Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „Directors”
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1
Meiliana, Meiliana, i Iven Julia. "Analisis Pengaruh Struktur Dewan Direksi terhadap Kinerja Perusahaan". Global Financial Accounting Journal 6, nr 1 (30.04.2022): 170. http://dx.doi.org/10.37253/gfa.v6i1.6683.
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Purpose - This study aims to determine the effect of the board structure on company performance. This study has 6 independent variables, which consist of the size of the board of directors, independent directors, board of directors meetings, board of directors education, female directors, and managerial ownership.
Research Method - The sample used in this research is quantitative data with a purposive sampling technique. Based on the criteria, the samples collected from 473 companies in the period 2014-2018. The sample data is tested using panel data regression.
Findings - This study concludes that all the independent variables have no significant effect on company performance. Board of directors still needs to be controlled to achieve good performance. Independent directors rarely interfere on other director decision. Board of director’s meetings only incurs unnecessary expenses. Board of director's education is just a qualification. Women's board of directors in each country could have difference effect because of cultural differences. There are still many directors in public companies that do not have ownership in the company, so there is still no visible effect on managerial ownership.
Implication - The findings of this study imply that corporate governance still needs to be strengthened to improve company performance. There are still many problems within the company due to poor governance.
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Bar-Hava, Keren, Feng Gu i Baruch Lev. "Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships". Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55, nr 3 (28.01.2019): 931–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000085.
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We examine investors’ preference for directors serving on fewer versus more boards (“busy directors”) by measuring market reaction to busy directors’ resignations at the companies that still keep these directors on the board. We find a positive reaction implying a preference for fewer directorships. The reaction is more positive when the need for the director’s services is greater, when the resignation frees up more of the director’s time, and when the director is of higher quality. Furthermore, we find that following their resignation, directors increase their board responsibilities/leadership at firms that still retain them and seek no board appointments elsewhere.
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CHAN, Raymond Siu Yeung, Daniel HO i Angus YOUNG. "Rethinking the Relevance or Irrelevance of Directors’ Duties in China: The Intersection between Culture and Laws". Asian Journal of Law and Society 1, nr 1 (28.01.2014): 183–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/als.2013.5.
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AbstractThis paper investigates how culture affects people’s attitudes towards directors’ duties in the People’s Republic of China by surveying a sample of Chinese business executives. If cultural practices lead people to behave differently from what the law prescribes, it is a serious regulatory oversight. Our results suggest that Chinese cultural values do matter when it comes to the perception of breaches of directors’ duties. Specifically, we find that respondents who identify with moral-discipline related traditional Chinese values are more lenient to the chairman breaching his director's duties, whereas respondents who subscribe to modern Chinese values are less receptive to the director failing to report the chairman’s contravention of his director’s duties. These results suggest that it is imperative for China’s law-makers to rethink their approach to regulating directors’ duties instead of the wholesale transplantation of laws from Western countries.
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Veltrop, Dennis B., Eric Molleman, Reggy Hooghiemstra i Hans van Ees. "The Relationship Between Tenure and Outside Director Task Involvement: A Social Identity Perspective". Journal of Management 44, nr 2 (25.03.2015): 445–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206315579510.
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Drawing from corporate governance research and social identity theory, the authors argue that the relationship between outside directors’ time in office and outside director task involvement is more complex than generally anticipated. By using a unique multisource data set composed of peer ratings provided by fellow outside directors rating a focal director’s task involvement, this study analyzes director task involvement at the individual director level of analysis. The authors propose and empirically demonstrate that outside director tenure has an inverted U-shaped relationship with outside director task involvement that is moderated by a director’s social identification with the organization. As such, the authors demonstrate that social identification with the organization provides a critical contingency for the curvilinear relationship between outside director tenure and outside director task involvement. Findings suggest that outside directors who socially identify with the organization are more likely to grow “stale in the saddle” at lower levels of tenure. These findings provide support for the merit of analyzing outside directors at the individual level of analysis and suggest that a “one-size-fits-all” approach may not be most appropriate in assessing the effects of tenure on outside director functioning.
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Balavar, Elham. "Comparative Analysis of Qualifications and Disqualifications of Directors: Commercial Act of Iran and Common Law Countries". Malaysian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (MJSSH) 9, nr 4 (30.04.2024): e002622. http://dx.doi.org/10.47405/mjssh.v9i4.2622.
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The directors of companies oversee almost all business operations and are the most important figures in corporate governance. Every company relies on its directors and board to succeed. Directors are crucial to a company since it is the work of directors to supervise and manage its operations. Director duties must be understood and executed responsibly. A person can be a director if meets legal conditions. This study meticulously compares the director's qualification and disqualification under the Commercial Act of Iran to common law countries including Australia, the UK, Malaysia, and Singapore. Such a comparison would reveal whether parts of the Iranian Commercial Act needed change or improvement.
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Mitrović, Milena. "Dužnosti direktora u održivom korporativnom upravljanju". Pravo i privreda 61, nr 3 (23.09.2023): 844–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.55836/pip_23308a.
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The author addresses the issue of directors’ duties in the context of sustainable corporate governance. The Proposal for a Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence provides for an extension of the duties of the director, which implies that the director takes into account sustainability issues, including human rights, climate change and environmental impacts. In this way, the director’s duty of care would be harmonised at EU level, which has not been the case so far due to the existence of different concepts of the director’s duty and the company’s interest in the member states. The Proposal was preceded by a Study on Directors’ Duties and Sustainable Corporate Governance. The Study was heavily criticised. The Study proposes a reform of directors’ duties which, if adopted in its current form, could have far-reaching consequences for corporate governance. The paper also looks at the possible consequences of a change in the director’s duty of care in the way provided for in the Proposal for a Corporate sustainability due diligence directive. Finally, the paper considers whether it is appropriate to harmonise directors’ duties at EU level.
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Yudy, Yudy, i Yulius Kurnia Susanto. "KEBIJAKAN HUTANG, TATA KELOLA PERUSAHAAN DAN MANAJEMEN LABA AKRUAL". Jurnal Equity 21, nr 2 (13.04.2019): 107. http://dx.doi.org/10.34209/.v21i2.638.
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The purpose of the study was to obtain empirical evidence about the effect of debt policy, director size, director independence, institutional ownership, and female directors on accrual earnings management. Samples were obtained through purposive sampling method as many as 102 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2016. The results showed that debt policy had a significant effect on accrual earnings management. While the director's size, director's independence, institutional ownership, and female directors do not have a significant effect on accrual earnings management. Management does not dare to make accrual earnings management because they get close supervision from creditors.
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Yudy, Yudy, i Yulius Kurnia Susanto. "KEBIJAKAN HUTANG, TATA KELOLA PERUSAHAAN DAN MANAJEMEN LABA AKRUAL". Equity 21, nr 2 (19.06.2019): 107. http://dx.doi.org/10.34209/equ.v21i2.638.
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The purpose of the study was to obtain empirical evidence about the effect of debt policy, director size, director independence, institutional ownership, and female directors on accrual earnings management. Samples were obtained through purposive sampling method as many as 102 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2016. The results showed that debt policy had a significant effect on accrual earnings management. While the director's size, director's independence, institutional ownership, and female directors do not have a significant effect on accrual earnings management. Management does not dare to make accrual earnings management because they get close supervision from creditors.
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Burt, Aaron, Christopher Hrdlicka i Jarrad Harford. "How Much Do Directors Influence Firm Value?" Review of Financial Studies 33, nr 4 (24.06.2019): 1818–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz068.
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Abstract The value a director provides to a firm is empirically difficult to establish. We estimate that value by exploiting the commonality in idiosyncratic returns of firms linked by a director and show that, on average, a director’s influence causes variation in firm value of almost 1% per year. The return commonality is not due to industry or other observable economic links. Variation in the availability of information on shared directors and a placebo test exploiting the timing of shared directors provide further identification. The results also imply that the directorial labor market does not fully assess directors in real time. (JEL G34, G14)
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Xue, Liu. "Rethinking and Constructing the Mechanism of Directors’ Exemption from Liability under the Revision of the Chinese Company Law". Lex Russica, nr 6 (11.06.2022): 138–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/1729-5920.2022.187.6.138-150.
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Since its introduction, Chinese Company Law has played a great role in the development of Chinese business system, but with the development of the economy, continuous technological innovation and changes in the world environment, the current Company Law can no longer meet Chinese current economic development and needs to be improved and modified. By examining the current legislative situation in China, the provisions on directors’ liability in China are too strict, which seriously affects the directors’ business judgment in favor of the company’s development in the process of business decision making and does not provide the company directors with the protection they deserve, but instead applies a more stringent standard of liability to directors. At present, there is a double lack of statutory exemption system and intentional exemption system for directors’ liability in Chinese corporate legal system, and in the field of practice, there is a misinterpretation of the judgment standard of directors’ liability for diligence, which needs to be clarified. By analyzing the value and function of the director’s liability exemption system, the article seeks ways to solve the problem of director’s liability exemption, protects directors from unfortunate punishment by introducing business judgment rules, reasonably constructs the intentional exemption mechanism of director’s liability, and clarifies the judgment standard of director’s liability for diligence. The director liability exemption system is reasonably constructed so as to improve the corporate governance problem in China and promote the internationalization level of Chinese company law.
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Wang, De Lu, i Ping Juan Liang. "Empirical Study on the Independent Director System' Effectiveness on the Corporate Performance of Listed Companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange". Advanced Materials Research 468-471 (luty 2012): 1595–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.468-471.1595.
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This essay has chosen 568 companies listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) as research samples. And it empirically analyzed the independent director system' effectiveness on the corporate performance. The result indicates that the proportion of independent directors is not significantly correlated with corporate performance, and that the independent directors' compensation is significantly positively correlated with the company’s performance and that the meeting attendance of independent directors is not significantly positively correlated with firm’s performance. At last, two proposals are put forward: firstly, broaden the company information's delivery channels to independent directorst; secondly, perfect the incentive and constraint mechanism of independent directors
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Wu, Tsung-Che, i Ming-hsiang Huang. "The Effect of Director's Individual and Family Shareholdings on Firm Performance". International Journal of Financial Research 9, nr 4 (21.08.2018): 51. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/ijfr.v9n4p51.
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The relation between firm performance and shareholding is a critical issue in corporate governance. In this paper, we examine if significant associations exist between firm performance and (1) directors’ shareholdings or (2) directors’ family shareholdings among Taiwanese listed firms. After addressing for possible endogeneity and controlling for firm specific variables, we find a positive association between executive director’s shareholding and firm performance. Consistent with incentive effect in agency theory, this result indicates that executive directors have incentive to maximize firms’ value. Also, we find that executive directors’ family shareholding is positively related to firm performance, which implies that executive directors may be motivated by their family members to improve firm value. The results also imply that the majority-minority agency problem can be mitigated when director’s family welfare is at stake. In addition, we divide research sample into subsets to accommodate the effect of mandatory independent director regulation in Taiwan since 2007.
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Cheng, Ching Hung, Zhe Huang, Siqi Lin i Hangyu Wu. "Analysis of Corporation’s Financial Fraud and Independent Directors’ Decision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory". BCP Business & Management 31 (5.11.2022): 195–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v31i.2561.
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The case of Kangmei Pharmaceutical Company’s financial fraud reveals several important issues in the independent director system in China. It is valuable to study these issues separately from the corporation and the independent director’s perspective, as both wish to maximize their profitability. This paper applies evolutionary game theory to construct two games between the corporation and independent directors, and {honest, dishonest} is the strategy set for the corporation in both games, while {dutiful, undutiful} and {continue, resign} are the strategy sets for the independent directors in game 1 and game 2 respectively. The evolutionary stability strategies obtained from these two games and simulation results show that if the independent directors should be dutiful and not quit their positive while the corporation should never consider making any financial fraud, then the independent directors and the corporation will get the optimal benefit. The results suggest that the award mechanism and reputation mechanism for independent directors should be established and fully completed to improve the independent director system.
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Wang, Yuwei, Shang-Yin Yang i Chia-Wei Chen. "The impact of directors’ liability insurance on board meeting attendance". Corporate Ownership and Control 19, nr 3 (2022): 92–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv19i3art6.
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We study the relationship between directors’ liability insurance and board meeting attendance. We find that directors’ liability insurance and board meeting attendance are positively associated. This suggests that directors’ liability insurance may actually serve a governance role because an insurer definitely has incentives to thoroughly scrutinize the insured. As a result, director’s board meeting attendance rate increases because more monitoring of directors leads to more responsible behaviors of directors. With 98,524 yearly observations at the director level and 8,968 yearly observations at the firm level of listed firms in Taiwan during the period from 2008 to 2015, our empirical findings suggest that, on average, the board meeting attendance rate of insured firms is 2.9 percent higher than that of uninsured firms.
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Shubhan, M. Hadi. "CHARGING DIRECTOR OF COMPANY WITH PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY FOR COMPANY MISMANAGEMENT". Jurnal Hukum dan Peradilan 8, nr 3 (12.12.2019): 353. http://dx.doi.org/10.25216/jhp.8.3.2019.353-370.
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This study aims to examine the theories, regulations, and practices at the commercial court in Indonesia regarding the possibility of charging director of limited liability companies (LLC, Perseroan Terbatas(PT)) with personal bankruptcy as a form of personal liability due to mismanagement causing the company to go bankrupt. This is an interesting issue to study because, in general, the rights and obligations of the company, and specifically LLC in this article, are separated from the rights and obligations of the directors. Therefore, the company’s liability cannot be requested upon its directors’ personal liability. Nonetheless, this general principle is revocable if the director makes an error which causes the company to go bankrupt. This study uses the normative (doctrinal) legal research method with statute approach, conceptual approach, and cases approach. The study results revealed that directors could be asked for personal liability if they create problems which lead to a company going bankrupt. The director's liability comes in the form of the obligation to file bankruptcy for the director him/herself. In this study, several cases were found that punished the director with the director's personal bankruptcy, like in the case of personal bankruptcy of director PT QSAR and in the case personal bankruptcy of director of PT CHK.
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AFAM-MEBEI BLESSING OMEBERE i EBIAGHAN, Orits Frank. "EMPIRICAL NEXUS BETWEEN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ATTRIBUTES AND DIRECTORS REMUNERATION: NIGERIAN EVIDENCE". Finance & Accounting Research Journal 4, nr 3 (18.10.2022): 58–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.51594/farj.v4i3.385.
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This study is aimed at investigating the relationship between corporate governance attributes and director’s remuneration in Nigerian quoted firms. Specifically the study attempted to proffer answers to questions as it relates to the impact of board size, firm size, board independence, chief executive officer duality on directors' remuneration. Secondary data were extracted from the financial statements and accounts of the sampled firms for a 25years period spanning 1997-2021. And analyzed using Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) E-views version 10 The study revealed that Board size, firm size, and board independence exerted positive effect on directors' remuneration, whereas the presence of a chief executive officer duality had negative influence on directors' remuneration. It was recommended that the position of Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 2020 as it concerns directors’ remuneration should be carefully adhered to and that the directors' remuneration must not be altered by any director irrespective of their positions in the organization. It is concluded that the chief executive officer duality should not be used as a yardstick in the determination of directors’ remuneration rather the board size, firm size, board independence should be used as a measure for fixing directors’ remuneration.
Keywords: Director’s Remuneration, Board Size, Firm Size, Board Independence, Chief Executive Officer Duality.
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Acero, Isabel, i Nuria Alcalde. "DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION. WHAT REALLY MATTERS?" Journal of Business Economics and Management 21, nr 1 (28.01.2020): 180–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/jbem.2020.11788.
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In the current scenario of increasing social inequality, the debate over the compensation received by directors and executives of large listed companies, and its justification, has intensified. Drawing on Agency Theory and Human Capital Theory, a multilevel analytical technique is used in this paper to examine the influence of firm-level variables and director-level variables on the individual compensation of the members of the board. The results obtained for the continental European context (Spain in particular) partially support the Human Capital Theory. Nevertheless, there is no evidence supportive of Agency Theory, as corporate governance mechanisms do not contribute to moderate the compensation of directors and there is no relationship between corporate performance and the compensation of directors. The analyses by subsamples (categories of directors) reveal that non-executive director’s compensation seems to be set for a group of individuals as a whole, depending mainly on firm-level characteristics, whereas executive director compensation is more based on the unique characteristics that a particular executive brings to the board.
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O’Keeffe, Julie. "Small College Library Directors: Getting in the Door and Surviving on the Job". College & Research Libraries 59, nr 2 (1.03.1998): 139–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/crl.59.2.139.
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This article reports findings from a 1996 survey that examined job preparedness of library directors at four-year colleges in twelve midwestern states. The survey measured: (1) qualifications possessed at the time each person obtained his or her first director’s position; and (2) the skills and abilities directors felt were essential to surviving and doing well in their positions. One hundred fifty-eight directors returned questionnaires for a response rate of 84 percent. Participants in the 1995–1996 College Library Director Mentor Program also supplied a list of essential skills for the first year in a new position.
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Chang, Jui-Chin, i Huey-Lian Sun. "Reputation and regulation effects on director turnover and change of directorships". Review of Accounting and Finance 15, nr 3 (8.08.2016): 274–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-12-2014-0138.
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Purpose This study aims to examine the reputation effect by assessing whether fraudulent financial reporting is associated with high board turnover and significant loss of directorship held by directors affiliated with fraud firms. Although the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) and major stock exchanges enhance board independence and formalize committee requirements, the new rules also create a high demand for qualified directors in the director labor market. Thus, this study further examines the change in the reputation effect of directors at fraud firms after SOX. Design/methodology/approach This paper intends to answer two research questions: Do directors suffer significant loss of reputation when firms are caught in fraudulent financial reporting schemes? Is the loss of reputation of directors at fraud firms affected by the regulation of SOX? To examine the reputation effect, this paper investigates the differences in director turnover and loss of directorships between fraud and non-fraud firms. To examine the regulation effect, this paper investigates the differences in director turnover and loss of directorships of directors at fraud firms by comparing non-fraud firms’ director turnover and directorship loss between the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. Findings Consistent with the reputation effect, this paper found that director turnover at fraud firms is significantly higher than that at non-fraud firms. It also found that the loss of directorships of directors at fraud firms is not significantly higher, which is consistent with findings of some prior research. The paper also investigates whether this reputation effect has changed after SOX but found no significant difference in the reputation effect at fraud firms. In conjunction with prior research that finds an increased demand for qualified directors in the labor market after SOX, the results imply that this shortage of qualified directors does not help fraud firms discipline directors after SOX. Research limitations/implications The findings are limited by the sample selection of only the initial litigation of US firms which are charged of fraudulent financial reporting. The findings suggest that SOX creates an increased demand for qualified directors, and consequently results in a shortage of qualified directors in the post-SOX labor market. The shortage of qualified directors slows the director turnover and weakens firms’ ability to replace culpable directors. Future research is needed on how governance practices might contribute to the lack of turnover among board members and how to promote ongoing overhauls of boards. Practical implications The decision process for removing a director is complicated and lacks transparency. Shareholders often do not know the real reason for a director’s departure from the board. To increase the accountability of individual directors and information transparency, new rules are needed for the disclosure of evaluations of individual directors’ governance effectiveness. Originality/value Survey of previous studies (Helland, 2006; Srinivasan, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007) indicates mixed evidence on reputation effect and no evidence so far on the SOX regulation effect. This study fills the gap by extending the findings of prior research to investigate the reputation effect along with the regulation effect of SOX at fraud firms. Different from findings of some previous studies (Helland, 2006; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007), this paper provides evidence consistent with the reputation effect. It also provides new evidence on the unintended consequences of SOX on director turnover.
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Schandy, Javier, Leonardo Steinfeld, Benigno Rodríguez, Juan P. González i Fernando Silveira. "Enhancing Parasitic Interference Directional Antennas with Multiple Director Elements". Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2019 (21.02.2019): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/7546785.
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The Swedish Institute of Computer Science Parasitic Interference Directional Antenna (SPIDA) is an electrically switched directional antenna that uses switched beamforming techniques to shape the antenna radiation pattern focusing the transmitted power in a given direction, increasing the maximum gain, and simultaneously reducing interference in other directions. This work extends the use of the SPIDA antenna, showing that using multiple director elements results in an improved performance in terms of maximum gain, narrower Half Power Beamwidth (HPBW), and a lower module of the S11 parameter. Measurements show that using three directors improves the maximum gain about 1.4 dB (6.8 dBi for the single director element antenna against 8.2 dBi for the antenna with three directors); the input impedance matching was also improved, obtaining a module of S11 parameter of -9.8 dB at the central frequency (fc = 2.4525 GHz) against -7.5 dB for the antenna with a single director element. Finally, new intermediate directions of transmission can be achieved by using two successive director elements, where the power is focused in the bisectrix of the angle formed by the two directors. This converts a six-sector antenna like the SPIDA into a twelve-sector antenna without changing the hardware.
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Cullinan, Charles P., Lois Mahoney i Pamela B. Roush. "Directors & Corporate Social Responsibility: Joint Consideration of Director Gender and the Director’s Role". Social and Environmental Accountability Journal 39, nr 2 (4.03.2019): 100–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0969160x.2019.1586556.
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Walther, Axel, Hannah Möltner i Michèle Morner. "Non-executive director’s motivation to continue serving on boards: a self-determination theory perspective". Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 17, nr 1 (6.02.2017): 64–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-05-2016-0120.
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Purpose This paper aims to identify distinct motivation profiles among non-executive directors and explores the reasons why non-executive directors continue to serve on boards of directors. Design/methodology/approach The analysis is based on a multiple case study in the context of German supervisory boards. The authors develop their primary insights from semi-structured interviews with 53 non-executive directors. Findings The findings indicate that non-executive director motivation revolves around material incentives, reputation, meaningfulness, congruence with firm goals and enjoyment. Three distinct motivation profiles emerge from the analysis, with each profile exhibiting a set of unique reasons to continue serving on boards. Research limitations/implications Future research needs to test for the statistical representativeness of the findings and their performance implications, preferably in a shareholder-oriented governance context. Originality/value The study introduces a psychological angle to the debate about non-executive director motivation. The contributions include going beyond a bi-polar distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation and draw attention to how motivation profiles relate to non-executive director’s intention to continue serving on boards.
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Abdul Wahab, Effiezal Aswadi, Mohd Faizal Jamaludin, Dian Agustia i Iman Harymawan. "Director Networks, Political Connections, and Earnings Quality in Malaysia". Management and Organization Review 16, nr 3 (lipiec 2020): 687–724. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/mor.2020.26.
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AbstractThis article investigates the relationship between director networks and earnings quality in Malaysia. Using data on 4,416 individual directors who served on the boards of 745 firms listed on Bursa, Malaysia during 2011, we map the entire network of directors and generate measures to reflect the size and quality of information within the network. We find a negative and significant relationship between the overall connectedness of a director's network and the firm's earnings quality. In addition, we find a negative and significant relationship between the political connectedness of the director's network and earnings quality. Our results are robust for different measures of earnings quality.
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Aprilia, Audrey Winona, Renita Febriany, Luciana Haryono i Nany Chandra Marsetio. "Pengaruh Karakteristik Direksi Terhadap Kinerja Perusahaan yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia". Jurnal Akuntansi 12, nr 2 (27.10.2020): 233–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.28932/jam.v12i2.2800.
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Directors are human resources who play an important role in maintaining the long-term sustainability of the company's business. Thus, this study aims to determine board size, CEO tenure, and foreign director on company performance in the non-financial industry on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-2018 with multiple linear regression analysis using 1,764 sample data from 294 companies. Contributions in this study using resource dependency theory, stewardship theory and foreign directors variables as indicators of independence. The results of the study board size have a significant positive effect on company performance, with an optimal number of 4-9 people because it can provide diverse perspectives and ideas in decision making. CEO tenure does not affect ROA and ROE because the president director tends to reject and avoid risks and company's performance is influenced by all directors, not just the president director. Foreign directors have a significant positive effect on ROA with an optimal percentage of 26-50% because they provide different perspectives on decision making, but does not affect ROE with 51-75% of the optimal amount because does not have large influence to influence decisions in improving company performance.
Keywords: Director’s Characteristics, Firm Performance, Resource Dependency Theory, Stewardship Theory.
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Sufiarina, Sufiarina, Muhammad Ali, Mufrina Mufrina, Ahmad Maulana i Hendry Frand Tia. "Legal Dynamics of Limited Liability Companies: Unveiling the Power of Commissioners and Shareholders to Take Legal Action Against Directors' Negligence". Unnes Law Journal 9, nr 2 (31.10.2023): 265–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.15294/ulj.v9i2.75526.
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The Limited Liability Company (LLC) is characterized by its distinct juridical entity, effectively segregating its management group from shareholders. Operating as a business entity, the primary goal of an LLC is profit generation. Functioning as a corporate legal entity with legal personality, an LLC comprises three key organizational components: the General Shareholders’ Meeting, Directors, and Commissioners. Directors, or the Board of Directors (BOD), bear the responsibility of managing and representing the LLC both within and outside the legal realm. The position of BOD is mandated to be occupied by a natural person, or 'naturlijk person,' either as a single individual (Director) or collectively by two or more individuals (Board of Directors). Despite a stringent selection process for board positions, the inherent nature of directors as natural persons introduces the possibility of intentional or negligent errors in management, potentially leading to financial losses. In the face of such negligence, the pertinent question arises: can a commissioner (Board of Commissioners) and/or shareholders initiate legal action against a director or BOD, whose legal standing is as the company’s representative? To address this query, a comprehensive library research initiative is undertaken, focusing on the analysis of Article 97 and Article 98 of the Limited Liability Company’s legal statutes. This examination aims to elucidate the viable courses of action that can be pursued against the company in the event of directorial negligence. The research findings reveal that specific commissioners and/or shareholders, in the absence of a director's power of attorney, are granted the authority by the LLC’s legal statutes to initiate legal proceedings against the director or board of directors in a court of law.
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Major, Marci L. "Building Identity in Collegiate Midlevel Choral Ensembles". Journal of Research in Music Education 64, nr 4 (19.11.2016): 435–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022429416672891.
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This study was designed to explore the director’s perspective on the role organizational images play in social identity development in midlevel choral ensembles. Using a phenomenological methodology, I interviewed 10 current or former directors of midlevel choral ensembles from eight midwestern U.S. colleges and universities. Directors cited different choral configurations, high performance standards, unique group identity, strong personal connections, and good faculty relationships as the primary tools used to build identity. Directors also revealed their perceived challenges with regard to midlevel choirs: director continuity, discrepancy in student musical ability and dedication, negative perceptions, and the need for director flexibility. No director mentioned preparing students to sing in the top ensemble as a purpose or priority of the midlevel ensemble; however, many stated that a good midlevel choir achieved this result and also raised the quality of the entire choral program. Implications of these findings reveal the importance of recognizing and addressing a midlevel identity phenomenon and the impact identity building efforts can make to facilitate stronger midlevel ensembles.
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Nuansari, Shindy Dwita. "PERFORMANCE OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION, DIRECTOR EXPERIENCE, AND MODERATION EFFECTS OF BOARD CHARACTERISTICS, BIDDER CHARACTERISTICS, AND TYPE OF MERGER AND ACQUISITION". Manajemen Bisnis 10, nr 1 (27.08.2020): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.22219/jmb.v10i1.10788.
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This research focuses on influence of the experience of independent directors (two tier systems) on mergers acquisitions performance and considers several other factors as moderation. Purpose of this study was to determine the effect of the experience of independent directors to be moderated by board characteristics, bidder characteristics, and types of merger acquisitions on merger and acquisition performance and to be controlled by independent director’s age. Research obtained from the company's financial and annual report data in 2009 - 2019. The dependent variable used in this study was merger and acquisition performance. Independent variable used in this study is independent director experience. Moderating variables in this are board characteristics, bidder characteristics, mergers and acquisitions types. The results of this study proves that the experience of director experience positively influences performance of merger and acquisition, board and bidder characteristics, type of merger and acquisition strengthen the positive influence of the experience of independent directors on merger and acquisition performance.
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Alias, Norazlan, Mohd Hasimi Yaacob i Nahariah Jaffar. "Does Governance Structure Matter In Post-Spinoff?" 11th GLOBAL CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 11, nr 1 (9.12.2020): 34. http://dx.doi.org/10.35609/gcbssproceeding.2020.11(34).
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This study examines corporate governance role in the post spinoff from the perspective of the new entity or spinoff firm. Using yearly data of Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) listed firms that announced and completed their spinoff exercises, for the period of 1994 to 2015. We focused on the new entity or spinoff firm's governance structure represented by board size, number of independent director and director's ownership. No variables were significant in direct effect term but the number of independent directors and percentage of directors' ownership respectively interact positively significant with debt ratio on firm performance measured by return on assets (ROA). This study recommends more board of directors' ownership and independent directors respectively for the new entity to optimize its capital structure policy as reflected in firm's debt ratio as shown by an increase in firm performance following a spinoff. In other words, an increase in board of directors'ownership and independent directors in board composition would negate risk associated with increasing debt in firm's capital structure. Keywords: Board Structure, Ownership Structure, Spinoff
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Syukra, Rahmiyatus, i Agustin Fadjarenie. "Narsisme Direktur, Komposisi Komisaris Independen dan Gender Direktur Pada Kualitas Laporan Keuangan BUMN". E-Jurnal Akuntansi 32, nr 12 (26.12.2022): 3736. http://dx.doi.org/10.24843/eja.2022.v32.i12.p18.
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The quality of financial reports can be seen through the characteristics adopted, several characteristics that can be assessed, namely the narcissism of the director, the composition of the independent commissioners and the gender of the director. The research objective is to obtain empirical evidence of the influence of director narcissism, composition of independent commissioners and director gender on the quality of financial reports. The research was conducted at companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2014 – 2019. The research sample consisted of 180 observations. Data is processed using multiple linear regression analysis. The results showed that the director's narcissism and the composition of the independent commissioners had an effect on the quality of financial reports, while there was no effect on the gender of directors and the quality of financial reports.
Keywords: Narcissism Director; The Composition of Independent Commissioners; Gender Directors on the Quality of Financial Reports
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Ardillah, Kenny. "The Impact of Characteristics, Independence, Diversity, and Activities of the Board of Director on the Sustainable Development Goals Disclosure". Dinasti International Journal of Education Management And Social Science 4, nr 2 (11.01.2023): 210–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.31933/dijemss.v4i2.1584.
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The role of the board of director is very important in disclosing the Sustainable Development Goals because most of the company's leadership with a higher number of directors, the existence of independent directors, directors with diversity, and an adequate number of board of director meetings can determine the company's sustainability strategy. This study aims to analyze the commitment of the board of director to Sustainable Development Goals disclosure in public companies by proving the influence of characteristics (size of the board of director), independence (proportion of independent directors), diversity (presence of female directors), and activity of the board of director (number of board of director meetings) on Sustainable Development Goals disclosure. This research is a quantitative research with documentation as data collection method. The sample of this research is a financial sector public company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2019-2021. The data analysis method used in this study is multiple linear regression with the panel data approach. The results of this study are that there is a positive effect of the presence of directors at board of director meetings on the disclosure of Sustainable Development Goals which has been controlled by profitability and firm size. The results of other studies are that there is no effect of the size of the board of director, the proportion of independent directors, the presence of female directors, and the number of board of director meetings on the Sustainable Development Goals disclosure which have been controlled by profitability and firm size.
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De redacció, Equip. "Les opinions dels directors i directores de Papers". Papers. Revista de Sociologia 42 (1.07.1993): 131. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/papers.1996.
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Andersen, Angela, Alexandre Garel, Aaron Gilbert i Alireza Tourani-Rad. "Disentangling Director Attributes: Human Capital versus Social Capital of Directors". Journal of Risk and Financial Management 15, nr 8 (29.07.2022): 336. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/jrfm15080336.
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This study seeks to disentangle the human capital and the social capital of directors to improve our understanding of the value that directors bring to their boardroom. Employing social network analysis (SNA) to measure the social capital of directors and using a unique and comprehensive sample of New Zealand publicly listed firms over the period of 2000–2015, we find a positive and significant relationship between the human capital and the social capital of directors, where the human capital appears to predict changes in social capital. We contend that the growing literature in the area of corporate finance and governance investigating the impact of characteristics of directors on corporate outcomes, need to take note of the complementary impact that social capital can have in addition to human capital.
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Anyira, Kingsley Chukwuemeka, i Divine Sheriff Uchenna Joe. "Spotlight on Challenges and Prospect of Directing in Nollywood: A Decade’s Study (2006-2016)". UJAH: Unizik Journal of Arts and Humanities 21, nr 4 (20.05.2021): 100–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ujah.v21i4.6.
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The art of video film directing is all encompassing as the director deals with virtually all aspects of film production. This comes with herculean challenges that tend to mar the efforts of directors if not properly addressed. Film scholars cum critics have done a lot of work investing the challenges of the Nigerian Video Film industry with little or no effort to directly ascertain the peculiar challenges of each sector of the industry. To this effect, the paper seeks to source from the directors what these challenges have been over the decade in view and as well through the affected, proffer plausible suppositions asmeasure to ameliorate the identified challenges. In doing so, this paper adopts the view point that the director is the author of the film and thus engages the Survey research method wherein Personal interviews are employed as data collation tool and later analyzed with inferences made from the responses. Conclusively, it anchors on the directors’ views of possible ways to improve/enhance the director’s art in future productions.
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Shiyyab, Fadi Shehab, Ayah Mohammad Abed Alnabi, Abdallah Bader Mahmoud Alzoubi i Mohammad Jamal Azzam. "Beyond self-interest: Cognitive bias as a source of agency costs". Corporate and Business Strategy Review 4, nr 4, special issue (2023): 335–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbsrv4i4siart14.
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Agency theory posits that the separation of ownership and control in a company allows self-interested managers to pursue their own interests by taking advantage of their superior information compared to shareholders. In this paper, we present evidence that agency costs (i.e., flawed director decision-making) can arise because of directors’ limited competence and the problem of specification of objectives, independent of information asymmetry and director independence. Using a 2x2 experimental design addressed to 180 directors, we demonstrate that anchors (Angeletos & Huo, 2021) and the mechanism of fairness (Mussel et al., 2022) may cause directors to deviate from the rational choice that maximizes a given utility function. We argue that the decision-making process can undermine a director’s ability to effectively monitor by exploiting their limited rationality, and this aspect remains inadequately specified in existing agency models. Consequently, we contribute to the literature that examines the board as a decision-making group by showcasing how a focused analysis of the decision process can unveil new mechanisms within the governance process.
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Sudibyo, Aris, i Hendra Wijaya. "THE IMPACT OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS CHARACTERISTICS ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN MANUFACTURING COMPANIES ON IDX". International Journal of Advanced Research 9, nr 08 (31.08.2021): 121–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.21474/ijar01/13239.
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This study aims to determine the impact of the demographic characteristics of the director on the companys financial performance. The demographic characteristics used are age of the director, proportion of female directors, educational background of directors, and tenure of directors. This research begins with data collection. Collected data is in the form of secondary data obtained by downloading from the IDX, the downloaded data is the annual report of manufacturing companies 2017-2019 period. After that, the data were analyzed using multiple linear regression. Age of directors, proportion of female directors, educational background of directors, and tenure of directors were measured using proportions. The companys financial performance is measured using return on assets.
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Taleska, Ana. "Activist Hedge Funds and Board Representation: A Comparative Analysis of the European and American Fiduciary Duties in the Context of Activist-Nominated Directors". European Company Law 18, Issue 3 (1.06.2021): 84–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/eucl2021011.
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Recently, a new breed of representative director has featured European and American corporate boards: activist-nominated directors. Activistnominated directors are sponsored by hedge funds in course of an activist campaign targeting a listed corporation in a bid to amplify hedge funds’ direct influence in board deliberations. Constituency directors are deeply rooted in (Continental) European corporate governance and activist-nominated directors may find that the decision-making processes and deliberations of multi-stakeholder (two-tier) boards are markedly different from majority-independent (unitary) boards, commonly featured at British and American firms. This dynamic in the (Continental) European corporate governance may significantly curtail activist directors’ influence in gaining support for their demands that are at odds with the interests of other (board-represented) stakeholder interests at (Continental) European firms. activist-nominated director, constituency director, nominee director, representative director
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Rahman, Rashidah Abdul, i Siti Noor Hayati Mohamad Zawawi. "Is there a relationship between directors remuneration and firm performance?" Corporate Board role duties and composition 1, nr 2 (2005): 39–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv1i2art3.
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The primary objective of the study is to determine whether there is a positive relationship between directors’ fees with the size of the firm and performance, based on the annual report of 246 listed firms. The results indicate a weak positive relationship between directors’ remuneration, corporate size (total assets) and corporate performance (operating cash flow on asset). The weak positive relationship between director fees and performance indicates that other factors, such as the director’s yearly performance, may also account for the determination of the director’s remuneration. The findings support the notion of agency theory and corporate governance that remunerating the top management should be based on individual and corporate performance. In contrast, other performance variables such as return on assets (ROA) and earning per share (EPS) measured indicates no statistical association.
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Jin, Youfang, Lishi Huang i Hanxuan Hu. "Research on the Compensation Incentive System of Independent Directors in Chinese Listed Companies". BCP Business & Management 38 (2.03.2023): 135–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v38i.3680.
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The independent director system is one of the important components of modern corporate governance. The huge liability of independent directors in the Kangmei Pharmaceutical case in 2021 has once again become a hot topic of discussion. In the exploration of the causes of the failure of the independent director system, the motivation of independent directors to perform their duties and their incentives are also worth considering. Based on the relevant theories of independent director incentives, this paper conducts a comparative analysis of the incentive models of independent directors in China and other countries and concludes that the legislative level of incentives for independent directors in China is relatively low, and the remuneration forms, standards, and payment subjects are unreasonable and lack implementation. In addition, the establishment of independent directors’ associations and the gradual construction of independent directors’ reputation incentives were proposed.
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Berthelot, Sylvie, i Michel Coulmont. "Director elections: An analysis of shareholder response to directors’ reputation and expertise". Corporate Ownership and Control 18, nr 1, Special Issue (2020): 346–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv18i1siart9.
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The purpose of this study is to determine whether shareholders take directors’ independence, gender, expertise, and reputation into account when voting in directors’ elections. To this end, we regressed several explanatory variables representing these characteristics on the percentage of “in favour” votes cast during annual elections in 2017 for each director, based on a sample of 60 Canadian firms. Among these explanatory variables, we used two measures of their reputation, one measure of their level of education, several measures of their area of expertise, and one measure of their independence. Their reputation was assessed based on their inclusion in the Canadian Who’s Who directory and their membership on another board of directors of a Canadian public company. The other explanatory variables were collected from official company documents, especially the proxy circulars available on the Canadian Securities Administrators website. The accounting and financial variables were drawn from the Research Insights database. The results of the regression analysis indicate that although shareholders do not seem to consider directors’ reputation and expertise when casting their vote, they do take their independence and gender into account
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Gallo, Miguel Angel. "Family Business Governance and Outside Directors—Expectations from an Independent Director". European Journal of Family Business 13, nr 1 (29.06.2023): 126–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.24310/ejfbejfb.vi.15377.
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Based on the author's own experience as an external and independent director of several boards of directors of family-owned companies, the objective of this paper is to show the responsibilities that these directors must assume and how they should preserve their qualities as "external" and "independent" directors. In this way, it is expected that this commentary can help to shape the procedure of incorporation and evaluation of external and independent directors.
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Refakar, Mohammad, i Ming-Ming Lai. "An investigation of board directors’ absence and its determinants in the Malaysian stock market". Corporate Ownership and Control 8, nr 2 (2011): 259–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i2c2p3.
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This paper examines the relation between directors’ absence in board meetings as an indicator of directors’ busyness with possible determinants of director absence on the constituent companies of FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI index from 2005 to 2008. This study has found board size as the strongest determinant of directors’ absence. As the size grows, there is higher probability of directors to be absent from board meetings. This study found a board size of 9 and less as an optimum board size. We also found that the more independent directors on the board, the less absence they made. The results showed that the number of multiple directorships a director holds, number of annual meetings, age, and ethnicity of the director are not significant determinants.
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Witono, Banu, Widowati Dian Permatasari i Dewita Puspawati. "Accounting Conservatism: Gender Diversity Accounting Conservatism: Gender Diversity and Educational Background on the Board of and Educational Background on the Board of Directors and Commissioner". Riset Akuntansi dan Keuangan Indonesia 8, nr 1 (26.05.2023): 72–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.23917/reaksi.v8i1.22641.
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This research aimed to analyze the effect of the board director’s characteristics and the board of commissioners toward accounting conservatism. The characteristics analyzed in this research were size, gender, and educational background that affect their behavior in dealing with issues related to accounting principles. This research will be conducted by analyzing all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2017-2019 using SPSS. Data was analyzed as 112 data using multiple regression analysis. The results show that both size of directors and commissioner’s and women of board director and commissioners affect the accounting conservatism. However, the educational background of board directors and commissioners does not affect accounting conservatism.
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Arora, Punit. "Financially Linked Independent Directors and Bankruptcy Reemergence: The Role of Director Effort". Journal of Management 44, nr 7 (9.05.2016): 2665–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206316648384.
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This study examines if the effort of financially linked independent (FLI) directors enable firms to reemerge from bankruptcy, a major organizational crisis. Using a sample of 307 bankrupt U.S. firms with instrumental variables regression methodology, I find that the efforts of these directors are critical for firm reemergence. FLI directors’ efforts increase the likelihood of reemergence as well as improve access to financial resources. In contrast, I do not find any evidence that non-FLI directors’ efforts are associated with reemergence. I also find that resourceful but uninvolved directors are not helpful for firms trying to navigate their way out of bankruptcy. My study highlights (a) the changing nature of roles played by directors in various lifecycle stages, (b) the greater importance of resource provisioning over monitoring during reemergence, and (c) that efforts of FLI directors, and not others director categories, matter for reemergence. Overall, my study extends research that suggests directors’ motivation may cause differential firm outcomes and provides evidence that directors do not always put in their best effort on behalf of their firms. This, I suggest, has profound implications for corporate governance research and practice.
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Norby, Suzanne M., Larry P. Karniski, Darren W. Schmidt i Donald E. Kohan. "Mentoring for Subspecialty Training Program Directors: An Unrecognized, Unmet Need?" Journal of Graduate Medical Education 2, nr 2 (1.06.2010): 206–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.4300/jgme-d-09-00091.1.
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Abstract Background The benefits of mentoring residents have been studied, but there is no research about mentoring new program directors. Program directors' responsibilities have become increasingly complicated, and they may not be adequately prepared for their role at the time of appointment without the benefit of mentoring that is specific to their new role. Objective To assess whether nephrology subspecialty program directors were specifically mentored and whether they felt prepared for the educational and administrative aspects of this role. Methods We conducted an electronic needs assessment survey of the nephrology subspecialty program directors through the American Society of Nephrology listserv for program directors. Results The survey response rate was 42% (58 of 139). Of the respondents, 58% did not feel adequately prepared when they first became subspecialty program directors, and only 32% reported having formal or informal mentoring for the role. Individuals who had served as associate program directors (34%) were more likely to report mentoring than those who had not (P = .02). Eighty percent of respondents reported that mentoring from another nephrology program director would have been beneficial during their first several years. Conclusions This appears to be the first study specifically evaluating mentoring experiences relevant to the role of nephrology program director. As a result of this survey, the American Society of Nephrology Training Program Director Executive Committee recognized the need to provide opportunities for mentoring new nephrology program directors and formed a New Training Program Director Training and Mentoring Work Group to recommend initiatives for mentoring and training new program directors. Further investigation is needed to assess whether mentoring benefits subspecialty program directors and whether these findings can be generalized to other specialties and subspecialties.
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Bhuiyan, Md Borhan Uddin. "Do problem directors affect firm operating performance?" Asian Review of Accounting 23, nr 2 (17.07.2015): 170–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ara-12-2013-0078.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the consequences of having problem directors on the board with respect to operating performance. Problem directors are directors who have a past history of managerial integrity weakness. Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses three measures of operating performance to investigate the impact of problem directors and applies regression analysis to data from S & P 500 companies from 2004 to 2009. Findings – The author found evidence for the problem that director affiliated firms have more board and independent members. The CEO dual firm has a comparatively higher number of problem directors on the board. Firm operating performance is reduced when a board is served by a problem director. The results are consistent for a number of sensitivity tests. Practical implications – Results provide evidence that firms have negative performance consequences when monitored by a director with a lack of managerial integrity. The practical implication of this study is that corporate boards should appoint directors who have a clean professional background so that more vigilant monitoring by directors can be ensured. Originality/value – This study goes beyond the traditional focus on corporate governance and firm performance. The author uses problem directors as an indicator of governance quality to measure firm performance. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper is the first to investigate the consequences of firms holding problem directors on the board. This issue has implications for investors, auditors, directors and regulators.
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Boumosleh, Anwar. "Firm Investment Decisions, Dividend Policy, And Director Stock Options". Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 28, nr 4 (28.06.2012): 753. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v28i4.7058.
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Since risk plays a role in setting dividend policy and granting stock options to directors, the paper investigates the effect of director compensation structure on the riskiness of the firms investment strategy by examining the firms dividend payout policy. The results imply that stock options to outside directors increase the firms appetite for risk and suggest that director stock options constitute a major incentive to changing corporate policies. The results also indicate that director stock options align the risk preferences of managers and directors. Finally, the results suggest that stock options do not motivate directors to act opportunistically in setting investment and payout policies.
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Coulson-Thomas, C. "Directors and IT, and IT directors". European Journal of Information Systems 1, nr 1 (styczeń 1991): 45–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ejis.1991.6.
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Popova, Oksana. "Stage design of the modern Ukrainian director theater". Almanac "Culture and Contemporaneity", nr 1 (31.08.2021): 127–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.32461/2226-0285.1.2021.238604.
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The purpose of the article is to identify and analyze the leading directions in the development of stage design in modern domestic director's theater, as well as to explore the problem of director's search in stage design. Methodology. A systematic method was applied, aimed at theoretical and artistic, and practical comprehension of the main aspects of the process of solving a stage work in the complex of organizing stage action and stage space; the method of artistic-critical analysis in the process of studying the modern theatrical repertoire, made it possible to study the stage design of the domestic director's theater in the variety of its forms; the typological method, helped to systematize traditional and innovative approaches to the development and implementation of stage design, as well as to determine its features in modern Ukrainian theater; the method of figurative and stylistic analysis, thanks to which the specifics of the stage design of modern productions of Ukrainian theater directors have been identified and analyzed; the hermeneutic method helped to identify and interpret the meanings laid down by the director in the rhythm-chronotopic configuration of the stage design. Scientific novelty. The directing-staging and scenographic activity of the leading Ukrainian directors (B. Polishchuk, D. Kostyuminsky, S. Masloboyshchikova) has been investigated, the variable variety of approaches to solving stage design in modern Ukrainian drama theater has been revealed and their influence on the artistic structure of the performance has been characterized; the specifics of the design solution for a modern theatrical performance by Ukrainian stage designers, as well as production directors, have been determined. Сonclusions. The transformations of the functions and vocabulary of stage design in Ukrainian directing theater XXI century are directly related to changes in the visual aesthetics of modern theatrical art, the problems of interpretation of the literary source, and its stage embodiment. Taking over the functions of a theatrical artist, stage directors strive to create a unique author's environment for a dramatic situation, visualizing a literary text in the space-time continuum of presentation in accordance with the individual definition of the meaning of the production, in an effort to accurately illuminate their own concept. But in the production, carried out by theatrical artists, the dominant position is occupied by the image - the performance is a series of visual images, and visual symbols exert an emotional impact on the viewer, which is usually stronger than a dramatic text and acting.
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McCabe, Margaret, i Margaret Nowak. "The independent director on the board of company directors". Managerial Auditing Journal 23, nr 6 (27.06.2008): 545–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/02686900810882101.
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Shen, Xuemin Sherman, i Khaled Letaief. "The IEEE Board of Directors and Division III Director". IEEE Communications Magazine 61, nr 4 (kwiecień 2023): 4–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mcom.2023.10106166.
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