Gotowe bibliografie tematyczne / Deterrence

Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Deterrence”

Autor: Grafiati
Data publikacji: 4 czerwca 2021
Data aktualizacji: 10 marca 2023

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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat "Deterrence"

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Vuori, Juha A. "Deterring Things with Words: Deterrence as a Speech Act1". New Perspectives 24, nr 2 (wrzesień 2016): 23–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2336825x1602400203.

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As Cold War historians and fans of the film Doctor Strangelove know, deterrence can be a tricky business. The complexity of deterrence and the lack of attention that has been paid to its social effects have too often left one of its forms – nuclear deterrence – depoliticized, uncontested, and thus a danger to us all. I argue in this article that speech act theory can provide insights into deterrence and its concomitant political effects. It can be used to philosophically explain the communicative difficulties involved in deterrent relationships, and to form a basis for a critical stance on deterrence as politics. This entails a shift of focus from deterrence as a state of mind to the politics of deterrence and the deontic powers it wields – a shift from the causative aspects of deterrence to the deontology of deterrents. The analysis of such political functions is aided by the neologism of deterrentification, which refers to assertive and declarative acts that alter the status functions of things so that they are thought to act as deterrents and bring about determent in someone or something. It also aids in conceptualizing how the status of deterrents can be cancelled, and how nuclear weapons can be drawn away from the exceptional sphere of deterrence and back into the sphere of politics. Such a status transformation is required to achieve a sustained nuclear disarmament.
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Elhag, E. A., A. H. El Nadi i A. A. Zaitoon. "Ovipositional Deterrence of Methanolic and Etherial Extracts of Five Plants to the Cowpea Bruchid, Callosobruchus maculatus (F.) (Coleoptera: Bruchidae)". Journal of Agricultural and Marine Sciences [JAMS] 4, nr 2 (1.06.1999): 27. http://dx.doi.org/10.24200/jams.vol4iss2pp27-33.

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Methanol and diethyl ether extracts of Harmal, Rhazya stricta Decne.; neem seed kernels, Azadirachta indica A.Juss; cloves, Syzygeum aromarticum (L.); citrus peel and Ramram, Heliotropium bacciferum (Forssk-) were evaluated for their deterrence to oviposition by Callosobruchus maculatus (F.) on chickpeas in choice tests. Both extracts of all materials significantly reduced oviposition on treated seeds. Maximum deterrent effects (91.8%) were obtained in the neem seed methanol extract at 0.5% concentration, citrus peel O. l% ether extract (90.9%), R stricta 0.5% methanol extract (83.9%), and clove 0. 1% ether extract (80.0%). Methanol extracts of neem seeds and R. stricta evoked higher deterrent effects than their etherial extracts, whereas the responses for cloves and citrus peel were more pronounced in their ether extracts. H. bacirferum % deterrency due to both types of extracts were practically identical. The results encourage future incorporation of such plant extracts as ovipositional deterrents in stored-product lPM programmes.
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Kajla, Mayur K., Gregory A. Barrett-Wilt i Susan M. Paskewitz. "Bacteria: A novel source for potent mosquito feeding-deterrents". Science Advances 5, nr 1 (styczeń 2019): eaau6141. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aau6141.

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Antibiotic and insecticidal bioactivities of the extracellular secondary metabolites produced by entomopathogenic bacteria belonging to genusXenorhabdushave been identified; however, their novel applications such as mosquito feeding-deterrence have not been reported. Here, we show that a mixture of compounds isolated fromXenorhabdus budapestensisin vitro cultures exhibits potent feeding-deterrent activity against three deadly mosquito vectors:Aedes aegypti,Anopheles gambiae, andCulex pipiens. We demonstrate that the deterrent active fraction isolated from replicate bacterial cultures is highly enriched in two compounds consistent with the previously described fabclavines, strongly suggesting that these are the molecular species responsible for feeding-deterrence. The mosquito feeding-deterrent activity in the putative fabclavine-rich fraction is comparable to or better than that ofN,N-diethyl-3-methylbenzamide (also known as DEET) or picaridin in side-by-side assays. These findings lay the groundwork for research into biologically derived, peptide-based, low–molecular weight compounds isolated from bacteria for exploitation as mosquito repellents and feeding-deterrents.
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Turunen, Maija, i Martti Kari. "Cumulative Cyber Deterrence". International Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security 17, nr 1 (2.03.2022): 433–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.34190/iccws.17.1.55.

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The cumulative cyber deterrence can be seen as a concept in which increasing the weight of different means and their use increases the deterrent effect on a common level or on selected adversaries. Cumulative cyber deterrence may include all traditional options of deterrence, and can be active or passive. Active deterrence can be characterized as targeting specific threats and actors, as a deterrent consisting of several different methods, while passive deterrence is a form of deterrence commonly targeted at all the potential adversaries. The cumulative cyber deterrence can be an independent type of deterrence or part of a state’s overall deterrence. This paper approaches the concept of cumulative cyber deterrence from a military perspective. The purpose is to determine what factors can be formed by cumulative cyber deterrence. It describes how cumulative deterrence will change and be affected and what problems can be associated with that concept. The aim is to find answers to these questions by looking at the way how Israel and Russia use cumulative cyber deterrence as part of their overall deterrence. In its theoretical context, this paper is based on the theory of the character of war. Through the theory of character of war and utilizing the concept of reflexive control, an attempt is made to explain the position of cumulative cyber deterrence as part of overall deterrence. Integrative literature analysis has been used as the research method. The key conclusion of the paper is that creating a credible cyber deterrent is an affect and cost-effective way to increase overall deterrence. However, this presupposes that the state also has offensive cyber methods at its disposal and is able to credibly communicate their existence and the will to use them if necessary. The concept of cumulative cyber deterrence depends on the other means of deterrence available to the state. Both Israel and Russia have all these qualities. A key difference in the deterrence strategies of these states is that Israel uses cumulative methods to make it clear where the red lines are, while Russia’s strategic goal is to blur them
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Guo, Zhenhua, i John C. Snyder. "MITE DETERRENCE OF TOMATO GENOTYPES IS CLOSELY RELATED TO LEAF SURFACE CHEMISTRY". HortScience 27, nr 6 (czerwiec 1992): 646a—646. http://dx.doi.org/10.21273/hortsci.27.6.646a.

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Choice and non-choice bioassays were used to examine deterrence in vitro and in vivo of Tetranychus urticae Koch. In vivo deterrence of leaflets from 11 Lycopersicon hirsutum accessions as well as the tomato cultivar `Ace 55' was measured as was in vitro deterrence of their leaf hexane extracts. Leaf surface chemistry was examined by gas chromatography. All 6 accessions of L. hirsutum f. hirsutum contained sesquiterpene hydrocarbons. Each of these extracts also contained one or a few late eluting components. All were deterrent in vitro and 5 out of the 6 were deterrent in vivo. The one lacking in vivo deterrence had low density of type IV trichomes. All 5 accessions of L. hirsutum f. glabratum contained methyl ketones. These accessions were less deterrent in vitro and 4 out of the 5, less deterrent in vivo. The one accession having high in vivo deterrence also had high density of type IV trichomes. `Ace 55', having few hexane extractable compounds was neither deterrent in vitro nor in vivo. Within an accession, secretions from different types of trichomes shared similar chemical profiles and were similar to leaf profiles.
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Hirtenlehner, Helmut, i Per-Olof H. Wikström. "Experience or deterrence? Revisiting an old but neglected issue". European Journal of Criminology 14, nr 4 (12.10.2016): 485–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1477370816671750.

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Deterrence theory states that fear of sanctions secures compliance with the law. Empirical research on the deterrent effect of legal sanctions has remained inconclusive though. This applies especially to perceptual deterrence studies. Most of them are cross-sectional in nature and rely on measures of self-reported previous offending, which implies that they actually explain past criminal behaviour from current perceptions of risk. However, such a temporal ordering of the concepts is more congruent with experiential effects according to which previous criminal involvement lowers subsequent risk perceptions rather than depicting deterrent relationships. The few longitudinal studies that have attempted to disentangle experiential and deterrent effects are based on samples from North America. Their common finding is that experiential effects exist and that they are substantially larger than the deterrent effect. Most of them reject the notion of deterrence. This work contributes to the discussion by for the first time addressing the experience–deterrence issue with panel data collected in the UK. Results show that associations between current risk estimates and prior offending found in cross-sectional studies reflect chiefly experiential effects. Evidence in support of deterrence remains very limited.
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Park, MiRang. "A preliminary Study on the 1:1 Electronic Supervision System and Crime Deterrence of Sex Offenders". Korean Association of Public Safety and Criminal Justice 31, nr 3 (30.09.2022): 147–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.21181/kjpc.2022.31.3.147.

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The main purpose of this study is to examine the deterrence of punishment of the 1:1 electronic supervision system. The study was conducted on all subjects of 1:1 electronic supervision, and with the cooperation of the Ministry of Justice, 20 subjects were interviewed and 21 subjects were surveyed. The deterrence of punishment perceived by the subjects of 1:1 electronic supervision was queried and investigated by dividing it into celerity, certainty, and severity. In terms of deterrence of punishment, the 1:1 electronic supervision system did not prove the special deterrece effect. However, it was proved that the deterrence of certainty is greater and clearer for the majority of sex offenders than severity or celerity. In addition, in terms of the celerity of punishment, the concern of the 1:1 electronic supervision was evident. In fact, it was recognized that the selection criteria that reflected the dynamic factor on the evaluation of the corrective effect and risk of the subject were necessary because the period of occurrence of the crime and the period of selecting the subject for 1:1 electronic supervision was too long. Although the system was started with great concerns, it was possible to partially confirm the effect of intensive probation that prioritizes human-centered and individual treatment within those concerns. In addition, it was confirmed that the unfairness of law enforcement or distrust toward the criminal justice system felt by the subjects weakened the net function of punishment. It could be confirmed once again that trust toward the criminal justice system takes precedence in order to expect the deterrent effect of punishment for special deterrence.
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Banasik, Mirosław. "Znaczenie odstraszania strategicznego dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego". Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 12, nr 1 (24.09.2021): 165–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.6467.

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The aim of the article was to clarify the essence of the strategic deterrence and to characterize the deterrent mechanisms used to shape international security. The article explains the nature of the deterrent and mechanisms to guarantee international security. It presents the genesis of deterrence and characterizes its evolution. It also indicates the need for changes in the theory and practice of deterrence. As a result of the studies, it has been established that, nowadays, thanks to the complementary use of hard and soft power, strategic deterrence has a multi-faceted character and its importance for international relations is increasing. It is closely linked to diplomacy and constitutes a mechanism, by means of which the foreign political interests of states are realized and the international security order is shaped.
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Dorrian, Jillian, i Kevin Purse. "Deterrence and Enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety Law". International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 27, Issue 1 (1.03.2011): 23–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/ijcl2011003.

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Deterrence is a central consideration in the regulation of occupational health and safety (OHS) and has been the focus of increased empirical attention by regulators and researchers in recent decades. This article provides an evaluation of quantitative and qualitative studies that have sought to determine the deterrent effect of OHS enforcement on employer behaviour. The main findings are that enforcement does result in deterrence where sanctions are involved but not in the manner presumed by traditional deterrence theory, that the certainty of enforcement appears to be the most important component of deterrence, and that specific deterrence is greater than general deterrence. It is also apparent that there are many gaps in the understanding of the role played by enforcement in promoting compliance with OHS obligations and in reducing work-related injury. Apart from their implications for enforcement activity, these findings highlight the necessity for a fundamental re-conceptualization of deterrence theory.
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Talbot, Brent. "Getting Deterrence Right: The Case for Stratified Deterrence". Journal of Strategic Security 13, nr 1 (kwiecień 2020): 26–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.1.1748.

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The potential for hostilities in the 21st Century is not likely to be deterred by a Cold War deterrence strategy. And while nuclear deterrence remains important, regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and accompanying long-range delivery capabilities are a rising concern. New technological breakthroughs in the space, cyber, and unforeseen realms could also provide asymmetric means of undermining deterrence. Moreover, the effort to achieve strategic stability in this day and age has become increasingly complicated in light of the changing relationship among the great powers. Today’s world has become one of “security trilemmas.” Actions one state takes to defend against another can, in-turn, make a third state feel insecure. There is great need for both nuclear diversity (theater and low-yield weapons) and increased conventional capabilities in the U.S. deterrent force to provide strategic stability in the decades ahead. In sum, we need a deterrence construct that both deters nuclear use by the great powers and terminates nuclear use by both regional powers and so called rogue states initiating nuclear wars on neighbors. I propose herein a policy of stratified deterrence which addresses deterrence needs at each potential level of conflict.
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Rozprawy doktorskie na temat "Deterrence"

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Baade, Hans Petter. "Acquiring Deterrence : Defence Procurements’ Role in Deterrence". Thesis, Försvarshögskolan, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-7457.

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A major Norwegian defence procurement project takes decades from project initiation to the desired military capability is delivered and has reached full operational capability. The Norwegian Armed Forces’ primary mission is to maintain a credible deterrence and prevent armed conflicts arising, meaning that the capability acquired through military procurement projects must play into future general deterrence. Do Norway’s strategic military capability procurement projects contribute to a credible and capable deterrence? The purpose of this study is to gain a deeper understanding of the deterrence potential of two chosen Norwegian military procurement projects of strategic importance. The capabilities studied are the acquisition of the US fifth generation fighter, F-35 Lightning II and the 212CD submarine to be designed and built by Germany. The two projects have a combined estimated investment cost of 113 billion NOK. Deterrence is a large area in social science and the discipline of War Studies. This study applies a deterrence theory lens, primarily based on the conclusion in Zagare’s and Kilgour’s perfect deterrence theory regarding the importance of capable and credible threats, operationalised through Dalsjö’s five dimensions of threshold defence. The analysis identifies a clear credibility issue with one of the projects and the paradox that cost saving decisions intended to ensure operational availability and increase credibility also make the capability more vulnerable and less credible due to lack of redundancy.
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Rekasius, Mindaugas. "Unconventional deterrence strategy". Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2005. http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/hyperion/05Jun%5FRekasius.pdf.

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Kolliniatis, Vasilios A. "On entry deterrence". Thesis, University of Essex, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.302813.

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Hemmer, Patrick T. "DETERRENCE AND CYBER-WEAPONS". Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/32836.

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
Rapid technological advancements and societal inclusion of these technologies have expanded civil and defense capabilities but have also created significant vulnerabilities. Cyber-weapons have the potential to affect interaction between states by exploiting this vulnerability. To better understand the mechanics of how cyber-weapons affect state relations this research applies a common framework to explore the attributes of traditional weaponsconventional, nuclear, and RMAand how they typically influence this behavior. After proposing selected factors that influence the effectiveness of a cyber-attack, the research examines the cyber-attacks in 2007 on Estonia and 2008 on Georgia in order to refine and provide nuanced analysis on the role of the proposed causal factors. The proposed factors are government involvement, level of attack sophistication, and the degree to which the state is dependent upon digitally connected technology. The research indicates that the role of the state is one of the most significant factors in influencing the effectiveness of a cyber-attack and highlights the role that plausible deniability plays in this relationship. Some initial policy recommendations are made based on the finding that the use of cyber-weapons as a deterrent is still ill-defined and that the focus should be on decreasing state vulnerability to these attacks.
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Park, Jusik. "Rationality in nuclear deterrence /". The Ohio State University, 1991. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu148775905515793.

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Moore, Ryan J. "Prospects for cyber deterrence". Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Naval Postgraduate School, 2008. http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Dec/08Dec%5FMoore.pdf.

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Thesis (M.S. in Information Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2008.
Thesis Advisor(s): Arquilla, John J. ; Denning, Dorothy E. "December 2008." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 29, 2009. Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-83). Also available in print.
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Rasmussen, David C. "Credible nuclear deterrence for Japan". Thesis, Monterey, Calif. : Springfield, Va. : Naval Postgraduate School ; Available from National Technical Information Service, 2000. http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA378257.

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Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, March 2000.
Thesis advisor(s): Wirtz, James J. ; Olsen, Edward A. "March 2000." Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-80). Also available in print.
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KODERA, Toshiki. "Software Compatibility Alters Entry Deterrence". 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2237/8596.

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Stephenson, John D. "Countering terrorism engagement, development, deterrence". Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5019.

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The war on terrorism has not reduced the threat from terrorism. Terrorism as a tactic cannot be defeated. States policies cannot rely on force alone in an attempt to defeat the use of a tactic. States need to use more effective counterterrorism policy options than coercion and force to deter groups from using terrorism. Groups choose to use terrorism as a tactic as a means to bring attention to be engaged and their grievances addressed. Engaging groups that use terrorism to address and resolve their grievances can prevent the cycle of violence of a terrorism campaign and delegitimize their use of force to resolve grievances. Economic development of developing nations can produce strong institutions necessary for minority groups to resolve grievances and build internally balanced market economies in developing nations that allow them to fully participate in economic globalization and reap the security benefits of globalization.
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Kolbas, Patrick Joseph. "Beyond Armageddon : deterrence with less". Thesis, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 1991. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/28016.

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This thesis examines the implications for nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union brought about by the dramatic changes in the strategic environment during the 1980s. Specifically, it examines the potential for a new criteria of deterrence at significantly lower levels of strategic weapons. The analysis indicates that a targeting strategy which emphasizes economic and industrial facilities will deter the Soviet Union. This targeting strategy allows for a reduction to 1500 strategic weapons while maintaining the robustness of nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union. Using as its criteria arms race stability, breakout stability, crisis stability, verification, predictability, consequences of war, and the security of friends and allies, this thesis concludes that a force structure comprised of the Trident D-5 Submarine-launched ballistic missile and the B-2 bomber best ensures deterrence both against the Soviet Union and any other nuclear power regardless of changes in their political or ideological orientation. To provide maximum flexibility while negotiating the agreement and to hedge against a breakdown in U.S/Soviet relations prior to implementation, the thesis recommends a modernization program for U.S. strategic forces including funding for the restructured Strategic Defense Initiative which is now named Global Protection Against Limited Strikes. *Nuclear Deterrence, limited Nuclear Options, *Arms Control, Strategic Nuclear Weapons, START
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Książki na temat "Deterrence"

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Lowther, Adam B., red. Deterrence. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137289810.

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Filippidou, Anastasia, red. Deterrence. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3.

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Adhikari, Shekhar. Deterrence. Allahabad: Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Allahabad, 2002.

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Ramsbotham, Oliver, i Hugh Miall. Beyond Deterrence. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-21720-5.

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Ware, Roger. Entry deterrence. Kingston, Ont: Institute for Economic Research, Queen's University, 1991.

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George, Levinger, red. Beyond deterrence. New York: Plenum, 1987.

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Ware, Roger. Entry deterrence. Kingston, Ont: Institute for Economic Research, Queen's University, 1991.

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Quackenbush, Stephen L. Understanding General Deterrence. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230370791.

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Bobbitt, Philip. Democracy and Deterrence. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18991-5.

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1944-, Stern Paul C., National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Contributions of Behavioral and Social Science to the Prevention of Nuclear War. i National Research Council (U.S.). Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education., red. Perspectives on deterrence. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

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Części książek na temat "Deterrence"

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Loughran, Thomas A., Ray Paternoster i Douglas B. Weiss. "Deterrence". W The Handbook of Criminological Theory, 50–74. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781118512449.ch4.

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Ritchie, Nick. "Deterrence". W A Nuclear Weapons-Free World?, 51–73. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137284099_5.

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Canton, Rob. "Deterrence". W Why Punish?, 83–101. London: Macmillan Education UK, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-44904-7_5.

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Apel, Robert, i Daniel S. Nagin. "Deterrence". W Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 998–1005. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-5690-2_606.

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Filippidou, Anastasia. "Deterrence: Concepts and Approaches for Current and Emerging Threats". W Deterrence, 1–18. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_1.

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Anastasopoulos, Charis. "Linking the Deterrence Concept to Migration". W Deterrence, 157–76. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_10.

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Kennedy, Greg. "Anglo-American Strategic Relations, Economic Warfare and the Deterrence of Japan, 1937–1942: Success or Failure?" W Deterrence, 177–91. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_11.

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Wilkinson, Edith. "Resilience and Deterrence: Exploring Correspondence Between the Concepts". W Deterrence, 19–33. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_2.

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Ashraf, Afzal. "Deterrence and Diplomacy". W Deterrence, 35–56. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_3.

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Steff, Reuben. "Nuclear Deterrence in a New Age of Disruptive Technologies and Great Power Competition". W Deterrence, 57–75. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29367-3_4.

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Streszczenia konferencji na temat "Deterrence"

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Libicki, Martin C. "Obnoxious Deterrence". W 2022 14th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Keep Moving! (CyCon). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/cycon55549.2022.9811024.

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Brantly, Aaron F. "The cyber deterrence problem". W 2018 10th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/cycon.2018.8405009.

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Jaeki Lee. "Union competition and entry deterrence". W 2007 International Forum on Strategic Technology. IEEE, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ifost.2007.4798581.

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Dobson, Andrew, EJ Milner-Gulland, Colin Beale, Harriet Ibbett i Aidan Keane. "Detecting deterrence from patrol data". W 5th European Congress of Conservation Biology. Jyväskylä: Jyvaskyla University Open Science Centre, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.17011/conference/eccb2018/107778.

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Fuller, G. H. "Tactical Deterrence - "Why" - "How" - "What"". W Warship 90 - The Future for Surface Warships. RINA, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.3940/rina.warship.1990.22.

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Atkinson, Simon Reay, David Walker, Kevin Beaulne i Liaquat Hossain. "Cyber -- Transparencies, Assurance and Deterrence". W 2012 International Conference on Cyber Security (CyberSecurity). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cybersecurity.2012.22.

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Soper, Braden C. "A Cyber-Nuclear Deterrence Game". W 2019 57th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/allerton.2019.8919910.

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Reddie, Andrew. "Tracing House: Wargaming Cyber Deterrence." W Proposed for presentation at the 89th MORS Symposium held June 21-25, 2021. US DOE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1871419.

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Feigenbaum, Joan, James A. Hendler, Aaron D. Jaggard, Daniel J. Weitzner i Rebecca N. Wright. "Accountability and deterrence in online life". W the 3rd International Web Science Conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2527031.2527043.

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Wanic, Elizabeth, i Neil Rowe. "Assessing Deterrence Optinos for Cyber Weapons". W 2018 International Conference on Computational Science and Computational Intelligence (CSCI). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/csci46756.2018.00011.

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Raporty organizacyjne na temat "Deterrence"

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Harbaugh, William, Naci Mocan i Michael Visser. Theft and Deterrence. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, maj 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w17059.

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Martz, Joseph. Capability Based Deterrence. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), listopad 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1716770.

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Jacobson, E. Towards Integrated Strategic Deterrence - 3rd Annual Cross-Domain Deterrence Seminar, 2016. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), kwiecień 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1635782.

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Goychayev, Rustam, Geoffrey A. Carr, Rachel A. Weise, David A. Donnelly, Samuel L. Clements, Jacob M. Benz, Kabrena E. Rodda, Rachel A. Bartholomew, Archibald D. McKinnon i Richard B. Andres. Cyber Deterrence and Stability. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), wrzesień 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1405058.

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Valle Jr, Vicente. Chaos, Complexity and Deterrence. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, kwiecień 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada432927.

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Sinnis, Constantine, Mark Benjamin Chadwick, Kimberly Carole New Scott i Stephen Val Milton. LANSCE 21st Century Deterrence. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), kwiecień 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1608676.

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Otterson, Kirk Grant. Nuclear Weapons Deterrence Concepts. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), styczeń 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1615645.

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Scarlett, Harry Alan. Nuclear Weapon Deterrence Principles. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), lipiec 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/1638615.

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Hayes, Richard E., i Gary Wheatley. Information Warfare and Deterrence. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, październik 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada385748.

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Erickson, S. A. Jr. A theory of deterrence. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), marzec 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/10127443.

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