Rozprawy doktorskie na temat „Evolutionary theory”
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Jiang, Ge. "Essays in evolutionary game theory". Thesis, University of Essex, 2016. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/16917/.
Pełny tekst źródłaGhachem, Montasser. "Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory". Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-132433.
Pełny tekst źródłaAt the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: Manuscript. Paper 3: Manuscript.
Borghoff, Thomas. "Evolutionary theory of the globalisation of firms". Wiesbaden Gabler, 2004. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?id=2649426&prov=M&dok_var=1&dok_ext=htm.
Pełny tekst źródłaTsakas, Elias. "Essays on epistemology and evolutionary game theory". Göteborg : Dept. of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University, 2008. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=016654920&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
Pełny tekst źródłaWallace, Christopher Conor. "Evolutionary game theory in the social sciences". Thesis, University of Oxford, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.322749.
Pełny tekst źródłaBaudisch, Annette. "Inevitable senescence? : contributions to evolutionary-demographic theory". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2006. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445312/.
Pełny tekst źródłaGeorge, Jessica. "Deadly light : Machen, Lovecraft, and evolutionary theory". Thesis, Cardiff University, 2014. http://orca.cf.ac.uk/58289/.
Pełny tekst źródłaDi, Nicola Alessandro. "Evolutionary theory and normative realism in epistemology". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:cf5de343-77b1-461f-9940-eeba1dd8b76b.
Pełny tekst źródłaBeauparlant, Marc A. "Evolutionary Game Theory and the Spread of Influenza". Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/35635.
Pełny tekst źródłaJackson, Edgar Basil. "The faith dynamic in creationism and evolutionary theory". Thesis, North-West University, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10394/9061.
Pełny tekst źródłaThesis (PhD (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus in association with Greenwich School of Theology, U.K., 2013.
Rael, Rosalyn Cherie. "Comparing theory and data on multi-species interactions using evolutionary game theory". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194398.
Pełny tekst źródłaSchlomer, Gabriel Lee. "Evolutionary Theory and Parent-Child Conflict: The Utility of Parent-Offspring Conflict Theory". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194662.
Pełny tekst źródłaBlickle, Tobias. "Theory of evolutionary algorithms and application to system synthesis /". Zürich : vdf, Hochschulverlag AG an der ETH Zürich, 1997. http://opac.nebis.ch/cgi-bin/showAbstract.pl?u20=3728124338.
Pełny tekst źródłaTreacy, Brian. "A stochastic differential equation derived from evolutionary game theory". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Analys och sannolikhetsteori, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-377554.
Pełny tekst źródłaPicchini, Giorgia <1992>. "On the origin of storytelling : evolutionary theory and literature". Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/15632.
Pełny tekst źródłaJAVARONE, MARCO ALBERTO. "Statistical Physics of Evolutionary Game Theory and its Applications". Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Cagliari, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/11584/249581.
Pełny tekst źródłaXu, Tianbing. "Nonparametric evolutionary clustering". Diss., Online access via UMI:, 2009.
Znajdź pełny tekst źródłaRichter, James Neal. "On mutation and crossover in the theory of evolutionary algorithms". Thesis, Montana State University, 2010. http://etd.lib.montana.edu/etd/2010/richter/RichterJ0510.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaHölzl, Werner. "The evolutionary theory of the firm. Routines, complexity and change". Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2005. http://epub.wu.ac.at/1650/1/document.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaSeries: Working Papers Series "Growth and Employment in Europe: Sustainability and Competitiveness"
Bell, Tom. "Evolutionary theory in the novelas contemporaneas of Benito Perez Galdos". Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.289590.
Pełny tekst źródłaElbergali, Abdalla Kh. "Factor analysis : theory and applications to evolutionary problems in chemometrics". Thesis, University of Bristol, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.282138.
Pełny tekst źródłaSALOMAO, GABRIEL MEYER. "ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY REGULATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY". PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2017. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=31461@1.
Pełny tekst źródłaCOORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR
PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO
Um dos principais desafios do mundo moderno é equilibrar o desenvolvimento econômico com a responsabilidade ambiental, de forma a alcançar um crescimento sustentável que minimize os impactos gerados no meio ambiente. Isto tem feito com que muitos governos e empresas estabeleçam políticas ambientais como instrumentos para a garantia de um futuro com sustentabilidade e que favoreçam o bem estar social. A proposta desta dissertação é utilizar a teoria dos jogos evolucionários para analisar as interações entre agentes reguladores de políticas ambientais de comando e controle e os agentes (firmas) que impulsionam o desenvolvimento econômico, porém que impactam de alguma forma o meio ambiente. Enquanto os primeiros precisam determinar as melhores ações estratégicas para implementar a política e aumentar o bem estar social, os segundos só irão se adequar à regulamentação ambiental estabelecida se esta escolha lhe render um maior retorno (payoff). Os resultados mostram que o custo de fiscalização é determinante para estabelecer a política ambiental mais adequada e, dependendo da magnitude deste custo, existem diferentes formas de iniciar sua implementação a fim de favorecer o melhor resultado possível sob o ponto de vista do bem estar social.
The modern world faces the great challenge of balancing economic development and environmental responsibility in order to achieve sustainable growth that minimizes the impacts generated on the environment. This has forced some governments and firms establish environmental policies as instruments to guarantee a future with sustainability and favors social welfare. Using evolutionary games theory, this work aims to analyze the interactions between environmental policies regulators and firms that provide economic development impacting the environment. While the firsts need to choose the best strategic actions to established and inspect environmental standards sets to increase social welfare, the company will only complies if this choice yields a better payoff. The results show how the inspection cost is decisive for establishing the better environmental policy and depending on the magnitude of this cost, there are different ways to introduce it in order to provide a better social welfare result.
Mambrini, Andrea. "Theory grounded design of genetic programming and parallel evolutionary algorithms". Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2015. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/5928/.
Pełny tekst źródłaHe, Qian. "Spatio-Temporal Patterns, Correlations, and Disorder in Evolutionary Game Theory". Diss., Virginia Tech, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/40296.
Pełny tekst źródłaPh. D.
Hanappi, Hardy, i Manuel Scholz-Wäckerle. "Evolutionary Political Economy: Content and Methods". Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07360932.2017.1287748.
Pełny tekst źródła姚濬帆 i Chun-fan Yiu. "Evolutionary synthesis of time-optimal control policies". Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2002. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B29866170.
Pełny tekst źródłaYiu, Chun-fan. "Evolutionary synthesis of time-optimal control policies /". Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 2002. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B25151058.
Pełny tekst źródłaNorman, William. "Evolutionary Game Dynamics and the Moran Model". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Analys och sannolikhetsteori, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-420672.
Pełny tekst źródłaChotibut, Thiparat. "Statistical Fluctuations in Evolutionary and Population Dynamics". Thesis, Harvard University, 2016. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33493257.
Pełny tekst źródłaPhysics
Chang, Jung-Fu. "A simulation matching approach of mate selection : an integration study". Thesis, University of Reading, 1997. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.362226.
Pełny tekst źródłaMendonça, G. P. A. de. "Nonlinear and evolutionary phenomena in deterministic growing economies". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2013. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/58404/.
Pełny tekst źródłaFoord, Peter Michael, i res cand@acu edu au. "Theology Engaging Evolutionary Theory: Fresh insights into the nature of God". Australian Catholic University. School of Theology, 2004. http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/digitaltheses/public/adt-acuvp45.29082005.
Pełny tekst źródłaRutledge, Michael L. "Indiana high school biology teachers and evolutionary theory : acceptance and understanding". Virtual Press, 1996. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/1027093.
Pełny tekst źródłaDepartment of Biology
Collard, Ian Frank. "Human evolutionary ecology in Africa : towards a theory of population differentiation". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.615804.
Pełny tekst źródłaFoord, Peter Michael. "Theology engaging evolutionary theory: Fresh insights into the nature of God". Thesis, Australian Catholic University, 2004. https://acuresearchbank.acu.edu.au/download/000a820c55899be157450dfd70a18dc1c18e3f74794e63a69b0d3f7f0c3c1b75/1039036/64868_downloaded_stream_93.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaRotolo, Thomas. "Occupational ecology: An evolutionary theory of the social composition of occupations". Diss., The University of Arizona, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/187392.
Pełny tekst źródłaYang, Jing. "Designing Superior Evolutionary Algorithms via Insights From Black-Box Complexity Theory". Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018SACLX054/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaIt has been observed that the runtime of randomized search heuristics depend on one or more parameters. A number of results show an advantage of dynamic parameter settings, that is, the parameters of the algorithm are changed during its execution. In this work, we prove that the unary unbiased black-box complexity of the OneMax benchmark function class is $n ln(n) - cn pm o(n)$ for a constant $c$ which is between $0.2539$ and $0.2665$. This runtime can be achieved with a simple (1+1)-type algorithm using a fitness-dependent mutation strength. When translated into the fixed-budget perspective, our algorithm finds solutions which are roughly 13% closer to the optimum than those of the best previously known algorithms.Based on the analyzed optimal mutation strength for OneMax, we show that a self-adjusting choice of the number of bits to be flipped attains the same runtime (apart from $o(n)$ lower-order terms) and the same (asymptotic) 13% fitness-distance improvement over RLS. The adjusting mechanism is to adaptively learn the currently optimal mutation strength from previous iterations. This aims both at exploiting that generally different problems may need different mutation strengths and that for a fixed problem different strengths may become optimal in different stages of the optimization process.We then extend our self-adjusting strategy to population-based evolutionary algorithms in discrete search spaces. Roughly speaking, it consists of creating half the offspring with a mutation rate that is twice the current mutation rate and the other half with half the current rate. The mutation rate is then updated to the rate used in that subpopulation which contains the best offspring. We analyze how the $(1+lambda)$ evolutionary algorithm with this self-adjusting mutation rate optimizes the OneMax test function. We prove that this dynamic version of the $(1+lambda)$~EA finds the optimum in an expected optimization time (number of fitness evaluations) of $O(nlambda/loglambda+nlog n)$. This time is asymptotically smaller than the optimization time of the classic $(1+lambda)$ EA. Previous work shows that this performance is best-possible among all $lambda$-parallel mutation-based unbiased black-box algorithms.We also propose and analyze a self-adaptive version of the $(1,lambda)$ evolutionary algorithm in which the current mutation rate is part of the individual and thus also subject to mutation. A rigorous runtime analysis on the OneMax benchmark function reveals that a simple local mutation scheme for the rate leads to an expected optimization time of the best possible $O(nlambda/loglambda+nlog n)$. Our result shows that self-adaptation in evolutionary computation can find complex optimal parameter settings on the fly. At the same time, it proves that a relatively complicated self-adjusting scheme for the mutation rate can be replaced by our simple endogenous scheme
Bailes, Rachael Louise. "An evolutionary psycholinguistic approach to the pragmatics of reference". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/22978.
Pełny tekst źródłaDukkipati, Ambedkar. "ACE-Model: A Conceptual Evolutionary Model For Evolutionary Computation And Artificial Life". Thesis, Indian Institute of Science, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/2005/47.
Pełny tekst źródłaZacchia, Paolo B. "Evolutionary macroeconomics : Schumpeterian long waves and shorter-term dynamics". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.336506.
Pełny tekst źródłaJayachandran, Jayakanth. "Improving resiliency using graph based evolutionary algorithms". Diss., Rolla, Mo. : Missouri University of Science and Technology, 2010. http://scholarsmine.mst.edu/thesis/pdf/Jayachandran_09007dcc807d6ba6.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaVita. The entire thesis text is included in file. Title from title screen of thesis/dissertation PDF file (viewed July 19, 2010) Includes bibliographical references (p. 56-62).
Dewell, Doreen R. "Investigating the usefulness of evolutionary theory for understanding biology and attaining bioliteracy". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/mq37512.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaHugie, Don Michael. "Applications of evolutionary game theory to the study of predator-prey interactions". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ52711.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaBerry, Camilla Vidya. "Bulldog, watchdogs and underdogs, is evolutionary theory a paradigm or a kennel?" Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape2/PQDD_0021/MQ48209.pdf.
Pełny tekst źródłaDunn, Malcolm. "Inside the capitalist firm : an evolutionary theory of the principal agent-relation". Universität Potsdam, 2013. http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2013/6515/.
Pełny tekst źródłaChen, J.-H. "An automated negotiation mechanism based on co-evolutionary processes and game theory". Thesis, Coventry University, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.427568.
Pełny tekst źródłaBreslin, Dermot Andrew. "Can evolutionary theory be used to shed light on mechanisms of change?" Thesis, University of Lincoln, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.517125.
Pełny tekst źródłaElsdon-Baker, Fern. "Historiographical constraints on evolutionary theory : conceptualisations of the inheritance of acquired characteristics". Thesis, University of Brighton, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.439200.
Pełny tekst źródłaIzquierdo, Luis R. "Advancing learning and evolutionary game theory with an application to social dilemmas". Thesis, Manchester Metropolitan University, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.444030.
Pełny tekst źródłaGeoffroy, Félix. "Explaining fine-grained properties of human cooperation : Insights from evolutionary game theory". Thesis, Montpellier, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018MONTG071/document.
Pełny tekst źródłaThe existence of cooperation among non-kin in many species constitutes an apparent paradox for evolutionary biologists. The most commonly accepted explanation is that cooperation can be enforced by mechanisms that reward cooperators or punish cheaters. Most of the theoretical works in evolutionary game theory, however, aim only at explaining how some cooperation can exist at an evolutionary equilibrium, thanks to these enforcement mechanisms. Here, we aim at showing, instead, that evolutionary game theory can also explain the fine-grained properties of the cooperation that takes place in the living world, especially in the case of the human species. First, we address the question of the origin of enforced cooperation: How can enforced cooperation evolve from an initially non-cooperative state? Using tools from the field of machine learning, we show that enforced cooperation can evolve as a by-product of adaptation to interactions with shared interests. We also show that this process has only two possible evolutionary outcomes. Either all cooperative opportunities are enforced, which corresponds to the human cooperative syndrome, or only a very few number are, which corresponds to non-human cooperation. We also propose a variation of this model to explain why many mutualisms are exaggerated forms of cooperation with shared interests. In a second approach, we focus on one specific enforcement mechanism called partner choice. Using agent-based simulations, we show that, when individuals can freely choose their cooperative partners, the only level of effort invested into cooperation that is evolutionarily stable is the one that maximizes the social efficiency of cooperation. We then build analytical models of partner choice imported from economic matching theory. We show that the only evolutionarily stable distribution of the benefits of cooperation is both independent of bargaining power and proportional to each participant's relative contribution. Thus, partner choice explains two fine-grained properties of human cooperation, namely our preferences for the most socially efficient forms of cooperation and our concerns for fair distributions. Finally, we show that costly signalling models of cooperation can explain several properties of moral reputation, and we conclude by discussing directions for future research