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1
White, Benjamin G. "Mind-Body Dualism and Mental Causation". Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/390365.
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PhilosophyPh.D.
The Exclusion Argument for physicalism maintains that since every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and cases of causal overdetermination (wherein a single effect has more than one sufficient cause) are rare, it follows that if minds cause physical effects as frequently as they seem to, then minds must themselves be physical in nature. I contend that the Exclusion Argument fails to justify the rejection of interactionist dualism (the view that the mind is non-physical but causes physical effects). In support of this contention, I argue that the multiple realizability of mental properties and the phenomenal and intentional features of mental events give us reason to believe that mental properties and their instances are non-physical. I also maintain (a) that depending on how overdetermination is defined, the thesis that causal overdetermination is rare is either dubious or else consistent with interactionist dualism and the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause, and (b) that the claim that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause is not clearly supported by current science. The premises of the Exclusion Argument are therefore too weak to justify the view that minds must be physical in order to cause physical effects as frequently as they seem to.
Temple University--Theses
2
Dziewulski, Klaudia. "Cartesian Dualism and the Feminist Challenge". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2018. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1760.
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This paper explores whether Cartesian dualism prioritizes the masculine over the feminine. Feminist authors have argued that due to the prioritization of the mind over the body in Cartesian dualism and the association of the masculine with the mind and the association of the feminine with the body, the masculine is prioritized. This paper analyzes both this prioritization of the mind over the body and the association of the masculine with the mind and the feminine with the body.
3
Ungureanu, Manuela L. "Naturalism and dualism in the study of language and mind". Thesis, McGill University, 1998. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=35720.
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The contemporary study in the philosophy of language concentrates extensively on a cluster of questions defining the problem of linguistic knowledge (Evans 1981, Davies 1989, Dummett 1991). What explains a speaker's language mastery? Is it knowledge that underwrites our linguistic abilities, and if so, what is the nature of this knowledge? Is rationality an intrinsic feature of language mastery, and if so, how does an account of linguistic knowledge accommodate the connection between language and rationality? While philosophers emphasize the importance of such questions for an account of language, the only systematic response to them has been based almost exclusively on research in psycho-linguistics, and in cognitive science, generally. And prominent cognitivists, such as Chomsky, use their view of linguistic knowledge to promote fervently the naturalistic ideal that the language researcher adhere faithfully to the methodology of the natural scientist, and to provide a thorough critique of any alternative (i.e., non-naturalistic or dualist) approach to language (Chomsky 1995a).In the thesis, I respond to the negative side of cognitivism, and defend a non-naturalistic approach to linguistic knowledge which I call interpretivism. I argue that when applied to interpretivism the cognitivist's critique is rather inconclusive. And, by itself, the cognitivist's explanation of language does not imply that interpretivism is invalid, but rather leaves room for it. The cognitivist explicates linguistic knowledge either as a system of computational states (Stich 1975) or as a set of intentional states (Dwyer and Pietroski 1996). And while under the computationalist construal the cognitivist cannot address the rationality of language, under the intentionalist construal he does not do full justice to it. The interest of interpretivism lies thus in its emphasis on the rational aspects of language, and on the related idea that linguistic knowledge is multifarious: not only intentional or computational, but also similar in kind to the capacity for thought. Following Sellars [1960/1963], I introduce a broad view of explanations of human behaviour within which both the cognitivist and the interpretivist model of explanation are tenable. I conclude that there is room and a need for a non-naturalistic approach to linguistic knowledge, and that naturalism cannot be the only defensible strategy in the study of language.
4
Vaught, J. R. "Kim's pairing problem and the viability of substance dualism". unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-07172008-171702/.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2008.Title from file title page. Eddy Nahmias, Andrea Scarantino, committee co-chairs; Sebastian Rand, committee member. Electronic text (42 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed September 17, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 39-42).
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O'Neal, Mikayla L. "The Numerous Forms of Occam’s Razor and their Effect on Philosophy of Mind". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2016. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1379.
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In the first chapter of this paper I focus on the general overview of Occam's Razor, and develop several interpretations and adaptations of Occam's Razor as a principle of simplicity. In the second chapter I apply these different interpretations in the Physicalism/Dualism debate, and critically assess the validity of these implementations of Occam's Razor in philosophy of mind. In the final chapter I give an overview of my discussion thus far, and make assertions about what my paper means for the usage of Occam's Razor's as a whole.
6
McCardell, Elizabeth Eve. "Catching the ball: constructing the reciprocity of embodiment". Thesis, McCardell, Elizabeth Eve (2001) Catching the ball: constructing the reciprocity of embodiment. PhD thesis, Murdoch University, 2001. https://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/id/eprint/189/.
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This interdisciplinary dissertation is a study of the ways in which we sensually embody and experience ow world. It is a metaphilosophical account that begins within orporeality; indeed, it is suggested that this is the place where the philosophic urge is argued, elaborated, and reflected upon.
While many studies of embodiment tend to focus upon the body as object, cultural artefact, or text for cultural inscription, the approach used in this dissertation is with the incarnation (the making flesh) of interaction in particular socio-physical milieux. The shift is thus from investigation of bodies to bodying, from noun form to transitive verb of incorporealization. This shift is felt necessary in order to better understand the so-called dualisms of traditional Western philosophic thought: mindbody, self-other, self-world, nature-culture, etc., and Tantric inspired Eastern philosophies of self-all relationality. It will be suggested, taking the lead from Leder (1990), that these apparent dualisms are not so much add-ons to philosophies of being, but arise in the experiential body itself.
This dissertation endeavours to rethink certain givens of everyday life, such as perception of time and space, place, enacted memory, having empathic feelings for others, and so on, from within bodily experience and occidental-oriental philosophies of being. Certain neurological disorders are examined for their way of deconstructing elements required to construct a meaningful incarnated life-world.
The process of embodiment is not only what the body is, but what it does.
My construction of what is necessary for embodiment studies therefore considers bodily praxes (cultural and individual), as well as the sensual, sensate experiences arising in the body.
The image of a ball game is evoked in various ways throughout the dissertation not only because it well describes the dense layers of interaction and an emergent sense of bodiliness, but it also illustrates reciprocity and situatedness.
This thesis is intended to contribute to the health sciences as well as cultural studies. It draws upon the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, J. J. Gibson's ecological psychology, neurological studies and case histories, and the Eastern tradition of Tantrism in its Mahayanist Buddhist and Taoist forms.
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McCardell, Elizabeth Eve. "Catching the ball : constructing the reciprocity of embodiment /". McCardell, Elizabeth Eve (2001) Catching the ball: constructing the reciprocity of embodiment. PhD thesis, Murdoch University, 2001. http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/189/.
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This interdisciplinary dissertation is a study of the ways in which we sensually embody and experience ow world. It is a metaphilosophical account that begins within orporeality; indeed, it is suggested that this is the place where the philosophic urge is argued, elaborated, and reflected upon.
While many studies of embodiment tend to focus upon the body as object, cultural artefact, or text for cultural inscription, the approach used in this dissertation is with the incarnation (the making flesh) of interaction in particular socio-physical milieux. The shift is thus from investigation of bodies to bodying, from noun form to transitive verb of incorporealization. This shift is felt necessary in order to better understand the so-called dualisms of traditional Western philosophic thought: mindbody, self-other, self-world, nature-culture, etc., and Tantric inspired Eastern philosophies of self-all relationality. It will be suggested, taking the lead from Leder (1990), that these apparent dualisms are not so much add-ons to philosophies of being, but arise in the experiential body itself.
This dissertation endeavours to rethink certain givens of everyday life, such as perception of time and space, place, enacted memory, having empathic feelings for others, and so on, from within bodily experience and occidental-oriental philosophies of being. Certain neurological disorders are examined for their way of deconstructing elements required to construct a meaningful incarnated life-world.
The process of embodiment is not only what the body is, but what it does.
My construction of what is necessary for embodiment studies therefore considers bodily praxes (cultural and individual), as well as the sensual, sensate experiences arising in the body.
The image of a ball game is evoked in various ways throughout the dissertation not only because it well describes the dense layers of interaction and an emergent sense of bodiliness, but it also illustrates reciprocity and situatedness.
This thesis is intended to contribute to the health sciences as well as cultural studies. It draws upon the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, J. J. Gibson's ecological psychology, neurological studies and case histories, and the Eastern tradition of Tantrism in its Mahayanist Buddhist and Taoist forms.
8
Ronco, Alexandra. "Minds, Brains, and Animals, Oh My! An Examination of Parfitian Personal Identity through Cartesian Dualism". Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/660.
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A particularly intriguing aspect of personal identity is the staying power of the first arguments. Many of the earliest arguments have remained influential to contemporary theories, even if they sometimes go unacknowledged. One of the most prominent of those long-lived theories comes from Descartes. In this paper I establish the intellectual background, framework, and implications of Cartesian dualism. With this theory in mind I examine Derek Parfit’s We Are Not Human Beings. Despite his denial dualism’s relevance, Parfit’s argument for personal identity contains Cartesian Dualism within it. His examples, definitions, and “intuitions” are compatible, if not more supportive of the Cartesian philosophy. To have the strongest argument that we are not human beings Parfit needs dualism - even if he will not directly acknowledge it.
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Adams, Rachel R. "Aristotle on mind". Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2011. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/9.
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The mind as it is found in Aristotle's great work De Anima is a special capacity of the soul. It has both active and passive properties that work together to allow discursive thinking and moral ethical behavior to emerge. This work will look at Aristotle's philosophy of mind, and I will forward a new interpretation of the mind as he understood it: what I call the active and passive mind property dualism. Aristotle's four causes allow for a unique application of a form of dualism that accounts for the ontological status of the mind and the emergence of rational thinking. The importance of potentiality and actuality in Aristotle's metaphysics gives a different sort of formulation of the mind-body problem than is traditionally understood in the philosophy of mind. The first section of this paper will look at the terms used, especially actuality and potentiality. A comparison to Plato's tripartite soul will be given. Next, Aristotle's different kinds of soul and their varied capacities will be explored. Finally, the active mind will be explained as it appears in Book III, chapter 5.ID: 030476185; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for honors in the major in Philosophy.; Thesis (B.A.)--University of Central Florida, 2011.; Includes bibliographical references (p. 32-34).
B.A.
Bachelors
Arts and Humanities
Philosophy
10
Powell, Margaret Cynthia. "A thesis on dualism of mind and body : an examination of the dualistic theories of Plato and Descartes and some contemporary rejections of and alternatives to dualism in the philosophy of mind". Thesis, Cardiff University, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.323645.
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Kenadjian, C. Glenn. "A problem with recent materialistic theories of mind". Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1991. http://www.tren.com.
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Devers, Nathan. "L’émergence de l’esprit : une approche énactive de la vie mentale". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Bordeaux 3, 2025. http://www.theses.fr/2025BOR30001.
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Comment appréhender la cognition sans hériter de toutes les rémanences, latentes ou explicites, qui continuent de découler, au sein des sciences cognitives, du paradigme dualiste ? Thématisée au début des années 1990, l’approche énactive désigne un mouvement qui, se situant au croisement de plusieurs champs d’étude - la philosophie de la biologie, la philosophie de l’esprit, les sciences cognitives, l’épistémologie et la phénoménologie -, aspire précisément à appréhender la vie mentale à l’aune de son incarnation. Mais en quoi le concept d’énaction permet-il de produire une compréhension unifiée de la cognition ? L’objet de notre thèse consiste à montrer que, par-delà la ramification des recherches qui s’inscrivent dans ce courant, ces dernières reposent toutes sur la même ambition directrice : dissoudre les problèmes qui émanent de l’opposition instaurée par le dualisme entre le corps et l’esprit, pour leur ériger la vie mentale en phénomène unitaire, sans imposer à son étude des clivages pré-constitués. En l’occurrence, l’énactivisme permet d’identifier, et ainsi de critiquer, trois configurations post-cartésiennes du dualisme. Contre l’imaginaire du neurocentrisme, qui tient le cerveau pour le foyer exclusif de l’esprit, la théorie autopoiétique entend dégager la circularité des processus cognitifs à partir de celle qui caractérise l’organisation en clôture des systèmes biologiques, ce qui permet d’observer l’activité mentale sourdre au sein même du vivant. Contre le paradigme du représentationnisme, l’idée d’une « cognition incarnée » refuse de considérer le sujet et l’objet comme des fondements épistémiques qui s’échangeraient des données objectives, ni de postuler l’existence pré-constituée d’un moi et un monde, mais elle étudie la manière dont ces deux régions se font mutuellement émerger au cours de leur interaction. En insistant ainsi sur la structuration sensori-motrice de l’expérience, elle sonne ainsi le glas d’un certain intellectualisme qui, réduisant cette dernière à un échange et une manipulation d’informations symboliques, établissait une frontière opaque entre la perception et la praxis. Parce qu’elle décrit la manière dont le moi et le monde « s’énactent », l’approche énactive permet surtout de dépasser l’antinomie qui régnait, en philosophie de l’esprit, entre les perspectives à la première ou à la troisième personne, c’est-à-dire entre la volonté de décrire la conscience de l’intérieur ou bien de l’objectiver. Non contente de créer les conditions d’un dialogue fécond entre la phénoménologie et les sciences cognitives, elle invite surtout la philosophie à repenser sa tâche, à mi-chemin de l’expérience vécue et l’exigence de scientificitéHow can we understand cognition without inheriting all the latent or explicit after-effects of the dualist paradigm that continues to permeate cognitive sciences? Founded in the early 1990s, the enactive approach refers to a movement which, situated at the crossroads of several fields of study - the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of mind, the cognitive sciences, epistemology and phenomenology - aims precisely to apprehend mental life in terms of its embodiment. But how can the concept of enaction produce a unified understanding of cognition? The issue of our thesis is to show that, despite the ramification of the research that forms part of this current, they rest on the same guiding ambition : the will to dissolve the problems which arise from the opposition established by dualism between body and mind, and to set up mental life as a unitary phenomenon, without imposing pre-constituted cleavages on its study. More precisely, enactivism enables us to identify, and thus criticize, three post-Cartesian configurations of dualism. Against the imaginary of neurocentrism, which describes the brain as the exclusive place of the mind, autopoietic theory aims to draw out the circularity of cognitive processes from the enclosure organization of biological systems, enabling us to observe mental activity emerging within the very heart of living organisms. Against the paradigm of representationalism, the idea of “embodied cognition” refuses to consider subject and object as epistemic foundations that would exchange objective data, nor to postulate the pre-constituted existence of a self and a world, but studies the way in which these two fields mutually emerge throughout their interaction. By insisting on the sensory-motor structuring of experience, it avoids the intellectualist tradition which established an opaque boundary between perception and praxis. Because it describes the way in which the self and the world “enact” themselves, the enactive approach enables us to overcome the antinomy that reigned in philosophy of mind between first- and third-person perspectives, i.e. between the desire to describe consciousness from within or to objectify it. Because it creates the conditions for a fruitful dialogue between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, this approach invites philosophy to rethink its task, halfway between lived experience and the demand for scientificity
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Johansson, Henning. "Framväxten av korrespondensläran : Swedenborgs esoteriska doktrins filosofihistoriska grund". Thesis, University of Skövde, School of Humanities and Informatics, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-2737.
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The purpose of this paper is to exam the philosophical development of Emanuel Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondence and to note some of the more important parallels between Swedenborg's doctrine and the three contemporary most debated theories concerning the mind-body problem. These three theories was pre-established harmony, its opponent physical influx and finally occasionalism. Especially occasionalism has close connections to Descartes' dualism, but neither pre-established harmony or physical influxus, which in some ways can be dated before Descartes, would have looked the same, if it were not for the Cartesian way of thinking. Also Swedenborg initially inherited major influences from Descartes and that is the first approach in this paper. From there on the paper follows the development of the doctrine of correspondence and the parallels according Swedenborg's more contemporary philosophical writers, until Swedenborg gets to a point where he underwent a profound spiritual crisis and turned his focus on an all together theological approach.
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Schröder, Felix. "Is Searle a Property Dualist?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-375774.
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It has often been argued that John Searle’s theory of mind, biological naturalism, due to its commitment to mental irreducibility amounts to no more than disguised property dualism. I suggest that a thorough analysis of Searle’s somewhat unusual views on the nature of reduction reveals this irreducibility to be not a metaphysical relation between mental properties and physical but one concerned only with the semantics of the respective terms used to refer to these. As a result, I argue, irreducibility in his sense is insufficient to support a metaphysical conclusion like property dualism. Finally, to reinforce this point I give a concrete example of a potential physicalist view which is compatible with the analysis of irreducibility as semantic but not as metaphysical and hence on my reasoning remains open to Searle.
15
Borges, David Gonçalves. "A crítica contemporânea ao dualismo metafísico alma-corpo de René Descartes". Universidade Federal do Espírito Santo, 2010. http://repositorio.ufes.br/handle/10/6274.
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This dissertation aimed to research about the contemporary conceptions concerning the mind, using as philosophical reference René Descartes - the thinker who inaugurates the inquiries on the subject with his works "Meditations On First Philosophy" and "Treatise on the Passions of the Soul." The investigation sought to identify the main implications of Cartesian metaphysics on the philosophy of mind, and to show that the latter only became a field of study distinct from other philosophical fields since it started from criticism of the Cartesianism. In the first section an extensive presentation of the thought of René Descartes was prepared, with special emphasis on his views about the "soul" (or "mind" in contemporary terms). The second section addressed the first criticisms on dualism, as well as the objections contained in the works of Gilbert Ryle and Daniel Dennett. The third section presents non-dualistic and noneliminativistic approaches, focusing on the positions of John Searle and Antonio Damasio. It was concluded that the philosophy of mind followed a linear, gradual, and somehow inevitable development - in the latter case, keeping in mind mainly how it originated from the categories postulated initially by Descartes. Additionally, it was concluded that the path to greater success and wider potential for the advancement of cognitive science is in the union between empirical and philosophical knowledge, similar to the methodology employed by Damasio
Esta dissertação tem como propósito a investigação a respeito das concepções contemporâneas sobre a mente, usando como referência filosófica René Descartes o pensador que inaugura as inquirições sobre o tema com suas obras Meditações Metafísicas e Tratado das Paixões da Alma . A pesquisa procurou identificar as principais implicações da metafísica cartesiana sobre a filosofia da mente, bem como demonstrar que esta última se constituiu, enquanto área de estudos distinta de outros campos filosóficos, a partir das críticas em relação ao cartesianismo. Na primeira seção é realizada uma ampla exposição do pensamento de René Descartes, com especial ênfase em suas concepções a respeito da alma (ou mente , em termos contemporâneos). Na segunda, são abordadas as primeiras críticas ao dualismo, bem como as objeções contidas nos trabalhos de Gilbert Ryle e Daniel Dennett. Na terceira seção são apresentadas abordagens não-dualistas e não-eliminativistas, tendo como foco os posicionamentos de John Searle e António Damásio. Concluiu-se que filosofia da mente seguiu um desenvolvimento linear, gradual, e, de certo modo, inevitável neste último caso, tendo em vista principalmente a forma como se originou a partir das categorias postuladas inicialmente por Descartes. Adicionalmente, foi possível concluir que o caminho de maior sucesso e com mais amplo potencial para o avanço das ciências cognitivas reside na união entre dados empíricos e conhecimento filosófico, de forma semelhante à metodologia empregada por Damásio
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Loos, Leonard. "Hur smart är AI? : En undersökning av möjligheten av intelligenta maskiner". Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-162367.
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The reemergence of artificial intelligence during the last 30 years has introduced severalforms of weak AI to our everyday lives, be it in our smartphones or how the weather ispredicted. Modern approaches to AI, using methods like neural networks and machinelearning, also feel confident about creating strong AI, intelligence that is human-like orsuperior to humans. In this thesis, I discover the philosophical premises of artificialintelligence, how the research program views the mind and what implications this has for theform of intelligence that is being constructed. Furthermore, I derive at several criteria thatneed to be met to qualify a system as intelligent. To cover this rather wide field, the works ofHubert Dreyfus, an early commentator on AI, and David Chalmers, one of the most widelyread philosophers of mind, are interrogated about their views on human intelligence and howsuch a theory relates to the possibility of intelligent machines.Key
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Toyooka, Megumi. "L'union de l'âme et du corps dans la philosophie de Descartes". Thesis, Strasbourg, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018STRAC015/document.
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Descartes admet simultanément deux thèses : la distinction réelle de l’âme et du corps, pensées comme deux substances séparées, d’une part, et leur union substantielle de l’autre. Comment ces deux substances, radicalement distinctes, peuvent-elles être unies ? Dans l'histoire de la philosophie, la métaphysique cartésienne est comprise comme un dualisme, distinguant radicalement la substance pensante et la substance étendue, donc l’âme et le corps. Ma thèse conduit à renverser une telle représentation grâce à la considération de la correspondance avec Elisabeth. Elle montre que sa conception des relations entre l’âme et le corps est plus complexe qu’on ne le pense souvent, et montre aussi comment sa philosophie réussit à assurer la compatibilité de sa métaphysique, de sa philosophie naturelle et de sa philosophie pratique. La pensée cartésienne s’adresse ainsi aux hommes, non seulement dans leur réflexion métaphysique,mais aussi dans leur expérience de la vieDescartes simultaneously admits two theses: one is the real distinction between mind and bodythought as two separate substances, and the other is their substantial union. How can these two radically distinct substances be united? In the history of philosophy, Cartesian metaphysics is understood as a dualism, radically distinguishing the thinking substance and the extended substance, therefore the mind and the body. The aim of my thesis is to reverse such are presentation by the grace of the consideration of correspondence with Elisabeth. She shows that his conception of mind-body relations is more complex than is often thought, and also shows how his philosophy succeeds in ensuring the compatibility between his metaphysics, his natural philosophy and his practical philosophy. Cartesian thought is thus addressed to a human being, not only in their metaphysical reflection, but also in their experience of life
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Ribeiro, Henrique de Morais. "Monadismo e fisicismo: um ensaio sobre as relações mente-corpo". Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8133/tde-13092012-094622/.
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Nesta tese, desenvolve-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo fundamentada na noção de mônada, ou substância simples, como elemento ontológico estruturante de um enfoque contemporâneo da mencionada relação. Na primeira parte da tese, de natureza crítica, analisam-se as teorias fisicistas contemporâneas da mencionada relação, a saber, a teoria de superveniência da mente, da emergência e da causação mental, com vistas a justificar a proposta de assunção de uma premissa dualista que visa, principalmente, propor, em contraste com o cenário epifenomenalista do fisicismo contemporâneo, uma ontologia da mente que seja compatível com as intuições realistas do senso comum e da psicológica popular sobre a força causal da mente no universo físico. Na segunda parte, de natureza positiva, propõe-se um argumento explicativo da relação mente-corpo partindo-se, para tanto, de uma assunção e duas premissas. A assunção afirma que a mente tem o mesmo importe ontológico da matéria física, sendo estes considerados como elementos composicionais, afirmação a qual se denomina dualismo elementar. No que se refere às premissas, propõe-se duas, a saber, a tese composicional holística, que afirma que a mente e a matéria são partes constitutivas de um todo chamado substância simples, e a tese composicional mereológica, que afirma que as substâncias simples ou mônadas compõem mereologicamente, por superveniência, a relação mente-corpo. Examinam-se também algumas objeções ao argumento monadista proposto.This thesis offers an explanatory argument concerning the mind-body relation, an argument that is grounded on the notion of monad, or the simple substance, as an ontological element for proposing a contemporary approach to the mind-body relation. In the first part, a critique of the current physicalist theories of mind is given, namely, supervenience, emergence and mental causation, in order to justify the proposal of a dualist premiss which aims at an ontology of mind which satisfies the realistic intuitions of common sense and of folk psychology on the causal efficacy and relevance of the mind amid the physical, in opposition to the epiphenomenalist view of contemporary physicalist theories. In the second part, the positive one, we propose an explanatory argument for monadism about mind-body relations, based on an assumption and two premises. The assumption says that the mind has the same ontological import of the physical matter, and they, mind and matter, are considered to be elements entering the composition of psychophysical relations, an assumption called elementary dualism. Regarding the premises, we propose two, namely, the holistic compositional thesis, which asserts that mind and matter are parts entering the composition of true wholes called substances, and the mereological compositional thesis, which says that such simple substances compose, via supervenience, the mind-body relations. Some objections to the proposed monadist argument are examined and rejoindered as well.
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Filho, Maxwell Morais de Lima. "Naturalismo biolÃgico: a soluÃÃo dualista de John Searle para o problema mente-corpo". Universidade Federal do CearÃ, 2010. http://www.teses.ufc.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=19938.
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CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel SuperiorO objetivo deste trabalho à propor uma classificaÃÃo do naturalismo biolÃgico de John Searle em uma das concepÃÃes teÃricas de Filosofia da Mente. Para tanto, apresentarei uma visÃo panorÃmica das principais teorias e uma exposiÃÃo das teses que compÃem o naturalismo biolÃgico, com o intuito de comparar este com aquelas. O prÃprio Searle resiste em rotular o naturalismo biolÃgico, jà que, segundo ele, todas as teorias da tradiÃÃo em Filosofia da Mente partem de um pressuposto equivocado, a saber, o dualismo conceitual, segundo o qual hà uma exclusÃo mÃtua entre as categorias fÃsica e mental: o fÃsico à nÃo mental, e o mental à nÃo fÃsico. Para Searle, fenÃmenos mentais sÃo biolÃgicos e, portanto, sÃo fÃsicos. No entanto, isso nÃo significa que hà uma reduÃÃo ontolÃgica do mental ao fÃsico, pois existe uma distinÃÃo ontolÃgica entre esses dois nÃveis â ontologia de primeira pessoa e ontologia de terceira pessoa, respectivamente. O problema à que com tal distinÃÃo ontolÃgica, Searle acaba por criar um novo tipo de dualismo, que em vez de contrapor o fÃsico ao mental, contrapÃe o objetivo (ontologia de terceira pessoa) ao subjetivo (ontologia de primeira pessoa). Por defender o fisicalismo ontolÃgico e, ao mesmo tempo, endossar que os eventos mentais sÃo reais, causalmente eficazes e ontologicamente irredutÃveis, a concepÃÃo de Searle converge em muitos pontos com o fisicalismo nÃo-redutivo e com o dualismo de propriedade. Compararei o naturalismo biolÃgico com ambas as teorias e, ao final, terei subsÃdios para argumentar o porquà de classificÃ-lo em uma delas e nÃo na outra.
The objective of this work is to propose a classification of John Searle‟s biological naturalism in one of theoretical conceptions of Philosophy of Mind. In order to do that, I will present a panoramic vision of principal theories and a presentation of theses of biological naturalism in order to compare this with those. Searle himself resist to label the biological naturalism since, according him, all theories of tradition in Philosophy of Mind start from a mistaken assumption, that is, the conceptual dualism, according to which there is a mutual exclusion between the physical and mental categories: the physical is not mental, and mental is not physical. For Searle, mental phenomena are biological and, therefore, physical. However, this does not mean that there is an ontological reduction of mental to physical, because there is an ontological distinction between these two levels â first-person ontology and third-person ontology, respectively. The problem is that with such ontological distinction, Searle ends up creating a new kind of dualism, that instead of countering the physical to the mental, opposes the objective (third-person ontology) to the subjective (first-person ontology). By defending the ontological physicalism and, at the same time, to endorse that mental events are real, causally effective and ontologically irreducible, Searle‟s conception converges at many points with the non-reductive physicalism and property dualism. I will compare the biological naturalism with both theories and â at the end â I will have subsidies to argue why classify it in one and not the other.
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Zilio, Federico. "The Problems of Consciousness and its Relationship with the World: An Investigation between Philosophy and Neuroscience". Doctoral thesis, Università degli studi di Padova, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3424671.
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The main subject of this dissertation is the relationship of consciousness with the world. Consciousness is extremely familiar and mysterious at the same time, and it is considered one of the most complex phenomena to describe and explain. Recently, cognitive science and neuroscience have assumed a significant role in the search for the fundamental structures of consciousness, investigating the neuronal basis that allows the emergence of our experience. For this reason, the present work is not only aimed at philosophical and phenomenological analysis but also at the latest results of neuroscience on the relationship between consciousness and brain.
The first chapter outlines the main topics of contemporary consciousness studies (first-, second-, third-person perspective, the nature of qualia, phenomenal contents, the hard problem and the meta-problem of consciousness, etc.). After presenting a provisional model for the phenomenological (Sartre) and logical (Kripke) structure of consciousness, represented by intentionality, phenomenality and self-awareness (Chapter 2), I will critically discuss reductive approaches that are influential both in neuroscience and in philosophy of mind. Some of them support the possibility to conceptually and ontologically reduce experience to brain activity (neuro-centrism; Chapter 3), while others perform the hypostatization of numerous mental states within the mind/brain (mento-centrism; Chapter 4).
In this regard, it is possible to identify a common paradigm, that is, the distinction between reality and appearance that occurred especially during modern philosophy (in particular Descartes) and after the modern scientific revolution (in particular Galilei). This has led to the reduction of experience to a mind- or brain-related quality/property, as we can see nowadays (Chapter 4). Given the perspectival, multifaceted structure of experience and following the analysis of several non-reductive approaches, I will argue for an ontologically and epistemologically pluralist account of consciousness, that it can be developed only through an interdisciplinary approach, by philosophy, phenomenology and neuroscience together (Chapter 5).
This will allow me to address the issue of consciousness from the so-called non-reductive neurophilosophical approach, through which I will analyse the way we experience the world from both a phenomenological and a neuroscientific perspective. Supported by Sartre's phenomenological analyses of consciousness in relation to world and body, I argue that experience is not given without the embodied-being-in-the-world condition, a condition that will then be connected to the neuroscientific concept of environment-body-brain alignment (adapted from Northoff’s world-brain relation), that is, a necessary predisposition for the maintenance of consciousness (Chapter 6).
In conclusion, the concept of consciousness-in-the-world will be tested through neurophilosophical experiments regarding the Locked-in syndrome and the dreaming state, suggesting the need to reconsider consciousness not merely in terms of brain- or mind-relation, but intrinsically as world-related.
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O'Brien, Annamarie L. "Mind over Matter: Expressions of Mind/Body Dualism in Thinspiration". Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2013. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1369057408.
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Brown, Julius. "Penser le corps, sa puissance et sa destinée chez Spinoza : aux sources de son anthropologie". Thesis, Strasbourg, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015STRAK012/document.
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Spinoza évaluera la révolution copernicienne et prônera un naturalisme rationaliste et matérialiste contre la tradition onto-théologique, Aristote et Descartes en étant les deux figures clés, sans parler des théologiens et de la Bible. Spinoza interprète l’erreur du géocentrisme comme signalant deux autres erreurs : le dualisme anthropologique classique qui inféodait le corps à l’âme et l’illusion du libre-arbitre. Par la réhabilitation gnoséologique, psychophysique et socio-affective du corps, il prétend conduire l’homme au salut présent, non eschatologique, le réconciliant avec lui-même et avec le Dieu-Nature. La permanence d’une sensibilité anthropologique hébraïque y est prégnante, ce qui n’annule pas des disparités conceptuelles, métaphysiques, sotériologiques et éthiques entre lui et l’Écriture. Ces disparités pourraient rapprocher Spinoza plus d’Aristote que de Descartes. Le projet spinozien tiendra-t-il ses promesses sans retomber dans les travers du mythique et du mystique ?Spinoza assesses the Copernican revolution and advocates a rationalist and materialistic naturalismagainst the onto-theological tradition, Aristotle and Descartes as the two main figures thereof,theologians and the Bible not to mention. Spinoza interprets the error of geocentrism as indicating twoother errors: classical anthropological dualism which subjugated the body to the soul and the illusion offree-will. By gnoseological, psychophysical and socio-emotional rehabilitation of the body, he claims tolead man to present salvation, not eschatological, reconciling him with himself and with God as Nature.The permanence of Hebraic anthropological sensibility is pregnant, which does not cancel metaphysical,soteriological and ethical disparities between him and the Bible. These disparities could bring Spinozacloser to Aristotle than to Descartes. Will the spinozian project keep its promises without relapsing intothe traps of the mythical and the mystical ?
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Roman, Judith. "George Herbert Mead and dualism". Thesis, Bangor University, 1988. https://research.bangor.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/george-herbert-mead-and-dualism(a63b5b7f-21fa-4778-b469-3c862a4e42f3).html.
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The thesis entertains dualism as a valuable conceptual frame of reference in the twentieth century. For the support of this contention, the Introduction calls on the writings of Piaget, Althusser, Chomsky and Levi-Strauss. All these dualists share, in distinction from traditional past approaches to a dualistic conceptual framework, an insistance on the primacy of the empirical term (or at least on the parity of the empirical term) vis-a-vis the d')-structural or covert term in their works, which two terms, on their accounts, indismissibly underlie the phenomena they tackle in their various disciplines. The terms of the dualism of the main concern in this study, pertain to social psychology, or anthropology in the Continental sense. They are, on the one hand, (a) an updated Hegelian 'object' as contaminated with a Hegel-akin 'subject' (with the terms 'my world', 'perspective', 'lived reality', 'human reality', 'the self' as its usual expressions), and (b) the same 'object' as pure and uncontaminated with 'subject': the medium of society's 'carriership', indeed of the very being of society itself, whose positivity is overtly demonstrable in statistical charts, as Durkheim was the first to show. For that reason, not only the explicitly dualistic Continental students of the self upon whom the thesis focuses (the existentialist Sartre, Kierkegaard and Bultmann in the main), but also Durkheim figures centrally in the argument. Another task which the thesis undertook was to show that the Hegelian, implicitly dualistic element in Mead's thought (picked up by him in Berlin: the scene of his undergraduate studies), amounts, not to a flaw spoiling the orthodoxy of his behaviourism (as usually grasped), but (when pursued and pushed to its limits), to a fruitful basis of comparison with and a valuable contribution to the works of his openly dualistic European anthropologist colleagues, just listed above. Both goals are, on the whole, implicitly achieved in the thesis, as they are, in the main, phenomenologically approached, and the method of their treatment is to allow them to transpire through a structure dictated by an abandon to their implications in experience. The dualism of Sartre's social psychology provides the major basis of comparison to Mead's implicit dualism. A by-product of this circumstance is the emergence, in the course of the argument, if not of a Sartrian ethics, at least of an ethics which is very Sartrian.
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Ungureanu, Manuela Liliana. "Naturalism and dualism in the study of language and mind". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape11/PQDD_0028/NQ50274.pdf.
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Miresco, Marc J. "Judgements of responsibility and mind brain dualism in clinical psychiatry". Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=97970.
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This thesis explores the phenomenon of mind-brain dualism in contemporary Western psychiatry from an anthropological and social psychological perspective. In a first chapter, it reports on an empirical study involving 127 staff psychiatrists and psychologists at McGill University who responded to a questionnaire based on clinical vignettes. Results revealed a latent process of judging patients' responsibility for illness, where the more a behavioural problem was seen as 'psychological,' the more the patients tended to be viewed as responsible and blameworthy for their symptoms, while behaviours with 'neurobiological' causes showed the opposite tendency. A second chapter reviews the history of psychosomatic medicine and argues that specific biomedical and psychological sick roles exist for patients that determine the ways in which their actions are judged, as well as how the functions of the rational mind are commonly understood. Insights from evolutionary psychology are used in a third chapter to speculate on new models of mental illness that may provide new contexts for negotiating mind-brain dualism and judgements of responsibility.
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Hendriksen, Willam J. "Descartes, the Cogito, and the Mind-Body Problem in the Context of Modern Neuroscience". Thesis, Boston College, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/683.
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Thesis advisor: Marilee OgrenThe suggestion of a mind-brain duality that emerges out of Descartes’ cogito argument is assessed in the context of twenty-first century neuroscience. The Cartesian texts are explored in order to qualify the extent to which the cogito necessitates such dualism and the functions that Descartes attributes to a non-corporeal soul are precisely defined. The relationship between the mind and brain is explored in the context of a number neuroscientific phenomena, including sensory perception, blindsight, amusia, phantom limb syndrome, frontal lobe lesions, and the neurodevelopmental disorder Williams syndrome, with an attempt to illuminate the physiological basis for each. Juxtaposing the two perspectives, the author concludes that Descartes hypothesis of a disembodied soul is no longer necessary and that a purely physiological understanding of the human mind is now possible, and that there is an underlying affinity between this assertion and Descartes theory of mind
Thesis (BS) — Boston College, 2009
Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences
Discipline: College Honors Program
Discipline: Psychology
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Smith, Cheryl A. "A tertium quid the interactive dualism of Thomas Aquinas /". Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 2000. http://www.tren.com.
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Brown, Julius. "Penser le corps, sa puissance et sa destinée chez Spinoza : aux sources de son anthropologie". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Strasbourg, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015STRAK012.
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Spinoza évaluera la révolution copernicienne et prônera un naturalisme rationaliste et matérialiste contre la tradition onto-théologique, Aristote et Descartes en étant les deux figures clés, sans parler des théologiens et de la Bible. Spinoza interprète l’erreur du géocentrisme comme signalant deux autres erreurs : le dualisme anthropologique classique qui inféodait le corps à l’âme et l’illusion du libre-arbitre. Par la réhabilitation gnoséologique, psychophysique et socio-affective du corps, il prétend conduire l’homme au salut présent, non eschatologique, le réconciliant avec lui-même et avec le Dieu-Nature. La permanence d’une sensibilité anthropologique hébraïque y est prégnante, ce qui n’annule pas des disparités conceptuelles, métaphysiques, sotériologiques et éthiques entre lui et l’Écriture. Ces disparités pourraient rapprocher Spinoza plus d’Aristote que de Descartes. Le projet spinozien tiendra-t-il ses promesses sans retomber dans les travers du mythique et du mystique ?Spinoza assesses the Copernican revolution and advocates a rationalist and materialistic naturalismagainst the onto-theological tradition, Aristotle and Descartes as the two main figures thereof,theologians and the Bible not to mention. Spinoza interprets the error of geocentrism as indicating twoother errors: classical anthropological dualism which subjugated the body to the soul and the illusion offree-will. By gnoseological, psychophysical and socio-emotional rehabilitation of the body, he claims tolead man to present salvation, not eschatological, reconciling him with himself and with God as Nature.The permanence of Hebraic anthropological sensibility is pregnant, which does not cancel metaphysical,soteriological and ethical disparities between him and the Bible. These disparities could bring Spinozacloser to Aristotle than to Descartes. Will the spinozian project keep its promises without relapsing intothe traps of the mythical and the mystical ?
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Walker, Christina M. Fieldman Hali Annette. "Mind/body dualism and music theory pedagogy applications of Dalcroze Eurhythmics /". Diss., UMK access, 2007.
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Thesis (M.M.)--Conservatory of Music and Dance. University of Missouri--Kansas City, 2007."A thesis in music." Typescript. Advisor: Hali Fieldman. Vita. Title from "catalog record" of the print edition Description based on contents viewed Dec. 18, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-96). Online version of the print edition.
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Nichols, Ryan Tate. "Reid's Philosophy of Mind". Connect to this title online, 2002. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1039111436.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2002.Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 369 p. Includes bibliographical references. Abstract available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center; full text release delayed at author's request until 2005 Dec. 5.
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Robinson, Thomas. "The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato". Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/113081.
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The article looks at a number of concepts of soul -sorne of them not easily reconcilable with others- in the earlier dialogues of Plato, and then moves on to discuss the well-known doctrine of tripartition in the Republic and Timaeus, arguing that it constitutes in many ways significant progress over Plato's earlier thinking, especially as found in the Phaedo. Mention is also made of the little-discussed question of the nature and significance of gender differentiation of soul in the Timaeus. As for the famous passage,again in the Tímaeus, conceming the composition of soul. it is argued that this may well have been an attempt by Plato to grapple with the thorny question of psycho-physical dualism.Este artículo analiza algunos conceptos del alma - no siempre fáciles deconciliar entre sí- en los diálogos tempranos de Platón. Prosigue luego con una discusión acerca de la bien conocida doctrina sobre la tripartición del alma en la República y el Timeo, sosteniendo que esta doctrina constituye, en muchos sentidos, un progreso importante con respecto al pensamiento temprano de Platón, especialmente al Fedón. Se menciona también la cuestión poco discutida de la naturaleza e importancia de la diferenciación de géneros del alma en el Timeo. En relación con el famoso pasaje, también del Timeo, sobre la composición del alma, se sostiene que bien pudo haber sido un intento de Platón por lidiar con la espinosa cuestión del dualismo psicofísico.
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Abramson, Darren. "Computability and mind". [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2006. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3230538.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, 2006."Title from dissertation home page (viewed July 5, 2007)." Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3005. Adviser: D. C. McCarty.
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Altintzoglou, Evripidis. "Dualism and the critical languages of portraiture". Thesis, University of Wolverhampton, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2436/116408.
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This thesis analyzes the philosophical origins of dualism in Western culture in the Classical period in order to examine dualist modes of representation in the history of Western portraiture. Dualism - or the separation of soul and body - takes the form in portraiture of the representation of the head or head and shoulders at the expense of the body, and since its emergence in Classical Greece, has been the major influence on portraiture. In this respect the modern portrait's commonplace attention to the face rests on the dualist notion that the soul, and therefore the individuality of the subject, rests in the head. Art historical literature on portraiture, however, fails to address the pictorial, cultural and theoretical complications arising from various forms of dualism and their different artistic methodologies, such as that of the physiognomy (the definition of personality through facial characteristics) in the 19th century. That is, there is a failure to identify the complexities of dualism's relationship to the traditional honorific aspects of the portrait (the fact that historians are inclined to accept at face value the fact that portraits historically have tended to honour the achievements and social status of the sitter). Indeed, scholars have a propensity to romanticise the humanist individualists inherent to this long history of the honorific, particularly in canonic portrait practices such as Rembrandt's and Picasso's.
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Jacoby, Dylan. "Stirring the pot: toward a physical reduction of mental events". [Denver, Colo.] : Regis University, 2009. http://165.236.235.140/lib/DJacoby2009.pdf.
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Perham, John. "SCIENCEFRICTION: OF THE POSTHUMAN SUBJECT, ABJECTION, AND THE BREACH IN MIND/BODY DUALISM". CSUSB ScholarWorks, 2016. https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd/268.
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This thesis investigates the multiple readings that arise when the division between the biological and technological is interrupted--here abjection is key because the
binary between abjection and gadgetry gives multiple meanings to other binaries, including male/female. Using David Cronenberg’s Videodrome and eXistenZ, I argue that multiple readings arise because of people’s participation with electronically mediated technology. Indeed, abjection is salient because Cronenberg’s films present an ambivalent relationship between people and technology; this relationship is often an uneasy one because technology changes people on both a somatic and cognitive level.
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Uings, David John. "Mind, meaning and miscommunication". Connect to e-thesis, 2008. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/355/.
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Thesis (M.Phil.) - University of Glasgow, 2008.M.Phil. thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Glasgow, 2008. Includes bibliographical references. Print version also available.
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Bruno, Michael George. "The Extended Conscious Mind". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/311472.
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Do minds ever extend spatially beyond the boundaries of the bodies of their subjects? I argue that they do. More precisely, I argue that some of our visual experiences are constitutively grounded by events that include parts of the world that are not parts of any subject's body. After surveying the development of externalist theories in the philosophy of mind, I present some of the motivations common to ecological, enactive, dynamic sensorimotor and two-level interdependence accounts of perception and explain how some of these accounts support the case for active vehicle externalism about consciousness. I then discuss and respond to three well-known objections. The first concerns whether the extended mind thesis implies that there extended selves, the second concerns what exactly demarcates mental events from non-mental events, and the last concerns what is required to demonstrate constitutive dependence. To address what distinguishes constitutive from nomological or causal forms of dependence, I develop an account of constitutive grounding. My account draws on recent work in analytic metaphysics on the notion of ontological dependence or grounding, where grounding is taken to be a non-causal relation of ontological priority. After showing how this notion is different than any kind of nomological dependence and how it can be constructively used to decipher the spatiotemporal extent of events, I argue positively that the grounds of visual experiences are always temporally extended and often include parts of the world external to the seeing subject's body. My argument for temporally extended vision begins by considering three different models of the temporal structure of consciousness: cinematic, retentional, and extensional. I then draw on the dynamic sensorimotor theory to object to the cinematic model and explore whether enactivists are really committed to retentionalism. I end up arguing that any account one gives of the intentional contents or phenomenal characters of individual conscious visual events will have to make reference to a briefly enduring process and not just an instantaneous event involving the subject. Lastly, I argue as follows: (P1) in the explanation of visual experience, the brain internal parts of the temporally extended events that constitutively ground visual experiences often cannot be decoupled from parts of the non-bodily world; (P2) if event A is a constitutive ground of event E and event B cannot be decoupled from A in the explanation of E, then B is also a constitutive ground of E; therefore, (C) some visual experiences are constitutively grounded by events that include parts of the non-bodily world. I call this conclusion the extended visual consciousness thesis. If my argument for it is sound, our conscious minds do, in some cases, extend beyond our bodies.
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McVeigh, Keith James. "Intuitive dualism : a rejection of contemporary antidualist attitude and argument". Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.337111.
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Botterell, Andrew (Andrew John) 1968. "Analysis in mind". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9670.
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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 1998.Includes bibliographical references (p. 111-114).
From the time of Descartes to about the 1960s, a certain epistemological idea dominated the philosophy of mind, namely the idea that theses about the relation between mind and body are, if true, a priori truths. Much of recent philosophy of mind is devoted to the question whether that idea is right. My research is largely an attempt to argue that some recent defenses of it are unsuccessful. For example, Physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that every actual psychological event, property, or process is necessitated by some actual physical event, property, or process. Many philosophers believe that Physicalism is true. Until about the 1960s, those who believed it true typically believed that statements relating mind and body were a priori truths. Let us call this thesis A Priori Physicalism. Many philosophers nowadays believe, instead, that statements relating mind and body are only a posteriori truths. Let us call this thesis A Posteriori Physicalism. A number of philosophers have argued in recent years that A Posteriori Physicalism is unacceptable; on their view, Physicalists had better be A Priori Physicalists. My thesis examines the question whether that view is correct. I begin with a discussion of two influential arguments for the conclusion that Physicalists must be A Priori Physicalists. Chapter 1 addresses itself to an argument for the conclusion that if physicalism is true, every referring psychological expression is coreferential a priori with some referring physical expression. This argument is commonly called the Property Dualism Argument against Physicalism. I argue that the Property Dualism Argument rests on an ambiguous premise: on one reading it begs the question against A Posteriori Physicalism, on the other reading the conclusion of the Property Dualism Argument does not follow. Chapter 2 addresses itself to an argument of Frank Jackson's for the conclusion that Physicalists must have an a priori story to tell about how the physical nature of the actual world makes true the psychological nature of the actual world. I distinguish two ways in which this claim might be understood, and I argue that on neither way of understanding it does Jackson have a compelling argument for A Priori Physicalism. Finally, in Chapter 3 I turn to a more general discussion of the relation between conceivability and possibility, and its bearing on the dispute between A Priori and A Posteriori Physicalists. I focus in particular on a recent argument of David Chalmers' from the conceivability of so-called zombies to the conclusion that A Posteriori Physicalism is false. I argue that this argument fails to provide compelling reasons for rejecting A Posteriori Physicalism. I argue, first, that it misconstrues the relation between conceivability and possibility, and second, that it fails to establish that zombies are conceivable in the relevant sense.
by Andrew Botterell.
Ph.D.
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Allen, Sophie Rebecca. "Causation and the mind : metaphysical presuppositions in the philosophy of mind". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.392097.
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Hurley, Josie. "The Transgender Person and Pictures of the Mind and Body: An Exploration of Thought Experiments, Transition, and Bad Faith". Thesis, School of Liberal Arts, 2023. https://ro.uow.edu.au/tharts/10.
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In this thesis, the experience of being a transgender person is viewed and imagined through two different ‘pictures’ of the mind and body: The Dualist Picture, which is operative in Descartes’s and Locke’s philosophy, and The Expressivist Picture, whose primary representatives in this thesis are Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell. These two pictures are pretheoretical ways of organising reality, and it will be shown, that when a different picture is taken as the base model for what a person, or self, is, there are ripple effects for how a transgender person comes to understand and reflect upon their experience. At the centre of each of the two parts of this thesis is a thought experiment from the respective picture of that part. The first is Locke’s The Prince and the Cobbler, and the second is Cavell’s The Guises. These two thought experiments both describe a kind of personal identity transformation related to the distinction between mind and body, what could more colloquially be called a body swap. Reflection on each of these thought experiments reveals that each picture leads to radically different notions of personal identity, of what a ‘transition’ of the self might be, and of what gender is and how it operates. This thesis also provides considerations of how the distortion of pictures can lead to what Sartre calls bad faith, a self-conception that fails to balance contrasting understandings of oneself, as an object amongst other objects on the one hand and as a subject capable of choice and change on the other hand. This thesis does not make value judgments on the pictures discussed, but rather calls for alternating between these pictures, or for a carousel-like use of pictures, to provide a more wide and rich understanding of self, especially for the transgender individual.
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Quevedo, Isabela. "Normative Dualism and the Definition of Art". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_hontheses/6.
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Defining art has been one of philosophy of art’s biggest projects. However, no definition offered has achieved to account for all objects we consider art. In this paper, I argue that normative dualism, an unjustifiable Western prejudice for the mental, plays a big part in this failure. The division between fine art and utilitarian and “low” art has been perpetuated because the former is associated with the mental processes involved in its appreciation and, thus, considered more valuable. Theories of art also tend to exclude production (a physical process), concentrating mostly on the appreciation of art (a mental process). Ridding theory of the bias of normative dualism, by abolishing the division that sets fine art apart as more valuable and writing theory that takes art production into consideration, is the only way art theory will succeed in accurately describing art objects.
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Li, Oliver. "Neuroscience and the soul : A study of physicalism and dualism with respect to the mind/body problem and Christian beliefs". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Religionsfilosofi, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-175783.
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Matier, Colin Paul. "The mind-independence of truth". Thesis, Queen's University Belfast, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.335453.
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Buttars, Simon. "The epiphenomenal mind". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2003. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/58425/.
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The Epiphenomenal Mind is both a deflationary attack on the powers of the human mind and a defence of human subjectivity. It is deflationary because in the thesis I argue that consciousness is an epiphenomenal consequence of events in the brain. It is a defence of human subjectivity because I argue that the mind is sui generis real, irreducible, and largely an endogenous product (i.e. not dependent on society or its resources). Part I is devoted to arguing that the conscious mind is epiphenomenal. Arguing from, the irreducibility of mental states, the causal closure of the physical domain, and the principle of causal explanatory exclusion, I seek to demonstrate that all theories of mental causation necessarily violate one or more of these premises. Contemporary approaches to mental causation come under two broad categories, those that argue that mental events are supervenient on physical events (such as Davidson, Kim and Horgan) and those (like Haskar) who argue that the mind is an emergent property of the brain. Supervenience based theories, I argue, end up reducing mental states in their search for a theory of mental causation and emergence based theories end up violating the principle of the causal closure of the physical. In part II, I explore some of the consequences of epiphenomenalism for social theory. This exploration comes in the context of a defence of human subjectivity against (i.) those sociological imperialists who view the mind and self as a 'gift of society', and (ii.) social situationalists who have abandoned the concept of action and an interest in 'what's in the head' of the actor, in favour of a concept of social action which views behaviour as action only to the extent that it is socially meaningful. The conclusion is that the social sciences should return to an interpretative style (Weberian) methodology.
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Tiarks, Peter Geoffrey Caspar. ""The intangible commons of the mind"? : the problem of dualism in narratives of information enclosure". Thesis, Durham University, 2012. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3629/.
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In this thesis, I argue that the nascent politics of Intellectual Property is poorly served through attempts to conceive IP rights as an “enclosure of the intangible commons of the mind” and highlight a number of problems with the enclosure/commons dialectic more generally. To this end, it tries to indicate some new possible directions for the politics of IP, based on the insights of pragmatist philosophy and Actor-Network Theory. Such insights, I argue, allow us to interrogate questions about IP along two axes that the enclosure/commons dialectic neglects. A move away from the “intangible commons” allows us to focus on the very material way in which many of the harms of IP rights play out, and on IP's contentious function as a regualtor of objects, bodies and technologies. Second, it allows for an interrogation of the epistemological question of whether knowledge is considered to have been created or discovered, a distinction which is of vital importance to the question of whether any give sort of knowledge will be protected by an IP right. In order to address these difficulties, I argue that, instead of seeing knowledge as a sort of substance, we should instead see it in terms of practice and relations. Ideas, I argue, are not things, but assemblages of materials. This perspective is developed and illustrated through a number of case studies. I examine the history of copyright, showing that its emergence was not as a means of granting rights to ideas, but instead as a method of controlling the circulation of books. The notion of knowledge as a substance, I argue, was introduced only later, as a way of legitimating and naturalising this system. I offer a similar account of the information commons, an idea that developed from the tendency to frame issues of internet regulation in terms of applying the law to a particular place – cyberspace. Finally, I examine the controversy surrounding the Google Book Search project. I argue that the attempted settlement should be understood as a combination of two different systems of control. Again, the language of substance obscures this insight, presenting the settlement as a compromise over access to knowledge. I conclude by arguing that this theoretical critique is also a political critique – that a politics of IP which gave up on the idea of knowledge of substance would necessarily have to focus more on the specific parties and practices that are threatened by IP rights.
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Sitek, Jessica Lynn. "DUALISM VS. MATERIALISM; TWO INADEQUATE PICTURES OF HUMAN NATURE". Master's thesis, Temple University Libraries, 2010. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/94023.
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ReligionM.A.
This discussion aims to demonstrate how the project of identifying the nature of humanity is ongoing. The dominant models have their own flaws to contend with, and in the end we are still left uncertain of what constitutes our nature. Of the two views vying for prominence (dualism vs. materialism) neither is indubitable, nevertheless their are faithful proponents on each side. In a debate of belief vs. theory we see these seemingly disparate realms come together in a resignation to faith that their option is an adequate representation of human nature.
Temple University--Theses
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O'Conaill, Donnchadh. "Phenomenology, philosophy of mind and the subject". Thesis, Durham University, 2010. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/338/.
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I propose to develop a phenomenologically-informed ontological model of the subject of experiences. This model will attempt to explain how it is possible for a subject to have experiences with a subjective character, which are like something for their subject. It will also address how the subject can have experiences whose subjective character plays an intentional role, making the subject aware of objects. The subjective character of experiences and their intentionality have both been widely discussed in the philosophy of mind. However, these discussions have focused on whether or not these features can be explained in naturalistic or physicalistic terms. As a result, there has been relatively little detailed description of the subjective character of experiences. In particular, complex experiential states such as those involving a combination of different kinds of experience have been neglected in the recent literature. There has also been little discussion of how we can be aware, not just of individual objects, but of situations, and indeed how our everyday awareness of objects involves an awareness of the world as the background to all our activities. In order to provide detailed descriptions of the subjective character and the intentionality of experiences, I shall turn to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Husserl developed concepts and techniques for studying the subjective character of intentional experiences independently of their non-experiential aspects. I shall use these techniques to focus on the subject qua experiencer, and on experiences as states or episodes which are like something for the subject. By studying the subject in this way, I shall provide a model of subjectivity, the ontological relation holding between a subject and its experiences. I shall argue that subjectivity can be explained by appealing to the temporality of experiences, the way they flow in a stream of consciousness. Every subject has a temporal structure which is the form of its particular stream of consciousness. What it is for a subject to have an experience is for that experience to pass through this temporal structure. I shall also examine how a subject can have experiences which are objective, that is, which make the subject aware of objects as having more than the features directly presented to the subject. One view is that to explain objectivity, we must adopt a special perspective on the world, allowing us to compare how objects appear to us with how they really are. I argue that we do not need to appeal to such a special perspective. Our everyday awareness of objects and of the world is essentially structured by a sense of objectivity. Lastly, I shall address a problem that arises for any transcendental study of the conditions for the possibility of our awareness of the world. This is the paradox of subjectivity, the problem of understanding how the one subject can be both a part of the world and that which makes sense of the entire world. I shall argue that applying phenomenological techniques can help us to understand how the one subject can answer to both of these descriptions. This thesis will thus use phenomenological methods to develop an ontological model which can explain certain key features of the subject. In doing so, it will serve both as a contribution to the philosophy of mind, and as an illustration of what can be gained by applying phenomenological methods in this area.
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Davies, Mark. "Narrow content in the philosophy of mind". Thesis, Swansea University, 2009. https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa43049.
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My thesis examines the notion of narrow content in the philosophy of mind. Narrowcontent is defined as a type of mental state that is shared between internal physicalduplicates in Twin Earth-type thought experiments. In these thought experiments,changes in the physical and/or social environments of the duplicates are usually takento have the result that the contents of certain of the duplicates’ mental states, e.g.,beliefs, etc., are different. The upshot of this is that intemalism with regards tomental content seems to be refuted, as the duplicates concerned share an identity ofinternal physical properties, then if intemalism about mental content is true, theirmental states should also be content-identical. However, despite this possibility, itseems to me that there is still a strong intuition that the duplicates in these TwinEarth-type situations do share type-identical mental states which can be individuatedby the states’ narrow content. The aim of the thesis is to examine several of the mostpopular construals of narrow content in the literature, to ascertain whether there is aconstrual that provides an adequate narrow content. To help with this task I suggestthree conditions of adequacy that a narrow content must satisfy in order to beconsidered adequate. I then choose my favoured construal and give a version of itwhich will hopefully be seen as an improvement on the other construals (by satisfyingall the adequacy conditions). It will be argued that my version of the narrow contentconstrual will provide, not just an adequate narrow content, at least in relation to asubject’s perceptual experience, but perhaps also necessary and sufficient conditionsfor a mental state, such as a perceptual belief, to have the specific content that it has.
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Marvell, Leon, of Western Sydney Hawkesbury University, Faculty of Social Inquiry i School of Humanities. "Hermes Recidivus: a postmodern reading of the recrudescence of the Hermetic imaginary". THESIS_FSI_HUM_Marvell_L.xml, 1998. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/114.
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It is proposed that there exist unmistakable resonances of the Hermetic world-view in much of the science of the modern period. Hermes Recidivus examines key figurations operating within both the imaginaries of Hermeticism and modern(ist) science with a view to developing a postmodern critical position in regard to the discourse of the modernist scientific project. It is proposed that a re-examination of the notions surrounding these key figurations may provide new hermeneutical tools, and that the imaginary of Hermeticism represents a potentially rich resource from which to develop alternative modes of critical enquiry. It is furthermore proposed that the mechanism by which these Hermetic resonances are perpetuated within the discourse of modernist science takes the form of a logic of the imaginary associated with key figurations within Hermeticism. Certain figural elements associated with the Hermetic imaginary seem to possess a constancy that travels across temporal and disciplinary barriers, encouraging the assumption that these figures are central organising principles within both Hermeticism and modern science. Specifically these figurations are those of the anima mundi and the Gnostic 'alien light' or spintheros. It is proposed that these figurations take the form of 'ideal objects' within both the discourses of Hermeticism and modernist science. The individual chapters respectively examine the relevance of the Hermetic imaginary to Artificial Intelligence research and cybernetic theory; occidental and oriental traditions of the 'subtle body' and their relevance to developing a postmodern perspective on the question of mind-body dualism; the 'metaphysical geometry' of key figures within the Hermetic and Kabbalistic traditions and their resonances within mathematical 'catastrophe theory' as developed by Rene Thom; the Hermetic alchemy of Robbert Fludd as revealed in his text Truth's Golden Harrow, and its relevance in regard to the subject-object split of modern(ist) scientific consciousness and, finally, the influence of Kabbalistic and Hermetic figuration on the development of Leibniz's monadological philosophy and on the notion of the 'field' in contemporary physical theoryDoctor of Philosophy (PhD)