisdiction » concept, evidencing the efforts of the European court for human rights to conciliate the various roles played by the States on the international scene. Taking into account that the mission of the Court is to protect individual rights, the challenge that the Strasbourg court is facing consists in emphasizing the State's role of « human rights guarantor » without creating functional or relational misbalances for the States – party to the Convention. Since the borderline between balance and misbalance is not a fix one, the « jurisdiction » concept functions as a variable orientation axis for the State's conduct, theoretically governed by the freedom of action principle, which in practice is bordered by the general obligation to guarantee the rights established in the Convention
Sund, Kasper, i Emil Johansson. "Schemalagt eget arbetes inverkan på studiemotivation i skolan : Hur elevers motivation påverkas av att de själva får bestämma vad de ska arbeta med på skoltid". Thesis, KTH, Lärande, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-232037.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe aim of the study is to examine how pupils are affected by working under free forms, with respect to student motivation. The study took place in a high school in Stockholm with free study time scheduled, where the pupils are able to choose to work with whatever they find suitable. A qualitative study was carried out with focus groups to explore the opinions of students, teachers and principals regarding the student motivation during these classes. The theoretical framework of this study draws on Ryan & Decis’ Self Determination theory (SDT) and other theories concerning responsibility and control. The results show that a large amount of freedom makes some of the pupils regard these classes as an advantage for their motivation. Some other pupils perceived that freedom of choice affects them negatively as they cannot take responsibility for their schooling. Common for all pupils is that despite their own choice, the intrinsic motivation is not generated. Furthermore, the results indicate that the majority of the pupils are not prepared to act within a normative governance philosophy despite the school's vision regarding this.
Lööv, Sofia. "Framtidens energieffektiva förskola : Gestaltning och formgivning av en naturförskola i passivhusteknik". Thesis, KTH, Byggteknik och design, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-126095.
Pełny tekst źródłaDaggkåpan is a preschool projected in passive house technology. The preschool is a nature preschool, which means the activity is mainly out door. It is a two floor building which gives conditions to use the area for more outdoor activities. Conditions for drive the preschool indoors is possible as well. The garden and the inside rooms are connected to each other by the exterior rooms and it is easy for the children just to take a step out to the garden from their residences. A solar cell system generates electricity to the building and makes it self-supplied. The residential development leads to the need of preschools. To obtain knowledge of energy effective constructions is a good idea as the buildings in the future have to be as energy effective as possible. One of the most important things by use the passive house technology is letting a well measured and energy- effective building shell replace a conventional heat supply. By improvement of the construction and focus on the process other parts of the building can be simplified and some can be replaced. What is expensive in one end can lead to a good investment in the other. The challenges with passive house are to systematize, see whole parts and contexts and especially to seek after the simple. Easy systems give low operations- and service-costs and reduce fear of disruptions. Most of the heat is for free. It comes from insulation, human heat and heat from cooking and technologies. Basic requirements for this type of building is a need of heat-output under 10 W per square-meter at an indoor temperature of 20 degrees on the coldest day of the year, defined of the dimensioned outdoor- temperature. The maximum of leak is 0,3 liters per second and square meter at +/- 50 Pa. To receive high comfort it claims well-isolated walls, shadings, energy-effective windows and doors, small thermal bridges and a good ventilation-system where the indoor heat recycles. The number of Passive houses increases, dominated of small houses. Building a preschool as a passive house is a good idea from several perspective; the well-isolated walls leaves out the noise, even the intermediate walls isolates and contributes to a silent building. The children get environmentally conscious as well and take notes of the energy- effectively. - A very important aspect for the future. The children contributes them self of heat to the building by their body heat. Investigations has been shown that outdoor playing children is more healthy, self-propelled, more creative and more clever. The most ultimate is so use patios as an extra room for the preschool activities. The pedagogy Reggio Emilia uses this concept. The children can consequently feel free staying outside, developing their minds in an imaginative environment, inspired of the interaction of the nature and sustainability.
Ndiaye, Ibrahima. "Enjeux éthiques et écologiques de la responsabilité : vers une approche de la co-responsabilité". Thesis, Poitiers, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014POIT5021.
Pełny tekst źródłaThus, the present investigation aims at examining the tools that can generate sufficiently persuasive resources in order to accomplish such a task. That's the reason why we relied on the analysis of the notion of responsibility as much in its political application as in its ethical rhetoric. According to Rousseau, mankind was able to rise above her strictly biological nature only by putting a stop to her drives. It is in the same vein that Kant will claim the autonomy of the subject who will be able to establish her moral responsibility. But the analysis of the concept we have undertaken has allowed us to claim that responsibility has a foundation that breaks with any moral voluntarism. Indeed, the dialectics between freedom and responsibility has brought about a more fertile conception of responsibility, at least ethically speaking. There is no doubt that one can be held legally responsible for something only when one accomplishes an action in full knowledge of the facts. This implies that the very person (subject) has a psychological and moral conscience, a free will, and a free volition. This is what the analysis of freedom has enabled to reaffirm here. But this kind of formal responsibility does not exhaust the richness of responsibilities that are incumbent upon us. Our responsibility does not spring exclusively from our freedom. On the contrary, it extends beyond it and contains it, on the political level, but above all on the ethical level. Such a conception of freedom rings or rather resonates as a call for an integral and collective responsibility. It resonates because this form of responsibility which consists in helping vulnerable beings who are condemned to perish without our intervention, has won its spurs with Hans Jonas, in his masterpiece: The Imperative of Responsibility. But, it is Emmanuel Levinas that we owe this conception of responsibility that we have towards other beings. An ethical responsibility concentrated on the irreducible concern for the Other "in the nakedness of his face" till the substitution. In a time when human relationships are being undone because they are being computerized and digitized through the dramatic development of new scientific and technological tools leading to the abrasion of empathy and sensitivity, it is crucial to reflect freshly upon a quasi-religious vision of progress that shrugs off the human being and the nature she uses. As activist for the preservation of humanly viable conditions, we have then attempted to replace the Human and her future in the centre of all concerns. Convinced that neither the absolute saint or the absolute devil exist, we aim at mobilizing all resources from the noble part of the Human Being in order to enable everyone to provide an appropriate answer to human distress and plays her role in expressing an immense and profound solidarity of souls…
Sanguineti, Raymond Wilfredo, Landaburu María Katia García i Ponce Milagros Vivas. "Effects of multinational companies’ Corporate Social Responbility (CSE) commitments of the Peruvian labor market: the experience of Topy Top". Economía, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/118322.
Pełny tekst źródłaEl presente trabajo estudia la incidencia que son capaces de tener los compromisos de responsabilidad social de las empresas multinacionales en la solución de conflictos laborales suscitados en sus cadenas de producción, a través de un caso emblemático que se produjo en el Perú, como consecuencia del cese masivo de representantes y afiliados sindicales por parte de la empresa Topy Top, que se solucionó a través de la intervención de dos marcas internacionales que eran clientes de dicha empresa. Esa intervención no solamente permitió la reposición de los trabajadores, sino que generó una serie de instrumentos que tenían por objeto desarrollar un sistema de relaciones industriales maduro. A través del análisis de los acuerdos e instrumentos adoptados y la forma cómo se desarrollaron las relaciones entre la empresa y el sindicato posteriormente, se evalúa el rol de garantía del cumplimiento de derechos laborales fundamentales que pueden asumir las empresas multinacionales.
Robichaud, Anne. "L’animation : un moyen de développer les déterminants de l'autonomie des personnes âgées". Thesis, Lyon 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LYO20048.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe important percentage of elderly persons in our countries is compensated by the fact that they keep a validity and physical and mental capacities that are little different from those of younger generations. But this process should be used as it deserves to be and the capacities of these generations should be used to the best and to a minimum and their role in society should not be downplayed.Louis Ploton writes that «the process of developing autonomy goes through a preliminary methodological stage that consists in refusing to view our elderly persons, with whom we are engaged in a conversation, as subjects who have lost something, to consider them as people that resort to other mechanisms, to other ways of doing things, that use other relational modalities in a given context».We start from the hypothesis that the degree of autonomy of elderly persons (their level of health being the same) is part of an interaction in the exercise of an adequate «leadership», of their degree of motivation and of the quality of their social insertion.That is why we are presenting to you a research-action program, set up within the framework of the clubs of elderly persons (that is Golden Age clubs), in a Canadian province, aiming to use the channel of the «leadership» of the elderly to increase their motivation, to improve their social insertion and their autonomy. We are keen on proposing the animation, on having the elderly take matters into their hands, as a lever that can act positively, in a global way, on the determining factors of autonomy, particularly on motivation and social insertion. That will be based on an argumentative initiative, for the lack of being able to offer formal experimental proofs, in the absence of satisfactory means of measuring the phenomena in interactions
Jeppsson, Sofia. "Practical Perspective Compatibilism". Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-72975.
Pełny tekst źródłaI den här avhandlingen argumenterar jag för en tes som jag kallar “praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism”. Enligt praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är det så att en agent med praktisk frihet är tillräckligt fri för att vara en moralisk agent och moraliskt ansvarig. Praktisk frihet är ett koncept vi ursprungligen hittar hos Kant. Det används också av en del nutida Kantianer. Kant argumenterade för att vi kan betrakta världen från antingen ett praktiskt eller ett teoretiskt perspektiv. Det teoretiska perspektivet är det vi har när vi gör förutsägelser och hittar kausala förklaringar, medan det praktiska är det vi har när vi väljer och handlar. Vi kan se att vi är fria när vi ser på tillvaron ur det praktiska perspektivet. Determinismen kan inte hota vår praktiska frihet, för vi måste välja våra handlingar oavsett om allting i slutändan är determinerat. I denna avhandling definierar jag praktisk frihet på följande sätt: En agent har minimal praktisk frihet om och endast om han måste välja sina handlingar, och han tror att hans vilja är effektiv när det gäller att realisera de handlingsalternativ han funderat över och väljer mellan. En agent har maximal praktisk frihet om och endast om han har minimal praktisk frihet, hans vilja verkligen är effektiv, han har full information om de alternativ han funderar över, och alla alternativ han inte tänkt på är sådana att hans egna värderingar inte ger honom ett övervägande skäl att välja ett av dessa alternativ snarare än det han faktiskt väljer. Jag argumenterar för att praktisk frihet så definierat är tillräckligt med frihet för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar eftersom moralen är handlingsvägledande. Det betyder att rätt och fel är koncept som ska användas i övervägning av olika handlingsalternativ och rådgivning. Tredje-persons-omdömen om ifall någon handlade rätt eller fel måste vara sådana att de hypotetiskt sett skulle kunna fungera som råd; egenskapen att vara rätt eller fel kan inte förändras beroende på om vi ger råd eller bara faller omdömen. Detta är ett starkt skäl för att betrakta faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare som irrelevanta när man faller omdömen om rätt och fel, och ifall någon hade en annan sorts frihet än den praktiska är irrelevant för övervägare och rådgivare. Vi har också prima facie skäl att betrakta moraliskt ansvar som knutet till rätt och fel, så att agenter är klandervärda när de gjorde fel (eller subjektivt fel, eller vad som skulle ha varit fel givet den information agenten hade osv) och berömvärda när de gjorde rätt (subjektivt rätt osv). Att det finns prima facie skäl för att betrakta praktisk frihet som tillräckligt för moraliskt ansvar utesluter förstås inte att det finns övervägande skäl för den motsatta ståndpunkten. Jag visar dock att inga klassiska argument för inkompatibilism om determinism och moraliskt ansvar fungerar när man riktar dem mot praktisk-perpsektiv-kompatibilism. Alla sådana argument förutsätter vad som skulle bevisas, nämligen att faktorer som är irrelevanta för övervägare och rådgivare är moraliskt relevanta, och att pålitliga moraliska intuitioner uppstår när vi betraktar agenter från ett teoretiskt snarare än praktiskt perspektiv. Slutligen diskuterar denna avhandling relationen mellan metaetik och kompatibilism. Praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism är kompatibel med samtliga metaetiska teorier, medan det finns flera metaetiska teorier som implicerar att inkompatibilismen är falsk, och åtminstone en som implicerar att vissa kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Enligt en speciell Kantiansk konstruktivistisk teori så finns det rätt- och felaktiga handlingar och moraliskt ansvar på grund av att det finns praktisk frihet. Om detta är den sanna metaetiska teorin, så följer det att praktisk frihet är tillräckligt för moraliskt agentskap och moraliskt ansvar, och att inte bara inkompatibilism men andra kompatibilistiska teorier också är falska. Beroende på vilken metaetisk teori som är den sanna, kan det alltså vara så att de föregående argumenten är överflödiga för att bevisa praktisk-perspektiv-kompatibilism. Det kan vara så att denna tes helt enkelt följer från den sanna metaetiska teorin.
Senate, University of Arizona Faculty. "Faculty Senate Minutes November 3, 2014". University of Arizona Faculty Senate (Tucson, AZ), 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/336522.
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