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Palermos, Spyridon Orestis. "Extending cognition in epistemology : towards an individualistic social epistemology". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/7972.
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The aim of the present thesis is to reconcile two opposing intuitions; one originating from mainstream individualistic epistemology and the other one from social epistemology. In particular, conceiving of knowledge as a cognitive phenomenon, mainstream epistemologists focus on the individual as the proper epistemic subject. Yet, clearly, knowledge-acquisition many times appears to be a social process and, sometimes, to such an extent—as in the case of scientific knowledge—that it has been argued there might be knowledge that is not possessed by any individual alone. In order to make sense of such contradictory claims, I combine virtue reliabilism in mainstream epistemology with two hypotheses from externalist philosophy of mind, viz., the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses. Reading virtue reliabilism along the lines suggested by the hypothesis of extended cognition allows for a weak anti-individualistic understanding of knowledge, which has already been suggested on the basis of considerations about testimonial knowledge: knowledge, many times, has a dual nature; it is both social and individual. Provided, however, the possibility of distributed cognition and group agency, we can go even further by making a case for a robust version of antiindividualism in mainstream epistemology. This is because knowledge may not always be the product of any individual’s cognitive ability and, thereby, not creditable to any individual alone. Knowledge, instead, might be the product of an epistemic group agent’s collective cognitive ability and, thus, attributable only to the group as a whole. Still, however, being able—on the basis of the hypothesis of distributed cognition—to recognize a group as a cognitive subject in itself allows for proponents of virtue reliabilism to legitimately apply their individualistic theory of knowledge to such extreme cases as well. Put another way, mainstream individualistic epistemologists now have the means to make sense of the claim that p is known by S, even though it is not known by any individual alone.
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Matheson, Jonathan D. "Epistemology and evidence an analysis of Alvin Plantinga's reformed epistemology /". Online full text .pdf document, available to Fuller patrons only, 2003. http://www.tren.com.
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Barnes, Allison. "Empathy and epistemology". Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/10905.
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Løkke, Håvard. "Early Stoic epistemology". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2004. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.404344.
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Deugo, Dwight L. (Dwight Lorne) Carleton University Dissertation Computer Science. "Computational evolutionary epistemology". Ottawa, 1993.
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Rysiew, Patrick William. "Contextualism in epistemology". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289063.
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Traditional epistemology is universalistic, in that it proceeds on the assumption that we can fully specify conditions making for the correctness of attributions of knowledge (/justified belief) without adverting to 'context'. In Chapter 1 examples are adduced which cast doubt on this assumption, since they seem to show that the very 'contents' of such attributions are 'context-dependent'. But even if some form of 'contextualism' is thereby shown to be correct, if we are to avoid resting content with the foregoing near-platitudinous observation, we need to address the following two questions: How exactly should we conceive of "context"? And in what way, exactly, does context affect the 'content' of those attributions? More precisely, does context affect what is literally expressed by a given knowledge-attributing sentence (as the semantic contextualist claims) or does it affect what the speaker means by the utterance of that sentence (as the pragmatic contextualist maintains)? Here it is argued that 'context' is a psychological notion, referring to the psychology of the speaker (perhaps qua member of some larger group). Further, it is argued that in addition to its being favored both by a correct understanding of the notion of context itself and by methodological considerations, pragmatic contextualism avoids the intractable problems faced by the semantic contextualist. Finally, the broader implications for epistemology of the foregoing results are explored, and their application to non-epistemological theories/areas are indicated.
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Wunderlich, Mark E. "Incomparability in epistemology". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289737.
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Epistemologists are interested in what makes beliefs well justified. Even before considering competing theories of epistemic justification, however, we should ask what sort of valuational structure we are trying to explain. If, as far as epistemic justification is concerned, beliefs are like bank accounts, then all beliefs are comparable: just as in any bank account there must be more, less, or as much money as in any other, one belief must be better, worse, or as good as any other. Contemporary epistemologists take for granted the assumption that beliefs are comparable in the same way that bank accounts are comparable: bank accounts have balances, sprinters have personal bests for the 100-meter dash, and beliefs have degrees of justifiedness. Alternatively, we could understand the justificatory status of a belief to be more like the expensiveness of a restaurant. Consider a concept of restaurant expensiveness on which the expensiveness of a restaurant is determined by the range of prices for meals at that restaurant. If meals at Restaurant A are 25 to 50 and meals at B are 10 to 20, then A is more expensive than B. Restaurant C, however (30 to 40), is neither more nor less expensive than A. Nor is it equally expensive, for there are restaurants that are more expensive than C that are not more expensive than A (like D, 45 to 50). Some evaluative concepts, like this concept of restaurant expensiveness, do not reduce values to single numbers. If epistemic justification is like this, then there may be pairs of beliefs such that neither is better justified than the other, but nor are they equally well justified. Such beliefs would be incomparable. While incomparability is familiar in the ethics literature, it has not previously been explored in epistemology. I discuss the implications of allowing for incomparability in epistemology, both for theories of epistemic justification and theories of knowledge.
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Tyson, Paul G. "Transcendence and Epistemology". Thesis, -, 2005. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/2003/1/2003.pdf.
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Where epistemology and transcendence are considered compatible, two approaches to truth are pursued. A Platonistic approach sees transcendence as the grounds of all true knowledge, whilst an Aristotelian approach sees natural human knowledge as providing inferential lodging places for speculative knowledge about transcendent truth. This paper argues: firstly, that the Aristotelian approach does not work; secondly, that the Platonistic approach does work; thirdly, that the failure of the Aristotelian approach has resulted in the death of truth at the hands of modern epistemological foundationalism, and; fourthly, that the Platonistic approach is able to displace post/modern scepticism regarding knowing transcendent truth.
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Miller, Seth T. "Toward an aesthetic epistemology| Transforming thinking through cybernetic epistemology and anthroposophy". Thesis, California Institute of Integral Studies, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3621053.
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The complexity, subtlety, interlinking, and scale of many problems faced individually and collectively in today's rapidly changing world requires an epistemology--a way of thinking about our knowing--capable of facilitating new kinds of responses that avoid recapitulation of old ways of thinking and living. Epistemology, which implicitly provides the basis for engagement with the world via the fundamental act of distinction, must therefore be included as a central facet of any practical attempts at self/world transformation. We need to change how we think, not just what we think. The new epistemology needs to be of a higher order than the source of the problems we face.
This theoretical, transdisciplinary dissertation argues that such a new epistemology needs to be recursive and process-oriented. This means that the thoughts about thinking that it produces must explicitly follow the patterns of thinking by which those thoughts are generated. The new epistemology is therefore also phenomenological, requiring the development of a reflexivity in thinking that recursively links across two levels of order--between content and process. The result is an epistemology that is of (and for) the whole human being. It is an enacted (will-imbued) and aesthetic (feeling-permeated) epistemology (thinking-penetrated) that is sensitive to and integrative of material, soul, and spiritual aspects of ourselves and our world. I call this kind of epistemology aesthetic, because its primary characteristic is found in the phenomenological, mutually fructifying and transformative marriage between the capacity for thinking and the capacity for feeling.
Its foundations are brought forward through the confluence of multiple domains: cybernetic epistemology, the esoteric epistemology of anthroposophy (the spiritual science of Rudolf Steiner), and the philosophy of the implicit as developed by Eugene Gendlin.
The practice of aesthetic epistemology opens new phenomenal domains of experience, shedding light on relations between ontology and epistemology, mind and body, logic and thinking, as well as on the formation (and transformation) of identity, the immanence of thinking in world-processes, the existence of different types of logic, and the nature of beings, of objects, and most importantly of thinking itself and its relationship to spirit.
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Devitt, Susannah Kate. "Homeostatic epistemology : reliability, coherence and coordination in a Bayesian virtue epistemology". Thesis, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 2013. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/62553/1/62553c.pdf.
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How do agents with limited cognitive capacities flourish in informationally impoverished or unexpected circumstances? Aristotle argued that human flourishing emerged from knowing about the world and our place within it. If he is right, then the virtuous processes that produce knowledge, best explain flourishing. Influenced by Aristotle, virtue epistemology defends an analysis of knowledge where beliefs are evaluated for their truth and the intellectual virtue or competences relied on in their creation. However, human flourishing may emerge from how degrees of ignorance are managed in an uncertain world. Perhaps decision-making in the shadow of knowledge best explains human wellbeing—a Bayesian approach? In this dissertation I argue that a hybrid of virtue and Bayesian epistemologies explains human flourishing—what I term homeostatic epistemology.
Homeostatic epistemology supposes that an agent has a rational credence p when p is the product of reliable processes aligned with the norms of probability theory; whereas an agent knows that p when a rational credence p is the product of reliable processes such that: 1) p meets some relevant threshold for belief (such that the agent acts as though p were true and indeed p is true), 2) p coheres with a satisficing set of relevant beliefs and, 3) the relevant set of beliefs is coordinated appropriately to meet the integrated aims of the agent.
Homeostatic epistemology recognizes that justificatory relationships between beliefs are constantly changing to combat uncertainties and to take advantage of predictable circumstances. Contrary to holism, justification is built up and broken down across limited sets like the anabolic and catabolic processes that maintain homeostasis in the cells, organs and systems of the body. It is the coordination of choristic sets of reliably produced beliefs that create the greatest flourishing given the limitations inherent in the situated agent.
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Ely, Deise Fabiana [UNESP]. "Teoria e método da climatologia geográfica brasileira: uma abordagem sobre seus discursos e práticas". Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/105091.
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Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:33:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0
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ely_df_dr_prud.pdf: 902098 bytes, checksum: 6c3ecec249be504e708f65dcb2fdee1a (MD5)O presente trabalho constitui um mapeamento e análise sobre os discursos e práticas empreendidos pela climatologia geográfica brasileira. O principal propósito para o seu desenvolvimento foi a verificação de como o conhecimento geográfico do clima encontra-se vinculado aos debates efetivados pelas diversas correntes filosóficas de pensamento e às diferentes concepções de natureza e de geografia. A verificação do processo de inserção e constituição dessa especialidade científica no Brasil demonstrou a existência de duas vertentes metodológicas principais: uma baseada em decomposições analítico-descritivas do fenômeno climático e outra subsidiada nas explicações da meteorologia dinâmica. O estudo geográfico do clima, a partir desse universo de análise, é desenvolvido a partir de cinco recortes temáticos principais: clima urbano, variabilidade pluvial, o clima na análise ambiental e da paisagem, modelagem estatística em climatologia e teoria e método da climatologia; pautados na concepção de natureza dinâmica-sistêmica. Foi verificado que as questões epistemológicas da Geografia não são refletidas enfaticamente pela climatologia geográfica brasileira, tornando a apreensão da espacialidade do clima na composição das novas territorialidades uma tarefa difícil de ser realizada.
The main purpose of this following thesis is to verify how the geographic knowledge of the climate relates to debates about diverse philosophical trends and the different conceptions of nature and geography, by mapping out and analyzing discourses and practices within the scope of the Brazilian geographic climatology. The climate geographic study, in this universe of analysis, is developed from five main themes: urban climate, pluvial variability, the climate in the environment and setting analysis, statistical modeling in climatology and climatology theory and method; all of them based on the conception of the dynamic-systemic nature. It was verified that epistemological problems in Geography are not emphatically concerned by Brazilian geographic climatology, what can make the understanding of the climate spatiality in the composition of new territorialities a difficult task.
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Fleming, Chris 1970, of Western Sydney Hawkesbury University i Faculty of Social Inquiry. "Theoria : performance and epistemology". THESIS_FSI_XXX_Fleming_C.xml, 1999. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/407.
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What might it mean to attempt to figure theatre as thought? More specifically, what possible relations hold between theatre and epistemology - that area of philosophy concerned with theories of knowledge? This study is a series of cross-disciplinary engagements that seek to articulate some of the relations between theatre, performance, and epistemology, to investigate performance as a 'deployed logic' in relation to those disciplines concerned with discovering and generating knowledge. For some thinkers in the continental tradition, the very thought of writing about the relations between performance and the anachronistic; hasn't the idea of 'performance' undermined most of the central tenets of the discourse concerned with knowledge and the Real, with truth and falsity? This, of course, remains an open question, one pursued in this work. The thesis draws on a diverse series of wide-ranging examples in order to relate the inquiry to current work being done in philosophy and performance studies, but notes the theoretical incompleteness of studies relating theatre and performance to conceptions of knowledge.It attempts to fill a void in the literature by offering analyses that think the relations between dramatic and philosophical activity. In short, it hopes to re-open the dialogue between performance and epistemology by showing how philosophy regularly attempts to expunge its foundational elements from its imaginary.Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
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Fleming, Christopher J. "Theoria : performance and epistemology /". [Richmond, N.S.W.] : University of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury, 1999. http://library.uws.edu.au/adt-NUWS/public/adt-NUWS20030527.091228/index.html.
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Pollock, William J. "The epistemology of necessity". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/4053.
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The thesis examines the direct reference theory of proper names and natural kind terms as expounded by Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam and others and finds that it has not succeeded in replacing some kind of description theory of the reference of such terms - although it does concede that the traditional Fregean theory is not quite correct. It is argued that the direct reference theory is mistaken on several counts. First of all it is question-begging. Secondly, it is guilty of a 'use/mention' confusion. And thirdly, and most importantly, it fails to deal with the notion of understanding. The notion of understanding is crucial to the present thesis - specifically, what is understood by a proper name or natural kind term. It is concluded that sense (expressed in the form of descriptions) is at least necessary for reference, which makes a significant difference to Kripke's claim that there are necessary a posteriori truths as well as contingent a priori truths. It is also argued that sense could be sufficient for reference, if it is accepted that it is speakers who effect reference. In this sense, sense determines reference. The thesis therefore not only argues against the account of reference given by the direct reference theorists, it also gives an account of how proper names and natural kind terms actually do function in natural language. As far as the epistemology of necessity is concerned the thesis concludes that Kripke (along with many others) has not succeeded in establishing the existence of the necessary a posteriori nor the contingent a priori from the theory of direct reference. Whether such truths can be established by some other means, or in principle, is not the concern of the thesis; although the point is made that, if a certain view of sense is accepted, then questions of necessity and a priority seem inappropriate.
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Gordon, Emma Catherine. "Understanding in contemporary epistemology". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/6408.
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My main aim is to contribute to the exploration of the nature of the epistemic state of understanding. It seems that the most productive way in which this might be done is by (i) investigating what sort of conditions must be fulfilled in order for one to understand, and (ii) comparing understanding’s place in certain contemporary debates to the place that knowledge has in those debates. Regarding conditions for understanding, I will argue that there are two types of understanding that are most relevant to epistemology—objectual understanding and atomistic understanding. I will contend that atomistic understanding is entirely factive while objectual understanding is moderately factive, that objectual understanding admits of degrees, that both types involve some sort of grasp of explanatory relations, that both possess a measure of luck immunity, and that both are cognitive achievements with instrumental, teleological, contributory and (crucially) final value. It must be stressed that the general accounts of both types of understanding that I attempt to provide are not supposed to be exhaustive sets of necessary and sufficient conditions—I remain particularly open to the possibility that there are further necessary conditions that are as yet undiscovered, especially for objectual understanding. Regarding understanding’s place in contemporary debates, it is perplexing that existing work does not capitalise on the thought that treating understanding in conjunction with many of the most prominent issues in recent epistemology is a worthwhile project that could yield interesting and important results. I will summarise understanding's potential significance for a number of these topics, looking at all of the following (in varying degrees of detail): factivity, coherentism, norms of assertion, the transmission of epistemic properties, epistemic luck, the nature of cognitive achievement, and epistemic value. This last topic is one that I think is particularly important to an investigation into understanding, because it is quite plausible that there is a particularly strong revisionist theory of epistemic value focused on understanding. Such a view would be one on which knowledge is not finally valuable, but one by way of which we could nonetheless explain why we might pre-theoretically think that knowledge is finally valuable. Since revisionist views often involve a claim that we should think of a different, closely related epistemic state as distinctively valuable, it is natural to consider understanding as a prime candidate for the focus of such a theory.
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Reaber, Grant. "Topics in probabilistic epistemology". Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2014. http://digitool.abdn.ac.uk:80/webclient/DeliveryManager?pid=227601.
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Three related topics in probabilistic epistemology are studied. 1. Issues in the theory of rationality raised by cases in which eithermultiple doxastic attitudes would be warranted if you had them or none would. 2. The concept of credential deference, which lies behind David Lewis's Principal Principle, Bas van Fraassen's Reflection Principle, et al., is analyzed. Particular interest comes from considering agents who are not always certain what their own credences are. 3. The concept of conditional probability. It is argued that the ratio formula for conditional probability functions as an analytic constraint on what can count as conditional probability, yet the abiding interest of the concept stems from the different concrete relations that (often imperfectly) model this formula. The chapter traces the appearance of these concrete relations through the early centuries of probability theory, in which conditional probability went unrecognized as a distinct concept.
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Silva, Polly M. "Epistemology of Incidental Learning". Diss., Virginia Tech, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/29287.
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The study explored incidental learning in the workplace. Three research questions guided the study:
1. What is the nature of incidental learning in the workplace?
2. How does professional context impact incidental learning?
3. How do incidental learners know they know in the workplace?
A series of three interviews were done with seven human resource professionals and with seven engineers following Seidmanâ s phenomenological interview protocol. The first interview focused on the participantâ s life history concentrating on the context of the participantâ s early learning experiences and their professional choices. The second interview provided details of the participantâ s current incidental learning experiences and an example of their current professional tasks. The third interview provided an opportunity for the participants and me to explore the meaning of their experiences.
Analysis of individual experiences was done via profiles, and an analysis of thematic findings was done across all participants.
Findings showed that in the â lived worldâ the experience of the participants and the nature of incidental learning is mediated by the individualâ s conception of learning and by the individualâ s learning style. At a professional level, frames and reflection-in and on-action further guide the focus of and validation of the incidental learning. For the researcher â and perhaps for co-workers or for participants themselves â incidental learning is easy to overlook; lessons learned often appear to be simply common sense after the fact. This may, in part, be due to the fact that the stories of incidental learning ultimately had successful outcomes. This study confirmed and expanded the importance and impact of context on incidental learning, showing how the elements of an individualâ s personal and professional context also impact incidental learning.
Recommendations for future research and implications for practice were provided. Recommendations for future research included: replicating the study to explore incidental learning in more professions and to explore of the impact of formal higher education on incidental learning. Process recommendations include studying incidental learning as an adjunct to other studies of organizational learning and as a part of an action research project. These methods allow the researcher to study the construct indirectly and as it happens.Ph. D.
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Prasad, Jwala. "History of Indian epistemology /". New Delhi : Munshiram Manoharlal publ, 1987. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb374688770.
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Holst, Cathrine. "Feminism, epistemology & morality". Bergen : University of Bergen, 2005. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/77564206.html.
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Oldemeier, Alexander Christoph Reinhard. "The epistemology of abstractionism". Thesis, University of Leeds, 2012. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/11312/.
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I examine the nature and the structure of basic logico-mathematical knowledge. What justifies the truth of the Dedekind-Peano axioms and the validity of Modus Ponens? And is the justification we possess reflectively available? To make progress with these questions, I ultimately embed Hale's and Wright's neo-Fregeanism in a general internalistic epistemological framework. In Part I, I provide an introduction to the problems in the philosophy of mathematics to motivate the investigations to follow. I present desiderata for a fully satisfactory epistemology of mathematics and discuss relevant positions. All these positions turn out to be unsatisfactory, which motivates the abstractionist approach. I argue that abstractionism is in need of further explication when it comes to its central epistemological workings. I fill this gap by embedding neo-Fregeanism in an internalistic epistemological framework. In Part 11, I motivate, outline, and discuss the consequences of the frame- work. I argue: (1) we need an internalistic notion of warrant in our epistemology and every good epistemology accounts for the possession of such warrant; (2) to avoid scepticism, we need to invoke a notion of non-evidential warrant (entitlement); (3) because entitlements cannot be upgraded, endorsing entitlements for mathematical axioms and validity claims would entail that such propositions cannot be claimed to be known. Because of (3), the framework appears to yield sceptical consequences. In Part 111, I discuss (i) whether we can accept these consequences and (ii) whether we have to accept these consequences. As to (i), I argue that there is a tenable solely entitlement- based philosophy of mathematics and logic. However, I also argue that we can over- come limitations by vindicating the neo-Fregean proposal that implicit definitions can underwrite basic logico-mathematical knowledge. One key manoeuvre here is to acknowledge that the semantic success of creative implicit definitions rests on substantial presuppositions - but to argue that relevant presuppositions are entitlements.
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Ahmed, Hasen Ali. "Quine on naturalised epistemology". Thesis, University of North Bengal, 2017. http://ir.nbu.ac.in/handle/123456789/2657.
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Baril, Anne. "EUDAIMONISM AND EPISTEMOLOGY: EPISTEMIC ASPECTS OF EUDAIMONIA AND A EUDAIMONIST APPROACH IN EPISTEMOLOGY". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/204296.
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Eudaimonism holds that a human being's thriving, or flourishing, provides the proper standard for the structuring of her life. In this dissertation I take steps toward a eudaimonist virtue epistemology, according to which the epistemic virtues are (1) deeply entrenched, coherent dispositions to think, act, and feel, and (2) part of a holistic system of such dispositions, a system in which (a) (intuitively) epistemic traits are interrelated with, and mutually supporting with (intuitively) non-epistemic traits, and (b) the elements of this system are unified in being elements of a system of character traits that human beings need in order to flourish. I argue that eudaimonism should be understood as a view of how we ought, all-things-considered, organize our lives, not as a contemporary moral theory that gives an account of what we ought morally to do. I argue that, so understood, a eudaimonist virtue ethics avoids some of the problems it is charged with when it is understood as a contemporary normative ethical theory, including charges that it offers the wrong kind of explanation of the moral rightness or wrongness of actions, and charges that it is egoistic. Likewise, it avoids analogues to those charges that arise in epistemology, including the charge that such a view will be baldly pragmatist, telling us to believe whatever is in our best interests. Eudaimonism, on the understanding that I propose, endorses the (all-things-considered) claim that one ought to develop the epistemic virtues on the condition that such traits are traits that enable us to flourish.
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Nance, Ian Thomas. "Intentional Actions: Explanation and Epistemology". UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA, 2012. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3482014.
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Lekas, Michelle Yvonne. "A brief epistemology of seriality /". Diss., ON-CAMPUS Access For University of Minnesota, Twin Cities Click on "Connect to Digital Dissertations", 2000. http://www.lib.umn.edu/articles/proquest.phtml.
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Marrs, Heath. "Culture, epistemology, and academic studying". Diss., Manhattan, Kan. : Kansas State University, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/2097/84.
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Harrison, Britt. "The epistemology of know-how". Thesis, University of Hertfordshire, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2299/10433.
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There is an as yet unacknowledged and incomparable contribution to the philosophical debates about know-how to be found in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is sourced in his investigations into knowledge and certainty in On Certainty, though it is not limited to these late passages. Understanding the ramifications of this putative contribution (even if one does not agree with it) highlights the extent to which (i) there is now a new range of issues pertaining to know-how which no future philosophical consideration of the topic can ignore, except on pain of failing to engage comprehensively with the subject; (ii) the topic of know-how has been inappropriately marginalised by naturalized epistemology, and may well be as central to epistemology as the propositional knowledge which currently dominates epistemology’s attention; and (iii) any engagement with these potential Wittgensteinian contributions will need to be conducted in tandem with a reflection on the meta-philosophy of epistemology, since their potential impact extends to epistemology’s main methodology, i.e., naturalized reflective equilibrium. These three conclusions, together with a diagnosis of where and why all the current intellectualist accounts of know-how are either internally inconsistent, or irreconcilably flawed on their own terms, provide the motivation and the opportunity for a New Epistemology of Know-How. These conclusions established, I offer one possible Wittgensteinian-orientated version of the New Epistemology of Know-How, providing the first example of a non-naturalized philosophical approach to the topic since Gilbert Ryle.
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Rickard, Joel. "Moral epistemology, particularism and generalism". Thesis, University of Kent, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.633659.
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This thesis is a contribution to the debate between moral generalism and moral particularism. Generalism is the view that morality both can and needs to be-expressed in finite and manageable general principles. Particularists challenge this claim. In this thesis I defend particularism. This involves four contributions: (i) In chapter 1 I present an account of what exactly a principle is, as surprisingly little analysis of this central term has been carried out. This includes a reply to the constitutive generalist, who argues that without principles that there would be no way of demarcating the correct use of the terms 'right' and 'wrong'. (ii) In chapter 2 I develop an argument for reasons holism, which is typically advanced as the basis for adopting particularism. Although I agree that some versions of holism are consistent with generalism, I show there is one version which is not. This, in turn, places the onus on the generalist to show why this version of holism is implausible. (iii) Chapters 3 and 4 form my main contribution to the debate. Particularists have been accused of having an untenable epistemology rooted in their commitment to a fonn of moral intuitionism. Throughout these chapters my main claims are as follows: a. intuitionism can be divorced from foundationalism b. particularism cannot adopt foundationalism c. intuitionism is consistent with coherentism d. particularism is consistent with coherentism e. coherentism is a tenable moral epistemology It follows that particularists can remain loyal to their historical commitments to intuitionism whilst adopting a coherentist moral epistemology. (iv) In the final part of chapter 4 I tackle some of the worries associated with the particularist's putative recommendation that we abandon using principles in our . everyday moralizing. My focus here is special pleading.
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Guha, Nirmalya. "Postulation : Arthapatti in india epistemology". Thesis, Lancaster University, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.536006.
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Kelp, Christoph F. F. "A minimalist approach to epistemology". Thesis, University of Stirling, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/242.
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This thesis addresses the problem of the analysis of knowledge. The persistent failure of analyses of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is used to motivate exploring alternative approaches to the analytical problem. In parallel to a similar development in the theory of truth, in which the persistent failure to provide a satisfactory answer to the question as to what the nature of truth is has led to the exploration of deflationary and minimalist approaches to the theory of truth, the prospects for deflationary and minimalist approaches to the theory of knowledge are investigated. While it is argued that deflationary approaches are ultimately unsatisfactory, a minimalist approach to epistemology, which characterises the concept of knowledge by a set of platitudes about knowledge, is defended. The first version of a minimalist framework for the theory of knowledge is developed. Two more substantive developments of the minimalist framework are discussed. In the first development a safety condition on knowledge is derived from the minimalist framework. Problems for this development are discussed and solved. In the second development, an ability condition is derived from the minimalist framework. Reason is provided to believe that, arguably, the ability condition can avoid the problems that beset traditional analyses of knowledge. It is also shown that even if this argument fails, minimalist approaches to epistemology may serve to provide a functional definition of knowledge. Reason is thus provided to believe that minimalist approaches to epistemology can make progress towards addressing the problem of the analysis of knowledge.
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Pirzada, Ahmed. "The Epistemology of Ahmadou Bamba". Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.288417.
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Sheppard, Christine. "Course design and student epistemology". Thesis, University of Surrey, 1990. http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/603/.
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Hulse, I. "Linguistic realism in mathematical epistemology". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2008. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1444275/.
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One project in the epistemology of mathematics is to find a defensible account of what passes for mathematical knowledge. This study contributes to this project by examining philosophical theories of mathematics governed by certain basic assumptions. Foremost amongst these is the "linguistic realism" of the title. Roughly put, this is the view that the semantics of mathematical sentences should be taken at face value. Two approaches to mathematics are considered, realist and fictionalist. Mathematical realism affirms the existence of mathematical objects, taking much of what passes for mathematical knowledge as knowledge of such things. It faces the challenge of explaining how such knowledge is possible. The main strategies here are to appeal to the faculty of reason, to a faculty of intuition or to the faculty of sense perception. Recent examples of each strategy are considered and it is argued that the prospects for a satisfactory mathematical realism are limited. Mathematical fictionalism does not affirm the existence of mathematical objects, claiming that mathematics is, or should be considered to be, a form of pretence. It faces the challenge of explaining how a form of pretence can discharge the roles mathematics has in empirical applications. Strategies here are to argue that mathematics is an eliminable convenience or, acknowledging that this may not be the case, that the roles played by mathematics in empirical applications are played in similar contexts by acknowledged forms of pretence. It is argued that the first strategy is not promising but that there is a version of the second that can be defended against objections. In closing, consequences of the conclusions reached are explored and directions for future research indicated.
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Orton, Jane. "Mathematical reasoning in Plato's Epistemology". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/9791.
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According to Plato, we live in a substitute world. The things we see around us are shadows of reality, imperfect imitations of perfect originals. Beyond the world of the senses, there is another, changeless world, more real and more beautiful than our own. But how can we get at this world, or attain knowledge of it, when our senses are unreliable and the perfect philosophical method remains out of reach? In the Divided Line passage of the Republic, Plato is clear that mathematics has a role to play, but the debate about the exact nature of that role remains unresolved. My reading of the Divided Line might provide the answer. I propose that the ‘mathematical’ passages of the Meno and Phaedo contain evidence that we can use to construct the method by which Plato means us to ascend to knowledge of the Forms. In this dissertation, I shall set out my reading of Plato’s Divided Line, and show how Plato’s use of mathematics in the Meno and Phaedo supports this view. The mathematical method, adapted to philosophy, is a central part of the Line’s ‘way up’ to the definitions of Forms that pure philosophy requires. I shall argue that this method is not, as some scholars think, the geometric method of analysis and synthesis, but apagōgē, or reduction. On this reading, mathematics is pivotal on our journey into the world of the Forms.
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Salvatore, Nicola Claudio. "Wittgensteinian epistemology and Cartesian skepticism". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/9742.
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This work starts from three complementary and interdependent questions: 1) How should we interpret Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategy as presented in On Certainty, and especially the elusive and yet central concept of ‘hinges’? 2) Can Wittgenstein’s strategy, when properly understood and developed, provide a satisfactory response to Cartesian skepticism? 3) Does a Wittgensteinian epistemology license epistemic relativism, and if so to what extent? In Chapter 1, I present Cartesian-style skepticism and its epistemological implications along with the Dretske-Nozick’s ‘relevant alternatives’ theory, based on the rejection of the Closure principle for Knowledge which underlies the skeptical challenge. After a brief discussion of the main concerns raised against this proposal, I argue that this line is untenable and that a successful anti-skeptical proposal has to retain Closure. Having shown the shortcomings of the Dretske-Nozick proposal, I then focus my attention on G. E. Moore’s famous anti-skeptical works, namely “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925, henceforth DCS) and “Proof of an External World”, (1939, henceforth PEW). In these seminal papers, Moore famously argued that it is possible to know several ‘obvious truisms of commonsense’ such as ‘There are external objects’, I have a body’ and so on and that this knowledge can offer a direct response to skeptical worries; the aim of this strategy is then to retain both Closure and our confidence in our everyday knowledge claims. After a detailed presentation of DCS and PEW I will discuss the problems of Moore’s direct response against the skeptic, drawing on the works of distinguished commentators such as Malcolm, Clarke, Stroud and Wright. Roughly, I argue that Moore’s strategy is both unnecessary and unconvincing: unconvincing because Moore’s knowledge-claims cannot refute Cartesian skeptical arguments; unnecessary for they can ‘work’ only within our everyday ‘non-philosophical’ context, thus when no skeptical hypothesis can be sensibly raised. Even if Moore’s anti-skeptical attempts have unanimously been considered unsatisfying, for several reasons his works have nonetheless been extremely influential, to the extent that quite a few contemporary anti-skeptical proposals can be fairly described as ‘Moorean’. In Chapter 2, I present and discuss the dominant ‘Moore-Inspired’ positions, namely Pryor’s Dogmatist Reading of PEW, Neta’s interpretation of the Proof, Greco’s reliabilist account, Fara’s ‘Second Proof’, DeRose’s ‘Moorean contextualism’ and Sosa ‘Neo-Mooreanism’. I criticise these accounts in turn, in order to show that all these strategies inherit the main problems of Moore’s treatment of skepticism and also have unpalatable consequences with regard to the so-called ‘value problem for knowledge’. After having extensively criticised both Moore’s and ‘Neo-Moorean’ epistemologies, in Chapter 3 I focus my attention on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty; given the obscurity and ambiguity of this work, in this chapter I present some of the less contentious aspects of Wittgenstein’s treatment of skepticism and I emphasise the role played by ‘hinges ’ in his anti-skeptical strategy. This will give me the background to assess the different ‘Wittgensteininspired’ anti-skeptical strategies I consider in Chapter 4, namely Conant’s ‘therapeutic’ reading, Wright’s ‘rational entitlement’ account, Williams’ ‘Wittgensteinian contextualism’, McGinn’s ‘framework’ reading and Pritchard’s ‘hinge commitment’ strategy. I argue that these proposals are wanting, both as plausible interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thought and more importantly as viable anti-skeptical strategies. Moreover, I show that McGinn and Williams’ proposals can lead to a form of epistemic relativism, according to which our epistemic practices are the result of pre-rational, social commitments not subject to rational evaluation of any sort; a conclusion which is not more palatable than skepticism itself. Chapter 5 is devoted to presenting Moyal-Sharrock’s ‘non-epistemic’ reading of OC, for which ‘hinges’ such as ‘There are external objects’ or ‘I have a body’ are the expression of a pre-theoretical, animal certainty which she sees as constitutively different from knowledge. While I defend Moyal-Sharrock’s exegesis and her analogy between ‘hinges’ and 'rules of grammar’ as the most plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought, in this chapter I also criticise her ‘non-epistemic’ account; roughly, I argue that following this strategy we will be forced either to reject the Closure principle, thus inheriting the problems of the Dretske-Nozick’s line, or else to endorse skepticism. Moreover, I also consider some of the relativistic implications of Moyal-Sharrock’s account, which make her proposal vulnerable to the same objections I have raised against McGinn’s framework reading and Williams’ Wittgensteinian contextualism. In Chapter 6, I develop my own anti-skeptical proposal, which is informed by the analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’ and their peculiar status. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s reflections on grammatical rules, developed in the socalled second phase of his thought, and especially in his Philosophical Investigations, I argue that ‘hinges’ cannot be object of knowledge but are subject to an altogether different epistemic standing, namely understanding or ‘mastery of techniques’. A promising anti-skeptical implication of this account is that it will help us to dismiss Cartesian-style skepticism as the result of a logical error, based on a misleading way of representing the structure of our epistemic practices, which are not based on propositional beliefs but rather on non-propositional, normative rules. In the rest of Chapter 6, I consider a final problem that a Wittgensteinian epistemology so construed has to face in order to be considered a fully viable antiskeptical position; that is, whether Wittgenstein’s account of ‘hinges’ would lead to epistemic relativism of a kind that is generated by the proposals put forward by Williams, McGinn and Moyal-Sharrock. Chapter 7 is devoted to addressing this question in detail. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s views on mathematics, metrology and religious beliefs, I aim to show that his remarks on ‘hinges’ will help us to dissolve epistemic relativism rather than licensing it. This is so because following Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of reason the disagreement between epistemic communities committed to different ‘hinges’ (for instance a community which believes in oracles rather than in science) is either solvable, as different epistemic practices can be compared and assessed if they have similar aims, or is a pseudo-disagreement which stems from a misguided comparison between different practices.
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Doyle, Tsarina. "Nietzsche on epistemology and metaphysics". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2002. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/73124/.
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This thesis examines Nietzsche's philosophy as a response to Kant. I show that Kant, as interpreted by Nietzsche, dissociates epistemology and metaphysics. According to Nietzsche, the consequence of this dissociation is the collapse of Kant's transcendental epistemology into a sceptical idealism, which disables the making of positive metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. I argue that Nietzsche overcomes the dissociation of epistemology and metaphysics by rejecting Kant's distinction between constitutive, empirical knowledge and regulative, metaphysical belief. Furthermore, I show that Nietzsche rejects, what he considers to be, Kant's formalistic constitutive epistemology in favour of a regulative and interest-directed account of knowledge. I argue that Nietzsche adopts an internal realist epistemology that stipulates that our epistemic claims must be justified from within our perspectival practices of justification but that such claims must be subject to a realist constraint. Moreover, I propose that Nietzsche is justified, from within these epistemic parameters, in putting forward metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. The thesis is structured in four chapters. Chapter one examines Nietzsche's appropriation of Kant. Chapter two takes up the issue of Nietzsche's perspectivism in the context of his concerns with the issues of justification and truth. The penultimate chapter examines the emergence of Nietzsche's internal realism in his early writings. Finally, chapter four examines Nietzsche's will to power thesis where I contend that the metaphysics of the will to power is both facilitated by and compatible with his perspectivism.
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Cowie, Christopher Douglas. "Reasons in ethics and epistemology". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2014. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.648688.
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Ho, Tsung-Hsing. "Epistemic value and virtue epistemology". Thesis, University of Southampton, 2015. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/383455/.
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My contributions to the research on epistemic value can be divided into two parts: first, I pinpoint some causes of the problems about epistemic value which have not previously been identified; and, second, I offer novel accounts of epistemic value which offer better solutions to the problems about epistemic value. First, there are two trends in the literature on epistemic value that are rarely challenged: (i) epistemologists tend to understand epistemic value in terms of intrinsic value from the epistemic point of view, and (ii) the discussion of epistemic value tends to focus only on the values of properties of belief. I argue that both trends should be rejected if we want to solve several persistent problems about epistemic value: the value problems about knowledge, the teleological account of epistemic normativity, and the triviality objection that some true beliefs (or knowledge) are too trivial to be epistemic goals. My account of epistemic value is in terms of goodness of epistemic kinds, which rejects (i). An epistemic kind is an evaluative kind—a kind that determines its own evaluative standards—whose evaluative standards are truth-directed: e.g. a belief is good qua belief if true. I argue that my account is immune from the triviality objection. Moreover, since the goodness of an epistemic kind is finally valuable, the account gives us simple solutions to the value problems of knowledge. I develop my own solutions through critically appropriating the virtue-theoretic account, according to which epistemic evaluation is a kind of performance evaluation, which rejects (ii). I argue that the value of knowledge consists of the value of epistemic success (true belief) and epistemic competence. Finally, I argue that approaches that focus on the evaluation of belief cannot explain epistemic normativity. Instead, we need an approach that focuses on the evaluation of person, which rejects (ii). I argue that conforming to epistemic norms is part of what makes us good qua person. The goodness of person qua person is an intrinsic value and able to provide pro tanto reasons for a person to be epistemically good qua person, which is the ground of epistemic normativity. Overall, there are two main differences between my account and the mainstream account: first, the purpose of epistemic evaluation is about good cognitive performances rather than good beliefs; and, second, what grounds epistemic normativity is the goodness of a person qua person rather than the goodness (or correctness) of belief qua belief. The upshot of my account is that the focus of epistemology should be on questions such as ‘What is an epistemically good person?’ and ‘What makes a person epistemically good qua person?’ Furthermore, my account shows that epistemic normativity is not distinct from ethical normativity. That is, the question ‘What is an epistemically good person?’ is part of the question ‘What is a good person?’ and a reason why we should be an epistemically good person is consequently a reason why we should be a good person.
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Molinaro, Matthew P. "Queer Time, Epistemology, and Psychology". Miami University Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=muhonors1303413630.
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Faramarzi, Danyal. "Nietzsche's epistemology : a Kantian reading". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2015. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/77153/.
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The aim of this thesis is to locate Nietzsche’s thoughts on epistemology within the Kantian tradition of Transcendental Idealism. Through a critical involvement with both Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Representation, the Study will draw attention to the level of Nietzsche’s involvement with key issues in Kantian epistemology. In doing so it will put forward a reading of Nietzsche’s early ‘error theory’, Which rejects the idea that Nietzsche endorses a metaphysical correspondence theory of truth. It will instead be argued that in the early error theory Nietzsche is critiquing the discursivity of our understanding. The study will finish with a consideration of Nietzsche’s attempted rejection of the concept of the thing-in-itself through an epistemology of perspectivism. It will be argued that this rejection, much like Schopenhauer’s rejection of Kant’s inference to the thing-in-itself, ultimately fails and that Nietzsche’s perspectivism itself presupposes the ability to refer to, and make use of, the concept of reality in itself.
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Mishra, Haramohan. "A study in Advaita epistemology /". Delhi : Parimal publ, 1990. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb358496212.
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Danks, David. "The epistemology of causal judgment /". Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3041399.
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Anderson, Gemma. "Drawing as epistemology for morphology". Thesis, University of the Arts London, 2016. http://ualresearchonline.arts.ac.uk/9204/.
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This thesis presents drawing as epistemology for morphology through the development and dissemination of drawing practices that extend understanding of, and engagement with, the diversity of natural form. The interpretation of the term ‘morphology’ is based on Goethe’s original concept (1792) of morphology as the ‘study of form and formative process’. This research is situated in the context of the emerging fields of ‘Drawing Research’, ‘Art/Science’ and the cross-disciplinary domain where contemporary art practice and education intersect (the ‘educational turn’). Led by drawing practice, the methodology encompasses a set of experimental approaches including interdisciplinary collaboration, museum collection study, workshop design, and exhibition making. This mixed method approach is conducted within the context of scientific institutions like the Natural History Museum and Imperial College, London to address two research questions. The first asks what contribution an artist can make, especially through drawing in collaboration with scientific practices and instrumentation, on representations and forms of analysis and interpretation that could lead to new understandings of morphology (animal, mineral, vegetable) for both artists and scientists? The second asks what shared morphological characteristics (form and symmetry) of animal, mineral and vegetable species can be identified and represented through the process and object of drawing and whether this research can develop an extra-scientific model of classification that is complementary to the scientific approach? This enquiry has contributed to the development of two interlinked bodies of artistic research (and two new terms and practices) ‘Isomorphology’: the observational study of the shared forms and symmetries of animal, mineral and vegetable species, and ‘Isomorphogenesis’: the systematic representation of dynamic form through drawing. These practices have been shared with artists, natural scientists, students and the general public through participatory workshops, conferences, publications and exhibitions. Early chapters provide examples of drawing as a ‘way of knowing morphology’ in the context of contemporary natural science and mathematics (empirical and conceptual), which are followed by a narrative of the development of ‘drawing as a way of knowing’ in my own artistic practice through the Isomorphology study. The later chapters then discuss the evolution of the Isomorphology concept and practice, as a shift from observation to abstraction first in the ‘Goethe method’ and later in the conceptual study of the dynamic nature of form ‘Isomorphogenesis’ (adding the 4th dimension of time). These chapters build a narrative, towards drawing as epistemology for a dynamic, processoriented morphology. This developmental series of empirical and conceptual drawing practice and theory brings my work with natural science (empirical) and mathematics (conceptual) together. The final chapter documents how this research is then shared as an experimental educational model through the Cornwall Morphology and Drawing Centre project.
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Fallis, Don. "Toward an Epistemology of Wikipedia". Wiley Periodicals, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/105728.
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Wikipedia (the â free online encyclopedia that anyone can editâ ) is having a huge impact on how a great many people gather information about the world. So, it is important for epistemologists and information scientists to ask whether or not people are likely to acquire knowledge as a result of having access to this information source. In other words, is Wikipedia having good epistemic consequences? After surveying the various concerns that have been raised about the reliability of Wikipedia, this paper argues that the epistemic consequences of people using Wikipedia as a source of information are likely to be quite good. According to several empirical studies, the reliability of Wikipedia compares favorably to the reliability of traditional encyclopedias. Furthermore, the reliability of Wikipedia compares even more favorably to the reliability of those information sources that people would be likely to use if Wikipedia did not exist (viz., websites that are as freely and easily accessible as Wikipedia). In addition, Wikipedia has a number of other epistemic virtues (e.g., power, speed, and fecundity) that arguably outweigh any deficiency in terms of reliability. Even so, epistemologists and information scientists should certainly be trying to identify changes (or alternatives) to Wikipedia that will bring about even better epistemic consequences. This paper suggests that, in order to improve Wikipedia, we need to clarify what our epistemic values are and we need a better understanding of why Wikipedia works as well as it does.
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Cruz, Joseph Lewis Hernandez. "Epistemology in the scientific image". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/289194.
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The leading versions of epistemic naturalism have attempted to make normative accounts of justification and knowledge in part dependent upon scientific psychology. Call this doctrine psychologistic naturalism. Psychologistic naturalism, it is thought, holds the promise of integrating normative questions about the relation between evidence and belief with a physicalist, causal conception of our mental life. In Part One of this essay I argue that psychologistic naturalism fails. My reasons for claiming this differ significantly from those advanced in the contemporary literature by epistemic non-naturalists, however. Non-naturalists have mistakenly accepted the terms of debate set by psychologistic naturalists, and thus they have argued that the empirical results of the science of the mind--as part of a merely descriptive causal account of natural systems--have no important place in epistemology. But psychologistic naturalism does not fail because psychology is causal and descriptive, as the non-naturalist alleges. It fails, instead, because psychology is not wholly or even primarily causal and descriptive. Psychology requires a robust normative account of rational inference in order to offer explanations within a cognitivist framework. The inadequacy of psychologistic naturalism may seem to invite a return to epistemology as first philosophy, where the primary methodology deploys a priori intuitions about cases. In Part Two, I argue that this is not the best response to the instability of psychologistic naturalism. If psychological explanations express an embedded normative component, then the non-naturalist's objections to a liaison between epistemology and psychology are misguided. I pursue an epistemology in the scientific image, where psychological explanations encode a normative epistemic component and where the states of natural cognizers are characterized at a finer resolution than beliefs. Psychological explanation involves an evaluation of the inferential cogency of each step in a cognitive process, and I replace the traditional methodology of epistemology with this more subtle and nuanced version of epistemic appraisal.
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Gilman, Todd Nathaniel. "Communicative Action as Feminist Epistemology". PDXScholar, 1995. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/4906.
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This thesis proposes that feminist social and political theory adopt the epistemology inherent in Jurgen Habermas's communicative ethics in order to more coherently work toward the goal of freeing individuals from social oppression. This thesis first examines the fundamental differences that exist between the particular claims for knowledge made by the three major schools of feminist theory; the empirical feminists, the standpoint feminists, and those allied with postmodernism. After illuminating the specifics of these feminist claims, the conception of knowledge central to Habermas's thought is explored and shown to be split into three distinct realms; the objective, the social, and the subjective. It is shown that the three realms of Habermas's knowledge account for the underlying claims of the differing groups of feminist theory, and provide a basis for reconciling the differences between them. Habermas's objective realm of knowledge corresponds to the concerns of empirically oriented feminists. A need for an accurate description of the events and conditions of the actual world is shared by both, as is a trust in the human potential for grasping these objects and events accurately. Standpoint feminism's concern for interpersonal relations, accounting for the context of an individual's or group's existence, is reflected in the type of knowledge that Habermas considers social in nature. Habermas's conception of our capacity for social knowledge, which guides our actions with other human beings, is shown to be dependent upon both social existence and communication. Finally, Habermas acknowledges the human potential for critical knowledge to explain the individual's ability to differentiate herself from the group, a task which a postmodern feminism demands to avoid essentializing any aspect of women. If feminist theory is able to move beyond the entrenched differences that it now finds itself locked within, perhaps then it will be able to continue with the project shared with Habermas, that of providing a meaningful emancipation for human beings.
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Godber, Amelia. "Towards an epistemology of propaganda". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris, EHESS, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024EHES0028.
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La plupart d'entre nous avons une compréhension notionnelle de ce qu'est la propagande, mais c'est un concept contesté. Il n'y a pas de consensus sur son étendue - l'ensemble des choses auxquelles le terme s'applique - donc il y a un problème de démarcation : qu'est-ce que la propagande et qu'est-ce qui ne l'est pas ? Ce projet tente de répondre à la question en se concentrant sur le rôle de la propagande dans la formation des croyances politiques. Je propose une interprétation épistémologique de la propagande qui clarifie le concept comme étant central dans le discours public, et qui repose sur une combinaison de moyens persuasifs qui n'impliquent pas suffisamment les capacités délibératives de son audience. J'articule une typologie de stratégies rhétoriques qui inclut la persuasion non rationnelle, irrationnelle et rationnelle manipulatrice, et je propose que la propagande implique une combinaison de moyens persuasifs non rationnels et soit irrationnels soit rationnels manipulateurs. Comme ces moyens subvertissent les processus rationnels, je soutiens que le phénomène est mieux compris comme une pratique illégitime et que, étant donné sa nature essentiellement trompeuse, il va nécessairement à l'encontre des intérêts épistémiques de son audience. Le concept vise à décrire un ensemble de tactiques politiques connues qui sont conformes à l'utilisation existante du terme, et à expliquer ce qui les rend efficaces. Le concept a des applications pratiques et théoriques qui contribuent à faire progresser la réflexion actuelle sur la propagande et des phénomènes connexes. En termes d’application pratique, le concept peut être opérationnalisé comme un outil qui détecte la propagande dans le discours public à grande échelle et en temps réel en utilisant la technologie de l'intelligence artificielle des grands modèles de langage. En termes d’applications théoriques, à partir du cadre du projet émerge une taxonomie des diverses contributions au discours public : il aide à circonscrire un concept de la contrepartie légitime de la propagande - le type de persuasion politique qui est le fondement d'une démocratie saine - et cela aide à mieux appréhender les concepts adjacents de fake news et de théories du complot, que je suggère être des variétés de la propagande. Une compréhension approfondie du fonctionnement de ces tactiques et de la nature de la menace qu'elles représentent nous dote des outils nécessaires pour les désamorcer et les affronter de manière plus efficaceMost of us have a notional understanding of what propaganda is, but it is a contested concept. There is no consensus on its extension — the set of things to which the term applies — so it has a demarcation problem: what is propaganda and what is not? This project attempts to answer the question by focusing on propaganda’s role in generating beliefs about politics. I put forward an epistemological interpretation of propaganda that clarifies the concept as one that is central to public discourse, and which turns on a combination of persuasive means that insufficiently engage respondents’ deliberative capacities. I articulate a typology of rhetorical strategies that includes non-rational, irrational and rational manipulative persuasion, and suggest that propaganda involves a combination of non-rational and either irrational or rational manipulative persuasive means. As these means subvert rational processes, I claim that the phenomenon is best understood as an illegitimate practice and that given its essentially deceptive nature, it necessarily runs counter to respondents’ epistemic interests. The concept aims to describe a set of familiar political tactics that agree with existing usage of the term, and explain what makes them effective. It has practical and theoretical applications that contribute to advancing current thinking about propaganda and related phenomena. In terms of the former, the concept can be operationalised as a tool that detects propaganda in public discourse at scale and in real time by harnessing large language model artificial intelligence technology. In terms of the latter, from the project’s theoretical framework emerges a taxonomy of various contributions to public discourse: it helps circumscribe a concept of propaganda’s legitimate counterpart, the type of political persuasion that is the bedrock of a healthy democracy, and it helps come to grips with adjacent concepts of fake news and conspiracy theories, which I suggest are varieties of propaganda. With a clear understanding of how these tactics work and the nature of the threat they pose, we are better equipped to disarm and defy them
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Arruda, Antonio Carlos Jesus Zanni de [UNESP]. "Inteligência e ensino de ciências: um estudo fundamentado na epistemologia genética de Piaget". Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/102018.
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Esta pesquisa possui como objetivo discutir a Noção de Inteligência na Epistemologia Genética de Piaget e possíveis implicações para o Ensino de Ciências que busca a construção de sujeitos autônomos e conscientes de sua importância histórica, isto é, de uma educação que não seja mera transmissão de conteúdos. Segundo Piaget as teorias clássicas que versam sobre a inteligência, não levam em conta que esta noção possui uma gênese. A inteligência nasce do esquematismo das ações e caracteriza-se como ação que coordena meios e fins (desde as ações sensório-motoras). Neste sentido, a inteligência expressa o aspecto dinâmico da construção da razão no sujeito, que possibilita o conhecimento
The purpose of this study is to discuss the Intelligence Notion of Piaget's Genetic Epistemology and possible implications to the Science Education, which searches for the building of independent subjects and it is aware of its historical significance, i.e., an education that is not just transmitting content. According to Piaget, the classic theories about intelligence do not considerer that this notion has genesis. Intelligent comes from the schematism of the actions and it is characterized as an action that coordinates centers and ends (since the motor sensory actions). In this way, the intelligent shows the dinamic aspect of the bulding of the reason on the subject, which enables the knowledge
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Awade, Marcelo. "Pluralismo epistemológico e sincretismo cultural: uma resposta às controvérsias da ecologia teórica". Universidade de São Paulo, 2016. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/41/41134/tde-19072016-154651/.
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Tradições acadêmicas no ensino da ecologia, assim como livros-texto convencionais redigidos de forma enciclopédica muitas vezes mascaram uma história de grandes controvérsias que existe por trás dos fundamentos teóricos desta disciplina. Muitos ecólogos são formados sem se darem conta dos diversos debates conflituosos que certamente circundam o corpo teórico de seus programas de pesquisa. Contudo, basta um aprofundamento mínimo na literatura para que se perceba a grande confusão que se transformou a formalização teórica da ecologia. Com suas raízes na história natural do século XIX e com uma ênfase empiricista, a ecologia passou por uma fase de formalização teórica calcada em uma episteme dedutivo-nomológica e na modelagem matemática de sistemas dinâmicos no começo do século XX. Este enfoque no aspecto conjectural da ecologia se consolidou na década de 1960 e muitos pesquisadores passaram a alegar que este seria o método ideal para a formalização de teorias sólidas e gerais. Entretanto, na década seguinte se inicia um contra-movimento, que criticou duramente esta escola alinhada ao pensamento dos físicos, culminando em debates que resultaram em posturas de radicalismo extremo em relação a qual é o objeto de estudo da ecologia e como o ecólogo deve proceder em sua atividade. Neste momento, passa a ser crucial que o cientista se volte à filosofia e à história das ciências para entender mais profundamente as origens e os motivos dessas confusões. Este conhecimento se faz necessário para que o ecólogo possa se posicionar criticamente dentro destas controvérsias e assim (re)definir seu próprio programa de pesquisa com mais coerência. Contudo, é preciso estar preparado para uma jornada psicologicamente intensa. Para muitos, esta empreitada histórico-filosófica gera um sentimento de frustração (no mínimo um grande desconforto intelectual) ao perceberem que a epistemologia não provê uma resposta simples e consensual para perguntas muito básicas como: o que é um conhecimento cientificamente válido? Quais são os fundamentos da teoria ecológica? A falta de treinamento em epistemologia associado à uma relutância psicológica em se envolver na área, mantiveram grande parte dos ecólogos afastada do debate filosófico, fazendo com que alguns equívocos sobre a ciência ecológica se propagassem por gerações. Assim, disputas intermináveis se sucederam na literatura dividindo os ecólogos ao invés de unir-los. Criou-se uma sensação geral de que há uma dicotomia entre teoria e empiria (também vista na forma de uma dicotomia conjectura-inferência), o que me parece um problema grave pois essa divisão é ilusória; a ciência é uma fusão desses dois componentes. Esta percepção dicotômica se estende a outros temas epistemológicos muito relevantes (\\textit{e.g.} indução ou dedução, descrição de padrões ou explicação por processos e mecanismos causais, generalidade ou precisão), o que a meu ver é prejudicial para um avanço fluente do conhecimento. Esta tese é uma tentativa de contextualizar historicamente o desenvolvimento do pensamento ecológico e revisar criticamente o debate epistemológico científico, assim como algumas controvérsias heurísticas relacionadas à modelagem de padrões e processos ecológicos, para então prover um argumento favorável ao pluralismo epistemológico na ecologia. Ao final, faço uma síntese das controvérsias epistemológicas, apresentando uma proposta de como conceber um programa de pesquisa em ecologia aberto ao pluralismo epistemológico. Para isso, valerei-me da noção de caixa preta epistemológica e de redes complexas de conhecimento tanto para mostrar que o pluralismo epistemológico pode ser visto como uma questão cultural intrínseca da ciência, como também para sugerir que uma postura colaborativa em detrimento de uma competitiva (conflituosa) é muito mais intuitiva e coerente para um ecólogo do século XXI. Acredito que uma predisposição ao sincretismo cultural em detrimento de um etnocentrismo “irracional” tem grande potencial de catalisar o avanço atravancado e controverso da ciência ecológicaAcademic traditions in teaching ecology, as well as conventional encyclopedical textbooks often mask a history of great controversies behind the theoretical bases of this discipline. Many ecologists are trained without realizing the many conflicting debates that surround the theoretical body of the research programs they are inserted in. However, a simple deepening in the literature is enough to sense the confusion that theoretical formalization of ecology has become. With its roots in 19th century natural sciences and with empiricist emphasis, ecology went through a phase of theoretical formalization based on a deductive-nomological epistemology and in mathematical modeling of dynamic systems in the beginning of 20th century. This focus on the conjectural aspect of ecology consolidated in the 60\'s and many researchers claimed this would be the ideal method to formalize solid and general theories. Yet in the following decade a counter-movement began, strongly criticizing this school of thought aligned with physicists, culminating in debates that resulted in extreme radicalism regarding the definition of ecology\'s study subject and how the ecologist should proceed in his activity. At this point it becomes crucial to the scientist to face philosophy and the history of sciences to further understand the origins and reasons for these confusions. This knowledge enables the ecologist to critically position oneself within these controversies and thus (re)define his own research program coherently. One should be prepared however, for an intense psychological journey. For many this historical-philosophical quest brings a sense of frustration (a great intellectual discomfort at least) since the epistemology does not provide a simple and consensual answer to basic questions such as: what is a valid scientific knowledge? What are the bases of ecological theory? This way, the lack of training in epistemology associated with psychological reluctance to get involved in this area, have kept most ecologists away from the philosophical debate, allowing some mistakes and misconceptions about the ecological sciences to propagate for generations. Thus, endless disputes in the literature divided ecologists instead of uniting them. A general sense was created that there is a dichotomy between theory and empiricism (also seen as a dichotomy between conjecture-inference), which seems to me as a serious problem given this division is illusory; science is the fusion of these two components. This dichotomous perception extends to other very important epistemological themes (e.g. induction or deduction, pattern description or explanation through causal processes and mechanisms, generality or precision), what hampers the advancement of ecological knowledge. This thesis is an attempt to contextualize historically the development of ecological thought and critically review the scientific epistemological debate, as well as some heuristic controversies related to modeling of ecological patterns and processes, to provide a favorable argument towards an epistemological pluralism in ecology. Finally, I synthesize the epistemological controversies, proposing how to conceive a research program in ecology opened to epistemological pluralism. For such I\'ll make use of the notion of an epistemological black box and of complex knowledge networks, both to show that epistemological pluralism can be seen as a cultural matter intrinsic to science, and also to suggest that a collaborative attitude instead of a competitive (conflicting) is much more intuitive and coherent with the 21st century ecologist. I believe that a predisposition to cultural syncretism in place of an “irrational” ethnocentrism has great potential to catalyze the advancement of the hampered and controversial science of ecology
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Beer, Paulo Antonio de Campos. "Questões e tensões entre psicanálise e ciência: considerações sobre validação". Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/47/47134/tde-04042016-122531/.
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Essa dissertação tem como objetivo estabelecer uma articulação atual entre psicanálise e ciência. A partir do reconhecimento de alguns equívocos frequentemente presentes no modo como este debate é desenvolvido, primeiramente é realizado um exame da maneira como o psicanalista Jacques Lacan trata essa questão, indicando que se deve evitar dois erros comuns: a ideia de que a ciência rejeita o sujeito e a confusão entre ciência e discurso da ciência. Esses equívocos parecem ser consequências ou de leituras pouco rigorosas do texto lacaniano, ou de uma concepção de ciência desatualizada. Em sequência, são examinados alguns avanços no campo da filosofia da ciência, assim como críticas ao pensamento psicanalítico daí originadas, a partir de autores como Kuhn, Feyerabend, Granger e Grünbaum. Reconhece-se a questão da validação extraclínica enquanto ponto comum de ataques, indicando-se a importância da validação na possibilidade de circulação do conhecimento produzido para além de seu lugar de origem. Frente a isso, alguns estudos de validação experimental são analisados, concluindo-se que existe uma articulação possível entre psicanálise e ciências experimentais, sem prejuízos para a clínica ou a ética psicanalítica. Esse tipo de articulação é extremamente importante para uma participação política mais efetiva por parte da psicanálise, além de trazer interessantes contribuições o debate epistemológicoThis dissertation has as goal to establish an articulation between psychoanalysis and science that takes into consideration the state of the art of the debate. Departing from the acknowledgment of some frequently present misconceptions of the way this debate is developed, initially an analysis of the way the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan treats the issue is done, indicating how one should avert two common mistakes: the idea that Science rejects the subject and the blurring of what is science and what is the discourse of science. These misconceptions seem to be consequences of either the lack of an accurate reading of the lacanian text or an outdated conception of Science.. After that, some advances on the philosophical field - as well as critics to the psychoanalytical thought originated from there - are analysed with the support of authors like Kuhn, Feyerabend, Granger e Grünbaum. The issue of extra-clinical validation as a common point for attacks is acknowledged as well as the importance of validation in the possibility of circulation of the knowledge that is produced beyond its origin place. Taking that into account, some experimental studies on validation are analysed with the perspective that an articulation between psychoanalysis and experimental sciences is possible without any harm to the clinic or the ethics of psychoanalysis. This kind of articulation is extremely important for a more effective political participation of psychoanalysis, and for contributing in an interesting way for the epistemological debate
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Ely, Deise Fabiana. "Teoria e método da climatologia geográfica brasileira : uma abordagem sobre seus discursos e práticas /". Presidente Prudente : [s.n.], 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/105091.
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Orientador: João Lima Sant'Anna NetoBanca: João Osvaldo Rodrigues Nunes
Banca: Margarete Cristiane de Costa Trindade Amorim
Resumo: O presente trabalho constitui um mapeamento e análise sobre os discursos e práticas empreendidos pela climatologia geográfica brasileira. O principal propósito para o seu desenvolvimento foi a verificação de como o conhecimento geográfico do clima encontra-se vinculado aos debates efetivados pelas diversas correntes filosóficas de pensamento e às diferentes concepções de natureza e de geografia. A verificação do processo de inserção e constituição dessa especialidade científica no Brasil demonstrou a existência de duas vertentes metodológicas principais: uma baseada em decomposições analítico-descritivas do fenômeno climático e outra subsidiada nas explicações da meteorologia dinâmica. O estudo geográfico do clima, a partir desse universo de análise, é desenvolvido a partir de cinco recortes temáticos principais: clima urbano, variabilidade pluvial, o clima na análise ambiental e da paisagem, modelagem estatística em climatologia e teoria e método da climatologia; pautados na concepção de natureza dinâmica-sistêmica. Foi verificado que as questões epistemológicas da Geografia não são refletidas enfaticamente pela climatologia geográfica brasileira, tornando a apreensão da espacialidade do clima na composição das novas territorialidades uma tarefa difícil de ser realizada.
Abstract: The main purpose of this following thesis is to verify how the geographic knowledge of the climate relates to debates about diverse philosophical trends and the different conceptions of nature and geography, by mapping out and analyzing discourses and practices within the scope of the Brazilian geographic climatology. The climate geographic study, in this universe of analysis, is developed from five main themes: urban climate, pluvial variability, the climate in the environment and setting analysis, statistical modeling in climatology and climatology theory and method; all of them based on the conception of the dynamic-systemic nature. It was verified that epistemological problems in Geography are not emphatically concerned by Brazilian geographic climatology, what can make the understanding of the climate spatiality in the composition of new territorialities a difficult task.
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