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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „Equilibrium”

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Autor: Grafiati

Data publikacji: 4 czerwca 2021

Data aktualizacji: 31 lipca 2024

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1

Kallman, Joshua B., i Leonid E. Zakharov. "Bishop-Taylor equilibria for calibration equilibrium and equilibrium reconstruction codes". Physics of Plasmas 14, nr 7 (lipiec 2007): 072504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.2749498.

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2

Suherman, Sofita, Fatmawati Fatmawati i Cicik Alfiniyah. "Analisis Kestabilan dan Kontrol Optimal Model Matematika Penyebaran Penyakit Ebola dengan Penanganan Medis". Contemporary Mathematics and Applications (ConMathA) 1, nr 1 (9.08.2019): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/conmatha.v1i1.14772.

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Ebola disease is one of an infectious disease caused by a virus. Ebola disease can be transmitted through direct contact with Ebola’s patient, infected medical equipment, and contact with the deceased individual. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the stability of equilibriums and to apply the optimal control of treatment on the mathematical model of the spread of Ebola with medical treatment. Model without control has two equilibria, namely non-endemic equilibrium (E0) and endemic equilibrium (E1) The existence of endemic equilibrium and local stability depends on the basic reproduction number (R0). The non-endemic equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable if R0 < 1 and endemic equilibrium tend to asymptotically stable if R0 >1 . The problem of optimal control is then solved by Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle. From the numerical simulation result, it is found that the control is effective to minimize the number of the infected human population and the number of the infected human with medical treatment population compare without control.

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3

Hron, J., i T. Macák. "Organisation equilibrium". Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 52, No. 4 (17.02.2012): 147–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/5008-agricecon.

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Parameters of structure should reflect the factors reflecting the situation, e.g. organisation age, size and type of production system (Mintzberg 1996). The present paper shows a way of achieving the equilibrium between the situation factors and the relevant project parameters of an organisation, the balance being based on a congruence approach.

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4

Kudryavtsev, Konstantin, i Ustav Malkov. "Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation". Open Computer Science 11, nr 1 (17.12.2020): 127–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/comp-2020-0210.

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AbstractThe paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.

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5

Cieślik, Andrzej. "Exports versus FDI in Smith-Motta framework". Equilibrium 11, nr 2 (30.06.2016): 189. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/equil.2016.009.

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In this paper we study the choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Smith-Motta duopoly framework. First, we identify the conditions necessary for exporting and FDI, depending on the costs of exporting and the cost of foreign investment. Then, we discuss various proximity-concentration tradeoffs. Finally, we demonstrate that six possible types of equilibriums may emerge depending on various combinations of the key parameters of the model. These equilibriums include: a monopoly FDI equilibrium, a monopoly exporting equilibrium, a domestic monopoly equilibrium, a duopoly FDI equilibrium, a duopoly exporting equilibrium, and no entry equilibrium.

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6

Enkhbat, R. "A Note on Anti-Berge Equilibrium for Bimatrix Game". Bulletin of Irkutsk State University. Series Mathematics 36 (2021): 3–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.26516/1997-7670.2021.36.3.

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Game theory plays an important role in applied mathematics, economics and decision theory. There are many works devoted to game theory. Most of them deals with a Nash equilibrium. A global search algorithm for finding a Nash equilibrium was proposed in [13]. Also, the extraproximal and extragradient algorithms for the Nash equilibrium have been discussed in [3]. Berge equilibrium is a model of cooperation in social dilemmas, including the Prisoner’s Dilemma games [15]. The Berge equilibrium concept was introduced by the French mathematician Claude Berge [5] for coalition games. The first research works of Berge equilibrium were conducted by Vaisman and Zhukovskiy [18; 19]. A method for constructing a Berge equilibrium which is Pareto-maximal with respect to all other Berge equilibriums has been examined in Zhukovskiy [10]. Also, the equilibrium was studied in [16] from a view point of differential games. Abalo and Kostreva [1; 2] proved the existence theorems for pure-strategy Berge equilibrium in strategic-form games of differential games. Nessah [11] and Larbani, Tazdait [12] provided with a new existence theorem. Applications of Berge equilibrium in social science have been discussed in [6; 17]. Also, the work [7] deals with an application of Berge equilibrium in economics. Connection of Nash and Berge equilibriums has been shown in [17]. Most recently, the Berge equilibrium was examined in Enkhbat and Batbileg [14] for Bimatrix game with its nonconvex optimization reduction. In this paper, inspired by Nash and Berge equilibriums, we introduce a new notion of equilibrium so-called Anti-Berge equilibrium. The main goal of this paper is to examine Anti-Berge equilibrium for bimatrix game. The work is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the existence of Anti-Berge equilibrium in a bimatrix game for mixed strategies. In Section 3, an optimization formulation of Anti-Berge equilibrium has been formulated.

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7

WARD, SEAMUS A., i IAN W. B. THORNTON. "Equilibrium theory and alternative stable equilibria". Journal of Biogeography 25, nr 4 (lipiec 1998): 615–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2699.1998.2540615.x.

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8

Arifovic, Jasmina, i James Bullard. "INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE: NEW APPROACHES TO LEARNING IN MACROECONOMIC MODELS". Macroeconomic Dynamics 5, nr 02 (kwiecień 2001): 143–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100501019010.

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The research questions addressed by the literature on learning in macroeconomics can be classified into four categories: First, there are issues related to the convergence and stability under learning in models with unique rational expectations equilibria. Authors here are concerned mainly with the learnability of a rational expectations equilibrium, as a measure of that equilibrium's plausibility as an observed outcome in an actual economy. Second, there are issues related to convergence and stability under learning in models with multiple rational expectations equilibria. In this case, learnability serves as an equilibrium selection device, helping economists decide which equilibria are the more likely to be actually observed among the many that exist under rational expectations. A third set of issues involves the examination of transitional dynamics that accompanies the equilibrium selection process. Following some type of unexpected strcutural change or change in policy regime, for instance, economies necessarily must follow temporary transitional paths to a rational expectations equilibrium associated with the new reality. Learning is sometimes used to help model such transitional dynamics. Finally, there are issues related to the examination of learning dynamics that are intrinsically different, even asymptotically, from the dynamics of the rational expectations versions of the models. In these cases, the learning dynamics do not converge to the rational expectations fixed points, and (unexploitable) expectational errors persist indefinitely. Some authors have tried to make use of this possibility in order to build explanations of otherwise puzzling macroeconomic phenomena based on constantly changing expectations.

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9

Julien, Ludovic. "Moneda, intercambios efectivos y desempleo keynesiano". Lecturas de Economía, nr 59 (30.10.2009): 149–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.17533/udea.le.n59a2702.

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El objetivo de este artículo es construir un modelo que produzca equilibrios con desempleo involuntario en una economía monetaria descentralizada. La existencia del desempleo involuntario reposa aquí sobre la organización monetaria de las transacciones. En tal economía, la moneda juega un papel esencial en la medida que permite la realización descentralizada de las transacciones y la determinación de los precios de mercado tanto en el equilibrio como en el desequilibrio. Palabras clave: desempleo involuntario, equilibrio, desempleo keynesiano. Clasificación JEL: B20, E12, E40. Abstract: This paper aims at building up a simple model of a decentralized monetary economy with Keynesian unemployment. The existence of involuntary unemployment is based on the organization of trades. Money plays a critical role in coordinating decentralized transactions in equilibrium and in disequilibrium. Without perfect expectations, trades occur out of equilibrium. However, Keynesian unemployment is essentially an equilibrium phenomenom. Key words: involuntary unemployment, equilibrium, Keynesian unemployment. JEL: B20, E12, E40. Résumé: L’objectif de ce papier est d’édifier un modèle qui produit des équilibres avec chômage involontaire dans une économie monétaire décentralisée. L’existence du chômage involontaire repose ici sur l’organisation monétaire des transactions. Dans une telle économie, la monnaie joue un rôle essentiel dans la mesure où elle permet la réalisation décentralisée des transactions et la détermination des prix de marché tant à l’équilibre qu’en déséquilibre. Mots clés: chômage involuntaire, équilibre, chômage keynésien. JEL: B20, E12, E40.

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10

Nguyen, Minhtri K., Liyo Kao i Ira Kurtz. "Calculation of the equilibrium pH in a multiple-buffered aqueous solution based on partitioning of proton buffering: a new predictive formula". American Journal of Physiology-Renal Physiology 296, nr 6 (czerwiec 2009): F1521—F1529. http://dx.doi.org/10.1152/ajprenal.90651.2008.

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Upon the addition of protons to an aqueous solution containing multiple buffers, the final H+concentration ([H+]) at equilibrium is determined by the partitioning of added H+among the various buffer components. In the analysis of acid-base chemistry, the Henderson-Hasselbalch equation and the Stewart strong ion formulation can only describe (rather than predict) the equilibrium pH following a proton load since these formulas calculate the equilibrium pH only when the reactant concentrations at equilibrium11 The term “equilibrium” refers to the steady state proton and reactant concentrations when the buffering of excess protons by the various buffers is complete. are already known. In this regard, it is simpler to directly measure the equilibrium pH rather than measure the equilibrium reactant concentrations to calculate the equilibrium pH. As these formulas cannot predict the final equilibrium [H+] following a proton load to a multiple-buffered aqueous solution, we developed a new quantitative approach for predicting the equilibrium [H+] that is based on the preequilibrium22 The term “preequilibrium” refers to the initial proton and reactant concentrations immediately upon addition of protons and before the buffering of excess protons by the various buffers. concentrations of all buffers in an aqueous solution. The mathematical model used to derive our equation is based on proton transfer buffer equilibria without requiring the incorporation of electroneutrality considerations. The model consists of a quartic polynomial equation that is derived based solely on the partitioning of H+among the various buffer components. We tested the accuracy of the model using aqueous solutions with various buffers and measured the equilibrium pH values following the addition of HCl. Our results confirmed the accuracy of our new equation ( r2= 1; measured pH vs. predicted pH), indicating that it quantitatively accounts for the underlying acid-base phenomenology.

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11

Kantorovich, Ye G. "Equilibrium Models of Spatial Interaction with Locational-Capacity Constraints". Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space 24, nr 8 (sierpień 1992): 1077–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/a241077.

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Two types of equilibrium models of urban spatial structures are considered. An equilibrium version of the production-constrained spatial interaction model involving zonal-capacity constraints on allocation is investigated. A model of equilibrium for interacting subsystems is defined (it is a generalisation of Nash equilibria and of some Lowry-type models) and connections between this model and Nash equilibria are investigated. An entropy-projection operator is used for equilibrium urban models with zonal-capacity constraints. Problems of uniqueness of an equilibrium and the convergence of the iterative computational process are studied for these models.

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12

Zhang, Xiaomin, Rui Xu i Chenwei Song. "Stability and Hopf Bifurcation of a Delayed Viral Infection Dynamics Model with Immune Impairment". International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 31, nr 08 (26.06.2021): 2150141. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218127421501418.

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In this paper, we consider a viral infection dynamics model with immune impairment and time delay in immune expansion. By calculation, it is shown that the model has three equilibria: infection-free equilibrium, immunity-inactivated infection equilibrium, and immunity-activated infection equilibrium. By analyzing the distributions of roots of corresponding characteristic equations, the local stability of the infection-free equilibrium and the immunity-inactivated infection equilibrium is established. Furthermore, we discuss the existence of Hopf bifurcation at the immunity-activated infection equilibrium. Sufficient conditions are obtained for the global asymptotic stability of each feasible equilibria of the model by using LaSalle’s invariance principle and iteration technique, respectively. Numerical simulations are carried out to illustrate the main theoretical results.

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13

Ah, Nurul Imamah, Wuryansari Muharini Kusumawinahyu, Agus Suryanto i Trisilowati Trisilowati. "The Dynamics of a Predator-Prey Model Involving Disease Spread In Prey and Predator Cannibalism". Jambura Journal of Biomathematics (JJBM) 4, nr 2 (31.12.2023): 119–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.37905/jjbm.v4i2.21495.

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In this article, dynamics of predator prey model with infection spread in prey and cannibalism in predator is analyzed. The model has three populations, namely susceptible prey, infected prey, and predator. It is assumed that there is no migration in both prey and predator populations. The dynamical analysis shows that the model has six equilibria, namely the trivial equilibrium point, the prey extinction point, the disease free and predator extinction equilibrium point, the disease-free equilibrium point, the predator extinction equilibrium point, and the coexistence equilibrium point. The first equilibrium is unstable, and the other equilibria conditionally local asymptotically stable. The positivity and boundedness of the solution are also shown. The analytical result is supported by numerical simulation. It is shown that in such a high cannibalization the coexistence equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable.

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14

Blavatskyy, Pavlo. "A Refinement of Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium". International Game Theory Review 20, nr 02 (czerwiec 2018): 1850004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198918500044.

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Unlike the Nash equilibrium, logit quantal response equilibrium is affected by positive affine transformations of players’ von Neumann–Morgenstern utility payoffs. This paper presents a modification of a logit quantal response equilibrium that makes this equilibrium solution concept invariant to arbitrary normalization of utility payoffs. Our proposed modification can be viewed as a refinement of logit quantal response equilibria: instead of obtaining a continuum of equilibria (for different positive affine transformations of utility function) we now obtain only one equilibrium for all possible positive affine transformations of utility function. We define our refinement for simultaneous-move noncooperative games in the normal form.

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15

Moghadas, S. M., i A. B. Gumel. "An epidemic model for the transmission dynamics of HIV and another pathogen". ANZIAM Journal 45, nr 2 (październik 2003): 181–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1446181100013250.

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AbstractA five-dimensional deterministic model is proposed for the dynamics between HIV and another pathogen within a given population. The model exhibits four equilibria: a disease-free equilibrium, an HIV-free equilibrium, a pathogen-free equilibrium and a co-existence equilibrium. The existence and stability of these equilibria are investigated. A competitive finite-difference method is constructed for the solution of the non-linear model. The model predicts the optimal therapy level needed to eradicate both diseases.

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16

Pham, Viet-Thanh, Sajad Jafari i Tomasz Kapitaniak. "Constructing a Chaotic System with an Infinite Number of Equilibrium Points". International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 26, nr 13 (15.12.2016): 1650225. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218127416502254.

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The chaotic systems with hidden attractors, such as chaotic systems with a stable equilibrium, chaotic systems with infinite equilibria or chaotic systems with no equilibrium have been investigated recently. However, the relationships between them still need to be discovered. This work explains how to transform a system with one stable equilibrium into a new system with an infinite number of equilibrium points by using a memristive device. Furthermore, some other new systems with infinite equilibria are also constructed to illustrate the introduced methodology.

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17

MUSY, OLIVIER, ANTONIN POTTIER i TARIK TAZDAIT. "A NEW THEOREM TO FIND BERGE EQUILIBRIA". International Game Theory Review 14, nr 01 (marzec 2012): 1250005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500053.

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This paper examines the existence of Berge equilibrium. Colman et al. provide a theorem on the existence of this type of equilibrium in the paper [Colman, A. M., Körner, T. W., Musy, O. and Tazdaït, T. [2011] Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria, J. Math. Psychol.55, 166–175]. This theorem has been demonstrated on the basis of a correspondence with Nash equilibrium. We propose to restate this theorem without using Nash equilibrium, and deduce a method for the computation of Berge equilibria.

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18

Myerson, Roger B., i Philip J. Reny. "Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions". Econometrica 88, nr 2 (2020): 495–531. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta13426.

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We extend Kreps and Wilson's concept of sequential equilibrium to games with infinite sets of signals and actions. A strategy profile is a conditional ε‐equilibrium if, for any of a player's positive probability signal events, his conditional expected utility is within ε of the best that he can achieve by deviating. With topologies on action sets, a conditional ε‐equilibrium is full if strategies give every open set of actions positive probability. Such full conditional ε‐equilibria need not be subgame perfect, so we consider a non‐topological approach. Perfect conditional ε‐equilibria are defined by testing conditional ε‐rationality along nets of small perturbations of the players' strategies and of nature's probability function that, for any action and for almost any state, make this action and state eventually (in the net) always have positive probability. Every perfect conditional ε‐equilibrium is a subgame perfect ε‐equilibrium, and, in finite games, limits of perfect conditional ε‐equilibria as ε → 0 are sequential equilibrium strategy profiles. But limit strategies need not exist in infinite games so we consider instead the limit distributions over outcomes. We call such outcome distributions perfect conditional equilibrium distributions and establish their existence for a large class of regular projective games. Nature's perturbations can produce equilibria that seem unintuitive and so we augment the game with a net of permissible perturbations.

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19

Gregoir, Stéphane, i Pierre-Olivier Weill. "Restricted perception equilibria and rational expectation equilibrium". Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31, nr 1 (styczeń 2007): 81–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2005.10.001.

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20

Grosser, Joachim. "Multiple Equilibria, Equilibrium Selection and Economic Policy". Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 119, nr 2 (1.02.1999): 191–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.3790/schm.119.2.191.

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21

Blázquez de Paz, Mario, i Nikita Koptyug. "Equilibrium Selection in Hawk–Dove Games". Games 15, nr 1 (31.12.2023): 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g15010002.

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We apply three equilibrium selection techniques to study which equilibrium is selected in a hawk–dove game with a multiplicity of equilibria. By using a uniform-price auction as an illustrative example, we find that when the demand in the auction is low or intermediate, the tracing procedure method of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and the quantal response method of McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) select the same equilibrium. When the demand is high, the tracing procedure method does not select any equilibrium, but the quantal response method still selects the same equilibrium as when the demand is low or intermediate. The robustness to strategic uncertainty method of Andersson, Argenton and Weibull (2014) selects two of the multiple equilibria irrespective of the demand size. We also analyze the impact of an increase in the minimum bid allowed by the auctioneer in the equilibrium selection.

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22

Васин, Александр Алексеевич, Alexander Vasin, Ирина Юрьевна Серёгина i Irina Seregina. "Sequential equlibria in signaling games". Mathematical Game Theory and Applications 14, nr 1 (18.01.2023): 3–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2022_1_42.

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The paper considers Bayesian multi-stage signaling games. Previously formulated for extensive-form games, concepts of sequential equilibrium, separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium are specified, and calculating methods for these equilibria are also discussed. A competitive collision model with signals indicating rivals' states is studied as a specific example. We determine conditions for existence of separating and pooling equilibria with ordered competition, in which the competition object goes to one of the rivals without a rigid encounter. Model parameters ranges of the equilibria existence are also determined.

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23

Clark, Daniel, i Drew Fudenberg. "Justified Communication Equilibrium". American Economic Review 111, nr 9 (1.09.2021): 3004–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201692.

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Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than receivers. In the learning model, the counterfactual “speeches” that have been informally used to motivate past refinements are messages that are actually sent. Stable profiles need not be perfect Bayesian equilibria, so JCE sometimes preserves equilibria that existing refinements eliminate. Despite this, it resembles the earlier refinements D1 and NWBR, and it coincides with them in co-monotonic signaling games. (JEL C70, D82, D83, J23, M51)

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24

S Prasad, Sanath. "Homeostasis - Balance, Equity, Equilibrium". International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR) 13, nr 3 (5.03.2024): 1742–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.21275/es24326161131.

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25

Miao, Hui, Xamxinur Abdurahman i Ahmadjan Muhammadhaji. "Global Stability of HIV-1 Infection Model with Two Time Delays". Abstract and Applied Analysis 2013 (2013): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/163484.

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We investigate global dynamics for a system of delay differential equations which describes a virus-immune interaction in vivo. The model has two time delays describing time needed for infection of cell and CTLs generation. Our model admits three possible equilibria: infection-free equilibrium, CTL-absent infection equilibrium, and CTL-present infection equilibrium. The effect of time delay on stability of the equilibria of the CTL immune response model has been studied.

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26

KOLPIN, VAN. "SEPARATING EQUILIBRIUM AND PERSISTENT INEFFICIENCY". International Game Theory Review 14, nr 02 (czerwiec 2012): 1250010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500107.

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In context of the traditional Spence signaling model, the realization of a separating equilibrium ensures that each worker is allocated to the sector of the economy where they are most productive. Traditional analysis assumes, however, that the incremental returns to labor employment are constant across workers of any given type. This paper demonstrates that the efficiency properties of separating equilibria can be profoundly altered by the presence of nonlinear returns. In particular, we show that separating equilibria fail productive efficiency whenever production satisfies a weak form of diminishing returns. This separating equilibrium efficiency failure persists whether or not equilibrium wages are assumed to depend solely on distributions of worker productivity.

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27

Pham, Viet-Thanh, Sajad Jafari, Xiong Wang i Jun Ma. "A Chaotic System with Different Shapes of Equilibria". International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 26, nr 04 (kwiecień 2016): 1650069. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218127416500693.

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Although many chaotic systems have been introduced in the literature, a few of them possess uncountably infinite equilibrium points. The aim of our short work is to widen the current knowledge of the chaotic systems with an infinite number of equilibria. A three-dimensional system with special properties, for example, exhibiting chaotic attractor with circular equilibrium, chaotic attractor with ellipse equilibrium, chaotic attractor with square-shaped equilibrium, and chaotic attractor with rectangle-shaped equilibrium, is proposed.

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28

Brautbar, Mickey, Michael Kearns i Umar Syed. "Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 24, nr 1 (4.07.2010): 723–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7634.

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We consider risk-sensitive generalizations of Nash and correlated equilibria in noncooperative games. We prove that, except for a class of degenerate games, unless a two-player game has a pure Nash equilibrium, it does not have a risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium. We also show that every game has a risk-sensitive correlated equilibrium. The striking contrast between these existence results is due to the different sources of randomization in Nash (private randomization) and correlated equilibria (third-party randomization).

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Qin, Wenjie, Xuewen Tan, Xiaotao Shi, Marco Tosato i Xinzhi Liu. "Sliding Dynamics and Bifurcations in the Extended Nonsmooth Filippov Ecosystem". International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 31, nr 08 (26.06.2021): 2150119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218127421501194.

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We propose a nonsmooth Filippov refuge ecosystem with a piecewise saturating response function and analyze its dynamics. We first investigate some key elements to our model which include the sliding segment, the sliding mode dynamics and the existence of equilibria which are classified into regular/virtual equilibrium, pseudo-equilibrium, boundary equilibrium and tangent point. In particular, we consider how the existence of the regular equilibrium and the pseudo-equilibrium are related. Then we study the stability of the standard periodic solution (limit cycle), the sliding periodic solutions (grazing or touching cycle) and the dynamics of the pseudo equilibrium, using quantitative analysis techniques related to nonsmooth Filippov systems. Furthermore, as the threshold value is varied, the model exhibits several complex bifurcations which are classified into equilibria, sliding mode, local sliding (boundary node and focus) and global bifurcations (grazing or touching). In conclusion, we discuss the importance of the refuge strategy in a biological setting.

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30

Ohnishi, Kazuhiro. "Non-altruistic Equilibria". Indian Economic Journal 67, nr 3-4 (grudzień 2019): 185–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0019466220953124.

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Which choice will a player make if he can make one of two choices in which his own payoffs are equal, but his rival’s payoffs are not equal, that is, one with a large payoff for his rival and the other with a small payoff for his rival? This paper introduces non-altruistic equilibria for normal-form games and extensive-form non-altruistic equilibria for extensive-form games as equilibrium concepts of non-cooperative games by discussing such a problem and examines the connections between their equilibrium concepts and Nash and subgame perfect equilibria that are important and frequently encountered equilibrium concepts.

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31

Yang, Shengxu. "Regional Stability of Switching Control Circuit Systems with Multiple Equilibria". Journal of Physics: Conference Series 2355, nr 1 (1.10.2022): 012027. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/2355/1/012027.

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Abstract This paper investigates the stability of systems of multi-equilibrium switching circuits. For a first-order switching circuit system with two subsystems containing unique equilibria and different equilibria, we first establish a sufficient condition for the stability of the region of the multi-equilibrium first-order switching circuit system, and then complete the proof of its stability by means of a general solution of the system state. Secondly, for the second-order multi-equilibrium switching circuit system, the sufficient condition for the stability of the second-order multi-equilibrium switching circuit system is given, and the feasibility of the theorem is finally proved by drawing on existing research results and related sufficient conditions. The conclusions obtained show that the system of first- and second-order multiple equilibria switching circuits in the region is regionally stable after the corresponding switching paths.

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Merrill, Samuel, i James Adams. "Computing Nash Equilibria in Probabilistic, Multiparty Spatial Models with Nonpolicy Components". Political Analysis 9, nr 4 (2001): 347–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a004874.

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Although there exist extensive results concerning equilibria in spatial models of two-party elections with probabilistic voting, we know far less about equilibria in multiparty elections—i.e., under what conditions will equilibria exist, and what are the characteristics of equilibrium configurations? We derive conditions that guarantee the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium and develop an algorithm to compute that equilibrium inmultiparty elections with probabilistic voting, in which voters choose according to the behaviorists' fully specified multivariate vote model. Previously, such computations could only be approximated by laborious search methods. The algorithm, which assumes a conditional logit choice function, can be applied to spatial competition for a variety of party objectives including vote-maximization and margin-maximization, and can also encompass alternative voter policy metrics such as quadratic and linear loss functions. We show that our conditions for an equilibrium are plausible given the empirically-estimated parameters that behaviorists report for voting behavior in historical elections. We also show that parties' equilibrium positions depend not only on the distribution of voters' policy preferences but also on their nonpolicy-related attributes such as partisanship and sociodemographic variables. Empirical applications to data from a recent French election illustrate the use of the algorithm and suggest that a unique Nash equilibrium existed in that election.

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33

Rubinstein, Robert, i Timothy T. Clark. "“Equilibrium” and “non-equilibrium” turbulence". Theoretical and Applied Mechanics Letters 7, nr 5 (wrzesień 2017): 301–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.taml.2017.09.010.

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Nakae, H., i Y. Koizumi. "Equilibrium and non-equilibrium wetting". Materials Science and Engineering: A 495, nr 1-2 (listopad 2008): 113–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.msea.2007.10.097.

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Forges, Fran�oise, i James Peck. "Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium". Economic Theory 5, nr 1 (luty 1995): 33–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01213643.

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Zhang, Yong Po, Ming Juan Ma, Ping Zuo i Xin Liang. "Analysis of a Eco-Epidemiological Model with Disease in the Predator". Applied Mechanics and Materials 536-537 (kwiecień 2014): 861–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.536-537.861.

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In this paper we formulated and analyzed a eco-epidemiological model with disease in the predator, analysis of the existing conditions of equilibrium point, the sufficient condition of the local asymptotical stability of the equilibrium was studied with the method of latent root, the global asymptotical stability of two of the boundary equilibriums and the local asymptotical stability of the positive equilibrium is proved by using the Lyapunov function.

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37

Pérez-Chavela, Ernesto, i Juan Manuel Sánchez-Cerritos. "Euler-type Relative Equilibria and their Stability in Spaces of Constant Curvature". Canadian Journal of Mathematics 70, nr 2 (1.04.2018): 426–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.4153/cjm-2017-002-7.

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AbstractWe consider three point positivemasses moving onS2andH2. An Eulerian-relative equilibrium is a relative equilibrium where the three masses are on the same geodesic. In this paper we analyze the spectral stability of these kind of orbits where the mass at the middle is arbitrary and the masses at the ends are equal and located at the same distance from the central mass. For the case of S2, we found a positive measure set in the set of parameters where the relative equilibria are spectrally stable, and we give a complete classiûcation of the spectral stability of these solutions, in the sense that, except on an algebraic curve in the space of parameters, we can determine if the corresponding relative equilibriumis spectrally stable or unstable. OnH2, in the elliptic case, we prove that generically all Eulerian-relative equilibria are unstable; in the particular degenerate case when the two equal masses are negligible, we get that the corresponding solutions are spectrally stable. For the hyperbolic case we consider the system where the mass in the middle is negligible; in this case the Eulerian-relative equilibria are unstable.

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38

Duffy, John, i Daniela Puzzello. "Gift Exchange versus Monetary Exchange: Theory and Evidence". American Economic Review 104, nr 6 (1.06.2014): 1735–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.6.1735.

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We study the Lagos and Wright (2005) model of monetary exchange in the laboratory. With a finite population of sufficiently patient agents, this model has a unique monetary equilibrium and a continuum of non-monetary gift exchange equilibria, some of which Pareto dominate the monetary equilibrium. We find that subjects avoid the gift exchange equilibria in favor of the monetary equilibrium. We also study versions of the model without money where all equilibria involve non-monetary gift exchange. We find that welfare is higher in the model with money than without money, suggesting that money plays a role as an efficiency enhancing coordination device. ( JEL C92, D12, E40, Z13)

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Kubičár, L., V. Vretenár i V. Boháč. "Study of Phase Transitions by Transient Methods". Solid State Phenomena 138 (marzec 2008): 3–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/ssp.138.3.

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The present paper deals with the application of the transient techniques for thermophysical analysis of the structural changes in materials. The technique has been applied for study of equilibrium transitions as well as for kinetic transitions. A special methodology has been developed to study kinetic transitions like crystallization, melting, etc. in a “pseudo-equilibrium states” by the help of porous structures. The paper includes three different issues: the transient methods for measuring thermodynamic and transport parameters, data analysis and application of the pulse transient method for measurements of materials in thermodynamic equilibrium, pseudoequilibrium and in non-equilibrium (quasi-equilibrium) states. Equilibrium transitions in CsPbCl3 and CsPbBr3 single crystals, kinetic transitions of freezing and thawing water in porous stones and non-equilibriums states in E-glass and Al2O3 ceramics during sintering have been studied.

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40

Khan, Muhammad Altaf, Yasir Khan, Sehra Khan i Saeed Islam. "Global stability and vaccination of an SEIVR epidemic model with saturated incidence rate". International Journal of Biomathematics 09, nr 05 (13.06.2016): 1650068. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793524516500686.

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This study considers SEIVR epidemic model with generalized nonlinear saturated incidence rate in the host population horizontally to estimate local and global equilibriums. By using the Routh–Hurwitz criteria, it is shown that if the basic reproduction number [Formula: see text], the disease-free equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable. When the basic reproduction number exceeds the unity, then the endemic equilibrium exists and is stable locally asymptotically. The system is globally asymptotically stable about the disease-free equilibrium if [Formula: see text]. The geometric approach is used to present the global stability of the endemic equilibrium. For [Formula: see text], the endemic equilibrium is stable globally asymptotically. Finally, the numerical results are presented to justify the mathematical results.

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41

Harks, Tobias, Mona Henle, Max Klimm, Jannik Matuschke i Anja Schedel. "Multi-Leader Congestion Games with an Adversary". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 36, nr 5 (28.06.2022): 5068–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20439.

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We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum loads causing additional costs for the leaders. For the resulting strategic game among the leaders, we show that pure Nash equilibria fail to exist and therefore, we consider approximate equilibria instead. As our first main result, we show that the existence of a K-approximate equilibrium can always be guaranteed, where K (approximately equal to 1.1974) is the unique solution of a cubic polynomial equation. To this end, we give a polynomial time combinatorial algorithm which computes a K-approximate equilibrium. The factor K is tight, meaning that there is an instance that does not admit an A-approximate equilibrium for any A < K. Thus A = K is the smallest possible value of A such that the existence of an A-approximate equilibrium can be guaranteed for any instance of the considered game. Secondly, we focus on approximate equilibria of a given fixed instance. We show how to compute efficiently a best approximate equilibrium, that is, with smallest possible A among all A-approximate equilibria of the given instance.

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42

Das, HK, i T. Saha. "An Algorithmic Procedure for Finding Nash Equilibrium". GANIT: Journal of Bangladesh Mathematical Society 40, nr 1 (4.08.2020): 71–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/ganit.v40i1.48196.

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This paper proposes a heuristic algorithm for the computation of Nash equilibrium of a bi-matrix game, which extends the idea of a single payoff matrix of two-person zero-sum game problems. As for auxiliary but making the comparison, we also introduce here the well-known definition of Nash equilibrium and a mathematical construction via a set-valued map for finding the Nash equilibrium and illustrates them. An important feature of our algorithm is that it finds a perfect equilibrium when at the start of all actions are played. Furthermore, we can find all Nash equilibria of repeated use of this algorithm. It is found from our illustrative examples and extensive experiment on the current phenomenon that some games have a single Nash equilibrium, some possess no Nash equilibrium, and others had many Nash equilibria. These suggest that our proposed algorithm is capable of solving all types of problems. Finally, we explore the economic behaviour of game theory and its social implications to draw a conclusion stating the privilege of our algorithm. GANIT J. Bangladesh Math. Soc.Vol. 40 (2020) 71-85

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Yao, Jinhui, Guihua Li i Gang Guo. "Higher Codimension Bifurcation Analysis of Predator–Prey Systems with Nonmonotonic Functional Responses". International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 30, nr 12 (30.09.2020): 2050167. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218127420501679.

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In this paper, we study the dynamic behaviors of a predator–prey system with a general form of nonmonotonic functional response. Through analysis, it is found that the system exists in extinction equilibrium, boundary equilibrium and two positive equilibria, one or no positive equilibrium. Furthermore, the conditions are given such that the boundary equilibrium is a saddle, node or a saddle-node point of codimension 1, 2 or 3. Then, some conditions are obtained so that the unique positive equilibrium of the system is a cusp point of codimension 2, 3 and higher or a saddle-node one of codimension 1 or 3, or a nilpotent saddle-node of codimension 4. When there are two positive equilibria in the system, the equilibrium with a large number of preys is a saddle point. For the other one, the system may undergo Hopf bifurcation. To verify our conclusion, we consider the functional response function in the literature [ Zhu et al., 2002 ; Xiao & Ruan, 2001 ]. Finally, we give a brief discussion and numerical simulation.

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44

Kopf, Dennis A., i Maxwell K. Hsu. "Game Theory, Tourism and Land Ethics". Sustainability 13, nr 15 (30.07.2021): 8515. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13158515.

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This paper combines game theory with Land Ethics to demonstrate a path forward for sustainable development. Our findings indicate that two likely equilibria can be reached. One equilibrium focuses on high short-term profits, but with ecological damage leading to less cumulative profits. The second equilibrium requires ecological maintenance costs (thus less short-term profits) yet yields greater cumulative profits. The comparison of the two equilibria and using the historical perspective of the Wisconsin Dells demonstrates how communities that embrace a Land Ethic can reach the equilibrium that produces greater long-term benefits.

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45

Kim, Hyung Min. "Determinants of the Onset of Militarized Conflicts". International Area Review 12, nr 2 (wrzesień 2009): 39–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/223386590901200203.

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Classical liberals such as Immanuel Kant have argued that expanding political participation and increasing economic interdependence would promote peace among states. The purpose of this paper is to use a game theoretical method to explore both pillars of the “liberal peace” hypothesis, one of the most frequently studied determinants of the onset of militarized conflicts. The paper focuses on two important contributions from related literature: Crescenzi's (2000) proposition that the linkage between economic interdependence and political conflict is unstable or more complex than the current theory of international bargaining suggests and Fearon's (1994) argument that relative audience costs (either domestic or international) matter in the international crisis situation (a political “war of attrition”). After revising Crescenzi's (2000) economic exit model using Fearon's (1994) audience cost argument, four different equilibriums in the international bargaining model emerged: the economic exit equilibrium, the constraint equilibrium, the bargaining power equilibrium, and the escalation equilibrium. This paper also provides seven examples of the bargaining game to demonstrate how these four equilibriums emerged.

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46

Maziane, Mehdi, Khalid Hattaf i Noura Yousfi. "Spatiotemporal Dynamics of an HIV Infection Model with Delay in Immune Response Activation". International Journal of Differential Equations 2018 (2018): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/3294268.

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We propose and analyse an human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection model with spatial diffusion and delay in the immune response activation. In the proposed model, the immune response is presented by the cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTL) cells. We first prove that the model is well-posed by showing the global existence, positivity, and boundedness of solutions. The model has three equilibria, namely, the free-infection equilibrium, the immune-free infection equilibrium, and the chronic infection equilibrium. The global stability of the first two equilibria is fully characterized by two threshold parameters that are the basic reproduction number R0 and the CTL immune response reproduction number R1. The stability of the last equilibrium depends on R0 and R1 as well as time delay τ in the CTL activation. We prove that the chronic infection equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable when the time delay is sufficiently small, while it loses its stability and a Hopf bifurcation occurs when τ passes through a certain critical value.

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47

A. Sabarmathi, C. Pooja ,. "A Fractional Order Approach in the Eco-epidemiological Model of Sugarcane Grassy Shoot Disease Using Controls". Tuijin Jishu/Journal of Propulsion Technology 44, nr 4 (16.10.2023): 5909–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.52783/tjjpt.v44.i4.2024.

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In this paper, an eco-epidemiological model for grassy shoot disease with controls is formed and analyzed using Fractional Differential Equations. The infection-free and endemic equilibriums of the model are obtained. Using the Next generation matrix approach, the basic reproduction number is calculated. The local stability of infection-free equilibrium for integer and fractional order is analyzed. The global stability of the equilibria is found using the Lyapunov function. The sensitive parameters which spread the grassy shoot disease are identified using sensitivity analysis.

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48

Balder, Erik J., i Nicholas C. Yannelis. "Bayesian–Walrasian equilibria: beyond the rational expectations equilibrium". Economic Theory 38, nr 2 (2.10.2007): 385–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0288-6.

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Lyn, Gary, i Andrés Rodríguez-Clare. "External Economies and International Trade Redux: Comment*". Quarterly Journal of Economics 128, nr 4 (29.08.2013): 1895–905. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt017.

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Abstract Recently, Gene Grossman and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg (GRH; “External Economies and International Trade: Redux,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 [2010], 829–858) proposed a novel way to think about the implications of international trade in the presence of national external economies at the industry level. Instead of perfect competition and two industries, GRH assume Bertrand competition and a continuum of industries. GRH conclude that the equilibrium is unique if transport costs are low, that there is no trade for high transport costs, and that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies when transport costs are intermediate. In this note we reexamine the equilibrium analysis under different transport costs for a single industry (partial equilibrium) version of GRH’s model. We confirm many of GRH’s results, but also find that there are circumstances under which there are multiple equilibria, including equilibria in which trade patterns run counter to “natural” comparative advantage, and also find that there is a profitable deviation to the mixed-strategy equilibrium postulated by GRH for intermediate trading costs. We propose an alternative set of strategies for this case and establish that they constitute an equilibrium.

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Marchesi, Alberto, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Nicola Gatti i Tuomas Sandholm. "Quasi-Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (17.07.2019): 2117–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012117.

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Equilibrium refinements are important in extensive-form (i.e., tree-form) games, where they amend weaknesses of the Nash equilibrium concept by requiring sequential rationality and other beneficial properties. One of the most attractive refinement concepts is quasi-perfect equilibrium. While quasiperfection has been studied in extensive-form games, it is poorly understood in Stackelberg settings—that is, settings where a leader can commit to a strategy—which are important for modeling, for example, security games. In this paper, we introduce the axiomatic definition of quasi-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium. We develop a broad class of game perturbation schemes that lead to them in the limit. Our class of perturbation schemes strictly generalizes prior perturbation schemes introduced for the computation of (non-Stackelberg) quasi-perfect equilibria. Based on our perturbation schemes, we develop a branch-and-bound algorithm for computing a quasi-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium. It leverages a perturbed variant of the linear program for computing a Stackelberg extensive-form correlated equilibrium. Experiments show that our algorithm can be used to find an approximate quasi-perfect Stackelberg equilibrium in games with thousands of nodes.

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