Gotowe bibliografie tematyczne / Equilibria

Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Equilibria”

Autor: Grafiati
Data publikacji: 4 czerwca 2021
Data aktualizacji: 31 stycznia 2023

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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Equilibria"

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CANOVAS, SABRINA GOMEZ, PIERRE HANSEN i BRIGITTE JAUMARD. "NASH EQUILIBRIA FROM THE CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA VIEWPOINT". International Game Theory Review 01, nr 01 (marzec 1999): 33–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198999000049.

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We consider Nash equilibria as correlated equilibria and apply polyhedral theory to study extreme Nash equilibrium properties. We obtain an alternate proof that extreme Nash equilibria are extreme correlated equilibria and give some characteristics of them. Furthermore, we study a class of games that have no completely mixed Nash equilibria.
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Ohnishi, Kazuhiro. "Non-altruistic Equilibria". Indian Economic Journal 67, nr 3-4 (grudzień 2019): 185–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0019466220953124.

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Which choice will a player make if he can make one of two choices in which his own payoffs are equal, but his rival’s payoffs are not equal, that is, one with a large payoff for his rival and the other with a small payoff for his rival? This paper introduces non-altruistic equilibria for normal-form games and extensive-form non-altruistic equilibria for extensive-form games as equilibrium concepts of non-cooperative games by discussing such a problem and examines the connections between their equilibrium concepts and Nash and subgame perfect equilibria that are important and frequently encountered equilibrium concepts.
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WARD, SEAMUS A., i IAN W. B. THORNTON. "Equilibrium theory and alternative stable equilibria". Journal of Biogeography 25, nr 4 (lipiec 1998): 615–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2699.1998.2540615.x.

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Kudryavtsev, Konstantin, i Ustav Malkov. "Weak Berge Equilibrium in Finite Three-person Games: Conception and Computation". Open Computer Science 11, nr 1 (17.12.2020): 127–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/comp-2020-0210.

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AbstractThe paper proposes the concept of a weak Berge equilibrium. Unlike the Berge equilibrium, the moral basis of this equilibrium is the Hippocratic Oath “First do no harm”. On the other hand, any Berge equilibrium is a weak Berge equilibrium. But, there are weak Berge equilibria, which are not the Berge equilibria. The properties of the weak Berge equilibrium have been investigated. The existence of the weak Berge equilibrium in mixed strategies has been established for finite games. The weak Berge equilibria for finite three-person non-cooperative games are computed.
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Yang, Qigui, i Xinmei Qiao. "Constructing a New 3D Chaotic System with Any Number of Equilibria". International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 29, nr 05 (maj 2019): 1950060. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218127419500603.

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In the chaotic polynomial Lorenz-type systems (including Lorenz, Chen, Lü and Yang systems) and Rössler system, their equilibria are unstable and the number of the hyperbolic equilibria are no more than three. This paper shows how to construct a simple analytic (nonpolynomial) chaotic system that can have any preassigned number of equilibria. A special 3D chaotic system with no equilibrium is first presented and discussed. Using a methodology of adding a constant controller to the third equation of such a chaotic system, it is shown that a chaotic system with any preassigned number of equilibria can be generated. Two complete mathematical characterizations for the number and stability of their equilibria are further rigorously derived and studied. This system is very interesting in the sense that some complex dynamics are found, revealing many amazing properties: (i) a hidden chaotic attractor exists with no equilibria or only one stable equilibrium; (ii) the chaotic attractor coexists with unstable equilibria, including two/five unstable equilibria; (iii) the chaotic attractor coexists with stable equilibria and unstable equilibria, including one stable and two unstable equilibria/94 stable and 93 unstable equilibria; (iv) the chaotic attractor coexists with infinitely many nonhyperbolic isolated equilibria. These results reveal an intrinsic relationship of the global dynamical behaviors with the number and stability of the equilibria of some unusual chaotic systems.
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THROUMOULOPOULOS, G. N., i H. TASSO. "Ideal magnetohydrodynamic equilibria with helical symmetry and incompressible flows". Journal of Plasma Physics 62, nr 4 (październik 1999): 449–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022377899008041.

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A recent study on axisymmetric ideal magnetohydrodynamic equilibria with incompressible flows [H. Tasso and G. N. Throumoulopoulos, Phys. Plasmas5, 2378 (1998)] is extended to the generic case of helically symmetric equilibria with incompressible flows. It is shown that the equilibrium states of the system under consideration are governed by an elliptic partial differential equation for the helical magnetic flux function containing five surface quantities along with a relation for the pressure. The above-mentioned equation can be transformed to one possessing a differential part identical in form to the corresponding static equilibrium equation, which is amenable to several classes of analytical solutions. In particular, equilibria with electric fields perpendicular to the magnetic surfaces and non-constant-Mach-number flows are constructed. Unlike the case in axisymmetric equilibria with isothermal magnetic surfaces, helically symmetric T = T(ψ) equilibria are overdetermined, i.e. in this case the equilibrium equations reduce to a set of eight ordinary differential equations with seven surface quantities. In addition, the non-existence is proved of incompressible helically symmetric equilibria with (a) purely helical flows and (b) non-parallel flows with isothermal magnetic surfaces and with the magnetic field modulus a surface quantity (omnigenous equilibria).
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Liu, Bing, Wanbo Liu, Fennmei Tao, Baolin Kang i Jiguang Cong. "A Dynamical Analysis of a Piecewise Smooth Pest Control SI Model". International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos 25, nr 05 (maj 2015): 1550068. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218127415500686.

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In this paper, we propose a piecewise smooth SI pest control system to model the process of spraying pesticides and releasing infectious pests. We assume that the pest population consists of susceptible pests and infectious pests, and that the disease spreads horizontally between pests. We take the susceptible pest as the control index on whether to implement chemical control and biological control strategies. Based on the theory of Filippov system, the sliding-mode domain and conditions for the existence of real equilibria, virtual equilibria, pseudo-equilibrium and boundary equilibria are given. Further, we show the global stability of real equilibria (or boundary equilibria) and pseudo-equilibrium. Our results can provide theoretical guidance for the problem of pest control.
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Васин, Александр Алексеевич, Alexander Vasin, Ирина Юрьевна Серёгина i Irina Seregina. "Sequential equlibria in signaling games". Mathematical Game Theory and Applications 14, nr 1 (18.01.2023): 3–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.17076/mgta_2022_1_42.

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The paper considers Bayesian multi-stage signaling games. Previously formulated for extensive-form games, concepts of sequential equilibrium, separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium are specified, and calculating methods for these equilibria are also discussed. A competitive collision model with signals indicating rivals' states is studied as a specific example. We determine conditions for existence of separating and pooling equilibria with ordered competition, in which the competition object goes to one of the rivals without a rigid encounter. Model parameters ranges of the equilibria existence are also determined.
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Gregoir, Stéphane, i Pierre-Olivier Weill. "Restricted perception equilibria and rational expectation equilibrium". Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31, nr 1 (styczeń 2007): 81–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2005.10.001.

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Levine, David K. "Nash equilibria equal competitive equilibria". Economics Letters 25, nr 4 (styczeń 1987): 301–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(87)90080-2.

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Rozprawy doktorskie na temat "Equilibria"

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Stein, Noah D. (Noah Daniel). "Exchangeable equilibria". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/66465.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2011.
Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 183-188).
The main contribution of this thesis is a new solution concept for symmetric games (of complete information in strategic form), the exchangeable equilibrium. This is an intermediate notion between symmetric Nash and symmetric correlated equilibrium. While a variety of weaker solution concepts than correlated equilibrium and a variety of refinements of Nash equilibrium are known, there is little previous work on "interpolating" between Nash and correlated equilibrium. Several game-theoretic interpretations suggest that exchangeable equilibria are natural objects to study. Moreover, these show that the notion of symmetric correlated equilibrium is too weak and exchangeable equilibrium is a more natural analog of correlated equilibrium for symmetric games. The geometric properties of exchangeable equilibria are a mix of those of Nash and correlated equilibria. The set of exchangeable equilibria is convex, compact, and semi-algebraic, but not necessarily a polytope. A variety of examples illustrate how it relates to the Nash and correlated equilibria. The same ideas which lead to the notion of exchangeable equilibria can be used to construct tighter convex relaxations of the symmetric Nash equilibria as well as convex relaxations of the set of all Nash equilibria in asymmetric games. These have similar mathematical properties to the exchangeable equilibria. An example game reveals an algebraic obstruction to computing exact exchangeable equilibria, but these can be approximated to any degree of accuracy in polynomial time. On the other hand, optimizing a linear function over the exchangeable equilibria is NP-hard. There are practical linear and semidefinite programming heuristics for both problems. A secondary contribution of this thesis is the computation of extreme points of the set of correlated equilibria in a simple family of games. These examples illustrate that in finite games there can be factorially many more extreme correlated equilibria than extreme Nash equilibria, so enumerating extreme correlated equilibria is not an effective method for enumerating extreme Nash equilibria. In the case of games with a continuum of strategies and polynomial utilities, the examples illustrate that while the set of Nash equilibria has a known finite-dimensional description in terms of moments, the set of correlated equilibria admits no such finite-dimensional characterization.
by Noah D. Stein.
Ph.D.
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Pilgrim, Beate. "Understanding financial markets from a general equilibrium perspective uniqueness of competitive equilibria /". [S.l. : s.n.], 2001. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=962998176.

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Joosten, Reinoud Anna Maria Gerardus. "Dynamics, equilibria, and values". Maastricht : Maastricht : Universiteit Maastricht ; University Library, Maastricht University [Host], 1996. http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=6709.

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Crespo, Cuaresma Jesus, i Gerhard Sorger. "Alpha-consistent expectations equilibria". SFB Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 1999. http://epub.wu.ac.at/1782/1/document.pdf.

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We modify the concept of consistent expectations equilibria introduced in Hommes and Sorger (1998) in two ways: (i) the consistency condition requires that the probability that the agents reject their perceived law of motion in any period does not exceed a given level and (ii) there may exist exogenous stochastic shocks. The concept is illustrated by two examples using a linear economic system. In one of the examples consistency implies rational expectations, in the other example it does not. (authors' abstract)
Series: Working Papers SFB "Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science"
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Taylor, P. D. "Iron(III) Hydroxypyridinone equilibria". Thesis, University of Essex, 1986. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.376747.

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Fasoulakis, Michail. "Computing approximate Nash equilibria". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2017. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/91306/.

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The problem of finding equilibria in non-cooperative games and understanding their properties is a central problem in modern game theory. After John Nash proved that every finite game has at least one equilibrium (so-called Nash equilibrium), the natural question arose whether we can compute one efficiently. After several years of extensive research, we now know that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete even for two-player normal-form games, making the task of finding approximate Nash equilibria one of the central questions in the area of equilibrium computation. In this thesis our main goal is a new study of the complexity of various variants of the approximate Nash equilibrium. Specifically, we study algorithms for additive approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix and multi-player games. Then, we study algorithms for relative approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player games. Furthermore, we study algorithms for optimal approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games and finally we study the communication complexity of additive approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games.
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Gupta, A. "Equilibria in finite games". Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2016. http://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/3001507/.

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This thesis studies various equilibrium concepts in the context of finite games of infinite duration and in the context of bi-matrix games. We considered the game settings where a special player - the leader - assigns the strategy profile to herself and to every other player in the game alike. The leader is given the leeway to benefit from deviation in a strategy profile whereas no other player is allowed to do so. These leader strategy profiles are asymmetric but stable as the stability of strategy profiles is considered w.r.t. all other players. The leader can further incentivise the strategy choices of other players by transferring a share of her own payoff to them that results in incentive strategy profiles. Among these class of strategy profiles, an 'optimal' leader resp. incentive strategy profile would give maximal reward to the leader and is a leader resp. incentive equilibrium. We note that computing leader and incentive equilibrium is no more expensive than computing Nash equilibrium. For multi-player non-terminating games, their complexity is NP complete in general and equals the complexity of computing two-player games when the number of players is kept fixed. We establish the use of memory and study the effect of increasing the memory size in leader strategy profiles in the context of discounted sum games. We discuss various follower behavioural models in bi-matrix games assuming both friendly follower and an adversarial follower. This leads to friendly incentive equilibrium and secure incentive equilibrium for the resp. follower behaviour. While the construction of friendly incentive equilibrium is tractable and straight forward the secure incentive equilibrium needs a constructive approach to establish their existence and tractability. Our overall observation is that the leader return in an incentive equilibrium is always higher (or equal to) her return in a leader equilibrium that in turn would provide higher or equal leader return than from a Nash equilibrium. Optimal strategy profiles assigned this way therefore prove beneficial for the leader.
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Scho¨nfelder, Apollonia Maria Oktavia. "Inverse polarity prominence equilibria". Thesis, University of St Andrews, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/14243.

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It has been supposed since the middle of this century that it is the global magnetic field surrounding a quiescent prominence that provides the force to prevent its collapse due to the sun's gravitational field. Many theoretical models, assuming that the prominence plasma is supported in a dip in the magnetic field lines associated by the magnetic tension force, have since been put forward. The aim of this thesis is to propose further models of quiescent prominences to widen our understanding and knowledge of these remarkable features. A short overview over the magnetohydrodynamic equations used to describe solar prominences, or most of the solar phenomena for that matter, are discussed in chapter 2, and a short summary of prominence observations and attempts to model them is given in chapter 3. A brief description of the numerical code used in chapters 5 and 7 is given in chapter 4. Observations of Kim (1990) and Leroy (1985) have found that most large quiescent prominences are of inverse polarity type for which the magnetic field passes through the prominence in the opposite direction to that expected from the photospheric magnetic field. Many theoretical models have been proposed, but failed. Hence, in chapter 5 we investigate first – without the inclusion of a prominence sheet – when an inverse polarity magnetic field must have the correct topology for an inverse polarity configuration before the formation of the prominence itself. Only very recently, the first basic successful model of an I-type polarity prominence was proposed by Low (1993). In chapter 6 we examine this model and investigate current sheets more complicated and realistic than the one used by Low. These analytical models deal with the force-free solution, which is matched onto an external, unsheared, potential coronal magnetic field. These solutions are mathematically interesting and allow an investigation of different profiles of the current intensity of the magnetic field vector and of the mass density in the sheet. The prominence properties predicted by these models have been examined and have been found to match the observational values. The mathematics of current sheets in general is also briefly discussed. Chapter 7 deals with numerical solutions of inverse polarity prominences embedded in a force-free magnetic flux tube, matched onto an unsheared potential coronal field. Unfortunately the solutions gained are quite sensitive to the boundary conditions imposed on them through the numerical box, showing a loss of convergence and a tendency for the solution to blow up. Finally, a short summary as well as possible future work is given in chapter 8.
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Halcrow, Jonathan. "Charting the State Space of Plane Couette Flow: Equilibria, Relative Equilibria, and Heteroclinic Connections". Diss., Atlanta, Ga. : Georgia Institute of Technology, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/24724.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Physics, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009.
Committee Chair: Cvitanovic, Predrag; Committee Member: Bracco, Annalisa; Committee Member: Dieci, Luca; Committee Member: Goldman, Daniel; Committee Member: Grigoriev, Roman
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Devanur, Nikhil Rangarajan. "Efficient Algorithms for Market Equilibria". Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/16282.

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The mathematical modelling of a market, and the proof of existence of equilibria have been of central importance in mathematical economics. Since the existence proof is non-constructive in general, a natural question is if computation of equilibria can be done efficiently. Moreover, the emergence of Internet and e-commerce has given rise to new markets that have completely changed the traditional notions. Add to this the pervasiveness of computing resources, and an algorithmic theory of market equilibrium becomes highly desirable. The goal of this thesis is to provide polynomial time algorithms for various market models. Two basic market models are the Fisher model: one in which there is a demarcation between buyers and sellers, buyers are interested in the goods that the sellers possess, and sellers are only interested in the money that the buyers have; and the Arrow-Debreu model: everyone has an endowment of goods, and wants to exchange them for other goods. We give the first polynomial time algorithm for exactly computing an equilibrium in the Fisher model with linear utilities. We also show that the basic ideas in this algorithm can be extended to give a strongly polynomial time approximation scheme in the Arrow-Debreu model. We also give several existential, algorithmic and structural results for new market models: - the *spending constraint* utilities (defined by Vazirani) that captures the "diminishing returns" property while generalizing the algorithm for the linear case. - the capacity allocation market (defined by Kelly), motivated by the study of fairness and stability of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) for the Internet, and more generally the class of Eisenberg-Gale (EG) markets (defined by Jain and Vazirani). In addition, we consider the adwords market on search engines and show that some of these models are a natural fit in this setting. Finally, this line of research has given insights into the fundamental techniques in algorithm design. The primal-dual schema has been a great success in combinatorial optimization and approximation algorithms. Our algorithms use this paradigm in the enhanced setting of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and convex programs.
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Książki na temat "Equilibria"

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Yusop, Sri Rahayu Mohd. Equilibria. Kuala Lumpur: UTM Press, 2012.

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Kandori, Michihiro. Equivalent equilibria. Stanford, Calif: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, 1987.

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Soustelle, Michel. Chemical Equilibria. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119178545.

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Arangies, Noreen. Keepers of Equilibria. Windhoek, Namibia: Wordweaver Publishing House, 2014.

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1940-, Bamberg Günter, i Spremann Klaus, red. Capital market equilibria. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1986.

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Fudenberg, Drew. Learning mixed equilibria. Cambridge, Mass: Dept. of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992.

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Novák, Josef P. Liquid-liquid equilibria. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1987.

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Aubin, Jean-Pierre. Optima and Equilibria. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-02959-6.

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Bamberg, Günter, i Klaus Spremann, red. Capital Market Equilibria. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-70995-1.

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Aubin, Jean-Pierre. Optima and Equilibria. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-03539-9.

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Części książek na temat "Equilibria"

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Aubin, Jean-Pierre. "Equilibria". W Studies in Economic Theory, 437–55. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-60756-1_14.

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Pardue, Harry L. "Solubility Equilibria". W Chemical Equilibria, 145–67. Boca Raton: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.: CRC Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9780429429897-7.

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Matsumoto, Akio, i Ferenc Szidarovszky. "ComputationComputation of equilibria of Equilibria". W Game Theory and Its Applications, 65–79. Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-54786-0_6.

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Laraki, Rida, Jérôme Renault i Sylvain Sorin. "Correlated Equilibria, Learning, Bayesian Equilibria". W Universitext, 129–49. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26646-2_7.

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Soustelle, Michel. "Physico-Chemical Transformations and Equilibria". W Chemical Equilibria, 1–24. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119178545.ch1.

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Soustelle, Michel. "Properties of States of Physico-Chemical Equilibrium". W Chemical Equilibria, 25–53. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119178545.ch2.

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Soustelle, Michel. "Molecular Chemical Equilibria". W Chemical Equilibria, 55–104. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119178545.ch3.

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Soustelle, Michel. "Determination of the Values Associated with Reactions - Equilibrium Calculations". W Chemical Equilibria, 105–50. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119178545.ch4.

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Pardue, Harry L. "Effects of Ionic Strength". W Chemical Equilibria, 1–16. Boca Raton: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.: CRC Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9780429429897-1.

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Pardue, Harry L. "Equilibrium Calculations for Metal-Ion/EDTA Reactions". W Chemical Equilibria, 203–47. Boca Raton: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019.: CRC Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9780429429897-10.

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Streszczenia konferencji na temat "Equilibria"

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Bitchikh, K., A. H. Meniai, W. Louaer i J. P. Grolier. "Experimental and Modelling of liquid –solid equilibria". W XXXV JEEP – 35th Conference on Phase Equilibria. Les Ulis, France: EDP Sciences, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/jeep/200900011.

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Wang, Woodrow Z., Mark Beliaev, Erdem Bıyık, Daniel A. Lazar, Ramtin Pedarsani i Dorsa Sadigh. "Emergent Prosociality in Multi-Agent Games Through Gifting". W Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/61.

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Coordination is often critical to forming prosocial behaviors -- behaviors that increase the overall sum of rewards received by all agents in a multi-agent game. However, state of the art reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from converging to socially less desirable equilibria when multiple equilibria exist. Previous works address this challenge with explicit reward shaping, which requires the strong assumption that agents can be forced to be prosocial. We propose using a less restrictive peer-rewarding mechanism, gifting, that guides the agents toward more socially desirable equilibria while allowing agents to remain selfish and decentralized. Gifting allows each agent to give some of their reward to other agents. We employ a theoretical framework that captures the benefit of gifting in converging to the prosocial equilibrium by characterizing the equilibria's basins of attraction in a dynamical system. With gifting, we demonstrate increased convergence of high risk, general-sum coordination games to the prosocial equilibrium both via numerical analysis and experiments.
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Dughmi, Shaddin, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat i Stefano Leonardi. "Lottery Pricing Equilibria". W EC '16: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940742.

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Gottlob, Georg, Gianluigi Greco i Francesco Scarcello. "Pure Nash equilibria". W the 9th conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/846241.846269.

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Hughes, David H., Robert A. Hedges i Bruce W. Suter. "Equilibria in transition". W International Symposium on Optical Science and Technology, redaktor Franklin T. Luk. SPIE, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1117/12.448689.

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Govindan, Srihari, Rida Laraki i Lucas Pahl. "On Sustainable Equilibria". W EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399514.

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Mossel, Elchanan, Manuel Mueller-Frank, Allan Sly i Omer Tamuz. "Social Learning Equilibria". W EC '18: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219207.

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Eldredge, Niles. "ON PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA". W GSA Connects 2022 meeting in Denver, Colorado. Geological Society of America, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1130/abs/2022am-377380.

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Goutaudier, C. "Crystal growth in condensed phase and phase diagrams". W XXXVII JEEP – 37th Conference on Phase Equilibria. Les Ulis, France: EDP Sciences, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/jeep/201100002.

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Linol, J., i G. Coquerel. "Simplification of the landscape under high energy milling of molecular solids exhibiting polymorphism". W XXXV JEEP – 35th Conference on Phase Equilibria. Les Ulis, France: EDP Sciences, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/jeep/200900013.

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Raporty organizacyjne na temat "Equilibria"

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Bullard, James. Learning Equilibria. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.1991.004.

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Hender, T. C., B. A. Carreras i V. E. Lynch. Heliac equilibria. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), listopad 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/7242000.

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Agim, Y. Two-dimensional magnetohydrodynamic equilibria with flow and studies of equilibria fluctuations. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), sierpień 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/6896738.

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Ho, C. K. Multicomponent three-phase equilibria. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), czerwiec 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/87825.

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Benhabib, Jess, Pengfei Wang i Yi Wen. Uncertainty and Sentiment-Driven Equilibria. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.20955/wp.2013.011.

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Benhabib, Jess, Pengfei Wang i Yi Wen. Uncertainty and Sentiment-Driven Equilibria. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, marzec 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18878.

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Kehoe, Patrick, i Fabrizio Perri. Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, lipiec 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w9077.

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Beahm, E. C. Comparative Calculations of Solubility Equilibria. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), lipiec 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/814615.

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King, Robert. Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, marzec 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12076.

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White, Roscoe, i Leonid Zakharov. Guiding Center Equations in Toroidal Equilibria. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), wrzesień 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/809823.

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