Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Economic relations with Germany”

AbstractThis chapter presents and analyses various official statements, 2021 election programmes and party manifestos, media reports as well as public hearings with regard to the changing view of China in the German public discourse. While the importance of economic interests is still the overarching topic in German-Chinese relations (China has been Germany`s most important trading partner since 2015), there has been a shift towards a more critical stance with regard to human rights issues in recent years. Germany was also the driving force behind the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China, which the EU signed in December 2020 under Germany’s presidency of the EU Council but so far never ratified.After the formation of a new SPD led government under chancellor Olaf Scholz, the two smaller coalition partners, the Alliance 90/The Greens, and the FDP, are said to have a much more critical view of China’s human rights issues. In particular, the new German foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock has publicly vowed to change Germany’s China policy. While Germany has remained within the hedging zone a shift from “economic pragmatism” to “soft balancing” can be observed, most noticeably in political terms: in particular, the new foreign minister Annalena Baerbock stresses the necessity for a closer cooperation both with the United States, but also a common policy of the EU towards China. Thus Germany, and the EU in general, seems to have shifted from “economic pragmatism” to “dominance denial” since the new government came into power, and the war in Ukraine has led to an even closer alliance of Germany, with the EU and the United States.

The present study investigated relations among maternal warmth, children’s self-regulation (i.e., behavior and emotion regulation), and prosocial behavior. The assumed relations were studied in Germany and Chile, two socialization contexts differing in socio-economic and cultural factors. The sample consisted of 76 German and 167 Chilean fourth graders, their mothers, and teachers. Maternal warmth was rated by mothers with the Parenting Practice Questionnaire (PPQ). Children reported the use of emotion regulation strategies on the Questionnaire for the Measurement of Stress and Coping in Children and Adolescents (SSKJ 3-8). Mothers’ and teachers’ ratings on the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) were used to measure children’s behavior regulation and prosocial behavior. Regression analyses revealed positive relations of maternal warmth to children’s problem-oriented emotion regulation and of behavior regulation to prosocial behavior in Germany and in Chile. Moreover, mediation analyses revealed indirect positive effects of self-regulation on the relations between maternal warmth and prosocial behavior. These indirect effects occurred for different aspects of self-regulation in Germany (i.e., behavior regulation) and in Chile (i.e., problem-oriented emotion regulation). Results are discussed from a cultural informed developmental perspective.

Over the recent decades, the changes in the paradigm of international trade have been observed. As the result of decreasing of trade barriers as well as the reduction in trade costs allowed companies to divide their production into stages and to locate it in different countries according to their competitive advantage. Eventually, the production process has become more fragmented, both geographically and vertically. It means that intermediate products are shipped across boarders many times and every exporting economy provides some value added according to its competitive advantage. As a result, global value chains have become one of the most important feature of international trade. Following (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011), in this study global value chains are defined as “the full range of activities that firms and workers do to bring a product from its conception to its end use”. Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) pointed out four types of upgrading in global value chains: product, process, functional and chain. Product and process upgrading involve companies retaining their positions in global value chains by enhancing productivity gains through adopting new product processes or “new configurations of product mix”. Thus, functional upgrading involves a slicing up the global value chains into new activity which generates higher value added, e.g. own brand manufacturing. In turn, chain upgrading involves a going up to new activity, which needs higher skills and capital and value added. Milberg and Winkler (2013) offered similar classifications of upgrading. Production fragmentation has caused a rapid increase in trade in intermediate goods as often companies offshore an intermediate stage of production process. Offshoring production has been typical to manufacturing (Timmer, et al., 2012), however, services have been often overlooked, but play a major role, especially in supporting global value chains (Kommerskollegium 2013). In turn, Digital Silk Road, announced in 2015, has become a significant part of Chinese Belt and Road Initiative strategy. China has implemented this strategy as a part of its long-term technological plan, under which China provides support to its exporters, including many well-known technology companies and builds a network of cooperation with selected countries in the field of technology, including ICT infrastructure, services, 5G networks, e-commerce, etc. China's rapid technological changes must not go unnoticed by trading partners, including analysed European countries, which, to maintain international competitiveness, are increasing the technological advancement and enhancing market protection against Chinese technology. Until recently, the value added from China to European countries was concentrated mainly on medium technology industries and value added from Europe to China focused more on advanced goods and services. Nowadays, there is a redirection of Chinese value added to high-tech activities (including service activities), which reflects China's ambition to build an economy that leads to innovation and industry 4.0. The transition of the CEE states’ economic and political systems initiated in the early 1990s, earned them the EU membership in 2004. The accession to the EU’s structures meant that these countries achieved the free-market economy status and they should be treated as the full member of the global business networks. Moreover, the decline in trade costs (transport and transaction), greater openness of their market and the removal of trade barriers have all helped the CEE states to join global value chains. Hence, the CEE economies are going to be more heavily involved in global production linkages. Many empirical studies have presented the close and dynamic integration of these countries with the EU market (especially the EU-15) and in a more limited scope with the whole global economy as well (Behar and Freund 2011). Generally, democratisation, the strengthening of political and economic relations (particularly with the EU), and the modernisation of many sectors (including financial sector, more advanced industries), were common elements of the CEE countries long-term development policies. One of their priorities was the redirection of foreign trade towards the EU and joining the global production linkages where China has become the core producer. Recently, the role of the economy in global value chains is more determined by the advancement of value added that it offers. Companies move toward services and innovations in the business model (Nenenen & Storbacka, 2010) and introduce industry 4.0 (Bundesministerium fur Bildung und Forschung, 2016). A symptom of these novelty is a concept of servicification of manufacturing (Neely et al. 2011) and cross-sectoral connections, which have reconstructed traditional global value chains (Naude et al. 2019) and, together with Industry 4.0, is expected to change the landscape of global manufacturing. As a result of facilitation of manufacturing, economies placed in the downstream market can improve their role in global value chains. In Europe, this can be an opportunity for most Central and Eastern European countries. Analyzing changes in CEE’s role in technological global value chains, we should take into account its two most important value-added suppliers: China and Germany, as well as their most important value-added buyer - Germany. These three economies established a sort of value added flows triangle. The regional supply chains built by Germany in the CEE allowed it to maintain a comparative advantage in sectors important for the economy, while helping the CEE countries join global value chains, positively influencing economic growth, but also reducing them to entities operating in less advanced stages of production (Jacoby, 2010; Fortwengel, 2011). Today, Germany also cooperates strongly with China (as a result of Digital Silk Road), and the CEE economies (especially the Visegrad Group) are increasingly dependent on Chinese value added, still linked to German value added. The most visible connections can be found in automotive and electronics. Hence, the question is: how strong are these links in servicification of manufacturing and whether there are visible trends in value-added flows in between this triangle in the era of industry 4.0 and Chinese Digital Silk Road. The research question seems to be relevant, thus in the subject literature, little is known about the mentioned relations (Roland Berger, 2021). The research method based on the analysis of data from the OECD Trade in Value Added databases, containing the world input-output tables for the period 2005–2018. The system of balance equations in the input-output model for one economy has been adopted to a multi-economy model. The model is described in more detail in (Koopman et al. 2013 or Hummels et al, 2001) and is based on the decomposition of gross exports. The method includes not only estimates of total value added in global value chains, but also calculations at both the mezoeconomic level and cross-sectoral flows of value added (including servicification of manufacturing). The results of analysis showed that most relations between economies continued to deepen the imbalance in flows of value added. The CEE economies are making their manufacturing increasingly dependent on advanced services (both from Germany and China). On the other hand, the share of CEE services to Chinese and German manufacturing is decreasing or remains steady. However, some trends could be observed in the last years, especially between Germany and China. German manufacturing is starting to rely more on Chinese value added (information and communication technologies services and the subgroup computer programming, consultancy and information services activities in manufacturing, information and communication technologies services' value added in transport equipment), although previously Germany provided more of these services to China. In telecommunications in manufacturing between CEE and Germany, the trend has turned against CEE. However, there was no direct compensation between pairs of economies, but the decrease in German value-added flows to China resulted in a much larger increase in value-added from China in German manufacturing. If the presented changes in flows were to reflect the effectiveness of Chinese industry 4.0 and Digital Silk Road. These strategies serve their purposes and increases not only the advancement of Chinese value-added exports, but also makes important economies dependent on this added value. On the contrary, the industry 4.0 strategy in CEE has not improved its position in the triad. Germany has still a strong position as a provider of value added, but its dependence on foreign value added is high, which derives from the links with CEE.

Представляется проблема взаимодействия экономических субъектов, часто находящихся в подчинении у конкурирующих политических надсистем. В качестве основных исторических примеров для анализа выделены связи фирм ВПК Германии и Великобритании. The problem of interaction of economic entities, often subordinate to competing political suprasystems, is presented. As the main historical examples for the analysis, the relations of the military-industrial complex firms of Germany and Great Britain are highlighted.

The text focus on a sensitive topic within the EU, the crisis around the operation of the Turów coal mine in Poland. The mine is located in the Turószow Spur on the borders of Czechia and Germany. The whole Three-border Region belongs to the economic periphery or semiperiphery, although the particular states have visible economic differences. The mine's operation violates many ecological norms, and its location brings adverse cross-border environmental effects. Polish authorities insist on the mine operation despite foreign complaints and international criticism. They are pretty successful with their diplomacy mixed with ignorance. Polish officials promote economy and energy; meanwhile, the neighboring states and the EU prefer ecologically sustainable development and fair neighbor relations. As human geographers, the authors use various methods: desk research of economic, geographical, political, and ecological sources connected to the Turów Mine and Tree-border Region, analyzing available statistical data, media analysis, survey, and expert interviews. The main focus is on Czech-Polish affairs, but some overlaps are inevitable. The study reveals differences in priorities between Poland and its neigbors, leading to conflicting narratives. Together with economic and developmental asymmetries, they determine the status quo mostly regardless of the environment and related pressure from the EU, promoting the struggle against climate change.

The European Union (EU) is an economic and political union of 28 European countries. The population is 508 million people, 24 official and working languages апd about 150 regional and minority languages. The origins of the European Union come from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), consisting of six states in 1951 - Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. These countries came together to put an end to the wars that devastated the European continent, and they agreed to share control over the natural resources needed for war (coal and steel). The founding members of ECSC have determined that this European project will not only be developed in order to share resources or to prevent various conflicts in the region. Thus, the Rome Treaty of 1957 created the European Economic Community (EEC), which strengthened the political and economic relations between The six founding states.

This paper deals with the evaluation of the financial performance and financial position of IT companies in the consolidated group. The sub­ject of the investigation is a consolidated group consisting of a parent com­pany domiciled in Germany and its subsidiary in Slovakia. The article aims to point out the mutual relations within the consolidated group through correlation coefficients. The examined relations are in the area of profitabil­ity, indebtedness, liquidity and some macroeconomic indicators. The paper set out two objectives of the research: 1) within the consolidated group, the mutual relations between the parent company and the subsidiary are not significant; 2) within the consolidated group, the mutual relations between the parent company and the subsidiary are significant. Interesting conclu­sions emerged from the comparison of correlation coefficients.

Geographically Mongolia has two neighbors. Mongolia’s existence today depends largely on mutually friendly relationships with two big neighbors. The main pillars of Mongolia’s new international strategy were incorporated in Mongolia’s National Security Concept adopted on June 30, 1994. This document, approved by the Mongolian Parliament, emphasizes a balanced policy towards the country’s two giant neighbors, underlines the importance of economic security in protecting Mongolia’s national integrity, and warns about too much dependence on any one country for trade. In today’s world of globalization and interdependence, Mongolia has to engage with other countries beyond these two neighbors, Russia and China. This is fundamental thing of the Mongolia’s searching third neighbor. Mongolia needs more friends to ensure its national security interests and achieve economic prosperity its ‘Third Neighbor Policy’1 is a policy of extending its friends all around the world. Two immediate neighbors of Mongolia, Russia and China, remain the foreign policy priority and this priority is not contradictory to the policy of having more friends. Mongolia is becoming an arena of clashes of economic interests of developed countries, multinational corporations due its rich mining deposits. Mongolia's Third Neighbor Policy is aimed to leverage the influence of neighboring countries in the national security issues of Mongolia. In contrast with other satellite states of the former Soviet Union, Mongolia concurrently instituted a democratic political system, a market-driven economy, and a foreign policy based on balancing relations with Russia and China while expanding relations with the West and East. Mongolia is now pursuing a foreign policy that will facilitate global engagement, allow the nation to maintain its sovereignty, and provide diplomatic freedom of maneuver through a “third neighbor” policy. 2 This policy is very much alive today but there is no reason to claim that its implementation is satisfactory. Mongolia has major investors from the US, Japan, Germany and France from the EU, for example. There are many universal conventions related to landlocked country. For Mongolia, access to sea via our two neighbors, means promoting economic ties with the third neighbors, as an important factor conducive to reinforcing the material foundations of Mongolia’s third neighbor policy.

This paper examines the concept of the "blue economy" in the context of the European Union (EU) and Portugal, exploring the economic importance of the sea and its resources. First, it provides an overview of the EU blue economy and its contribution to the overall EU economy over the last decade. Data from the European Commission shows that coastal tourism is the most important sector both in terms of Gross Value Added (GVA) and employment, with the four largest EU countries (Spain, Germany, Italy, and France) being the largest contributors to the EU blue economy. In this context, this study aimed to investigate the performance of Portuguese coastal tourism in comparison to other European coastal countries, particularly in relation to the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. The findings show that Portugal's GVA generated by the coastal tourism sector was consistently lower than the respective mean of all other European coastal countries in several years. The statistical tests confirm these results and suggest that Portugal's coastal tourism sector may need more attention and efforts to improve its economic performance.

Using the dynamic, three-region environmental multi-sector general equilibrium model EMuSe, we find that pricing carbon in Germany or Spain only leads to a permanent negative effect on output in these economies. The induced emissions reduction is not large enough to overcompensate for the increase in marginal production costs. If the rest of Europe joins the carbon pricing scheme, long-run output effects are positive. However, in this case, transition costs are even larger due to close trade relations within Europe. We find evidence for carbon leakage, which can be reduced slightly by a border adjustment mechanism. Still, it is no game changer as it mainly protects dirty domestic sectors. While Germany benefits from border adjustment, Spain actually loses throughout the transition. In the long run, the Spanish energy sector benefits most because of its relatively low emission intensity. Finally, Europe has a strong incentive to get the rest of the world on board as then the downturn is shorter and long-run benefits are larger.

The UK’s 2021 Integrated Review of security, defence, development and foreign policy describes Russia as ‘the most acute direct threat to [the UK’s] security’ in the 2020s. Relations did not get this bad overnight: the trend has been negative for nearly two decades. The bilateral political relationship is now broken. Russian policymakers regard the UK as hostile, but also as weaker than Russia: a junior partner of the US and less important than Germany within Europe. The consensus among Russian observers is that Brexit has reduced the UK’s international influence, to Russia’s benefit. The history of UK–Russia relations offers four lessons. First, because the two lack shared values and interests, their relationship is fragile and volatile. Second, adversarial relations are the historical norm. Third, each party exaggerates its importance on the world stage. Fourth, external trends beyond the UK’s control regularly buffet the relationship. These wider trends include the weakening of the Western-centric international order; the rise of populism and opposition to economic globalization; and the global spread of authoritarian forms of governance. A coherent Russia strategy should focus on the protection of UK territory, citizens and institutions; security in the Euro-Atlantic space; international issues such as non-proliferation; economic relations; and people-to-people contacts. The UK should pursue its objectives with the tools of state power, through soft power instruments and through its international partnerships. Despite Brexit, the EU remains an essential security partner for the UK. In advancing its Russia-related interests, the UK should have four operational priorities: rebuilding domestic resilience; concentrating resources on the Euro-Atlantic space; being a trusted ally and partner; and augmenting its soft power. UK decision-makers should be guided by four propositions. In the first place, policy must be based on clear, hard-headed thinking about Russia. Secondly, an adversarial relationship is not in itself contrary to UK interests. Next, Brexit makes it harder for the UK and the EU to deal with Russia. And finally, an effective Russia policy demands a realistic assessment of UK power and influence. The UK is not a ‘pocket superpower’. It is an important but middling power in relative decline. After Brexit, it needs to repair its external reputation and maximize its utility to allies and partners, starting with its European neighbours.

The purpose of this report is to compare the risk communication strategies and public health mitigation measures implemented by Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK) in 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic based on publicly available documents. The report compares the country responses both in relation to one another and to the recommendations and guidance of the World Health Organization where available. The comparative report is an output of Work Package 1 from the research project PAN-FIGHT (Fighting pandemics with enhanced risk communication: Messages, compliance and vulnerability during the COVID-19 outbreak), which is financially supported by the Norwegian Research Council's extraordinary programme for corona research. PAN-FIGHT adopts a comparative approach which follows a “most different systems” variation as a logic of comparison guiding the research (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). The countries in this study include two EU member States (Sweden, Germany), one which was engaged in an exit process from the EU membership (the UK), and two non-European Union states, but both members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA): Norway and Switzerland. Furthermore, Germany and Switzerland govern by the Continental European Federal administrative model, with a relatively weak central bureaucracy and strong subnational, decentralised institutions. Norway and Sweden adhere to the Scandinavian model—a unitary but fairly decentralised system with power bestowed to the local authorities. The United Kingdom applies the Anglo-Saxon model, characterized by New Public Management (NPM) and decentralised managerial practices (Einhorn & Logue, 2003; Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014; Petridou et al., 2019). In total, PAN-FIGHT is comprised of 5 Work Packages (WPs), which are research-, recommendation-, and practice-oriented. The WPs seek to respond to the following research questions and accomplish the following: WP1: What are the characteristics of governmental and public health authorities’ risk communication strategies in five European countries, both in comparison to each other and in relation to the official strategies proposed by WHO? WP2: To what extent and how does the general public’s understanding, induced by national risk communication, vary across five countries, in relation to factors such as social capital, age, gender, socio-economic status and household composition? WP3: Based on data generated in WP1 and WP2, what is the significance of being male or female in terms of individual susceptibility to risk communication and subsequent vulnerability during the COVID-19 outbreak? WP4: Based on insight and knowledge generated in WPs 1 and 2, what recommendations can we offer national and local governments and health institutions on enhancing their risk communication strategies to curb pandemic outbreaks? WP5: Enhance health risk communication strategies across five European countries based upon the knowledge and recommendations generated by WPs 1-4. Pre-pandemic preparedness characteristics All five countries had pandemic plans developed prior to 2020, which generally were specific to influenza pandemics but not to coronaviruses. All plans had been updated following the H1N1 pandemic (2009-2010). During the SARS (2003) and MERS (2012) outbreaks, both of which are coronaviruses, all five countries experienced few cases, with notably smaller impacts than the H1N1 epidemic (2009-2010). The UK had conducted several exercises (Exercise Cygnet in 2016, Exercise Cygnus in 2016, and Exercise Iris in 2018) to check their preparedness plans; the reports from these exercises concluded that there were gaps in preparedness for epidemic outbreaks. Germany also simulated an influenza pandemic exercise in 2007 called LÜKEX 07, to train cross-state and cross-department crisis management (Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk, 2007). In 2017 within the context of the G20, Germany ran a health emergency simulation exercise with WHO and World Bank representatives to prepare for potential future pandemics (Federal Ministry of Health et al., 2017). Prior to COVID-19, only the UK had expert groups, notably the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE), that was tasked with providing advice during emergencies. It had been used in previous emergency events (not exclusively limited to health). In contrast, none of the other countries had a similar expert advisory group in place prior to the pandemic. COVID-19 waves in 2020 All five countries experienced two waves of infection in 2020. The first wave occurred during the first half of the year and peaked after March 2020. The second wave arrived during the final quarter. Norway consistently had the lowest number of SARS-CoV-2 infections per million. Germany’s counts were neither the lowest nor the highest. Sweden, Switzerland and the UK alternated in having the highest numbers per million throughout 2020. Implementation of measures to control the spread of infection In Germany, Switzerland and the UK, health policy is the responsibility of regional states, (Länders, cantons and nations, respectively). However, there was a strong initial centralized response in all five countries to mitigate the spread of infection. Later on, country responses varied in the degree to which they were centralized or decentralized. Risk communication In all countries, a large variety of communication channels were used (press briefings, websites, social media, interviews). Digital communication channels were used extensively. Artificial intelligence was used, for example chatbots and decision support systems. Dashboards were used to provide access to and communicate data.

In 2018, after 25 years of the North America Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the United States requested new rules which, among other requirements, increased the regional con-tent in the production of automotive components and parts traded between the three part-ner countries, United States, Canada and Mexico. Signed by all three countries, the new trade agreement, USMCA, is to go into force in 2022. Nonetheless, after the 2020 Presi-dential election, the new treaty's future is under discussion, and its impact on the automo-tive industry is not entirely defined. Another significant shift in this industry – the acceler-ated rise of electric vehicles – also occurred in 2020: while the COVID-19 pandemic largely halted most plants in the automotive value chain all over the world, at the reopen-ing, the tide is now running against internal combustion engine vehicles, at least in the an-nouncements and in some large investments planned in Europe, Asia and the US. The definition of the pre-pandemic situation is a very helpful starting point for the analysis of the possible repercussions of the technological and geo-political transition, which has been accelerated by the epidemic, on geographical clusters and sectorial special-isations of the main regions and countries. This paper analyses the trade networks emerg-ing in the past 25 years in a new analytical framework. In the economic literature on inter-national trade, the study of the automotive global value chains has been addressed by us-ing network analysis, focusing on the centrality of geographical regions and countries while largely overlooking the contribution of countries' bilateral trading in components and parts as structuring forces of the subnetwork of countries and their specific position in the overall trade network. The paper focuses on such subnetworks as meso-level structures emerging in trade network over the last 25 years. Using the Infomap multilayer clustering algorithm, we are able to identify clusters of countries and their specific trades in the automotive internation-al trade network and to highlight the relative importance of each cluster, the interconnec-tions between them, and the contribution of countries and of components and parts in the clusters. We draw the data from the UN Comtrade database of directed export and import flows of 30 automotive components and parts among 42 countries (accounting for 98% of world trade flows of those items). The paper highlights the changes that occurred over 25 years in the geography of the trade relations, with particular with regard to denser and more hierarchical network gener-ated by Germany’s trade relations within EU countries and by the US preferential trade agreements with Canada and Mexico, and the upsurge of China. With a similar overall va-riety of traded components and parts within the main clusters (dominated respectively by Germany, US and Japan-China), the Infomap multilayer analysis singles out which com-ponents and parts determined the relative positions of countries in the various clusters and the changes over time in the relative positions of countries and their specialisations in mul-tilateral trades. Connections between clusters increase over time, while the relative im-portance of the main clusters and of some individual countries change significantly. The focus on US and Mexico and on Germany and Central Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) will drive the comparative analysis.